The Border War on Drugs

March 1987

NTIS order #PB87-184172
Recommended Citation:

U.S. Congress, Office of Technology Assessment, The Border War On Drugs, OTA-O-336

(Washington, DC: U.S. Government Printing Office, March 1987).

Library of Congress Catalog Card Number 87-619802

For sale by the Superintendent of Documents

U.S. Government Printing Office, Washington, DC 20402
Foreword

Smuggling of illegal drugs into the United States is a problem of serious proportions.

The three major drugs of foreign source—cocaine, heroin, and marijuana-are the products

traded by an enormous criminal enterprise whose retail sales total approximately $50 billion annually. Federal efforts to stop or deter international narcotics trafficking have met

with only limited success.

The Office of Technology Assessment was requested by the Senate Committee on

Appropriations to conduct an analysis of Federal drug interdiction efforts and to report

on technological opportunities for future improvements. The study characterizes the drug

smuggling problem and the interdiction efforts now in place within the responsible Federal agencies. It describes technologies in use, under development, and potentially available

for countering smuggling by the various modes—private vessels, private aircraft, land vehicles, commercial carriers, and through official ports of entry. The report also highlights

OTA’s principal findings, focusing on: the need for comprehensive design of integrated

technological systems, the need for long-range planning for employing technologies, the

need for integrated strategies, and the need for data and methods to measure effectiveness.

There are many issues that this OTA study did not cover because they were considered either outside the boundary of the congressional request or beyond the scope of the

study given the OTA resources devoted to it. Among the issues not examined are: the

demand side of the drug problem; international initiatives to control production; investigation and prosecution of drug traffickers; domestic production and distribution of drugs;

civil liberty concerns about law enforcement activities; impacts of drug law enforcement

on legitimate commerce or private use of border areas. Even though not covered in this

study, these issues are important and must be considered when formulating sound public

policy.

OTA is grateful for the considerable assistance provided during the conduct of this

study by our advisory panel, an agency advisory group, numerous other contacts within

the several Federal agencies, and a number of additional consultants or advisors. These

individuals have made it possible for OTA to use comprehensive, accurate, and current

information in analyzing this complex subject with numerous Federal entities. They have

also enabled OTA to examine the problem from a number of important perspectives. We

appreciate the help and advice from all these individuals.

 JOHN H. GIBBON S

Director

Ill
Advisory Panel—Border War on Drugs Project

Don Kash, Chairman

George Lynn Cross Research Professor

University of Oklahoma

Myles J. Ambrose, Esq. Timothy J. Millhouse

O’Connor & Hannan Consultant

(Former U.S. Commissioner of Customs) (Former Director, Customs Air Operations

William J. Coffey

Associate General Counsel

Sealand Corp.

Thomas R. Evans

Applied Physics Laboratory

The Johns Hopkins University

Derwood Hall

Facilities Management Division

NY/NJ Port Authority

Roy Kaaa

Assistant Chief

Honolulu Police Department

West)

Mark F. Mispagel, Esq.

Gatzke & Mispagel

Frank Monastero

Consultant

(Former DEA Chief of Operations)

Arthur F. Nehrbass

Commander, Organized Crime Bureau

Metro-Dade Police Department

Admiral William Stewart

U.S. Coast Guard, Retired

(Former Coast Guard District Commander)

John L. McLucas

President

QuesTech, Inc.

iv
OTA Project Staff—Border War on Drugs

John Andelin,

Science, Information,

Assistant Director, OTA

and Natural Resources Division

Robert Niblock, Oceans and Environment Program Manager

Peter Johnson, Project Director

Joan Ham, Analyst

Larry Jenney, Senior Analyst

Daniel Kevin, Analyst

Elizabeth Keyes, Senior Analyst

Stan Kolar, Research Assistant

Administrative Staff

Kathleen Beil

Jim Brewer
Page

Summary . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1

Key Findings . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 3

Goals and Options . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 4

Purpose of This Study. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 7

The Drug Problem . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 9

Sociopolitical Impacts of Smuggling. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 9

Trends . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 10

The War on Drugs. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 17

The Drug Trafficking System . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 19

Production and Processing . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 19

Transport . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 19

Domestic Distribution and Marketing . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 19

Recycling Revenues . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 20

Noninterdiction Options . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 20

Smuggling Activities. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 23

Transport Modes . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 23

Drug Trafficking Organizations . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 27

Enforcement Organizations. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 33

Drug Enforcement Administration. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 33

Federal Bureau of Investigation . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 34

Coast Guard . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 34

Customs Service . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 35

Border Patrol.. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 37

Support Agencies . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 37

Department of Defense . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 38

Federal Aviation Administration . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 38

State and Local Enforcement Agencies . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 38

Coordination Organizations . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 39

Interdiction Technologies . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 41

Generic Limitations . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 41

Intelligence. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 41

Command and Control . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .......43

Surveillance . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 44

Pursuit and Capture. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 46

Detection at Ports of Entry... . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .......48

Findings . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 51

Inadequate Direction . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 51

Data Deficiencies . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 52

Coordination Problems . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 52

Technological Limitations . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 53

Appendix A—Anti-Drug Abuse Act of 1986, OTA Selected Summary of

Interdiction Provisions . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 59

Appendix B—Acknowledgments . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .......61
Contents—continued

Tables

Table No. Page

I. Total Drug Traffic Revenues . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . , 9

2. 1985 Drug Prices . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 9

Figures

Figure No. Page

1.

2.

3.

4.

5.

6.

7.

8.

9.

10.

11.

Total Cocaine Traffic, 1981-86 . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 11

Cocaine-Related Emergency Room Visits, 1981-85 . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 11

Cocaine Production, Traffic, and Consumption, 1981-85 . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 12

Cocaine Wholesale Prices in Miami and Nationwide, 1981-86 . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 13

Total Marijuana Traffic, 1981-86 . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 14

Total Heroin Traffic, 1981-86 . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 15

Heroin Smuggling Routes From Source Areas to the United States . . . . . . . . . 24

Cocaine Smuggling Routes From Latin America to the

United States and Europe . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 25

Marijuana Smuggling Routes From Latin America and the Caribbean

to the United States . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 26

Estimated Illegal Drug Gross Income to the Smuggler by Country or Region,

Calendar Year 1985 . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 29

Interdiction Functions . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 42

vii
SUMMARY

Despite a doubling of Federal expenditures on

interdiction over the past 5 years, the quantity of

drugs smuggled into the United States is greater

than ever. Illegal imports of cocaine, the drug now

of intense national concern, have about doubled

since 1981, supplying a growing number of users

at prices that have fallen as the supply has increased.

The challenge faced by drug enforcement agencies is formidable. OTA estimates that U.S. retail

sales of marijuana, cocaine, and heroin totaled

about $50 billion in 1985. A survey taken at that

time indicated that 18.2 million Americans used

marijuana once or more a month and 5.8 million

were monthly users of cocaine. Overall, 10 percent

of the population over age 12 were found to be

monthly users of marijuuana and 3 percent monthly

users of cocaine. Other data indicate that 500,000

persons in this country use heroin regularly.

l

The large market, coupled with the huge profits

to be made by transporting drugs from foreign suppliers to domestic wholesalers, fuels this illegal traffic. OTA estimates that the mark-up between foreign and domestic wholesale prices is on the order

of 20 to 30 times for marijuana, 4 to 5 for cocaine,

and 30 to 40 for heroin. In 1985, the value added

to the product through smuggling was roughly $6

billion for marijuana, $1.6 billion for cocaine, and

$1 billion for heroin. Of this, perhaps 90 percent

(over $7 billion) was realized as profit by drug

smugglers.

