Hazards Ahead: Managing Cleanup

Worker Health and Safety at the Nuclear

Weapons Complex

February 1993

OTA-BP-O-85

NTIS order #PB93-163368

GPO stock #052-003-01316-9
Recommended Citation:

U.S. Congress, Office of Technology Assessment, Hazards Ahead: Managing

Cleanup Worker Health and Safety at the Nuclear Weapons Complex,

OTA-BP-O-85 (Washington, DC: U.S. Government Printing Office, February 1993).

For sale by the U.S. Goverment Printing Office

Superintendent of Documents.Mail Stop.Stop SSOP Washington, DC 20402-9328

ISBN 0-16 -041667- 1
Foreword

c

old War nuclear weapons production has left a legacy of environmental

contamination that is unprecented in scope and complexity. The

Department of Energy has begun cleaning up pollution at the Nuclear

Weapons Complex (NWC)-an expensive, decades-long task that will

require a workforce numbering tens of thousands of scientists, technicians, and

laborers. Protecting their health and safety must be a major goal of this cleanup

effort. Achieving this goal will require DOE to successfully confront significant

technical and managerial challenges, but it also poses a unique opportunity to

advance state-of-the-art occupational health and safety technologies and practices.

The Senate Committee on Armed Services asked OTA to undertake this

project as part of OTA’s evaluation of environmental restoration and waste

management at the DOE Nuclear Weapons Complex. The Committee directed

OTA to examine risks workers might face in cleaning up contamination at the

Complex and to evaluate the effectiveness of DOE’s occupational safety and health

programs for cleanup workers.

This background paper concludes that, thus far, DOE and its contractors

have devoted little attention to cleanup worker health and safety. They have not

convinced workers and managers that a “new culture” of accountability in

environment, safety, and health is truly ascendent. DOE’s plans call for ambitious

increased capability in occupational safety and health matters, but DOE has

devoted few resources to these efforts. Policies and programs needed to protect

cleanup workers are not yet in place.

Yet DOE could apply to great advantage both its own technical strengths

and the lessons learned by the Nation’s experience with protecting cleanup workers

at non-Federal waste sites. If the Department aggressively addresses its

organizational problems, it could become a major force in establishing the

principles, practices, and technologies needed to restore contaminated

environments to safe conditions-in a manner that ensures that the “cure” for

contaminated environments does not do more harm than the pollution itself.

In the course of preparing this background paper, OTA received important

assistance from many individuals and organizations. Workshop participants,

employees of OSHA, EPA, and DOE, and numerous contributors and reviewers

from academia, industry, and organized labor gave generously of their advice and

time. In the absence of such expert advice and guidance, OTA would have been

unable to accomplish this study. The analysis and conclusions of this background

paper are, of course, OTA’s, and OTA assumes full responsibility for the paper and

the accuracy of its contents.

Roger Herdman, Acting Director . . .

Ill
workshop Participants

DOE CLEANUP WORKER

HEALTH AND SAFETY

Ed Bergin

Occupational Safety and Health

Administration

U.S. Department of Labor

Joseph Cocalis

Office of Solid Waste and

Emergency Response

U.S. Environmental Protection

Agency

Steven Cordova

Joint Company Union Safety

committee

Rocky Flats Plant

U.S. Department of Energy

Denny Dobbins

Worker Education and Training

Branch

Occupational Health and Technical

Services

National Institute of Environmental

Health Sciences

John Serocki

Office of Environmental

Restoration and Waste

Management

U.S. Department of Energy

Robert Goldsmith

Office of Health Surveillance and

Epidemiology

U.S. Department of Energy

Lanny Graves

Atomic Trades and Labor Council

Y-12 Plant

William H. Greendyke

Los Alamos National Laboratory

Ellen J. Mangione

Disease Control and Environmental

Epidemiology

Colorado Department of Health

James Melius

Division of Occupational Health

and Environmental

Epidemiology

New York State Deparatment of

Health

John Moran

Safety and Health Laborers’

National Health and Safety

Fund

Diane Morrel

Health & Safety

Ebasco Environmental

Glenn Paulsen

Illinois Institute of Technology

Michael Silverstein

Occupational Safety and Health

Washington State Department of

Labor and Industry

Sandra Tillet

Occupational Health Foundation

HAZARDOUS WASTE ACTION

CONTRACTORS (HWAC)

WORKSHOP

Richard C. Gerlach

Health Sciences Division

Halliburton NUS Environmental

Corp.

Thomas Bailey

Kleinfelder, Inc.

Martin S. Mathamel

Health and Safety Division

CH2M-Hill

Carolyn M. Kiely

Hazardous Waste Action

Contractors

Brad Whitehurst

State & Technical Affairs

Hazardous Waste Action

Contractors

NOTE: OTA appreciates and is grateful for the valuable assistance and thoughtful critiques provided by the workshop participants. The participants do not, however, necessarily approve, disapprove, or endorse this background paper. OTA assumes

full responsibility for the background paper and the accuracy of its contents.

iv
John Andelin PRINCIPAL STAFF

Assistant Director

OTA Science, Information, and Tara O’Toole

Natural Resources Division Project Director

Robert W. Niblock Joan Ham

Oceans and Environment Program Principal Analyst

Manager

CONTRIBUTING ANALYSTS

Emilia Govan

Senior Analyst

Peter Johnson

Senior Associate

Preject Staff

ADMINISTRATIVE STAFF

Kathleen Beil

Office Administrator

Kim Holmlund

Administrative Secretary

Sharon Knarvik

Secretary

CONTRIBUTOR

Florence Poilon

Editor

German Reyes

Analyst

v
List of Abbreviations

ACE-United States Army Corps of Engineers

DOE-United States Department of Energy

EH—-DOE Office of Environment, Safety and Health

EM—DOE Office of Environmental Restoration and

Waste Management

ERMC-Environmental Restoration Management

Contractor

GAO-United States General Accounting Office

HASP-Health and Safety Plan

HAZWOPER-Hazardous Waste Operations and

Emergency Response Standard

HWAC-Hazardous Waste Action Contractors

LANL--Los Alamos National Laboratory

M+O-Management and Operation Contractor

NIOSH—National Institute of Occupational Safety and

Health

NWC-nuclear weapons complex

OSH-occupational safety and health

OSHA-Occupational Safety and Health

Administration

PEL—permissible exposure limit

PPE-personal protective equipment

RCRA—Resources Conservation and Recovery Act

RFI-Remedial Facility Investigation

RIFS-Remedial Investigation/Feasibility Study

USCG—United States Coast Guard

WAS—Westinghouse Hanford Corporation

vi
contents

1 Overview and Findings, 1

Cleanup Worker Health and Safety Risks, 3

Consequences of Failure To Protect Weapons

Complex Cleanup Workers, 5

Approach Used in This Study, 5

Superfund and RCRA Experience: Worker Protection

Lessons, 6

Cleanup Worker Protection in the DOE Nuclear

Weapons Complex Cleanup Program, 11

Summary of Findings, 13

Chapter 1 Endnotes, 14

2 Lessons From Superfund and RCRA, 19

Worker Protection Issues Within the Regulatory

Process, 19

Problems With Contracting Practices, 24

Effectiveness of Cleanup Worker Health and Safety

Regulations, 27

Chapter 2 Endnotes, 43

3 Cleanup Worker Protection at the DOE

Nuclear Weapons Complex, 49

Management Commitment to Occupational Safety and

Health Priorities, 50

Line Management Responsibility for Occupational

Safety and Health, 52

Oversight of Occupational Safety and Health

Practices, 56

Worker Protection Competes With Other Cleanup

Priorities, 59

DOE Site Characterization Data, 60

Impacts of DOE Contracting Practices, 62

Application of HAZWOPER to DOE Cleanup, 64

Chapter 3 Endnotes, 73

Conclusion–Opportunities and Dangers, 79

vii
Overview

and Findings 1

T

he Manhattan Project-the secret effort to invent and

build the first atomic bomb-was accomplished in less

than 4 years at a cost of approximately $2 billion.l The

project was backed by the resources of America’s

largest and most advanced corporations and engineering fins,

and employed the talents of thousands of the world’s best scientists, technicians, and workers.

A half century later, the institutional descendant of the Manhattan Project, the U.S. Department of Energy (DOE), cofronts

a new mission: cleaning up the environmental pollution left by

cold war nuclear weapons production. This new mission presents DOE with daunting technical and organizational challenges as it strives to revise policies that led to widespread pollution throughout the Nuclear Weapons Complex and to restore

contaminated environments to safe conditions,

It is estimated that cleanup of environmental contamination

from nearly 50 years of nuclear weapons manufacture will cost

more than $100 billion and require more than 30 years to complete. The cost and length of the cleanup are uncertain because DOE is

the true extent of pollution and the means to remedy it areas yet

only dimly understood, Some areas of the Weapons Complex responsible for

may never be restored to pristine conditions.2

The tasks involved in the cleanup of environmental contami- protecting those

nation are unfamiliar to DOE. Indeed, the entire field of hazard- who will do

ous waste management and environmental remediation is in its

infancy. Methods of characterizing contaminated sites are highly the work of

uncertain, 3 and approaches to cleaning up are largely unproved

at both waste sites owned by private industry and government- cleaning up

owned facilities such as DOE reservations.4 5

It is clear, however, that cleaning up the 14 facilities in 13

States that make up the Nuclear Weapons Complex (NWC) will

1
2 Hazards Ahead: Managing Cleanup Worker Health and Safety at the Nuclear Weapons Complex

demand the application of great talent and resources. The tens of thousands of people who

will be engaged in cleanup of the Weapons Complex will join a large and growing industry devoted to the characterization and restoration of contaminated environments. It is estimated that over

the next 5 years, DOE’s Office of Environmental

Restoration and Waste Management could require the services of as many as 25,000 scientists, engineers, and technicians.6

Some workers will be involved in collecting

environmental samples, studying groundwater

movement, and designing remediation projects.

Others will be operating earth moving equipment; handling, inspecting, and repacking waste

drums; or building dams, digging trenches, and

constructing complex waste treatment facilities.

Still others will be plant operators, maintenance

personnel, and technical experts at vitrification

plants, wastewater treatment facilities, and incinerators. Municipal firefighters, police, medical

experts, and other emergency response personnel

may be called on in the event of fire, explosion,

or accidental release of toxic materials.

The NWC cleanup will be one of the largest

environmental remediation efforts ever, and very

likely the largest undertaken by the Federal Government at taxpayers’ expense. If conducted effectively, the DOE cleanup could serve as a

model of how workers engaged in hazardous

waste and emergency response operations should

be protected from work-related illness and injury. DOE’s past refusal to acknowledge its

obligation to comply with environmental laws

and regulations means that the Department is

starting environmental characterization and remediation activities more than a decade after the

private sector began cleaning up Superfund and

Resource Conservation and Recovery Act

(RCRA) sites. During those years, much has

been learned about how to protect the health and

safety of cleanup workers; DOE could apply

these lessons to great advantage.

As DOE turns its attention toward its new mission of environmental restoration and waste

management, the Department assumes responsibility for providing safe and healthful working

conditions for those who will do the work of

cleaning up. The vigor and success with which

DOE implements health and safety programs for

cleanup workers will be a signal of its willingness and ability to embrace the “new culture”

spoken of by the Secretary of Energy—a culture

that honors protection of the environment,

health, and safety as a fundamental priority.8 If

effectively conducted, the DOE cleanup could

serve as a model of how workers engaged in hazardous waste and emergency response operations

should be protected from work-related illness

and injury.

Environmental restoration and waste management activities at DOE provide an opportunity to

advance the state of the art of occupational health

and safety programs for cleanup workers. DOE’s

stated commitment to attain a new culture that

respects the environment, health, and safety; its

search for new ways of incorporating effective

worker protection programs into contract agreements; and its intent to pursue cleanup in a responsible and cost-effective manner-all place

DOE in a position to become a major force in advancing the programs and technologies needed to

adequately protect workers from safety hazards

and from the adverse effects of exposure to toxic

materials.

Achieving such a leadership position in occupational health and safety will require DOE to

adopt policies and undertake actions now only in

their incipient stages. To apply management

lessons gleaned from experience at non-Federal

cleanup operations, DOE must first recognize the

need for strong management commitment to the

occupational safety and health (OSH) of its

cleanup workers. Comprehensive, DOE-wide

OSH policies, objectives, programs, and means

of assessing progress must be developed. The cooperative efforts of line managers and health and
Chapter l–Overview and Findings 3

safety professionals will be required along with

input from experienced workers. Consultation

and interaction with other government agencies

and organizations with expertise in worker protection issues will also be needed if DOE is to

formulate a timely and effective approach to

cleanup worker protection. The policies adopted

then will have to be implemented and enforced.

Finally, truly independent oversight of OSH policies will be necessary at DOE facilities, with

mechanisms developed to reward or penalize adherence to or violation of these policies.

CLEANUP WORKER HEALTH

AND SAFETY RISKS

In addition to many of the safety hazards associated with conventional construction operations,

such as manual lifting, operation of heavy machinery, electrical hazards, exposure to extreme

heat and cold, and confined space operations,

workers involved in characterizing or remediating toxic waste sites may encounter fire and explosion hazards, as well as the health threats associated with exposure to toxic chemicals and

radiation. 9 10 Stress-related illness can also afflict cleanup workers because of the unusual demands and uncertainties associated with this

work. 11 Finally cleanup workers at DOE facilities will confront-in addition to all of the usual

risks encountered in hazardous waste work—

other hazards, such as high-level radioactive

waste and mixed waste, that are unique to the

Weapons Complex.

It is not known what specific health risks 12 No prospective studies cleanup workers face.

have been done of health effects among workers

employed in the new industry of environmental

remediation. It is highly uncertain what, if any,

specific biologic effects result from exposure to

toxic substances encountered during work with

hazardous waste. The health outcomes associated with exposure to most of the chemicals in

commercial use are poorly understood,13 and the

health consequences of exposure to low doses of

Cleanup workers face safety hazards associated with

traditional construction tasks as well as health risks

from exposure to toxic chemicals and radionuclides.

radiation are in dispute.

14-17 The long-term con -

sequences of exposure to chronic, low dosages of

toxic materials, radiation, or mixtures of these—

the types of exposures most likely to be encountered by cleanup workers—remain largely uninvestigated.

The construction trades, which include many

workers engaged in environmental cleanup, are

among the most hazardous occupations in the

United States and have long been associated with

a high rate of worker injuries.18 19 An estimated

$8.9 billion is spent annually on costs related to

20 Indirect costs, includ -

construction accidents.

ing reduced productivity, schedule delays, and

damage to equipment or facilities, account for

most of this amount.
4 I Hazards Ahead: Managing Cleanup Worker Health and Safety at the Nuclear Weapons Complex

A number of useful objective measures of past

safety performance have been developed, and research has demonstrated several ways of reducing workplace injury rates, including effective

worker health and safety training, and the planning and enforcement of safe work practices. An

analysis by the Business Roundtable concluded

that site owners can effectively influence job

safety and that strong construction safety programs are cost effective.21

Workers employed in the construction industry also suffer higher rates of some cancers and

increased overall mortality compared to the U.S.

population as a whole.22 The causes of these increased rates of nontraumatic deaths among construction workers are not understood; possible relationships between work-related risks and health

outcomes among construction workers have not

been well studied.

The large number and variety of toxic chemicals present at many hazardous waste sites, the

potential interaction of contaminants, and the

“disorderly physical environment” of cleanup

work make it difficult, and sometimes impossible, to accurately assess all potential chemical or

radiologic hazards. In many cases, site contaminants are unidentified and loose in the environment or “uncontrolled.” These factors result in

work situations that:

• “may include numerous and varied hazards

that may pose an immediate danger to life or

health;

Ž may not be immediately obvious or identifiable;

● may vary according to the location on site

and the task being performed;

● may change as site activities progress.”23

Because of these features, the application of

traditional approaches to worker protection—

namely, a reliance on industrial hygiene data to

identify potentially dangerous worker exposures

and the use of engineering controls to reduce or

eliminate such exposure-is often precluded during environmental cleanup work. Instead, cleanup workers must depend on less certain strategies

for identifying site-specific hazards, such as environmental monitoring and medical surveillance,

and must rely in large measure on respirators, impermeable clothing, and other personal protective

equipment to prevent exposure to toxic materials. 24

The demographics of much of the private sector hazardous waste work force—youth, frequent

turnover, high proportion of minorities25

-serve

to lessen the power of individual employees. The

realities of workers’ compensation laws in most

States restrict a worker’s means of legal recourse

in the event of injury or adverse health effects.

The burden of proof in cases of alleged work-related health problems is on the worker; pervasive

scientitic uncertainties about the health impacts

of environmental toxicants often make it difficult

to prove that a given ailment is work related.

Many health professionals believe that in most

cases, cleanup workers can be protected from

the harmful effects of exposure to toxic substances.26-28 However, achieving such protection

requires that managers pay vigilant attention to

identifying and anticipating potential site hazards

and devote adequate resources to design and implementation of the occupational health and safety programs needed to mitigate such hazards. In

addition, workers must be trained to recognize

unexpected dangers when they are encountered

and must be knowledgeable in the use of personal protective equipment.

The Office of Technology Assessment found

that there is sufficient evidence to question the

adequacy of existing provisions for protecting

cleanup workers from occupational illness and

injury. Concerns about cleanup worker health

and safety have arisen during operations at nonFederal cleanup sites. These concerns are also

salient to environmental restoration of the Nuclear Weapons Complex. Some features of the

DOE cleanup may intensify worker protection

problems encountered at non-Federal facilities.
Chapter l-Overview and Findings 15

CONSEQUENCES OF FAILURE TO

PROTECT WEAPONS COMPLEX

CLEANUP WORKERS

The failure to adequately protect cleanup

workers now can have effects that range from

near-term public dissatisfaction to future claims

of liability against the Federal Government. The

linkage between worker health and safety and

off-site health impacts is well recognized by

communities surrounding hazardous waste sites,

as experience with Superfund has shown.29 30 If

worker health and safety is perceived by the public to be neglected or poorly protected, public

confidence in the overall cleanup effort could be

undermined. Public doubts about the adequacy of

worker protection, the accuracy of site characterization, the hazards of proposed remediation

plans, and the reliability of emergency response

capabilities could lead to strong pressures to repeat characterization studies, revise planned

cleanup strategies, strengthen emergency response plans, or take other measures that would

delay cleanup schedules and increase costs.

Given the extent and complexity of contamination at the NWC, the projected size of the

cleanup work force, and the expected decadeslong duration of cleanup activities, work-related

accidents and illnesses are bound to occur. 31 O c -

cupational illnesses are also likely in view of the

volume and nature of hazardous materials known

to exist on weapons plant reservations .32

In addition, uncertainties about the health hazards associated with characterization and restoration of contaminated environments are pervasive;

existing regulatory mandates governing cleanup

worker health and safety are ambiguous; and significant weaknesses characterize DOE’s and its

contractors’ occupational health and safety programs for cleanup workers. These features suggest that the Federal Government could face significant liability claims in the future if large

numbers of the cleanup workers develop workrelated diseases or suffer injuries that might reasonably have been prevented, or if future investigations demonstrate that DOE or its prime

contractors failed to exercise prudent judgment in

occupational health and safety matters during

cleanup. Inadequate attention to OSH issues during cleanup of federal facilities may leave the

government vulnerable to lawsuits and claims

akin to those now being made by veterans of

33 by citizens living downwind atomic bomb tests,

of nuclear tests,34 and by DOE workers and others alleging radiation-related illness and damages .35-39

APPROACH USED IN THIS STUDY

This OTA background paper was written after

review of available government documents and

published articles that chronicle cleanup worker

health and safety issues.40 OTA also consulted

numerous government officials involved in oversight or regulation of cleanup worker safety and

health, as well as DOE contractor employees,

DOE and private sector workers involved in hazardous waste operations, labor representatives,

academic experts, and health and safety managers from environmental and engineering firms.

Two workshops were held to discuss issues

raised in this background paper. The first, referred to as the “OTA Workshop on DOE Cleanup Workers,”’41 included employees of DOE, the

Environmental Protection Agency (EPA), and the

Occupational Safety and Health Administration

(OSHA); workers at DOE weapons facilities;

representatives of labor unions engaged in cleanup work; and health and safety professionals

from academia and the private sector. The second

workshop, the “OTA-HWAC Workshop,”42 included OTA staff and members of Hazardous

Waste Action Contractors (HWAC), a national

association of engineering and science firms

practicing in hazardous waste management.

In the course of this project, OTA staff visited

all of the facilities in the DOE Nuclear Weapons

Complex. The EPA-Labor Health and Safety

Task Force, a group that includes representatives
6 I Hazards Ahead: Managing Cleanup Worker Health and Safety at the Nuclear Weapons Complex

from several government agencies and labor organizations convened to address controversial issues surrounding cleanup worker health and safety, allowed OTA staff to attend several of its

meetings and to review the minutes of other

meetings. OTA staff benefited greatly from the

opportunity to accompany representatives from

OSHA, EPA, the Army Corps of Engineers

(ACE), and the EPA-Labor Health and Safety

Task Force on a tour of a (non-DOE) Superfund

site. This tour was part of an interagency effort to

establish an OSHA inspection protocol for Superfund incineration sites.43 44

There is no comprehensive documentation of

the successes or problems associated with worker

health and safety programs at hazardous waste

sites either in the private sector or at DOE facilities. The government does not categorize workers

engaged in environmental remediation or hazardous materials emergency response actions in

ways that allow accurate analyses of occupational health and safety statistics in this industry.45

Further, much of the activity at hazardous waste

sites thus far has involved characterization studies aimed at mapping pollution pathways and

short-lived emergency removal projects.46 47

Only recently have actual remediation and cleanup activities become a prominent aspect of work

at Superfund and RCRA sites. This is also the

case at DOE facilities, where site characterization efforts are ongoing and environmental cleanup work is just getting underway.48

OTA’s analysis of DOE’s capacity to protect

cleanup worker health and safety draws on a

number of documents reviewing DOE’s management of environment, safety, and health issues.

(See, for example, work cited in footnotes 49-

64.) Some of these reports were compiled by expert independent panels, many convened at the

request of the Secretary of Energy. These reviews, although focusing primarily on the DOE

weapons production work force and not on cleanup workers, provide useful information about the

Department’s general approach to worker health

and safety. OTA also examined DOE documents

pertinent to occupational safety and health policies and practices, including internal memoranda

and drafts of proposed OSH orders and programs. The DOE Office of Environmental

Restoration and Waste Management (EM) and

the Office of Environment, Safety, and Health

(EH) reviewed and commented on a draft of this

OTA background paper.

Because of the limited data documenting

health and safety risks or health outcomes among

cleanup workers, the lack of reliable surveys of

work conditions at hazardous waste sites, and the

absence of any comprehensive or prospective

studies of the occupational illnesses or injuries

encountered during environmental cleanup work

at private sector sites or at government facilities,

some of the information presented in this OTA

background paper is necessarily anecdotal.

Nonetheless, several themes and issues were

raised consistently and repeatedly in the course

of OTA’s investigation; these are discussed here.

There is also considerable consensus among the

diverse participants in the EPA-Labor Health and

Safety Task Force on the major health and safety

problems at private sector waste sites—although

individuals have differing ideas about the sources

and solutions to these problems.

SUPERFUND AND RCRA EXPERIENCE:

WORKER PROTECTION LESSONS

The experience accumulated in the course of

nearly two decades of Superfund and RCRA activities provides valuable lessons on how to establish effective occupational health and safety

programs during hazardous waste operations and

environmental remediation. As the environmental restoration industry continues to grow and

hazardous waste operations shift from characterization studies to actual cleanup, new problems

are identified and the regulatory response to these

emerging issues continues to evolve.

Some of the problems that plague efforts to establish sound OSH programs during environmental cleanup operations are technical in nature and
. —

Chapter l–Overview and Findings 7

result from the difficulties associated with efforts

to identify site contaminants and worker exposures, and from the pervasive uncertainties regarding the human health consequences of exposure to environmental pollutants. However, the

overriding problems that hinder worker protection efforts during hazardous waste cleanup re -

sult from a lack of emphasis on OSH issues in Su -

perfund and RCRA procedures, and inadequate

management commitment to or accountability for

cleanup worker health and safety.

The next section of this chapter introduces

some of the reasons why cleanup workers in the

private sector are not better protected against occupational injury or illness. Chapter 2 of this

OTA background paper addresses these matters

in more detail. Chapter 3 discusses cleanup

worker health issues within the context of cleanup of the Nuclear Weapons Complex.

Management Commitment

and Accountability

Management commitment to worker health

and safety is increasingly recognized as a critical

element of all good occupational health and safety programs.

91 92 The environmental laws and

regulations that drive most cleanup operations do

not however, assign OSH matters a high priority.

Cleanup managers who are compelled to devote

great attention to complying with environmental

laws and other competing priorities, sometimes

neglect the need for aggressive and sustained

management involvement in developing and implementing effective worker protection strategies.

Moreover, cleanup operations are characterized by a diffuse managerial structure that makes

it difficult to maintain clear chains of command

or to determine who is accountable for occupational health and safety. Cleanup workers have

been endangered because health and safety experts were unavailable on-site; lacked the seniority, training, or authority to interrupt production

schedules when worker safety was threatened; or

were not familiar enough with site operations to

recognize potential hazards.93 94

Site owners and prime contractors often “push

down” responsibility and accountability for

worker health and safety to subcontractors95—

even though subcontractors frequently have less

experience, can devote fewer resources to hazard

identification and worker protection, and command less access to trained occupational safety

and health professionals than the prime contractor.96 Fear of legal liability has made some managers reluctant to intercede in worksite health and

safety problems that do not directly involve their

own employees-even when they are aware of

obvious exposure hazards or unsafe work practices. 97 Furthermore, the lack of rigorous enforcement of OSHA standards during hazardous

waste operations and emergency response leaves

employers unaccountable for the adequacy of

worker protection measures.

Inadequate Characterization Data

The Remedial Investigation/Feasibility Study

(RIFS) process in Superfund cleanups and

RCRA Facility Investigation (RFI) efforts are

supposed to provide information about the presence, location, and concentration of hazardous

contaminants at a site. These data are then analyzed to produce assessments of baseline health

risks posed by site contaminants and devise appropriate engineering responses to the pollution. 98 Unfortunately, the data gathered by the

engineers and environmental scientists who design and conduct characterization studies typically fail to provide the type of information needed

to evaluate potential worker health and safety

threats. 99-103 In some cases, characterization

studies are incomplete when requests for cleanup

proposals are sent out for bid or when remediation work begins. In other instances, site assessment activities may have been carried out years

before actual remediation gets under way; thus

assessment reports do not represent the site conditions existing when cleanup work begins.
8 I Hazards Ahead: Managing Cleanup Worker Health and Safety at the Nuclear Weapons Complex

Site characterization activities are generally

not designed to produce the information needed

to “engineer” a cleanup. Most professionals with

experience in environmental cleanup anticipate

that remediation activities will uncover “surprises” not revealed during the site characterization

phase. These surprises are usually unpleasant and

may include, for example, more extensive zones

of subsurface contamination, or additional “hot

spots” with high contamination levels.

These realities have led many environmental

remediation specialists to endorse the so-called

observational approach to cleanup. The observational approach is a method for staging data collection and remedial action so as to account for

the uncertainties inherent in assessing environmental contamination. The approach involves

initiating response action early to prevent migration of contaminants and then collecting the additional information necessary to design the final

remedy. Contingency plans are developed to define actions that will be taken if additional areas

of contamination are found or if remedial actions

are not as effective as planned.

The quality and focus of site characterization

data are important because these data are the

basis of site health and safety plans (HASPS).l04

HASPS are legally mandated by HAZWOPER,

the OSHA standard governing worker protection

during hazardous waste site operations and emergency response. HASPS must present a written

blueprint of health and safety hazards associated

with proposed work plans at contaminated sites

and must establish the personal protective gear,

work practices, medical surveillance, and health

and safety training required to conduct the cleanup and respond appropriately to any emergencies

that might arise.

When characterization data are inaccurate or

incomplete, there is no sound basis from which to

craft effective site-specific health and safety

plans or to determine the level of worker protection required in performing specific work tasks.

To address this deficiency, the basic premise of

health and safety practice must be to “expect the

unexpected” and to train workers to identify unforeseen contamination problems.

Poor Contracting Practices

The lack of flexibility in many cleanup contracts contributes to the difficulties of creating effective occupational health and safety programs

for cleanup workers. Contractors bidding on

cleanup jobs are placed in a difficult position as a

result of the large uncertainties inherent in all environmental restoration work, the errors and

omissions that distinguish most characterization

data, and the failure to include provisions in

cleanup contracts that allow changes in original

HASPS or renegotiation of worker protection

costs. Managers are often forced to choose between either assuming “worst-case” scenarios

and planning for elaborate worker health and

safety provisions in their bids; or hoping that no

new hazards come to light in the course of cleanup (a hope that experience has shown is usually

unrealized) and budgeting less money for worker

protection.

Employers engaged in cleanup work command widely differing levels of expertise in occupational health and safety matters. Even large

firms that possess significant technical abilities

vary widely in the amount of attention paid to implementing and enforcing principles of worker

safety and health protection.105 In an effort to

better assess work-related hazards, some large

environmental firms have tried to include costs of

additional characterization studies in the cleanup

bids submitted, but they have not always succeeded, especially when negotiators lack health

and safety backgrounds or are unfamiliar with the

hazards of environmental cleanup work. The

practice of awarding contracts for environmental

cleanup solely on the basis of a low bid may militate against firms that incorporate strong worker

protection programs into contract proposals.
Chapter l–Overview and Findings 19

Difficulties in Interpreting OSHA’S

Hazardous Waste Operations and

Emergency Response Standard

The regulation that protects hazardous waste

workers is vague and difficult to enforce. In

1990, the Occupational Safety and Health Administration promulgated a regulation to protect

workers engaged in hazardous waste operations

and emergency response, the so-called HAZWOPER standard.l06 Other OSHA regulations,

such as standards governing construction worker

protection, use of respirators, and exposure to

certain regulated materials, also apply to environmental cleanup work, but HAZWOPER is the

most comprehensive and important regulation

applicable to cleanup worker health and safety.

HAZWOPER is a “performance-based” regulation. The standard sets forth a number of goals

and approaches that employers must adopt, but

does not prescribe how cleanup worker protection programs should be designed or implemented. Some aspects of HAZWOPER are ambiguOUS. OSHA has not issued guidance documents

that would aid employers in interpreting and applying the standard. Also, different OSHA regional offices have offered contradictory interpretations of some HAZWOPER provisions.107

Consequently, there is significant controversy

about how elements of the standard should be implemented, and wide variations exist in the rigorousness of cleanup worker protection programs

at hazardous waste sites. To respond to such controversy in a more timely manner than its bureaucratic procedures usually allow, the OSHA Directorate of Compliance Programs recently

published a compilation of letters and memos

from OSHA headquarters that respond to specific

queries on HAZWOPER interpretation.108

Especially controversial aspects of HAZWOPER implementation include the following:

● provisions for dividing waste sites into work

zones categorized by the potential for worker exposure to hazardous materials within

these zones;

●

●

●

●

●

methods for monitoring worker exposure to

potentially hazardous substances;

methods for determiningg acceptable worker

exposure levels during cleanup operations;

the criteria that determine an individual

worker’s eligibility for inclusion in legally

mandated medical surveillance programs

and prescribe minimum hours of health and

safety training;

the content of medical surveillance programs and the qualifications of physicians

who design and manage the activities; and

the adequacy of emergency response preparations and capabilities during hazardous

waste operations.

OSHA has also proposed a regulation that

would establish certification criteria for cleanup

worker health and safety training programs mandated by HAZWOPER.109 Some aspects of the

proposed rule (29 CFR 1910.121) have been criticized; in particular, the absence of any required

certification for trainers or for the programs that

train emergency response personnel have been

cited.

110-112

Weak Oversight of Occupational Health

and Safety Rules by Regulators

The Occupational Safety and Health Act holds

employers responsible for providing workers

with “safe and healthful working conditions.’66

HAZWOPER, the OSHA regulation enacted to

protect cleanup worker health and safety, mandates a structured, but nonspecific, approach to

worker protection during hazardous waste operations and emergency response.67 Under this standard, critical decisions about how to identify and

mitigate cleanup worker health risks are left to

the judgment of individual employers.

The quality of worker health and safety programs implemented under HAZWOPER at Superfund and RCRA sites are reported to vary

widely. 68 69 These inconsistencies are apparently

a consequence of information gaps and uncertainties about necessary levels of worker protec-
10 I Hazards Ahead: Managing Cleanup Worker Health and Safety at the Nuclear Weapons Complex

tion; differences in the rigorousness with which

different employers pursue worker safety and

health; OSHA’s failure to issue detailed guidance

to help employers interpret and apply the broadly

worded HAZWOPER regulation; and weak

OSHA enforcement efforts.

OSHA and EPA have agreed to cooperate in

developing an OSHA inspection protocol for incinerators at Superfund sites.70 In general, however, OSHA enforcement of HAZWOPER has

not been vigorous.

71 72 OSHA has about 1,00 0

inspectors (including supervisors and trainers) to

enforce health and safety standards for nearly 3.6

million employers and 55 million workers .73

Aside from a few planned Superfund incinerator

inspections, neither the more than 4,000 RCRA

sites that require or have undergone remediation,

nor the 1,354 sites on Superfund’s National Priorities List74 75 have been targeted as high priorities for OSHA inspections.

EPA is the Federal agency with the most expertise in hazardous waste operations, but EPA

staff are not well prepared to assess or oversee

worker health and safety during cleanup. Few of

EPA’s regional staff or project managers have occupational health and safety backgrounds. Currently, none of the staff members of EPA’s Office

of Solid Waste and Emergency Response

(OSWER) Hazardous Site Control Division are

occupational health or safety professionals, EPA

maintains furthermore that it lacks the authority

to enforce OSHA’s HAZWOPER standards.76

EPA has, at times, neglected to consider worker risks when selecting cleanup options .77 EPA

officials have acknowledged the need to weigh

worker health risks against the benefits of particular remediation measures but have developed a

formal means of doing so only in the past few

months,78 79 and the effectiveness of these proposed changes has yet to be tested.

To its credit, EPA’s Office of Solid Waste and

Emergency Response (OSWER) has established

the EPA-Labor Health and Safety Task Force,

consisting of employees from EPA, OSHA, the

National Institute of Occupational Safety and

Health (NIOSH), ACE, and representatives of

labor unions whose members frequently conduct

cleanup work. This Task Force has been constructive in identifying some of the more pressing

and pervasive worker protection problems at

RCRA and Superfund sites.

