RECONSTRUCTING IRAQ: INSIGHTS,

CHALLENGES, AND MISSIONS FOR MILITARY

FORCES IN A POST-CONFLICT SCENARIO

Conrad C. Crane

W. Andrew Terrill

February 2003
ACKNOWLEDGEMENTS

Dr. Conrad Crane was in charge of an Army War College faculty

team that included Dr. W. Andrew Terrill, Colonel George Oliver,

Colonel Stephen Kidder, Colonel Tom McShane, LTC Mike Esper, and

Professor William Kiehl. Colonel Robert McClure of DCS, G-3

coordinated support from the Army Staff. Interim reports were

prepared and presented to a joint and interagency workshop conducted

by Dr. Crane and Dr. Terrill in December. Outside attendees were from

the Department of Defense, the State Department, the Joint Staff, the

Army Staff, National Defense University, Joint Forces Command,

AUSA/RAMP, and SAIC. Especially notable were contributions from

Dr. John Finney, RADM(ret) John Siglar, Colonel Paul Hughes, Colonel

(retired) Scott Feil, Mr. Joseph (Barry) Hughes, LTC Guy Sands-Pingot,

and Ms. Sarah E. Peter.

NOTICES

The views expressed in this report are those of the authors and do

not necessarily reflect the official policy or position of the Department of

the Army, the Department of Defense, or the U.S. Government. This

report is cleared for public release; distribution is unlimited.

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FAX (717) 245-3820, or be e-mail at Rita.Rummel@carlisle.army.mil

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ISBN 1-58487-112-1

ii
FOREWORD

During World War II, the U.S. military’s extensive

planning for the occupation of Germany was a major factor

in achieving long-term strategic objectives after the war

was won. More recent examples of military operations also

emphasize the challenges of post-conflict operations and the

criticality of detailed planning and preparation. As the

possibility of war with Iraq looms on the horizon, it is

important to look beyond the conflict to the challenges of

occupying the country.

In October 2002, the U.S. Army War College’s Strategic

Studies Institute, in coordination with the Office of the

Army Deputy Chief of Staff/G-3, initiated a study to analyze

how American and coalition forces can best address the

requirements that will necessarily follow operational

victory in a war with Iraq. The objectives of the project were

to determine and analyze probable missions for military

forces in a post-Saddam Iraq; examine associated

challenges; and formulate strategic recommendations for

transferring responsibilities to coalition partners or civilian

organizations, mitigating local animosity, and facilitating

overall mission accomplishment in the war against

terrorism.

The Strategic Studies Institute organized an

interdisciplinary team under the leadership of Dr. Conrad

C. Crane and Dr. W. Andrew Terrill. The team’s initial

findings were vetted at a joint and interagency workshop

conducted in December. The final report of the project

consists of three parts: a discussion of historical insights

from 20th century postwar occupations and post-conflict

operations; an analysis of the unique challenges Iraq will

present for an occupying power; and a mission matrix that

lists 135 specific tasks that must be performed to build and

sustain a state. The matrix arrays those tasks across four

phases of occupation and designates whether coalition

iii
military forces or civilian agencies should perform them.

The study has much to offer planners and executors of

operations to occupy and reconstruct Iraq, but also has

many insights that will apply to achieving strategic

objectives in any conflict after hostilities are concluded.

In recent decades, U.S. civilian and military leadership

have shied away from nation-building. However, the

current war against terrorism has highlighted the danger

posed by failed and struggling states. If this nation and its

coalition partners decide to undertake the mission to

remove Saddam Hussein, they will also have to be prepared

to dedicate considerable time, manpower, and money to the

effort to reconstruct Iraq after the fighting is over.

Otherwise, the success of military operations will be

ephemeral, and the problems they were designed to

eliminate could return or be replaced by new and more

virulent difficulties.

DOUGLAS C. LOVELACE, JR.

Director

Strategic Studies Institute

iv
SUMMARY

During the latter half of the 20th century, U.S. military

leaders and planners focused heavily on winning wars, and

not so much on the peacekeeping or nation-building that

comes afterwards. But national objectives can often be

accomplished only after the fighting has ceased. With the

winds of war swirling around Iraq, it is time to begin

planning for the post-conflict reconstruction of that state.

This monograph presents some historical insights from past

occupations and peace operations, provides some additional

analysis of the unique requirements involved in remaking

Iraq, and, most importantly, develops a detailed list of

potential tasks to help contemporary military commanders

plan for post-conflict operations there.

Most analysts and commentators focus on World War II

for insights about occupying states and replacing regimes.

Clearly, the American experience with occupations after

major wars provides valuable insights about the importance

of long and detailed planning for such missions, and about

just how difficult demilitarization and democratization can

be, even under the best of conditions. The world has changed

a great deal since 1945, however. The experiences of the

1990s are generally more relevant to shape post-conflict

operations in Iraq. They reveal past inadequacies in Army

planning and preparation, and the difficulties in finding

competent and resourced civilian agencies to assume

responsibilities from the military. Recent experiences also

show that even when the Army plans and performs well in a

post-crisis environment, as it did in Haiti, strategic success

is not guaranteed. That state quickly reverted back to chaos

when military forces left.

Iraq presents far from ideal conditions for achieving

strategic goals. Saddam Hussein is the culmination of a

violent political culture that is rooted in a tortured history.

Ethnic, tribal, and religious schisms could produce civil war

v
or fracture the state after Saddam is deposed. The Iraqi

Army may be useful as a symbol of national unity, but it will

take extensive reeducation and reorganization to operate in

a more democratic state. Years of sanctions have debilitated

the economy and created a society dependent on the UN Oil

for Food Program. Rebuilding Iraq will require a

considerable commitment of American resources, but the

longer U.S. presence is maintained, the more likely violent

resistance will develop.

The monograph concludes by developing and describing

a phased array of tasks that must be accomplished to create

and sustain a viable state. The 135 tasks are organized into

21 categories, and rated as “essential,” “critical,” or

“important” for the commander of coalition military forces.

They are then projected across four phases of transition—

Security, Stabilize, Build Institutions, and Handover/

Redeploy—to reflect which governmental, nongovernmental, and international organizations will be involved in

execution during each phase. To reduce the amount of

resentment about the occupation in Iraq and the

surrounding region, it is essential that military forces

handover responsibilities to civilian agencies as soon as

practicable. They, in turn, should relinquish control fairly

quickly to the Iraqis, though not until well-defined coalition

measures of effectiveness have been achieved for each task.

The U.S. Army has been organized and trained

primarily to fight and win the nation’s major wars.

Nonetheless, the Service must prepare for victory in peace

as well.

vi
RECONSTRUCTING IRAQ: CHALLENGES AND

MISSIONS FOR MILITARY FORCES IN A

POST-CONFLICT SCENARIO

INTRODUCTION

By the time Germany surrendered in May 1945, detailed

Allied planning for the occupation of that nation had been

ongoing for 2 years. All staff sections at Supreme

1

CONCLUSIONS:

To be successful, an occupation such as that contemplated after any hostilities in Iraq requires much detailed

interagency planning, many forces, multi-year military

commitment, and a national commitment to nationbuilding.

Recent American experiences with post-conflict

operations have generally featured poor planning,

problems with relevant military force structure, and

difficulties with a handover from military to civilian

responsibility.

To conduct their share of the essential tasks that must

be accomplished to reconstruct an Iraqi state, military

forces will be severely taxed in military police, civil

affairs, engineer, and transportation units, in addition to

possible severe security difficulties.

The administration of an Iraqi occupation will be

complicated by deep religious, ethnic, and tribal

differences which dominate Iraqi society.

U.S. forces may have to manage and adjudicate

conflicts among Iraqis that they can barely comprehend.

An exit strategy will require the establishment of

political stability, which will be difficult to achieve given

Iraq’s fragmented population, weak political institutions, and propensity for rule by violence.
Headquarters Allied Expeditionary Forces and Army Group

headquarters invested considerable resources in developing

what became Operation ECLIPSE. The plan correctly

predicted most of the tasks required of the units occupying

the defeated country. Within 3 months, those formations

had disarmed and demobilized German armed forces, cared

for and repatriated four million POWs and refugees,

restored basic services to many devastated cities,

discovered and quashed a potential revolt, created working

local governments, and reestablished police and the courts.1

In contrast, LTG John Yeosock, commander of Third

Army in Operation DESERT STORM, could get no useful

staff support to assess and plan for post-conflict issues like

hospital beds, prisoners, and refugees, complaining later

that he was handed a “dripping bag of manure” that no one

else wanted to deal with.2 Neither the Army nor the

Department of Defense (DoD) had an adequate plan for

postwar operations to rebuild Kuwait, and civilian agencies

were even more unprepared. The situation was only

salvaged by the adept improvisations of Army engineers

and civil affairs personnel, and the dedicated efforts of

Kuwaiti volunteers and the Saudi Arabian government.3

Some of the deficiencies in postwar planning for

DESERT STORM can be attributed to the fact that Third

Army was the first American field army in combat since the

Korean War. Post- conflict planning historically has been a

function of headquarters at echelons above corps, and

continuing problems with more recent operations are at

least partly attributable to the generally small scale of

American interventions. Difficulties also result from the

fact that for at least the latter half of the 20th century, U.S.

Army leaders and planners focused predominantly on

winning wars, not on the peacekeeping or nation-building

that comes afterwards. But national objectives can often be

accomplished only after the fighting has ceased; a war

tactically and operationally “won” can still lead to strategic

“loss” if post-conflict operations are poorly planned or

executed.

2
With the winds of war swirling around Iraq, it is already

past time to begin planning for the post-conflict

reconstruction of that state. Many historical insights can be

gained from past occupations and peace operations. With

some additional analysis of the unique requirements

involved in remaking Iraq, a list of potential tasks can be

developed to help contemporary military commanders

envision what they need to do in order to achieve the

effectiveness of Operation ECLIPSE if a lengthy occupation

of Iraq is required.

PART I: HISTORICAL OVERVIEW OF AMERICAN

OCCUPATIONS

The American army of occupation lacked both training and

organization to guide the destinies of the nearly one million

civilians whom the fortunes of war had placed under its

temporary sovereignty.

COL Irwin L. Hunt, 19204

Recent history provides a number of useful examples to

illustrate the missions and challenges involved in

post-conflict operations. Though recent cases have more

often involved restoring regimes than changing them, many

valuable insights still can be gained from careful analysis.

Panama. Operations in Panama leading to the

overthrow of the Noriega regime have been touted as a

model use of quick and decisive American military force,5

but post-conflict activities did not go as smoothly. The crisis

period was exceptionally long, beginning with public

revelations about General Manuel Noriega’s nefarious

activities in June 1987 and culminating with the execution

of Operation JUST CAUSE in December 1989. Planning for

military intervention began as early as February 1988.6

When Noriega annulled the election of May 1989, sent his

paramilitary thugs to assault opposition candidates, and

increased his harassment of Americans, the United States

executed Operation NIMROD DANCER. This show of force,

3
executed by U.S. Southern Command, was designed to show

further American resolve, in the hope that it would pressure

Noriega to modify his behavior. When there was no obvious

modification, the President directed the execution of

Operation JUST CAUSE. A textbook example of the quality

of the new armed forces and doctrine developed in the

United States, it encompassed the simultaneous assault of

27 targets at night.7

Due to a focus on conducting a decisive operation and not

the complete campaign, the aftermath of this smaller scale

contingency (SSC) did not go as smoothly, however.

Planning for the post-conflict phase, Operation PROMOTE

LIBERTY, was far from complete when the short period of

hostilities began. Missions and responsibilities were vague,

and planners failed to appreciate adequately the effects of

combat operations and overthrowing the regime.8 Though

guidance from SOUTHCOM on post-hostility missions was

fairly clear, tactically oriented planners at the 18th

Airborne Corps (in charge of the joint task force carrying out

the operation) gave post-conflict tasks short shrift. For

instance, the plan assigned the lone MP battalion the

responsibility for running a detention facility, conducting

security for all of the numerous convoys, and providing

security for many key facilities, as well as for being prepared

to restore law and order.9 Though the battalion was mainly

concerned with a relatively small geographic portion of the

country, it was quickly overwhelmed by its responsibilities.

With the elimination of the Panamanian Defense Force,

the task of restoring law and order became particularly

demanding, as looting and vandalism spread throughout

the country. Chaos reigned as American forces scrambled to

restore some semblance of order.10 Military policemen

trained in law and order missions did not perform well in

unfamiliar combat operations, and were inadequate in

numbers to deal with the problems they faced in the

aftermath.11 They also could not handle all displaced

personnel and the enemy prisoners of war for which they

were now responsible. Similarly, there were not enough civil

4
affairs personnel or engineers for the rebuilding effort.

Personnel deficiencies were exacerbated by slow and

disorganized Reserve call-ups relying on volunteers.

Political-military interagency cooperation was also poor, as

many agencies were excluded from DoD planning and the

embassy was severely understaffed.12

Senior commanders admitted afterwards that they had

done poorly in planning for post-conflict operations and

hoped the Army would remedy that situation in the future.13

Despite these deficiencies, the U.S. Military Support Group,

activated in January 1990 to support the growth of

independent Panamanian institutions, was able to be

deactivated just 1 year later in a much more stable country;

though whether it or Panamanian leaders deserved most

credit for this success was unclear to observers.14

Haiti. Like Panama, this was another SSC in response to

a long-festering crisis. It began with the military overthrow

of President Jean-Bertrande Aristide by Lieutenant

General Raoul Cedras in September 1991. On April 1, 1993,

the JCS sent the first alert order to CINCUSACOM to begin

planning for contingency operations in Haiti. Planning for

active intervention intensified in October of that year after

armed protesters in Port Au Prince turned away a ship

loaded with UN peacekeepers. During the next year,

international pressure on the military leaders of Haiti

increased, and was intensified even further by obvious

American preparations for an invasion. The decision of the

Haitian government in September 1994 to return President

Aristide to power was to a large extent taken because they

knew Army helicopters and 10th Mountain Division

soldiers aboard the USS Eisenhower, along with elements of

the 82nd Airborne Division deployed from Fort Bragg, were

heading for Haiti.15 In fact, General Cedras did not begin to

negotiate seriously with the American diplomatic

delegation until he had confirmed that the 82d Airborne

contingent was in the air. The overwhelming force deployed

in the initial occupation and the soldiers’ professional and

disciplined conduct and appearance in continuing

5
operations did much to deter and control the actions of

potential troublemakers.16

The long lead-time between the beginning of the crisis

and actual military intervention, combined with lessons

learned from operations like those in Panama and Somalia,

greatly facilitated planning for Operation UPHOLD

DEMOCRACY.17 USACOM prepared operational plans for

both forced and unopposed entry, while the DoD conducted

extensive interagency coordination.18 Its Haiti Planning

Group, with the assistance of other government agencies,

prepared a detailed “Interagency Checklist for Restoration

of Essential Services.” The lead agency for all major

functional areas was the U.S. Agency for International

Development (USAID), with DoD support (mostly from

Army units) in reestablishing public administration,

conducting elections, restoring information services,

assisting the Department of Justice with setting up and

training a police force, planning disaster preparedness and

response, running airports, and caring for refugees.

Military units did have primary responsibility for security

measures, such as explosive ordnance disposal (EOD),

protecting foreign residents, and demobilizing paramilitary

groups. These were mostly Army functions, and the service

provided 96 percent of deployed military forces.19

These plans and their execution were affected by the

desire of military leaders to avoid getting involved with

“nation-building” missions such as those that had led to so

much grief in Somalia. Army lawyers wrestled with

interpreting humanitarian requests for reconstruction to

classify them as related to the mission or as nation-building.

Those requests that fell into the former category were

approved, while those interpreted as nation-building were

denied.20 Medical units were told to focus on supporting the

Joint Task Force (JTF) and not humanitarian assistance, as

leaders were concerned about not replacing the medical

facilities of the host nation.21 This reluctance to embrace

peacekeeping or nation-building had its most regrettable

result on September 20, 1994, when restrictive rules of

6
engagement prohibited American forces from intervening

as Haitian police killed two demonstrators. The next day,

American officials expanded the rules of engagement to

allow more military involvement in restoring and

maintaining law and order.22

Similar expansion of Army roles and missions happened

in most other areas of the restoration efforts.23 The

attorneys eventually rationalized that any action that made

Americans look good lessened security risks and could

therefore be approved as mission-related.24 Other

governmental agencies were slow to arrive or build up

resources, so the military picked up the slack. Generally,

the other departments had not done the detailed planning

that DoD had, and often wanted more support than DoD

had expected to provide.25 A typical example was when the

Ambassador to Haiti asked for military advisers to help new

government ministries get established until efforts from

USAID and the State Department could begin to bear fruit.