The drug traffic moves by a great variety of

transport modes and routes to reach the United

States. Most imported marijuana comes either by

sea in private vessels or by land across the Mexican border, but private aircraft and commercial

‘The number of regular marijuana users and heroin addicts has

been reported in the annual Narcotics Intelligence Estimate published

by DEA and in the most recent (June 1986) DEA Special Report,

‘‘Worldwide Drug Assessment. Estimates of heroin addicts are based

on a 1981 survey. Marijuana usage is based on 1982 and 1985 NIDA

“Household Surveys, ” The 1985 National Household Survey on Drug

Abuse published by the National Institute on Drug Abuse puts the

number of regular cocaine users at about 5,800,000. Total U.S. consumption of cocaine appears to have increased 20 to 30 percent from

1982 to 1986. Some researchers believe that the number of users may

not be growing as much as the incidence of very heavy usage. In addition, the 1985 University of Michigan survey of high school students

states that cocaine use by high school seniors was at an all time high

(17 percent have tried cocaine) and that this would indicate increased

use among that group in the future. Highlights of the 1985 Household Survey are appended to this report.

1
2

transport are also used. Cocaine is smuggled across

all three coasts and the Mexican border, with about

half the traffic carried in private aircraft and a large

share of the remainder in private vessels. The

amount of cocaine smuggled through ports of entry appears to be increasing. The heroin produced

in Southeast and Southwest Asia is primarily carried by airline passengers through ports of entry

or hidden in cargo or mail. An increasing amount

of Mexican heroin enters across the land border.

Smugglers show great ingenuity in devising methods of entry. When interdiction efforts restrict a

particular mode of transport or route, drug traffickers quickly shift to alternatives. As a result, the

Nation’s long and highly permeable borders are being assaulted by an illegal traffic that uses all conceivable means of transport and concealment.

The agencies with primary responsibility for drug

interdiction are the Customs Service and the Coast

Guard. The Customs Service is charged with combating smuggling by private aircraft, by private vessels in near-shore waters, and by all modes at ports

of entry. The Coast Guard shares responsibility

with Customs for interdiction of seaborne drug traffic near shore and conducts patrols along the entire U.S. coastline and in the open ocean, focusing on the Gulf of Mexico and the Caribbean Sea.

Along the Mexican border between ports of entry,

the Border Patrol of the Immigration and Naturalization Service exercises enforcement effort as an

adjunct to its primary mission of preventing illegal immigration.

These front-line agencies, supported by numerous other Federal agencies, have seized increasing

quantities of drugs over the past 5 years. In fiscal

year 1986, almost $800 million was expended by

the Federal Government in this effort. Despite these

efforts only a small percentage of drugs are being

seized and the flow of drugs into this country has

not yet been stemmed. (Seizure rates vary according to the particular drug, the season of the year,

locale, and mode of transport.)

The Anti-Drug Abuse Act of 1986 (Public Law

99-570) affirms the role of interdiction as an important element in drug law enforcement. The act

authorizes a substantial increase in funding for interdiction resources and personnel and greater use

of military assets. It also sets the stage for resolving some of the fragmentation in organization and

responsibilities for drug interdiction (e. g., between

Coast Guard and Customs). It establishes mechanisms for allocating new military equipment and

the requirement for legislative proposals from the

President by mid-1987 to reorganize executive

branch efforts to combat drug trafficking and abuse.

The goal of the Nation’s overall anti-drug abuse

program is to reduce the number of users and prevent others from becoming users. The national

strategy includes many elements of both supply and

demand reduction. Interdiction is only one element

of supply reduction, which also includes investigation and prosecution, and international narcotics

control. While many debate the relative merits of

each of these elements, most agree that some level

of effort in each is necessary.

Central to the success of future drug interdiction

efforts are the technologies employed to detect, intercept, and capture smugglers. This study investigates the availability, use, and performance of the

technologies now used for this and others that could

contribute to the Nation’s effort to prevent illegal

drug traffic. Understanding the present contribution and potential improvement of these technologies involves not only examination of the technologies themselves but also the organizations that use

these systems and the enforcement strategies they

employ.

Photo credit: Border Patrol

The Border Patrol has recently been given authority to

perform drug interdiction along the 2,000-mile Mexican

border but law enforcement coverage is sparse.
3

1.

2.

3.

4,

Key Findings

Despite increasing Federal expenditures for interdiction, illegal drug imports appear to be increasing. There is no clear correlation between

the level of expenditures or effort devoted to

interdiction and the long-term availability of

illegally imported drugs in the domestic market. However, given the profitability of drug

smuggling, a worldwide glut of drugs, and the

view that the United States is the favored market for drugs, interdiction alone will probably

never result in more than a short-term or relatively small reduction in drug availability.

OTA found the Federal agencies charged with

the responsibility of drug interdiction to be

staffed by dedicated and vigorous personnel who

demonstrate courage and imagination m carrying out their responsibilities. For the most part,

however, they have had to operate with very

limited technological resources. The size, scope,

and diversity of the smuggling challenge is enormous compared to the human and equipment

resources that front-line enforcement agencies

can bring to bear.

Data on drug smuggling, the trafficking system,

and interdiction activities are inadequate for

effective planning and management. Such data

are needed to make informed selection of best

strategies, to allocate enforcement resources, and

to guide the design and management of interdiction programs. Measures of effectiveness for

interdiction are difficult to define precisely. The

numbers and quantities of drug seizures are difficult to interpret without good knowledge about

smuggling attempts. Often, intelligence reports

provide the best information on the effect of interdiction efforts on smuggling activity.

Responsibilities of the Federal drug interdiction

agencies are fragmented and overlapping. The

lack of a suitable institutional framework is a major impediment to the adoption and effective use

of technologies, particularly command and control systems that could offer significant benefits.

With the exception of special intensive operations, problems with interagency coordination

and cooperation occur and no central authority

addresses important strategic questions on priorities and resource allocation.

Roles of Drug Interdiction Agencies

SOURCE: Office of 1

Photo credit: U.S. Customs Service
5.

6.

7.

8.

Lack of an overall direction that would establish a comprehensive approach to planning and

operations, limits the effectiveness of interdiction programs. Improved direction could enable:

—enforcement resources to be allocated to the

highest priority problems;

—the various agencies to design and carry out

more effective coordinated interdiction strategies; and

—the effectiveness of interdiction programs to

be evaluated.

The value of intelligence is very high for all

aspects of drug interdiction. In particular, good

tactical intelligence can mean a large increase in

ability to identify smuggling attempts. In certain

areas, intelligence gathering is limited by inadequate resources and an ineffective network.

Needed information cannot be gathered and delivered to the users in a timely fashion. Classified intelligence, even if valuable to interdiction

efforts, is not often or easily used because of concerns about revealing sources and methods during court proceedings.

Over the past 2 years many new technologies,

ranging from remote sensors to pursuit aircraft

and patrol boats, have been introduced into Federal drug interdiction programs. These technologies have, for the most part, enhanced Federal

capabilities. However, the technologies are just

now becoming operational and evaluations of

their overall effectiveness cannot be made without more experience and a directed effort to collect relevant data for evaluation.

No single technology has been identified that

by its addition would solve the Nation’s overall drug interdiction problem. But there are

many opportunities for individual technologies

to make incremental contributions to specific

Federal interdiction efforts. Realizing these opportunities may require development of new

technologies or procurement of increased numbers of existing technologies. However, most

technological improvements, by themselves, may

have only a temporary benefit because, based

on the record, the drug traffickers will take rapid

and usually successful actions to neutralize the

effectiveness of new interdiction techniques.

9. There is a serious lack of support for research,

development, test, and evaulation of new or

transferred technologies within all of the drug

interdiction agencies. Opportunities exist within

other Federal agencies (especially the national

laboratories and Department of Defense (DOD)

laboratories) to provide some of the needed capabilities.

Goals and Options

Even though goals for the national drug interdiction program are seldom stated explicitly, it appears that three major objectives make up the implicit working goals of all of the agencies involved.

These are:

1.

2.

3.

to constantly harass and deter smuggling attempts by significant modes and at key locations

and to work toward disrupting the trafficking

networks, seizing as many drugs as possible, and

making arrests of the drug traffickers;

to force the most vulnerable drug trafficking

organizations out of business; and

to demonstrate a national resolve to curtail the
5

While these goals do not lead to specific measures of effectiveness, it may be useful to consider

how well the technologies, agencies, and programs

are directed toward them.

Operationally, the above goals have been used

by each interdiction agency to develop strategies

that are reasonably consistent with each other.

OTA’s investigation has concluded that at least

three elements are vital to such strategies:

1.