EPA’s principal goals, however, which are

largely a response to public and congressional

pressures, are to reduce the time needed to complete the RCRA and Superfund processes, and to

accomplish cleanup more economically. EPA’s

“new Superfund paradigm,” is designed to speed

up site assessment and initiate activity early in

cleanup so as to reduce “immediate risks.”80 81

Some contend that these priorities may beat odds

with worker protection needs, which might dictate a “go-slow” approach in unusually hazardous

situations or in implementing innovative remedies. 82

The Agency for Toxic Substances and Disease

Registry (ATSDR) is responsible for determining

the potential human health impacts of toxic materials released into the environment, and has broad

statutory authority to intervene when environmental contaminants imperil human health,83

ATSDR officials are rarely present during cleanup operations, however, and focus mostly on possible off-site health effects of Superfund and

RCRA pollution. 84 In some circumstances, e f -

forts to mitigate risks to off-site populations may

actually increase the health and safety hazards

faced by cleanup workers.85 86

Neither the assessment of cleanup worker

health and safety risks nor the evaluation of

worker protection programs has high priority for

the regulatory agencies most involved in implementing Superfund and RCRA, The OSHA regulatory officials who are most knowledgeable

about worker protection issues generally are not

familiar with environmental cleanup work and

are rarely present during cleanup operations,

whereas the EPA regulators who are most familiar with hazardous waste work know little about

occupational health and safety matters and refuse

to enforce OSHA standards. The net result is that
Chapter l–Overview and Findings I 11

the interpretation and implementation of cleanup

worker OSH standards are highly variable and

are left, essentially, to the voluntary efforts of

employers.

87-90 Consequently, the forces that

drive cleanup operations—particularly the need

to comply with environmental regulations and

the need to address concerns about off-site health

impacts of pollution-may, in practice, overshadow questions and actions aimed at possible risks

to cleanup workers,

CLEANUP WORKER PROTECTION

IN THE DOE NUCLEAR WEAPONS

COMPLEX CLEANUP PROGRAM

The task of cleaning up environmental contamination throughout the Nuclear Weapons

Complex presents greater technical and political

challenges than cleanup at private hazardous

waste sites, DOE must grapple with the challenges of cleanup, even as it confronts other difficult and unfamiliar missions such as nuclear

weapons dismantlement. Accomplishing these

missions is likely to require significant changes

in DOE’s priorities, organizational structure, and

approach to problem solving.

The Secretary of Energy has acknowledged

that DOE and its predecessor agencies have historically embodied an institutional culture that

valued weapons production over the protection of

human health and the environment. 113 Multiple

expert and government reports have documented

DOE’s past inattention to occupational health

and safety and to environmental protection,

DOE’s past failures in these realms have been

pervasive and serious.114

In efforts to alter this record, DOE initiated a

number of reforms and issued directives in 1991

and 1992 aimed at improving health and safety

programs at its facilities, 115-119 Management responsibility for worker protection has been reemphasized within the DOE organization; its Office

of Environment, Safety and Health (EH) has been

restructured; 120 and DOE’s contractors have been

told to devote more resources to health and safety

matters.

The Occupational Safety and Health Act of

1970 exempted Federal agencies from the authority of OSHA to the extent that those agencies

exercised independent authority over worker

safety and health,121 DOE, granted such authority under the auspices of the Atomic Energy Act,

is the only Federal agency that claims such an exemption. DOE Order No. 5483 requires DOE

contractors to obey and implement all OSHA

standards. 122 However, OSHA does not have

right-of-entry or inspection at DOE weapons facilities, nor can it issue citations at DOE facilities

or impose financial or criminal penalties if DOE

contractors fail to comply with these standards.123

The DOE Office of Environmental Restoration

and Waste Management, which has line management responsibilities for cleanup of the NWC, is

struggling to establish OSH policies applicable to

DOE contractor employees engaged in environmental remediation and waste management. EH,

the DOE office charged with providing independent oversight of occupational health and safety

programs within DOE and among its contractors,

has reorganized, added new safety and health

staff, and is in the process of revising and updating DOE orders, some of which are relevant to

cleanup worker protection.

These and other proposed and accomplished

actions indicate that DOE has taken a number of

positive steps to improve worker health and safety at its facilities. However, DOE and its contractors continue to operate under an organizational

structure that presents serious obstacles to

progress in safeguarding worker health and safety. OTA notes three major organizational issues

that must be confronted if DOE is to institutionalize a “new culture of accountability in environment, safety, and health.”

First, managers and workers throughout DOE

and its contractor corps must be convinced that

occupational health and safety is truly a top priority of the Department. OTA analysis indicates

that this is not now the case. 124-131 In 1990,
12! Hazards Ahead: Managing Cleanup Worker Health and Safety at the Nuclear Weapons Complex

OSHA found that “pressures to get the job done

often overrule safety and health concerns.” Some

top managers openly derided the significance of

the “new culture,” and workers also indicated

skepticism of health and safety as a serious priority. Today, assertions that DOE management is

aggressively pursuing staunch worker protection

policies are undermined by delays in addressing

inadequate OSH practices documented by Tiger

Teams,132 133 as well as delays in official adoption of proposed OSH orders; by the failure of

DOE managers to impose penalties on contractors who do not enforce sound worker protection

policies; and by reports that DOE facility operations have continued or been resumed before appropriate safety training and procedures were

completed.

134 135

Second, DOE line organizations require significantly more staff and more resources devoted

to OSH matters. The DOE approach to worker

health and safety protection calls for its line organizations, such as EM, to develop OSH policies

within the purview of their program missions and

ensure that contractors implement these policies

adequately. In practice, there are far too few OSH

professionals in DOE to accomplish this. DOE

staff trained or experienced in OSH matters are

scattered throughout the line organizations and

are frequently found in “advisory” positions with

no real influence.

As in the private sector, actual cleanup at DOE

facilities is just beginning. EM, the line organization directly responsible for cleanup, has laid an

important foundation for the DOE cleanup effort

and may, in time, develop effective and innovative occupational safety and health programs.

However, OSH issues have been neglected by

EM thus far, and the Office does not have the

staff needed to create or monitor a robust worker

health and safety program for the cleanup. EM

managers, preoccupied with other priorities, address OSH issues only reactively.

Third, DOE has no reliable or credible process for rewarding or punishing managers’ performance in matters of safety and health. The

ability of EH to properly monitor DOE and contractor performance in OSH matters is inadequate and is likely to remain so despite progress

in formalizing contractor assessment protocols,

because of the small numbers of qualified field

staff. Actual enforcement of OSH orders is haphazard, and the only penalty levied DOE or contractor managers for failure to comply is embarrassment. EH, which is charged with providing

independent oversight of OSH activities, is not

truly independent. Its policy recommendations

must, in practice, receive the concurrence of

other DOE program managers. The EH role is

advisory only; this Office has no authority to enforce its own stated policies.

These three structural flaws in DOE’s approach to worker protection—lack of strong

management commitment to OSH priorities; lack

of sufficient OSH staff and resources in DOE

program offices to carry out stated OSH responsibilities; and lack of independent oversight or

enforcement of OSH policies and orders at DOE

facilities-are likely to impede efforts to ensure

protection of workers engaged in cleanup of the

Nuclear Weapons Complex.

In addition, DOE’s decentralized internal organization and the diffuse, multilayered structure

of DOE-contractor relationships are likely to intensify the difficulties with accountability, efficient communication, and chain of command that

have hampered the protection of cleanup workers

during other hazardous waste operations.

Finally, because of the scope and complexity

of environmental contamination throughout the

NWC, worker protection issues encountered at

non-Federal cleanup sites, including inadequate

characterization of site OSH hazards, poor contracting procedures, and controversial and variable implementation of HAZWOPER, are likely

to be not only revisited but magnified during the

DOE cleanup. The DOE institutional structure

that will frame OSH policy and practice for the

cleanup is poorly suited to address many of these

matters.
Chapter l–Overview and Findings 13

SUMMARY OF FINDINGS

Opportunities for DOE

The challenge of environmental restoration

and waste management at the DOE Weapons

Complex provides an opportunity both: to advance the state-of-the-art of occupational health

and safety programs for the cleanup workers who

will carry out DOE’s new mission of environmental restoration; and to create a model for

keeping the thousands of workers engaged

worldwide in this task safe and healthy.

Current DOE Approach Inadequate

DOE’s current approach to worker health and

safety is marked by three major weaknesses:

●

●

●

the Department has not established an institutional culture that honors protection of environment, safety and health as fundamental

priorities;

the DOE Office of Environmental Restoration and Waste Management (EM) has not

developed effective OSH policies and programs for the cleanup or ensured that contractors are implementing appropriate worker protection programs;

the DOE Office of Environment, Safety and

Health (EH) does not have the field staff

necessary to oversee cleanup worker health

and safety and does not have sufficient authority to enforce OSH policies and orders

among DOE line managers and contractors.

Draw From Experience

Experience in protecting cleanup workers during RCRA corrective actions and Superfund operations has revealed a variety of problems that

have ranged from inadequate health and safety

planning, to poor training to lax enforcement o f

cleanup worker protection standards. DOE could

learn from this experience by participating in the

EPA/Labor Superfund Health and Safety Task

Force, and by initiating additional consultations

and interactions with other government agencies

and with labor representatives.

Focus Now

The need to focus high-level management attention and increased resources on protecting

those who will do the work of cleaning up is urgent. Some needed provisions, such as worker

training programs, medical surveillance strategies, and emergency response plans, will take

time to develop and implement and must be in

place when cleanup commences.

Areas Needing Attention

Key areas where concerted management efforts could bring needed results are:

●

●

●

●

improving characterization data for contaminated sites in order to prepare good health

and safety plans;

improving contracting practices to ensure

proper incentives for protecting workers at

all contracting levels;

interpreting and implementing OSHA worker protection standards and supplementing

these with rigorous management attention to

safety and health, including outside oversight;

providing for informed and active worker

participation in protection programs.

Consequences of Failure

Failure to prudently and adequately protect

cleanup workers at Nuclear Weapons Complex

could have serious consequences. Individual

workers might experience illnesses or injuries

that could have been avoided had effective OSH

programs been in place. In addition, concerns

about worker protection might result

delays, increased costs, and erosion

lie’s faith in proposed cleanup plans.

in schedule

in the pub-
14 I Hazards Ahead: Managing Cleanup Worker Health and Safety at the Nuclear Weapons Complex

CHAPTER 1 ENDNOTES

1 R. Rhodes, The Mak”ng of the Atomic Bomb (New York NY:

Sirnon and Schuster, 1986).

z U.S. Congress, Office of Technology Assessment, Complex

Cleanup-the Environmental Legacy of Nuclear Weapons Production, OTA-O-484 (Washington DC: U.S. Government Printing Office, February, 1991).

3 Ibid.

4 U.S. Congress, Office of Technology Assessment, Corrdng

Clean-Superfund Problems Can Be Solved, OTA-lTE-433 (lVashington, DC: U.S. Government Printing Office, October, 1989).

5 D.M. Mackay, J.A. Cherry, “Groundwater Contamination:

Pump-and-Treat Remediatio&” Environmental Science and Technology, vol. 23, No. 6, 1989, pp. 630-636.

G C.W. Holmes, R. Lewis, ct. al., “Environmental Restoration

and Waste Management Manpower Needs Assessment: U.S. Department of Energy Complex,” Contract DE-AC06-76RL0 1830,

June 1992.

7 Office of Technology Assessment, Complex Cleanup, 1991,

op. at.

8 James D. Watkins, Secretary of Department of Energy, “Ten

Points Initiative,” reprinted in Occupational Safety and Health Administration, Evaluan”on of the U.S. Department of Energy’s Occupational Safety and Health Programs for Its Government-Owned

Contractor -Operated Facilities, December 1990, p. B13.

9 J. Demerit, “Training Under Superfund, ” Toxicology and lndustria/Health, vol. 5, No. 4, 1989, pp. 103-110.

10 M GocMeld and J, B~ger, Ynvestigaticms and Activities at

Supcrfund Sites,” Occupational Medicine: State of the Art Re)’iews,

vol. 5, No. 1, January-March 1990, pp. 127-142.

11 N Fiedler, “un~ers~~gstress h H=dous Waste Workers,” Occupational Medicine: State of the Art Reviews, vol. 5, No. 1,

January-March 1990, pp. 101-108.

IZ J Mefius, ~~Medicals~eiuance for H=dous Waste ‘Orkcrs, ” Journal of Occupational Medicine, vol. 28, No. 8, August

1986, pp. 679-683.

Is Natio~ Academy of Sciences, Risk Assessment in the Federal Government. Managing the Process (Washington, DC: National Academy Press, 1983), p. 12.

14 National Academy of Sciences, Health Effects of Exposure ‘0

Low Levels of Ionizing Radiation, BEIR V (Washington DC: National Academy Press, 1990).

is A. Stewti, “Healthy worker and Healthy !kvivOr Eff~ts in

Relation to the Cancer Risks of Radiation Workers,” American

Journal of /ndusm”al Medicine, vol. 17, No. 2, 1990, pp. 151-154.

16 E. Gil&fi, “studies of Workem Exposed to bW Doses of External Radiatiou” Occupational Medicine: State of the Art Reviews,

vol. 6, No.4, October-December 1991, pp. 665-680.

17 J Go f- Radia~”on-Induced Cancerfiom hw Dose EXPOsure: An Independent Analy$is (San Francisco, CA: CNR Book Division, 1990).

18 B+ ~v ad J).we-, Occupational Health-Recognizing

and Preventing Work-Related Disease (Bostoq MA Little Brow

1988), p. 4.

19 J B Fu- Construction Safety, Security, and ~ss Pre- . .

vention (New Yorlq NY: Wiley-Interscience, 1984).

20 me Business Ro~d@ble, Improving C0nw74cti0n Safev

Pe~ormance, Report A-3 (New Yorlq NY; January 1982, reprinted

July 1990).

21 Ibid.

22 c Rob&04 F< St-, H. Venable, et. al., The Assessment of

Hazards in the Construction Industry (National Institute for Occupational Safety and Health, May 1990).

23 National Institute for Occupational Safety and Health

(NIOSH), Occupational Safety and Health Administration (OSHA),

U.S. Coast Guard (USCG), U.S. Environmental Protection Agency

(EPA), Occupah”ond Safety and Health Guidance Manual for Hazardous Waste Site Activities (Washington DC: U.S. Government

Printing Office, October 1985), p. 2-1,

u M Gochfe]d, “me Medi~ Surveillance Of -dous Wrote

Workers,” Occupational Medicine State of the Art Reviews, vol. 5,

No. 1, Januaxy-March 1990, p. 3.

25 M. Gochfeld, V, Cmpbell, and P. Landsbergis, “Demo~aphy of the Hazardous Waste Industry,” Occupational Medicine

Stare of the Art Reviews, vol. 5, No. 1, Janq-March 1990, pp. 9-

23.

26 Offlce of Technology Assessment Workshop on cle~uP

Worker Health and Safety at the DOE Nuclear Weapons Complex,

Washington DC, May 15, 1991.

27 Office of TwhnoIon Assessment-Hazardous waste Action

Contractors (I-WAC) Workshop, Washingto% DC, Sept. 17, 1991.

28 M, Gochfeld, Dirmtor, Occupational Health Divisio% University of Medicine and Dentistry of New Jersey, Robert Wood

Johnson Medical School, persoml communication with T. O’Toole,

Office of Technology Assessment, April 22, 1991

29 office of TechnoloW Assessment, Complex Cleanup, 1991*

op. cit.

~ Office of Technolo~ Assessmen4 Coming Clean, 1%9, oP.

cit.

31 DOE po~ts out that its rate of lost workdays due to COns~Ction-related illnesses or injuries is about half that of the private sector. These claims must be tempered by documentation by the Occupational Safety and Health Administration of serious, wide-spread

errors in DOE’s methods of recording work-related illness or injuxy.

Also, recent audits of DOE line management oversight of contractor

construction practices suggest that DOE’s performance in this area

is weak.

32 office of Technolo~ Assessment Workshop on c*e~uP

Worker Health and Safety at the DOE Nuclear Weapons Complex,

op. cit.

33 P.L. 10@321 .

M U,st Congress, General Accounting Office, Marshall ~slandtitate of the Nuclear Claims Trust Fund, GAOiNSlAD-92-

229, (September 1992).

35 K.R, Feinberg, “In the Shadow of Fernald: Who Should Pay

the Victims?” The Brookings Review, summer 1990, pp. 41-46.

36 Weapons Complex Monitor, “DOE to pay Fernald Citizens

$73 million in Three Installments,” Feb. 14, 1990, p. 3.

37 R. Bo~o, ~~second Downwin&r Lawsuit Filed,” The SPokeman Review, Aug. 10, 1990, p. B2.
Chapter l–Overview and Findings 115

38 Associated Press, “Judge Combines Radiation Lawsuits, ”

Tri-City Herald, Mar. 3, 1991.

39 E. Schumacher, “Hanford Spends $39 Million in ~~wycrs,”

The Spokesrnarr Reivew, Mar. 8, 1992, p. B6,

40 Throughout this paper, tie te~ “cleanup worker” includes

all individuals who engage in hazardous waste operations or emergency response, Thus, project managers, engineers, supervisors, enwronmental scmntists, technicians, laborers, firefighters, and others

arc all cleanup workers,

~1 Offlcc of T~hnology Assessment Workshop on DOE Cleanup Workers, op. cit.

~z oTA_wAc workshop, oP cit.

43 Env~onmcn(al protection Agency-IArcrr Health and s~cty

Task Force, minutes of meeting, June 27, 1992,

44 Offlcc of Hca]th Compliance Assistance, Directorate of C~mplmnce Programs, U.S. Dcp,artmcnt of IAor, Occupational Safety

and Health Administmtion, “Draft Protocol for OSHA Compli,ancc

Inspections of Supcrfund Inciner:ition Sites,” May 13, 1992.

‘s J.T. Hughes, “An Assessment of Training Needs for Worker

Safety and Health Programs: Hazardous Waste Operations and

Emergency Response,” Applied Occupational En~[rorrmentul Hygiene, February 1991, p. 116.

46 wm K. Reilly,, A(fminis~~itor, [1 S. Environmental ~otcctmn Agency, “S(atemcnt Before the Subcommittee on Investigations and Oversight, Committee on Public Works arid Transportation,” U.S. House of Representatives, Oct. 3, 1991.

47 U.S. Envlronm~nta] Protection Agency, “Update on SuPcrfund, ” submitted to Subcomrnittcc on Investigations and Oversight,

Comrnlttcc on Public Works and TrimspottatloI~, U.S. House of

Representatives, Oct. 3, 1991,

18 Office of Technology Assessment, ~’orrlln{q Clf’an, 19~9.

Op. clt,

49 u s, DepLirtlnent of ~bor, Occupational Safct}’ and H~lth

Admimstration, Ejuluurlon qf the US. Department of Encr-qy’s Occup</tlonal Sufetj <Ind Health Program for its Go\crnment-On ncd

Cc)ntr(~ct{)r-Opt’rutedF [lcllltle.r (December 1990)

o Sccrctti<il pmcl for Ev~llua(ion of Epidcmlologlc RcsLlrch

Actlvltlcs for the U.S. Department of Energy, “Report to the Secrcwy,” March 1990.

s i us Dcp:~nlent of Energy,, Environment, Safety and He~lt~l

01 fICC of Environmental Audit, En\/ronmen/a/ Sun’cy prcllnlinarj

Rcp~),r(, Hunford .\’r(e, Rlrhlund, W>l (Washington, DC: l_I.S, Government I%ntmg Office, August 1987).

5L U.S. Department of Energy, Envimnmcnt, S:licty and Iicalth

Olflcc of Er~\’ironmcntal Audit, Er~\~rott/)~c~tt{~/ .~ur~ej Prc[iminary

Report, Rock>s Flats Plant, Gol~icn, Cc)lorudo (Washington, DC:

Li. S Govcrnrnent Prmtlng Office, June 1987)

s 7 [r s F ncrgl, Rc$ ~arctl and Dc; c1 opmcnt Ad rmn I Smt ion,

. . .

hlound Labor.itory, .Wounii klhorat{)~l E~l\/rl)/l))lt’tl/ul Piutoniurn

.$/udj, 1974 ~ Sprlngflc]d, VA: National Technical Inforrniition ScrVlcc!, 1975)

-W cl ,S, Dcp:lrtr~lcrlt ~>f Encr~y, Env ironmcnt, Siifety and H~alfll

Office of Envlronmcntal Audit, F)~\lr~)r/?)tt’~]f<J/ ,SUnt7)I Pr(7/r’m[narj

Report, itiah,] Nat[<)nu[ k“n,ginecrln<q Lahi)ra[,)rv, iciahcj Fallsj

[duho dnd Component Dc\[ioi)ment an(i lnt<,~rd[l( In f’uci[lr>, B1/trc,

Montunu, ( Wiishlrlgtorl, DC: L’. S (;o~ crnmcnl I’rln(l ng Of( ICC,

Septcmhcr 1988),

55 U.S. Dep~cnt of Energy, Environment, Safety and H~~

Office of Environmental Audit, Environmental Survey Preliminary

Report, Los Aiamos National Laboraton, Los Aiamos, New Mexico

(Washington, DC: U.S. Government Printing Office, January

1988).

% u . .s Dep~ment of Energy, Environment, s~ew ad ‘~]~

Office of Environmental Audit, Tiger Team Assessment of the Oak

Ridge Y-12 Piant, Oak Ridge, Tennessee (Washington, DC: U.S.

Government Printing Office, February 1990).

ST u s Dep~ent of Energy, Envlronmcnt, Safety and H~lth . .

Compliance Assessment [)f the Ne)’ada Test Si~e, (Washing[on, DC:

U.S. Government Printing Office, January 1990).

5L7 Natio~ Academy of Sciences, Committee to Provide Interim Oversight of the DOE Nuclear Weapons Complex, Commission

on Physical Sciences, Mathematics, and Resources, The Nucicar

Weapons Complex: Management for Health, Safety, ami the Environmertt (Washington, DC: National Academy Press, 1989).

59 Advisory committee on Nuclear Facility Safety to tic us.

Department of Energy, “Final Report on DOE Nuclear Facilities,”

November 1991.

60 u s Congress, General Accounting Office, Increased Rating . .

Resuits in An’ard Fee to Rock} Fiats Contractor, GAO/RCED-92-

162 (Washington, DC: U.S. Government Printing Office, March

1992),

61 Defense Nuc]e~ Fac~]itles Safety Board, “Recommendation

to the Secretary of Energy pursuant to 42 U.S.C Section 2286a(5)

A[ornic Energy’ Act of 1954, as amended,” Dec. 19, 1991.

62 U.S. General Accounting Off’ice, More Attention to Health

and Safety Needc(i at Pantex, GAOmCED-91- 103 (Washington,

DC: U.S. Government Printing Oficc, April 1991).

63 Richlmd Field Office, U.S. Department of Energy, “DOE Invcstlgation Board Report Fall-Related Fatality of a Construction

Worker at Hanford Silc 105-F Building on Apr. 7, 1992,” May

1992.

64 Richland Field Office, U.S. Dcparrmcnt of Energy. ‘WW B

Invcstlgation of Hanford Tank Fiim]s Vapor Exp{)surcs, ” April

1992,

65 M Gochfeld et ~~, Demography of the Haz=dous Waste industry: Occupational Medicine Stute (?f the Art Reiic}%ys, vol. 5,

No, 1, January-March, 1990, pp. 9-23

~ ~g uSC, 65 I-678 (wrest 198S id SUPPI. 1992 ~

67 ;9 CFR 1910.120,

fi OTA_HWAC Workshop, op. cit.

69 J coca115, rndu~~i,il Eiygicmlst, Office Of Enlergcncy R~-

sponsc and Rcmcdiation, US. Environmental Protection Agcrrcy,

Co-chair, EPA-L,abor Health and Safety Task Force, Of flcc of

Emergency and Remedial Response, U.S. Environmcnt:il Protcctlon Agency; personal communication to T. O’TOOIC, Offlcc of

Tcchnolo~ Assessment.

m Occupatlorlal Safety and Hca]th Administration, Office of

Hc:tlth Compliiil]ce Assistiu]ce, Directorate of Compliance Progri!nls, LJ.S Department of Labor, “Protocol for OSHA Compliance

Inspections of Superfund Incineration S1tcs-Draft Final, ” Nov. 16,

lq)~

“’] EPA-l~ibor Ficiiltll iirld Safety Task Force, rnlnutcs of rncetinp, Sept. 22, 1992,

720 r.4-IIW’AC W’orkfhop, op. cll.
16 I Hazards Ahead: Managing Cleanup Worker Health and Safety at the Nuclear Weapons Complex

73 Uos, Cowas,(j~~~AccO@hgOffl% o@O~fOr improving Safety and Health in the Workplace, GAO/HRD-90-66BR.

(Washington, DC: U.S. Governm ent Printing Offke, August 1990).

7A U.S. Environmental Protection Agency, “Superfund

prO~tXS,” 9200.1-12, May 1992.

75 Uos, ~v~~en~ protection Agency, “Supplemen@

terial, National Priorities List Proposed Rule,” EPA 9320-7~51,

February 1992, p. 3.

76 J. Belagq Regio~ Administrator, U.S. Environmental ~0-

tection Agency letter to H. Lenow, Counsel to Hausom Massachusetts Permanent Firefighters Association, Apr. 29, 1992.

~ R. H- ~d R. ~uscins~, “fi&ge ROD Ove_d,”

Environ Report, Winter 19891Sp~ 1990, p. 1.

78 -WAissues~h for Early Risk Assessment to SCIWII

Alternatives,” Super@dReport, Jan. 15, 1992.

79 ~ce of fiagemy and Remedial Response, U.S. EnvhOnmental Protection Agency, Risk Assessment Guidance for Superfimd: Vol.1-Human Health Evaluation Manual, Part B, Development of Risk-Based Preliminary Remediation Goals, (Washington

DC: U.S. Government Printing OffIce, December 1991).

so u s. .Enviro~en~l Protection Agency, Office of Solid

Waste and Emergency Response, “Superfund Accelerated Cleanup

Model-SACM,” March 1992.

81 EpA-~bor H~th and Safety Task Force, mhlutes Of w. 5,

1992 meeting.

82 L. MWhy, D~ector, ~dous ~te~S Tr*g, ‘tmtional Association of Firefighters, personal communication to T,

O’Toole, July 17, 1992.

83 EpA.~bor H~ti and Safety Task Force, minutes Of ~. 5,

1992 meeting.

~ U.S. O&Ice of TecMology Assessmen4 Compkx Cleanup,

1991, op. cit.

85 J, CoCalls, Natioml Institute of OtXupatioml Stiety ~d

Health, Environmental Investigation Branch (formerly Co-chair,

EPA-Labor Health and Safety Task Force), personal cmmmmication to T. O’Toole, Office of Technology Assessment, August

1992.

86 utter from K.F. Gravit4 Area Director, Occupational s~ety

and Health AdministratiorL U.S. Department of Labor to J. Merloni,

Jr., president Massachusetts Laborer District Council, Oct. 13,

1989.

ST OTA Wo~op on DOE Cleanup Workers, OP. cit.

88 OTA.~AC Workshop, op. cit.

89 U.S. Env~o~en~l Protection Agency-Labor H@lth ad

Safety Task Force, minutes of meeting, Sept. 22, 1992.

m U.S. Envirorunen~l protection Agency-Labor H~lth ~d

Safety Task Force, notes from Mar. 11, 1991 meeting.

w U.S. mp~ent of hbor, Occupational Safety ~d H~th

Administration% “Safety and Health Program Management Guide

lines; Issuance of Voluntary Guidelines” Federal Register, vol. 54,

No. 16, pp. 3904-3916, Jan. 26, 1989.

~ U.S. ~p~ent of Labor, Occupational Safety ~H~th

Administratio~ “Process Safety Management of Highly Hazardous

Chemicals; Explosives, and Blasting Agents; Final Rule,” Federal

Register, vol. 57, No. 36, pp. 6356-6417, Feb. 24, 1991.

w OTA Wo~op on DOE Cleanup Workers.

~ U.S. Dep~ent of Labor, Occupational Safety ~d H~th

Administration “OSHA Inspection of Bros Hazardous Waste Incinerator Facility,” 1992.

95 OTA.mAC Workshop, oP. cit.

96 OTA wo~op on DOE cleanup workers, Op. cit.

w oTA-mAc Workshop, oP. cit.

9S U.S. ~vhomen~ protection Agency, OffIce of Emergency

and Remedial Response, Risk Assessment Guidance for Superfund: vol. 1: Human Health Evaluation Manual, 9285.701A, July

1989.

99 OTA Wo&shop on DOE cl~up Worbrsj ‘pm Cit”

Im M. ~Meld and E. Fava@ “Medical !huveitie of ~-

ardous Waste Workers: Conclusions and Consensus,” Occupan”orud

Medicine: State of the Art Reviews, vol. 5, No. 1, January-March

1990, pp. 151-159.

101 0’fA-~Ac wO&ShOp, op. ciL

loz ~A-~bor HcxIJth and safety Task Force, minutes Of m@-

ing, Mar. 5, 1991, May 3, 1992.

103 J. Mow D~~tor of Occupiitiond Sddy ~d ‘da ‘-

borers Health and Safety Fund of North America, “Testimony on

Proposed Rulemaking on Accreditation of Training Programs for

Hazardous Waste Operations,” Docket No. S-760-5, U.S. Department of Labor, Occupational Safety and Health Ad.ministratio@

Jan. 22, 1991.

104 OSHA and NIOSH refer to Site Safety and Hdth pl~

(SSHPS) whereas EPA uses the term Health and Safety Plans.

Throughout this documen~ health and safety plan (HASP) is used to

include all these terms.

105 OTA-WAC Workshop, op. it.

106 OSM promulgated an interim final rule on H~wdous

Waste Operations and Emergency Response (HAZWOPER) as 29

CAR 1910.120, December 1986; the fti rule was issued on Mar.

6, 1989, with an effective date of Mar. 6, 1990.

107 OTA-WAC Workshop, op. cit.

log U.S. Dep~ent of Labor, Occupational Safety ad He~th

AdrninistratiorL “HAZWOPER Interpretive Quips (IQs),” October

1992.

10955 Federal Register (WAingtoq DC: U.S. Gove~ent

Printing Office, Jan. 26, 1990): “Accreditation of Training Programs for Hazardous Waste Operations; Notice of Proposed Rulernaking,” U.S. Department of Labor, pp. 277&2793.

110 J. Mo- op. cit.

1 I 1 Natioml ~ti~te of Environmental Health Sciences, Accrealtation of Training Programs for Hazardous Waste Operations

(March 1990).

112 ~temtio~ Association of Firefighters, “Accreditation of

Training programs for Hamrdous Waste Operations,” Docket No.

S-760-B. U.S. Department of Labor, Occupational Safety and

Health Administratio~ Jan. 22, 1991.

113 J-eswa~s, secre~, U.S. Department Of Energy,

“Ten-Point Initiativc+Remarks by James D. Watkins, June 27,

1989,” reprinted in Evaluation of the U.S. Departme nt of Energy’s

Occupational Safety and Health Program for Its GovernmentOwned Contractor-Operated Facilities, Occupational Safety and

Health Admi.nistrationj December 1990, op. cit., p. B-1-13.

114 ~lce of TduwIogy Assessment Complex Cleanup, 1991,

op. cit.
Chapter l–Overview and Findings ! 17

115 James wa~s, secretary, U.S. Department of Energy,

“Strengthening Line Management and Accountability in DOE Contractor Worker Safety and Health Programs,” memorandm Mar.

20, 1991. 116 ~ld,

117 Jwes wa~, swe~, U.S. Department of Enmgy, “Developing Strategy For Assigning Rewards and Penalties for Compliance with Occupational Safety and Health Administration

(OSHA) Regulations and DOE Orders,” memorandum, Mar. 20,

1991.

118 James wa~s, secretary, U.S. Department Of Energy,

“Reevaluation of the DOE’s Pending Whistleblower Rule,” Mar.

20, 1991.

119 U,s. Dep~cnt of Energy, OffIce of the press Sarew,

“Secretary of Energy Appoints Environment, Safety and Health

Committee,” Mar. 30, 1992.

no petm Bms~ Acfig Assi.mm Secretary Envkomen4 Safety and Health+ U.S. Department of Energy to the Secretary, “hnplementation Plan for the Office of Heal@” memorandu% May 18,

1990.

12139 u.S.C 651-678 (West 1985 and SUpp. 1992), 4@)(l).

122 us, Dep~ent of Energy, Office of Environment, Safev

and Health, “Contractor Occupational Medical Program, DOE

Order 5480.8A,” June 26, 1992.

123 Executive ~der 12191 gives OSHA authority to tispect

DOE facilities for the limited purpose of inspecting working conditions for Federal employees.

124 Advisow Committee on Nuclear Facility Safety, oP. cit.

125 us. Conwess, General Accounting Office, Increased Raring Results in Award Fee to Rocky Flats Contractor, GAO/RCED92-162 (wWdliIlgtOIlj DC: U.S. GOV emment Printing Office, March

1992).

126 Defense NucleaI Facilities Safety Bored, op. cit.

127 u-s. Congress, General Accounting Office, op. cit.,

GAO/RCED-91-103, (Washington DC: U.S. Government printing

OffIce, April 1991).

126 U.S. D~~ent of Labor, Occupational Health md Safety

Administiatioq Evaluation of the U.S. Department of Energy’s Occupational Safety and Health Program for Its Government-Owned,

Contrucfor-Operated Facilities (Washington, DC: U.S. Government Printing OffIce, December 1990).

129 Ricwd Field Office, op. Cit.

130 Ricwd Field Office, op. cit.

131 OTA Workshop on DOE Cleanup Worken.

132 weapons Complex Monitor “Hanford Shows Lack of

Progress on ES&H Issues, DOE Report Says, Aug. 10, 1992, pp.

19-20.

133 U.S. Dep~ent of Energy, offke Of Safety, Offla of ~-

vironment Safety and Health, “Report on the DOE Occupational

Safety and Health Program Review of the Portsmouth Gaseous Diffusion Plant”, October 1992.

1~ Weapons Compffl Monitor “OFNSB Critical of Westinghouse, DOE at Savannah River Plutonium Plant”, Mar. 30, 1992,

pp. 7-8.

135 Adviso~ Committee on Nuclear Facility Safety, op. cit.
Lessons From

T

he United States has had nearly 20 years’ experience

with hazardous waste operations at Resource Conservation and Recovery Act (RCRA) and Superfund

sites, Much of this work has involved site characterization efforts: attempts to identify the nature of site pollutants and

to map their locations, concentrations, and environmental transport routes. In addition, emergency removals of contaminants

have been carried out at about one-third of all (non-Federal) sites

12 permanent cleanup ac- on the National Priorities List (NPL).

tivities and construction projects that usually involve more complex and lengthy remediation actions are just getting underway

at most sites. Nonetheless, the RCRA-Superfund experience offers important lessons about protecting the health and safety of

workers engaged in environmental remediation—lessons that

are directly applicable to cleanup of the Nuclear Weapons

Complex.

Superfund

and RCRA 2

WORKER PROTECTION ISSUES WITHIN THE

REGULATORY PROCESS

Competition Between Worker Protection

and Other Cleanup Priorities

The environmental laws and regulations that drive the goals

and schedules of most environmental cleanup operations do not

assign worker health and safety a high priority. Superfund and

RCRA regulations and procedures are complicated, and are intended to guide employers through the multitude of technical

uncertainties and necessary assumptions that are inevitably part

 Amid the complexities an d of environmental remediation.3-5

controversies surrounding site characterization, remedial design,

The RCRA -

Superfund

experience offers

important lessons

about protecting

worker health

& safety

19
20 I Hazards Ahead: Managing Cleanup Worker Health and Safety at the Nuclear Weapons Complex

and cleanup, the information and programs needed to ensure the safety and health of cleanup

workers and emergency responders can be overshadowed or neglected.