The result was the hasty deployment of a ministerial

advisor team from the 358th Civil Affairs (CA) Brigade, “the

first large scale implementation of a civil administration

effort since World War II.”26 The scope and pace of CA

missions increased so rapidly that they threatened to get

out of control, and raised fears that such actions would only

heighten Haitian expectations that U.S. forces could fix all

the nation’s problems, and thus set the people up for great

disappointment later.27

These expanded missions caused many other problems,

to some extent because CA units are relatively small

organically, and require considerable support from other

organizations. Engineer planning, equipment, and

personnel were inadequate for their required civil affairs

and reconstruction projects. Soldiers had to develop new

policies and procedures to help set up internal security

forces and expend funds. This often required “working

around” Title 10, U.S. Code, restrictions. They assumed

expanded roles in maintaining law and order, including

manning and operating detention facilities and developing

7
new crowd control techniques. Items like latrines and police

uniforms were in short supply. Doctrine and personnel were

not available to establish proper liaison with the myriad

civilian organizations working in the country. Intelligence

assets were severely taxed, and the force in Haiti had to rely

heavily on theater and national intelligence assets to make

up for deficiencies.28

However, the military in general, and the Army in

particular, has received much praise for its performance in

Haiti. Nonetheless, since the last American troops left the

island in April 1996, the situation there has deteriorated to

conditions approaching those early in the 1990s. Without

long-term military involvement, most U.S. policy goals have

been frustrated. The civilian agencies that replaced

military forces have not had the same resources available,

and persistent flaws in the Haitian economy, judicial

system, and political leadership have obstructed reform.

American officials have decried the results of recent

elections, and admitted the failure of their policies. Even the

Secretary General of the UN recommended against

renewing the mission there.29 Between 1992 and 1995, the

United States spent over 1.6 billion dollars for operations in

Haiti. Over $950 million of that was expended through DoD,

and mostly for Army operations, to include the

administration of large refugee camps.30 One key lesson

from that frustrating experience is that the redeployment of

military forces should be predicated on the achievement of

designated measures of effectiveness, and not based on time

limits. Another is that follow-on civilian agencies must be

capable of maintaining those standards as well as achieving

new ones.

The Balkans. The U.S. Army has picked up its usual

predominant load of post-conflict tasks requiring several

thousand troops in Bosnia and Kosovo, and seems resigned

to a long-term commitment in the region. Rotational

schedules have been prepared through 2005, and there have

been discussions in Washington about establishing a

“permanent presence” there.31

8
Current American operations in the Balkans again

reveal how force and mission requirements change during

the post-conflict phase. Eighteen months after the signing

of the agreement between NATO and the Yugoslav Army

over Kosovo, U.S. Army troops there were still engaged in

“peacekeeping with an iron fist.” They were primarily

focused on establishing a safe and secure environment

under the rule of law, with patrols backed by armored

vehicles and detention centers to control troublemakers.

The UN-NATO justice system has been heavily criticized,

and a Judge Advocate General Legal Assessment Team

found the UN mission in Kosovo so severely short of

facilities and personnel to establish the rule of law that it

recommended teams of 15 Army lawyers be rotated through

the country to reinforce the UN effort. Additionally, the

resentment of impatient Kosovars has grown against a UN

presence that seems to be making little progress toward a

transition to local control.32

Efforts in Bosnia are more advanced, and the

environment more secure and peaceful. Deployed Army

task forces have become lighter with every rotation, and

have moved from immediate security concerns towards

enhancing long-term stability. By late 1997 it became

apparent to the Stabilization Force (SFOR) that a large

disparity existed between the ability of military forces to

achieve their initially assigned tasks of the General

Framework Agreement for Peace (GFAP) and that of their

less-capable civilian counterparts to meet their own

implementation requirements. SFOR realized it could not

disengage with such a large “GFAP Gap” remaining, and

expanded its mission to “assist international organizations

to set the conditions for civilian implementation of the

GFAP in order to transition the area of operations to a stable

environment.” U.S. military leaders on the scene recognized

they were moving into the area of nation-building, but saw

no alternative if SFOR was ever going to be able to withdraw

or significantly reduce its commitment without risking the

peace.33

9
As the nature of the stability operations and support

operations in Bosnia evolved, so did the requirements of the

peacekeeping force. It needed fewer combat troops and more

engineers, military police, and civil affairs personnel.

Intelligence requirements changed and expanded.

After-action reports highlighted many shortfalls in the

Balkans force structure and peacekeeping policies, many of

them common to previous SSCs. Army lawyers again proved

adept at “thinking outside traditional fiscal rules and

applications” to support operational requirements.34 The

roles of military policemen expanded to include performing

as maneuver battalion task forces and working with

international law enforcement agencies.35 Difficulties with

tactical MPs trying to perform law and order missions

reappeared.36

There were problems again with shortages and recall

procedures for Reserve Components engineer, military

intelligence, and civil affairs augmentation.37 The massive

engineering requirements for Operations JOINT

ENDEAVOR and JOINT GUARD especially highlighted

branch deficiencies with command and control,

construction unit allocations, and bridging.38 A split-based

logistics system trying to meet requirements in the Balkans

and back in the Central Region of Europe required

considerable augmentation, but still strained combat

support and combat service support assets considerably.39

Liaison officers were in great demand, not just as Joint

Commission Observers with the Entity Armed Forces, but

also to coordinate with the myriad non-governmental

organizations and other civilian agencies.40 There were

shortages of linguists throughout the theater, which

especially exacerbated problems with intelligence. Military

intelligence doctrine was completely inadequate for

supporting peace operations, and understaffed intelligence

units had to adapt as best they could for the complex

“multi-service, multi-agency, and multi-national” situation

further complicated by a host of treaty requirements.41

10
A Defense Science Board study concluded that Balkan

operations revealed many shortcomings in psychological

operations, as well, especially in planning and resources to

support engagement and post-conflict activities for all the

geographic combatant commanders.42 Even with all these

problems, Army units in Bosnia have continued to compile a

superlative record of accomplishments. However, the

“GFAP Gap” remains, with recurring UN problems

coordinating and directing civilian agencies. Recent

elections were dominated by continuing political

divisiveness, reflecting the limited progress in changing

people’s attitudes.43 However, while American military

leaders have complained about the troops remaining in the

Balkans, the fact that decisions about their redeployment

have been based on achieving measures of effectiveness and

not on reaching a time limit has at least insured stability in

the region.

Insights from Major Wars.

The world has changed a great deal since the massive

occupation efforts that followed World War II, and the

experiences of the 1990s are generally more relevant in

shaping possible post-conflict operations in Iraq. However,

a number of important guidelines can be obtained from

analyzing major American wars of the 20th century.

The Philippines. In the aftermath of the SpanishAmerican War, the United States began a long occupation of

the Philippine Islands that officially ended with their

independence in 1946. This lengthy transition to selfgovernment is not typical of American experiences with

occupation, and the most useful insights are to be gleaned

from the early years, when American forces were trying to

subdue resistance and establish control in the former

Spanish colony.

One aspect of post-conflict operations that becomes very

clear from the Philippines example is that they are

misnamed. To be successful, they need to begin before the

11
shooting stops. “Transition Operations” is probably a better

term, and they will be conducted simultaneously with

combat. Appropriate planning must be completed before the

conflict begins, so military forces are prepared to begin

immediately accomplishing transition tasks in newlycontrolled areas. All soldiers will need to accept duties that

are typically considered in the purview of CA detachments.

There will not be enough CA troops to go around, and

immediate needs will have to be met by whomever is on the

scene. Even in the midst of combat, leaders and their

soldiers must keep in mind the long-term goals of peace and

stability, and conduct themselves accordingly.44

In the Philippines, both military and civilian officials

recognized that the best agent for local pacification was the

military leader on the spot. Considerable decentralization

was required for a situation where village attitudes and

characteristics varied widely. Officers had great discretion

and were not closely supervised, though they also had clear

directives from higher headquarters providing guidelines.

The requirement for local familiarity meant that soldiers

could not be rotated quickly. In village societies personal

relationships are important, and take considerable time

and effort to establish. The Army had to accept some decline

in the combat efficiency of its units in order to keep them in

lengthy occupation duties. Troops had to be aware of the

cultures they were in, and not try to force American values.

Knowledge of the Koran and local customs were important

for everyone. Even John J. Pershing could spend hours

talking to local imams about religion. This does not lessen

the requirement to achieve the right balance of force and

restraint, but the long-term consequences must be

considered for every action. General Leonard Wood’s

predilection for punitive forays in response to even minor

incidents like theft did cow many Moro chiefs, but he also

undermined many alliances and relationships painstakingly established by local commanders. Instead of

quieting small disturbances, Wood’s expeditions often

created larger problems by driving pacified or neutral

12
villages into joining more rebellious ones, and made it more

difficult for his subordinates to gain local trust.45

Germany. The United States has been involved in the

occupation of Germany twice in the past century. At the

conclusion of World War I, 200,000 American troops moved

to positions around Coblenz, preparing for the possibility

that the Germans would not sign the peace treaty. When

they agreed to the Versailles Treaty in the summer of 1919,

the occupation force rapidly diminished, numbering only

16,000 a year later. By the end of 1922 that figure was down

to 1200, and all left the next year.46 Though the bulk of

responsibility for the details of the occupation and regime

change fell on other Allied governments, occupying

American troops did find themselves in charge of a million

civilians. The U.S. Army and government had not really

accepted the administration of civil government in occupied

enemy territory as a legitimate military function after the

Mexican War, Civil War, or Spanish-American War, and the

officer in charge of civil affairs for the U.S. military

government in the Rhineland after World War I lamented

that the American army of occupation “lacked both training

and organization” to perform its duties.47

As World War II approached, Army War College

committees went back to the World War I reports and

developed formal doctrine for military government. In the

spring of 1942, a School of Military Government was

established at the University of Virginia, and thinking

began there about postwar reconstructions of Germany,

Japan, and Italy.48 This new emphasis produced Operation

ECLIPSE and the impressive success described previously.

Despite the many differences between Iraq and Germany,

valuable insights can still be gained from that occupation

experience, the most important of which is the value of a

long detailed planning process far in advance of the start of

occupation.

Before any Allied armies entered Germany, planners

designated specific military governance units to follow

13
combat forces closely. The first civil affairs detachment in

the country set itself up in Roetgen on September 15, 1944,

only 4 days after U.S. troops entered Germany. Once the

Third Reich surrendered, small mobile detachments were

sent out immediately to every town in the U.S. occupation

zone. Typically, unit commanders confronted mayors with a

number of demands: a list of local soldiers and party

members; the turn-in of all military and civilian firearms;

and housing for American troops. In addition, detachment

leaders imposed curfews after dark and immobilized the

population. They also had the authority to replace

uncooperative mayors.49

The regime in Germany was changed from the bottom

up. Local elections and councils were allowed to function,

and responsibility was shifted to local authorities as quickly

as possible. State governments were next in priority, and

only after they were working effectively were national

elections considered. At the same time, political life was

strictly controlled to prevent any resurgence of radicalism,

although public opinion polls were conducted on an almost

weekly basis to monitor what the German people thought

about occupation policies. The German legal profession was

totally corrupted by the Nazis, and each occupying ally took

a slightly different approach in reestablishing courts. The

British used a lot of old Nazi lawyers and judges, while the

Americans tried to reform the whole system, a slow process.

The best solution was probably the one the Soviets applied,

where they found educated and politically loyal people and

gave them 6 weeks of legal training. Their system built

around these “lay judges” got criminal and civil court

systems working very quickly.50

One of the most vexing problems for occupation

authorities was how to dismantle the Nazi Party and its

security apparatus while retaining the skills of some

members who performed important functions. This was

accomplished by having every adult German fill out a

detailed questionnaire about their associations. There were

heavy penalties for lying or failing to answer questions. A

14
board of anti-Nazi Germans reviewed the Fragebogen

(German for “questionnaire”) and determined which people

had held leadership positions and deserved to have their

political and economic activities curtailed for the

occupation. By the time they were allowed to regain their

rights, democratic Germans were so solidly established that

a Nazi revival was impossible. A similar approach might

work to demobilize and reintegrate members of the Baath

Party and security forces in Iraq.51

Japan. The occupation force for Japan, a country slightly

smaller than Iraq, included almost 23 divisions amounting

to more than 500,000 soldiers in 1945. Most ground forces

were American, though allies were used in some sensitive

areas, such as British and Australian units in Hiroshima.52

While there had been ongoing interdepartmental deliberations in Washington about occupying Japan since the

aftermath of Pearl Harbor, the actual planning in the

Pacific for Operation BLACKLIST did not begin until May

1945.53 Within 2 years, most Japanese soldiers had been

disarmed and repatriated (except from Soviet-controlled

areas), a “purge” list of persons restricted from political

activity had been completed, basic services were restored,

police reform programs were implemented, the economy

was restarted, land reform was begun, and the nation

adopted a new democratic constitution that renounced war

as an instrument of national policy.54

In October 2002, reports emerged that the Bush

administration was looking at the Japanese occupation as a

model for achieving democratization and demilitarization

in Iraq. Since then, the administration appears to have

withdrawn from that position, and many experts have

highlighted the important differences between the

scenarios. The Japanese surrendered unconditionally after

total defeat, and the whole world acknowledged the legality

and necessity of Allied occupation. Millions were dead, cities

were in ashes, and the populace was destitute and cowed.

Their more homogeneous culture did not feature the ethnic,

tribal, and religious divisions so evident in Iraq, and the

15
Japanese were conditioned to obey the command of the

emperor to accept defeat and submit to their conquerors.

They also had some experience with limited democracy,

though it may be argued that Iraq had some similar

experiences during their earlier history this past century.

An additional major difference is that Iraq is much richer in

natural resources than Japan, providing another set of

opportunities for occupying powers.55 However, Operation

BLACKLIST does provide useful insights about purging

undesirable political elements, and on how to design the

insertion of military forces into a situation where the

possibility of armed resistance remains ambiguous.

Similarities exist between the way Americans viewed the

Japanese in 1945 and the way they perceive Iraq today, as a

totally foreign and non-Western culture.56

These factors will be discussed in more detail in the rest

of this monograph. While the success of Douglas

MacArthur’s experience illustrates the benefits of having

strong centralized leadership of the occupation force, he also

had the advantage of years of relative quiet to carry out his

programs. Policymakers and most of the rest of the world

were more concerned with developments in Europe. That

will not be the case with post-conflict Iraq in the midst of

Middle East tumult. All American activities will be watched

closely by the international community, and internal and

external pressure to end any occupation will build quickly.

John Dower, who has written the seminal work on the

American occupation of Japan, argues strongly that it does

not provide a useful model for Iraq, with the important

caveat that it should give a clear warning to current

policymakers, “Even under circumstances that turned out

to be favorable, demilitarization and democratization were

awesome challenges.”57

Applying Historical Insights to Iraq.

While none of the historical cases described above

provide an ideal model for reconstructing Iraq, some

16
insights should be applied there. Detailed long-term

interagency planning for occupation is important, and can

considerably smooth transition. MacArthur’s staff managed

to develop Operation BLACKLIST in just over 3 months,

but analysis for such a course had been going on for years

back in the United States, it required little interagency

coordination, and the Far East Command staff made many

adjustments on the fly during the early years of occupation.

The ideal approach is exemplified by the interagency

planning for Haiti, which produced a detailed list of

post-crisis tasks and responsibilities well in advance of any

possible combat. That operation eventually failed, however,

because civilian agencies proved incapable of completing

the mission once military forces left, due to inadequate

resources or inflated expectations. In Iraq it will also be

important to lessen military involvement as expeditiously

as possible, so interagency planners must be sure that

governmental, non-governmental, and international

civilian organizations are ready to perform assigned tasks

when required. This handover problem is discussed in

greater detail in Part III of this monograph. The primary

problem at the core of American deficiencies in post-conflict

capabilities, resources, and commitment is a national

aversion to nation-building, which was strengthened by

failure in Vietnam. U.S. leaders need to accept this mission

as an essential part of national security and better tailor

and fund the military services and civilian governmental

organizations to accomplish it.

There are other implications of past experience for a

contemporary occupation of Iraq. The German and

Japanese examples furnish some possible alternatives for

purging the Baath Party and security forces of potentially

disruptive elements while maintaining the services of some

indigenous expertise. Since a new Iraqi regime is best

constructed from the bottom up, similar evaluations will

have to be conducted for local mayors and administrators.

The more an occupation can rely on dependable Iraqis, the

better. American occupation forces will have to nurture

17
such essential relationships, which can take much time and

effort to establish and maintain in a society like Iraq’s.