2.

3.

to apply constant pressure on drug traffickers

operating wherever intelligence or experience indicates that significant activity takes place;

to constantly monitor trafficking patterns and

smuggling attempts to direct interdiction pressure; and

to conduct limited duration special operations

that cause exceptional problems, costs, or risks

for the traffickers.

OTA has found that the front-line interdiction

agencies, in general, use these strategies implicitly,

if not explicitly, in their day-to-day operations.

And, these strategies can fulfill the national goals.

For example, constant pressure fulfills the general

harassment goal; constant monitoring can direct

that pressure to maximize seizures and arrests; special operations can force out the vulnerable organizations and also produce quick successes that contribute to demonstrating national resolve.

Congress passed the Anti-Drug Abuse Act of

1986 (Public Law 99-570) in October 1986. Several provisions of the act are directed at enhancing

Federal interdiction efforts conducted by the Drug

Enforcement Administration (DEA), the Coast

Guard, and the Customs Service as well as those

supported by DOD and other agencies. The interdiction agencies, therefore, can benefit from a

unique opportunity to allocate new resources and

redirect existing ones to meet the objectives of the

bill. Other provisions provide the opportunity to

reallocate agency responsibilities and provide direction. For example, the Coast Guard may assume

a greater role in the air interdiction mission. The

National Drug Enforcement Policy Board is charged

with making decisions about such changes in the

missions.

This OTA assessment of interdiction technologies suggests a range of options that could be employed by the Federal agencies in an effort to improve the effectiveness of future operations, increase

success within their operational strategies, and

make more efficient use of resources. These options

are listed below:

●

●

●

The principal interdiction agencies, under the

direction of the National Drug Enforcement

Policy Board, the National Narcotics Border

Interdiction System, or another central authority, could prepare a coordinated long-range

plan for deployment of interdiction resources

and technologies to apply pressure on major

smuggling modes at ports of entry and air,

marine, and land borders. This would entail

matching resources to the present threat and

developing a system to assure that consistent

monitoring of trafficking is fed into the planning process. The plan could include networks

for intelligence and surveillance data as well

as designated commands for specific arenas.

OTA has noted throughout its report deficiencies in information and command networks

and has stressed centralized planning.

Establish a system and standards common to

all agencies which would be used to evaluate

deterrent capabilities and the effectiveness of

technologies and techniques used for interdiction. The system would need to include specified

data to be collected, standards for measuring

detection and apprehension rates, consistent

costing methods, and procedures for using the

most appropriate data to evaluate systems or

operations.

For the port of entry interdiction problem, the

Customs Service or another agency could establish a substantial R&D program to develop

more effective detection technologies. OTA

has found that there is some promise of technological advancement in this area but R&D

efforts are too small to conduct needed work.

Existing National laboratories could provide

the technical base for a major R&D effort.

OTA has made suggestions for specific program elements in later sections of this report.
6

• For illegal border entry interdiction (air, ma- are available to address this problem, but that

rine, and land), a cooperative agency group a design for deployment is lacking. An OTA

could design a border surveillance-detection suggested approach is contained in other secnetwork for smuggler traffic. OTA has found tions of this report.

that sufficient technologies (mostly military)
PURPOSE OF THIS STUDY

This report deals with one component of the Nation’s war on drugs— specifically, the effort to interdict drugs en route to or across the Nation’s

borders. More than half the recent Federal expenditures on drug law enforcement are devoted to interdiction. OTA estimates that in Fiscal Year 1986

drug interdiction expenditures amounted to almost

$800 million. The Anti-Drug Abuse Act of 1986

(Public Law 99-570) and a number of Administration proposals will substantially increase this

number.

The precise effect of the present interdiction effort is difficult to determine, but interdiction plays

a significant role in the national strategy to combat drug abuse. For example, interdiction can deter at least some inexperienced smugglers and,

when seizures result, subsequent investigations may

lead to the break-up of smuggling organizations.

However, given the worldwide glut of drugs and

the expert view that the United States is the favored

market for drugs, interdiction alone will probably

never result in more than a short-term reduction

in drug supply.

This study is concerned with the availability, performance, and use of technologies that can contribute to the interdiction effort. Thus, this study focuses major attention on the technologies available

and the Federal organizations that use those technologies and their strategies. The procurement and

operation of technologies used to support drug interdiction represent the largest share of Federal expenditures aimed at the prevention of smuggling.

This study investigates the range of choices among

technologies and the alternative ways of using those

technologies.
THE DRUG

Illegal drug trafficking and use in the United

States is a problem of major size and scope. Although the illegal drug network now reaches every

area of the Nation and all strata in society, the hard

data necessary to provide a precise and complete

description of the Nation’s drug problem are not

available. Drug data are fraught with uncertainty

for a simple reason. They are data about and derived from a system that is part of the underworld.

Drug traffickers and users devote great efforts to

staying hidden.

This report does, however, attempt to characterize the size and impact of the Nation’s drug problem by drawing on publicly available information

and Federal agency estimates. Many of the numbers are constructed from limited data, so OTA

generally gives them as ranges.

Illegal drugs are classified by the Controlled Substances Act into four categories: 1) cannabis (e. g.,

marijuana and hashish); 2) cocaine; 3) dangerous

drugs (e. g., methamphetamine, LSD, methaqualone, and amphetamines); and 4) opiates (e. g.,

heroin). The size of the illegal economy supported

by the three drugs (marijuana, cocaine, and heroin)

that are the focus of this study (because they are

mostly or entirely imported) are estimated by OTA

to have had an annual gross retail value in 1985

of about $50 billion (see tables 1 and 2). Thus, the

retail sales of marijuana, cocaine, and heroin equal

the combined sales of the Nation’s two largest retailers, Sears and K-Mart. Unlike Sears and KMart, the drug industry requires small capital investment, involves no retail stores, and minimal

investment in production and storage facilities. The

industry’s major operating costs are associated with

paying employees and supporting the illegal transportation network that is the focus of this study.

The DEA states that the rate of drug use in the

United States is higher than any other Western industrialized country. Marijuana is the most widely

used illegal drug with an estimated 18.2 million

Americans using it one or more times each month.

As many as 5.8 million Americans use cocaine one

or more times a month and there are estimated to

be a half million heroin addicts.2 In sum, 10 percent of the population over the age of 12 are regu-

‘Ibid.

PROBLEM

Table I.—Total Drug Traffic Revenues

(1985 gross averages in U.S. billions of dollars)

Foreign Domestic

wholesale wholesale Retail

Marijuana . . . . $0.4 $6. 3 $16.8

Cocaine . . . . . . 1.2 2.8 20.0

Heroin . . . . . . . — 1.0 13.8

Total. . . . . . . $1.6 $10.1 $50.6

NOTE: These data were derived from the 1985 Worldwide Drug Assessment prepared by DEA and 1985 National Average Prices also developed by DEA.

The averge of the high and low estimates for import weight of each drug

was multiplied by the average of the high and low price to obtain the above

estimates of gross revenue. The estimates represent only those drugs

that were imported and consumed in the United States. Such portions

that were stockpiled, lost, seized, or domestically produced have been

deducted from these figures These data could be very inaccurate but

these are the most reliable figures OTA could obtain

Table 2.—1985 Drug Prices

(U.S. dollars per pure kilogram)

Foreign Domestic

wholesale wholesale Retail

Marijuana

(national average). . . . 35 990 2,625a

Cocaine:

(national average). . . . 9,000 40,000 285,000 b

(Miami) . . . . . . . . . . . . . – 30,000C —

Heroin . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 4,500 160,000 2,300,000 d

%olombian marijuana purchased in small quantities.

bpurchased in small quantities at 35 PerCent purity.

cFirst half of 19M cocaine prices in Miami ranged from $20,000 to $32,~.

dpurchased in small quantities at 5 percent purity.

SOURCE: Drug Enforcement Administration and Metro-Dade Police Department.

lar users of marijuana and 3 percent are users of

cocaine.

Sociopolitical Impacts of Smuggling

The above statistics tell only part of the story.