In setting cleanup priorities, site owners, managers, and regulators must contend with a range

of issues and goals, such as the concerns and priorities of local communities, technical obstacles

to meeting target levels of residual contamination, legally binding agreements on cleanup

schedules or project “milestones,” and cleanup

costs. The importance of worker health and

safety protection may become lost in this welter

of competing issues, especially when the workforce is unorganized, transient, and inexperienced—as is the case for a large proportion of

cleanup workers6—and when work-related illnesses are not clearly linked to specific work

hazards or appear only years after initial exposure.

The Agency for Toxic Substances and Disease

Registry (ATSDR) is responsible for determining

the potential human health impacts of toxic materials released into the environment. ATSDR has

broad statutory authority to evaluate the human

health implications of environmental toxicants,

and has occasionally intervened to protect the

health of cleanup workers.7 ATSDR officials are

rarely present during cleanup operations however, and the Agency’s work focuses mostly on

possible off-site health effects of Superfund and

RCRA pollution.

In some circumstances, efforts to mitigate

risks to off-site populations may increase the

health and safety hazards faced by cleanup workers. For example, at one Superfund site, contractors proposed construction of a structure to prevent air releases of volatile organic compounds

(VOCs) that were being pumped from contaminated groundwater. However, workers operating

within this structure would have been exposed to

VOC levels that were up to half the concentration

believed immediately dangerous to life and

health,8 OSHA and EPA recently agreed to make

investigations of worker protection issues associated with “enclosures” at hazardous waste sites a

high priority.9

Weak Oversight of Occupational Health

and Safety Rules by Regulators

The Occupational Safety and Health Act holds

all employers responsible for providing workers

with “safe and healthful working conditions.”10

The Occupational Safety and Health Administration (OSHA) standard for Hazardous Waste

Operations and Emergency Response (HAZWOPER), enacted to protect cleanup worker

health and safety, mandates a structured, but nonspecific, performance-based approach to worker

protection during hazardous waste operations

and emergency response.ll Under this standard,

crucial and complex decisions about how to

identify and mitigate cleanup worker health risks

are left to the judgment of individual employers.

The quality and the comprehensiveness of

health and safety programs implemented under

HAZWOPER at Superfund and RCRA sites are

reported to vary widely.12 13 These inconsistencies stem from several sources, including of information gaps and uncertainties about necessary

levels of worker protection; differences in the

rigorousness with which different employers

pursue worker safety and health protection;

OSHA’s failure to issue detailed guidance documents that would help employers to interpret and

apply the broadly worded HAZWOPER regulation; and a weak OSHA enforcement effort.

OSHA and EPA cooperatively developed an

OSHA inspection protocol for incinerators at

Superfund sites.

14 In general, however, OSHA

enforcement of HAZWOPER has been weak.15

OSHA has about 1,000 inspectors (including supervisors and trainers) to enforce health and safety standards for almost 3.6 million employers

16 Aside from the hand- and 55 million workers.

ful of planned Superfund incinerator inspections,

OSHA has not targeted the more than 4,000

RCRA sites that may require or have undergone
Chapter 2–Lessons From Superfund and RCRA 21

remediation, or the 1,354 sites on Superfund’s

NPL

17 18 as high priorities for OSHA inspections.

EPA is the Federal agency with the most expertise in hazardous waste operations. However,

EPA staff are not well prepared to assess or oversee worker health and safety during cleanup. Few

of EPA’s regional staff or project managers have

occupational health and safety backgrounds.

Currently, EPA maintains that it does not have

the authority to enforce OSHA’s HAZWOPER

requirements .19

EPA has, at times, neglected to consider worker risks when selecting cleanup options.20 21

Although EPA officials have acknowledged the

need to weigh worker health risks against the

benefits of particular remediation measures, they

have developed a formal means of doing so only

in the past few months, and the effectiveness of

the proposed changes in EPA’s risk assessment

approach has yet to be tested.22

EPA’s principal goals, which are largely a response to public and congressional pressures, are

to reduce the time needed to complete the RCRA

and Superfund processes, and to accomplish

cleanup more cheaply. A recent proposal for a

“new Superfund paradigm” is designed to speed

up site assessments and initiate activities early on

in the cleanup process to reduce “immediate

risks.” 23 It is not clear how this new paradigm

will affect cleanup worker health and safety.

Some contend that these “faster, cheaper” priorities are at odds with worker protection needs,

which might in certain cases dictate a “go-slow”

approach to unusually hazardous situations or

when implementing innovative remedies.24

Neither the assessment of cleanup worker

health and safety risks nor the evaluation of proposed and implemented worker protection programs has high priority for the regulatory agencies most involved with the implementation of

Superfund and RCRA. The OSHA regulatory officials who are most knowledgeable about worker protection issues generally are not familiar

with environmental cleanup work and are rarely

present during cleanup operations. The EPA regulators who are most familiar with hazardous

waste work know little about OSH matters and

refuse to enforce OSHA standards. The net result

is that interpretation and implementation of

cleanup worker OSH standards are highly variable and are left, essentially, to the voluntary efforts of employers.25-27

EPA-Labor Health and Safety Task Force

The EPA Office of Solid Waste and Emergency Response (OSWER) has established the

EPA-Labor Health and Safety Task Force, consisting of employees from EPA, OS HA, the

National Institute of Occupational Safety and

Health (NIOSH), the Army Corps of Engineers

(ACE), and representatives of labor unions

whose members frequently conduct cleanup

work. Regular meetings of the Task Force have

provided a collegial, nonbureaucratic setting in

which participants can discuss problems associated with the interpretation and enforcement of

HAZWOPER from a technical and professional

perspective, 28 outside the policymaking process.

The Task Force is situated in the EPA office

that has line control over remedial action programs. Task Force members believe this organizational position gives it greater authority and

persuasive powers with contractors and construction managers than if it were located in a health

and safety oversight unit.

The Task Force has facilitated the clarification

and integration of EPA, OSHA, and ACE policies, and has been constructive in identifying

some of the more pressing and pervasive worker

protection problems at RCRA and Superfund

sites. One major accomplishment of the group is

the preparation of “fact sheets,” or simplified

guidance documents, on topics that have been

problematic at Superfund sites. 29-34 Other accomplishments that have been stimulated by

needs identified by the Task Force include a

Memoranda of Understanding between OSHA
22 I Hazards Ahead: Managing Cleanup Worker Health and Safety at the Nuclear Weapons Complex

and EPA that provide EPA funding to train

OSHA personnel and develop a protocol for OSH

inspections of hazardous waste incinerator operations.

35 36

The Task Force represents a multidisciplinary,

interagency, cooperative effort that has proved

extremely useful in developing viable approaches

to worker health and safety protection in the environmental cleanup industry. EPA’s OSWER deserves credit for initiating and supporting the

Task Force. Yet despite such progress, the Task

Force appears to enjoy only limited support

among EPA and OSHA policymakers. EPA has

not hired any health or safety professionals to replace the two industrial hygienists who formerly

staffed OSWER's Design and Construction

Management Branch. OSHA, too, was initially

reluctant to participate in the incinerator inspection project.

Some evidence suggests that EPA staff perceive Task Force suggestions and findings as potential impediments to the achievement of other

agency goals, such as the speedy completion of

cleanup.

37-39 There is some justificatiion for such

concern. One issue that the Task Force has raised

repeatedly is the inadequacy of site characterization data with respect to the identification of

potential safety hazards and worker health

risks. 40-42 provisions that would allow revision of

or additions to the regional site characterization

so as to better support HASPS might delay cleanup schedules.

The Task Force has also focused attention on

the inadequacy of emergency response plans at

some Superfund sites. Lack of appropriate training and equipment on the part of municipal firefighters who might be called on to respond to

emergencies during the cleanup operation is of

particular concern.

43-45 Remedying these problems may be time consuming and costly.

Since EPA is under considerable pressure to

demonstrate rapid progress in moving waste sites

through to closure, delays are of concern to

OSWER staff. However, avoiding delays in fuplished by ensuring that worker risks area specific focus of initial characterization efforts, requiring management to take proper heed of site hazards, and instituting appropriate emergency

response plans. Such actions could improve community acceptance of cleanup plans and thereby

expedite the remediation process.

Worker Protection Needs and Site

Characterization

Site characterization activities are especially

important to efforts to protect cleanup workers.

Characterization data obtained during the

Remedial Investigation/Feasibility Study (RI/FS)

process in Superfund cleanups and during RCRA

Facility Investigation (RFI) efforts are supposed

to provide information about the presence, location, and concentration of hazardous contaminants so that appropriate engineering responses

to the pollution can be devised.46

EPA requires that potential remediation alternatives at Superfund sites

47 be assessed against

nine criteria that include overall protection of

human health and the short-term effectiveness of

different cleanup technologies-thus implying

the obligation to consider risks to cleanup workers.

48 Practitioners and health professionals consulted by the Office of Technology Assessment

(OTA) maintain, however, that in practice, other

criteria—particularly “implementability” and

cost—weigh more heavily than protection of

cleanup worker health and safety. In practice,

possible threats to cleanup workers are seldom

considered at the outset of site characterization

efforts, and such issues are rarely factored into

decisions about environmental sampling strategies.

49-51 Consequently, RI/FS and RFI data frequently fail to provide the information needed to

determine the nature or seriousness of the health

and safety hazards that cleanup workers might

encounter and do not always translate into useful

information about potential worker exposures,

health risks, or necessary protection levels.52

ture cleanup schedules might best be accom-
Chapter 2–Lessons From Superfund and RCRA 23

RI/FS and RFI data are the foundation on

which site-specific worker health and safety

plans are formulated. Health and safety plans

(HASPS) are legally mandated documents intended to identify specific hazards workers might

face and provide a blueprint of worker protection

programs and safe work practices to be followed

PPE is needed to prevent worker exposure to

contamination when the nature and extent of toxic

pollutants is uncertain, These workers wear

protective clothing and respirators while drilling

sampling wells.

during cleanup activities. HASPS are a key element of OSHA’s HAZWOPER standard, the

major Federal regulation governing the occupational health and safety of cleanup workers. If

site hazards are not recognized in characterization studies, HASPS are likely to be flawed.

The failure of RI/FS and RFI data to provide

sufficient information to support sound and efficient worker protection programs reflects a pervasive lack of focus in site characterization studies.53 54 Decisions about what substances to look

for at contaminated sites, what instruments to

use, how long or often to carry out monitoring,

etc., are very site specific, require considerable

professional judgment, and are not readily prescribed by regulations (see box 2-A).55

OSHA standards for some toxic substances

(e.g., lead, benzene) mandate specific monitoring

methods to ensure accurate determinations of

worker exposure.

56 Most standards do not include monitoring requirements, however, and in

any case, many of the substances found at waste

sites are not addressed by OSHA regulations.57

Careful consideration of sampling strategies,

measurement methods, and quality assurance

(QA) programs is essential if environmental

monitoring data are to be successfully applied to

worker protection programs, The National

Academy of Sciences, in its recently published

report on monitoring exposure to airborne pollutants, has estimated that 15 to 25 percent of the

total monitoring budget should be expended on

Q A .

5 8

Attempts to organize environmental monitoring programs for cleanup workers are constrained

by the technical limitations of available monitoring equipment; real-time instruments suitable for

field use are especially needed. (See box 2-B.)

The logistic complexities of assaying worker exposures under the changeable conditions of many

hazardous waste operations and most emergency

response scenarios are also problematic. Finally,

the costs associated with robust worker monitoring programs can be considerable, and such investments are not always recognized as high priorities in contract negotiations.59 60

EPA recognizes that environmental sampling

strategies used in Superfund and RCRA cleanup

are often poorly conceptualized, and has emphasized the need to link environmental monitoring

data to specific information needs and to involve

risk assessors and other health professionals

early on in data collection strategies.61 EPA has

recently issued interim guidelines for risk assessment at Superfund sites that aim to streamline environmental sampling and to address directly the

potential worker risks associated with implementing selected cleanup remedies. 62 63 This

new approach may prove useful if it truly does direct more attention toward characterizing risks to

cleanup workers. There is some danger, however,

that EPA’s eagerness to make site evaluations

shorter and less expensive could counteract the
24 I Hazards Ahead: Managing Cleanup Worker Health and Safety at the Nuclear Weapons Complex

Box 2-A—Environmental Monitoring and Worker Protection at

Hazardous Waste Sites: How Much Is Enough?

The purpose of environmental monitoring at hazadous waste sites is to identify the type and quantity of

site contaminants, and to map envviromnmental transport pathways, current boundaries, and probable future

migration patterns of the contamination. The appropriateness and efficiency of the traditional approach to

environmental monitoring at hazardous waste sites have been controversial Some experts are frustrated

with the delays and costs associated with laborious efforts to “study a site to death,” whereas others complain that hasty and possibly ineffective cleanup remedies are being imposed before the nature of the con-

●

tamination is understood.

At many Superfund sites, enormous amounts of data are collected to no purpose because monitoring

programs not integrated with the information requirements of proposed remediation tasks, risk assessment activities, or worker protection programs. For example, at a Superfund site in EPA Region II, large

numbers of environmental samples were collected and analyzed during incineration of lagoon sludge containing polychlorinated biphenyls (PCBs) and other toxic materi als. The results of these analyses were not

routinely reviewed by health and safety professionals, nor were they used to confirm or improve the effectiveness of ongoing occupational safety and health (OSH) procedures.l 2

Decisions about what substances to look for contaminated sites, what instruments to use, how long or

often to carry out monitoring, etc., are very site specific, require considerable professional judgment, and

cannot be readily prescribed by regulations. Although the Occupational Safety and Health Administration

(OSHA) standard on Hazardous Waste Operations and Emergency Response (HAZWOPER) requires environmental monitoring at toxic waste sites, it does not specify that the highest exposures to most hazardous materials be monitored. OSHA standards for some toxic substances (e.g., lead, benzene) mandate specific monitoring methods to ensure accurate determinations of worker exposure.3 Most standards do not

include monitoring requirements, however, and in any case, many of the substances found at waste sites

are not addressed by OSHA regulations.

1 Joee#l coceli& CO-CIUU“ , Us. w “ 1~A&v-= Heahh md Safety Task rbrce, pemenal co rmnmicatiim to T. O’Toole,

Aug. 19,1992 2 R. Curtis, Dixector, Ocmpetieml S@y md Heal& Admidmmd “in’s HeeIth Respanse T- U.S. Depamwm of Labor, letter to J. Rocbe,

Residcat hgineer, U.S. Almy ~ of e, Aug. 17,1992.

3 U.S. Caqpw, Ommd A~CMce, Occupational Safety and Health: Options for Improving Health and S~ety in the Wor&place,

GAO/HRD-90-66BR (Augwt 1990).

benefits of an increased focus on cleanup worker quired. A typical cleanup operation will include

health and safety.

PROBLEMS WITH CONTRACTING

PRACTICES

A multilayered managerial structure encompassing a large number and variety of employers

is an important feature of most cleanup operations. 64 65 Waste sites undergoing cleanup resemble more routine construction sites, with many

tasks proceeding simultaneously and with workers employed by multiple contractors or subcontractors coming and going as their skills are reofficials of State and Federal regulatory agencies;

managers of contracting firms and subcontractors; and an array of organized and unorganized

laborers, skilled workers, technicians, scientists,

and engineers.

66 The sprawling, complicated

structure of such a work force generates significant management challenges to protecting cleanup worker safety and health.

Contractual agreements among site owners,

prime contractors, and subcontractors are the

principal mechanisms for establishing the occupational health and safety programs that will be
— 

Chapter 2–Lessons From Superfund and RCRA 25

Box 2-A—Continued

Unusual or episodic exposures like those that occur during accidents may represent some of the most serious health threats at waste sites, but such exposures would not be noted during routine monitoring. Thus,

inhalational exposures that occur during unusual wind conditions, or dermal exposures that occur when a

drum is pierced accidentally or when personal protective equipment fails, are not easily anticipated or documented by routine environmental monitoring. Also, monitoring data may reflect only average exposures

when biological effects are determined by peak concentrations. Monitoring that measures ambient conditions may fail to reflect the actual exposure of particular individuals.

Disputes over the accuracy and adequacy of characterization data, and how these data inform interpretations of worker health risks, have caused delays in cleanup schedules at Superfund sites and Resource

Conservation and Recover Act (RCRA) facilities. At a Superfund site in Massachusetts, for example, the

prime contractor was unable to produce characterization data justifying the designated boundaries of supposedly uncontaminated areas. Work was halted for several months while the prime contractor, labor representatives, and regional Environmental Protection Agency and OSHA officials attempted to resolve the

controversy. Additional environmental sampling was eventually necessary.4 5 Phase I contract costs increased by $1.3 million as a result of response actions associated with safety and health issues. 6 The

regarding the adequacy of site characterization data spilled over into local communities, led citizens to

question the wisdom of the entire cleanup plan, and contributed to additional delays in cleanup schedules.7

At the Nyanza Superfund site in New England, characterization data failed to identify important site

contaminants, and the HASP resulting from this inaccurate picture of site hazards proved inadequate to

protect workers.8Employees working without protective gear, in a supposedly “clean” area of the site, uncovered drums containing unidentified materials. Six workers became ill; one was hospitalized. At this

same site, it was discovered-after cleanup work had begun-that no methods existed for detecting potentially dangerous levels of methylmercury found on-site.9 Cleanup had to be halted for several months while

monitoring procedures and safe work practices were devised.

4 L Mqhy, ‘*Cn~i~ in ~F~ ~~i~,” fhlfeR0C12 pIIXX%dhI&S of ~‘ktProtection Agency Design and Construction Issues at

Hazardous Waste Sites Conference, Dallas, TX, May 1-3,1991, EPA 540/8-91fl12, p. 828.

5

P

. Gratin, Area Director, U.S. Depmnent of Labor, Occupational Safety and Healt& letter to J. Merloni, Jr., President, Massachusetts Laborers’

Dishict blXIC& Oct. 13, 1989.

6 J. Cocalis, Co-Chair, EPA-Labor Health and Safety Task Pmce, personal cornmuni cation to T. O’Toole, U.S. Congress, Office of Technology

Assessment, Aug. 19, 1992.

7 J. MorQ Co-Chair, EPA-Labor Health and Safety Task Force, personal communi cstion to T. O’Toole, U.S. Congress, Office of Technology

Assessment, June 23, 1992.

s Ibid.

9 James Merloni, Jr., Administrator, New 13@and Laborers’ Training and Trust FUOL letter to Congressman Joseph D. Early, U.S. House of

Repnxentatives, July 13, 1989.

followed during cleanup operations. From the matched to appropriate worker protection strateperspective of occupational safety and health,

cleanup contracts must ensure that site HASPS

adequately address site hazards and worker risks,

and that employers are held accountable for

implementing such plans. Contracts must also

be sufficiently flexible to allow individual contractors or subcontractors to negotiate changes in

the original HASPS as work progresses so that

the evolving understanding of site hazards is

gies.

Unless occupational health and safety programs included in contract bids are critically reviewed and the health and safety records of competing bidders are taken into account, companies

offering cheaper, less stringent worker protection

programs may have an unwarranted advantage

over firms whose bids include more rigorous

OSH plans. Contract proposals that incorporate

331-056 0 - 93 - 3 QL 3
26 I Hazards Ahead: Managing Cleanup Worker Health and Safety at the Nuclear Weapons Complex

Box 2-B-Environmental Monitoring: Technical Limitations

Environmental monitoring methods can be divided into measurements obtained via direct-reading instruments and those obtained by sample collection with laboratory analysis of results. Direct-reading field

instruments provide instantaneous readings, albeit of a somewhat general nature, for some groups of contaminants. Laboratory analysis of environmental samples can provide more specific information about the

types and concentrations of contaminants, and is usually required for purposes of legal documentation, but

time (hours, days, weeks, or months) is needed to obtain the results.

Direct-reading monitoring instruments are becoming increasingly available and have several advantages.l Immediate availability of contaminant measures is obviously useful, eliminating both the time and

the costs required for laboratory analyses. Direct-reading instruments are invaluable for certain aspects of

cleanup, such as the early stages of site investigation, or during confined entry procedures when means of

detecting very high levels of contaminants that might pose immediate danger to life or health are required.

Direct-reading equipment is available to detect flammable or explosive atmospheres, oxygen deficiency,

the presence or absence of organic vapors, some contaminants in soil or groundwater, and surface contamination by radionuclides.2

Direct-reading instruments are also useful for identifying changing conditions at a site to alert personnel

that additional caution may be warranted. For example, direct-reading instrumentation can be used to monitor drilling or drum-packing operations. If an area of highly concentrated chemicals is penetrated or a

drum leak occurs, abruptly high direct readings of contaminant concentration could prompt an immediate

reevaluation of the health and safety procedures in effect and possibly prevent worker exposure.

Significant limitations attend the use of most direct reading field instruments, however.3 Low concentrations of contaminants are not easily detected by direct-reading equipment, and often only classes of contaminants, not specific chemicals, can be identified Some contaminants cannot be detected by such equipment, and most direct-reading instruments are not sensitive enough to detect low levels of contamination

that may be of concern. Most instruments cannot detect airborne concentrations of less than 1 part per million. In some cases, subsequent laboratory analysis of samples is necessary to verify results of such directreading instruments, particularly when monitoring results are being used for litigation or regulatory purposes.

Direct-reading instruments require careful calibration and must be operated by skilled personnel who

understand their limitations and idiosyncrasies. The interpretation of values given by direct-reading equipment is not necessarily straightforward4 There is potential interference by other contaminants, and appropriate sampling protocols for use of this equipment have not been well established. Direct-reading equipment is essential for many worker protection monitoring programs, but as the National Academy of

Sciences noted, there are major research and development needs in this areas

1 W. Chudyk, “Field Screening of Hazardous Wsste Sitis;’Emirome~l Sciewe &Technology, WA 23, No. 5, 1989, pp. 504-507.

2 Us. ~Pm@iou Agency, CM&e of Euxwgency and Remedial Respmse, “Estabiisbing Work Zones at Uncontro I.led Hazardous

Waste Sites,” Publication 9285.2-06FS, April 1991.

3 ~&

4 Office of Technology Assessnxmt Workshop cm DOE Cleanup Workem, op. cit.

5 N~~ Ac~myof~=$,H~n@osureAssessment for Airborne Po1l-~~ D(!: National kXUk321y PRX?S), 1991.

vague or boilerplate HASPS may militate against costs of additional investigations into potential

firms that insist on more rigorous or comprehen- site hazards.67

sive occupational health and safety programs or It is important that contract bids and awards be

that wish to include in their contract bids the reviewed by persons who are informed about ac-
—.————— — ..——.

Chapter 2–Lessons From Superfund and RCRA 127

tual site conditions, who recognize the limitations of available characterization data, and who

have sufficient technical background to evaluate

occupational health and safety needs.68 Otherwise, the programs required to protect cleanup

workers may be negotiated out of contract agreements.

Negotiators who lack professional training in

occupational health and safety, or are unfamiliar

with the great uncertainties about site hazards

and worker risk that pervade hazardous waste

operations, may fail to recognize the need for

prudent, proactive approaches to worker protection. 69 Some OSH professionals have complained to OTA that the lack of occupational

health and safety expertise among Federal contract negotiators has made it difficult to ensure

adequate levels of worker protection during

cleanup operations.70

EFFECTIVENESS OF CLEANUP WORKER

HEALTH AND SAFETY REGULATIONS

Overview of OSHA’s Hazardous Waste

Operations and Emergency Response

(HAZWOPER) Standard

Congress has recognized that workers engaged

in hazardous waste and emergency response

operations face special health risks . 71 T h e

Superfund Amendments and Reauthorization Act

of 198672 required OSHA and EPA to establish

regulations to protect such workers. Accordingly,

EPA and OSHA promulgated identical regulations,73 the so-called HAZWOPER standard, to

protect workers engaged in hazardous waste operations and emergency response.74

Many different laws and regulations, promulgated by both Federal and State authorities, can

affect cleanup worker health and safety. However, HAZWOPER targets workers engaged in

hazardous waste operations and emergency response, and is the most comprehensive and specific regulation governing occupational safety

and health programs or procedures applicable to

environmental cleanup activities.

HAZWOPER is a complex regulation of many

parts (see figure 2-1).75 The standard requires

employers to consider systematically the potential hazards to cleanup workers at specific waste

sites, and to develop procedures to explicitly

gauge and avoid, or mitigate such hazards. HAZWOPER acknowledges the uncertainty inherent

in hazardous waste operations and mandates several strategies for dealing with this uncertainty,

Figure 2-l—Elements of Site-Specific Health and

Safety Plans Required by HAZWOPER

(29 CFR 1910.120(a)-(o))

a.

b.

c.

d.

e.

f.

g.

h.

i.

j.

k.

l.

m.

n.

o.

Scope, application, and definitions

Safety and health program

Site characterization and analysis

Site control

Training

Medical surveillance

Engineering controls, work practices,

and personal protective equipment for

employee protection

Monitoring

Informational programs

Handling drums and containers

Decontamination

Emergency response by employees at

uncontrolled hazardous waste sites

Illumination

Sanitation at temporary workplaces

New technology programs

—

SOURCE: U.S. Environmental Protection Agency, Office of Solid

Waste and Emergency Response, “Hazardous Waste

Operations and Emergency Response,” April 1991.
28 I Hazards Ahead: Managing Cleanup Worker Health and Safety at the Nuclear Weapons Complex

including requirements for task-specific hazard

or risk analyses to assess the possible dangers of

particular jobs; ongoing environmental monitoring to evaluate worker exposure during cleanup;

medical surveillance programs for certain categories of workers; worker health and safety training to equip individual workers to respond appropriately to health threats they might face in the

course of their jobs; and written, “regularly rehearsed,” emergency response plans to handle

“anticipated emergencies.”

HAZWOPER LACKS DETAILED GUIDANCE

HAZWOPER is a performance-based standard. It describes broad goals that the law aims to

achieve, but does not include detailed instructions on how employers should reach these

goals. 76 The diversity of hazards, setttings, and

work tasks encompassed by environmental cleanup operations, and the “uncontrolled” nature of

the pollutants at issue, generally preclude the use

of explicitly prescribed engineering and mechanical controls to eliminate site safety and health

hazards or to prevent exposure to such hazards.77-

79 The lack of scientific understanding of the

health impacts of environmental toxicants further

complicates attempts to dictate specific worker

protective measures.

The rigor with which elements of HAZWOPER are implemented varies greatly, in part because key components of the regulation are

worded vaguely and subject to different interpretations. 80-82 Most Federal regulations are accompanied by preambles, guidance documents, and

other materials that describe the history, intent,

and appropriate application of the regulation.

EPA, for example, has issued many guidance

documents pertinent to aspects of Superfund

cleanups. OSHA also typically publishes guidance documents to inform employers and its own

inspectors about how specific regulations should

be applied and to ensure that regulations are enforced in a consistent manner.

Hazardous Waste Action Contractors (HWAC),

a major trade association of engineering and science firms engaged in hazardous waste management, notes that the technological uncertainties

of hazardous waste work incur “enormous business risks” and “create many opportunities for

large legal liability exposures.”83 HWAC notes

that regulatory guidance documents provide important clues to interpreting hazardous waste

statutes and regulations-and hence are a crucial

hedge against future liability.

Two years have passed since the final HAZWOPER rule was published, but OSHA has not

yet issued guidance on how critical parts of the

regulation should be interpreted or put into practice. The lack of specificity of many HAZWOPER provisions, combined with the absence

of comprehensive compliance guidance from

OSHA, has made it difficult for employers and

regulators to apply the standard in particular situations. Consequently, HAZWOPER has been

variously interpreted by employers and Federal

officials in different OSHA and EPA regions.8485

For example, for some toxic substances,

OSHA standards specify workplace air concentrations that constitute “action levels.”86 When

monitoring indicates that action levels have been

attained, OSHA mandates that particular responses be triggered, such as the initiation of

medical surveillance and the use of personal protective equipment. 87 88 Many of the contaminants

found at hazardous waste sites are not addressed

by OSHA regulations, however. Employers are

thus left to determine what concentrations of

contaminants in different media should be considered action levels and what actions should be

triggered. Different employers at the same cleanup site may use different action levels.89

Some of the variability in implementing HAZWOPER is due to “information vacuums”-a

virtual absence of toxicological data, exposure

monitoring technology, or both. For example,

there is no toxicological information regarding

the cancer-causing potential of 75 to 85 percent

of all chemicals in commercial use.90 The data

base on noncancer health effects due to exposure

to environmental toxicants (e.g., neurological,
Chapter 2–Lessons From Superfund and RCRA 29

immunological, or reproductive effects) is severely limited in nearly all cases.91-93

The lack of clear regulatory guidance has

caused the HAZWOPER standard to be implemented in ways that are inconsistent, inefficient,

and in some cases ineffective. 94 There is a need

to establish uniform, validated methods for calculating probable worker exposure from given

levels of pollutants in certain media. There is also

a need for regulatory guidance on how to assign

action levels for some common site contaminants

and what worker protection measures should be

triggered when action levels are reached.

EMPLOYER RESPONSIBILITY UNDER HAZWOPER

Although all employers are responsible for

providing “safe and healthful working conditions,” 95 employer responsibility for the health

and safety of cleanup workers is especially burdensome because of the unpredictable and variable nature of cleanup work, the performancebased structure of HAZWOPER, and the lack of

interpretive guidance from OSHA, Under HAZWOPER, employers must determine whether a

particular job is hazardous, assess the degree of

risk involved, and design the appropriate protection strategies to be followed. These decisions are

usually made under conditions of great uncertainty and with little-or contradictory-scientific evidence in support of a given course of action.

Under HAZWOPER:

●

●

●

employers assess the adequacy of environmental characterization data for identifying

site hazards;

employers interpret these data and determine whether and which potential risks are

important;

employers decide how risks to worker will

be mitigated, what level of protective gear is

needed, and what levels of worker exposure

to potentially hazardous-and sometimes

unregulated-materials are acceptable;

Workers moving drums of hazardous waste.

●

●

employers determine what doctors are competent to design and manage medical surveillance programs; and

employers are the final arbiters of whether

and how to alter worker protection strategies

based on the results of medical surveillance

or environmental monitoring.

EPA has made it clear that prime contractors

will be held responsible for inadequate health

and safety plans submitted by subcontractors.96

The U.S. Court of Appeals for the Eleventh Circuit ruled recently that the U.S. Army Corps of

Engineers is responsible for failing to enforce its

own health and safety plan, and is liable for a

subcontractor’s failure to follow ACE safety procedures. 97

OSHA has indicated that employers are responsible for conducting site characterization

studies that accurately portray potential worker

hazards. In a number of instances, OSHA has issued citations to both prime contractors and subcontractors for failure to identify site hazards,98-

100 Employers have challenged such citations ‘n

the grounds that the lack of comprehensive compliance guidance for HAZWOPER makes it impossible to know whether characterization data

accurately portray site hazards, what level of detail must be included in site health and safety

plans, or what specific occupational safety and

health strategies should be implemented to protect workers against uncertain risks.101 102
30 I Hazards Ahead: Managing Cleanup Worker Health and Safety at the Nuclear Weapons Complex

These objections are undercut by HAZWOPER’s clear directive that in the event worker risks

or exposures are unknown or unquantified, work103 It is not practice- ers should be fully protected.

ble, however, to outfit workers in full protective

gear whenever indeterminate exposures to uncertain risks are encountered or anticipated: such

uncertainties are simply too pervasive in cleanup

work. Regulatory guidance providing rational,

consistent approaches to some of the major, common questions regarding interpretation and implementation of HAZWOPER could aid employers and simplify OSHA’s enforcement efforts.

Problems With Specific

HAZWOPER Elements

Most OSHA health standards mandate the use

of specific engineering and mechanical controls

designed to limit worker exposure to potentially

dangerous materials.

104 The diversity of hazards,

settings, and work tasks encompassed by environmental cleanup operations—and the “uncontrolled” nature of the environmental contaminants at issue—render this approach impractical

for many hazardous waste operations, however.

Instead, HAZWOPER provides a framework for

anticipating and responding to potential health

and safety risks encountered during environmental restoration activities, and specifies a number

of elements that must be included in cleanup

worker protection strategies.

Some of the most critical elements of the

HAZWOPER approach are subject to disparate

interpretations.

105 The performance-based language of the standard has allowed employers to

implement aspects of HAZWOPER in widely

differing ways, and the validity and appropriateness of these various approaches have been hotly

disputed.

106 The design and enforcement of sitespecific health and safety plans, the designation

of work zones, and the development of medical

surveillance programs have proved especially

contentious and are discussed below.

HEALTH AND SAFETY PLANS

HAZWOPER requires that a detailed health

and safety plan be in place before any characterization or cleanup work begins. The site-specific

HASP is intended to establish comprehensive

health and safety principles and practices to be

followed by all employees working on-site during normal operations or during emergencies.

The HASP is the essential starting point of an adequate occupational health and safety program at

cleanup sites.

According to HAZWOPER, the HASP must

identify all the safety and health hazards that a

site is believed to harbor. An understanding of

site hazards must then be linked to planned work

tasks. Potential worker health and safety threats

associated with particular jobs must be anticipated via hazard analyses, risk assessments, or other

disciplined methods of scrutiny. Strategies for

worker protection must be devised, such as the

use of environmental and worker monitoring,

medical surveillance, emergency response plans,

worker health and safety training and the use of

personal protective gear. The organizational

structure of the cleanup operation must be described and provisions made for the protection of

off-site populations during cleanup activities. A

written HASP must be in place before any

characterization or mediation work begins, and it

must be updated annually or whenever additional

information about the site is acquired and work

plans change.

Experience at Superfund sites and RCRA facilities has revealed a number of problems associated with HAZWOPER-mandated HASPS.

HASPS formulated on the basis of erroneous or

incomplete information about site conditions or

cleanup plans may promote inappropriate health

and safety practices. As noted earlier, characterization data available when HASPS are written

may fail to identify significant site hazards.

Important potential worker risks may therefore

be missed or inaccurately assessed. Alternatively,

if insufficient information is available about a po-
tential exposure hazard, the HASP may recommend an unnecessarily stringent approach to

worker protection. Fully encapsulated clothing

and respirators decrease a worker’s ability to

communicate and impose risks of heat stress, reduced peripheral vision, and physical clumsiness

on workers. These may be important factors in

hot climates or in situations where agility or the

ability to make a rapid exit is necessary.

Experience at cleanup sites indicates that in

some cases the written provisions of the HASP,

although adequate, are not enforced by either the

prime contractor or regulators, and do not reflect

actual site conditions or work practices.107 108

This was reportedly the case at two Superfund

sites in New Bedford, Massachusetts, where

mandated emergency response plans exist only

on paper. At the New Bedford Harbor site, where

plans call for polychlorinated biphenyl (PCB)

contaminated sediment to be dredged from the

harbor and incinerated, the water supply available in the event of a fire is only 25 percent of

that called for in the written HASP.109 110 The

New Bedford Fire Chief has publicly stated that

his department lacks the training and equipment

needed to respond to emergencies at either of the

two local Superfund sites, and has prohibited

members of his department from entering either

of these sites.111 112

Another problem with many HASPS is the tendency to concentrate on potential worker health

threats (e.g., long-term cancer risks) while paying little attention to more immediate site safety

risks. 113 problems encountered at hazardous

waste incinerators illustrate the seriousness of

safety risks and the need for detailed analyses of

potential hazards and ongoing vigilance in evaluating risks and altering worker protection strategies as cleanup proceeds and site operations

change.