Units and their leaders cannot be rotated out after short

tours, which will strain force structure and possibly degrade

combat readiness. The nation and the Army must be

prepared to commit considerable time, manpower, and

money to make an occupation of Iraq successful in the long

term.

PART II: CHALLENGES OF A MILITARY

OCCUPATION OF IRAQ

Iraq has always been a border state between civilizations and a

place where empires collided and armies clashed. Violence has

become ingrained in the Iraqi character.

Mohamed Heikal58

The attack against Iraq that U.S. leaders are

considering seeks to eliminate the Saddam Hussein regime

and replace it with a government with respect for human

rights as well as an interest in democracy and economic

reform. To implement this change and control postwar

chaos, U.S. and allied forces will be required to occupy Iraq

for an extended period of time following Saddam’s defeat.

The exact circumstances and special challenges of an

occupation cannot be predicted with certainty, although an

assessment of the general types of problems inherent in

such a situation is possible.

If the war is rapid with few civilian casualties, the

occupation will probably be characterized by an initial

honeymoon period during which the United States will reap

the benefits of ridding the population of a brutal dictator.

Nevertheless, most Iraqis and most other Arabs will

probably assume that the United States intervened in Iraq

for its own reasons and not to liberate the population.

Long-term gratitude is unlikely and suspicion of U.S.

motives will increase as the occupation continues. A force

initially viewed as liberators can rapidly be relegated to the

18
status of invaders should an unwelcome occupation

continue for a prolonged time.59 Occupation problems may

be especially acute if the United States must implement the

bulk of the occupation itself rather than turn these duties

over to a postwar international force. Regionally, the

occupation will be viewed with great skepticism, which may

only be overcome by the population’s rapid progress toward

a secure and prosperous way of life.

A U.S. military occupation of Iraq will involve a number

of special challenges and problems that relate directly to

Iraqi political culture and wider regional sensitivities about

the military domination of an Arab Muslim country by a

Western power. Despite a relatively short experience with

French and British occupation, the Arab world today is

extraordinarily sensitive to the question of Western

domination and has painful memories of imperialism.

Many Iraqis can also be expected to fear hidden U.S.

agendas. The United States is deeply distrusted in the Arab

World because of strong ties to Israel and fears that it seeks

to dominate Arab countries to control the region’s oil. Iraqis,

even before Saddam’s rise to power, have been especially

distrustful of the West and uncompromisingly hostile to

Israel.60 Throughout any occupation, the United States

should expect to face a series of demands from the Arab

world to place pressure on Israel over Palestinian issues to

calm passions created by an occupation of Iraq.

Additionally, flare-ups in Israeli-Palestinian violence could

have a direct influence on the willingness of Iraqi citizens to

cooperate with U.S. occupation forces.

Religious factors may also become important. Muslims

have a formal religious duty not to submit to the authority of

non-Muslim rulers such as found in the Judeo/Christian

West. Such an injunction may not be taken to apply to a

temporary occupation force in Iraq and has been ignored by

large Muslim minority communities in countries such as

India and Nigeria. Nevertheless, sensitivities on this issue

will require watching in Iraq. The combination of religious

19
and Arab nationalist motives for wishing a speedy

departure to U.S. occupation troops could allow U.S. forces

to wear out their welcome even more rapidly than would be

expected in most cases of foreign soldiers reordering the

political structure of a defeated country.

The special circumstances of Iraq, therefore, need to be

examined with considerable care when deciding upon

workable policies to conduct an occupation of Iraq and to

win the support of the Iraqi population. Obstacles to such a

goal are enormous, and a successful occupation will not

occur unless the special circumstances of this unusual

country are used to inform occupation policy.

Historical Background.

Iraqi political values and institutions are rooted in a

tortured history that must be understood before it is

possible to consider the rehabilitation of Iraqi society.

Additionally, Western understanding of Iraq has not been

particularly deep, and that country is often seen as a remote

part of the Arab world. Few Westerners have spent

significant amounts of time in Iraq, and since 1990 even less

contact has existed between Americans and Iraqis.

Moreover, many Western visitors to Iraq who have traveled

throughout the Arab World consider that country to be a

culture apart, more hostile and less welcoming than other

Arab countries.61 Understanding Iraq is therefore a much

greater challenge than considering the political culture of

most other Arab nations.

While Mesopotamia has been home for a variety of

ancient and proud civilizations, Iraq itself is a relatively

new nation state. It was formed by the British out of the

former Ottoman Turkish vilayets of Baghdad, Basra, and

Mosul following World War I.62 Previously, these provinces

were directly ruled from Istanbul, often having little

interaction with each other.63 Nor were each of the vilayets

pleased to be included in the new state. The population of

the Kurdish-dominated vilayet of Mosul considered its

20
inclusion in the new state as a betrayal of great power

promises of Kurdish independence in the Treaty of Sevres.64

Leaders of the Shi’ite province of Basra rightly suspected

that their own interests would be subordinated to the less

numerous but more politically powerful Sunni Muslims in

Baghdad. Kuwaiti scholar Shafeeq Ghabra has noted that

Iraq was so fractured after the Ottoman collapse that

separate neighborhoods in the Shi’ite city of Najaf declared

independence with their own constitutions. In the northern

city of Mosul civil strife erupted between neighborhoods.65

Tensions among the Iraqi communities were therefore

severe, but were also viewed as controllable by a strong

central government supported by the British.66 The first

Iraqi government was led by the Hashemite King Faisal

who was installed by the British from the Hajaz based on his

wartime alliance with them. As an Arab nationalist leader,

Faisal had some popularity and his position as King was

confirmed by an Iraqi referendum. Nevertheless, Faisal

began his reign as a client of the United Kingdom, and

British troops helped him consolidate power and establish

authority. Such tasks were often difficult. Tribal uprisings

and isolated acts of terrorism against British troops were a

problem from early in the occupation. Moreover, Shi’ite

clerics proclaimed a jihad against British forces from the

Shi’ite holy city of Karbala in southern Iraq. The situation

stabilized in February 1921 after the British had suffered

around 2,000 casualties. Britain remained involved in Iraq

despite the bloodshed because of that country’s oil wealth.67

Iraq’s Hashemite dynasty remained in power until 1958

when it was ousted by military coup. Additionally, at this

time, Iraqi politics began to emerge as considerably bloodier

than usually seen in the rest of the Arab world. The 1958

coup that overthrew the monarchy led to a massacre in

which the young king and a number of his associates were

murdered, with hostile crowds desecrating the bodies of the

dead. Not a single military unit rose to defend the

monarchy, which in 37 years of existence made little

progress consolidating power. The instability of this period

21
can be seen in the appointment of the amazingly high figure

of 58 cabinets during the years of monarchy.68

In the 10 years between the ouster of the monarchy and

the second Baath regime, Iraq experienced instability and

violence with various contenders for power killed in coups

and coup attempts. Occasionally, the armed supporters of

various factions clashed, and in one case the paramilitary

National Guard fought against the Iraqi Army in the streets

of Baghdad. Jet aircraft armed with rockets were also used

in this encounter.69 In other instances, demonstrations by

opposition groups such as the Iraqi Communist Party were

put down with severe brutality. Moreover, massive purges

of the Armed Forces became an ongoing feature of Iraqi

politics as various strongmen attempted to consolidate

power.70 Throughout the series of new governments

following the monarchy, the Sunni Muslims remained

dominant.

Saddam Hussein emerged as a product of Iraqi politics

and not an aberration from that system. His first

well-known act of notoriety was to participate with a Baath

assassination team in an unsuccessful attempt to murder

Iraqi dictator Brigadier General Abdul Karim Qassim (who

was later killed by Baathists in a 1963 coup). Later,

Saddam, as a rising Baath party leader, continued to focus

on the importance of violence as a tool for achieving political

goals, strongly advocating the assassination of Baath

Secretary-General al-Saadi in 1963 due to al-Saadi’s wild

and irresponsible leftism, which was undermining the basis

of Baathist rule.71 Saddam’s advice was ignored in this

instance, and the Baath party fell from power, not to

reemerge until 1968. Saddam had by then totally

internalized the idea of disciplined violence to control Iraq.

Methodically building the machinery of repression, Saddam

remained Iraq’s secondary leader until 1979 when he took

full power as absolute dictator.72

While Saddam is a product of the Iraqi system, he may

also be its culmination. As one of the most repressive

22
dictators in the world, Saddam has broken the previous

Iraqi pattern of authoritarian governments that maintain

control for a handful of years before being removed from

power by coup and street violence. Saddam, by achieving a

higher level of brutality, cruelty, and repression than his

predecessors, has been able not only to seize power, but to

maintain it under exceptionally difficult conditions.

Independent centers of power have not been allowed to

develop and threaten him as they did with earlier Iraqi

leaders.

Saddam has also built one of the most impressive

personality cults in the post-Stalin era, with a system that is

currently rivaled only by that of North Korea. It is this

system that will have to be dismantled and replaced in any

post-Saddam era. While many Iraqis may currently only go

through the motions of believing the propaganda associated

with this cult of personality, nevertheless a number may be

pro-Saddam true believers. Such individuals will have no

role in the future of a reforming Iraq and vetting will be

necessary to insure that they are not retained in positions of

responsibility.

Issues of Pluralism, Stability, and Territorial

Integrity.

The establishment of democracy or even some sort of

rough pluralism in Iraq, where it has never really existed

previously, will be a staggering challenge for any occupation

force seeking to govern in a post-Saddam era. Essentially,

such a force must support changes in the fundamental

character of the Iraqi political system, where antidemocratic traditions are deeply ingrained just as they are

throughout the wider Arab World.

It is also reasonable to expect considerable resistance to

efforts at even pluralism in Iraq. Iraq’s Sunni Arabs, having

enjoyed disproportionate power under a series of regimes,

have every reason to assume that a democratic opening will

occur at their expense by allowing traditionally disen23
franchised groups to claim larger shares of power. Various

tribes will also fear the rise of rival tribes within a

government. All may fear a situation where rival groups

take a significant share of power and then refuse to yield it

under whatever constitutional processes might be put in

place.

Currently, Iraq has only one legal political party, the

Baath, and this organization is expected to have no role in a

post-Saddam government. Yet, the basis upon which new

parties will be formed is currently unclear. The most likely

development would be for parties to emerge based on ethnic,

religious, tribal, and other such factors. Thus, even under

free elections, differences within Iraqi society may be

further exacerbated. Ethnically-based political parties

generally increase divisions rather than mitigate them in

highly fractious countries. Moreover, the current Kurdish

political movements are also armed militias and thus set

the wrong kind of example for others to follow by establishing political organizations which also maintain

para-military forces.

Nor would it be easy for the United States to accept the

breakup of Iraq while it is under occupation as an

alternative to managing factional strife. The United States

has committed itself to the territorial integrity of Iraq

following Saddam’s ouster, and would face severe international problems if it allowed the dismemberment of the

Iraqi state. Future relations with Turkey and the Arab

world could be undermined severely due to strong concerns

throughout the region about Iraqi stability and territorial

integrity.

The Turks have made it clear that an independent

Kurdish state in the north is an unacceptable provocation

and have also warned Iraqi Kurds against seeking too much

autonomy within any future Iraqi federation. Turkey fears

that its population of between 12-20 million Kurds will

agitate for any type of concessions that are granted to Iraqi

Kurds. Ankara has correspondingly announced that it will

24
intervene militarily in northern Iraq if the Kurds declare

independence or if Kurdish military forces seize Kirkuk.

Kurdish spokesmen have replied that any Turkish actions

along these lines will make it easier for Iran to intervene in

Iraq as well.73

Many Arabs also view a dismemberment of Iraq as

favoring Israel by destroying a large and important Arab

state whose military potential traditionally has been of

concern to a series of Israeli governments. Occasionally,

some Israeli leaders and analysts have stated their

preference for an Iraq broken into three separate states, all

fighting each other. While such statements should be

expected from a democratic state allowing divergent

opinions, they are viewed with absolute suspicion in the

Arab world. Additionally, previous Israeli efforts to arm

and support the Kurdish guerrillas are taken at face value

as an attempt to undermine the unity of Iraq. These efforts

are now widely known and have been discussed in the

memoirs of right-wing retired Israeli General Raful Eitan.74

Should democracy or even pluralistic political stability

be established in Iraq, this would be a tremendous

achievement of which all could be proud. Nevertheless, U.S.

policymakers sometimes assume that a democratic

government will also be friendly to U.S. policies in the

Middle East. This cannot be assumed in the case of Iraq. At

the present time, the only Arab leader who has been elected

in a fair election is Palestinian President Yassir Arafat, who

is clearly not the favored U.S. choice. Likewise, in the Gulf,

Islamists have done extremely well in recent legislative

elections in Bahrain. The Kuwaiti parliament has a strong

Islamist grouping, and free elections in other states could

duplicate this situation. Free elections in the Arab world

seldom produce pro-Western governments.

Addressing the Sunni/Shi’ite Divide.

Shi’ite Muslims comprise the majority of the Iraqi

population, and a vast majority of the Arab population of

25
Iraq (since most Iraqi Kurds are Sunni Muslims). Despite

Shi’ite numerical dominance, all Iraqi governments since

the formation of the state have been Sunni-dominated. This

domination has been a source of Shi’ite resentment,

although Saddam’s regime has made strong attempts to

appear open to Shi’ite participation. This effort to showcase

Shi’ite leaders is impressive, although Saddam’s actual

power base is centered on Sunnis from his hometown of

Tikrit. A few key Sunni tribes also are part of Saddam’s

base of power, although they are less central than the

Tikritis.

Shi’ites are, nevertheless, present at all levels of the

Iraqi government, including Saddam’s inner circle and

throughout the Baath party. Some Shi’ite leaders, such as

current Speaker of the Assembly and former Prime Minister

Sadun Hammadi and senior Presidential Advisor General

Amer Al-Saadi, are among the most public faces of the

regime. While this upward mobility has helped the Shi’ite

community in Iraq, it has by no means eliminated

discrimination as a serious problem. The service of

prominent Shi’ites has, however, helped Saddam appear as

a leader of all Iraqis above the issues of faction and ethnicity

that so dominate the Iraqi mindset.

When calling upon members of the Shi’ite community to

serve in the regime, Saddam exhibits a predictable bias in

favor of well-educated secular elites. Secular regime

officials are held up as important models for emulation in

Iraq since secularism helps to lessen tensions between

Shi’ites and Sunnis. Consequently, secular Shi’ite leaders,

in some contrast to the clergy, have a more clearcut record of

collaboration with the regime. This background of

collaboration by individuals with Ph.D.s rather than

Islamic education may be held against them by ordinary

Shi’ites in a post-Saddam regime. Secular elites have been

willing to participate in the structure of repression. This is

less so with clerics.

26
Saddam traditionally has been especially distrustful of

Shi’ite religious leaders and seems to view these people as

the greatest potential subversives within the Shi’ite

community. This distrust may be a partial result of the

8-year war with Iran and the recurring Iranian calls for an

Islamic Republic in Iraq. There is also a natural tension

between the Baath regime and religious leaders since the

latter can, if not carefully managed, form an alternative

source of authority. Saddam’s distrust of Shi’ite religious

leaders has been translated into a particularly long string of

assassinations of untrustworthy clerics by the Iraqi intelligence and security services.

The Tehran-based Supreme Council for the Islamic

Revolution in Iraq (SCIRI) is Iraq’s largest Shi’ite Muslim

dissident organization. Its leader, Ayatollah Mohammad

Baqer al-Hakim, and his family have a sterling record of

opposition to the Saddam Hussein regime. Their record

includes suffering torture, imprisonment, and murder at

the hands of the security police.75 This background leaves

them untainted by the stain of collaborationism and will be

an asset in seeking a share of power in a postwar environment. Nevertheless, SCIRI will have real problems in

generating a popular following in Iraq because it is so

clearly and unequivocally a tool of Iranian foreign policy.

Most Iraqi Shi’ites have proven themselves to be unwilling

to cooperate with Tehran against their own country. They

correspondingly resent SCIRI people attempting to play a

prominent role in government. The public would probably

favor cooperation with the Iranians only in cases of extreme

need or clear political disenfranchisement by an emerging

post-Saddam government in Baghdad.

Some of this logic may change if Iraq breaks apart and

the fragments are fighting with each other. It might also be

noted that a rump Shi’ite state in the southern area of Iraq

would be a prime target for Iranian influence and

subversion if it was placed under pressure by Sunni elites

from the central portion of the country. Iran could then be

viewed as a natural ally of the former Iraqi Shi’ites, and

27
these Shi’ites would at least consider seeking Iranian

support to help counterbalance the influence of the Sunni

Arab regimes in the Gulf area. The establishment of a

pro-Iranian Shi’ite government in Iraq would also be of

concern to other Sunni-led states in the region with a

significant number of Shi’ites within their borders. Kuwait

and Saudi Arabia would be especially concerned.