Another dimension is the impact of the trafficking

system itself. Virtually all heroin and cocaine and

about 80 percent of the marijuana consumed are

smuggled across our borders. The social, economic,

and political consequences of this huge industry are

negative and serious.

The international drug trade is considered so

dangerous that in April 1986 the President signed

a National Security Decision Directive on Narcotics

and National Security, and directed Federal agencies including the Department of Defense to more

actively counter narcotics smuggling.3 A major fo-

‘Testimony of Colonel Harvey G. Pothier, USAF, Acting Director of DOD Task Force on Drug Enforcement, before the Subcommittee on Defense, Senate Committee on Appropriations, July 30,

1986.

9
10

cus of concern has been the effect of drug revenues

in corrupting political and judicial institutions

worldwide. Growing evidence suggests that many

political leaders, police officials, and judges provide protection for drug smugglers in exchange for

bribes. In more extreme cases, political, military,

and police officials are themselves active participants in the international drug trade.

Where the officials involved are members of

friendly governments, the dilemmas posed for U.S.

foreign policy are evident. U.S. efforts to crack

down on the drug trade may result in destabilizing the Nation’s allies.

Domestically, the range of impacts resulting from

the drug trade is reported daily in the news media. The highly publicized deaths of college and

professional athletes reflect a growing awareness of

cocaine abuse. More generally the increase in drug

abuse has led the commissioners of professional

baseball and football to establish drug testing programs. Similarly, many corporations have become

so concerned about drug use among their employees that they plan to require drug tests as well. Testing of U. S. military personnel over the past 5 years

has apparently led to dramatic declines in the number of users in the services.

In recent years a growing number of major U.S.

banks have been fined for their failure to report

large cash transactions. The suspicion is that some

of these large cash transactions involve the laundering of drug money. Whether the failure to report large cash transactions is conscious or inadvertent, they reflect the pervasive nature of the drug

economy.

The President’s Commission on Organized

Crime believes that drug trafficking is the most

widespread and lucrative organized crime activity

in the Nation, accounting for almost 38 percent of

all organized crime cases.4 Drugs have not only

become a major activity of long-established criminal organizations, but have also led to the establishment of a growing number of newly organized

crime families. Criminal organizations dominated

by Latin Americans and Asians are now commonly

identified. As these criminal organizations develop

and mature, they grow ever more sophisticated.

‘Report of the President’s Commission on Organized Crime,

Washington, DC, March 1986.

With this sophistication comes, all too frequently,

efforts to corrupt U.S. political, police, and judicial officials. One member of this study’s advisory

committee said: ‘‘There is an old adage that everyone has his price. The drug traffickers have the revenues to pay that price.

Trends

Data on the size and character of the drug trafficking system are not reliable. For the most part,

estimates of the quantity of drugs being smuggled

are derived from data on seizures by drug enforcement agencies. Seizure data from a given agenc~

are often inconsistent and comparison of seizure

data from different agencies regularly highlights

gross contradictions. Some of the inconsistency is

due to double counting, inaccurate weighing, and

the existence of several different, separate data systems set up by the agencies involved. A quantitatively reliable picture of trends is not currently available. A new system to eliminate double counting

among agencies began operating in October 1986.

However, this improvement will not provide information necessary to evaluate effectiveness of individual program elements. Neither can it provide

meaningful information about trends until enough

data is acquired (perhaps in a year or two).

Even the most conservative estimates of the

quantities of drugs coming into the United States

are cause for major concern. It also appears that

the illegal drug networks will continue to seek market expansion. The drug trafficking system has

evolved a level of professionalism that allows it to

respond to the market with a speed and sophistication equal to or greater than that of many legitimate industries. Both the volume of drugs available and the forms of sale are flexible.

In terms of retail sales the total dollar value of

cocaine is second to marijuana, but DEA views cocaine as the country’s most serious drug problem,

because of its widespread use, increasing availability

and significant health consequences. DEA believes

that this will remain the case for the foreseeable

future.5

5U. S. Department of Justice, Drug Enforcement Administration,

Special Report: Worldwide Drug Assessment: Threat to the United

States, June 1986, p. 2.
11

Figure l.—Total Cocaine Traffic, 1981.86

(exports to the United States based on production estimates)

180 

1

1982 1984

Year

1

1985 1986

NOTE: Some law enforcement officials believe that this estimate is low and the actual cocaine imports have at least tripled

in past 5 years

SOURCES: 1981-64: National Narcotics Intelligence Consumers Committee, Narcotics /rrte//lgerrce Estimate, 1983 and 1984

1985: Drug Enforcement Administration, Wor/dwide Drug Assessment, June 1986.

1964-86: United States Customs, Drug Smuggling Threat Estimate, 1984-86.

Estimates are that the quantity of cocaine coming into the United States has more than doubled

in the last 5 years (see figure 1). The number of

cocaine-related hospital emergencies has been rising (figure 2) and cocaine use has spread to every

part of the Nation. During the initial period of

growth in cocaine use, it was marketed as a powder. The form in which cocaine is used, however,

has been changing and at present a new form,

‘‘crack, is spreading across the United States.

Crack is particularly dangerous; compared with

more common forms of cocaine, it is more potent,

costs less per dose, and its effects last for a shorter

time before the user craves more. By most accounts,

it is highly addictive.

Data on cocaine production, traffic, and consumption from 1981-85 have been collected by

OTA from several sources and are displayed in figure 3. These data illustrate not only major growth

Figure 2.—Cocaine.ReIated Emergency Room

4,000 —

3,000 —

2,000 “

1,000 -

1982 1983

Year

1984 1985

NOTE: Only those emergency room visits reported through the DAWN system

are included. Actual totals are probably higher.

SOURCE: Drug Abuse Warning Network.
12

Figure 3.-Cocaine Production, Traffic, and Consumption, 1981-85

1981 1982 1983 1984 1985

Year

SOURCE: National Narcotics Intelligence Consumers Committee, Narcotics Intelligence Estimate, 1983 and 1984; Drug Enforcement

Administration, Worldwide Drug Assessment, June 1986.

during this period but what appears to be a huge

oversupply of this drug. Price data for the period,

shown in figure 4, indicate a sharp decline which

may contribute to the increasing numbers of users.

Experts differ on the interpretation of these data

and many claim they are too inaccurate to reach

any conclusion.

Marijuana use appears to be declining in recent

years, but it already represents a huge market, 18

million monthly users. Marijuana imports shown

in figure 5 appear to have ranged between 10,000

and 12,000 metric tons for at least the past 5 years.

Imports appear to be decreasing while domestic

production is increasing, and larger quantities of

imports are coming from countries closer to the

U.S. border, mainly Mexico. In addition, assessments by U.S. drug agencies indicate that over the

last decade the potency of marijuana being grown

for the U.S. market has been steadily increasing.

Heroin use remains relatively stable and the user

population has, at least until relatively recently,

been concentrated in major metropolitan areas. Figure 6 shows heroin traffic (assumed equal to consumption) from 1981 to 1986 leveling off at about
73

Figure 4.—Cocaine Wholesale Prices in Miami and

1 I 1 1

1981 1982 1983 1984 1985 1986a

aFlrst half of 1986

SOURCES: Art Nehrbass, Metro-Dade Police Department, personal

munication, 1966 Drug Enforcement Administration, 1986.

com6,000 kilograms for the past 3 to 4 years. A major

change has been the recent rapid increase in the

import of heroin from Mexico. One form of Mexican heroin, known as ‘‘black tar, is generally of

both higher quality (i.e., higher purity) and lower

price than heroin from other sources. Infusion of

Mexican heroin has created a new problem for drug

enforcement officials. The Drug Enforcement Administration preliminary data suggest a limited increase in heroin use during 1985.6 This may be a

function of the lower priced, high-quality Mexican

heroin, plus the novelty of a new form.

In sum, overall trends suggest two developments.