At one site, while soils contaminated with ex -

plosives were being incinerated, an explosion resulted in more than $200,000 in property damage

and more than $1 million in costs for research,

incinerator redesign, and lost production. One

Chapter 2–Lessons From Superfund and RCRA 31

employee received first- and second-degree burns

over 40 percent of his body. The ACE investigation team that reviewed the incident noted that fatalities would have been a near certainty if other

114 

workers had been in the area, This accident

occurred after more than 12,000 tons of contaminated soil had been incinerated successfully.

Changes in the composition of the soil being

treated significantly affected the behavior of the

incinerator and eventually led to the massive

overpressure that resulted in explosion. Smaller

explosions had occurred prior to the accident,

causing temporary and automatic shutdown of

the plant, but they were not fully investigated or

allowed to interrupt production.115

Another incinerator accident resulted in the

hospitalization of three workers. Once again, failure to persistently scrutinize potential worker

risks resulted in injuries. In this case, slag and

soil deposits were known to collect in the incinerator quench tank during burns of contaminated

soil, and workers had to remove this material

manually between burns. On at least two occasions, workers refused to enter the tank for fear of

being hit by falling pieces of hot slag, but managers failed to inspect the burner chamber for

slag buildup to determin e the danger to workers

operating in the tank below. On the day of the accident, two workers were inside the quench tank,

shoveling slag onto the tank portal, when approximately 3 cubic yards of slag/soil fell from the

burner. These workers received second- and

third-degree burns over 30 percent and 75 percent

of their bodies. Five other workers who had

joined in the rescue effort were taken to the hospital for evaluation of lung irritation from breathing the fine dust particles released when the slag

fell. One of these workers was hospitalized with

pulmonary edema.116

WORK ZONES

OSHA has determined that wastes sites may

be divided into zones, according to the “potential” for worker exposure to hazardous materials
32 I Hazards Ahead: Managing Cleanup Worker Health and Safety at the Nuclear Weapons Complex

Figure 2-2—illustration of Typical Work Zones at Hazardous Waste Sites

\\\. . “ “. “ l--i+ 0

Command post

*,\

—====siL- —.— , d

\

Prevailing wind direction

—

Hazardous Waste Sites,” April 1991.

(see figure 2-2). Exclusion or “hot” zones should

include all areas where workers are “potentially”

exposed to contaminants in excess of OSHA’s

published Permissible Exposure Limits (PELs).

Access to such areas should be restricted to those

who have received certain levels of health and

safety training and who are equipped with appropriate personal protective gear. Decontamination procedures must be followed when people

or items of equipment leave such exclusion

zones. 

117 118

.

On the periphery of hot zones are contamination reduction zones (CRZS), where decontamination procedures take place. Beyond the CRZs

are support zones, which should be free from

contamination or exposure hazards. According to

HAZWOPER, workers in the support zone need

no special protective equipment or training beSOURCE: U S. Environmental Protection Agency, Office of Solid Waste and Emergency Response, “Establishing Work Zones at Uncontrolled

yond instruction in the proper evacuation procedures in case of emergency.l19

Limiting the hot zone confers logistic and economic advantages because outside this zone, applicable HAZWOPER training provisions are

less rigorous, decontaminatiion procedures need

not be followed, workers do not have to use special protective gear, and work can generally proceed in a less rigid and more rapid fashion. Yet

OSHA offers little guidance on how employers

should determine if workers are “potentially exposed” to hazardous materials, other than to note

that such exposures include “accidental or possible exposure.”

120 121 OSHA provides no suggestions about what to do if a site contains contaminants that are not regulated or have no “published

levels,’’ 122 nor does it suggest how employers
Chapter 2–Lessons From Superfund and RCRA 33

.

$- - 4.

Decontamination procedures must be carried out

when workers leave “hot zones” for uncontaminated

or “clean” areas of the site.

should gauge risks to workers exposed to mixtures of hazardous materials (see box 2-C).

OSHA’s published PELS refer to allowable air

levels, but many environmental contaminants encountered at waste sites are found in soil, sediment, vegetation, and water, There is no scientific

consensus about, or validation of, what methods

should be used to convert the amount of a toxic

substance that is legally permissible in ambient

air into the allowable concentration of that substance in soil or other media. Determining the degree of hazard or risk associated with a particular

worker exposure, and the level of worker protection required, depends on a number of assumptions and estimates. In the absence of validated or

government-sanctioned methods for estimating

exposures and risks, different employers make

use of different assumptions, which result in differing estimates of allowable exposure levels.123

MEDICAL SURVEILLANCE

Medical surveillance in the workplace refers

to the periodic and systematic collection and

analysis of data about workers’ health and workplace conditions, with the aim of detecting “illnesses or health trends that indicate a possible adverse effect of workplace exposures” before

serious disease has become evident or the worker

would normally seek medical advice,124

In addition to indicating the effectiveness of

worker protection from hazards and providing

early recognition of work-related health effects,

medical surveillance programs may also:

●

●

contribute valuable information to studies of

long-term health impacts of occupational

exposures among groups of workers, and

allow evaluation of an individual worker’s

“fitness” to carry out particular job tasks or

to cope with physical stresses such as wearing respirators or encapsulated clothing. 125

The information collected in medical surveillance programs may take the form of questionnaires, physical exams, medical tests such as

x rays or blood analyses, or environmental monitoring and industrial hygiene data. To be useful,

such information must be gathered and analyzed

in a systematic way: there must be some coherent

rationale directing the types of data that are collected and the questions that are analyzed. The

most important purpose of medical surveillance

activities is the translation of analytic results into

actions that forestall or reduce further exposure

to materials shown to be hazardous.

When surveillance data are analyzed over populations or whole groups of workers, it is possible to practice “primary prevention.” In such

cases, medical surveillance reveals that some exposure or situation is causing adverse health effects or abnormalities that might lead to future
34 I Hazards Ahead: Managing Cleanup Worker Health and Safety at the Nuclear Weapons Complex

Box 2-C-Cleanup Workers and Allowable Limits of Exposure

to Environmental Toxicants

Among the most difficult issues surrounding protection of cleanup worker safety and health is the question of what “levels of exposure” to particular toxic substances are reasonable and legal. Many toxic substances encountered at hazardous waste sites are not covered by existing regulations. The 620 substances

for which the Occupational Safety and Health Administration (OSHA) has published Permissible Exposure

Limits (PELs) were chosen for their relevance to general industry and exclude many of the substances

found at Superfund and Resource Conservation and Recovery Act (RCRA) sites. The Environmental

Protection Agency (EPA) publishes allowable exposure limits for some materials, but many of EPA’s regulations are media specific. It is not clear that standards designed to regulate allowable concentrations of

toxic substances in groundwater can or should be translated into occupational limits for a particular toxic

contaminant in soils, for example. Mixtures of hazardous contaminants have not been satisfactorily addressed by any regulatory agency.

The scientific basis for setting particular exposure limits is often scanty. Approximately 60,000 chemicals are used commercially; human data are available on the cancer-causing potential of about 60 substances. Animal and in vitro studies of carcinogenicity have been conducted on a somewhat larger number

of substances, but no information whatsoever is available on the cancer-causing potential of 75 to 85 percent of all chemicals in commercial use today.l Even less is known about the nonacute, noncarcinogenic

effects of chemical exposure. Scientists have become increasingly attentive to noncancer biological end

points, such as the impact of environmental toxicants on the neurological, immunological, and reproductive systems.

Most worker exposure standards focus on ambient air contaminants, and almost all regulatory standards

and recommended exposure levels (PELs, Threshold Limit Values, etc.) are based on air monitoring measurements. This historical focus on airborne contaminants in occupational settings does not accurately

capture many potentially toxic exposures encountered during hazardous waste operations, such as the ingestion of contaminated soil or skin absorption of toxins. It is often unclear how to translate measurements

of contaminants in ambient air into dosages received by individual workers via ingestion or absorption

through the skin.

Furthermore, many OSHA standards are outdated, and the scientific basis for many PELs has been challenged. 2 34 The U.S. Court of Appeals for the Eleventh Circuit recently vacated more than 400 OSHA

PELs established in 1989, thereby in effect making the worker exposure limits established in 1971 the law

of the land.5

The difficulty of accurately measuring cleanup worker exposure to toxic materials is increased by the

variety of particular cleanup tasks and associated worker exposures, which may differ from one day to the

next. Episodic worker exposures to hazardous materials, such as releases that occur during accidents, are

especially difficult to monitor. The transiency of much of the hazardous waste work force makes it difficult

—

1 U.S. Congress, Office of Technology Assessmmt, Complex Cleanup-the Environmental Legacy of Nucltzr Weapons Production (Washington

DC: U.S. Govermrmt Printhg Office, February 1991).

2 S. Roach and S. Rsppaport, “But ‘Iky Are Not Tbrmholds: A Critical Analysis of the Docunmmtation of Threshold Limit Values,” American

Journal of Industrial Medicine, vol. 17, pp. 727-753, 1990.

3 B. Castlernan and G. Ziem “Corporate Influences on Threshold Limit Values,” American Journal of industrial Medicine, vol. 13, pp. 531-554,

1988.

4 Me pit~er, ‘+s~&d SW@; A pO~tiC~ Mss,’’American Jownal afIndustrkd Medicine, VOI. 17, No. 2, pp. 255-Z9, IW.

5 Occupational Safety and Health Reporter, “Labor Department Asks Eleventh Circuit To Reconsider Core on OSHA Exposure Limits”

(Washington, DC: ‘he Bureau of National Affairs, Inc.) %pt, 9,1992, pp. 515-516.
Chapter 2–Lessons From Superfund and RCRA 35

Box 2-C-Continued

to determine workers’ past exposures or to ascertain an individual’s cumulative exposure burdens. There

are no regulations requiring that a worker’s cumulative exposure be tracked over time. In some situations,

peak levels of exposure bear most heavily on health outcomes; interpretation of monitoring data that record

only average exposures may therefore be problematic.

In the absence of occupational standards, the allowable exposure levels for hazardous waste workers are

unclear. Some argue that EPA standards, developed to protect community health and based on lifetime

risks (24-hour exposures for 70 years) and a consideration of sensitive individuals such as the elderly and

young children, should be applied. Others believe this approach is overly conservative.

Many legal exposure standards in fact represent compromises between health considerations and other

concerns such as cost, feasibility, and the potential benefits of a chemical.6 7 In many cases, there is no

pragmatic alternative to such compromises. Different stakeholders have competing interests in the establishment of exposure standards, and regulators must act on the basis of the limited toxicologic information

available. It is important to keep in mind, however, that legal standards and recommended exposure guidelines are not always well validated by scientific evidence.

Appropriately designed medical surveillance programs might, over time, eliminate much of the uncertainty about what level of worker protection is needed in different exposure situations, but medical surveillance of cleanup workers is itself hampered by limited science, vague regulations, potentially high costs,

and poor oversight by managers.

What is certain is that controversies over the adequacy of worker monitoring, and wide variations in the

costs and efficacy of such programs, will continue to occur.

6 IWChael Pi[cher, “Stan&rd Setting: A Political Process, ’’American Journal of Industrial Medicine, vol. 17, No. 2, 1990, p. 255.

7 National Research Council, Risk Assessment in rhe Federal Government: Managing the Process (Washington, DC: National Academy Press 1983)

pp. 44-47.

health problems in some portion of the work Medical surveillance is especially important in

force. This recognition provides the impetus to

alter work conditions so that additional exposures

are reduced or eliminated. The ability to use

medical surveillance data in support of primary

preventive strategies depends on how the data are

organized and assessed, the way results are communicated to workers and decision makers, and

the manner in which managers respond to the re- —

Suits. 126-128

The identification of health problems in particular individuals-with prompt intervention in the

form of removal from harmful work situations

and medical treatment if necessary-is called

“secondary prevention.” With secondary prevention, the individual has experienced a harmful exposure and some adverse biological effect has already occurred.

hazardous waste work. 129 Traditional industries

rely on industrial hygiene monitoring to detect

worker exposure to dangerous substances. This

information guides the use of appropriate engineering controls, personal protective equipment,

safe work practices, etc. At hazardous waste

sites, however, the usefulness of environmental

monitoring to detect worker exposures is limited

(see box 2-B). The failure to identify or accurately map site contaminants; the episodic nature of

many worker exposures, especially during accidental releases of toxic materials and other emergencies; and the lack of reliable, real-time field

instruments to detectcontaminants in all media

mean that, in many situations, medical surveillance is the only way to recognize worker exposure to toxic substances.l 30
36 I Hazards Ahead: Managing Cleanup Worker Health and Safety at the Nuclear Weapons Complex

In addition, many of the engineering controls

and work practices used in traditional industrial

settings to prevent worker exposure to hazardous

substances are impractical at hazardous waste

sites, Instead, less reliable methods of worker

protection must be used, such as personal protective equipment (PPE) or work practice techniques (e. g., exclusion of untrained workers

without appropriate PPE from contaminated 131 Finally, given the many sci- areas of the site).

entific uncertainties about the biological consequences of exposure to environmental toxicants,

prudence demands that the health status of cleanup workers be reviewed periodically to ensure

that adverse exposures and health effects are not

occurring.

The medical surveillance provisions of HAZWOPER are a tacit admission of the difficulty of

reliably protecting cleanup workers from potentially hazardous exposure. The HAZWOPER

standard does not mandate medical surveillance

for all workers at hazardous waste sites, however.

Only those employees “who are or may be exposed” at or above OSHA’s PELs for 30 or more

days a year, who wear a respirator for 30 or more

days a year, who become sick due to overexposure during a release incident, and who are

members of emergency response teams must be

132 Under HAZ- offered medical surveillance.

WOPER, workers who do not meet OSHA’s “30-

day trigger” are not eligible for periodic medical

surveillance evaluations and are not required to

undergo medical assessment at the termination of

employment.

Determining which workers “may be” exposed to high levels of toxic materials is as problematic in designating eligibility for medical surveillance coverage as it is in delineating the

boundaries of work zones. Some consider the 30-

day trigger an invitation to hire short-term workers to perform the dirtiest and most dangerous

jobs, without burdening employers with the costs

of providing medical supervision or adequate

training for these workers. 133 134 On the other

hand, representatives from some national environmental firms told OTA that they believe failure to include all employees working on a hazardous waste site in surveillance programs

amounts to negligence and is an invitation to

litigation in the event of worker injury or illness. 

135136

.

In any case, there is no scientific basis for

HAZWOPER’S 30-day demarcation for medical

surveillance coverage. 137 Guidelines for medical

surveillance programs covering EPA employees

acknowledge that brief, high-dose exposure to

toxic materials may carry as much, and sometimes greater, risk than longer but lower dose exposures. Likewise, some exposures, work tasks,

and work conditions may be more hazardous

than others.138 HAZWOPER does not link mandated medical surveillance to such considerations, however.

The OSHA standard includes requirements

pertaining to what written information about

medical surveillance results must be given to individual workers and to employers, as well as

employer record-keeping requirements. The

medical surveillance provisions do not stipulate

that physicians in charge of medical surveillance

programs be trained or have experience in occupational or environmental medicine; doctors need

only be “licensed physicians” according to HAZWOPER, The standard also fails to specify the

content of medical exams or testing programs

(see box 2-D). HAZWOPER does not require

that information gathered for medical surveillance purposes be analyzed by qualified health

professionals or that the results be reported to

health authorities, even if adverse health impacts

are detected or conventional protection programs

are discovered to be inadequate.

The absence of any requirement to report the

results of medical surveillance of cleanup workers to health authorities is a serious shortcoming

of HAZWOPER. Indeed, there is no requirement

to analyze collected data: employers may comply

with the law even if surveillance results are never

reviewed. The absence of a reporting requirement

increases the difficulty of developing truly worth-
Chapter 2–Lessons From Superfund and RCRA 37

Box 2-D—Design of Medical Surveillance Programs for Cleanup Workers

The National Institute of Occupational Safety and Health defines medical or health surveillance as “the

periodic medicophysiological examinations of exposed workers with the objective of protecting health and

preventing disease.”l

Surveillance tests may detect evidence of exposure to a potentially harmful substance-so that appropriate action can be taken to prevent additional exposure; or a test may signal a biological efffect of toxic exposure-hopefully an effect that occurs early in the course of illness, when removal from additional toxic insults or the initiation of appropriate medical treatment can forestall the

development of serious disease.

Even in traditional industries there is little agreement about what constitutes appropriate medical surveillance for a broad range of exposures and work processes. Anecdotal reports suggest that surveillance

involving general industrial workers may at times be excessively elaborate and expensive, that large

amounts of data may be gathered to little purpose, or that collected data may be inappropriately reviewed

and analyzed. On the other hand, the hazardous waste industry is relatively new; no prospective studies of

hazardous waste workers have been done; and the long-term health risks to these workers remain largely

uninvestigated.

There is no consensus on what particular medical exams or diagnostic tests should be included in a medical surveillance program for hazardous waste workers. One study of more than 400 such workers found

that laboratory tests typically used in medical settings were incapable of distinguishing “exposed” (i.e.,

employees whose job titles and descriptions placed them at potential risk of coming in contact with hazardous chemicals) from “unexposed” employees.2

The number and usefulness of tests that aim to detect the effects of toxic exposure are seriously limited

by a lack of information about the biological consequences of exposure to particular chemicals. Many diagnostic medical tests, designed to evaluate people who are already ill, are too insensitive to serve as indicators of the early abnormalities one would like to detect in surveillance programs. Other tests are nonspecific and prone to register an “abnormal” reading even when actual diseases or the effects one is

attempting to measure do not exist. When administered to large populations of healthy individuals, a test

inability to distinguish the truly abnormal from apparently abnormal (i.e., its tendency to produce “falsepositive” readings) can result in a large number of abnormal readings. Such results may then be repeated to

check their accuracy or may lead to more elaborate medical testing, which can cause significant anxiety

and expense.

‘ S. Hemberg, ‘The Validation of Biological Monitoring: An Introduction,” Occupational and Em,ironmental Chemical Hazarok, V. Foa et al., eds.

(New York NY: JOlIII Wiley& Sons, 1987).

2 E. Favata and M. Goehfeld, “Medical Surveillance of Hazardous Waste Workers: Ability of Laboratory Tests to Disc riminate Exposure,”

American Journal of Industrial Medicine, vol. 15, 1989, pp. 255-265.

(contmutd on nexl page)

while programs because data from different sur- Finally, because the precise hazards and nature

veillance programs may be variously analyzed or

interpreted, cannot easily be pooled, and are unavailable to researchers seeking to identify trends

or reliable indicators of exposure or health effects. Small companies may be unable to design

medical surveillance programs with enough statistical power to detect important adverse worker

health impacts.

of possible worker health impacts associated

with hazardous waste operations are poorly

understood, it is important to use medical surveillance results to take advantage of every opportunity to practice primary prevention. Unless

medical surveillance data are translated into improved work site health and safety practices,

“screening and monitoring . . . become sound and
38 I Hazards Ahead: Managing Cleanup Worker Health and Safety at the Nuclear Weapons Complex

Box 2-D-Continued

Thousands of possible medical tests could be included in a medical surveillance program for hazardous

waste workers; it is important that such tests be chosen judiciously. If the medical surveillance program is

not designed to include appropriate tests of exposure to or effects of the toxic materials present at a work

site, then reliance on seemingly “normal” medical surveillance results could induce a false sense of security. On the other hand, pursuit of a large “grab bag” of test components is also unwise. Meaningful analyses

of large amounts of data may be impractical, and a larger number of tests increases the likelihood of falsepositive results.

Medical surveillance programs should not be limited to periodic monitoring of the health of individual

workers without reference to previous findings. They should include analyses of changes in individual

workers over time, as well as cross-sectional “snapshot” analyses of group data. Although a slight decrement in lung function in a single individual might not be cause for concern, progressive loss of function in

a single person or a similar loss of lung function among a group of workers who share job tasks or exposures should, at the least, prompt a work site evaluation and a search for the cause of such findings.

Determining the components of a medical surveillance program is a matter of clinical judgment. It is not

possible to compile a cookbook of recipes to dictate the ingredients of medical surveillance programs that

are appropriate for all cleanup sites. As much as possible, medical surveillance programs should be designed on a site-specific basis. Although the Occupational Safety and Health Administration’s Hazardous

Waste Operations and Emergency Response standard requires only that medical surveillance for hazardous

waste workers be conducted by “licensed physicians,” effective and efficient programs must be designed

by health professionals who have knowledge of the toxic substances a site is suspected or known to harbor,

who understand what medical tests can effectively detect such exposures or their effects, and who recognize the capabilities and limitations of the tests selected.

fury, preventing nothing.’’ 139 HAZWOPER, how- materials may be the frost warning that contamiever, contains no requirement that managers take

medical surveillance results into account when

reviewing the adequacy of existing health and

safety practices or planning new approaches.

Problems With Health and Safety

Training Under HAZWOPER

Cleanup workers’ health and safety depends to

a great degree on the use of personal protective

equipment and on workers’ abilities to recognize

and respond appropriately to unanticipated hazards. The safety of local communities also depends on cleanup workers’ performance and

judgment, because improper management of

contaminants could lead to off-site dispersion of

hazardous materials.

140 The uncertainties of site

characterization and the continuously changing

nature of sites undergoing cleanup mean that

worker recognition of the presence of hazardous

nation exists in a particular area or that a release

of toxic materials has occurred.

The Superfund Amendments and Reauthorization Act (SARA) specifically requires that

hazardous waste workers, managers, supervisors,

and emergency response personnel receive health

and safety training, and directs OSHA to issue

regulations specifying training standards and certification requirements.141 The HAZWOPER

standard sets forth the general “elements” that

should be covered in training courses for cleanup

workers and specifies the number of training

hours required for different categories of workers.

OSHA has also proposed the Hazardous Waste

Operations Training Accreditation Standard,142

which stipulates course content, training hours,

accreditation review processes, and other issues

in greater detail. The proposed regulation is cur-
Chapter 2–Lessons From Superfund and RCRA 39

rently under review; it is expected to be finalized

in early 1993.

HAZWOPER stipulates that hazardous waste

workers must receive health and safety training

that meets certain minimum requirements before

engaging in operations that could expose them to

toxic materials or to safety or health hazards.

Initial or “generic” training must include certain

topics, such as the basic principles of hazard

identification, the use of PPE, and review of the

site HASP and of medical surveillance programs.

Additional training is to be furnished to workers

exposed to “unique or special hazards .“ 143

Programs must include both classroom instruction and supervised, site-specific field training.

HAZWOPER also specifies the minimum

number of training hours that workers must log.

The amount of training required is supposedly

keyed to a worker’s potential for being exposed

to hazardous materials above permissible exposure limits:

• “General site workers (such as equipment

operators, general laborers and supervisory

personnel)” must receive a minimum of 40

hours of off-site instruction and at least 3

days of supervised field experience.

● On-site managers and supervisors “directly

responsible for or who supervise” cleanup

workers must receive an additional 8 hours

of specialized training.

• In addition, general site workers and supervisors must receive at least 8 hours of “refresher training” annually.

• “Occasional” workers who are on-site for

only “a specific, limited task . . . and who are

unlikely to be exposed over permissible exposure limits and published exposure limits”

must undergo a minimum of 24 hours of offsite instruction and at least 1 day of supervised field training.

• Another category of workers, who are regularly on-site but work in areas that have been

monitored and “fully characterized indicating that exposures are under permissible exposure limits where respirators are not necessary, and the characterization indicates

that there are no health hazards or the possibility of an emergency developing” must

also receive 24 hours of off-site instruction

and one day of field experience.144

Because OSHA fails to specify any criteria for

distinguishing between general site workers and

those occasional workers who are “unlikely” to

be exposed to hazardous materials above published PELs, the responsibility for determining

which workers receive the more extensive training is placed on employers. In practice, some

complain that there is a trend to “train to the lowest minimum level, which is 24 hours .’’145-147

The OSHA training categories have been criticized for the same reasons that the designation of

work zone boundaries and worker eligibility for

medical surveillance has provoked criticism:

there is no scientific basis for determining an individual worker’s “potential for exposure” to

hazardous materials during cleanup work. A

1990 workshop held by the National Institute of

Environmental Health Sciences was unable to determine what criteria could be used to distinguish

between general site workers and “occasional”

workers or to determine the applicability of the

24-hour training for “occasional workers.’’148

Another contentious aspect of HAZWOPER’s

proposed training rule is the grandfather clause

that allows some workers to be exempted from

the initial, generic training requirements.149

Employers who can “document or certify” that a

worker’s experience or past training has resulted

in training “equivalent to” that required by HAZWOPER are not required to provide initial training. OSHA does not specify what type or amount

of past experience qualifies a worker for “equivalent training.” Thus, the employer determines

which workers are in need of instruction in an accredited program. Critics contend that this provision violates SARA’s intent that cleanup workers

receive appropriate training in accredited programs.

150 151
40 I Hazards Ahead: Managing Cleanup Worker Health and Safety at the Nuclear Weapons Complex

Some union representatives with extensive experience in hazardous waste operations and environmental remediation claim that even 40 hours

of instruction—the maximum required under

OSHA’s proposed accreditation standard-is insufficient to teach individuals the rudiments necessary to perform cleanup work safely. Several

unions have created cleanup worker training programs that are more rigorous than HAZWOPER

requires, and some have developed 80-hour

“generic” courses.

152 153 The Internationa l

Association of Firefighters (IAFF) argues that

firefighters and emergency responders need far

more extensive and rigorous training than either

HAZWOPER or the proposed accreditation standard mandates.154

In the absence of a current regulatory standard

governing the content and quality of the training

curricula for hazardous waste workers, many different programs have emerged to meet the HAZWOPER requirements that cleanup workers obtain certain minimum hours of health and safety

training. Both the content and the quality of existing courses appear to vary widely.155 Some

courses are reportedly entirely didactic and involve no hands-on training in the use of PPE,

etc. 156 Because HAZWOPER includes no specific requirements for course content or format, employers accept as “trained” any worker who can

provide certification that he or she has received

the requisite number of hours of instruction.157

The target audience should be a factor in directing the focus and the content of training programs. Some labor unions have developed training courses that assume students will be skilled

crafts people who have a basic knowledge of

trade-specific safe work practices. EPA offers

courses geared primarily to Federal Superfund

site managers and to State and local government

officials. 158 Some vendors of health and safety

programs, however, do not differentiate among

the needs of different groups, and train laborers,

skilled crafts people, and scientists with advanced degrees in the same classes, using the

same materials.159 160

OSHA’s proposed accreditation standard

would not impose specific, detailed requirements

on the content of health and safety training courses. The proposed rule includes no minimum standards or training requirements for instructors,

does not incorporate peer review or on-site inspection of proposed programs, and does not require that annual refresher courses be reviewed

and accredited.161

A grants program for the training and education of workers engaged in hazardous

waste operations and emergency response was

established by the 1986 Superfund amendments.

162 163 Nonprofit organizations with

demonstrated access to appropriate populations

of cleanup workers are eligible to apply for aid in

developing, implementing, and operating worker

health and safety training and education programs.

164 The overall program is administered by

the National Institute of Environmental Health

Sciences (NIEHS) and currently supports 16

training grants involving a total of 60 individual

institutions. 165 166

NIEHS adopted a National Institutes of

Health-type peer-review process to review initial

grant applications and to oversee grant management activities and program administration.

Stringent review criteria require applicants to

demonstrate access to the target population; to

provide an experienced, qualified program director; and to offer hands-on training with appropriate facilities and equipment. Protocols for on-site

peer review of field programs are being developed. 167

Initial efforts of NIEHS grantees were directed

toward developing suitable curricula for hazardous waste work training and establishing appropriate field training facilities. The widely varying

audiences that the grantees targeted necessitated

a range of teaching materials and classroom exercises.

168 NIEHS subsequently established a national clearinghouse for training materials and

course curricula developed by its grantees that

makes such technical information and curricula

available to the general public.169
Chapter 2–Lessons From Superfund and RCRA 41

Emergency Response

Emergencies arising at hazardous waste operations differ from other health and safety issues

associated with environmental cleanup work.

Site accidents, equipment failures, weather damage, or other emergency situations are likely to

require the assistance of individuals beyond those

who work on-site or are directly involved in

cleanup. Emergency responders might include

police officers, firefighters, medical personnel,

and possibly local civil defense, transportation,

and government officials. Releases of site contaminants may also pose a public health threat to

off-site populations.

Two sections of SARA are relevant to emergency response at Superfund sites. SARA Title I

directs EPA and OSHA to establish specific regulations to protect the health and safety of workers

engaged in hazardous waste operations and

emergency response. These are the HAZWOPER regulations that OSHA issued in 29 CFR

1910.120. EPA promulgated identical regulations

in 40 CFR 311. HAZWOPER requires that emergency response plans be included in all site

HASPS and details the necessary components of

these plans.

170 HAZWOPER al SO requires that

the emergency response plan be “rehearsed regularly” as part of the overall site training program

and reviewed periodically and amended, as needed.

171

SARA Title III, “The Emergency Planning

and Community Right-to-Know Act of 1986,” requires municipalities to take steps to ensure the

safety of communities from environmental releases of toxic substances.

172 The statute mandates the preparation and testing of a comprehensive emergency response plan that would go into

effect in the event of significant environmental

release of hazardous substances. Title III thus

pertains to most hazardous waste operations and

most industrial facilities that use or store hazardous materials, not just to Superfund or RCRA

sites. The plan is required to include the involvement of a variety of State and local officials, including organizations such as fire and police departments; local environmental, hospital, and

transportation personnel; community groups; and

site owners.173

Together, SARA Title I and Title III are designed to provide communities with a comprehensive, integrated capacity to respond to emergencies arising from environmental release of

hazardous chemicals. The intent was to create a

basic emergency response infrastructure (via

Title 111) and to deal with emergencies that might

result from operations at uncontrolled waste sites

by requiring site-specific emergency response

plans and hazardous materials training for designated emergency responders (via Title I/HAZWOPER).

A number of recent incidents have revealed

significant flaws in the implementation of Title

111 provisions as well as serious problems with

the emergency response plans and capabilities at

Superfund sites.

174-182 Emergency response

plans at some Superfund sites appear to be “paper

programs” that exist in written form but remain

largely unimplemented.

183 184 Also, local communities may be unable or unwilling to invest the

resources necessary to train and equip fire departments or others to comply with legal mandates

pursuant to SARA Title III.

In the course of reviewing the HASP at the

Baird-McGuire Superfund site, it was discovered

that the local fire department lacked the resources

to provide either the equipment or the mandated

training needed to prepare firefighters to respond

to an emergency at Baird-McGuire. Although

EPA believed that the local fire department had

agreed to provide support to the site, none of the

local firefighters or emergency medical technicians had received even the minimal 8-hour

“awareness” training required of first responders. 185 This situation violated the EPA’s audit

guidelines for the evaluation of local community

response capabilities as well as HAZWOPER

regulations.

186 The situatiion was corrected after

EPA provided training of local firefighters

through an Interagency Agreement with IAFF. 187
42 I Hazards Ahead: Managing Cleanup Worker Health and Safety at the Nuclear Weapons Complex

In December 1991, the Fall River, Massachusetts fire department responded to a hazardous materials incident at a local manufacturing

facility, where a worker had fallen into a container of chemicals. A firefighter-who had not received legally mandated hazardous materials

training—entered the container, fell, and was

himself submerged in chemicals. Two ambulances and their crews were subsequently contaminated in the rescue effort. The response of the

local hospital was also less than optimal.188 The

shower designated for decontamination was not

usable, and a long delay occurred before either

man was washed clean of the chemical (dimethyl

diisocyanate). One of these contamination victims subsequently developed liver failure.189

A review of this incident conducted by EPA’s

Emergency Response Team in conjunction with

the EPA-Labor Task Force determined that in a

fire department with more than 200 professionals, serving a population of 100,000, only 6 firefighters had received hazardous materials response training equivalent to OSHA’s operations

level; 2 firefighters had been trained to specialist

level. No one in the department had been trained

as an incident commander.190

In New Bedford, Massachusetts, the fire department has publicly stated that it is not prepared for and will not respond to an emergency at

the New Bedford Harbor and Sullivan’s Ledge

Superfund sites, *9* where plans call for contaminated sediments to be dredged from the harbor

and incinerated within city limits. Although a

written emergency response plan has been developed for the lower risk preliminary phases of this

site, the present plan, if applied to the planned incineration phase of the cleanup, will be unacceptable with regard to personnel roles, lines of authority, communication, safe distance zones and

places of refuge, civilian evacuation plans, emergency care for responders, and use of personnel

equipment.

192193 If prompt action is not taken to

address emergency response activities and related training issues, lead time may not be sufficient

to prevent costly project delays. EPA is investigating programmatic remedies for these issues.

194

The emergency responder provisions of HAZWOPER and the proposed training accreditation

standard have generated intense criticism from

many quarters including EPA,195 the International Association of Firefighters,196 and other

labor organizations. 197 OSHA’s failure to require

certification of training for emergency response

workers has been especially controversial.

OSHA contends that it lacks both the personnel

and the resources needed to review and accredit

training programs for the many emergency responders (including professional and volunteer

firefighters) who might be called on to assist in

an emergency during hazardous waste operations

or during an accidental release of toxic materials.

198

HAZWOPER does not stipulate any minimal

training requirements for emergency responders.

The standard notes only that “employees who are

engaged in responding to hazardous situations at

. . . cleanup sites that may expose them to hazardous substances shall be trained in how to respond

to such expected emergencies.’’ 199 The standard

designates five tiers of emergency response

workers and links training requirements to the responsibilities an individual is likely to exercise

during an emergency. OSHA offers no justification for why emergency responders in successively lower ranked tiers should be afforded less

protection in the form of less extensive hours of

health and safety training. No minimum number

of hours of training is required of the first, lowest

tier of emergency responders, “who are likely to

witness or discover a hazardous substance release.’’ 200 Only 24 hours of safety and health

training is required of even the highest category

of emergency responders, which includes “on

scene incident commanders.” In addition, training courses for emergency responders are explicitly exempted from accreditation requirements

under OSHA’s proposed rule.201

The IAFF found in 1991 that 79 percent of the

nation’s firefighters considered themselves inad-
Chapter 2–Lessons From Superfund and RCRA 43

equately trained to deal with hazardous materials

emergencies, and 82 percent felt they were not

202 The IAFF is concerned adequately equipped.

that fire departments responding to emergencies

at cleanup sites might be unprepared to provide

the assistance required by the situation in a manner that affords adequate protection to firefighters and others. There is particular concern about

the absence or inadequacy of preincident planning. IAFF argues that provisions must be made

in advance for communication and coordination

of activities, as well as for transfer of command

to the fire department “in pre-identified areas .”203

In crafting HAZWOPER requirements for

emergency response training, OSHA may have

presumed that firefighters’ proficiency in fire

suppression affords expertise in handling hazardous materials. However, traditional firefighting

tasks do not require a knowledge of basic chemistry, the reactive properties of chemicals, the

characteristics of hazardous materials, or radiation protection—all of which are skills needed to

conduct effective emergency response operations

at hazardous waste sites.