Additionally, fragmentation also exists within Iraq’s

Sunni community. Some Sunni tribes have been clear and

enthusiastic supporters of the Saddam regime, whereas

others remain more clearly outside of the circles of power.

Once Saddam has been removed, the potential for tension

between pro-Saddam Sunnis and other Sunnis who were

more clearly victims of Saddam would be high.

Addressing the Kurdish and Turkoman Factors.

Iraqi Kurds have long dreamed of independence. A weak

central government in Baghdad following Saddam’s ouster

would therefore serve as an invitation for a renewed

political effort to seek broad autonomy that may serve as a

stepping stone to independence. Kurdish independence is a

special concern for Iraqi Arabs because of its financial and

defense implications. Much of Iraq’s oil is located in the

Kurdish regions of the country, and significant oil revenues

would be lost to the central government following a Kurdish

secession. Likewise, many of Iraq’s neighbors, including

Iran and Syria, as well as Turkey, fear independent or even

autonomous Iraqi Kurds who might then provide an

unwelcome model to their own Kurdish minorities.76 These

countries might also be inclined to fund and support

factions sympathetic to their interests.

Kurds comprise around 20-25 percent of the Iraqi

population. They are divided by tribe, religion (although

most Iraqi Kurds are Sunni), and two distinct languages

(Surani and Bahdinani). Iraqi Kurds also have a long

history of internecine fighting among factions, tribes, and

major political groupings. For example, in the mid-1990s,

28
thousands of Kurds were killed in fighting between the

Patriotic Union of Kurdistan (PUK) and the Kurdish

Democratic Party (KDP), with both parties seeking outside

assistance against their rival. The PUK received Iranian

assistance while the KDP turned to Saddam’s regime in

Baghdad to assist them. This KDP decision led to massive

casualties once Iraqi troops re-entered Kurdish areas.77

This phase of the conflict also underscored the level of

Kurdish disunity, whereby working with Saddam or the

Iranians was considered an acceptable part of interKurdish conflict.

Currently, Kurdish leaders are stressing reconciliation

and unity as a way of demonstrating that they can be

reliable allies with the United States in helping to shape a

post-Saddam Iraq. Nevertheless, even now, major Kurdish

groups have repeatedly been unable to present more than

cosmetic shows of unity. Kurdish inability to cooperate even

with other Kurds suggests that it is extremely doubtful that

they can work with Iraq’s other minorities to build a

functioning government, without severe and unrelenting

pressure from outside forces.

Another key Iraqi minority are the Turkomans.

Turkomans comprise a significantly smaller percentage of

the Iraqi population, although their exact numbers are

subject to considerable disagreement. Most U.S. sources

suggest they constitute between 3 and 5 percent of the Iraqi

population.78 Turkish and Turkoman scholars dispute these

figures and claim they are tainted by official Iraqi

estimates, which downplay Turkoman numbers. Turkish

scholarship suggests that around 2 million Iraqis are

Turkomans out of a population of 22 million.79 Large

numbers of Turkomans are located in some of the same

areas as the Kurds and have overlapping and conflicting

claims to various areas in northern Iraq including the key

city of Kirkuk, which is located near some of Iraq’s most

important oil fields. The Turkomans would resist any drive

for Kurdish independence, and any large-scale mistreatment of them by Kurds could provoke Turkish intervention.

29
Addressing the Tribal Factor.

The Sunni, Shi’ite, and Kurdish populations of Iraq are

further subdivided by affiliation with hundreds of tribes

scattered throughout the country. While previous Iraqi

governments have viewed tribes as suspicious alternative

sources of authority, Saddam has increasingly come to view

them as forming important fault lines upon which to

splinter and further factionalize potential sources of opposition within larger ethnic and religious communities.80

Additionally, Sunni tribes have been key recruiting grounds

for the officer corps of the Iraqi military. Thus, Saddam is

ignoring Baath ideology which proclaims tribes backward

and an obstacle to modernization, in order to use the tribal

system as a bulwark of his own power. Saddam has even

called the Baath party “the tribe encompassing all tribes.”81

Saddam’s retribalization of Iraq began in the late 1980s

and has progressed sufficiently enough to cause townsmen,

several generations removed from the countryside, to

“rediscover” their tribal identities and affiliations. Some of

these same people have sought out a tribal sheikh to ask

permission to affiliate with his tribe in cases where their

own lineage has become unclear. This is done to seek the

protection and support of the tribe and improve chances for

individual advancement.82

Tribalism also appears to have strengthened in the

Kurdish areas during Saddam Hussein’s presidency as a

result of central government policies dating back for

decades. During the Iran-Iraq War, Kurdish conscripts

were exceptionally prone to desertion at the earliest

opportunity, leading Baghdad to switch to a tribal strategy

to manage the Kurds and address the manpower drain. In a

move away from the conscription of individual Kurds, the

Iraqi government paid the leaders of Kurdish tribal militias

to perform various security duties useful to the war effort.

Tribalism was strengthened accordingly.

30
Any post-Saddam government will thus be faced with

the requirement to operate within a highly tribalized

society, even if the new government seeks to transform and

modernize such a society over the long term. Moreover, in

any post-Saddam government a new President might be

quick to turn to his own family and tribal supporters to help

remain in power. Once Saddam is ousted, the successor

government will probably seek to reestablish ties to a

myriad of tribal leaders, many of whom are now either

actually or nominally loyal to Saddam. This could be an

exceptionally difficult task.

Other Sources of Potential Iraqi Fragmentation.

Beyond ethnic, tribal, and religious cleavages, other

differences among Iraqis may also aggravate political

fragmentation. One potentially problematic difference is

between exiles and non-exiles. Iraqi citizens who have

suffered under Saddam could well resent Iraqis coming

from outside the country following a war and claiming a

disproportionate amount of power. Some returning exiles

may also be more readily viewed as the tools of foreign

powers such as the United States, Iran, and perhaps

Turkey. Some might even be seen as friends of Israel.

It is doubtful that the Iraqi population would welcome

the leadership of the various exile groups after Saddam’s

defeat. Many Iraqis are reported as hostile to the external

Iraqi opposition groups despite the fact that a post-Saddam

power struggle has yet to take place. According to former

CIA analyst Judith Yaphe, “[Iraqi exile leader Ahmad]

Chalabi and the INC [Iraqi National Congress] are known

quantities and extremely unpopular in Iraq.”83

Another potential cleavage is between civilian and

military opposition to Saddam Hussein. Some former Iraqi

officers seem like attractive alternatives to Saddam, and

various U.S. Government officials are reported in the press

as favoring the possibility of an ex-Iraqi general replacing

Saddam.84 The accession of a moderate general may

31
increase the likelihood of a stable government remaining in

power and also decrease the possibility of a civil war

erupting from postwar chaos. Such a military accession to

power will, nevertheless, be challenged by civilians seeking

a government completely free of the influence of a politicized

military. Moreover, any Iraqi officer leading a new

government will be viewed with suspicion as a potential

strongman seeking permanent power. It is highly probable

that a strong military figure would at least initially seek a

civilian front man.

A Force for Unity: Dealing with the Iraqi Military.

While a struggle for power between civilian and military

elites would contribute to Iraqi fragmentation, the military

can also serve as a unifying force under certain conditions.

In a highly diverse and fragmented society like Iraq, the

military (primarily the ground forces) is one of the few

national institutions that stresses national unity as an

important principle. Conscripts are at least publicly

encouraged to rise above parochial loyalties and may be

stationed in parts of the country far from their ethnic

kinsmen. To tear apart the Army in the war’s aftermath

could lead to the destruction of one of the only forces for

unity within the society. Breaking up large elements of the

army also raises the possibility that demobilized soldiers

could affiliate with ethnic or tribal militias.

The role of the current Iraqi military in a post-Saddam

regime is unclear. Some of the elite units with special

regime protection functions will clearly have to be

disbanded, but it is less certain what to do with the more

mainstream units. Officers in the regular army have often

resented Saddam’s interference in military activities and

been particularly angered by the actions of Baathist

political officers in their units. Moreover, regular army

units are of low priority for resupply with equipment, spare

parts, and other military provisions. Under these

circumstances, at least some underlying discontent is

32
possible, and it is conceivable that the Iraqi Army would be

willing to work with U.S. or coalition forces in a postwar

environment under the proper conditions. U.S. occupation

policy may therefore be well-served by attentiveness to the

potential willingness and capabilities of key elements of the

Iraqi military in rebuilding the country.

Sizing and Funding an Occupation Force.

Initial projections of the number of troops that may be

needed for an occupation of Iraq are somewhere around

100,000. This figure is based on studies of past U.S. military

occupations, including Germany and Japan. Testimony

before the U.S. Senate has suggested that the occupation

would need at least 75,000 troops to carry out a complex

series of postwar functions.85 Nevertheless, any projections

of actual troop numbers remain highly speculative until the

actual postwar situation becomes clear.

An occupation force would also have to be large enough

initially to discourage neighboring powers, particularly

Iran, from meddling in Iraqi affairs and carving out

informal areas of interest within Iraq. Later, U.S. troops

can be assisted in these efforts by reformed Iraqi forces.

Coalition troops of some kind may have to be placed directly

on the Iranian border to contain Iranian influence. If U.S.

forces are stationed there, such deployments would be

viewed with the utmost concern in Tehran and possibly

have an influence on the ongoing Iranian power struggle.

Conservatives in Iran would have a golden opportunity to

point at tangible examples of the U.S. threat. Reformers

may attempt to use the situation to force the government to

seek better relations with the United States, although they

would undoubtedly be accused of being tools of a foreign

power for choosing to do so.

According to the Congressional Budget Office,

maintaining a force of between 75,000 and 200,000

peacekeeping troops in Iraq would cost between $17 billion

and $46 billion per year.86 None of these occupation costs

33
should be funded by Iraqi oil revenues, which are expected

to be diverted entirely to reconstruction efforts. Any effort

to divert these funds to occupation costs would be viewed as

an effort to plunder Iraq’s economic resources. Conversely,

the use of oil revenues for improving the lives of the Iraqi

population will be one of the most important tools that the

occupation force has to contain and defeat potential

nationalistic, sectarian, and religious anger with the

occupation.

In addressing the needs of postwar Iraq, there may also

be considerable domestic pressure to limit the duration and

extent of the U.S. occupation. Large Reserve and National

Guard mobilizations and deployments may be necessary to

help staff the occupation. Regular Army units would face

the need to train their troops in a very different set of skills

required for occupation duties as opposed to warfighting. In

particular, young soldiers must be trained to interact with

large numbers of foreign civilians as something similar to a

constabulary force. They must also learn that, unlike in

warfighting, force is often the last resort of the occupation

soldier. Moreover, while troops are serving on occupation

duty, many of their warfighting skills could deteriorate,

requiring them to undergo a period of retraining when they

return to more traditional duties.87

The Potential for Terrorism against U.S.

Occupation Forces.

The longer a U.S. occupation of Iraq continues, the more

danger exists that elements of the Iraqi population will

become impatient and take violent measures to hasten the

departure of U.S. forces. At the same time, a premature

withdrawal from Iraq could lead to instability and perhaps

even civil war. By ousting the Saddam Hussein regime, the

United States will have placed itself in the position where it

will be held responsible by the world should anarchy and

civil war develop in a post-Saddam era. Having entered into

34
Iraq, the United States will find itself unable to leave

rapidly, despite the many pressures to do so.

If the campaign to eliminate Saddam is short and

involves few civilian casualties, it is likely that U.S. troops

will be greeted with enthusiasm by Iraqi citizens who have

had the burden of Saddam’s tyranny lifted from their

shoulders. Nevertheless, the United States should not

expect that occupation forces will be protected by a

bottomless well of gratitude. Most Iraqis will assume that

the United States has intervened in their country for its own

political purposes and not to liberate them from oppression,

an argument that is not terribly difficult to make. Indeed

some sources, such as the London-based Economist, suggest

that the Iraqi population already appears to distrust U.S.

motives for an invasion, assuming such an act would be

initiated primarily to help Israel’s strategic situation and to

dominate Iraqi oil.88 Major postwar improvements in the

quality of daily life of the population may soften such

concerns, but they are unlikely to eliminate them.

Although Iraq is one of the most repressive countries in

the world, it is not a disarmed society. Unlike a variety of

other dictatorships, many Iraqi citizens have access to

firearms. One of Saddam’s most common ways of rewarding

loyal tribal sheikhs is to allow them to arm their followers.

Moreover, a variety of militias in Iraq have been equipped

with weapons as part of a regime defense strategy. These

weapons can become a problem following the war.

It is likely that in a post-Saddam era both the United

States and the new Iraqi government will seek a less

militarized civil society. Disarming the population will

nevertheless be a difficult task. Arab chieftains who have

been permitted to arm their followers would view efforts to

disarm them as the actions of an enemy. Additionally, in the

aftermath of a war, many individuals may feel the need to

maintain personal weapons for self-defense in case there is

a breakdown in public order. Yet, to leave weapons in

private hands invites the possibility of terrorism. A

35
potential compromise is to allow some individual weapons

to remain in public hands, while larger crew-served

weapons are removed to government control.

In the past, Shi’ite Arabs in other countries have shown

themselves to be particularly dangerous when they turned

to terrorism, due to the special religious sanction given to

the concept of martyrdom in Shi’ite Islam. Shi’ites in

Lebanon developed and perfected the technique of suicide

car bombing which they applied to Israeli occupation forces

during the 1980s and 1990s with considerable effect. This

tactic is now popular in the Palestinian territories, but was

utilized only after careful attention to the Lebanese Shi’ite

example.

Following Saddam’s defeat, the United States will

further need to seek indigenous forces to aid in law and

order functions and help prepare for a post-occupation Iraq.

This approach is an inevitable part of rehabilitating Iraq to

govern itself without U.S. military forces. Nevertheless, by

developing local allies, the United States makes itself at

least partially responsible for the behavior of those allies.

Hence a pro-U.S. force that attacks any other Iraqi force for

private reasons threatens to involve the United States in

the complex web of sectarian, tribal, or clan warfare.

The Israeli example in Lebanon is also instructive here.

While occupying Lebanon, Israeli forces supported and

strengthened pro-Israel militias which they viewed as

useful for reducing their own manpower requirements and

casualties. Unfortunately for the Israelis, many of the

militia members brought their own political and factional

priorities to their tasks as militiamen. In one case, Druze

members of the Southern Lebanese Army (SLA) militia

randomly murdered thirteen Shi’ite villagers in response to

an ambush of their troops. While both the SLA leadership

and the Israelis denounced this crime, the tension between

Israeli occupation forces and Shi’ite Lebanese was pushed

to a new level.

36
Another danger of occupation is that terrorists might

generate strategies to alienate Iraqis who are initially

neutral toward a U.S. occupation. In Lebanon, for example,

militants would occasionally hide weapons in mosques to

tempt Israeli occupation troops into conducting searches of

these sites. The sight of a mosque being ransacked by

foreign, non-Muslim soldiers is offensive to many believers,

no matter how good the reasons for such a response might

be. As a result, the Israelis further alienated the population.

Such actions are particularly problematic when no weapons

are found. Moreover, damage created by a search remains

to be viewed by devout believers after the troops depart.

Also, any expansion of terrorism or guerrilla activity

against U.S. troops in Iraq will undoubtedly require a

forceful American response. Such U.S actions could involve

a dramatic escalation in the numbers of arrests, interrogations, and detentions of local Iraqis. While such actions do

improve security and force protection, they seldom win

friends among the local citizenry. Individuals alienated

from the U.S. occupation could well have their hostility

deepened and increased by these acts. Thus, a small number

of terrorists could reasonably choose to attack U.S. forces in

the hope that they can incite an action- reaction cycle that

will enhance their cause and increase their numbers.

Finally is the question of suicide bombers. As noted,

suicide bombings were popularized as an anti-occupation

tactic by Lebanese Shi’ites fighting to rid their country of an

Israeli army in the mid-1980s.89 Since then, the tactic has

been used by Arab radicals to help equalize the struggle

between a heavily-armed Israeli force and a terrorist group

operating within a civilian population. Currently, suicide

bombings are front page news in the Middle East due to

Palestinian suicide strikes against the Israelis. For

example, on Sunday, November 17, 2002, Sheikh Hassam

Nasrallah, the head of the Lebanese terrorist group

Hizballah, stated that suicide bombing attacks were “the

most powerful and most effective” tactic that the

Palestinians could employ.90

37
This ongoing media attention to suicide bombing

suggests that any future Iraqi terrorist leaders could have

this tactic at the forefront of their minds. Moreover, all

Arabs who pay attention to the Israeli-Palestinian confrontation are now learning stunning lessons about the

effectiveness of suicide bombers. Suicide bombings against

Israel are currently showing frightening results. The most

notable impact came from 39 recent suicide attacks that

cumulatively killed 70 Israelis and wounded over 1,000.91

Additionally, while some of the bombings by both Lebanese

and Palestinian terrorists have been quite spectacular,

many bombers were willing to settle for killing only two or

three soldiers or civilians. In Lebanon, such bombers would

sometimes drive up to a checkpoint and then detonate their

explosives at the roadblock, killing a few guards.