First, illegal importation of certain drugs into the

United States is increasing. Second, the illegal drug

industry is demonstrating a capacity to distribute

more potent drugs in a variety of forms to suit the

market. Cocaine is the drug causing the greatest

public concern both because of its increasing availability and its dangers. During the early period of

its growth in use, some portions of society saw it

as a ‘‘safe’ drug. Today few doubt the dangers of

cocaine.

bIbid., p. 3.
14

Figure 5.-Total Marijuana Traffic, 1981-86

(exports to the United States based on production estimates)

1 - 1 1 L

1986

SOURCES: 1981-84: National Narcotics Intelligence Consumers Committee, rVarcotlcs Intelligence Estimate, 1983 and 1984.

1885: Drug Enforcement Administration, Woddwide Drug Assessment, June 1988.

1984-88: United States Customs, Drug Smuggling Threat Estimate, 1984-88.
75

Figure 6.—TotaI Heroin Traffic, 1981-86 (traffic assumed equal to consumption estimates)

7

6

5

4

3

2

1

0 L 1-

1981 1982 1983 1984 1985

Year

1986

SOURCES: 1961-64: National Narcotics Intelligence Consumers Committee, Narcotics Intelligence Estimate, 1963 and 1964.

1985: Drug Enforcement Administration, Worldwide Drug Assessment, June 1986.

1964-86: United States Customs, Drug Smuggling Threat Estimate, 1984-86.
THE WAR

As the Nation has become increasingly aware of

these problems and trends, efforts by the Federal

Government to prevent drug abuse and trafficking have increased. Following the example of several predecessors, the President has declared war

on drugs and has given the problem high visibility.

The national strategy for attacking the drug

problem has five components: education, enforcement, treatment, research, and international cooperation. Efforts in each of these areas are expanding, but there is little evidence yet of success in the

current war on drugs.

If the war on drugs is to be successful, the character of that war will need to be broadly understood.

Perhaps the most important thing to recognize is

that there will be no clean, clear victory. The enemy

will not surrender, fold his tents, and return home.

Understanding the challenge the Nation faces requires starting with the recognition that the drug

problem is not new. Drug use has a long history

in the United States. However, the relatively recent and large-scale use of cocaine seems to have

triggered the latest declaration of war.

Thus, the war on drugs must be designed and

executed with a recognition of the following factors:

●

●

●

●

illegal drug use is woven into the fabric of the

population,

the population of drug users is large,

there is literally a mass market, and

the profits made from serving that market are

very large.

The recent rapid growth in cocaine use has resulted in the development of a number of major

new drug trafficking cartels with large financial resources and flexible and sophisticated delivery systems. When one adds these relatively recent cocaine

cartels to the trafficking networks that supply the

other drugs, the challenge faced is clearly formidable,

The networks that supply the Nation’s drug

users— the enemy in the war on drugs—is ill defined. While drug trafficking can be characterized

as a system, it is a system made up of complex,

decentralized, and infinitely flexible subsystems.

Drug traffickers respond rapidly to pressure by

using other strategies, routes, or delivery methods.

ON DRUGS

Evidence suggests that even when major law enforcement operations disrupt or eliminate particular

drug trafficking arrangements the benefits are only

temporary. The vacuum that is left is quickly filled

by other drug traffickers. And, finally, at every level

from production through processing, transportation, and marketing the drug trafficking system can

be changed to avoid detection.

The starting point for an effective war, and, more

specifically, an effective interdiction program is to

know what effectiveness means. Effective interdiction requires a tight linkage between national goals,

organizational arrangements, and strategies. It

seems evident that the Nation’s goals involve stopping the growth of drug abuse. Doubtless, the public wishes to do more than that: specifically, to reduce the extent and frequency of drug abuse, The

ideal would be to eliminate drug abuse in the

United States.

None of the goal statements by high-level national policy groups provide clear direction for drug

interdiction agencies on where to set priorities.

Rather they allow each agency to define its goals

as it deems appropriate. Redefinition can occur at

will. In sum, such goal statements allow the individual agencies to define their individual goals to

fit their capabilities and programs and not vice

versa.

Certain drugs have been considered more threatening than others at certain times. Priorities for particular drugs were established in the past. Such priorities have followed changing drug popularity and

changing perceptions of the magnitude of the drug

problem. At present the Administration specifically

refrains from setting priorities for specific drugs.

However, it is generally agreed that limited resources require that some problems be given more

attention than others. Interdiction programs have

therefore been focused more on those drugs and

modes of smuggling where they appear to have the

most success (i. e., maritime smuggling of marijuana and private air smuggling of cocaine) and

less on those drugs and modes where success is

questionable (e. g., port of entry smuggling of

heroin). The drug enforcement agencies argue that

it is more effective to counter heroin trafficking by

means other than interdiction, but that interdiction is effective against marijuana trafficking.

17
18

OTA’s investigation suggests that a successful be difficult to obtain and interpret unless goals are

war on drugs will require clear goals and a long fixed and long-range trends are measured.

sustained effort (decades). Evidence of success will
THE DRUG TRAFFICKING SYSTEM

Interdiction seeks to prevent or disrupt the transport of drugs (chiefly marijuana, cocaine, and

heroin) into the United States. The international

illegal drug trafficking system has four components.

The first consists of production and processing in

foreign countries. The second involves the transportation system that moves the drugs from foreign source countries to and across the borders of

the United States. The third component consists

of the domestic distribution and marketing system.

And the fourth and final component involves the

recycling of drug monies out of the United States.

Following is a description of each of these components as it relates to the three drugs of concern.

Production and Processing

Marijuana

Foreign countries provided about 10,000 metric tons (about 80 percent) of the marijuana consumed in the United States in 1985, with Colombia and Mexico each supplying about one-third.

Jamaica and Belize supplies are substantially smaller,

but they remain significant. The cannabis that is

the source of marijuana can apparently be grown

in almost any country, thus the proportion of marijuana coming from any specific country changes

in any given year and is primarily a reflection of

established production and marketing capabilities,

weather conditions, local eradication programs, and

interdiction efforts. Potential sources of supply appear to be nearly unlimited. Some believe Mexico

will soon become the leading U.S. supplier. Domestic U.S. cultivation could supplant imports even

more if it were lower cost and less risky. Some believe the trend to more domestic production is already occurring, although eradication and other

control efforts are also underway.

Cocaine

Based on estimates of the number of hectares of

coca cultivated, Peru ranks at the top of the list of

coca producers with approximately 70,000 hectares

(1 hectare = 2.47 acres). Bolivia is next with 30,000

to 38,000 hectares. Colombia is third with 15,000

to 17,000 hectares, with Brazil and Ecuador having small-scale cultivation. Colombia continues to

dominate the final stage processing of cocaine and

is the major export point to the United States. As

government efforts to find and destroy processing

facilities increased in Colombia and more recently

in Bolivia, processing laboratories have been established elsewhere.

Heroin

Estimates are that the U.S. heroin market was

supplied in 1985 as follows: Southwest Asia, 47 percent; Mexico, 39 percent; and Southeast Asia, 14

percent. A form of Mexican heroin, ‘‘black tar,

appears to be taking a growing share of the U.S.

market.

U.S. efforts to deal with the drug problem in the

source countries involves a two-pronged approach.

First, the United States has drug eradication agreements with 14 foreign countries, up from two in

1982. Under these programs the United States supplies funds and expertise to support source country efforts aimed at eradicating cannabis, coca, and

opium poppies and processing facilities. Second,

Drug Enforcement Administration agents support

local efforts to identify and prosecute the individuals in source countries responsible for the drug

traffic. The availability of other U.S. aid is sometimes linked to foreign cooperation in these efforts.

The goal is to disrupt the organizational and management networks that feed the U.S. drug market.

Transport

The second component of the international drug

trafficking system, transport to the United States,

is the primary focus of this study. This system will

be described in detail later. Transportation activities of concern are those which pick up drugs at

the export point in a foreign country and deliver

them to the domestic distribution marketing system in the United States. As will become clear in

what follows, the transportation system is large, diverse, well-equipped, and flexible.

Domestic Distribution and Marketing

The third component of the trafficking system

is the domestic distribution and marketing network.

These activities are divided among distributors who

receive drugs from the smugglers, wholesalers, and

19
20

retailers. OTA has not investigated this area and

therefore cannot provide a confident description of

the domestic distribution and marketing network.