204 OSHA and EPA also

apparently assume that fire departments will have

the benefit of the health and safety training required under Title III provisions of SARA.

Recent experience at Superfund sites suggests

that such an assumption may be unwarranted.

Many towns and cities have apparently not yet

complied with the emergency response preparedness provisions of Superfund and lack the resources to do so in the near future.205 206

CHAPTER 2 ENDNOTES

1 William Reilly, Administrator, U.S. Environmental Protection

Agency, “Statement Before the Subcommittee on Investigations

and Oversight Committee on Public Works and Transportation,

U.S. House of Representatives,” Oct. 3, 1992,

z Under the Superfund Amendments and Reauthorization Act

(SARA), the Environmental protection Agency has the authority to

order emergency removal of environmental contamimtion at uncontrolled hazardous waste sites when the contamination is believed to represent an acute or immediate threat to human health.

An example of a such action was the removal of thousands of highly radioactive metal “needles,” 200 lab reagent chemicals, deteriorating shock-sensitive ether cans from a Superfund site in Ncw

York.

3

42 U.S.C. 9601 et. scg.

4 National Oil and Hazardous Substances Pollution

Contingency Plan, 40 CFR 300 et. seq.

5 C. Zarnuda, “Superfund Risk Assessments: The Process and

Past Experience at Uncontrolled Hazardous Waste Sites” The Risk

Assessment of Environmental and Human Health Hazards: A

Textbook of Case Studies , D.J. Paustenbach (cd.) (New York, NY:

J. Wiley& Sons) 1989.

6 M. Gochfeld, V. Campbell, P. Landsbergis, “Demography of

the Hazardous Waste Industry,” Occuputlonal Medicine: State of

the Art Reviews, vol. 5, No. 1, January-March 1990, pp. 9-23.

7 Mark Bashor, Asst. Administrator for Federal Facilities,

Agency for Toxic Substances and Disease Registry, personal communication to T. O’Toole, Nov. 24, 1992.

8 J. Cocalis, National Institute of Occupational Safety and

Heal@ Environmental Investigation BranclL personal communication to T. O’Toole, Aug. 19, 1992.

9 M. Garrahan+ Senior Industrial Hy@enist, Occupational Safety

and Health Administration, persoml communication, T. O’Toole,

Dec. 1, 1992.

1039 USC. 651-678 (West 1985 ~d SUPP1. 1992).

1129 CFR 1910.120.

IZ Office of Technology Assessment-Hazardous Waste

Advisory Council (HWAC) Workshop, Washington, DC, Sept. 17,

1992.

13 J coc~s, pemo~ communication to T. O’Toole, Aug. 19,

1991, op.

cit.

14 occupatlon~ s~e~ and Health Administration, Office of

Health Compliance Assistance, Directorate of Compliance

Programs, U.S. Department of Labor, “Protocol for OSHA

Compliance Inspections of Superfund Incineration Sites-Draft

Final,” NOV. 16, 1992.

15 u s Environmental protection Agency-Labor . . Health and

Safety Task Force, minutes of meeting, Sept. 22, 1992.

lb u s Genera] Accounting office, OptiOnS for ~mp~o~’~ng .

Safety and Health para3:in the Workplace , GAO/HRD-9@66BR

(August 1990).

17 u s. . Environmental Protection Agency, Office of Solid

Waste and Emergency Response, “Superfimd Progress,” 9200.1-12,

May 1992.

18 us. Environmental Protection Agency, Office of Solid

Waste and Emergency Response, “Supplementary Material,

National Priorities List Proposed Rule,” EPA 9320-7/05 1, February

1992, p. 3.

]~ Letter from J. Bclaga, Regional Administrator, us.

Environment Protection Agency to H. Lenow, counsel to Hanson

Permanent Fire Fighters Association% Apr. 29, 1992.

Zo R, H~is, R, Kapuscirlslci, “Hardage ROD Overturned, ”

Environ Report , Winter 1989/Spring 1990, p. 1.

11 Superfund Report “EPA Issues Guidance for Early Risk

Assessment to Screen Alternatives,” Jan. 15, 1992.
44 I Hazards Ahead: Managing Cleanup Worker Health and Safety at the Nuclear Weapons Complex

n U.S. Environmental Protection Agency, Office of Emergency

and Remedial Response, Risk Assessment Guidance for Supe@ui:

Vol. l—Human Health Evaluation para3:Manual, (Part B,

Development of Risk-Based Preliminary Remediation Goals ,

(December 1991).

23 u s Envirorunental Protection Agency, Office of Solid . .

Waste and Emergency Response “Superfund Accelerated Cleanup

Model—SAC~” March 1992.

24 L. Murphy, Director, HtizardOu S Materials Training,

International Association of Firefighters, personal communication

tO T. O’TOOIC, OTA, Ju1y 17, 1992.

25 Office of Tec~ology Assessment Workshop on Clemup

Worker Health and Safety at the Department of Energy Nuclear

Weapons Complex, Washingto~ DC, May 15, 1991.

26 Office of Technology Assessment-HWAC Workshop, op. cit.

‘7 EPA-Labor Health and Safety Task Force, notes from Mar, 5,

1991 meeting

28 K, Ayers, Chief, Design and Construction Management

Branch, Office of Solid Waste and Emergency Response, U.S.

Environmental protective Agency, personal communication to T.

O’TOok, Aug. 20, 1991.

‘9 U.S. Environmental Protection Agency, Office of Solid

Waste and Emergency Response, “Hazardous Waste Operations

and Emergency Response: General Information and Comparison”

(9285 .2-09FS). April 1991.

so u s. . Environmental protection Agency, Office of Solid

Waste and Emergency Response, “Hazardous Waste Operations

and Emergency Response: Uncontrolled Hazardous Waste Sites

and RCRA Corrective Actions” (9285 .2-08FS) April 1991.

31 U,S. Enviro~ental Protection Agency, Office of Solid

Waste and Emergency Responses, “Hazardous Waste Operations

and Emergency Response: RCRA TSD and Emergency Response

Without Regard to Location” (9285 .2-07FS) April 1991.

32 U.S. Enviro nmental Protection Agency, Office of Solid

Waste and Emergency Responses, “Hazardous Waste Operations

and Emergency Response: Establishing Work Zones at

Uncontrolled Hazardous Waste Sites” (9285 .2-06FS) April 1991.

~J US. Enviro~en[al Protection Agency, Office of Solid

Waste and Emergency Responses, “Hazardous Waste Operations

and Emergency Response: Health and Safety Responsibilities at

Remedial Sites” (9285.1-02) April 1991.

M u s EnviroDental protection Agency, Office of SOlid . .

Waste and Emergency Responses, “Hazardous Waste Operations

and Emergency Response: Hazardous Waste Operations and

Emergency Response: Available Guidance (9285 .2-1OFS) April

1991.

35 Occupatlond safety and Health Administration, OffiCe of

Health Compliance Assistance, “Protocol for OSHA Compliance

Inspections of Superfund Incineration Sites,” op. cit.

36 EpA-Labor He~th and Safety Task Force, July 18, 1991

meeting.

w Env~o~en~ protection Agency-Labor Healti ~d Safety

Task Force, minutes of Oct. 17, 1991, meeting.

38 utter from Don Clay, Asst. A(hinis~tor, OffIce of Solid

Waste and Emergency Response, U.S. Environmental Protection

Agency, to Les Murphy, Director, Hazardous Materials Training,

International Association of Firefighters, June 23, 1992.

39 LMurphy, Director, Hazardous Materials Training,

International Association of Firefighters, personal communication

to T. O’Toole, Office of Technology Assessment, July 17, 1992.

u U.S. Enviro~ental protection Agency-Labor Heal~ ‘d

Safety Task Force, minutes of Oct. 17, 1991 meeting.

41 U.S. Enviro~ental Protection Agency-Labor Healti ~d

Safety Task Force, notes from Mar. 5, 1991 meeting.

42 J. Mow Co-cti, u.S. Environmental Protective Agency

Labor Health and Safety Task Force, Director of Occupational

Safety and Health, Laborers’ Health and Safety Fund of North

America, personal communication to T. O’Toole, Jan. 22, 1991.

43 us,Envirorlmental protection Agency Labor-Healti ad

Safety Task Force, minutes of July 10, 1992 meeting.

44 us. Enviro~ental Protection Agency-Labor Heal~ ‘d

Safety Task Force, minutes of June 17, 1992 meeting.

45 Memo from L. MuWhy, Director Hazardous Materials

Training International Association of Firefighters to Environmental

Protection Agency-Labor Task Force, July 20, 1992,

46 I_J.S. Enviro~ental Protection Agency, Office of Solid

Waste and Emergency Response Risk Assessment Guidance for

Superfund, Human Health Evaluation Manual, Part A (9285.701A)

Washington DC, Sept. 29, 1989.

47 MOS. cle~up work m date has taken place at Supefid ‘ites.

Relatively few RCRA facilities have begun extensive remediation

action. Although most of the obsemations in this report are drawn

from experience at Superfund sites, regulators, environmental professionals, and lalxx representatives believe that this experience is

also applicable to environmental cleanup at RCRA facilities,

48 s, Goll~, E. Dodge, B. Bixler, “Conducting Remedial

Investigations and Feasibility Studies Under CERCLA,” Superjhnd

‘88-Proceedings of 9th National para3:Conference , Washington

DC, NOV. 28-30, 1988.

@ OTA-WAC Workshop, op. cit.

50 J. Moran, Director of Occupational Stiety ad ‘ealth~

Laborers Health and Safety Fund of North America, personal communication to T. O’Toole, Jan. 22, 1991.

51 K. Ayers, Chief, Design and Construction M~agement

Branch U.S. Environmental Protection Agency, personal communication to J. H- T. O’Toole, Feb. 12, 1991.

52 OTA Workshop on DOE CleanUp Workers, op. cit.

53 U,s$ CongeSS) office of Technology Assessment-j coming

Clean-Superfund Problems Can Be So(ved , OTA-ITE-433

(Washington, DC: U.S. Government Printing Office, October

1989).

M U,s$ Congess, Ofiqm of TtXhIIOIOgy Assessment oTA-o484, Complex Cleanup —The Environmental Legacy of Nuclear

Weapons Production (Washington DC: U.S. Government Printing

Office, February 1991).

55 c Nob]e, 1~Keep~g OSHA’S Feet to the Fire,” Technology

Review , February/Mmch 1992, pp. 43-51.

56 Gener~ AccOUfig office, Options for IrnProv@ Health

and Safety in para3:the Workplace , op. cit.

ST OTA wor~hop on DOE Cleanup Workers, op. cit.

58 NatiO~ A~demy of sciences, Hutnan Exposure Assessment

for Airborne para3:Pollutants (Washington, DC: National

Academy Press, 1991).

59 OTA-WAC Workshop, oP. cit.

@ OTA wO&hOp Orl DOE Cleanup Workers Op. cit.
—.._—

Chapter 2–Lessons From Superfund and RCRA 45

61 u s Envjronrncntal Protection Agency, Office of Solid

Waste and Emergency Response, “Guidance for Data Usability in

Risk Assessmcn~” 9285 .7-05FS, September 1990.

cz u s Envlromental Protection Agency Office of Emergency

. .

and Remedial Response, Risk Assessment Guidunce for SuperfundPurt B , op. c~t.

63 Ibid., Part C.

~ ~, Morm, and D. Elisburg, “Hazardous Waste Sites: Worker

Protection Perspectives”, Conference Proceedings: First EPA

Design and Construction Issues para3:at Hazardous Waste Site

Conference , EPA 540/8-91/012, May 1991

65 Nationa] Institute of Occupational Safety and Health

(NIOSH), Occupational Safety and Health Administration (OSHA),

U.S. Coast Guard (USCG), U.S. Environmcntat Protection Agency

(EPA), Occupational Safety and Health para3:Guidance Manual

for Hazardous Wuste Sire Activities (Washington, DC: U.S.

Government Printing Office), October 1985.

66 Morm ~d Elisbcrg, op. cit.

67 Off’lce of Technology Assessment-HWAC Workshop, oP. cit.

68 u s Environmental Protection Agency-Labor . . Health and

Safety Task Force, notes from Mar. 5, 1991 meeting.

69 office of TCChnOIO~ Assessment-HWAC Workshop, op. cit.

70 Ibid.

71 u s congress, House of Representatives Committee on . .

Govcmmcnt Operations, “OSHA’S Failure to Protect the Health and

Safety of Workers at Hazardous Waste Sites,” House Report 99-

140, May 21, 1985.

~z 42 usc 9601 Ct ‘~”

73 ~c contents of the HAZWOPER standard promulgated by

each agency are identical. The jurisdictions of OSHA and EPA differ. EPA covers public employees of States without OSHA-approvcd State plans. Federal employees are covered under Executive

Order No. 12196. OSHA and EPA have agreed that OSHA will be

the agency respon.wble for interpreting the regulations. The OSHA

HAZWOPER regulations are codified at 20 CFR 1910,120 (54

Federal Register 9294, Mar. 6, 1989). The EPA regulations Me codified at40CFR311 @cdcral Register 26654, June 23, 1989) and incorporate the OSHA standards by refercncc.

Td me stadad is applicable at any cleanup carri~ out bY a

govcmmcnt body that revolves hazardous substances, including

sites on or recommended for the National Priorities List; sites where

preliminary characterization efforts are conducted bdore the presence of hazardous materials has been ascertained or ruled out;

RCRA sites undergoing corrective actions; operations at RCRA

treatment, storage, and disposal facilities; emergency respome operations for releases of, or substantial threats of releases of, hazardous substances; and voluntary cleanup operations.

7529 CFR 1910.120.

76 R, Yodaiken, “Surveillance, Monitoring, and Regulatory

Concerns” J. of para3:Occupational Medicine , vol. 28, No. 8,

August 1986, pp. 569-571.

77 J. Melius, “Medicai Surveillance for Hazardous Waste

Workers,” J. of Occupational Medicine , vol. 28, No. 8, August

1986, pp. 679-683.

78 E. Fanvata, and M. Gochfeld, “Medical Surveillance of

Hazardous Waste Workers: Ability of Laboratory Tests to

Discriminate Exposure, ” American Journal para3:uf Industrial

Medicine , vol. 15, 1989, pp. 255-265.

79 N. Nelson et rd., “Cleanup of Contaminated Sites,” Toxic

Chemicalx, Health and the Envirorlment , L. Lane and A. Uptom

cds. (Baltimore, MD: Johns Hopkins University Press, 1987).

so U.S. Environmental Protection Agency-Labor Health and

Safety Task Force, notes from Mar. 5, 1991 meeting.

81 OTA wO&ShOp on DOE Cleanup Workers, op. cit.

82 OTA-NAC workshop, oP. cit.

83 H=dous waste Action Contractors, The Hazardous Wasre

Practice--para3 :Technical and LegaI Environment 1992 (HWAC,

Washington DC: 1991), p. vi.

~A u s Environmental Protection Agency-Labor . . Health and

Safety Task Force,

notes from Mar. 5, 1991 meeting.

as J Mor~ and D. Elisburg, Op. cit.

86 2“9 CFR 1910.1000.

~~ Federal Re,gisrer 37591 (Sept. 27, 1988).

w Federal Register 2332 (1989)

89 OTA-HWAC Workshop, op. cit.

90 National Academy of Sciences, Risk Assessment in the

Federal Government: para3:Managing the Process (Washington

DC: National Academy Press, 1983).

91 U.S. Congress, Office of Technology Assessment,

Neurotoxicity: ldentifiing and Controlling Poisons of the Nert’ous

System (Washington DC: U.S. Government Printing Office, April

1992).

92 National Academy of Sciences, Biologic Markers ‘ n

Immunotoxicology (Washington, DC: Nationat Academy Press,

1992).

93 National Academy of Sciences, Biologic Markers in

Reproductive para3:Toxicology (Washington, DC: National

Academy Press, 1983).

w oTA_wAc Workshop, op. cit.

9539 U.S.C. 651-678 (West 1985 and SUppl. 1992).

96 us. Environmental Protection Agency, Office of Solid

Waste and Emergency Response, “Hazardous Waste Operations

and Emergency Response: Uncontrolled Hazardous Waste Sites

and RCRA Corrective Actions,” op. cit.

97 us. Co~ of Appeals for the Eleventh Circuit, S. Phillips

and P.D, para3:Phillips v. United States of America , No. 91-8040,

Mar. 30, 1992.

98 us Dep~ent of Labor, Occupational Safety and H~tb

Administration, data from Federal and State (18B) State Inspection

of Hazardous Waste Activity, Mar. 1, 1990 through Dec. 6, 1991.

99 EpA-~bor Health and Safety Task Force, fiUteS from Oct.

17, 1991 meeting,

Im Occupation s~e~ and Healti Administration, Directorate

of Compliance Programs, “HAZWOPER-Interpretative Quips

(IQs),” October 1992.

lol OTA workshop on DOE Cleanup Workers, op. cit.

102 OTA-WAC Workshop, oP. cit.

10329 cm 1910.120.

104 M Gochfeld, “Medical Surveillance of Hazardous Waste

Workers: Principles and Problems,” Occupational Medicine: Stare

of the Art Reviews , vol. 5, No. 1, January-March 1990, p 107.

Ios OTA-WAC workshop, op. cit.

t06 OTA Workshop on DOE Cleanup Workers, op. cit.

10T OTA workshop on DOE Cleanup Workers, 0p. cit.
46 I Hazards Ahead: Managing Cleanup Worker Health and Safety at the Nuclear Weapons Complex

108 Enviromen~ ~otection Agency-Labor Healti ~d S~etY

Task Force, notes from Mar. 5, 1991 meeting.

109 L Murphy, Director, International Association of

Firefighters, memorandum to Environmental Protection AgencyLabor Health and Safety Task Force, “New Bedford,” July 20,

1992.

‘10 Wehran Envirotech, “Site Health and Safety Plan-New

Bedford Superfund Site,” November 1991.

] ] I H opem~w, chief, Civ of New Bedford, Massachusetts

Fire Department, “Special Communication%” Oct. 7, 1992.

112 M. Boyle, N. white, “PCB Site Cleanup Hits Snag,” Cape

Cod Standard para3:Times , Oct. 27, 1992.

113 OTA Workshop on DOE Cleanup Workers, op. cit.

I 14 u s Army COT5 of Engineers, Accident Investigation .

Report, “Louisiana Army Ammunition Plant Incinerator Accident,

Second of Two Accidents,” Mar. 10, 1989.

1‘5 Ibid.

I IC u s. .hy COWS of Engineers, Accident Investigation

Report, “Cornhusker Army Ammunition Plant, Incinerator

Accident, First of Two Accidents,” Sept. 17, 1987.

117 u s.  Environmental Protection Agency, Office of . Solid

Waste and Emergency Response, “Establishing Work Zones . . .“,

op. cit.

118 Occupatlond Sdety ad He~th Administration, Director of

Compliance

Programs, “HAZWOPER-Interpretive Quips”, op. cit.

119 U.S. Enviro~ental Protection Agency, Office of Solid

Waste and Emergency Response, “Establishing Work Zone . . .“,

op. cit.

IZO ~aticia clw~ Director 13txignak, Director of ComPli~cet

Department of Labor, Occupational Safety and Health

Administration, letter to J. Moran, Laborers’ National Health and

Safety Fund, Oct. 3, 1990.

121 Occupational Stie[y Wd He~th Administration, Director of

Compliance Programs, “HAZWOPER-Interpretative Quips”, op.

cit.

12229 CFR 1910.120, July 1, 1991, p. 367.

123 OTA-HWAC Workshop, op. cit.

‘U David Rempel, “Medical Surveillance in the Workplace:

Overview,” Occupational Medicine: State of the Art Reviews , vol.

5, No. 3, July-September 1990.

125 ~osH/os~scG@pA, 1985, oP. cit.

126 w. H~perin and T. Frazier, “Surveillance for the Effects of

Workplace Exposure”, Annual Review of Public Health , vol. 6,

1985, pp. 419-32.

127 w. H-dper~ J. RatcMfe et al!, “Medical Screening ‘n ‘e

Workplace: Proposed Principles”, Journal of Occupational

Medicine , vol. 28, No. 8, August 1986, pp. 547-552.

IM OTA Workshop on DOE Clemup ‘orkem.

129 E Favata ~d M. Gochfeld, “Medical s~veillwce ‘f

Hazardous Waste Workers: Ability of Laboratory Tests to

Discriminate Exposure,”American Journal para3:of Industrial

Medicine, vol. 15, 1989, pp. 255-265.

130 J. Melius, “OSHA Standard for Medical Surveillance of

Hazardous Waste Workers,” Occupational Medicine: State of the

Art Reviews , vol. 5, No. 1, January-March 1990, pp. 143-150.

131 M Gochfeld, “Medic~ Surveillance of H=dous Wrote

Workers,” op. cit.

132 zo cm 1910.120$

133 The so-by ~=er *O applies to eligibility for HAZWOPER-mandated health and safety training.

13A OTA wor~hop of DOE Cleanup Workers, op. cit.

135 Ibid.

136 OTA-WAC workshop, op. Cit.

137 J. Melius, op. cit.

138 U.S. Environmental Protection Agency, “U.S.

Environmental Protection Agency Environmental Response Term’s

Occupational Medical Monitoring Program Guidelines for SARA

Hazardous Waste Field Activity Personnel, ” 9285.3-04, January

1990.

139 M. Silverstein, “Medical Screening, Surveillance and the

Prevention of Occupational Disease,” Journa/ of Occupational

Medicine, vol. 32, No. 10, October 1990, pp. 1032-1036.

l@ Office of Technology Assessment complex Cieanup, l$@l,

op. cit.

141 fibL, 99-499, 42 U.S.C. 126(d).

,42 ~(-7R 1910.121 “

143129 u.s.c. 8655; Pub. L. W-499, Oct. 17, 1986.

IW 40 cm 1910.120.

145 j, Mor~ “Tes~ony of Laborers’ hternationat UniOn of

North Arneric& AFL-CIO, Laborers-AGC Education and Training

Fund, and Laborers’ HeaJth and Safety Fund of North America on

Proposed Rulernaking on Accreditation of Training Programs for

Hazardous Waste Operations, ” Docket No. S-760-B, U.S.

Department of Labor, Occupational Safety and Health

Adrninistratiow Jan. 22, 1991, p. 14.

146 OTA Workshop on DOE Cleanup Workers, op. cit.

147 L. Murphy, Director, Hazardous Materials Training,

International Association of Firefighters, personat communication

to T. O’Toole, Office of Technology Assessment, July 17, 1992.

148 National Institute for Environmental Health Sciences,

Minimum Criteria for Worker Health and Safety Training of

Hazardous Waste Operations and Emergency Response , April

1990.

14940 CFR 1910.121

ISO OTA wO&hOp m DOE Cleanup Workers, op. cit.

151 J. Wmen, Executive Director, Laborers-AGC MuCation

and Training Fund, “Testimony on Proposed Rulemaking on

Accreditation and Training Program for Hazardous Waste

Operations,” Docket No. S-760-B, U.S. Department of Labor,

Occupational Safety Health Administration Jan. 22, 1991.

152 Nolan Hancock, Director, Citizenship-Legislative

Department, Oil Chemical and Atomic Workers International

Union, personal communication to T. O’Toole, Office of

Technology Assessment.

153 J. Mor~, Director of Occupatioml safety and Heal@

Laborers’ Health and Safety Fund of North America, personal communication to T. O’Toole, Office of Technology Assessment.

154 R, Dtify, Dfiector Of Health and Safety, International

Association of Firefighters, “Testimony on Proposed Rulemaking

on Accreditation of Training Programs for Hazardous Waste

Operations,” Docket No. S-760-B, U.S. Department of Labor,

Occupational Safety and Health Administration, Jan. 22, 1991.

155 OTA Workshop on DOE Cleanup Workers, op. cit.

156 mid.

157 Ibid.
Chapter 2–Lessons From Superfund and RCRA 47

15~ u s. Enviro~en[al Protection Agency, Office of Solid

Waste and Emergency Response, Office of Emergency and

Remedial Response, “Hazardous Materials Incident Response

Training Program,” Jan. 1, 1991.

159 B, Sattlcr, Director, National Center on Hazard

Communications, University of Maryland, personal communication

to OTA staff, Apr. 9, 1991.

160 u s Dcpafiment of Health and Human SemiCeS, public

. .

Health Service and the Agency for Toxic Substances and Disease

Registry, Esaluatirtg Hazardous K’aste Educution and Training ,

(November 1990).

16 I National Institute of Environmental Health Sciences,

Department of Health and Human Services, “Testimony of the

National Instltutc of Environmental Health Scrviccs on the

Occupat]ontil Safety and Health Administration’s Proposed

Standard for Accreditation of Hazardous Waste Operations and

Emergency RcsporLsc Training: 29 CFR 1910. 121”, Jan. 29, 1991.

1~~ Supcflun(l Amendments ~d R@?uthorization Act of 1986S

Section 126(g).

163 J. Hughes, “An Assessment of Training Needs for Worker

Safety and Health Programs: Hazardous Waste Operations and

Emergency Rcspon~c, ” Applled Occupational En\ironnzcnta[

H-ygienc , vol. 6, No 2, February 1991, pp. 114-118,

Iti 5 I Ft,dfrai Rp,clstcr , 4556 DCC. 19, 19~6

165 ‘NiitlonalInstitute of Environmental Health SCi CnCCS,

“Summ:i~ of NIEHS Funded Supcrfund Worker Training Grants”,

1991

I ~~ National Ins[i tut c of Environmental Health SClcll Ks,

“Request for Grant Applicatio~Hazardous Materials and Waste

Worker Health und Safety Trainirlg—Background Infornlatlon,”

Miu. 16, 1990,

1~7 National Institute of Environmental Health S~icnCc S,

“Summary Report of 1990 Site Visit Reviews of NIEHS Worker

Tralnlng Cirantcrs-Driift Version 2-2591,” February 1991.

16s D Dobbln, program Administrator, Worker Health and

Safety Training Grant program, National Institute of Environmental

Health Sciences, personal communication to T. O’TOOIC, Office of

Tcchnolo~g Assessment, Feb. 20, 1991,

169 National Instltutc of Environmental Health Sciences,

“Testimony of the NIEHS on the OSHA’S Pmposcd Standard for

Accrcditatlon of Hazardous Waste Operations and Emergency

Response Trammg: 20 CFR 1910.121 ,“ U.S. Department of Labor,

Washington DC, Jan, 29, 1991,

ITo 29 CFR 1910.120.

17] Ibid.

17Z SARA Title III, Sec. 301-305, En}’ironnrenfal Srarures

(Rockville, MD: Government Institutes, Inc., 1991), p. 1048.

173 Ibid.

174 u s Environmental protection Agency-Labor Health ad

Safety Task Force, Minutes of Meeting, June 25, 1992.

ITS u s Environmental Protection Agency-Labor Hc~lth ad

Safety Task Force, Minutes of Meeting, Aug. 17, 1992.

176 U.S. Env~onrncnt~ Protection Agency-Labor Hcalti ~d

Safety Task Force, Minutes of Meeting, May 14, 1992.

177 u s. Env~onmental I%otcction Agency-Labor Health ad

Safety Task Force, Minutes of Meeting, April, 13, 1992.

178 L MuWhy, “Crisis in the Fire Service,” Proceedings of First

EPA Design and Construction Issues at Hazardous Waste Sites

Conference , Dallas, TX, May 1-3, 1991, p. 827.

179 Les MuWhy, Dlrcc(or, Hazardous Materials Training,

International Association of Firefighters, letter to R. Guimond,

Deputy Assistant Administrator, Office of Solid Waste and

Emergency Response, U.S. Environmental Protection Agency,

Mar. 4, 1992.

ISO R. Guimond, Deputy Assistant Administrator, OffiCe of

Solid Waste and Emergency Response, U.S. Environmental

Protection Agency, letter to Les Murphy, Dlrcctor, Hazardous

Materials Training, Intcrnatronal Association of Firefighters, Apr.

6, 1992,

18 I R, Camara, Firefighters Association of Fall River,

Massachusetts letter 10 Don Clay, Assistant Administrator, Office

of Solid Waste and Emergency Response, LT. S. Environmental

Protection Agency, Feb. 12, 1992.

182 D clay, ASSISt~tA(fminlSt~tor, office Of Solid waste and

Emergency Response, U.S. Environmental Protection Agency, letter to L. Murphy, Director, Hazardous Materials Training Program,

International Association of Firefighters, June 23, 1992.

IB~ J Mor~, co-c~llr, EPA-hbor Task Force, memorandum

to Vicki Santoro, Environmental Protection Agency Emergency

Response Team, “Fall River, MA Title III Audit, June 26, 1992, ”

July 9, 1992.

1s4 p Li~cr, Dis~ic[ Chief, Ncw Bedford, MA Fire Depmment,

“mcmomndum to H. Opcnshaw, Chief of Department, re: Grass

Fire PCB Site Foot of Sawyer Street,” Mar. 14, 1992.

1X5 H, ~now, Esq., On behalf of Hanson PCMKIII cnt Firefighters

Association, IAFF Local 2914, Icttcr to J. Bclaga, Regional

Administrator, Region 1, U.S. Environmental Protection Agency,

Apr. 9, 1992.

186 L, Mqhy, Op. cit.

1~7 J. coc~ls, Co-chair, Environmental f%otcction Agency,

Health and Safety Task Force, personal communication to T.

O’TOOIC, my 18, 1992.

1~$ R. Cmma, letter to Don Clay, Feb. 12, 1992, op. cit.

189 L, Murphy, Director, Hazardous Materials Training,

International Association of Firefighters, personal communication

to T. O’Toole, Office of Technology Assessment, July 17, 1992.

lm J Mor~, “Fall River Audit,” Op. Cit.

191 Lcs Murphy, Director, Intcrnationa] Association of

Firefighters, Hazardous Materials Training, memorandum to

Environmental Protection Agency-Labor Health and Safety Task

Force, “NCW Bedford,” July 20, 1992.

192 J Cocdls, Co.chAr, EPA-Labor Health and safety Task

Force, personal communication to T. O’TOOIC, Office of

Technology Assessment, Aug. 19, 1992.

’

93 Ibid.

194 Ibid.

195 stephen L~tig,Director, Emergency Response Division+

U.S. Environmental Protection Agency, “Comments of OSHA’S

Proposed Rule: Accreditation of Training programs for Hazardous

Waste Operations,” OSHA Docket, No. S-760-B, U.S. Department

of Labor, Occupational Safety and Health Administration.

’96 R. Duffy, op. cit.
48 ! Hazards Ahead: Managing Cleanup Worker Health and Safety at the Nuclear Weapons Complex

197 Don Cky, Assist~t Administrator, Office Of Solid Waste

Emergency Response, U.S. Environmental Protection Agency, letter to K. Ringeu Executive Director, Laborers’ Health and Safety

Fund, June 23, 1992.

19855 Federal Register , 2778, J~. 26, 1990.

19929 Cm 1910.120.

m Ibid.

ml 55 FR , 2778, Jan. 26, 1990.

~z R. D~fy, 1991, Op. Cit.

~3 ~, Mwhy, ‘iCrisis ~ me Fire Service,” op. cit.

204 L. Murphy, Director, Hazardous Materials Training,

International Association of Firefighters, personal communication

to T. O’Toole, Office of Technology Assessment, Jan. 20, 1991.

ms J. Mor~ memor~d~ to Vicki Santoro, JUne 16, 1991, oP.

cit.

206 L Muqhy, memor~dum to Environmental protection

Agency-Labor Task Force-New Bedford, June 20, 1992. op. cit.
Cleanup Worker

Protection at

the DOE Nuclear

Weapons Complex 3

M

ore than 3 years have passed since the Department of

Energy began a concerted, publicly declared campaign to chart a “new course” toward full accountability in the areas of environment, safety, and

health.1 Yet evidence of DOE leadership and substantive accomplishments in furthering worker health and safety remain sparse.

The “new culture” pursued by the Secretary of Energy, a culture

that honors protection of the environment, health, and safety as

fundamental organizational values, has not been translated into

official policies and programs-or even been wholly accepted—

by DOE and its contractors.

The new culture has not taken hold largely because of three

flaws in DOE’s approach to worker protection:

1.

2.

3.

Not all DOE employees, contractor managers, and workers are convinced that worker health and safety truly takes

precedence over other goals.

Within DOE, organizational responsibility for occupational health and safety is dispersed among different program The “new culture”

offices. This has caused staff with occupational safety and

health (OSH) experience to be thinly spread throughout at DOE has

DOE line organizations. Within the DOE Office of Environmental Restoration and Waste Management (EM), not yet been

there are insufficient numbers of OSH professionals to develop program-specific policies or ensure implementation translated into

and enforcement of such policies by EM contractors.

Internal oversight of DOE and contractors’ implementa- official policies

tion and enforcement of OSH programs is weak. The DOE

Office of Environment, Safety and Health (EH) does not and programs

have enough qualified field staff to monitor contractor operations. Furthermore, EH has no direct authority to en49
50 I Hazards Ahead: Managing Cleanup Worker Health and Safety at the Nuclear Weapons Complex

force OSH orders or regulations. EH influence on DOE line organizations rests

chiefly on the capacity to embarrass line

managers into complying with OSH orders

and regulations. There are no meaningful

rewards or penalties for occupational

health and safety performance levied on

DOE or its contractors.

The Occupational Safety and Health Act of

1970 established that those Federal agencies that

exercise statutory authority to prescribe or enforce occupational safety and health standards,

or regulations affecting those conditions, were

not subject to the authority of the Occupational

Safety and Health Administration (OSHA) under

Section 4(b) 1 of the Act.2 DOE is the only Federal agency that claims such an exemption. DOE

and its contractors derive authority to determine

their own occupational safety and health standards from the Atomic Energy Act of 1954.3

There is thus no external oversight or regulation

of DOE’s or its contractors’ performance in OSH

matters.

When OSHA released its comprehensive December 1990 report on occupational safety and

health programs at DOE facilities, it recommended that DOE institute a number of major organizational changes to ensure adequate worker

safety and health protection.4 DOE reacted

promptly to the OSHA review by reasserting line

management responsibility for contractor safety

and health programs5 and by directing the relevant DOE program offices to present the Secretary with ways of responding to the OSHA findings. 6-8

Several important reforms resulted from these

efforts, including the establishment of an Office

of Occupational Safety within EH9 and the addition of many health and safety professionals,

among them former OSHA employees, to DOE

headquarters staff. In addition, both EH and EM

have established advisory boards consisting of

outside experts to augment in-house expertise

and provide an independent perspective on DOE

activities. 10 DOE also ordered its program offices to include specific crosscuts in the fiscal

year 1993 budget to identify and summarize all

occupational health and safety activities in a single document “to make visible and facilitate action on OSH activities.” Future budget submissions will be subjected to comprehensive OSH

reporting and will be used to support an OSH

Five-Year Plan that is under development.l 1

In August 1992, DOE and OSHA signed a

Memorandum of Understanding that provides

DOE with access to OSHA’s technical expertise

and formalizes arrangements for joint training

programs. The agreement acknowledges that

DOE retains authority to develop, implement,

and enforce OSH policies for its contractor employees, whereas OSHA has the right to conduct

unannounced inspections at DOE facilities to

protect Federal (i.e., DOE) employees.12-14

These are positive steps, but it is unclear if

such efforts can overcome fundamental organizational obstacles that underlie DOE’s approach to

worker protection. DOE’s problematic organizational OSH framework, coupled with the enormous scope and complex nature of the pollution

at Nuclear Weapons Complex (NWC) will likely

reflect and magnify worker protection problems

already encountered at non-Federal Superfund

sites. Success in addressing cleanup worker

health and safety at the NWC will depend to a

large extent on achieving substantial changes in

the organizational format of DOE’s approach to

worker protection. The next section discusses organizational problems pertinent to OSH matters

at DOE. Subsequent sections of the chapter address particular OSH issues encountered at nonFederal hazardous waste sites that are likely to be

troublesome during cleanup of the NWC.