Sometimes, but not often, women were used for such

missions.

The impact of suicide bombing attacks in Israel goes

beyond their numbers, and this fact will also capture the

imagination of would-be Iraqi terrorists. Israel’s population

has been demoralized and the economy has been crippled, as

fewer people patronize businesses where they can be

randomly attacked. Israel remains unable to cope with

these tactics, and the Israeli government has now chosen to

fund a security fence along the entire border between Israel

and the West Bank. Obviously such a tactic cannot be

duplicated by occupation forces in Iraq.

The Potential for a Popular Uprising

against U.S. Troops.

A mass uprising against occupation forces is unlikely in

the early stages of any U.S. occupation of Iraq, probably up

to at least the first year. Gratitude for the removal of

Saddam Hussein and an uncertainty over the degree to

which U.S. troops can be pushed are virtual guarantees of

the limits to which even a restive population can reasonably

be expected to adhere. After the first year, the possibility of

38
a serious uprising may increase should severe disillusionment set in and Iraqis begin to draw parallels between U.S.

actions and historical examples of Western imperialism.

Mass uprisings have occurred in that part of the world in

several key historical instances and therefore are known to

the local population. In the final death agonies of the last

Iranian shah’s regime, millions of individuals took to the

streets to protest and resist Imperial authority. Shi’ites and

Kurds in Iraq also rose up against Saddam Hussein in 1991

but were then crushed in a ruthless campaign by the Iraqi

regime. While it is hoped that nothing that the United

States could do would provoke the same kind of reaction as

Saddam’s actions, the potential for an uprising against U.S.

authority cannot be wholly dismissed, especially if it is

encouraged by false and escalating rumors of U.S. antiMuslim activity.

The Iraqi population is, as noted, diverse, and many

internal grievances exist among the various factions, tribes,

ethnicities and religious sects. Any occupation authority

will assume the responsibility for mediating among

opposing groups and attempting to resolve differences in a

nonviolent way. Some of these differences are centuries old

and cannot be resolved by any third party. Thus even the

most scrupulous effort at fairness can nevertheless alienate

various tribes and ethnicities from the occupation forces

and cause them to respond to occupation policies as a group.

This discontent could fuel mass action or even an uprising.

The Requirement for Large-Scale Economic

Assistance to Iraq.

Iraq is a country with important natural resources

which is, nevertheless, stricken by poverty as a result of

recent historical events. Ten years of sanctions followed

upon the heels of the Gulf War in 1991. Earlier, from

1980-88, Iraqis were absorbed in an extremely bloody war

with Iran. While Saddam initially attempted to fund both

war requirements and social spending during the conflict

39
with Iran, circumstances forced him to shift to a total war

economy by 1981. If the United States assumes control of

Iraq, it will therefore assume control of a badly battered

economy.

Upon ousting Saddam, the United States will then have

responsibility for providing some level of comfort and

subsistence to Iraq’s impoverished population. Based on

the people’s current plight, these tasks will be exceptionally

challenging. Moreover, regional or international public

opinion will have little tolerance for a lethargic aid program

under which people starve while waiting for relevant

bureaucracies to work out their problems. Any incidents of

suffering, neglect, or U.S. indifference can be expected to

come to the prompt attention of the regional and

international media.

Some of the economic burden of rebuilding the country

may be borne by reliance on the Iraqi oil industry. It is

doubtful, however, that oil wealth will pay for all of Iraq’s

reconstruction needs, even if the oil infrastructure survives

the war relatively intact. Estimates of the cost of rebuilding

range from $30 to $100 billion and do not include the cost of

occupation troops.92 Such troops will be maintained as a

separate expense from that of reconstruction and are not

expected to be maintained through Iraqi revenues.

Moreover, Iraq also has an exceptionally heavy burden of

debt, the management of which was one of Saddam’s major

reasons for invading Kuwait in 1990. On the plus side, Iraq

does have a well-educated population that could participate

in reconstruction efforts.

It is not clear what the condition of the Iraqi oil industry

will be in the aftermath of war with a U.S.-led coalition. If

Saddam perceives his regime as crumbling, he could order

the destruction of the wells just as he did with the Kuwaiti

oil wells in 1991.93 While the destruction of Kuwaiti wells

may have had some military utility in obscuring ground

targets from allied aircraft, Saddam’s primary motive for

this action was probably revenge. Should his regime face

40
certain destruction, it is likely that Saddam will at least

consider the destruction of the Iraqi oil fields, rather than

leave them for a successor regime. It is also possible that

Saddam will destroy other Iraqi infrastructure targets if he

can.94

The destruction of some or even most of Iraq’s oil

infrastructure would delay the ability of a successor

government to generate revenue, but the oil wells could not

be rendered permanently unusable. The experience of

repairing the Kuwaiti oil wells suggests that deeply

damaged facilities can be repaired in a reasonable period of

time with current technology. Sabotage would of course

remain a serious threat well into the occupation and this

would require substantial efforts at security by either

occupation forces or their indigenous allies.

Additionally, economic shortfalls could come at a time of

critical need due to the expected creation of large numbers of

displaced persons (DPs) and internally-displaced persons

(IDPs) during the war. The exact number of IDPs is

impossible to predict because it depends on the nature and

progress of the war. A worst case analysis would suggest

IDPs in the millions.95 Also, tuberculosis, cholera, and

typhoid are already prevalent in Iraq, and the health crisis

in that country could only be further aggravated due to war.

Medical crises are extremely likely in postwar Iraq.

Winning the Peace in Iraq.

The occupation of Iraq involves a myriad of complexities

arising from the political and socio-economic culture of that

country. This situation is further complicated by the poor

understanding that Westerners and especially Americans

have of Iraqi political and cultural dynamics. The society is

exceptionally difficult for Westerners to penetrate and the

factions and fragmentations are extraordinarily complex.

While Americans often define themselves by a national

creed dating back to the 1770s, Iraqis have no such creed

and define themselves through tribe, ethnicity, and

41
religion. Moreover, the predispositions and concerns of the

Iraqis, not the values of their occupiers, will need to be

addressed to build a viable new society. Any culturallybased efforts by the United States to assume away

differences between Americans and Iraqis can only doom

the effort for social rebuilding.

The possibility of the United States winning the war and

losing the peace in Iraq is real and serious. Rehabilitating

Iraq will consequently be an important challenge that

threatens to consume huge amounts of resources without

guaranteed results. The effort also threatens to be a long

and painful process, but merely “toughing it out” is not a

solution. The longer the occupation continues, the greater

the potential that it will disrupt society rather than

rehabilitate it. Thus, important and complex goals must be

accomplished as quickly as possible. However, a withdrawal

from Iraq under the wrong circumstances could leave it an

unstable failed state, serving as a haven for terrorism and a

center of regional insecurity or danger to its neighbors. The

premature departure of U.S. troops could also result in civil

war.

Successfully executing the postwar occupation of Iraq is

consequently every bit as important as winning the war.

Preparing for the postwar rehabilitation of the Iraqi

political system will probably be more difficult and complex

than planning for combat. Massive resources need to be

focused on this effort well before the first shot is fired.

Thinking about the war now and the occupation later is not

an acceptable solution. Without an overwhelming effort to

prepare for occupation, the United States may find itself in a

radically different world over the next few years, a world in

which the threat of Saddam Hussein seems like a pale

shadow of new problems of America’s own making.

PART III: A MISSION MATRIX FOR IRAQ

While insisting upon the firm adherence to the course

delineated by existing Allied policy and directive, it is my

42
purpose to continue to advance the transition just as rapidly

as you are able to assume the attending autonomous responsibility.

General Douglas MacArthur,

message to the people of Japan,

194996

Based on relevant experience and an analysis of the

current situation in Iraq, this monograph proposes a list of

essential missions that must be performed to maintain a

viable state and change the regime there. The way such

tasks fit in the overall campaign plan for possible

operations in Iraq is illustrated by Figure 1.97 They will be

performed during a period of “Transition” that must begin

while “Decisive Operations” are still ongoing. Transition

will take many years, and for purposes of this monograph

has been divided into four distinct phases.98 The first will

encompass those requirements necessary to provide

“Security,” including separating factions and beginning the

repair of vital infrastructure. Functions during this period

will be almost solely the responsibility of coalition military

forces, and it will take at least several months to complete

this phase.

The next phase for occupying forces will be to “Stabilize”

the country. Security tasks will continue, but services will

expand and begin to incorporate civilian agencies. Their

involvement should become at least equal to that of

coalition military forces once they start to “Build

Institutions,” where the basis of the new Iraq will be firmly

established. Eventually, military forces will “Handover”

significant duties to Iraqi and international agencies, and

the new regime will be ready to resume its proper place in

the world community. Even after the handover, some

low-key residual American presence is probable.

In the past, no part of post-conflict operations has been

more problematic for American military forces than the

handover to civilian agencies. Ideally, the allocation of

effort and process of shifting responsibilities should

43
proceed as depicted in Figure 2,99 but in reality it normally

looks more like Figure 3, where the handover is given

directly to the local government. To limit the potential for

any regional backlash from a perceived prolonged American

military occupation, it is essential that U.S. civilian and

international organizations assume coalition military

responsibilities as soon as possible.

While recent experiences in the Balkans and

Afghanistan appear to indicate that civilian agencies are

now better prepared to take over transition responsibilities

from military forces, this should not be assumed for Iraq.

Years of sanctions and neighbors with restrictive border

policies have severely reduced the number of non-governmental organizations and international agencies prepared

or positioned to enter Iraq. To facilitate participation of such

groups and speed the reintegration of Iraq into the

international community, sanctions and associated

44

– 1 year 2 years

1⁄2 coalition military

2 - 1 years

1⁄4 coalition military

Opns

DETER/

ENGAGE

SECURITY STABILIZE BUILD

INSTITUTIONS

HANDOVER/

REDEPLOY

3-4 Months

All coalition military

6 months

3⁄4 coalition military

Intl.

Control

• Secure the state

•Separate forces

•Stop the fighting

•Detain resistors

•Round up regime

•Provide emergency

services

•Repair vital infrastructure

•provide humanitarian

assistance

•Establish public

relations

• Continue state

security

•Continue infrastructure

repair

•Continue HA

•Continue public Svcs

•Assist NGO/IO,

interagency process

•Begin military

reorganization

•Destroy WMD

•Establish localgov’t

•Process detainees

•Repatriate refugees

•Continue C-M relations

•Establish State -wide commo

•End sanctions

•Continue state security

•Assist NGO/IO

•Continue military

reorganization

•Complete destruction

of WMD

•Establish police force

•Establish higher

level gov’t

•Encourage investment

•Start jobs programs

•Institute educational

programs

•Handover svcs to

local authorities

•Handover gov’t

supervision

to int’l body

•Transition to host

nation security

forces

•Begin HN policing

•Begin local gov’t

control

•Redeploy coalition

forces

SEIZE

INITIATIVE

DECISIVE

OPNS

TRANSITION

Starts during

Decisive

Figure 1.
licensing requirements need to be removed as soon as

possible, probably at the beginning of Stabilization.100

Additionally, the haphazard and ad-hoc nature of

civil-military organization and planning in Afghanistan has

made many NGOs and IOs wary and hesitant to deal with

the American military again. Some have been especially

critical of what they perceive as the manipulation of

humanitarian aid for political advantage, and a blurring of

roles between NGOs and special operations forces,

particularly those involved in civil affairs. The civilian

agencies feel that if they become identified with military

agendas their utility will be lessened and their personnel

endangered.

Another factor that could further limit any civilian

involvement in Iraq is the threat of biological or chemical

weapons. No governmental, non-governmental, or interna45

Ideal Vision of Transition

Time

Indigenous

Organizations

U.S. Civilian Organizations,IOs

U.S. Military w/allies

Time

Indigenous Organizations

(very slow rise)

U.S. Civilian Organizations, IOs

U.S. Military, w/allies

Realistic Vision of Transition

Figure 2.

Figure 3.
tional organization is trained or equipped to operate in such

an environment, and most will not even go near an area

where the use of such weapons is just rumored.101

While some UN agencies and aid groups like CARE and

the Jordan Red Crescent have begun to anticipate future

requirements, little money will be available until a crisis

erupts. The United Nations High Commissioner for

Refugees received a 25 percent budget cut in 2002, and has

had great difficulty getting preliminary support or financial

commitments for Iraqi contingencies. Some donors who

made pledges to Afghanistan have still not met those

obligations, and the costs of reconstruction there were

grossly underestimated. So, military planners would be

wise not to assume too much support from civilian agencies,

especially those outside the U.S. Government, for the early

phases of Transition.102 The United States should work to

put together the broadest possible coalition to carry out

combat operations, since that group will also inherit the

immediate responsibility for Transition.

The Mission Matrix for Iraq (Appendix A) was

constructed with these facts in mind.103 The 135 essential

tasks are grouped into 21 Mission categories and arrayed

across the four phases of Transition described above. Each

column lists those U.S. agencies that should be involved in

performing that task during a specific phase, with some

additional focus on coalition partners and international

organizations. While Iraqi participation is not specifically

stated except in a couple of cases of special emphasis, it

should be understood that local Iraqis will be involved as

much as possible in each activity. That is why quickly

establishing an effective personnel vetting process is so

important.

It should also be noted that each task will proceed on a

different timeline, determined by individual measures of

effectiveness developed by planners. For instance,

establishing the legal system in Category 3 might advance

quickly into Stabilizing and Building Institutions, while the

46
major security activities in Category 1 lag behind.

Achievements might differ between regions, as well.

Commanders and governors must be aware of the progress

achieved in each task in each part of the country.

While the Mission Matrix appears complicated, the

array of activities involved in rejuvenating Iraq and

rebuilding its government will actually be even more

complex. And leaders of the occupation must keep in mind

the dangers of being too successful in supplying services.

The final goal is to create an Iraqi state that can stand on its

own, not one dependent on American or international aid.

While all 135 tasks will have to be accomplished to

reestablish an Iraqi state fully, they are not all of primary

concern for the commander of coalition military forces.

Thirty-five are considered “critical” for the military. If the

commander of coalition military forces does not put

immediate emphasis and resources on these activities he

risks mission failure. The 32 “essential” tasks also require

quick attention and resources from the commander of

coalition military forces, although they are generally not as

time sensitive as the critical tasks. However, failure in

accomplishing them will have significant impact on the

overall mission. The remaining 68 “important” tasks must

still be performed to create and maintain a viable state, but

they are more important in later phases of transition and/or

primarily are the responsibility of non-military agencies.

The rating of all these tasks is valid whether there is a

civilian or military governor of Iraq. They will have to be

accomplished no matter who is in charge. We now

summarize each Mission Category in more detail, paying

particular attention to military roles. The categories

themselves are not prioritized.

Major Security Activities. Most coalition combat forces

will be occupied with these tasks for some time, although

there will also be plenty to do for specialized units like

Military Police. Considering the political aspects of an Iraqi

occupation and the size of the forces required, military

47
planners should not assume a major UN peacekeeping role.

The U.S.-led coalition might be able to broaden its

participation for tasks like training the new Iraqi army,

which, along with other elements of the Iraqi security

sector, eventually must be able to assume these security

responsibilities. Part of this training program should

include bringing selected Iraqi officers to the United States

for special courses on how an army should function in a more

democratic state. A long-term solution also requires

creating a trustworthy and transparent new Iraqi

government that will live up to its international obligations

concerning weapons of mass destruction and other issues.

There are many long-term cautions that should be

considered in conducting these major security activities. In

separating factions, coalition military forces must avoid the

dangers of unplanned and escalating alienation of ethnic

and religious groups, such as the Israelis experienced

during their occupation of Lebanon. That example also

illustrates the previously noted problems that will grow if

an occupation begins to be perceived as permanent.104

Military commanders and forces must be clear from the

beginning that they are intent on leaving as quickly as

possible. They must demonstrate progress toward that end,

and civilian organizations that accept a handover of

responsibilities in turn must be clear that they aim to return

control to Iraqi institutions as soon as possible. The quote

from General MacArthur that opened this section is an

example of the statements he issued to emphasize his intent

to relinquish control of Japan quickly, although not until all

Allied transition goals were met.