In some areas distribution and wholesaling is controlled by organized crime networks. In other areas

there appear to be competing distributors and

wholesalers. The link between smugglers, distributors, and wholesalers appears to be relatively well

established, given the quantities of drugs being

moved into the retail market. The network for marketing marijuana has expanded to a point where

it is readily available in almost all areas of the

United States. Similarly, the broad availability of

cocaine suggests that its distribution and marketing

system is beginning to parallel that of marijuana.

Efforts to prevent or disrupt domestic distribution and marketing are divided among Federal,

State, and local authorities. Federal responsibilities are primarily directed at the smugglers and distributors. State and local responsibilities are primarily directed at the wholesalers and retailers.

Domestic drug enforcement efforts include arrest

and conviction of major drug distributors and

wholesalers, seizure of drugs in domestic transport,

arrest and conviction of drug retailers or pushers,

and seizures of their assets. In addition, increasing efforts, primarily carried out at the local level,

are focused on education programs aimed at existing and potential drug users with the goal of significantly reducing the market for drugs.

Recycling Revenues

The fourth and final component of the drug system involves the recycling of monies from the sale

of drugs. The domestic drug wholesale and retail

economy runs on cash, It is a multi-billion-dollar

economy carried on with limited recourse to checks

or credit cards, where the primary currency is $100

bills. Thus, the drug system must launder and

transport huge amounts of currency, the ultimate

need being to move large portions of those revenues out of the United States to support the production, processing, and transport of drugs and to

return profits to the bosses of the trade.

Efforts to disrupt the cash flow of drug monies

include financial reporting requirements for large

banking transactions and U.S. Customs’ efforts to

detect outgoing currency at ports of entry.

Noninterdiction Options

Although this study did not investigate or seek

to weigh the relative benefits of focusing drug law

enforcement activities on the three nontransportation components of the system, any informed national policy must carefully weigh the costs and benefits of actions against these components vis-a-vis

expenditures on activities aimed at the transportation component. More than 50 percent of Federal expenditures on drug law enforcement go to

the interdiction activities, but it is by no means certain that this is the component of the system where

the Nation gets the largest multiplier effect from

given expenditures or given levels of effort.

On the other hand, some interdiction expenditures also benefit other elements. For example, a

successful interdiction could yield evidence or other

leads that save substantial investigation time. Also,

some sensors provide both support for investigations and general data for international threat

assessments and related options.

A few brief examples of noninterdiction options

may be in order. Some have suggested that greater

emphasis on reducing supply in producing countries would have a high pay-off. An example often

cited to support control of supply is the successful

program which essentially eliminated the illicit production of poppies in Turkey. Others, however,

draw just the opposite conclusion. They agree that

programs of eradication and control have been successful but the longer term result is usually to move

production into other areas.

In addition, many, including DEA, contend that

the investigation and prosecution of major traffickers and their organizations, and the seizure and

forfeiture of their drug-related assets, have the most

impact on disrupting drug traffic. DEA claims that

their major investigations are usually the results of

DEA or Task Force efforts—not a followup to a

seizure at the border.

Many people interviewed in connection with this

study believe that, given a high, continuing demand

for drugs and the large profits associated with the

illegal importation of drugs, the prospect of interdiction ever preventing or significantly limiting

drug availability is doomed to frustration. Those

who take this position often suggest that the highest payoff would come from education programs
21

or treatment programs that aim to reduce the de- It should be noted that OTA found no one who

mand for drugs. This point of view seems to be sug- argues that a single component of the drug system

gested by the current Administration campaign to should receive all or even a majority of the atten-

‘‘say no to drugs. tion to the exclusion of other components. Rather,

Finally, some of those interviewed suggest high the policy issue concerns the relative priorities, and

payoff from focusing major attention on disrupt- therefore how resources should be allocated to variing the recycling of revenues from drug sales. This ous components. However, this allocation issue is

beyond the scope of this study. The study focuses point of view rests on the belief that tracking and

seizing illegal drug profits cuts off the motivation on strengths and weaknesses of interdiction efforts.

for trafficking.
SMUGGLING

The fuel that drives the illegal importation of

drugs into the United States is the huge increase

in value between the foreign wholesale market and

the domestic wholesale market. In the case of marijuana, the wholesale value in the United States is

20 to 30 times higher than it is in the source countries. OTA’s calculations, based on 1985 data, suggest that transport of marijuana into the United

States added roughly $6 billion to the value of the

product. In the case of cocaine the domestic wholesale value is four to five times higher than the foreign wholesale value. Thus, transport added roughly

$1.6 billion to the value of the cocaine, In the case

of heroin, transportation added roughly $1 billion

in 1985, increasing the value 30 to 40 times. Net

profit margins of at least 90 percent of these added

values attract participants who show great ingenuity

in devising smuggling methods. Modes of transport range from commercial airplane passengers

with drugs hidden in body cavities, to four-engine,

long-range aircraft that start in South America and

end in New England, to high-speed boats that are

the envy of racing enthusiasts.

To understand the nature of the drug interdiction problem and the technologies available to support interdiction requires investigating three

elements:

● the transport system and those who operate it;

● the organizational, jurisdictional, and geographic responsibilities of the Federal organizations that carry out interdiction activities;

and

• existing and potential technologies and the

strategies available to enforcement agencies.

Transport Modes

The starting point for any effort to gain a picture of the transportation system used by drug

smugglers must be the recognition that the United

States has a long and highly permeable border. The

choice of transport mode for illegal drugs coming

into

●

●

●

the United States reflects three factors:

the geographic location from which the drug

is exported,

the dollar value/volume ratio of the drug, and

the smugglers perception of interdiction strategies and capabilities.

ACTIVITIES

The maps in figures 7 through 9 provide a general

picture of the routes whereby heroin, cocaine, and

marijuana are illegally imported into the United

States from Western Hemisphere source countries.

Heroin

The three sources of heroin destined for the U.S.

market are Southwest Asia, Mexico, and Southeast Asia. Most of the opium poppies that supply

the smuggling system from Southwest Asia are

grown in Afghanistan, Iran, and Pakistan, with a

small amount coming from India. Major export

points for heroin produced from Southwest Asian

opium poppies are Pakistan, Turkey, and India,

with smaller amounts coming through Syria and

Lebanon.

Mexican heroin is produced from poppies grown

and processed in Mexico. It enters the United States

across the 2,000-mile border with Mexico.

Southeast Asian heroin is produced primarily

from poppies grown in Burma, Thailand, and Laos

and generally processed along the Thailand-Burma

border. It is then exported from Thailand and

Malaysia.

Most Southwest Asian heroin is smuggled through

European countries and enters the United States

at ports of entry along the east coast. Southeast

Asian heroin comes in primarily through Hawaii

and west coast ports of entry. Usually Southwest

and Southeast Asian heroin is transported via commercial aircraft in the possession of passengers who

act as couriers. Smaller amounts are shipped in

commercial vessels and through the mail. Air parcels appear to be more widely used for heroin exported from India than any other location. Mexican heroin is typically transported in vehicles or

by persons. ’

Because of its high value to volume ratio, heroin

can be profitably imported into the United States

in very small quantities. That fact, in combination

with the long transportation distances, explains the

use of commercial aircraft and vessels as the primary transportation mode. During 1985, 25 million

passengers entered the United States on commercial airline flights, 48,000 ocean-going commercial

‘Ibid., p. 24.

23
24

Figure 7.—Heroin Smuggling Routes From Source Areas to the United States

SOURCE: Drug Enforcement Administration

vessels entered U.S. sea ports from foreign ports,

and 100 million letters and parcels entered through

the postal system. Given this volume of traffic, the

probabilities of interdicting smuggled heroin without prior intelligence (so-called ‘ ‘cold hits’ have

some of the characteristics of finding the proverbial “needle in the haystack. ”

Mexican heroin enters both at official ports of

entry and between ports of entry. The number of

persons entering from Mexico through official land

ports of entry during 1985 was 115 million with as

many as 3 to 4 million illegal entries between ports

of entry. Although the form of transport is different, the Mexican border also poses a ‘‘needle in

the haystack” problem.

Cocaine

Colombia is the primary export point for cocaine.