MANAGEMENT COMMITMENT TO

OCCUPATIONAL SAFETY AND

HEALTH PRIORITIES

Skepticism about the vigor and persistence of

DOE’s commitment to occupational safety and
Chapter 3–Cleanup Worker Protection at the DOE Nuclear Weapons Complex 51

health continues to haunt the Department. In the

course of OSHA’s 1990 audit of DOE worker

health and safety programs—carried out at

DOE’s request—OSHA inspectors noted that

“pressures to get the job done often overrule

safety and health concerns.”15 OSHA found that

resource allocation decisions and planning by

DOE managers and contractors did not indicate

worker health or safety to be of paramount concern. OSHA reported that some top managers in

DOE’s contractor organizations failed to demonstrate a strong commitment to worker health and

safety:

One top manager stated that occupational

safety and health was not a fundamental organizational value . , . [and] saw the emphasis on

safety and health as a hindrance to the facility’s

mission. 16

Assertions that DOE management is aggressively pursuing staunch worker protection policies are weakened by failure to correct inadequate OSH practices documented by Tiger

Teams; 17 18 by long delays in official adoption of

proposed OSH orders;

19-21 by the failure of DOE

managers to impose penalties on contractors who

do not enforce sound worker protection

policies; 22 23 and by reports that DOE facility operations were resumed or allowed to continue before appropriate safety training and procedures

had been completed. 24-27

Workers, too, appear skeptical of the depth

and staying power of DOE’s commitment to the

new culture. In November 1991 the Secretary’s

Advisory Committee on Nuclear Facility Safety

found that the new philosophy of valuing health

and safety over weapons production is “not understood, accepted or believed” by workers at

Rocky Flats,28 where public controversy over

safety has been intense. The committee (referred

to as the Ahearne committee after its Chair, John

Ahearne) reported that DOE’s response to highprofile safety issues has been characterized by

[an] . . . insistence on rapid response without adequate understanding [that] has produced premature action plans and decisions, with resultant frequent schedule revisions, organizational

changes, and unclear explanations of the need

and bases for the actions and decisions. Workers may be left with no alternative but to consider production in fact as the continuing, dominant priority, and safety as simply a passing

fancy of the current Secretary .29

OSHA noted that union representatives were

not routinely included in health and safety committees, and that employees were not routinely

asked to participate in safety and health inspec-

 Although at tion activities at weapons sites.30 

most weapons sites, joint labor-management

committees have been formed to facilitate communication about health and safety issues and

other matters,31 32 workers have not been actively enlisted in efforts to enhance occupational

safety and health at DOE facilities. 33

OSHA also noted that investigations of workers’ complaints of health and safety problems

had in some instances resulted in DOE field offices referring the problem back to the employer

against whom the complaint was raised. In some

cases, OSHA found that allegations of reprisals

against employees who had initiated health and

safety complaints had not been investigated

properly by DOE.34

Reports of workers being harassed for raising

health and safety concerns continue to surface.

For example, the DOE Inspector General reported in September 1991 that a DOE contractor and

a former contractor at Hanford had acquired

wiretapping and eavesdropping equipment designed for covert surveillance, in violation of

DOE orders and Federal acquisition requirements. Security forces at the Idaho National Engineering Laboratory and at Savannah River

were discovered to have similar equipment. 35

The Inspector General reviewed 14 instances of

covert video surveillance conducted by security

forces at Hanford, but found no evidence to sub-
52 I Hazards Ahead: Managing Cleanup Worker Health and Safety at the Nuclear Weapons Complex

stantiate allegations by Hanford workers that

they had been subjected to illegal surveillance

after complaining about health and safety problems. 36

In February 1992 the Department of Labor

found that a worker at the Oak Ridge National

Laboratory had been isolated, assigned to menial

jobs, and forced to work in hazardous areas after

raising concerns about safety issues.37 38 The

DOE contractor involved is appealing this ruling.

In April 1992, DOE published its proposed

Whistleblower Rule in the Federal Register.39

The DOE Office of Nuclear Energy has taken the

lead in developing complaint procedures for

DOE contractor employees, but these procedures

have not been finalized.40 EH reviews of employee concerns programs indicate that some DOE

field offices have neglected to establish adequate

employee concerns programs in spite of longstanding directives to do so.41

LINE MANAGEMENT RESPONSIBILITY

FOR OCCUPATIONAL SAFETY

AND HEALTH

Occupational health and safety programs

within DOE and its contractor corps are based on

two organizational “pillars”: line responsibility

for safety and health, and independent oversight.

42 (See figure 3-1,) A directive from the

Secretary of Energy explicitly charged DOE line

organizations with responsibility for occupational health and safety matters within their

purview. 43 Each program office (e.g., Environmental Restoration and Waste Management, Defense Programs, Nuclear Energy) is expected to

develop health and safety policy relevant to its

mission, to issue guidance in worker safety and

health matters, and to assess contractors’ OSH

performance.

Responsibility for worker safety and health

may be an appropriately decentralized function

in a large organization. However, EM, the DOE

program office examined by the Office of Technology Assessment, lacks adequate numbers of

qualified staff to develop occupational health and

safety programs suited to EM line operations and

has little capacity to assess contractors’ performance in health and safety matters. As of late

1992, the DOE Office of Environment, Safety,

and Health, had not initiated serious consultations with EM or other line organizations to determine the top priorities of the line programs or

to assist managers in formulating effective OSH

policies.

EM headquarters staff handling worker safety

and health matters are overwhelmed with the

constant need to react to the latest crisis, and are

unable to devote the time and resources needed to

develop coherent cleanup worker protection policies. 44 EM's office of Oversight and Self-Assessment is responsible for producing health and

safety policy, implementation guidance, and

technical advice on EM related OSH matters, and

for assessing the adequacy of EM and its contractors’ occupational safety and health performance.

45 EM has a single staff person with training

in occupational health and safety, and two employees with nuclear safety expertise.46 47 The

EM program office responsible for environmental remediation has no staff trained in occupational safety or health, and is planning to rely entirely on contractors to meet its OSH needs. One

consequence of such staffing patterns is that by

August 1992, EM headquarters staff had not reviewed a single cleanup site health and safety

plan (HASP).48

When the DOE Office of Environmental Restoration and Waste Management was established

in 1989, its leaders confronted pressing responsibilities. Undertaking cleanup of the Weapons

Complex required EM to create and staff a new

program office; to initiate more productive relationships between DOE and its contractors and

between DOE and a skeptical, alarmed public; to

demonstrate progress and justify proposed cleanup budgets to Congress; to comply with environmental regulations, and to meet schedule deadlines in Interagency Agreements. Amidst these

diverse and urgent efforts, EM neglected the de-
-------------------

E

Office of Scientific

and Engineering Recruitment,

Training and Development r

Office of Intelligence

F

I

Office of Policy,

Planning and Analysis

I

Figure 3-l-The Department of

. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .r===

Deputy Secretary

Under Secretary

1

4

Office of Special Projects

-1 I Office of Public Affairs

I 1 A

Office of Nuclear Safety

Assistant Secretary,

Congressional and General Counsel Inspector

Intergovernmental General

I 1 I

Assistant Secretary, Assistant Secretary, Assistant Secretary,

Nuclear Energy Fossil Energy Conservation and

Renewable Energy

Adminis::n.JE Economic Regulatory——

SOURCE: U.S. Department of Energy, 1992.

I

Assistant Secretary,

Ertvironmental

Restoration and Waste

Management

,

Energy

J

Office of Security Affairs I

OffIce of Scheduling .

and Logistics

OffIce of Minority

Economic Impact —

1 1

Office of the Secretary of

Energy Advisory Board

-

d

Board of

Contract Appeals

IOffice of Procurement I I -.. I I Office of I

Assistance, and Officc

Program Ma

! of Financial Administration and

nagement Human Resource

I Mana~ement II and Controller Management

~——

Office of Civilian

Radioactive Waste

Management

-——-—_-L–

office of

Energy Research

-. 1

office of

New Production

Reactors
54 I Hazards Ahead: Managing Cleanup Worker Health and Safety at the Nuclear Weapons Complex

velopment of rigorous or high-profile policies related to cleanup worker safety and health.

It maybe that EM will evolve a more purposeful and aggressive approach to occupational safe-

~ and health as the organization becomes established, as cleanup gets underway, and as the

cleanup workforce increases in size. Currently,

however, there is little evidence of leadership in

OSH matters at EM headquarters, and few indications that decision makers have recognized the

need to urgently address cleanup worker protection issues.

The head of DOE’s Environmental Restoration and Waste Management program explicitly

reaffirmed the Secretary of Energy’s commitment to protecting worker health and safety as

the “highest programmatic priority” in a July

1991 memo to all EM and contractor personnel. 49 The memo goes on to list actions and

programs needed to accomplish EM’s OSH

goals:

●

●

●

●

establishment of firm OSH priorities and responsibilities,

development and implementation of quantitlable OSH performance standards to ensure programmatic accountability,

planning and budgeting for necessary OSH

resources to ensure availability, and

formulation and application of improved

channels of communication.50

Little progress has been made in implementing these programs. Some of EM’s OSH goals

could be accomplished by adopting the proposed

DOE Order 5483, XX, “Occupational Safety and

Health Program for DOE Employees;’ which

was designed by EH and has been under review

by DOE program offices for months. Adoption of

this order would be a constructive response to the

recommendation repeated over the years by multiple expert advisory bodies—including the National Academy of Sciences,51 OSHA,52 the Advisory Committee on Nuclear Facility Safety,53

and the Defense Nuclear Facilities Safety Board

(DNFSB)54—that DOE develop clear health and

safety policies at the national level and establish

explicit, measurable goals that its operations offices and contractors should achieve to implement these policies.

In the absence of a comprehensive OSH order

or policy directed at cleanup work, DOE contractors must rely on existing DOE orders. Numerous

expert reviewers55-57 have Cemented that many

DOE OSH orders lack specificity and adequate

implementation guidance. This lack of precision

allows DOE contractors great leeway in determining what constitutes satisfactory compliance

with Occupational Health and Safety orders.

Also, DOE’s existing OSH orders and policies do

not address some worker protection issues specific to the DOE cleanup, such as the content of

health and safety training programs or medical

surveillance for hazardous waste workers.

Recent DOE policy changes designed to reduce risks to off-site populations, but developed

in the absence of comprehensive occupational

health and safety policies or a clear focus on

worker protection needs, may have heightened

cleanup worker health and safety threats. For example, the Final Safety Analysis for Rocky Flats

concentrated principally on off-site radiological

risks from plant operations. The Secretary’s Advisory Committee on Nuclear Facility Safety expressed concern that changes in plant operations

made on the basis of this safety analysis might

actually increase risks to workers.58 In addition,

the committee worried that concerns about environmental threats might prompt managers to replace carbon tetrachloride, a liver toxin used in

large quantities at Rocky Flats, with less toxic—

but more flammable-solvents. Because fire hazards are among the most serious threats at the

plant, a narrow analysis that focuses on health

hazards but ignores potential worker safety risks

could be disastrous.59

The Ahearne committee also expressed concern that ongoing activity may jeopardize workers at the Hanford tank farms, where potentially
Chapter 3–Cleanup Worker Protection at the DOE Nuclear Weapons Complex 55

flammable high-level radioactive waste is stored.

The committee noted that DOE and its contractor

managers “have shown little appreciation of the

safety of workers working on top of Tank 101-

SY,’ which is suspected to have an appreciable

chance of exploding. The committee went on:

At Hanford, as elsewhere in the DOE, there

is a tendency to concentrate on risk to the general public and give much less attention to workers. At such an isolated site as Hanford, this can

make conditions seem much better than they

really are.60

There is a pressing need to establish the primacy of orders, standards, and regulations applicable to cleanup worker protection at DOE facilities. Throughout DOE and its contractor corps,

compliance with environmental laws is seen as

having a higher priority than compliance with occupational health and safety regulations. The former are statutory requirements, and violation is

understood by DOE and its contractors to carry a

threat of great embarrassment and possible fries

against DOE. Some fear that criminal sanctions

might be levied against the employees responsible.

Occupational health and safety regulations, on

the other hand, have the status “merely” of DOE

orders, which many mangers consider “policy”

rather than explicit, legally enforceable commands. Although the Secretary of Energy specifically instructed managers to comply with all applicable OSHA standards and regulations,61

DOE and its contractors appear to regard this directive as 1ess compelling or of lower priority

than compliance with environmental statutes.

This attitude is understandable, if regrettable,

given the absence of effective mechanisms for

enforcing OSH orders at DOE facilities and the

lack of significant or visible penalties imposed

for failure to implement sound worker protection

policies.

A litany of problems at the Hanford tank farms

suggests that DOE’s ability to monitor contractor

OSH practices or induce contractors to follow adequate worker health and safety practices is extremely limited.62-65 DOE regards Hanford’s single-shell tanks as its top safety concern because

of the potential for tank contents to undergo a

chemical explosion and spew radionuclides

across the surrounding countryside. Yet at least

16 different “events” resulting in worker exposure to tank vapors occurred between 1987 and

1992, before a DOE investigation revealed the seriousness of the problem and the lack of adequate

management response,66

Several of these exposures caused workers to

be hospitalized; at least one worker suffered permanent loss of lung function. In January 1992 an

investigation by the DOE Richland Field Office

concluded that the causes of the recurring exposures were inadequate “implementation of management systems,” lack of a properly developed

industrial hygiene program, and “failure to properly characterize the work environment and develop appropriate engineering controls.”67 It is

notable that the Richland Field Office Safety Program had no staff whatsoever from August 1991

until April 1992.68 From 1980 through August

1991 the Richland Field Office had only one-half

of one full-time-equivalent (FTE) staff person for

industrial hygiene functions .69

A former Assistant Secretary of Labor for Occupational Safety and Health, who reviewed

DOE’s internal report investigating the tank farm

exposures

70 at OTA’s request, commented:

The failure of those in responsible management charge to assign resources to this problem

in the presence of repeated violations would,

without any doubt, have been viewed by OSHA

as willful violations of the [Occupational Safety

and Health] Act and subject to possible criminal

penalties. This conclusion would probably have

been reached by the end of 1987 when three

[worker exposure] episodes had occurred, but

certainly by 1989 when the episodes reoccurred.

The absence of high priority for solving this

problem in 1990, with attendant lack of professional staff and resources could well put someone on trial for criminal behavior [had the oc-
56 I Hazards Ahead: Managing Cleanup Worker Health and Safety at the Nuclear Weapons Complex

currences been subject to OSHA enforcement

and penalties]. Also, in 1989 with the reoccurrence of the episode, [an OSHA finding of] “imminent danger” and a series of restrictive procedures akin to closure of a manufacturing facility

probably would have been invoked.’l

A DOE internal memo on the subject of the

tank farm vapor exposures noted that if Hanford

were subject to OSHA citations and penalties,

fines up to $70,000 per day might be expected.72

Nonetheless, despite these and other failures in

occupational health and safety performance, the

DOE contractor at Hanford was granted an award

fee of almost $5 million in 1991.73

OVERSIGHT OF OCCUPATIONAL SAFETY

AND HEALTH PRACTICES

DOE’s Office of Environment, Safety, and

Health makes up the second pillar of the Department’s approach to worker health and safety protection: independent oversight. EH is responsible

for providing DOE line management programs

with internal review of DOE and contractor OSH

programs. EH also provides line organizations

with technical advice, develops and maintains

DOE orders, and conducts Technical Safety Appraisals and Tiger Team Assessments.74

EH has 11 site representatives or “residents”

stationed at 5 weapons facilities. These 11 individuals are responsible for monitoring contractor

OSH performance throughout the NWC,75 

covering a total work force of more than 100,000.76

EH site representatives have been directed to

shift their evaluation of DOE facilities from compliance-oriented inspections to “programmatic 

assessment” of DOE line management OSH performance and to identify root causes of deficiencies.77 The results of these assessments are sent

directly to DOE Program Secretarial Officials

(PSOs) such as the Assistant Secretary for EM.78

Formerly, EM field resident reports were reviewed at the DOE field office level. The change

in reporting structure was made to increase the

visibility of OSH performance79 and to respond

to OSHA’s complaint that DOE field offices were

embroiled in a “major conflict of interest” because they were responsible both for ensuring

contractor compliance with DOE health and safety policies and for reporting back to program

offices at DOE headquarters on their own effectiveness as overseers and enforcers of such compliance. 80

The EH site representative reports indicate

that significant progress must be made if DOE

line managers are to exercise meaningful oversight of contractor OSH activities. For example,

EH site residents found that the Oak Ridge Field

Office had not assessed the adequacy of the site

construction contractor’s work control program

and could not guarantee that “adequate work controls will be established and implemented to ensure worker safety during construction activities.” 81 This report also documented that the

construction management contractor had not ensured that the personnel who assessed the site for

the presence of possible worker safety hazards

were properly trained to perform this task.82 In

addition to these findings of inadequate DOE

oversight of OSH matters, the EH representative

found that “work controls specifying safety requirements are not effectively and consistently

implemented and followed by construction personnel and their management at work sites.”83

DOE Chain of Command and

Accountability for Occupational

Safety and Health

Other monthly reports of EH site representatives provide additional evidence that DOE line

management is not effectively overseeing contractor occupational health and safety performance. One impediment to effective DOE

oversight of contractors is the complex and overlapping jurisdictions of its different line organizations at weapons facilities.

According to an EH report on Idaho National

Engineering Laboratory (INEL) for example,

DOE managers failed to independently assess or
_—

Chapter 3-Cleanup Worker Protection at the DOE Nuclear Weapons Complex 57

verify contractors’ freeze protection initiatives.

(Such winterization precautions are essential to

ensure functioning fire protection systems at

INEL.) 84 This failure was largely due to confusion about the jurisdictional overlaps between

different line management organizations at DOE.

A memo from the DOE Office of Defense Programs (DP) detailing department policy on freeze

protection was interpreted by the prime contractor as being applicable to DP facilities only. Consequently, the contractors did not address INEL

operations controlled by EM in its response to

the Idaho Field Office questionnaire. DOE field

office staff failed to realize that the contractor

had not considered all aspects of INEL operations. 85

Another instance of inadequate DOE oversight

of contractor activities was documented by EH

representatives at Hanford, who found that construction contractor safety programs were quite

good, but that the Richland Field Office exercised

only “weak” oversight over contractor construction safety programs and had failed to assign anyone the responsibility of identifying emerging

regulations, requirements, or safety training

needs in construction. The representatives determined that “contractor [IOSH] performance is due

to the contractor’s efforts rather than direction

from the line organization.”86 The report noted

that DOE field office staff “did not programmatically review any of the contractor’s safety programs and that the contractor could revise existing safety programs without [the field office’s]

knowledge. Therefore there is no assurance that

the apparently acceptable performance of a contractor will remain acceptable.”87

The lack of strong, centralized control over

DOE contractor organizations will hinder efforts

to ensure consistent and comprehensive implementation of OSHA’s Hazardous Waste Operation and Emergency Response (HAZWOPER)

standard and other health and safety standards

during the NWC cleanup. DOE headquarters is

currently unable to determine the roster of work88 ers at a given weapons facility. Ascertaining

that all contractor and subcontractor employees

have undergone legally mandated health and

safety training, are enrolled in required medical

surveillance programs, and so forth, will be difficult under these circumstances. Currently, most

weapons facilities lack administrative mechanisms to ensure that workers transferring to new

jobs at a facility undergo initial fitness exams

prior to beginning new duties or are subsequently

enrolled in appropriate medical surveillance programs. Overseeing the quality and comprehensiveness of cleanup worker health and safety programs administered by hundreds of DOE

subcontractors engaged in the cleanup will be a

monumental task.

DOE Tiger Teams and OSHA noted that

health and safety personnel at DOE facilities had

a poor grasp of OSHA inspection and hazard assessment methods.89 Recent guidance from EH

headquarters to its site representatives on how

DOE and contractor OSH performance should be

assessed is an important step forward, but without a significant infusion of staff and resources,

such guidance cannot overcome current staffing

limitations within DOE.

OSHA and DOE have negotiated a Memorandum of Understanding (MOU) that establishes a formalized working relationship and allows

“where practical” for “mutually beneficial” OSH

training, technical assistance and information ex90 

change, and program evaluations. Although the

MOU does not specifically mention cleanup

worker issues, DOE EH has already arranged access to computerized files of OSHA’s “HAZWOPER Interpretative Quips” and has plans to

access much of OSHA’s technical information as

well.91

The interactions made possible by the MOU

might be very helpful to DOE staff, who are trying in effect to reproduce OSHA policies and

programs. The content of the MOU is vague,

however; it contains no promises of specific interactions and proposes collaboration only “to

the extent priorities and resources permit.”

Specific arrangements for reimbursing OSHA
58 I Hazards Ahead: Managing Cleanup Worker Health and Safety at the Nuclear Weapons Complex

will be worked out in future interagency agreements. 92

EH has initiated major revisions of two DOE

orders that are fundamental to worker protection

at the Weapons Complex. The Occupational

Safety and Health Program for DOE Contractor

Employees (DOE Order 5483. XX)93 is a comprehensive reformulation of DOE OSH orders

that would codify the hierarchy of DOE-developed OSH standards, DOE-adopted OSHA standards, DOE-adopted consensus standards, etc.,

that managers should follow in implementing

worker protection programs at DOE facilities. In

addition, the proposed Order 5483.XX establishes DOE OSH program requirements; sets forth

rules for procedures, schedules, and employee

participation in DOE and contractor OSH selfassessments; prescribes reporting procedures for

work-related illnesses and injuries; and describes

a risk assessment methodology for determining

the priority of abatement procedures .94

This proposed DOE order would also establish

a formal process for hazard abatement and would

require approval of any significant delays in correcting identified hazards.95 OSHA found that at

one facility, more than 5,000 hazards had gone

uncorrected for over a year because managers did

not recognize these items as a priority. At another

facility, OSHA identified inadequate ventilation

and electrical conditions that had been uncorrected for 6 years.

96 A 1992 EH review of occupational safety and health programs at the Portsmouth Gaseous Diffusion Plant revealed more

than 500 violations of DOE OSH orders, most of

which were classified as “serious.” Many of these

violations had been previously identified, but had

not been corrected.97 Situations such as the failure to abate—or even fully investigate—the

vapor exposure hazards at the Hanford tank

farms would hopefully become less likely with

the adoption and implementation of the proposed

order.

Another OSH order under development by EH

is the Construction Safety Program,98 which

would replace the current construction safety and

health program (DOE Order 5480.9) adopted in

1980. The new order would establish program requirements for DOE line management and contractors involved in all construction activities, including environmental restoration, and might

provide some of the ingredients needed to create

sound health and safety plans for cleanup work.

EH has tried to instill sound occupational

health and safety principles into line management programs through the provision of technical

support. EH has begun an effort to assist contractors with the development of model worker protection projects. Managers will have the option of

using EH seed funds to pilot worker health and

safety initiatives that will be published and reviewed in a DOE on-line clearinghouse.99 This

project was a response to OSHA’s complaint that

the historically insular nature of DOE operations

had led it to repeatedly reinvent the wheel and

had hindered consistency in OSH practices.lOO

EH has also undertaken a significant upgrading

of DOE’s documentation of work-related injuries

and illnesses in an effort to remedy serious inaccuracies noted by OSHA in current record-keeping procedures. 101

The impact of recommendations and policy

proposals from EH is tempered by the relatively

weak authority it exerts over DOE line management. EH acts in an “advisory capacity” to DOE

program offices; its policy products are subject to

comment and review by these program offices.

(The proposed “Occupational Health and Safety

Order, 5480.XX’ garnered 1,300 comments from

within DOE.102) EH maintains that after such

intra-agency review, it makes independent determinations on final policies to be submitted to the

Secretary for approval. The Assistant Secretary

for EH has the option of bringing EH proposals

to the Secretary for approval that do not have the

concurrence of other DOE program offices.103

104

In practice, the process of gaining official approval of EH recommendations is one of compromise and accommodation.

105 

EH has tried, with

some success, to “leverage” its sparse resources
Chapter 3–Cleanup Worker Protection at the DOE Nuclear Weapons Complex 59

and authority by conducting “special assessments” of high-profile problem areas or operations. These reviews are used essentially to embarrass managers into more vigorous OSH

efforts.

DOE’s limited capacity to enforce worker

health and safety policies and orders among contractors has been documented by OSHA and by

EH site residents reports,106-109 This failure was

grimly illustrated by the death of a Hanford contractor employee, who was killed in April 1992

after falling through the roof of an abandoned reactor building known to be in danger of collapse.

The fatality demonstrated that written safety procedures are not always followed, even when

workers and supervisors are aware of their existence. 110

DOE and contractor management participation in many EH initiatives is voluntary; the principal EH approach to oversight of line management OSH activities remains reactive responses

to problems that might have been avoided had

strong programs been implemented. Critical

OSH orders proposed by EH have yet to be approved.

Nonetheless, progress in occupational health

and safety at DOE should be measured against

the pervasive and serious deficiencies in worker

protection that characterized operations before

1989, with consideration for the difficulties of securing management and worker commitment to

new DOE missions and priorities. In this light,

EH efforts over the past year represent positive

steps toward a programmatic approach to a “new

culture” honoring environment, safety, and health

at DOE.

The organizationally segmented structure of

occupational safety and health activities at DOE

demands extensive staff and resources that are

not now in place. Further progress in institutionalizing rigorous worker protection throughout the

Weapons Complex requires a significant increase

in trained occupational health and safety professionals in DOE line organizations and in EH. In

addition, serious and sustained consultation between EH and EM will be required to develop

and implement OSH programs most urgently

needed for cleanup. EH initiatives and policies—

no matter how valid---are meaningless unless

line management and field staff have the will and

resources to implement them.

Finally, oversight and enforcement of contractor occupational health and safety activities by

both line management and EH must be augmented. DOE must demonstrate its commitment to

worker health and safety by making the formulation and implementation of clear and coordinated

OSH policies an urgent priority. Otherwise, as

will be discussed in the next section of this background paper, management attention will continue to focus on other goals, such as schedules for

achieving environmental compliance and contract costs, at the expense of worker protection issues. The risks of such a course include the potential endangerment of thousands of employees

and further erosion of DOE’s credibility as a responsible and competent protector of environment, safety and health.

WORKER PROTECTION COMPETES

WITH OTHER CLEANUP PRIORITIES

DOE and contractor managers involved in

cleanup of the NWC must contend with all of the

issues that clamor for attention and resources at

non-Federal hazardous waste sites. If anything,

the competing pressures and priorities are more

diverse and intense at DOE weapons facilities.

Communities neighboring weapons sites are

greatly concerned about possible health and environmental impacts of the pollution—and have

expressed this concern via Congressional hearings, the national media and in successful and

pending lawsuits against DOE.lll -113 The pressure on EM and on DOE contractors to demonstrate progress while holding down costs is unrelenting, and occurs in a context of technical

complexities unmatched at most non-Federal

waste sites.
60 I Hazards Ahead: Managing Cleanup Worker Health and Safety at the Nuclear Weapons Complex

In addition to the need to comply with applicable environmental regulations, particularly Superfund and the Resource Conservation and Recovery Act (RCRA), the DOE cleanup is being

driven by priorities and schedule “milestones”

established in Interagency Agreements (IAGs)

negotiated among DOE, EPA, and individual

States. The milestones and deadlines set forth in

IAGs were typically agreed to before reliable

characterization data was available and in the absence of health-based cleanup priorities or analyses of potential occupational hazards associated

with proposed cleanup work.114 The need to respond to regulatory demands and IAG schedules

has preoccupied much of the management talent

in EM. Available evidence, including staffing

patterns and resource allocation, indicates that

DOE line management has paid relatively little

attention to OSH issues associated with the

cleanup.

DOE has convened the Tripartite Commission

to discuss occupational health and safety matters

related to its operations. This high-level working

group consists of DOE senior managers, contractor managers, and representatives of national

labor organizations with members employed at

facilities in the NWC. The group has discussed

DOE initiatives in medical surveillance, health

and safety training, and other matters pertinent to

DOE workers generally; it is not designed to

focus solely on cleanup issues. Much of the

group’s discussion has reportedly been directed

at the fate of DOE production workers whose

original job titles will be eliminated as weapons

production activities end and some facilities are

115 The Tripartite converted into cleanup sites.

Commission does not address the level of technical detail that is the major focus of the EPALabor Health and Safety Task Force,116 117 nor

does it include representatives from EPA, the National Institute of Occupational Safety and

Health (NIOSH), OSHA, or other Federal agencies whose missions and expertise are pertinent

to the NWC cleanup.

Many contentious questions are involved in interpreting and implementing HAZWOPER, coordinating policies among Federal agencies, and

communicating effectively with those who actually do the work of cleaning up. DOE might more

efficiently resolve some of these issues by convening a multidisciplinary, interagency task

force—perhaps even broader in membership than

EPA’s—including for example, staff from the National Institute of Environmental Health Sciences

(NIEHS) and the Agency for Toxic Substances

and Disease Registry (ATSDR), as well as health

and safety experts from relevant unions. Health

and safety staff from DOE’s EM and EH might

also benefit from sitting in on sessions of the

EPA-Labor Health and Safety Task Force.

DOE SITE CHARACTERIZATION DATA

Both the scale and the complexity of contamination at the Nuclear Weapons Complex distinguish the DOE cleanup from most other hazardous waste operations.

118 These factors increase

the uncertainties involved in mapping environmental pathways or determining pollution

boundaries, and in turn heighten the difficulties

associated with identifying site hazards, recognizing potential worker health and safety risks,

and designing and implementing work practices

that effectively limit such risks.

Characterizing the nature, extent, and future

course of environmental contamination is a

time-consuming and technically difficult job in

any case, but it will be especially challenging

throughout the NWC. Records documenting past

releases of contaminants from DOE weapons facilities are scant. The exact content and location

of past releases are frequently unknown, and the

environmental pathways followed by contaminants released years or decades earlier are often

difficult to track. **9

In many cases, the volume of contaminants released to the environment at DOE facilities

dwarfs the amount of hazardous material found at

more typical waste sites. Groundwater contami-
Chapter 3–Cleanup Worker Protection at the DOE Nuclear Weapons Complex 161

nation has been confirmed at all NWC facilities.

All nonarid sites are believed to have surface

water contamination.

120 The volume of soil and

sediment contaminated with radionuclides, hazardous chemicals, or both is estimated to total

billions of cubic meters.

121 Thousands of solid

waste management units have been identified

throughout the Weapons Complex, many of

which require remedial action. Hundreds of

buildings and other structures will eventually require decontamination and decommissioning.

The sheer magnitude of characterization efforts at the NWC will pose great challenges to attempts to link environmental data with potential

worker health and safety threats. Currently, DOE

environmental cleanup requires the analysis of

two to three million samples per year. DOE has

estimated that by 1995, at least 10 million analyses of environmental samples conducted in offsite laboratories will be required annually.122 The

possible presence of radionuclides in DOE samples will magnify the costs and logistical problems typically associated with characterizing

complex pollution scenarios-including long delays in obtaining sample results—because few

laboratories are equipped to handle such analyses.

Very few DOE or DOE contractor employees

involved in characterization of the nuclear weapons sites are trained in any health discipline.

Trained industrial hygienists qualified to assess

the adequacy of available characterization data

and review the quality of contractors’ HASPS are

in short supply at DOE. The few industrial hygienists who are available still appear to be concentrating on reviewing exposure hazards and

establishing industrial hygiene protocols for

weapons production activities.123 OTA was unable to identify anyone at DOE headquarters, in

either EM or EH, who is attempting to establish

guidance or policies that DOE contractors or

field staff could use to assess the adequacy of

characterization data used in formulating HASPS

for cleanup worker protection.

DOE has not directed contractors to factor potential cleanup worker health threats into characterization strategies or remediation plans. The

Los Alamos National Laboratory (LANL) recently proposed to assist the EH Office of Health

Physics and Industrial Hygiene by developing

technical documents in support of draft program

requirements for a “Health and Safety Standard

for Hazardous Waste Operations and Emergency

Response” and an “Industrial Hygiene Technical

Manual for Health and Safety During Hazardous

Waste Operations and Emergency Response.’’ 124

The former document is to follow OSHA’s HAZWOPER standard, whereas the latter “will be

similar in depth and scope” to existing NIOSH

and OSHA manuals.

125 It is unclear to what extent this proposed project might develop new material specific to the nuclear weapons sites cleanup. DOE has noted that this proposal “will be

revised to include EM,’’ 126 but the draft documents appear to be aimed at worker protection efforts that commence only after site characterization is well under way or completed.

DOE lacks the field staff needed to determine

if contractors have done a good job analyzing the

type and extent of pollution, or to assess whether

available characterization data adequately delineate the health and safety hazards that cleanup

workers might encounter. Thus, DOE managers

will have little substantive basis for evaluating

contractors’ proposed site-specific HASPS.

Prime contractors at some weapons facilities

are attempting to reduce the time and costs required to complete characterization efforts by

integrating Remedial Investigations with Feasibility Studies. Westinghouse Hanford is planning to use the “observational approach” in assessing pollution in Hanford old plutonium

reactor areas for example. 127 This approach ha s

been used with success at some non-Federal

waste sites and incorporates the idea that characterization studies should be conducted for a specific purpose, not merely to satisfy regulatory

checklists (see ch, 1).
62 Hazards Ahead: Managing Cleanup Worker Health and Safety at the Nuclear Weapons Complex

A focal point of environmental studies used to

support the observational approach to site characterization should be the identification of possible

risks to cleanup workers. It is not evident, however, that either DOE or EPA has instructed contractors to make potential threats to cleanup

worker health an important “purpose” of site

characterization. In the absence of such policy,

eagerness to reduce characterization costs may

also reduce the availability of environmental data

vital to site hazard identification and worker protection.

DOE has not issued any orders or guidance to

ensure that contractors use approved or consistent methods in collecting and analyzing environmental samples throughout the Weapons Complex so that pollution scenarios at different sites

can be compared. Indeed, DOE has no comprehensive plan for consistently gathering and analyzing environmental monitoring data within or

across weapons sites, and no strategy and little

technical capacity for relating such data to potential adverse health effects among workers or offsite populations who may be exposed to pollutants. 128 Consequently, DOE has no means of

determining which of the many thousands of polluted areas within the NWC require more urgent

or more rigorous characterization and cleanup

because of their potential health risks. Nor will

DOE be able to weigh potential risks to cleanup

workers against possible benefits of proposed environmental remedies.