Public Administration. First priority in this mission

category must be establishing viable local governments,

relying as much as possible on existing institutions. Civil

affairs units will be needed all over the country to assist this

process. Evaluating the trustworthiness and reliability of

indigenous administrators will be important, and effort

should be made now to gather a body of regional experts,

Americans and trusted Iraqis, who can make such

48
judgments. National government will be developed in later

phases of Transition, and while civil affairs can help with

this task, the responsibility will primarily be with other

agencies. All troops need to be aware of the importance of

preserving public records, and this must be emphasized

from the beginning of actual military operations.

Legal. While coalition military forces will pick up

missions in this category while security is being established,

overall responsibility should be passed fairly quickly to

other agencies. However, commanders should be prepared

to provide support for war crimes tribunals for some time.

Depending on what system is decided upon for prosecution,

military personnel might be involved with the actual trials.

In regard to quickly reestablishing civilian courts, judges

and lawyers from the Arab League might be available,

though coordination for such augmentation should begin

early.

Public Finance. The coalition military commander must

be prepared to take necessary actions to keep the public

finance system operating until civilian government

agencies can take responsibility. Again, civil affairs units

will be instrumental.

Civil Information. Information will be a key tool in

gaining and maintaining the support of the Iraqi people.

Coalition military forces will have to work promptly while

security is being established to restore and maintain mass

media to communicate around the nation, and to coordinate

messages with whatever transition government exists. The

initial priority for restoring capabilities must be given to

government systems with wide range and commercial

media with the widest circulation.

Historical, Cultural, Recreational Services. While it

would be best to let the Iraqis control access to historic and

cultural sites, an occupying power assumes responsibility

for security of such places. Particular attention must be paid

to religious and historic sites that have great importance;

their damage or disruption could fan discontent or inspire

49
violence, not just within Iraq but around the region. At the

same time, public access must be assured, especially to

religious sites. The coalition military commander will have

to delicately balance these competing requirements for

security and access.

Public Safety. Coalition military forces will have to

include a sufficient number of military police to perform law

and order tasks until an international or trustworthy

indigenous police force can be established in sufficient

numbers. This may take some time. For example, it is

estimated that training and deploying a new Afghan police

force will take at least 3 years.105 Iraq does not contain the

same density of UN and NGO demining elements as

Afghanistan did, so coalition forces may also have to be

prepared to do more of those missions. Requirements may

be reduced if coalition military forces limit their own use of

mines and cluster bombs. The latter can be especially

problematic. Human Rights Watch estimates that more

than 12,000 unexploded bomblets remain on the ground in

Afghanistan, and well over 100 civilians have been killed or

maimed by them since October 2001.106

Disarmament, Demobilization, and Reintegration. This

is another category that will require regional experts for

vetting and evaluation of personnel. A system resembling

the Fragebogen might be relevant for this process. First

priority for coalition military forces will be disarming

groups and securing weapons. The potential difficulties

involved in accomplishing this were discussed in great

detail in Part II of this monograph.

Electoral Process for More Participatory Government.

Many proposals are being discussed about the future form of

Iraq’s government. American-style democracy is probably

not the ideal model for a Middle Eastern state, but some

system with increased popular participation should be

adopted. This will not be a decision for the coalition military

commander to make, but he will be involved in supporting

50
elections, as well as the constitutional convention and

referendum to shape and legitimize the new government.

Disaster Preparedness and Response. Coalition military

forces must be prepared to provide these services until civil

capacity can be restored. As with most other categories, the

intensity of the conflict preceding Transition will have a

great impact on the timeline leading to Handover.

Public Works. Iraq’s infrastructure has deteriorated

under sanctions, and coalition military engineers will have

to begin to repair key facilities early in the Security phase.

This will be necessary to facilitate their use by the coalition

as well as by the Iraqis. This mission will be much easier if

the coalition limits destruction with careful targeting

during combat operations.

Public Utilities. Special concerns for this mission

category resemble those for the previous one. Restoring

public utilities quickly will have a significant impact on

public health and sanitation, and will help avoid epidemics.

Telecommunications and Public Communications.

Restoring communication links will help tie the country

together. First priority should be given to broadcasting

systems in order to facilitate nationwide coalition

information operations. Computer networks and Internet

sites are also included in the telecommunications systems to

be restored and maintained.

Education. Though this is primarily a category for

civilian agencies, some engineer and civil affairs effort

should be dedicated to helping rejuvenate public schools.

Iraqi education has seriously deteriorated under sanctions.

Keeping students in schools keeps them off the streets and

out of trouble. It will also be important to implement job

training programs quickly for the multitude of unemployed

Iraqis.

Public Health. This is a category where help from

international and non-governmental organizations should

be forthcoming fairly quickly, though the limitations

51
mentioned earlier about access and WMD might have

significant impact. Iraqi medical personnel and facilities

should also be available, though sanctions again have had a

deleterious effect. Coalition military support will be

especially important early in the Transition to provide and

distribute health-related supplies. Many non-governmental

organizations have already voiced concerns about the

potential health and environmental disaster war could

bring to the whole region, and coalition military forces must

contribute to preventing such an outcome.107

Public Welfare and Humanitarian Relief. This will be

another mission category of very high international

visibility.108 The coalition military commander and

governing authorities will need to work with UN agencies to

exploit the resources and 46,000 distribution centers of the

Oil for Food Program. Again there should be some

responsive IO and NGO support for what could be a massive

problem with refugees and other displaced persons. Caring

for and controlling displaced populations will require

extensive and well-orchestrated civil-military cooperation

that should have already started.

Economics and Commerce. In this category, first priority

for coalition military forces will be to secure, repair, and

maintain oil facilities. If Saddam Hussein burns wells as he

did in Kuwait, military forces will have to provide

assistance to fire-fighting organizations. Managing oil

revenues will be very important in rebuilding Iraq and

perhaps funding occupation costs, and coalition military

forces will have to coordinate with many agencies on this

complicated issue. Iraqi technocrats should also be

available for assistance, though some vetting will be

necessary to insure their reliability.

Labor. This mission category should not be one of

concern for the coalition military commander.

Property Control. Though this category is also not

directly a coalition military force responsibility, the military

will be preserving the public records mentioned under

52
Public Administration. These will provide important

documentation to establish ownership systems.

Food, Agriculture, Fisheries. During the Security phase,

coalition military forces will have some responsibility to

insure the availability and flow of food and agriculture. This

includes items like cooking oil, the availability of which can

have significant impact on local conditions and attitudes.

To avoid famine, the coalition commander must be sensitive

to the timing of the initial planting and harvest, and might

have to provide supporting resources to overcome any

post-conflict disruption.

Transportation. During the Security phase especially,

coalition military forces will have primary responsibility for

the operation of Iraqi transportation systems which will be

essential for military as well as civilian organizations.

These duties will require many specialized units which

must be available from the beginning of any hostilities.

These systems have also deteriorated under sanctions, but

the Iraqi technocrats who have maintained them should be

available to help operate them.

As is apparent from the matrix and discussion of mission

categories, civil affairs, engineer, military police, and

transportation units will be a high demand. Some of these

specialties have already been stretched thin by requirements for the war on terrorism.109 At the same time, a

strong combat force will be essential, at least during the

Security and Stabilize phases. Additionally, many senior

headquarters will be needed, from the level of brigade and

higher, to command and control the complex set of activities

that will be occurring throughout the country. This

monograph has made a good start, but it would be advisable

for military leaders, and especially the Army, to conduct a

more-detailed analysis of the force requirements for Title X

and other missions in a post-conflict Iraq. Such an analysis

must involve all major service components, and possibly

joint players, since the impact of requirements for occupying

53
Iraq will have repercussions on force providers around the

world.

While this monograph has focused specifically on Iraq,

these insights will apply to any important post-conflict

operation. The U.S. Army has been organized and trained

primarily to fight and win the nation’s major wars. Nonetheless, the Service must prepare for victory in peace as

well.

ENDNOTES

1. MAJ Kenneth O. McCreedy, Planning the Peace: Operation

Eclipse and the Occupation of Germany, Fort Leavenworth, KS: School

of Advanced Military Studies, 1995.

2. John J. Yeosock, remarks in “What We Should Have Done

Differently,” Part II of In the Wake of the Storm: Gulf War Commanders

Discuss Desert Storm, Wheaton, IL: Cantigny First Division

Foundation, 2000, p. 25.

3. Ibid, p. 29; Janet A. McDonnell, After Desert Storm: The U.S.

Army and the Reconstruction of Kuwait, Washington, DC: Department

of the Army, 1999.

4. Office of Civil Affairs, American Forces in Germany, American

Military Government of Occupied Germany, 1918-1920: Report of the

Officer in Charge of Civil Affairs, Third Army and American Forces in

Germany, March 4, 1920, Vol. I, p. 88.

5. Combat operations were conducted superbly and quickly in a

complex situation (with difficult terrain, many civilians, and restrained

rules of engagement) that required intricate joint planning and

execution.

6. John T. Fishel, The Fog of Peace: Planning and Executing the

Restoration of Panama, Carlisle Barracks, PA: Strategic Studies

Institute, U.S. Army War College, April 1992, p. 7.

7. Thomas Donnelly, Margaret Roth, and Caleb Baker, Operation

Just Cause: The Storming of Panama, New York: Lexington Books,

1991.

8. Fishel, pp. 29-63.

9. U.S. Army War College, American War Plans Special Text-2001,

Carlisle Barracks, PA: U.S. Army War College, November 2000, pp.

233-306.

54
10. LTC John Fishel and MAJ Richard Downie, “Taking

Responsibility for Our Actions? Establishing Order and Stability in

Panama,” Military Review, April 1992, pp. 66, 69-70.

11. Fishel and Downie, pp. 70-75; Oral History Interview JCIT 097Z

of LTG Carmen Cavezza by Dr. Larry Yates, Dr. Robert Wright, and Mr.

Joe Huddleston, “Joint Task Force South in Operation Just Cause,”

conducted at Fort Lewis, WA, April 30, 1992, available on the U.S. Army

Center of Military History website, http://www.army.mil/cmh-pg/

documents/panama/jcit/JCIT97Z.htm.

12. Cavezza Interview; Fishel, pp. 38, 58-59.

13. Cavezza Interview. LTG Cavezza expressed doubt, however,

that he could have trained his unit adequately for both the Mission

Essential Tasks List required for war and for the complexities of the

post-conflict operations he faced.

14. Fishel, p. 63.

15. CINCUSACOM CD-ROM, Operation UPHOLD DEMOCRACY:

US Forces in Haiti, 1997, executive level AAR pamphlet, pp. 1-13.

16. Joint Universal Lessons Learned System entries 10451-37950

and 10754-92362, USACOM CD-ROM.

17. David Bentley and Robert Oakley, “Peace Operations: A

Comparison of Somalia and Haiti,” National Defense University

Strategic Forum No. 30, May 1995, available on NDU website at

http://www.ndu.edu/inss/strforum/forum30.html.

18. AAR, 2-9, USACOM CD-ROM.

19. Haiti Planning Group, “Draft Interagency Checklist for

Restoration of Essential Services,” furnished to author by COL Mike

Fitzgerald, CENTCOM J-5; U.S. Army Program Analysis and

Evaluation Directorate, America’s Army . . . into the 21st Century,

Washington, DC: HQDA, 1997, p. 5.

20. Interview of LTC Karl Warner by COL Dennis Mroczkowski,

JTF-190 Operation UPHOLD DEMOCRACY AAR, pp. 266-267,

USACOM CD-ROM.

21. Interview of COL Gerald Palmer by MAJ Christopher Clark,

JTF-190 Operation UPHOLD DEMOCRACY AAR, p. 269, USACOM

CD-ROM.

22. Chronology, Operation UPHOLD DEMOCRACY, USACOM

CD-ROM.

23. This expansion of missions is evident from the Operation

UPHOLD DEMOCRACY Logistics Support Operations briefing from

the USACOM CD-ROM.

55
24. Warner Interview, p. 267.

25. JULLS entry 10829-67459, USACOM CD-ROM.

26. Memorandum from 358th Civil Affairs Brigade to CG, U.S.

Army Civil Affairs and Psychological Operations Command, SUBJECT:

After Action Report, USACOM Operation Uphold/Maintain Democracy,

May 26, 1995, p. 3, USACOM CD-ROM.

27. JULLS entry 11566-55234, USACOM CD-ROM.

28. JULLS entries 00676-58398, 00969-70100, 01040-06216,

02656-20553, 10355-63106, 10447-74360, 10758-27517, 11558-362234,

11640-05029, 11640-61460, 50257-20594, 50258-39326, 92638-89373

USACOM CD-ROM.

29. U.S. General Accounting Office (hereafter USGAO), Foreign

Assistance: Any Further Aid to Haitian Justice System Should be Linked

to Performance-Related Conditions, GAO-01-24, October 2000; “Haiti is

Nightmare for U.S.,” Charleston Post and Courier, October 5, 2000;

“Haiti’s Disappearing Democracy,” New York Times, November 28,

2000; Ben Barber, “U.S. Officials See Failed Haiti Policy,” Washington

Times, November 29, 2000; “Annan Urges End to U.N. Mission in Haiti,”

New York Times, November 29, 2000.

30. USGAO, Peace Operations: U.S. Costs in Support of Haiti,

Former Yugoslavia, Somalia, and Rwanda, GAO/ NSIAD-96-38, March

1996, pp. 6-7.

31. “Army Has Begun Reviewing Options For Long-Term Balkan

Presence,” Inside the Pentagon, October 26, 2000; Steven Lee Myers,

“Army Will Give National Guard The Entire U.S. Role In Bosnia,” New

York Times, December 5, 2000.

32. Gregory Piatt, “A Good Bit Of Progress...A Long Way To Go,”

European Stars and Stripes, September 17, 2000, p. 2; “UN-NATO

Court Setup In Kosovo Faulted,” New York Times, October 20, 2000;

Donald G. McNeil, Jr., New York Times, November 22, 2000; Emily

Kelly, “Peacekeeping With An Iron Fist,” Stars and Stripes Omnimedia,

November 29, 2000; MG Donald Campbell, Memorandum for Record,

SUBJECT: Trip Report for Reserve Component (RC) Judge Advocate

General (JAG) Legal Assessment Team for Kosovo deployed between

May 26 and June 5, 2000, June 9, 2000, copy furnished to author by LTC

Peter Menk; Yaroslav Trofimov, “U.N.’s Long Stay and Power in Kosovo

Stir Resentment,” Wall Street Journal, January 3, 2003, p. 1.

33. Headquarters, U.S. Army Europe, After Action Report:

Operation Joint Guard, November 1998, pp. 3-2, 3-21 to 3-23.

34. Ibid., p. 9-26.

35. Ibid., p. 9-36.

56
36. Headquarters, U.S. Army Europe, Operation Joint Endeavor:

After Action Report, May 1997, p. 235.

37. Operation Joint Guard, pp. 4-5, 5-18. Problems were so acute

that the AAR asked for both the Reserves and National Guard to realign

their units and specialties for peacekeeping missions.

38. COL David A. Kingston, Towards a More Relevant Engineer

Command, Carlisle Barracks, PA: U.S. Army War College, 2000;

Operation Joint Endeavor, pp. 206, 210.

39. Operation Joint Endeavor, pp. 130-131.

40. Center for Army Lessons Learned, Joint Military Commissions:

Lessons Learned From Operation Joint Endeavor, May 1996. The large

requirement for military liaison with the myriad agencies involved in

such contingencies was a key point of discussion at a Post Conflict

Strategic Requirements Workshop conducted by the Center for

Strategic Leadership at the U.S. Army War College from November

28-30, 2000.

41. Operation Joint Endeavor, pp. 78-94; LTC Melissa E. Patrick,

Intelligence in Support Operations: The Story of Task Force Eagle and

Operation Joint Endeavor, Carlisle Barracks, PA: U.S. Army War

College, 2000.

42. “Outdated Equipment, Organizational Issues Hamper Effective

PSYOPS,” Inside the Pentagon, September 28, 2000, p. 1.

43. ADM (ret) Leighton W. Smith, “NATO’s IFOR in Action: Lessons

from the Bosnian Peace Support Operations,” National Defense

University Strategic Forum No. 154, January 1999, available on the

NDU website at http://www.ndu.edu/inss/strforum/forum154.html;

R. Jeffrey Smith, “Ethnic Hatred Permeates Bosnia’s Bitter Peace,”

Washington Post, November 10, 2000, p. 30; Paul Watson, “Bosnian

Vote Seen As A Setback,”Los Angeles Times, November 14, 2000, p. 9.