Cocaine enters the United States on all three coasts

as well as across the Mexican border. Florida continues to be the largest import area, but entry

through other Gulf Coast States is also large. Intelligence indicates that transshipment of cocaine

via Mexico is increasing, probably as a result of

interdiction efforts in Florida and the Caribbean.

Cocaine smuggling involves a complex, diverse,

and flexible transportation system. Until recently,

the majority of cocaine was thought to bypass the

official entry process at ports. Seizure statistics indicated that, in 1985, private aircraft transported

over one-half and private vessels one-quarter of cocaine imports. The remaining cocaine came by

commercial aircraft, commercial vessels, and overland methods. However, recent large seizures and

other intelligence indicate a growing use of ports

of entry.

There is no one mode of transport clearly preferable for cocaine smuggling. The past preference of

cocaine smugglers for noncommercial modes of

transport is a reflection of several characteristics of

the cocaine trade as compared to heroin. First, although cocaine sells on a weight basis for only onefourth to one-half the price of heroin on the domestic wholesale market, it nonetheless has a high dollar

value to volume ratio. Second, transportation distances for cocaine as compared to Asian heroin are

short. General aviation aircraft can fly from Colombia to the United States without refueling and,

depending on the departure point, private vessels

can move to the United States in relatively short

periods of time—a few days at most. In the case
25

Figure 8.—Cocaine Smuggling Routes From Latin America to the United States and Europe

SOURCE: Drug Enforcement Administration.
26

Figure 9.—Marijuana Smuggiing Routes From Latin America and the Caribbean to the United States

SOURCE: Drug Enforcement Administration.

of cocaine transshipped through the Bahamas, a gofast boat can leave the Bahamas and be in Florida

within an hour. A third factor which could influence the transportation choice of cocaine smugglers

is the size of the market. While the heroin user population is estimated to be 500,000 people, the population of current cocaine users is at least 10 times

that amount. The total quantity of cocaine imported

into the United States during 1985 was probably

over 100 metric tons while for heroin the figure was

probably about 6 metric tons.

In combination, then, the dollar value to volume

ratio of cocaine, the relatively short transportation

distances, and the large market add up to a situation where there are substantial economies of scale

in transporting cocaine by private aircraft and vessels. The average size of a cocaine shipment is in

the range of several hundred pounds. Some illustration of this can be found in the cocaine shipments

seized during 1985. In total, 121 seizures of 100

kg (220 lb) or more were interdicted during 1985,

and together represented 41 metric tons. The average weight of these large seizures was 341 kg.

The risks and difficulty of trying to transport

shipments of this size through official ports to date

have been perceived as higher than other modes,

leading cocaine smugglers to prefer private conveyances. However, the two largest seizures ever made

were at ports of entry. In 1986, over 3,000 kg (6,900

lb) were seized from 40-foot shipping containers at

the port of West Palm Beach and, in 1982, nearly

1,800 kg (3,940 lb) were seized from cargo at Miami International Airport. Available evidence indicates that when interdiction efforts put pressure
27

on particular locations or particular modes of transport the cocaine smugglers do not hesitate to switch

to transport through ports of entry.

In sum, cocaine smugglers can and do make use

of every conceivable means of transport. Thus, cocaine smuggling can only be stopped if every means

of transport is restricted.

Marijuana

Imported marijuana comes primarily from Colombia, Mexico, Jamaica, and Belize, with smaller

quantities originating in Brazil, Guatemala, Costa

Rica, Panama, and Thailand. In addition, approximately 150 to 200 tons of the cannabis derivative,

hashish, were smuggled into the United States during 1985. The principle hashish producing countries are Lebanon, Pakistan, and Afghanistan with

small amounts coming from Morocco and India.

The vast majority of the Central and South

American marijuana is transported to the United

States in private vessels. The next largest mode of

transport is private aircraft. Both marijuana and

hashish coming from Thailand appear to use commercial vessels as the primary means of transport.

The mode of marijuana transport is a reflection

of its low dollar/high volume character, the relatively short distances from export point to the

United States, and the large volume marijuana

market. These factors result in large individual

shipments. The average shipment seized by American authorities in 1985 was 4 metric tons. Shipments of this size are difficult to bring through official ports of entry and too large for all except the

largest aircraft. Thus, the primary pattern is to

move marijuana into the United States along Gulf

of Mexico and Caribbean sea routes bypassing official ports of entry. A particularly popular mode of

transport has been so-called “mother ships. ” These

ships transport large quantities of marijuana to

points near the coast of the United States. The

marijuana is then shuttled to shore on smaller boats.

The other major means have been vessels which

transport directly from export points to the border

of the United States or through transshipment

points in the Caribbean islands.

Mexican marijuana is predominantly transported

across the border in land vehicles and private aircraft, although some is carried in by individuals.

Primarily because of the low dollar/high volume

character of the marijuana trade, smugglers do not

have as wide a range of transportion alternatives

as those available to cocaine smugglers. Smuggling

vessels sometimes carry both marijuana and cocaine.

An overview of the drug smuggling network indicates that U.S. borders are being assaulted from

every direction and by every means of transport.

Further, the smugglers have demonstrated a strikingly rapid response capability. When drug interdiction agencies focus attention on a particular

mode of transport or a particular region, smugglers

shift quickly to other modes of transport, other

routes, or other strategies. They can, for example,

simply wait out the period of interdiction pressure.

Alternatively, they may send decoy vessels or aircraft with small amounts of drugs and, when authorities have focused attention on the decoys,

dispatch larger shipments in follow-on vessels or

planes.

Drug Trafficking Organizations

The people and organizations responsible for

smuggling heroin, cocaine, and marijuana into the

United States generally specialize in a particular

drug. Traffickers range from individual entrepreneurs to tightly run, highly disciplined, wellfinanced organizations. At one extreme is the person who crosses into Mexico to purchase either

Photo credit: U.S. Customs Service

Border crossing stations such as this are increasingly

used to smuggle illegal drugs from Mexico.
marijuana or heroin for personal use and/or for sale

in a local market. At the other extreme are organizations that own or lease fleets of airplanes and

ships for transporting marijuana or cocaine into the

United States. The highest priority concerns of

those responsible for drug law enforcement are, of

course, the continuing criminal activities of major

organizations that are involved in cultivation, production, smuggling, and distribution of drugs.

Although drug trafficking organizations have

great variability, they commonly share several characteristics that allow them to succeed. The leaders

of the organizations pay their members generously.

They provide continuing support for members of

the organization if they are arrested in the course

of drug trafficking activities, and they provide support for the members’ families. That same pattern

of generosity extends to people who live in the areas

where the organization is based or where its processing occurs. Thus, the drug traffickers are frequently viewed as local heroes. Any member of the

organization who violates the code of secrecy,

cheats, or informs on the organization faces the

threat of death. In those instances where retribution cannot be taken directly on an informant or

a violator of the organization, it is commonly carried out against family members. Some drug traffickers try to wreak their vengeance quickly and

with no quarter given.

Another factor that contributes to the success of

drug trafficking organizations is corruption in

source, processing, and transit countries. In addition, drug law enforcement agencies lack the equipment, training, manpower, and funding to conduct

effective anti-drug operations and investigations in

source countries.

Figure 10 shows the major source countries and

their relative gross revenues attributable to illegal

drug trafficking.

Following are illustrative sketches of some of the

types of organizations that traffic in heroin, cocaine,

and marijuana. These sketches are general in character and are derived from public literature and interviews with drug enforcement officials.

Heroin

Southwest Asia is the largest source of heroin

coming into the United States. A variety of organized crime groups are involved in that smuggling.

Following is a general sketch of a Southwest Asian

drug trafficking organization.

Southwest Asian organizations normally control

the heroin system from the point where the poppies are harvested through the various processing

steps to the delivery of heroin to an American

wholesaler. Farmers who grow opium poppies are

frequently linked to a specific organization. That

is, the poppy crop is committed to a particular

criminal organization from the time it is planted.

Farmers commit their crops based on an agreement

with the drug trafficking organization to pay a

predetermined price.