Another problem confronting identification of

potential cleanup worker health and safety threats

is the lack of coordination or consistent management of characterization data across DOE facilities. Subcontractors engaged in cleanup efforts at

DOE facilities have complained to OTA that it is

sometimes difficult to get access to characterization data pertinent to worker health and safety.129

130 The varying organizational structures associated with different DOE contractors are such that

there is no consistency among sites in the titles of

individuals assigned to data collection and analy -

sis or in the procedures required for subcontractors to obtain these data.

Such inconsistencies in the structure of DOE

contractor organizations add another layer of

complexity to efforts to link characterization data

to potential cleanup worker health threats. The

lack of standard procedures for collecting, analyzing, and recording site characterization data

and ongoing environmental monitoring data will

also impede efforts to fashion efficient, effective,

and consistent medical surveillance programs or

health and safety training programs for the cleanup.

IMPACTS OF DOE

CONTRACTING PRACTICES

DOE and its predecessor agencies were not

conceived as organizations subject to strong centralized direction and control. The Manhattan

Project was a loose consortium of private corporations who agreed to participate in building the

atomic bomb for reasons of national security.

The companies that contributed their skills and

expertise to managing and operating government-owned nuclear weapons facilities during

the Cold War (the M&Os) did so in an era when

the risks of nuclear technology and other potentially hazardous processes used in weapons production were not fully known. These considerations, and the pressure to augment the nuclear

arsenal, induced the government to indemnify

M&Os against nuclear and other losses, including workers’ compensation costs. 131

Over the years, a special “partnership” developed between DOE and its M&O’s that has

greatly complicated DOE’s oversight of its contractors.132 About 90 percent of DOE’S total budget is spent on contractors, primarily those who

manage the NWC. This amounted to $17.6 billion in fiscal year 1990.133

Beginning in the 1980’s, revelations about the

seriousness of environmental contamination

throughout the NWC, and a succession of weapons facility shutdowns prompted by safety con-
Chapter 3-Cleanup Worker Protection at the DOE Nuclear Weapons Complex 63

cerns raised questions about DOE’s ability to effectively monitor contractor operations. Such

events also prompted questions about the appropriate limits of contractor indemnification in the

face of regulatory noncompliance.134

Environmental Restoration Management

Contractors (ERMCS)

Environmental cleanup will be a significant

activity at all sites run by M&O contractors, including those facilities that continue to have responsibilities for weapons production, testing,

and dismantlement. DOE has determined that at

facilities where environmental restoration is the

only or major mission, Environmental Restoration Management Contractors (ERMCs) will replace or augment M&Os.

ERMCs will be responsible for conducting

Superfund Remedial Investigation/Feasibility

Studies, RCRA Remedial Field Investigations,

and associated “base program” activities. Subcontractors supervised by the ERMC will actually carry out the characterization studies and will

design and implement remedial actions. The

ERMC Will be responsible for procuring and

managing construction subcontractors.

135 T h e

DOE Office of Environmental Restoration and

Waste Management is the program office in

charge of all environmental restoration and waste

management act iv i ties, whether they occur at

ERMC sites or at facilities run by M&O contractors. 136

The ERMC concept was designed to help restore public confidence in the DOE cleanup effort by making a clear distinction between cleanup contractors and those who had generated the

contamination, ERMCs also reflect DOE’s desire

to expand its contractor corps to include firms

with environmental expertise and to inject more

competition into bids for its cleanup contracts.

DOE claims that contractor accountability is

137 Some critic s

increased under the ERMC rules.

have. however, dubbed the ERMC approach “an

 It is possible that the accountability disaster.”138

large number of subcontractors and the multiple

layers of managerial responsibility characteristic

of ERMC cleanup operations will dilute and confuse responsibility and authority for worker

health and safety issues.

DOE has tried to build provisions into ERMC

agreements that enhance its authority over contractors. For example, ERMCs will not be “bankrolled” in advance by the government for cleanup

costs. Instead, they will have to invest their own

capital, and DOE will reimburse costs after budgetary review.

139 This approach may forc e

ERMCs to pursue more responsible and prudent

cost-accounting practices than have always been

followed by M&Os, but it might also encourage

contractors to scrimp on outlays for occupational

safety and health, unless DOE imposes and enforces explicit OSH performance criteria.

Two ERMCs are currently planned. The FluorDaniel Co. has been selected as the ERMC at

Fernald, DOE estimates that up to $5 billion

could be spent on the Fernald cleanup over the

next 5 years; the ERMC could earn as much as

$125 million annually during this period.140 Bidding for the Hanford ERMC is under way. The

Hanford ERMC will manage all environmental

restoration and defense decontamination and decommissioning projects. Waste management activities at Hanford, including characterization

and retrieval of materials stored in high-level

waste tanks, will remain the responsibility of the

current M&O contractor, Westinghouse Hanford

Corporation. (WHC).141

Cost-Plus Award Fee Process

Contractors at all DOE weapons facilities

(M&Os and ERMCs) are now subject to a new

contracting process, the cost-plus award fee

(CPAF) policy. DOE established the CPAF to encourage attention to environment, health, and 142 

Under the new policy, contrac -

safety issues,

tors are paid a “base fee” for reimbursement of

costs, plus a variable “award fee,’” 51 percent of

which is determined by DOE on the basis of con-
64 Hazards Ahead: Managing Cleanup Worker Health and Safety at the Nuclear Weapons Complex

tractor performance in environment, safety, and

health. 143 If the contractor fails any one of these

categories, the entire award fee would be at

risk. 144

The record suggests that the award fee

contracting provisions are not functioning as

planned. Reports by the General Accounting Office (GAO) *45 and the DOE Inspector Genera1146

have called into question DOE’s willingness or

ability to use the CPAF to hold contractors accountable for performance. OSHA noted that

M&Os have avoided penalties for deficiencies in

health and safety by negotiating larger base

fees.147 For example, the M&O contractor at Oak

Ridge increased its “award fee” in 1992 compared to 1991, even though its performance in environment, health, and safety-areas that supposedly determine 51 percent of the award-had

declined. The contractor accomplished this by

negotiating a higher base fee in 1992,148

GAO reported that under the new cost-plus

award fee system, DOE failed to reduce contractor awards even when serious deficiencies had

been found in contractor performance.149 150 At

Hanford, for example, multiple management

errors in safety performance,151 152 and shortcomings in hazard analysis and worker protection

at the high-level radioactive waste tank farms, *53 154

did not prevent WHC from receiving an appreciable award fee in fiscal year 1991.155

At the Nevada Test Site, the contractor’s performance in environment, safety, and health in

1990 was rated “average.” According to DOE

policy, this should result in lower award fees. The

DOE Inspector General found, however, that

DOE field personnel adjusted the maximum

award fees to allow their contractor to earn fees

equal to earlier amounts-without increasing its

performance score.156

The M&O contractor at Rocky Flats was

granted an award fee of $1.7 million for 1991,

even though the performance review board found

that the contractor did not deserve the award. Defense Programs, the DOE office responsible for

Rocky Flats, decided to overrule the board with

the concurrence of the DOE field office manager.

157 DOE's EM and EH offices reviewed the .

award fee in an advisory role: EM supported the

award; EH did not. EH opposition was based

largely on 29 significant deficiencies in environment, safety, and health cited by the board. In reviewing this decision, GAO was unable to determine the weight accorded environment, safety,

and health in the final award decision. GAO also

recalled earlier undeserved awards to previous

Rocky Flats contractors who tolerated serious environment, safety, and health problems, and

noted that “some of the same problems we identified [in 1989] still exist.’’ 158

In practice, DOE contractor compliance with

environmental regulations appears to receive

more emphasis than occupational health and

safety issues when award fees are assigned. The

CPAF process does not establish what, if any,

portion of the award is based on occupational

safety and health performance. As discussed earlier in this background paper, the priorities and

processes that guide Superfund and RCRA

cleanups accentuate the importance of environmental cleanup schedules, costs, and possible

off-site impacts of pollution, downplaying potential health and safety threats to on-site workers.

DOE appears to be reasserting these priorities in

its contractor awards. Contractor performance in

environmental areas— measured by meeting

schedule deadlines and milestones set forth in

IAGs-appears to weigh more heavily than performance in occupational health and safety.

APPLICATION OF HAZWOPER

TO DOE CLEANUP

Policy Guidance on Implementation

The DOE Office of Environmental Restoration

and Waste Management has line responsibilities

for the cleanup of weapons facilities. EM has

made it clear that all environmental restoration

and waste management activities are subject to

existing DOE orders and must comply with
Chapter 3-Cleanup Worker Protection at the DOE Nuclear Weapons Complex 65

HAZWOPER, OSHA’s construction standard (29

CFR 1926), and other relevant OSHA regulations. 159

In December 1991, responding to earlier findings by the DOE Inspector General that failure to

comply with HAZWOPER training provisions

was widespread at NWC facilities,160 the Office

of the Environment within EH issued guidance

on “OSHA Training Requirements for Hazardous

Waste Operations.’’161 EH recently completed a

draft of a document outlining HAZWOPER,162

which essentially reiterates the requirements of

OSHA’s standard,163 albeit in a more readable

format. It also provides some important ancillary

references that might be helpful in implementing

the regulation and includes a sample outline of a

site-specific HASP.

The effort proposed by LANL in October

1992 to develop a draft “Health and Safety Standard for Hazardous Waste Operations and Emergency Response” on behalf of the EH Office of

Health Physics and Industrial Hygiene164 will

presumably focus more specifically on the programmatic requirements of identifying and controlling cleanup worker exposures to health and

safety hazards, although available documents do

not make clear how the EH HAZWOPER draft

differs from the proposed LANL project. It is

also unclear that either effort will significantly

alter or augment the existing OSHA standard.

Full implementation of the OSHA HAZWOPER standard at DOE facilities will require considerable effort and cooperation on the part of

DOE line managers and contractors. A robust implementation of the standard-for example, a

program that takes into account private sector

criticisms of deficiencies in OSHA’s proposed

health and safety training program accreditation

process, includes reporting requirements and

qualification criteria for physicians designing

medical surveillance programs, and imposes

more rigorous standards for emergency responder training—cannot occur unless DOE line

managers and EH staff make such goals a prioriIt is also probable that cooperative cross-organization efforts among health and safety staff at

EM and in different divisions of EH will be necessary to create workable and rigorous OSH policies for the cleanup. The EPA-Labor Task Force

on Health and Safety has demonstrated that regular discussion among experienced health and

safety practitioners from multiple disciplines and

agencies can produce valuable insights and help

resolve some of the more ambiguous and problematic questions surrounding HAZWOPER implementation. DOE’s efforts to interpret and implement HAZWOPER effectively might also

benefit from consultation with health and safety

experts from academia and the private sector, as

well as different branches of the government

such as NIOSH, NIEHS, ATSDR, and the Army

Corps of Engineers (ACE), who are familiar with

some of the issues involved. DOE has not yet initiated any such outreach.

DOE and its contractors are not moving aggressively to ensure that the minimal requirements of HAZWOPER are met at DOE facilities.

EM has not issued policies or guidance explaining how DOE field offices and contractors should

interpret and implement HAZWOPER. The EH

HAZWOPER draft, even if promptly finalized,

will not address interpretive issues associated

with HAZWOPER that were discussed in earlier

sections of this background paper.

In the absence of clear DOE policies and

guidance, implementation of HAZWOPER by

different contractors at different facilities is certain to be of variable quality. Furthermore, compliance with some aspects of the HAZWOPER

standard developing emergency response plans

and meeting worker training requirements, for

example-requires contractors to make preparations well in advance of initiating site cleanup activities. However, DOE has not yet carried out assessments of the resources and programs that

must be established to ensure compliance with

HAZWOPER. The next section of this background paper addresses the implication for

DOE’s complex cleanup of specific elements of
66 Hazards Ahead: Managing Cleanup Worker Health and Safety at the Nuclear Weapons Complex

HAZWOPER that have proved contentious at

non-Federal cleanup sites.

Health and Safety Plans

The site Health and Safety Plan is a cornerstone of HAZWOPER’s approach to cleanup

worker protection. Experience with Superfund

and RCRA cleanups has shown that the design

and implementation of HASPS encompass many

of the most frequently encountered disputes associated with HAZWOPER.165 166 EPA explicitly

states that “there can be only one HASP per

site .’’167 Many of the DOE sites, however, are

huge. The Idaho National Engineering Laboratory is larger than the State of Rhode Island. Hanford is nearly as big. Even relatively small sites,

such as Fernald and Rocky Flats, harbor multiple

and complicated pollution sources. 168 At a given

time, dozens of subcontractors may be operating

on-site and potentially be exposed to different

Solid Waste Management Units (SWMUS)

169 170

encompassing many different contaminants en -

vironmental transport pathways, and waste

streams.

The scope and complexity of contamination

throughout the NWC will probably accentuate

the problems experienced at other waste sites in

linking characterization data to potential cleanup

worker health and safety risks. Characterization

of the NWC will continue for years, and in some

cases, will overlap with remediation activities

and efforts to prevent contamination from

spreading. It will be necessary to have systems in

place that allow existing HASPs to efficiently integrate new site information, including environmental monitoring data, plans for altered or additional work tasks, and associated worker

protection strategies.

Crafting HASPS that accurately delineate

weapons site hazards will require a major effort

on the part of DOE and its contractors. The EH

Draft Hazardous Waste Operations and Emergency Response document stipulates that DOE

contractors must designate a Company Health

and Safety Supervisor who has “overall responsibility for development and implementation of the

HASP.’’ 171 The proposed guidance also requires

that a health and safety officer be on-site during

all level A,B, or high-hazard level C field operations, and during all invasive/evacuation work

such as well drilling. Site OSH officers would

have stop-work authorization. These provisions,

if implemented, might mitigate some of the problems with accountability and chain of command

that have been troublesome at non-Federal cleanup sites.

Organizing and updating the paperwork needed to document site characterization studies,

work plans, and environmental monitoring results, and the challenges of linking appropriate

worker protection strategies to particular cleanup

jobs throughout the NWC, will be formidable.

Paper reviews of written HASPs-let alone field

assessments of the adequacy of implemented

health and safety programs-will be daunting

tasks. Thus far, the press of competing demands

and limited staffing have prevented the EM headquarters Office of Oversight from reviewing a

single HASP from any weapons facility.172 No

Federal or State agency currently reviews HASPS

for the DOE cleanup. *73

OTA has reviewed site-wide HASPS written to

support cleanup activities at some DOE facilities,

but has not reviewed a sufficient number to draw

generalizable conclusions. The few documents

reviewed by OTA focused on weapons production activities—not cleanup operations-and emphasized hazards from radionuclide contamination. Health threats associated with potential

worker exposure to hazardous chemicals did not

receive much consideration, even though characterization data demonstrated the presence of

these materials on-site. Potential safety threats

were also given minimal attention.

The tendency of DOE and its prime contractors to focus on radionuclides and neglect nonradioactive chemical hazards has been noted by the

National Academy of Sciences174 and by DOE

Tiger Teams auditing environment, safety, and
Chapter 3–Cleanup Worker Protection at the DOE Nuclear Weapons Complex 67

health programs at NWC facilities. This emphasis also reflects DOE staffing patterns and the importance accorded radioactive materials in DOE

orders.

The focus on radioactive hazards that has traditionally characterized DOE contractor OSH

practices need not be a Liability as DOE attempts

to forge HASPS suitable for cleanup of environments contaminated with a wide variety of toxic

materials, Although the Advisory Committee on

Nuclear Facilities Safety 175 and the Defense Fa176 

cilities Nuclear Safety Board have strongly

criticized the poor quality and dispersed organization of DOE radiation protection programs,

DOE clearly has significant, if insufficient, expertise in this area. Radiation protection, which

will be a critical component of worker health and

safety programs during many cleanup operations

at the NWC, is not an area in which many health

and safety professionals outside DOE have extensive experience. If DOE “borrowed” expertise

in nonradiologic hazard assessment and control

from other agencies or sources of expertise, it

could focus greater efforts on upgrading and applying its own capabilities in radiation protection.

The Nuclear Weapons Complex contains some

environmental contaminants and mixtures of pollutants that may never be encountered at more

typical hazardous waste operations, High-level

radioactive waste and mixed waste (containing

both radionuclides and hazardous chemicals) are

in this category. For some contaminants and contamination scenarios, there are no published standards or guidelines setting forth appropriate action levels and permissible exposure limits. For

example, no Federal agency has established allowable worker exposure levels for soil contaminated with radionuclides.177

Attempts by DOE to independently establish

allowable worker exposure levels are likely to encounter strong opposition because its credibility

in the field of occupational health and safety has

been called into question as a result of past practices. 178-181 The need for such worker exposure

levels and action levels is too pressing to wait the

3 years or longer that are usually required for

OSHA to complete new rule making under the

Administrative Procedures Act, EPA is working

on the development of allowable soil standards

for radionuclides,

182 but denies having jurisdictional authority over workers. A consensus

approach that draws on expertise from EPA,

NIOSH, OSHA, and other knowledgeable agencies and individuals might usefully address issues

such as appropriate environmental monitoring

strategies and methods, and the development of

action levels and other worker exposure standards.

Medical Surveillance

In 1990 the Secretarial Panel for Evaluation of

Epidemiologic Research Activities at DOE

(SPEERA) strongly criticized DOE’s past efforts

to conduct medical surveillance among weapons

production workers. In particular, SPEERA

noted that epidemiologic studies and health surveillance programs were uncoordinated and

lacked the capacity to monitor workplace exposure, to evaluate such exposure in terms of workers health, or to prescribe the corrective actions

required. *83

DOE and its contractors still have very limited

ability to monitor worker exposure to toxic materials. This is true even for weapons production

workers, whose exposures are technically and administratively much less difficult to track than

those of cleanup workers. Medical staff at many

DOE facilities do not have access to information

documenting potential production worker exposures and are not informed of job transfers that

might result in worker exposure to hazardous materials. 184-190 Thus, some NWC facility medical

departments are unable to verify that workers

who are potentially exposed to hazardous materials are receiving appropriate medical surveillance. 191

Efforts to establish a viable system of medical

surveillance for workers engaged in the DOE
68 I Hazards Ahead: Managing Cleanup Worker Health and Safety at the Nuclear Weapons Complex

cleanup facilities must overcome several obstacles. The initial problem is that worker job titles

and tasks, management procedures, and the organizational structure of occupational medicine

departments are different at each weapons facility. 192 This makes it difficult to craft and implement DOE-wide procedures that would identify

individual workers who potentially face hazardous exposures, are at greatest risk of acquiring

work-related illnesses, and are required by DOE

orders or OSHA standards to be offered inclusion

in medical surveillance programs.

The task of identifying individual cleanup

workers at high risk for exposure to potentially

toxic contaminants and in need of medical surveillance is further complicated by the panoply of

employers engaged at a given site, and by the

lack of any coherent analysis of characterization

data from the perspective of potential worker exposures. Medical directors at DOE facilities are

not informed when subcontractors are working

on-site, do not assess the potential hazards tha t

subcontractor employees might encounter, and

do not review subcontractors’ medical surveillance programs.

Another problem impeding efforts to develop

DOE medical surveillance programs that comply

with HAZWOPER is the lack of influence and

authority of the EH Office of Occupational Medicine. 1 9 3

-

1 9 5

which would presumably be the

source of policies related to cleanup worker medical surveillance.

When DOE established the Office of Health

within EH in May 1990, separate offices were assigned responsibility for industrial hygiene and

health physics, epidemiology and health surveillance, and occupational medicine

196 (see figure

3-2). This reorganization of health activities was

a direct response to SPEERA recommendations

and accomplished the important goal of collecting previously disparate health-related programs

under a single Deputy Assistant Secretary. It is

not clear, however, that this reorganization has

effectively signaled the importance of occupational medicine to DOE and its contractor managers, or improved the visibility and status of occupational health and safety professionals at

DOE.

The separate Offices of Environment, Safety,

and Health within EH and the different divisions

in the Office of Health appear to remain independent domains with their own agendas. OTA found

little evidence of coordination or communication

among the Offices of Health Physics and Industrial Hygiene, Occupational Medicine, and Epidemiology and Health Surveillance, and no indications of regular contact between EH staff and

health and safety professionals working in DOE

line organizations.

The DOE Office of Occupational Medicine

continues to exert little influence within DOE or

among its contractors. Neither the newly created

Office of Occupational Medicine, nor the Office

of Epidemiology and Health Surveillance, had

acquired its full complement of staff when a hiring freeze was imposed across all EH divisions.

Consequently, as of late 1992, both of these offices remain well below projected size.

197 198

In June 1992, DOE Order 5480.8A, which

prescribes minimal occupational medicine

program requirements for DOE contractors,199

was updated for the first time in more than a

decade. 200 The new order has the potential to

place occupational medicine in a more proactive

role at DOE facilities. For example, under the

new order, managers must ensure that site occupational medicine physicians are informed of

201 On paper, the new Contrac- worker exposures.

tor Occupational Medicine Order is a significant

improvement; the speed and thoroughness with

which the order is actually implemented will be

important indicators of managers’ readiness to

embrace a strong health and safety presence at

the operations level.

EH had to make important concessions to

DOE program offices to win approval of the Occupational Medicine Order, however. To achieve

the “consensus” among DOE Program Secretarial Officers that is a prerequisite for adoption of

most EH policy recommendations, EH dropped
Chapter 3-Cleanup Worker Protection at the DOE Nuclear Weapons Complex

1

I

I

1- 1

1

r--

I ——

I

J ——

1 J

muu
70 I Hazards Ahead: Managing Cleanup Worker Health and Safety at the Nuclear Weapons Complex

language requiring that contractor medical directors report directly to the site manager and instead allowed the option of medical directors reporting to “another management level with

sufficient authority to ensure program effectiveness.”

202 203 The importance of t.his concession is

reflected in comments by the National Academy

of Sciences,

204 SPEERA ,205 and OSHA,206

These expert reviewers observed that occupational medical input to decisions at DOE facilities

was “negligible” and “inadequate”; that medical

departments were relegated to a reactive role at

DOE facilities; and that these roles were mirrored

at DOE headquarters.

In 1991 and 1992, EH conducted audits of occupational medicine programs throughout the

Weapons Complex. These studies documented

that as of 1992, occupational physicians at many

weapons facilities remain uninformed of workers’ potential exposure to hazardous materials,

that physicians continue to experience problems

in getting the attention of decision makers, and

that every occupational medicine program in the

Weapons Complex has fewer staff than called for

by DOE orders .207-213

The weakness of contractor occupational medicine programs has important implications for the

cleanup. As matters now stand, there is no entity

in DOE or its contractor corps capable of designing, conducting, or overseeing the medical surveillance of cleanup workers required under

HAZWOPER. In the absence of guidance from

DOE, contractors and subcontractors are free to

pursue any notion of adequate medical surveillance that a licensed physician is willing to endorse. Under these conditions, the quality and

comprehensiveness of cleanup worker medical

surveillance are destined to be uneven. The costs

of this service are also likely to vary considerably

because DOE has no means of competently assessing the scope or effectiveness of proposed

surveillance activities.

The development, implementation, and analysis of useful medical surveillance data necessarily represent a multidisciplinary task requiring the

cooperation of health experts from many disciplines including medicine, industrial hygiene,

health physics, biostatistics, and epidemiology.

OTA found little indication that the institutional

capacity for such cooperative efforts exists at

DOE.

In its approach to medical surveillance for the

NWC cleanup, DOE is repeating some of the

mistakes critics have accused it of making in

studying the health outcomes of radiation-exposed workers.

214215 DOE is not reaching b e -

yond its own organization to gather expertise

from other government agencies or the private

sector. The failure to institute an effective quality

assurance program for medical surveillance data

collection and analysis will compromise any

findings the data might suggest. The absence of

any system for following individual workers’ cumulative exposures to hazardous materials will

also limit what lessons can be learned from medical surveillance efforts. The data documenting

surveillance activities will differ not only from

site to site but also among subcontractors. There

will be little chance of pooling data from different vendors in ways that support sound science,

and the opportunity to learn what kinds of surveillance are useful, which are a waste of time

and money, and what types of cleanup task or exposures are problematic, will be lost.

Finally, it is very important that DOE make a

strong effort to guarantee workers that the contents of individual medical records will be treated

confidentially, that pooled information used for

research purposes or made available to the public

will not permit identification of individuals, and

that the contracts and affiliations of persons conducting medical surveillance will be disclosed if

requested. These steps are necessary both to encourage extensive worker participation in surveillance projects and to comply with standard ethical medical practices.
. - -. —

Chapter 3–Cleanup Worker Protection at the DOE Nuclear Weapons Complex 171

Health and Safety Training

A December 1990 DOE Inspector General’s

report documented that contractors at seven

M&O facilities and three field offices were not

complying with AZWOPER health and safety

training requirements. The report noted that the

root causes of noncompliance were “acceptance

of non-compliance conditions and a lack of corporate and DOE ownership of problems;’ as well

as failure of DOE field offices to issue site-specific guidance to M&O contractors or to monitor

contractor training efforts.216

In response to these findings, EH staff prepared guidance on “OSHA Training Requirements for Hazardous Waste Operations.’’ 217 Although this guidance does spell out procedures

for documenting training at DOE sites, it is little

more than a near-verbatim reiteration of the sections of the OSHA regulation that deal with

worker training, stapled to a copy of EPA’s “Fact

Sheet on Establishing Work Zones at Uncontrolled Hazardous Waste Sites.”218 The guidanc e

document does not indicate what the content of

training curricula for DOE cleanup projects

should be (beyond reproducing OSHA’s suggested HAZWOPER course content checklist), nor

does it incorporate the training course accreditation criteria proposed in OSHA’s 1910.121 regulation219 or indicate that DOE will evaluate the

adequacy of cleanup worker health and safety

training programs.

A year after EH released the guidance on

HAZWOPER training, the Colorado Health Department found violations of RCRA training requirements among DOE contractor personnel at

the Rocky Flats Plant.

220 In May 1992, the DOE

Hanford contractor denied State inspectors from

the Washington State Department of Ecology access to personnel training records. The State cited

the contractor for “failure to properly identify

personnel in the training plan,” a violation that

could include penalties up to $6,000 per day.

DOE has admitted that under the terms of the

DOE-Westinghouse contract, it would be compelled to reimburse Westinghouse for these

fines. 221

The National Defense Authorization Act for

fiscal years 1992 and 1993 authorized DOE to

award training grants to workers engaged in hazardous substance response or emergency response at nuclear weapons facilities.222 DOE and

NIEHS have begun collaborative efforts in this

area. 223 224

.

A provision in an earlier Defense Authorization Act had required DOE to evaluate the suitability of NIEHS Training Grants for workers

involved in hazardous waste operations and

emergency response at DOE facilities.225 In the

course of its assessment of NIEHS training programs, DOE found that about half of the DOE

contractors had trained all or most employees targeted for 24- and 40-hour health and safety

courses. DOE also discovered that its contractors

were “taking various approaches” to defining

populations of employees who require training

under HAZWOPER. At some DOE facilities, decisions about worker training were left to subcontractors who conducted cleanup operations.226

The survey revealed that the confusion evident at

non-Federal waste sites about which workers

should receive 24 hours of training and which

should undergo 40-hour training sessions was

also bothering DOE contractors.227 DOE facilities were relying on an assortment of vendors to

deliver training, at costs of $1,000 to $1,200 per

trainee for a 40-hour course.228

The report also noted a number of barriers to

utilization of NIEHS training programs. It was

suggested that NIEHS grant programs might be

more attractive to DOE contractors if DOE headquarters guidance and standards “were to specify

as a minimum criterion for all training that it

meet the requirements of the [proposed 29 CFR

1910.121] OSHA rule on training program accreditation . . .“.229 DOE has not promulgated

such guidance, however. Although EH plans to

develop curricula for all worker health and training courses to be implemented by DOE line organizations, there is no program to develop mini-
72 I Hazards Ahead: Managing Cleanup Worker Health and Safety at the Nuclear Weapons Complex

mum criteria or course content for the cleanup on

an urgent basis. DOE contractors continue to

comply with HAZWOPER’s worker training requirements without any guidance from DOE

headquarters on course content, type or extent of

hands-on training, or site-specific training needs.

The International Association of Firefighters

(IAFF) has expressed concern that NIEHS grant

monies set aside for DOE workers will not be directed toward the special training needs of firefighters. The IAFF contends that firefighters who

might be called on during emergencies related to

DOE cleanup activities—including personnel

employed at on-site fire brigades and members of

municipal fire departments located near weapons

sites—are in urgent need of extensive training in

hazardous materials incidents.230 The IAFF

maintains that most NIEHS programs do not provide adequate training for emergency response

(ER) professionals,231 and argues that firefighters

require more substantive training courses than

those that merely satisfy the minimal number of

hours stipulated by HAZWOPER.232 IAFF believes that providing adequate training for ER

professionals should be a top priority in worker

health and safety efforts at all hazardous waste

operations, including DOE weapons facilities.233

The IAFF conducted an informal survey of

hazardous materials training among emergency

responders employed in fire brigades at DOE facilities and at fire departments located in communities near nuclear weapons facilities.234 All responders reported having had some emergency

response training, but most had received only

“awareness/operational level” instruction. Training was provided by a variety of vendors including in-house instructors (Hanford); State-certified instructors (Savannah River, Oak Ridge

National Laboratory, and Hanford); community

college- or university-based training programs

(Pantex, Rocky Flats); and instructors from a national chemical manufacturing concern (Hanford). There is presently no way of evaluating the

content or quality of these courses.

Emergency Response

DOE weapons facilities have written emergency response or disaster plans addressing emergencies that might arise from regular (weapons

production) operations at each facility.235 All

DOE facilities have on-site fire brigades and are

required to establish liaisons with local fire departments and medical facilities.

236 DOE Tiger

Team audits of environment, safety, and health

performance at weapons facilities have documented deficiencies in emergency preparedness

at DOE facilities, although these assessments

presumed continued weapons production operations and did not usually address risks from environmental cleanup activities.

The Ahearne committee report noted that Hanford does not have plans to handle an emergency

at high-level waste tanks.237 The committee also

concluded that at Rocky Flats, the potential release of toxic chemicals, “which could be catastrophic to the on-site population,” had been inadequately assessed,238 and that Rocky Flats “has

not had much success in demonstrating its emergency preparedness and response capabilities,

even in exercises” carried out as late as May

1991. 239 The Ahearne committee found fire detection and suppression systems at Rocky Flats to

be “antiquated” This finding is of particular concern because, historically, fires have been the

greatest safety hazard at that location. Recent decisions to cease production operations may reduce the possibility of accidents and emergency

situations at this facility.

Many emergency scenarios that could plausibly arise during the DOE cleanup would require

the involvement of off-site fire departments and

emergency medical teams. At Pantex, where assembly, dismantlement, and testing of conventional explosive components of nuclear warheads

take place, the Tiger Team found off-site medical

facilities to be inadequate and noted no evidence

that DOE had ever audited the real status of medical response there or compared actual capabilities to the commitment made by the local hospi-
—

Chapter 3–Cleanup Worker Protection at the DOE Nuclear Weapons Complex 73

tal in written contracts.

240 DOE has taken steps to ated with weapons production activities. Some

remedy these deficiencies. exceptional situations covered by the environIt is difficult to assess the ER capabilities mental restoration and waste management proavailable at DOE facilities with respect to clean- gram-such as the potential for fire or explosion

up tasks, in part because neither DOE nor its con- at the Hanford tank farm where residues of hightractors have surveyed the possible emergency level radioactive waste are stored, fire in a radiaresponse needs specifically associated with envi- tion-contaminated building at Rocky Flats, or an

ronmental restoration and waste management op- emergency involving vitrification of high-level

erations. Most emergencies that might plausibly radioactive waste-could potentially jeopardize

arise from environmental restoration or waste large numbers of workers or pose significant

management functions are likely to be less risks to off-site populations.

calamitous than the worst-case scenarios associCHAPTER 3 ENDNOTES

] U.S. Department of Energy, Secretary of Energy Notice, “Setting the New DOE Course,” SEN-1 1-89, Sept. 5, 1989,

2

39 U,S.C. 651-678 west 1985 and Supp. 1992).

3

42 U.S.C. Section 2201(f).

4 Occupational Safety and Health Adrninistratio~ U.S. Department of Labor, Evaluation of the U.S. Department of Energy’s Occupational Safety and Health Program for Its Government-Owned

Contractor-Operated Facilities, December 1990.

5 Jmes Wati, Secretw, U.S. Department of Energy, memo

-

randum, “Strengthening Line Management and Accountability in

DOE Contractor Worker Safety and Health Programs,” Mar. 20,

1991.

6 Jmes Wati, Secre-, U.S. Department of Energy, ‘memorandum, “Strengthening Office of Environment, Safety and Health

Independent Oversight of DOE Line Management of Worker Safety and Health Programs,” Mar. 20, 1991.

7 James Watkins, Secretary, U.S. Department of Energy, memorandum, “Developing A Strategy for Assigning Rewards and Pemlties for Compliance with Occupational Safety and Health Administration (OSHA) Regulations and DOE Orders,” Mar. 20, 1991.

8 James Watkins, Secretaxy, U.S. Department of Energy, memorandum, “Reevaluation of the DOE’s Pending Whistleblower

Rule,” Mar. 20, 1991.

9 petm Bms~ Ac~g Assistant Secretary, Environment, SafetY

and Healti U.S. Department of Energy, memorandum to the Secretary of Energy, “Implementation Plan for the Office of Health,”

May 18, 1990.

10 U S Dep~ent Of Ener~, OffiCe Of he Ress Secre@?

. .

“Secretary of Energy Appoints Environment, Safety and Health

Committee,” Mar. 30, 1992.

11 U.S. Dep~ent of Energy, memorandum to all Departmental Elements, “Supplementary Request for Occupational Safety

and Health Data Required for the FY 1993 Internal Review Budget

Process,” May 14, 1991.

12 Occupatioti Heal~ and Safety Reporter, “OSHA Jfisdiction Over DOE-Owned Plants Outlined in Memorandum of Understanding, ” (Washington, DC: Bureau of National Affairs, Inc.) vol.

13, Aug. 26, 1992, p. 422.

13 U.S. Dep~ent of Labor and U.S. Department of Energy,

Memorandum of Understanding, July 1992.

14 Executive Order No. 12196, Feb. 26! 1980.

15 occupatio~ safe~ ~dHe~~ Administration, Evaluation

of U.S. Department of Energy ..., op. cit.

‘6 Ibid.

17 weapon5 Complex Monitor, “Hanford Shows Lack of

Progress on ES&H Issues, DOE Report Says” (Washingto~ DC:

Exchange Pubs.), Aug. 10, 1992, pp. 19-20.

18 us. Dep@ment of Energy, Office of Environment Safety

and Healti Environment, Safety and Health Compliance Assessment of the Portsmouth Gaseous Difision Plant (Springfield, VA:

National Technical Information Service, April 1990).