44. Most of the ideas in this section on the Philippines were

developed in conjunction with Dr. Brian Linn of Texas A&M University.

He is the author of The U.S. Army and Counterinsurgency in the

Philippine War, 1899-1902, Chapel Hill: University of North Carolina

Press, 1989; and The Philippine War, 1899-1902, Lawrence: University

Press of Kansas, 2000.

45. Linn discussions; Jack C. Lane, Armed Progressive: General

Leonard Wood, San Rafael, CA: Presidio Press, 1978, pp. 124-125.

46. Edward M. Coffman, The War To End All Wars: The American

Military Experience in World War I, Lexington, KY: University Press of

Kentucky, 1986, pp. 359-360.

47. Earl F. Ziemke, The U.S. Army in the Occupation of Germany,

1944-1946, Washington, DC: Center of Military History, 1975, p. 3.

57
48. Ibid., pp. 6-8.

49. LTC Wally Z. Walters, The Doctrinal Challenge of Winning the

Peace Against Rogue States: How Lessons from Post-World War II

Germany May Inform Operations Against Saddam Hussein’s Iraq,

Carlisle Barracks: U.S. Army War College, 2002, p. 18.

50. The ideas in this paragraph were provided by Professor James

Corum, of the School of Advanced Airpower Studies, Maxwell AFB, AL.

51. Corum.

52. John W. Dower, Embracing Defeat: Japan in the Wake of World

War II, New York: W.W. Norton, 1999, p. 73; Charles A. Willoughby,

editor-in-chief, Reports of General MacArthur, Volume 1 Supplement,

Macarthur in Japan: The Occupation: Military Phase, Center for

Military History: Washington, DC, 1966, pp. 2, 16.

53. Dower, “Lessons From Japan About War’s Aftermath,” New

York Times, October 27, 2002; Willoughby, p. 2.

54. For more complete descriptions of these reforms, see Dower,

Embracing Defeat, and Willoughby.

55. Dower, “Lessons”; Chalmers Johnson, “Rebuilding Iraq: Japan

is No Model,” Los Angeles Times, October 17, 2002; James P. Pinkerton,

“Iraq is No Stage for MacArthur-Japan Sequel,” Long Island Newsday,

October 15, 2002; Trudy Rubin, “Pre-Occupation Blues,” Philadelphia

Inquirer, October 16, 2002.

56. Some ideas in this paragraph came from discussions with Dr.

Gordon Rudd, Marine Corps School of Advanced Warfighting, Quantico,

VA.

57. Dower, “Lessons.”

58. As cited in Fawaz A. Gerges, “Illusions of Iraqi Democracy,”

Washington Post, October 8, 2002, p. 25. Note Heikal is referring to the

entire history of Mesopotamia and not simply the modern state of Iraq.

59. For an earlier example, see W. Andrew Terrill, “Low Intensity

Conflict in Southern Lebanon: Lessons and Dynamics of the

Israeli-Shi’ite War,” Conflict Quarterly, Vol. VII, No. 3, Summer 1987,

pp. 22-35.

60. “Oust Him Please,” The Jerusalem Report, October 21, 2002, pp.

22-23; W. Andrew Terrill, “Iraq’s Role in the 1973 Arab-Israeli War,”

Small Wars and Insurgencies, Vol. 11, No. 3, Winter 2000, pp. 1-20.

61. Elaine Scolino, The Outlaw State, New York: John Wiley & Sons,

Inc, 1991, pp. 11-19.

62 Vilayets were administrative divisions of the Ottoman Empire.

Often they had a considerable amount of autonomy.

58
63. Liora Lukitz, Iraq: The Search for National Identity, London:

Frank Cass, 1995.

64. Edmund Ghareeb, The Kurdish Question in Iraq, Syracuse:

Syracuse University Press, 1981, pp. 6-8.

65. Shafeeq N. Ghabra, “Iraq’s Culture of Violence,” Middle East

Quarterly, Vol. VIII, No. 3, Summer 2001, p. 39.

66. David Fromkin, A Peace to End All Peace, New York: Henry Holt

and Company, 1989.

67. Fromkin, pp. 508-509.

68. Said K. Aburish, Saddam Hussein: The Politics of Revenge, New

York: Bloomsbury, 2000, p. 36.

69. Malcolm Kerr, The Arab Cold War, London: Oxford University

Press, 1970, p. 94.

70. Ibid., pp. 93-94.

71. Aburish, p. 62.

72. Efraim Karsh and Inari Rautsi, Saddam Hussein: A Political

Biography, New York: The Free Press, 1991, chapter 2.

73. Keith B. Richburg, “Kurds see Turkey as Backing Off,”

Washington Post, November 30, 2002, p. 18.

74. General Raful Eitan, A Soldier’s Story, The Life and Times of an

Israeli War Hero, New York: Shapolsky Books, 1991, chapter 18.

75. Charles Tripp, A History of Iraq, Cambridge and New York:

Cambridge University Press, 2000, pp. 199-204.

76. Nicholas Blanford, “As War Looms, the voice of Kurds is heard in

Syria,” The Christian Science Monitor, November 20, 2002, p. 7.

77. Aburish, p. 337.

78. Central Intelligence Agency, The World Factbook 2002, Internet

version.

79. H. Tarik Oguzlu, “The ‘Turkomans’ as a Factor in Turkish

Foreign Policy,” Turkish Studies, Vol. 3, No. 2, Autumn 2002, pp.

139-148.

80. Michael Slackman, “Iraq’s Tribes May Provide A Secret Weapon

for Hussein,” Los Angeles Times, October 14, 2002, p. 3.

81. Tripp, p. 266.

82. Ibid.

59
83. “Reinventing Iraq: The Regional Impact of U.S. Military

Action,” Middle East Policy, December 2002, p. 26.

84. Monte Reel, “Ex-Iraqi Generals Test Political Might,”

Washington Post, November 25, 2002, p. A-12.

85. Hearing before the Committee on Foreign Relations: United

States Senate, August 1, 2002, www.foreign.senate.gov.

86. “After the Fall,” U.S. News and World Report, December 2, 2002,

p. 23.

87. David R. Seagal, et al., “Paratroops as Peacekeepers,” Armed

Forces & Society, Summer 1984, pp. 487-506.

88. “Waiting with Bravado and Anxiety,” The Economist, October

19, 2002, pp. 41-42.

89. Terrill, “Low Intensity Conflict in Southern Lebanon: Lessons

and Dynamics of the Israeli-Shi’ite War,” pp. 22-35.

90. “Hizbollah could strike Israel in case of a U.S. war on Iraq—

army officer,” Jordan Times, November 19, 2002. Internet edition.

91. Gal Luft, “The Palestinian H-Bomb, Terror’s Winning Strategy,”

Foreign Affairs, July/August 2002, pp. 2-7.

92. “After the Fall,” p. 23.

93. Christopher Cooper, “A Burning Issue About Iraq: Will Hussein

Set Oil Ablaze?” Wall Street Journal, November 27, 2002, internet

edition.

94. Bradley Graham, “Scorched Earth Plans in Iraq Cited,”

Washington Post, December 19, 2002, p. 1.

95. Displaced persons were an immense problem after World War II.

It took many years to resettle them, and many never could return home.

96. Quoted in Willoughby, p. 297.

97. This chart is primarily the product of COL Stephen Kidder of the

U.S. Army War College.

98. The timelines on the chart are approximate and perhaps

optimistic. Also, different mission categories are likely to progress at

varying rates.

99. This depiction was developed by Dr. Steven Metz of the Strategic

Studies Institute of the U.S. Army War College, and first appeared in

Conrad Crane, Landpower and Crises: Army Roles and Missions in

Smaller-Scale Contingencies During the 1990s, Carlisle Barracks:

Strategic Studies Institute, January 2001, p. 34.

60
100. These observations came from NGO and IO participants at two

conferences, a Carr Center for Human Rights Policy Project on the

Means of Intervention Ground Operations Workshop held at the

Army-Navy Club in Washington, DC, on October 17-18, 2002; and an

Institute for National Security Studies/Naval Postgraduate School

Workshop on “Iraq: Looking Beyond Saddam’s Rule,” held at National

Defense University in Washington, DC, on November 20-21, 2002.

101. Ibid.

102. Moni Basu, “Aid Groups Get Ready for War,” Atlanta Journal

and Constitution, December 23, 2002; James Bone, “UN Chief Issues

Secret Orders for War in Iraq,” TimesOnLine, December 23, 2002,

http://www.timesonline.co.uk/article/0,,3-522510,00.html; Mukesh

Kapila and Karin Wermester, “The Afghan Job is Bigger Than

Expected,” International Herald Tribune, January 14, 2003.

103. For the completion of the Mission Matrix, the authors are

indebted to the participants in the Post Conflict Military Missions

Workshop held at Carlisle Barracks, PA, on December 10-11, 2002, and

particularly to Professor William Kiehl, of the U.S. Army Peacekeeping

Institute.

104. For further analysis of the Israeli experience in Lebanon, see

Terrill, “Low Intensity Conflict in Southern Lebanon: Lessons and

Dynamics of the Israeli-Shi’ite War,” pp. 22-35.

105. Chris Kraul, “In Afghanistan, Guns Hold Sway Over Law,” Los

Angeles Times, December 27, 2002, p. 1.

106. Peter Slevin and Vernon Loeb, “Bush Urged to Limit Weapons

in Iraq,” Washington Post, December 27, 2002, p. 12.

107. See, for example, June Salvage, Collateral Damage: The Health

and Environmental Costs of War on Iraq, London: Medact, 2002. Medact

is the United Kingdom affiliate of International Physicians for the

Prevention of Nuclear War.

108. A number of organizations have already raised red flags about

the impact of war in Iraq on the whole region due to refugee flows. See,

for example, International Institute for Strategic Studies, “A New

Refugee Crisis in Iraq?” Strategic Comments, Vol. VIII, No. 8, November

12, 2002.

109. Military police have been in especially high demand. Harry

Levins, “New Guard Call-Ups Renew Question of Troop Strength,” St.

Louis Post-Dispatch, December 21, 2002.

61
APPENDIX A

MISSION MATRIX FOR IRAQ

C = Critical Task, E = Essential Task, I = Important Task

63

Handover

Phase

Transparent Iraq GovtIraqi ArmyUS ArmyIraqi InstitutionsIraqi ArmyIraqi ArmyIraqi ArmyIraqi ArmyIraqi ArmyIraqi Army

Build

Institutions

DoS, UNMOVICCMF, Iraqi ArmyCMF (broadened)CMF, CIA, DoJCMFCMF, IATFCMF, Iraqi ArmyCMF, Iraqi ArmyCMF, Iraqi ArmyCMF, Iraqi ArmyCMF, Iraqi ArmyCMF, Iraqi Army

Stabilize

Phase

CMF, DoS, UNMOVICCMFCMFCMF, CIA, DoJCMF,CMF, IATFCMFCMFCMFCMFCMFCMF

Security

Phase

CMFCMFCMFCMFCMFCMF, DoJCMFCMFCMFCMFCMFCMF

Task

Category 1 - Major Security Activities

Secure/Destroy WMDStop Intra- and Inter-factional FightingTrain New Iraqi ArmyRound Up RegimeEliminate Pockets of ResistanceProcess Detainees/POWsSecure BordersSeize and Secure Oil FacilitiesPlan and Conduct Consequence ManagementPlan and Conduct Theater InformationOperationsMaintain Freedom of MovementRegulate Movement

Task

No.

1A-C1B-C1C-E1D-C1E-C1F-E1G-C1H-C1I-C1J-C1K-C1L-E
64

2A-C2B-I2C-I2D-I2E-E3A-E3B-E3C-E3D-E3E-E3F-I3G-I4A-E4B-I4C-I

Category 2 - Public Administration

Establish and Assist Regional and Local GovernmentsE&A National Legislative SystemE&A National Executive OfficeE&A MinistriesPreserve & Improve Public Records System

Category 3 - Legal

Operate Criminal Court SystemOperate Civil Court SystemEstablish and Operate System to Enact & Publicize LawsOperate Judicial Administrative SystemSupport & Conduct War Crimes TribunalsProvide Legal EducationProtect Human Rights

Category 4 - Public Finance

Stabilize CurrencyMaintain & Operate Govt Finance System (Revenues & Distribution)Establish Private Financial Institutions

CMFCMFCMF, DoSCMF, DoSCMF, DoJCMF, Iraqi courtsCMF, Iraqi courtsCMFCMF, Iraqi courtsCMFCMFCMF, TrsyCMF. Trsy

CMF, AID, NED, DoS, IOAID, NED, DoS, IO, CMFAID, NED, DoS, IO, CMFAID, NED, DoS, IO, CMFCMF, DoJAID, AOUSC, DoJ, AL, IraqiAID, AOUSC, DoJ, AL, IraqiAID, DoJ, AOUSC, ALAID, AOUSC, DoJ, AL, IraqiCMF, DoJ, DoS/S/WCIAID, USED, AL, NGODoS, AID, CMF, NGOTrsy, AIDTrsy, AIDTrsy, AID

AID, NED, DoS, UNDP, IOSame as aboveSame as aboveSame as aboveIraqi InstitutionsPrevious + DoS/FPrevious + DoS/FPrevious + DoS/FPrevious + DoS/FCMF&ICC or TribunalAID, USED, AL, NGODoS, AID, ICM, NGOTrsy, AID, WB, IMFTrsy, AID, WB, IMFTrsy, AID, WB, IMF

UNDP, Iraqi InstUNDP, Iraqi InstUNDP, Iraqi InstUNDP, Iraqi InstAL, IraqiAL, IraqiAL, IraqiAL, UNDP, ICM, IraqiIraqi InstitutionsAL, IraqiICM, NGOWB, IMF, IraqiWB, IMF, IraqiWB, IMF, Iraqi
65

4D-I4E-E4F-I5A-E5B-C5C-C5D-I5E-I5F-I5G-I5H-C6A-I6B-I6C-I6D-C

Conduct Foreign Currency ExchangePay Govt Civil & Military EmployeesCollect Customs and Duties

Category 5 - Civil Information

Restore and Maintain Newspapers and Print MediaR&M Government Radio SystemR&M Government Television SystemEstablish Private TV SystemEstablish Private Radio SystemDevelop Censorship and Libel LawsRestore & Maintain Cable SystemsCoordinate USG-Iraq Govt Info

Category 6 - Historical Cultural,

Recreational Services

Maintain Art & Cultural InstitutionsProtect Historical ArtifactsMaintain Sports and Recreational SystemsProtect Religious Sites & Access

TrsyCMFCMFCMFCMFCMFCMF, DoS/RIraqiCMF, IraqiIraqiCMF, Iraqi

Trsy, AIDAID, DoS, CMFTrsy, AID, CMFAID, DoS/IIP, CMFAID, BBG, CMF, DoS, FCCSame as AboveAID, FCCAID, FCCAID,DoJ,CMF, DoS, ALAID, CMF, DoSDoS/R, CMFDoS/ECA, AID, IraqiDoS/ECA, DoJ, AID, IraqiAID, DoS/ECA, IraqiCMF, Iraqi

Trsy, AID, WB, IMFAID, DoS, CMF, WBTrsy, AID, CMF, IraqiAID, DoS/IIP, CMFSame as previousSame as aboveAID, FCCAID, FCCAID, DoJ, CMF, DoS, ALAID, CMF, DoSDoS/R, CMFPrevious + UNESCOPrevious + UNESCOPrevious + UNESCOIraqi Forces

WB, IMF, IraqiWB, IraqiIraqiIraqiIraqiIraqiIraqiIraqiAL, IraqiIraqiDoS/RUNESCO, IraqiUNESCO, IraqiUNESCO, Iraqi

Category 4 - Public Finance (Cont)
66

7A -C7B -I7C -E7D-I7E -E7F-I8A-E8B-I8C-I8D-I8E-E8F-C

Category 7 - Public Safety

Establish & Maintain Police Systems and OperationsTrain PoliceMaintain Penal SystemsProvide & Support Fire Fighting SystemsConduct Explosive Ord Disposal & DeminingProtect Foreign Residents

Category 8 - Disarmament,

Demobilization and Reintegration

Demobilize & Reorganize Army/Scty Forces/MilitiasTransfer & Reorient to Reintegrate into Civil SectorReintegrate Demobilized Persons into Civil SectorRestructure & Reorganize New Civil Security ForcesDismantle Baath PartyDisarm and Secure Weapons

CMFCMFCMFCMFCMFCMF, DoSCMFCMF

DoJ, DoS/INL, CMF, APDoJ, DoS/INL, APAID, DoJ, CMF, ALAID, FEMA, CMFCMF, AID, DoS/PM, NGOCMF, DoSCMF, DoSAID, CMFAID, DoSDoJ, DoS/INL, CMF, APNED, AID/OTI, DoS/DRL, CIACMF