19 Roy Gibbs, Ac~g D~~tor, OffIce of Occupational Safety,

Office of Environment Safety, and Healti U.S. Department of Energy, presentation to OTA staff, Oct. 8, 1992.

m w Gr=ndyke, M~~ Director (re~ed), Los ~amos ‘ational Laboratory, personal communication to T. O’Toole, Office of

Technology Assessment, Mar, 4, 1991,

21 U,S. ConHess, offke of Technology Assessment Worhhop

on Cleanup Worker Health and Safety at the DOE Nuclear Weapons Complex, Washington DC, May 15, 1991.

22 U.S. Conwss, General Accounting Ofilce, Increased Rafing

Results in Award Fee to Rocky Flats Contractor, GAO/RCED-92-

162 (March 1992).

23 Weawm Complex Monitor, “Despite Lower Performance

Rating, Martin Marietta Award Fees Higher” (WashingtorL DC:

Exchange Pubs.), June 22, 1992, pp. 11-12.

24 Stif ad Wfie RW~s, “Audit of Unused Buildings at Hanford Finds Hazards,” The Spokesma?+Review, Nov. 13, 1992.

u Rictimd Field Office, U.S. Department of Energy, “T~ B

Investigation of Hanford Tank Farm’s Vapor Exposures,” April

1992.

26 Job TX%, ~~a, ~gh-~vel Tanks Task Force, Office of

Environmental Restomtion and Waste Management, U.S. Department of Energy, memorandum to Ronald Gerton, DOE Richland

Field Office, “Investigation of Persomel Exposure to Noxious Vapors of Tank 103-C,” WHC Internal Memo #76314-91 -KEM-040,

Jan. 14, 1992.
74 I Hazards Ahead: Managing Cleanup Worker Health and Safety at the Nuclear Weapons Complex

27 U.S. Dep@ent of Energy, OffIce of Envir0nmen4 Safe&

and Herdth, “Site Representative ProgranL Rocky Flats Regional

OffIce Monthly Report for March 1992,” RF-92-03, June 5, 1992.

~ Advisov Committee on Nuclear Facility Safety to the Secre+

tary of Energy, “Finat Report on DOE Nuclear Facilities,” November 1991, p. 20.

m Ibid.

w Occupation s~e~ ~d Health Administration, Evaluation

of the Department of Energy ..., op. cit.

31 U.S. Dep~ent of Energy, “Report-Evaluation of tie Suitability of the Training Program Developed by the National Institute

of Environmental Health Sciences for Trainin g Workers Involved

in Environmental and Waste Management Activities of the U.S.

Department of Energy,” May 1991, p. 3-16.

32 OTA Workshop on DOE Cleanup Workers, op. cit.

33 Ibid.

34 Occupatioti Safety ~d Health Administration, Evaluation

of U.S. Department of Energy . . ., op. cit.

35 U,S. Dep~ent of Energy, Office of Inspector General,

“Report on Inspection of Surveillance Equipment and Activities at

DOE Field Office, Richland,” DOIYIG-0299, September 1991.

36 K. Scheider, “Inquiry Finds Illegal Surveillance Of Workers

in Nuclear Plants,” New York Times, Aug. 1, 1991, p. A18.

37 Weapons Complex Monitor, “Labor Sides with whistleblower,” (Washington DC: Exchange Pubs.), Feb. 10, 1992, p. 20.

38 M. wald, “wh.istlebloWer at National Laboratory Was Disciplined, Labor Department Rutes,’’New York Times, Feb. 5, 1992, p.

A16.

3910 CFR 708.

40 Roy Gibbs, oP. cit.

41 J. FiQger~d, Jr., U.S. Department of Energ, Depum Assistant Secretary, Safety and Quality Assurance, memorandum to P.

Ziemer, Assistant Secretary of Environment, Safety and Health,

“EH-30 Site Representative, September Monthly Reports,” Oct. 29,

1991.

42 ~cupatio~ Stiety and Health Administration, Evaluation

of U.S. Department of Energy ..., op. cit.

43 U.S. Dep~ent of Energy, Secretary of Energy Notice 6,

SEN-6-89, “Departmental Organization and Management Arrangements,” May 19, 1989.

44 OTA workshop on DOE Cleanup Workers, op. cit.

45 U.S. Dep~ent of Energy, Secretary of Energy Notiw, “Departmental Organ&a tion and Management Arrangements,” SEN6E-92, Feb. 21, 1992.

46 OTA workshop on DOE Cleanup Workers, oP. cit.

47 J Serocki, Office of oversight and Health Assessment ‘apartment of Energy, Office of Environmental Restoration and

Waste Management, personal communication to T. O’Toole, OTA,

July 11, 1992.

4S ScrW~, J., Offlce of oversight and Health Assessment, ME

Office of Environmental Restoration and Waste Management personal communication to T. O’Toole, OTA, July 11, 1992.

49 Leo D~fy, Director, Office of Environmental Restoration

and Waste Management U.S. Department of Energy, memorandum

to EM DOE and Contractor Persomel, “EM Policy and Commitment Regarding Occupational Health and Safety,” July 11, 1991.

w Ibid.

51 NatiO~ A~demy of Sciences, The Nuclear WCMpOnS Compltz-Managementfor Health, Safety, and the Environment (Washington, DC: National Academy Press, 1989).

52 ~upatio~ Safev and Health Administration, Evaluation

of U.S. Department of Energy ..., op. cit.

53 Advisov Committee on Nuclear Facility Safety, Op. tit.

54 J Conway, ~, Defense Nuclear Facilities Safety Bo~7

“Recommendation to the Secretary of Energy, pursuant to 42

U.S.C. 2286a(5) Atomic Energy Act of 1954, as amended,” Dec.

19, 1991.

55 Natio~ A&emy of Sciencw, The Nuclear weUpOnS Complex. . . . op. cit.

M Mitre Corp., “COrnp@Ve Review of Safety Standards for

DOE Defense Nuclear Facilities,” (no date), Executive Summary,

vol. 1. Contract Report for the Defense Nuclear Facilities Safety

Board.

57 ~upatio~ s~e~ and Health Administration, Evaluation

of U.S. Department of Energy . . ., op. cit.

58 Advisovcommittee on Nuclear Facility safety, op. cit.

59 Ibid.

m Ibid.

61 U.S. Depar~ent of Energy, Secretary of Energy Notice,

SEN-6-89, “Departmental Organimtion and Management Ammgements,” May 19, 1989, Sept. 5, 1989.

62 us, Dep~ent of Energy, EnvkOnmenC Safety ‘d ‘d@

Technical Safety Appraisals of the Hanford Tank Farm Facility

(Springfield, VA: National Technical Infomnation Service, May

1989).

63 Advisow Committm on Nuclear Facility Safety, oP. Cito

a Rictid Field Mice, oP. cit,

65 WeaPm Complex Monitor, “State Issues Violations at Hanford as Tank Monitors Found Inoperable” (Washington DC: Exchange Pubs.), May 25, 1992, p. 1.

66 Ricwd Field Office, op. Cit.

67 Ibid.

a Ibid.

@ Offlce of Ihvironment, Safety and Heal@ U.S. Depment

of Energy, Report on the EH Special review of Occupational Safety

and Health Programs for the Hanford High-Level Waste Tanks, October 1992.

mMcwd Field Office, oP. cit71 Moflon Com ~of~sor ~d Director, Division of Environmental Health Engineering, The Johns Hopkins University, School

of Hygiene and Public Health, letter to T. O’Toole, OTA, July 27,

1992.

n Jo~ TseW, Ma, H@-hvel Tanks Task Force, Office of

Environmental Restoration and Waste Management, U.S. Department of Energy, memorandum to Ronald Gerton, DOE Richland

Field Office, “Investigation of Persomel Exposure to Noxious Vapors of Tank 103-C,” WC Internal Memo #76314-91 -KEM-040,

Jan. 14, 1992.

73 J Wagoner, -ger, Richland Field OffIce, U.S. Dep~-

ment of Energy, letter to T. Anderson, President, Westinghouse

Hanford Corp., July 2, 1992.

74 Occupation s~e~ and Health Administration, Evaluation

of US. Department of Energy ..., op. cit.

75 Roy Gibbs, op. cit.
—

Chapter 3–Cleanup Worker Protection at the DOE Nuclear Weapons Complex 75

76 u s Conwess, offim of Technology ~~ssmenti C~mP1ex . .

cleanup, 1991, op. cit.

77 p. Zlemer, Assistant Secretary, Environment, Stiety ad

Healti U.S. Department of Energy, memorandum to R. ClaytoL

Assistant Secretary, Defense Programs, William Young, Assistant

Saretary, Nuclw Safety, L. Duffy, Assistant Secretary, Environmental Restoration and Waste Management, “EH Site Representative Assessment of Occupational Safety and Health Issue Managemen~” Sept. 6, 1991.

78 Roy Gibbs, op. cit.

79 us. Dep~ent of Energy, Office of Environment+ Stiety

and Heal@ “Briefing on Draft Revision to DOE Order 5480.9

Construction Project Safety and Health Management” no date.

w Occupation s~e~ and Healti Administration, ~VUh@fiO~

of U.S. Department of Energy . . .% op. cit.

s 1 p. Zlemer, Assistant Secretary Environment, Safety ad

Healti U.S. Department of Energy, memo to William Young, Office of Nuclear Energy, “EH Site Representative Monthly Reports,”

Dec. 26, 1991.

82 Ibid.

‘

3 Ibid.

u Ibid.

85 Ibid.

86 J. Fitzger~d, Jr., Deputy Assistant Secretary, Stiety ASSWance and Quality, U.S. Department of Energy, memorandum to Leo

Duffy, EM-1, “EH Site Representative Monthty Report,” Jan. 14,

1992,

87 Ibid.

88 R, Goldsmi~ Director, Office of Epidemiology ad H~~

Surveillance, U.S. Department of Energy, personal communication

to T.O’Toole, OTA, July 21, 1992.

69 Occupation s~e~ ~d He~~ Administration, Evaluation

of the Department of Energy ..., op. cit.

~ U.S. Dep~ent of Labor and U.S. Department of Energy,

MOU, op. cit.

91 Roy Gibbs, op. clt”

92 u s. Depment of ~~r and U.S. Dep~ent o

f ‘nergy’

MOU, op. cit.

93 Office of Environment, Safety and Heal@ Office of s~etY,

U.S. Department of Energy, “Briefing on DOE 5483.XX Occupational Health and Safety Program for DOE Contractor Employees—Draft,” Apr. 14, 1992.

% Ibid.

95 Roy Gibbs, Op. cit.

% occupatio~ s~e~ md He~th Administration, Evaluation

of U.S. Department of Energ y. ., op. cit.

97 u s Dep@ent of Energy, Assistant Secretary for Envtion- . .

ment, Safety and Health, Report on the Department of Energy Occupational Safety and Health Program Review of the Portsmouth

Gaseous Difision Plant, October 1992.

98 u.S. Dep~ent of Energy, Office of Environment Stiety

and Health, “Briefing on Draft Revision to DOE Order 5480.9-

Construction Project Safety and Health Managemen~” no date.

99 Roy Gibbs, op. cit.

100 Occupatioti Sdety and He~th Administration+ Evaluation

of US. Department of Energy ., op. cit.

’01 Ibid.

102 Roy Gibbs, op. Cit.

loq p. Ziemer, Assistant Secretary for Environment+ Safety ~d

Heal@ U.S. Department of Energy, letter to T. O’Toole, OTA, Oct.

14, 1992.

104 Offlce if tie SwretW, U.S. Department of Energ’y, Smretary of Energy Notice, “Departmental Organizational and Management Arrangements,” SEN-6E-92, Feb. 21, 1992.

105 OTA workshop on DOE Cleanup Workers, op. cit.

106 Occupation s~e~ and Health Adrninistratio~ Evaluation

of U.S. Department of Energy ..., op. cit.

tOT J. Fitzger~d, maorandum to L. Duffy, J~. 14, 1992, oP.

cit.

1o13 p. Ziemer, Assistant Secretary, Environment, Safety and

Healm U.S. Department of Energy memorandum to R. ClaytoL

Assistant Secretary for Defense Programs, “EH Site Representative

and March Monthly Report,” June 5, 1992.

l@ p. Ziemer, Assistant Secretary, Environment, Stiety ad

Healti U.S. Department of Energy, memorandum to R. Clayton,

Assistant Secretary for Defense Programs, “EH Site Representative

Monthly Report,” July 2, 1992.

110 Ricmd Field office, U.S. Department of Energy, Rictiand

Field Office, “DOE Investigation Board Report on Fall-Related Fatality of a Construction Worker at Hanford Site 105-F Building on

April 7, 1992” May 1992.

I I 1 Office of TKhnology Assessment, Complex cleanup, 1991,

op. cit.

11’2 W~Pm Complex Monitor, “DOE to Pay Fernald Citizens

$73 Miltion in Three Installments,” (Washington, DC: Exchange

Pubs.) Feb. 19, 1990, p. 3.

113 W=wm Comp]ex Monitor, “At Oak Ridge OPS . . . Citizen

Files Wrongfut Death Suit Against DOE,” (Washington, DC: Exchange Pubs.) June 27, 1990, p. 12.

114 Office of TwhnoIo= Assessment, Complex Cleanup, 1991,

op. cit.

I IS D E1isburg, formerIy Director, Occupational Healti Foundation personal communication to OffIce of Technology Assessment staff, Mar. 19, 1991.

116 OTA workshop on DOE Cleanup Workers, oP. cit.

I 17 D Elisburg, perso~ communicatio~ Mar. 19, 1991, op. cit.

116 &ce of TwhnoIogy Assessmen~ Complex Cleanup, 1991,

op. cit.

119 ~ld.

*M Ibid.

121 fiid.

122 Rewfl on Defense plant wastes) “DOE Sampling, Analysis

Requirements to Increase in Coming Decade” (Silver Spring, MD:

Business Publishing), May 22, 1992.

123 DOE Workshop on DOE Cleanup Workers, OP. cit.

lx U.S. Dep~ent of Energy, Los Ahmos Natiod ~bOratory, “Draft Health and Safety Standard for Hazardous Waste Operations and Emergency Response—Statement of Work, October

1992.”

125 Ibid.

126 R c Fleting, Regulatory compliance Divisiom Office of

. .

Program Support, Environmental Restoration, U.S. Department of

Energy, informal note to T, O’Toole, OTA, Oct. 9, 1992.
76 I Hazards Ahead: Managing Cleanup Worker Health and Safety at the Nuclear Weapons Complex

127 Rqofi on Defense pklt wwest “New Cleanup Strategy

Could Save Millions on Cleanup of DOE’s Hanford Site,” (Silver

Spring, MD: Business Publishing) July 3, 1992, p. 111.

128 ~lce of TwhnoIogy Assessmen~ Complex Cleanup, 1991,

op. cit.

129 OTA Worwop on Cleanup Worker Health and Safety, op.

cit.

130 Office of Technology Assessment, Hazardous waste Action

Contractors (HWAC) Workshop, Washington DC, Sept. 17, 1991.

131 Occupatioti s~e~ and Health Adrninistratiow Eva~uafi~n

of the Department of Energy. . . . op. cit.

132 mid.

133 Wapons Complex Monitor, “In the GAO” (Washington,

DC: Exchange Pubs.) June 18, 1992, pp. 24-25.

134 offIce of TechnoIo~ Assessment, Complex cleanup, op.

cit.

135 Weapom complex Monitor, “DOE Issues Long-AWtited

Request for Proposals for Fernald ERMC” (Washington, DC: Exchange Pubs.), Jan. 13, 1992, p. 2.

136 U.S. ~pm~ent of Energy, Secretary of Energy Notice,

“Departmental Organizational and Management Arrangements,”

SEN 6E-92, Feb. 21, 1992.

1sI’ weapons Complex Monitor (Washington, DC: Exc@We

Pubs.), Jan. 13, 1992 op. cit.

138 mid.

139 mid.

la weapom Complex Monitor, “Fernald ERMC Mkion postponed, On-Site Target Now End of Year” (Washington DC: Exchange Pubs.), Mar. 30, 1992, p. 1.

141 WWPIIS Complex Monitor, “DOE Requests proPosals for

Hanford Cleanup Contractor”, (Washington DC: Exchange Pubs.)

Apr. 20, 1992, pp. 1-4.

142 H-s Befo~ tie subcommittee On H~& ~ Stiety ‘f

the Committee on Education and Labor, House of Representatives,

“Oversight Hearings on Health and Safety of Workers at Department of Energy Owned Nuclear Facilities Operated by Private Contractors,” Serial No. 101-32, May 10& 17, 1984.

143 u.s, Dep~ent of Energy, Secre@ry of Energy Notice,

“Setting the New DOE Course,” SEN-11-89, Sept. 5, 1989,

144 U.S. ~p~ent of ~r=, Environmental Restoration ~d

Waste Management, Five-Year Plan Fiscal Years 1992-1996,

DOE/S-0078P (Spriq@eld, VA: National Technical Information

Services), June 1990).

145 U.S. COngreSS, General Accounting ~lce, Vuherability of

DOE’s Contracting to Waste, Fraud, Abuse, and Mismanagement

(May 1991).

146 W=pons CoWlex Monitor, 1’IG Report Criticizes Field Office Management” (Washington, DC: Exchange Pubs.) June 22,

1992.

147 Occupation s~e~ and Health Adrninistratio~ Evaluation

of the Department of Energy ..., op. cit.

148 Weapons complex Monitor, (w=h@tOn, DC: ‘ic%e

Pubs.), op. cit.

149 Rewfl on Defense p~t Wastes, “GAO F~ds Con@cting

Practices Prone to Abuse” (Silver Spring, MD: Business Publishers,

hlC.), my 22, 1992.

MO Us. cow,, GmdAccouq Office, Vuznerabilify of

DOE’s Contracting to Waste, Fraud, Abuse, and Mismanagement

GAO/RCED-92-101 (my 1992).

151 Weapom Complex Monitor, “DOE gives Westinghouse

Hartford ‘Satisfactory’ Rating” (Washington, DC: Exchange

Pubs.), Jan. 13, 1992.

152 U.S. Dep~ent Of Energy, 0ffk42 of Environment, s~ety

and Heal@ “EH-30 Site Representative Office Monthly Report for

August-September 1991,” Jan. 14, 1992.

1S3 M-d Field office, Op. Cit.

1~ U.S. Dep~ent of Energy, office of Environment, s~ety

and Healm “Technical Safety Appraisal of the Hanford Tank Farm

Facility,” DOE/EH-0088, my 1989.

155 J~. w%oner, _gm, WCW Field OffIce, U.S. Department of Energy, letter to T.M. Andersoq President, Westinghouse

Hanford Co., July 2, 1992.

156 W=pm Complex Mo~tor, “IG Report Criticizes Field Office hfanagemen~” (Washington DC: Exchange Pubs.), June 22,

1992.

157 WeaPm Complex Monitor, “GAO Says Awmd Fee for

EG&G at Rocky Flats Unjusti.tied,” (Washington DC: Exchange

Pubs.), Apr. 13, 1992.

158 US,~ner~ACCO-OffIce, Vulnerability of DOE Contracting ..., op. cit.

159 M ~, Dir~tor, C)ffke of Environmental Restoration

and Waste Management, memorandum, “Safety and Health Review

for Startup/Restart of All Operations,” Feb. 6, 1991.

km U.S. ~pmat of EtItigy, OffIce of ~~P@or G-*

“Environmental Training at the Department of Energy,” DOE/IG0294, Dec. 21, 1990.

161 U.S. Dq~ent of Energy, OffIce of Environment Stiety

and Heal~ “OSHA Training Requirements for Hazardous Waste

Operations,” DOE/EH-0227P, December 1991.

162 U.S. Dep~ent of Energy, Office of Environment s~ety

and Healt.tL “Draft-Hazardous Waste Operations and Emergency

Response (HAZWOPER),” no date.

16329 ~ 191o.12o.

164 Los -OS NatioA Laboratory, “Draft-Health ~d S~ety Standard for Hazardous Waste Operations and Emergency Response: Statement of WO*” October 1992.

165 Dam from ~patio~ Safety ~d HAth A(hhktdoQ

U.S. Department of Labor, “Federal and 18(B) Source Inspections

of Hazardous Waste Activity,” Mar. 1, 1990 through Dec. 6, 1991.

166 ~vkowenti Mtition Agency-Labor H~~ ~‘tie~

Task Force, notes of meeting, Mar. 5, 1991.

167 U.S. Environmen~ protection Agency, Office Of Solid

Waste and Emergency Response, Hazardous Waste Operations and

Emergency Response: Uncontrolled Waste Sites andRCRA Corrective Actions, 9285 .2-08FS. (April 1991).

168 Offiw of Twhnology Assessmen~ Complex Cleanup, 1991

op. cit.

169 EPA defiesms-as “any unit at a facility from which

hazardous constituents might migrate, irrespective of whether the

units were intended for the management of solid and/or hazardous

wastes.” Thus an SWMU could be a unit such as a landfdl, waste

pile, surface impoundment container, @or incinerator.
Chapter 3-Cleanup Worker Protection at the DOE Nuclear Weapons Complex 77

ITO U.S. Offlm of Technology Assessment complex cleanup,

1991, op. cit.

171 us. Dep~ent of Energy, Office of Environment, Stiety

and Health, “Draft-Hazardous Waste Operation and Emergency

Response- HAZWOPER,” op. cit.

172 J. Semcki, July 11, 1992, op. cit.

173 J. CW~iS, Cocm, EPA-Labor Health and Safety Tmk

Force, personal communication to T.O’Toole, OffIce of Technology Assessmen6 Aug. 19, 1992.

174 Natio~ Actierny of Sciences, The Nuclear weapons Complex Management for Health, Safety, and Environment (Washington DC: National Academy Press, 1989).

ITS Advisory Committee on Nuclear Facility Safety, op. cit.

176 Defeme Facfities Board, “Recommendations tO tie Secretary of Energy Pursuant to 42 U.S.C. Sec. 2286a(5). Atomic Energy

Act of 1954, as amended,” Dec. 19, 1991.

177 U.S. Conwess, Office of Technology Assessment, Compl~

Cleanup, op. cit.

178 Natio~ Academy of sciences, Improving Risk COmnication (Washington DC: National Academy Press, 1989) p. 120.

179 B. Mere, “Nuclem weapo~ Facilities Face Attacks from

Environmentalists, Government Agencies,” Journal of the American Medical Association, Aug. 4, 1989, p. 604.

180 Physlcims for smi~ Responsibility, Dead Reckoning: A

Critical Review of the Department of Energy’s Epidemiologic Research (Washington, DC: Physicians for Social Responsibility,

1992).

181 Seaew Pmel for the Evaluation of Epidemiologic Research Activities for the U.S. Department of Energy, (SPEERA)

“Report to the Secretary,” March 1990.

182 Weapm Complex Monitor, “EPA Better ‘Get Off It’s Duff’

on Rad Standards, Glem Warns” (Washington, DC: Exchange

Pubs.), Apr. 13, 1992.

183 Seaeti pmel for the Evaluation of Epidemiologic Research ..., op. cit.

184 U.S. Dep~@ of Energy, Office of Occupational Medicine, “Occupational Medical Program Appraisal Nevada Test Site,”

Mar, 2-6, 1992.

ls~ U,S. Dep~ent of Energy, OffIce of Occupational Medicine, “Occupational Medical Program Appraisal at Fernald Environmental Management ProJecL” June 1992.

186 U.S. Dep~ent of Energy, Ofllce of Occupatioti Mficine, “Appraisal of the Occupational Medical Program at the

Oakridge K-25 Site,” Nov. 12-22 and Dec. 2-10, 1991.

187 U.S. Dep~ent of Energy, Office of OCcupathid Medicine, “Occupational Medical Program at Mason & Hanger (Pantex

Plant),” Sept. 30, 1991.

188 us. Dep~ent of ~ergy, Office Of Occupational ‘eticine, “Occupational Medical Program Hanford Environmental

Health Foundation Richkmd, WA,” June 24-26, 1991.

189 u-s, Dep~@ of Energy, Ofllce of Occupational Medicine, “Occupational Medical Appraisal Lawrence Livermore National Laboratory,” Apr. 27-May 1, 1992.

190 U.S. Dep~ent of Energy, Office of occupatio~ M~-

cine, “Occupational Medical program Review,” Los Alamos, NM,

Sept. 22-Oct. 25, 1991.

191 OTA wor~hop on DOE Cleanup Workers, op. cit.

‘w Ibid.

193 w. Green d y k e, M. SW@ D, Minner, D. Comad, L. Clevenger, J. Hightower, L. Kreisler, J. Spickhard, P. Mossman, Medical Directors DOE Facilities, letter to J. Watkins, Secretary of Energy, Aug. 7, 1989.

194 Willim Greendyke, Chair, DOE Medical professional

Committee, letter to J. Watkins, Secretasy of Energy, Mar. 5, 1990.

195 Natio~ Ac~emy of Sciences, The Nuclear weapons COmple-x. . . . op. cit.

196 H.J. pe~gill, Dep~ent of Energy, Acting Deputy Assistant Secretary for Healthj memorandum to the Secretary of Energy,

“Implementation Plan for Office of Heal@” May 18, 1992.

197 R. Gol~@ Dkector, OffIce of Epidemiology and He~th

Surveillance, U.S. Department of Energy, personal communication

to T.O’Toole, July 21, 1992.

198 G. Gebus, Di~tor, Office of Occupational Medicbe, U.S.

Department of Energy, personal communication to T.O’Toole, July

21, 1992.

199 u s Dep~tment of Energy, Environment, Stlfety and . .

Healti “Contractor Occupational Medical Prograrq” DOE Order

5480.8, June 26, 1992.

~ WT. Greendyke, formerly Chair, DOE Medicrd professio~

Committee, Medical Director, Los Alamos National Laboratory (re

tired), personal communication to T. O’Toole, Aug. 24, 1992.

201 us Dep~ent Of fiergy, Assistant Secretary for Environ-

. ,

men~ Safety and Heal@ “Contractor Occupational Medical PrograQ” Order 5480.8A

‘2 Ibid.

203 w. Grmdyke, Op. cit.

204 pJatio~ Academy of Sciences, The Nuclear weaPon cOmplex. . . . op. cit.

20S S=eti pael for Evaluation of Epidemiologic RtiWch

Activities at the U.S. DOE, op. cit.

206 ~cupatio~ s~e~ ~d H4t.h Administration Evaluation

of the Department of Energy ..., op. cit.

207 US, Dep~ent of Energy, Oflice of OCcupatioMl M*5

icine, “Occupational Medical Appraisal Nevada Test Site,”

Mar. 2-6, 1992.

2f18 u-s- Dep~@ of fiergy, ~lce of Occupatioti ‘dicine, “Occupational Medical Program Appraisal at Fernald Environmental Management Projecg” June 1992.

209 us. Dep~ent Of EIIergy, OffIce Of occupatio~ Medicine, “Appraisal of the Occupational Medical Program at the

Oakridge K-25 Site,” Nov. 12-22 and Dec. 2-10, 1991.

210 U S Departm~t of fiergy, offlCe Of occupation Med-

. .

icine, “Occupational Medical Program at Mason & Hanger (Pantex

Plant), Sept. 30, 1991.

21 I U.S. ~p~ent of Energy, Office of OccupatiOMl Medicine, “Occupational Medical program Hanford Environmental

Health Foundation Richland, WA” June 24-26, 1991.

212 U*S. ~p~=t of EQmW, Offlce of Occupational Medicine, “OWupational Medical Appraisal Lawrence Livermore National Laboratory, Apr. 27-May 1, 1992.

213 I-J.S. Dep~ent of Energy, Office of Occupational Medicine, “Occupational Medical Program Review, Los Alamos, m

Sept. 22-Oct. 25, 1991.”

214 ~ysicia for Socti R~ponsibility, oP. cit.
78 I Hazards Ahead: Managing Cleanup Worker Health and Safety at the Nuclear Weapons Complex

215 Seaeti pael for Evaluation of Epidemiologic Research

Activities at the U.S. DOE, op. cit.

216 U.S. ~p~at of mm=, OffIce of the Inspector G~erd

Environmental Training at the Department of Energy, DOE/IG0294, Dec. 21, 1990.

217 u-s.Dep~ent of Energy, Office of Environment, Safety

and Health, Environmental Guidance-OSHA Training Requirements for Hazardous Waste Operations, DOE/EH-0227, December

1991.

218 us. Env~onmen@l Protection Agency, Office of Solid

Waste and Emergency Response, “Establishing Work Zones at Uncontrolled Hazardous Waste Sites,” 9285.2-06F6, April 1991.

21955, Federal Register (Jan. 26, 1990) 2776.

220 Weqom Complex Monitor, “Rocky Flats Cited for 56 Violations,” (WashingtorL DC: Exchange Pubs.) June 19, 1992, p. 2.

221 Weapom Complex Monitor, “State Denied AC~SS to Tr*-

ing Records,” (Washington, DC: Exchange Pubs.) May 25, 1992,

pp. 2-3.

222 Natio~ Defense Authorization Act for FY 1992 ~d 1993,

Pub.L. 102-190, Dec. 5, 1991.

223 p. Whi&leId, Deputy Assistant SaretiUy for Envkonmenti

Restoration U.S. Department of Energy, letter to K. Oldew Director, National Institute of Environmental Health Sciences, June 12,

1992.

224 K. Olden, D~ector, Natlonat Institute of Environmental

Health Sciences, letter from to P. WhM3eld, Deputy Assistant Secretary of Environmental Restoratio~ U.S. Department of Energy,

June 29, 1992.

225 Natio~ Defense Authori~tion Act for Fiscal Yem 1991?

Pub.L. No, 101-510.

226 us.Dep~ent of Energy, Evaluation of the Suitabilio of

the Training Program Developed by the National Institute of

Environmental Health Sciences for Training Workers Involved in

Environmental and Waste Management Activities of the Department of Energy, May 1991.

‘7 Ibid.

‘a Ibid.

29 Ibid.

230 L. Mwhy, ~$~sis in the F~e SeNice,” Proceedings of First

EPA Design and Construction Issues at Hazardous Waste Sites

Conferences, Dallas, TX, EPA 540/8-91/012, May 1-3, 1991.

231 L. Mqhy, Dhector, H~dous ~teridS Trtig, ‘d ‘“

Corbett, Assistant Project Director, International Association of

Firefighters, personal communication to OTA, Nov. 20, 1991.

232 L, MWhy, ~~Tes~ony on Accreditation of Tr*g Programs for Hazardous Waste Operations and Emergency Respons+omments of the International Association of Firefighters, ” Docket No. S-760-B, U.S. Department of Labor,

Occupational Safety and Health Administration, May 26, 1992.

233 L. Mqhy, ~~o~COIItXItUtticiltio~ Nov. 20, 1991, ‘p- Cit”

~ ~te~o~ Association of Firefighters, “Phone fhuvey of

Hazardous Materials Training Among Municipal Firefighters b

cated Near DOE Weapons Plants,” 1992.

235 U.S, Dep~ent of Energy Order 5481 .B.

2315 U.S. Dep~ent of Energy Order 5480.7.

237 Adviso~ Committee on Nuclear Facility Safety, op. cit.

‘8 Ibid.

‘9 Ibid.

zlo us. Dep~ent of Energy, “Tiger Team Assessment of tie

Pantex Plant Arnardl“ o Texas,” DOE/EH-0130, February 1990.

Ml U.S. Congess, General Accounting Office, Marshall ~$-

IandHtatus of the Nuclear Claims Trust Fund, GAO/NSIAD-92-

229 (Washington, DC: Government Printing Office, September

1992).
c

Conclusion—

Opportunities and Dangers

leanup of the DOE Nuclear Weapons

Complex offers the opportunity to define

and advance the standard of health and

safety protection provided to workers engaged in the growing, world-wide industry of environmental remediation. To meet this challenge,

DOE and other federal agencies must recognize

that protection of those who do the work of

cleaning up is urgent and has been too long neglected.

Characterization and remediation of polluted

environments pose numerous work-related health

and safety hazards. During environmental cleanup operations at non-federal sites, worker protection issues have been given insufficient attention.

Experience at these sites indicates that many issues compete for management attention. The regulations and procedures of Superfund and RCRA

do not emphasize worker protection issues.

Environmental compliance, schedule deadlines,

cleanup costs, and community concerns about

possible off-site health risks are usually given

higher priority than occupational health and safety. Worker protection is often neglected by managers, or addressed only in written health and

safety plans that do not accurately portray site

hazards or work practices.

Under OSHA’s Hazardous Waste Operations

and Emergency Response Standard (HAZWOPER), employers are responsible for identifying

site hazards, designing effective programs to protect cleanup workers, and ensuring that such programs are properly implemented and enforced.

OSHA has not issued regulatory guidance for this

complex regulation, which has left some technical provisions of the standard subject to controversial and diverse interpretations. In addition,

OSHA’s limited capacity to inspect work practices or enforce OSH standards at cleanup sites

has meant that enforcement of HAZWOPER is

left largely to voluntary efforts by employers.

The quality and effectiveness of cleanup worker

protection is reported to vary greatly.

Worker protection problems at DOE are even

more critical than in the private sector due to the

scope and complexity of environmental contamination at the NWC and organizational features of

DOE’s approach to occupational safety and

health. DOE has not yet institutionalized its

stated commitment to a culture of excellence and

accountability in environment, health, and safety

matters. The meager staff and resources allocated

to OSH matters within the Office of Environmental Restoration and Waste Management indicates a neglect of this crucial area. To date, DOE

has failed to develop cleanup-specific OSH policies, or to effectively monitor or enforce contractors’ OSH programs. Unless this is changed, effective cleanup worker protection throughout the

NWC will not be achieved.

The reorganized DOE Office of Environment,

Safety and Health has issued some proposals to

79
80 I Hazards Ahead: Managing Cleanup Worker Health and Safety at the Nuclear Weapons Complex

revise existing DOE OSH orders that would, if

adopted, provide a more coherent and workable

approach to worker protection programs generally. EH has little capacity to oversee DOE line

managers’ or contractors’ OSH practices in the

field, however, and no authority to actually enforce OSH orders. In the absence of independent

enforcement authority or close collaboration

with, and commitments from, the DOE line organizations, EH efforts—no matter how valid —

will remain largely reactive.

As the owner-manger of the largest environmental cleanup effort in history, DOE is positioned to develop the organizational approaches,

information, and technologies that would advance the state of the art of occupational health

and safety practices for the growing, world-wide

cleanup industry. To accomplish this, DOE must,

at minimum, acknowledge the urgency of the

worker protection issues that confront the department and significantly augment OSH expertise at

EM headquarters and in the field. An approach to

site characterization and cleanup must be developed that takes worker health and safety hazards

into account, and that allows risks to cleanup

workers to be weighed against the benefits of

proposed remediation plans. Means of monitoring contractor OSH performance must be developed and an incentive system that levies appropriate rewards and penalties for OSH practices

must be put in place. Achieving these goals will

most likely require the cooperation of government agencies and experts outside of DOE.

As the cleanup workforce expands, so do the

chances of accidents, toxic exposures, and further loss of trust in DOE’s willingness or ability

to demonstrate responsible oversight of contractor practices and to make good its promise to

“honor environment, safety and health as fundamental organizational priorities.” DOE has an

opportunity to create policies, programs and

technologies for cleanup worker health and safety that could set the standard for the entire environmental remediation industry. But it must

move swiftly.

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