DoJ, DoS/INL, AP, UNPDoJ, DoS/INL, AP, UNPAID, DoJ, ALAID, FEMAAID, DoS/PM, UNMAS, NGOCMF, DoS, Iraqi ForcesCMF, DoSAID, CMFAID, DoSSame as previousSame as previous

AP, IraqiAP, IraqiAL, IraqiIraqiUNMAS, Iraqi, NGOIraqiAP
67

9A-I9B-I9C-I9D-I9E-I9F-I9G-I9H-I9I-I9J-I9K-I10A-I10B-I10C-I10D-I

Category 9 - Electoral Process for More

Participatory Government

Plan Local ElectionsPlan National ElectionsPrepare Local ElectionsPrepare National ElectionsAssist Conduct of Local ElectionsAssist Conduct of Natl ElectionsProvide Post Local Election SupportProvide Post Natl Election SupportPlan for Constitutional ConventionAssist Conduct of Const ConventionAssist Conduct of Constitutional Referendum

Category 10 - Disaster Preparedness

and Response

Provide Emergency Warning SystemsProvide Emergency Evacuation and TreatmentProvide Post Disaster RecoveryConduct Pre-Disaster Planning

CMFCMFCMFCMFCMFCMFCMF

NED, AID/OTI, DoS/DRLSame as aboveSame as aboveSame as aboveSame as above+CMFSame as aboveNED,AID/OTI, DoS/DRLSame as aboveSame as aboveSame as above+CMFAID/OFDA, CMF, FEMAAID/OFDA, CMF, FEMAAID/OFDA, CMF, FEMAAID/OFDA, CMF, FEMA

Previous+NGOPrevious+NGOPrevious+NGOPrevious+NGOPrevious+NGOPrevious+NGOPrevious+NGOPrevious+NGOPreviousPreviousSame as aboveSame as previousSame as previousSame as previousSame as previous

NGONGONGONGONGONGONGONGOIraqiIraqiIraqiIraqi
68

11A-C11B-C11C-C11D-C11E-C11F-I11G-I12A-C12B-C12C-I12D-C12E-E13A-E13B-C13C-I

Category 11 - Public Works

Repair Roads and StreetsRepair BridgesRepair Port FacilitiesRepair AirportsRepair RailroadsRepair DamsRepair Canal System

Category 12 - Public Utilities

Restore & Maintain Power SystemsRestore & Maintain Water SystemsRestore & Maintain Gas SystemsR&M Sewage SystemsR&M Garbage Collection

Category 13 - Telecommunications

and Public Communications

Restore and Maintain Telecommunications SystemR&M Broadcasting SystemsR&M Postal System

CMFCMFCMFCMFCMFCMFCMFCMFCMFCMFCMFCMFCMFCMFCMF

AID, CMF, DoS/FAID, CMF, DoS/FAID, CMF, DoS/FAID, FAA, CMF, DoS/FAID, CMF, DoS/FAID, CMF, DoS/FAID, CMF, DoS/FAID, DOEAID, HHSAID, DOEAID, HHSAIDAID, FCCAID, FCCAID, USPS

Previous, UNDPPrevious, UNDPPrevious, UNDPPrevious, IATA, UNDPPrevious, UNDPPrevious, UNDPPrevious, UNDPAID, DOE, UNDPAID, HHS, UNDP, WHOAID, DOE, UNDPAID, HHS, UNDP, WHOAID, UNDPAID, FCC, IPUAID, FCC, IPUAID, USPS, IPU

UNDP, IraqiUNDP, IraqiUNDP, IraqiIATA, UNDP, IraqiUNDP, IraqiUNDP, IraqiUNDP, IraqiUNDP, IraqiUNDP, WHO, IraqiUNDP, IraqiUNDP, WHO, IraqiUNDP, IraqiIPU, IraqiIPU, IraqiIPU,Iraqi
69

14A-E14B-I14C-I14D-I14E-I15A-E15B-E15C-E15D-E15E-E15F-E15G-E15H-E15I-E15J-I15K-I

Category 14 - Education

Operate Public School SystemOperate Private School SystemProvide Adult Education ServicesProvide Job Training ProgramsProvide University Education

Category 15 - Public Health

Provide Emergency Medical ServiceOperate HospitalsProvide Doctors and Health ProfessionalsProvide and Distribute Pharmaceutical SuppliesProvide and Distribute Non-PharmaceuticalMedical SuppliesDispose of Medical WasteProvide Vector Control SystemsProvide Garbage Disposal SystemInsure Proper SanitationPerform Preventive MedicineProvide Mortuary Services

CMFAIDCMF, ITCMF, ITCMT, ITCMFCMFCMFCMFCMFCMFCMFCMF

AID, USEDAID, USEDAID, USEDAID, UNDP, NGODoS/ECA, USED, AIDAID/OFDA, FEMA, ITAID, HHS, WHO, NGO, ITAID, HHS, WHO, NGO, ITAID,HHS,WHO,NGO,CMFSame as aboveAID, HHS, WHOAID, HHS/CDC, WHOAIDAID HHS, WHOAID, HHS, WHO NGOAID, HHS

AID, USED, UN, WBAID, USED, UN, WBAID, USED, UN,AID, UNDP, NGOPrevious + UNESCOPrev.+ UN, ICRC, NGOSame as previousSame as previousSame as previousSame as previousAID, HHS, WHOAID, HHS/CDC, WHOAID, UNDPAID, HHS, WHO, UNDPPrevious + UNDPAID, HHS, UNDP

UN, WB, IraqiUN, WB, IraqiUN, IraqiUNDP, NGOUNESCO, IraqiUN, ICRC, NGO, IraqiWHO, NGO, IraqiWHO, NGO, IraqiWHO, NGO, IraqiWHO, NGO, IraqiWHO, IraqiWHO, IraqiUNDP, IraqiWHO, UNDP, IraqiWHO, UNDP, IraqiUNDP, Iraqi
70

16A-I16B-I16C-I16D-I16E-I16F-C16G-C16H-C16I-C17A-I17B-I17C-E17D-E17 E-I17F-I

Category 16 - Public Welfare and

Humanitarian Relief

Provide Assistance to PoorProvide Emergency ReliefOperate OrphanagesProvide Care for AgedProvide Psychological AssistanceCare for and Relocate RefugeesCare for and Relocate Displaced PersonsAdminister Oil for Food ProgramManage and Distribute Relief Supplies

Category 17 - Economics and

Commerce

Revitalize Commercial SectorRevitalize Industrial SectorRepair and Maintain Oil FacilitiesManage Oil RevenuesImplement Wage and Price ControlsMaintain Foreign Trade System

CMFCMFCMFCMFCMFCMFCMF, DoS/PRMCMF, UNCMFCMF, ITCMF, UN

AID, USDA, WFP, NGOAID/OFDA, DoDAID, HHSAID, HHSAID, HHSDoS/PRM, CMF, AID, UN, NGOAID, CMF, DoS/PRM, UN, NGOUNAID, CMF, UN, NGOAID, DoC, Trsy, ITAID, DoC, Trsy, ITAid, DoE, ITAID, DoS, Trsy, DoE, UNAID, TrsyAID, DoS, Trsy

Previous + UNDPAID/OFDA, DoD, ICRCPrev.+UNICEF, NGOAID, HHS, WHO, NGOAID, HHS, WHO, NGOPrevious, incl. OCHAPrevious, Incl. OCHAUNAID, CMF, UN, NGOAID, DoC, Trsy, WB, ITAID, DoC, Trsy, WB, ITAID, UNDP, ITPrevious + WB, IraqiAID, Trsy, WBPrevious + WB, IMF

UNDP, WFP, NGO, IraqiICRC, IraqiUNICEF, NGO, IraqiWHO, NGO, IraqiWHO, NGO, IraqiOCHA, NGO, IraqiOCHA, NGO, IraqiUN, NGO, IraqiWB, IraqiWB, IraqiUNDP, IraqiUN, WB, IraqiWB, IraqiWB, IMF, Iraqi
71

17G-I17H-C18A-I18B-I18C-I19A-I19B-I20A-I20B-I20C-I20D-I20E-I20F-I

Set Customs and DutiesImplement Oil Fire Contingencies

Category 18 - Labor

Establish and Provide Employment Services and BenefitsEstablish and Maintain System to Resolve Management - Labor DisputesEstablish and Monitor Worker Safety Programs

Category 19 - Property Control

Establish and Enforce Ownership System for Real PropertyEstablish and Enforce Ownership System for Personal Property

Category 20 - Food, Agriculture,

Fisheries

Maintain Production SystemMaintain Processing SystemMaintain Distribution SystemMaintain Retail Sales SystemEstablish and Execute Inspection SystemMaintain Irrigation System

AID, CMFCMF, ITCMF, ITCMF, ITCMFCMF, IT

DoS, Trsy, DoCAIDAID, DoLAID, DoL, Dos/DRLAID, DoL, OSHAAID, DoC, DoJAID, DoC, DoJAID, USDA, ITAID, USDA, ITAID, USDA, ITAID, USDA, DoCAID, USDA/APHISAID, USDA, IT

IraqiAID, DoL, ILOAID, DoL, DoS/DRL, ILOAID, DoL, OSHA, ILOAID, DoC, DoJAID, DoC, DoJAID, USDA, UNFAO, ITAID, USDA, UNFAO, ITAID, USDA, UNFAO, ITAID, USDA, DoCAID, USDA/APHISAID, USDA, UNFAO, IT

ILO, IraqiILO, IraqiILO, IraqiIraqiIraqiUNFAO, IraqiUNFAO, IraqiUNFAO, IraqiIraqiIraqiUNFAO, Iraqi

Category 17 - Economics and Commerce (Cont)
72

20G-E21A-C21B-C21C-C21D-E21E-C21F-C

Support Harvest

Category 21 - Transportation

Operate PortsOperate Rail SystemMaintain Intercity Road NetworkMaijntain Municipal RoadsOperate Air System (incl. Airspace Management)Operate Pipelines

CMFCMF, ITCMF, ITCMFCMFCMFC8MF, IT

AID, CMF, USDAAID, CMF, DoT, IT, DoS/FAID, CMF, DoT, IT, DoS/FAID, CMF, DoT, DoS/FAID, CMFAID, FAA, CMF, DoS/FAID, DoE, IT, DoS/F

Previous + UNDPPrevious + UNDPPrevious + UNDPAID, CMF, UNDPPrevious + UNDPPrevious + UNDP

UNDP, IraqiUNDP, IraqiUNDP, IraqiUNDP, IraqiUNDP, IATA, IraqiUNDP, Iraqi

Task Breakdown:35 Critical Tasks32 Essential Tasks68 Important Tasks

Category 20 - Food, Agriculture, Fisheries (Cont)
DEFINITION OF TASK CATEGORIES:

Critical – If the commander of coalition military forces

does not put immediate emphasis and resources on these

activities he risks mission failure.

Essential – These tasks also require quick attention

and resources from the commander of coalition military

forces, though they are generally not as time sensitive as the

critical tasks. However, failure in accomplishing them will

have significant impact on the overall mission.

Important – These tasks must still be performed to

create and maintain a viable state, but they are more

important in later phases of transition and/or primarily the

responsibility of non-military agencies.

ABBREVIATIONS

AID – U.S. Agency for International Development

AID/OFDA– Office of Foreign Disaster

Assistance

AID/OTI– Office of Transition Initiatives

AL – Arab League

AP – Arab Police Academy

AOUSC – Administrative Office of the U.S. Courts

BBG – Broadcasting Board of Governors

CIA – Central Intelligence Agency and other U.S.

intelligence organizations

CMF – Coalition Military Forces

DoC – U.S. Department of Commerce

DoD – U.S. Department of Defense

DoE– U.S. Department of Energy

DoJ – U.S. Department of Justice

73
DoL – U.S. Department of Labor

OSHA– Occupational Health and Safety

Administration, Dept. of Labor

DoS – U.S. Department of State

DoS/PRM– Bureau of Population, Refugees

and Migration Affairs

DoS/ECA- Bureau of Educational &

Cultural Affairs

DoS/IIP– Office of International

Information Programs

DoS/INL– Bureau of International

Narcotics and Law Enforcement

Affairs

DoS/DHL– Bureau of Democracy, Human

Rights and Labor

DoS/F– Future of Iraq Project

DoS/G– Office of the U/S for Global

Affairs

DoS/R– Office of the U/S for Public

Diplomacy and Public Affairs

DoS/CA– Bureau of Consular Affairs

DoS/DRL– Bureau of Democracy, Human

Rights and Labor

DoS/PM– Bureau of Political-Military

Affairs

DoS/S/WCI– Ambassador at Large for War

Crimes Issues

DoT– U.S. Department of Transportation

FAA– Federal Aviation Administration

FEMA– Federal Emergency Management Agency

HHS– U.S. Department of Health and

Human Services

HHS/CDC– Centers for Disease Control

ILO– International Labor Organization

IATA– International Air Transport Association

IATF– Interagency Task Force

74
IPU– International Postal Union

ICC– International Criminal Court

ICM– United Nations International Civilian

Monitors

ICRC– International Committee of the Red Cross

IMF– International Monetary Fund

IO– International Organizations

IT– Iraqi Technocrats (Indigenous and

Expatriate)

NED– National Endowment for Democracy

NGO– Non-governmental Organizations

OCHA– UN Office for the Coordination of

Humanitarian Affairs

Trsy– U.S. Department of the Treasury

USDA– U.S. Department of Agriculture

USDA/APHIS–Animal and Plant Health

Inspection Service

UN– United Nations Organizations

UNDP– United Nations Development Program

UNICEF– United Nations Children’s Fund

UNFAO– United Nations Food and Agriculture

Organization

UNMAS– United Nations Mine Action Service

UNMOVIC– United Nations Moratorium Verification and

Inspection Commission

UNP– United Nations Police

USED– U.S. Department of Education

USG– U.S. Government

75
UNESCO– U.N. Educational Scientific and Cultural

Organization

WFP– World Food Program

WHO– World Health Organization

WB– World Bank

76
ABOUT THE AUTHORS

CONRAD C. CRANE is currently the Director of the U. S.

Army Military History Institute at Carlisle Barracks, PA.

He joined the Strategic Studies Institute in September 2000

after 26 years of military service that concluded with 9 years

as Professor of History at the U.S. Military Academy. He

has written or edited books on the Civil War, World War I,

World War II, and Korea, and published articles on military

issues in such journals as The Journal of Strategic Studies,

The Journal of Military History, The Historian, and

Aerospace Historian, as well as in a number of collections

and reference books. Dr. Crane holds a B.S. from the U.S.

Military Academy and an M.A. and Ph.D. from Stanford

University. He is also a graduate of the U.S. Army

Command and General Staff College and the U.S. Army

War College.

W. ANDREW TERRILL joined the Strategic Studies

Institute (SSI) in October 2001, and is SSI’s Middle East

specialist. Prior to his appointment, he served as a senior

international security analyst for the International

Assessments Division of the Lawrence Livermore National

Laboratory (LLNL). In 1998-99, Dr. Terrill also served as a

Visiting Professor at the U.S. Air War College on

assignment from LLNL. He is a former faculty member at

Old Dominion University in Norfolk, VA, and has taught

adjunct at a variety of other colleges and universities. He is

a U.S. Army Reserve lieutenant colonel and a Foreign Area

Officer (Middle East). Dr. Terrill has published articles in

numerous academic journals on topics including nuclear

proliferation, the Iran-Iraq War, Operation DESERT

STORM, Middle Eastern chemical weapons, and ballistic

missile proliferation, terrorism, and commando operations.

Since 1994, at U.S. State Department invitation, he has

participated in the Middle Eastern Arms Control and

Regional Security (ACRS) Track 2 talks, which are part of

77
the Middle East Peace Process. Dr. Terrill has a B.A. from

California State Polytechnic University and an M.A. from

the University of California-Riverside, both in Political

Science, and a Ph.D. in International Relations from

Claremont Graduate University, Claremont, CA.

78
U.S. ARMY WAR COLLEGE

Major General Robert R. Ivany

Commandant

*****

STRATEGIC STUDIES INSTITUTE

Director

Professor Douglas C. Lovelace, Jr.

Director of Research

Dr. Steven Metz

Authors

Dr. Conrad C. Crane

Dr. W. Andrew Terrill

Director of Publications

Ms. Marianne P. Cowling

Publications Assistant

Ms. Rita A. Rummel

*****

Composition

Ms. Kimberly A. Rockwell

Mrs. Mary Jane Semple