The organization converts the opium to heroin

in its own crude laboratories. Transport to the

United States is normally by individual courier

traveling on commercial airlines via Europe. The

head of the trafficking organization usually makes

courier arrangements through representatives; however, in some instances he will make these arrangements himself. A typical shipment involves several

couriers who take different routes but end up at a

common U.S. location. The couriers may be professionals who regularly carry heroin, or individuals who make only one trip. The nonprofessionals

are normally individuals who desire to enter the

United States for personal reasons and are willing

to act as couriers for the price of an airline ticket

plus a predetermined fee.

Couriers normally deliver their heroin to a member of the drug trafficking family. Frequently the

individual who receives the heroin in the United

States is the same individual who has made the arrangements for the couriers in the exporting country. This individual normally does not carry heroin

on his trip.

The recipient of the heroin then distributes it to

other members of the drug family at geographically

dispersed locations within the United States. These

members of the family then sell the heroin to domestic wholesalers.

Southwest Asian drug organizations are sometimes the creations of and are managed by a single

individual. They are highly personal organizations.

The trafficking organizations are normally made

up of individuals who are blood relatives, members

of the extended family, and/or childhood friends
29

Figure 10.-Estimated Illegal Drug Gross Income to the Smuggler by Country or Region,

5

4

3

2

1

0

Calendar Year 1985a

Colombia Mexico Jamaica Bolivia Peru Southwest Southeast

Asia Asia

Country

~Heroin ~Cocaine 9Marijuana

aTh~ aVerag~ of the difference bgtwegn Unjted States domestic and foreign wholesale prices was used to estimate these jncomes

SOURCES: Office of Technology Assessment calculations based on data from: Average quantities smuggled: Drug Enforcement Administration, Worldwide Drug Threat Assessment, 1985. Prices: Drug Enforcement Administration, Intelligence Division,

of the head of the organization Thus, it is literally

accurate to characterize these heroin criminal organizations as families. For this reason, it is extremely

difficult for drug law enforcement agents or informers to infiltrate these organizations.

OTA did not investigate how the revenues from

heroin are recycled to the country of origin or who

transports the funds. It is generally believed that

the majority of the monies are transported back in

American currency.

Cocaine

The vast majority of the cocaine smuggled into

the United States comes from Colombia and is under the control of some 10 to 12 cocaine cartels run

and staffed by Colombians. The coca leaves from

which the cocaine is made come primarily from two

sources, Bolivia and Peru, where the highest quality coca leaves are produced in the Andes Mountains. Coca is grown as a cash crop and has been

used for centuries by the indigenous population for
30

various purposes. Colombian cartels purchase the

coca leaves from the farmers. In the late 1970s, the

Colombian cartels initiated coca leaf cultivation in

Colombia.

The coca leaves are processed into cocaine in laboratories controlled by the cartels. The cocaine is

transported by various modes from those laboratories to the United States. A most frequent pattern is for the cartels to charter aircraft for purposes

of transport to the United States. These aircraft

may be rented by a pilot in the United States for

a single round trip, or they may be chartered from

individuals who own a fleet of airplanes and whose

primary business is cocaine smuggling. The cartels

sometimes use stolen aircraft, and on other occasions buy the airplanes that are used for smuggling.

However the cocaine is transported, it is normally delivered to members of the cartel located

in the United States. Recent evidence suggests that

the cartels are extending their control of wholesale

cocaine distribution within this country. This extended supply system appears to include members

of the cartel who are geographically dispersed

throughout the United States. The Colombian

crime organizations, then, appear to be more vertically integrated than is the case for those organizations which traffic in heroin and marijuana. Increasing vertical integration allows the cartels to

enjoy the profits from a larger number of the steps

in the supply system for cocaine.

The typical Colombian cocaine cartel is headed

by an individual. A number of leaders of the cartels are well-known to the drug law enforcement

community. The cocaine trafficking organizations

are among the largest and most complex of the drug

trafficking organized crime groups. Many of the

cartels are believed to have financial resources that

amount to several billion dollars. Although the

Colombian criminal organizations include many

members who are blood relatives of their leaders,

their size appears to require the inclusion of members who are not literally family members. Where

members are recruited outside the family they tend

to be recruited from friendship groups. A common

pattern is for cartel members to be people who have

been life-long friends of the leaders, frequently people who have grown up in the same village or the

same area as the leader.

Like the heroin organizations, the cocaine cartels maintain secrecy, loyalty, and discipline by

using friendship bonds, financial rewards, and the

threat of death for those who compromise the cartel. The latter point deserves special emphasis with

regard to the Colombian drug organizations. Most

drug law enforcement officials believe that the cocaine traffickers are the most violent of the drug

traffickers. Cocaine-related killings tend to be particularly violent.

The cartels maintain communication systems

which provide them with the ability to communicate with the aircraft and vessels used for smuggling. Finally, the Colombians use portions of their

large cocaine-generated revenues to pay for protection and assistance in the source, processing, and

transit countries and in certain areas of the United

States where the cocaine is landed.

The cartels appear to be a dominant force in

some portions of Colombia. Cartel leaders have

used some of their revenues to provide health care

and education facilities for people in the surrounding villages. There appears to be broad public support for the drug traffickers in some areas where

they operate.

Many of those involved in drug law enforcement

believe that the vast majority of the revenues generated by the sale of cocaine are cycled back to Colombia. A portion of these revenues are laundered

through U.S. financial institutions. Recent evidence

suggests that a growing portion of the revenues are

being shipped out of the United States in $100 bills.

This change is thought to be the result of two factors: 1) a growing focus by U.S. drug law enforcement authorities on recycling through financial institutions, and 2) the high rates of inflation in some

South American countries have caused the drug

traffickers to want to keep their revenues in relatively inflation-free U.S. currency. Some areas of

South America are said to be operating on what

is substantially a dollar economy.

Marijuana

A typical example of a marijuana trafficking

organization is more difficult to sketch because of

the diversity of sources of supply and the much

larger number of marijuana traffickers. What fol-
31

lows is a sketch of typical organizations involved

in the illegal importation of marijuana into the

United States from Colombia.

The larger, better-organized marijuana trafficking organizations in Colombia purchase the marijuana from individual farmers and package the

leaves into bales. Shipments to the United States

normally involve several tons. The preferred form

of transport is in coastal freighters or fishing vessels called mother ships. These vessels depart from

the Colombian coast and make contact about 50

miles off the U.S. coast with smaller vessels that

transport the marijuana to shore.

The larger, better-organized marijuana traffickers own or have under contract a number of

mother ships. Marijuana trafficking organizations

frequently use small aircraft for surveillance to determine where Coast Guard cutters are located and

use communication systems to direct the mother

ships along what are believed to be the safest routes.

Criminal organizations that traffic in marijuana are

essentially ocean transportation companies. They

buy the marijuana in Colombia or other places and

transport it to the United States where the marijuana is sold to domestic distribution and marketing organizations.

Like the criminal organizations involved in

heroin and cocaine trafficking, those involved in

smuggling marijuana tend to be creations of and

managed by a single individual. They are generally composed of people who have either family or

friendship bonds. The logistics of smuggling tons

of marijuana require a large number of people to

man the mother ships as well as the vessels that

shuttle marijuana from the mother ships to shore.

Marijuana organizations, nonetheless, appear to

be just as tightly disciplined as those involved in

heroin and cocaine smuggling.

It appears that in source countries those organizations handling marijuana and cocaine smuggling

are separate and distinct. There have been a few

instances where cocaine and marijuana have been

transported on the same vessel, but this is the exception. *
32

The criminal organizations involved in smuggling heroin, cocaine, and marijuana have demonstrated a capacity for responding flexibly to U.S.

drug interdiction efforts. Although there have been

many large drug busts by law enforcement officials,

the criminal organizations involved in drug smuggling have demonstrated an ability to use other

means to rapidly fill the supply gap resulting from

major seizures. The large resources and highly disciplined character of the crime families and cartels

suggest that the only way they are likely to be seriously disrupted is if the leaders and primary managers of these organizations can be arrested and incarcerated, and their assets seized and forfeited.

Since many of the leaders are usually insulated from

law enforcement and have their primary residences

in the source countries, such arrests can only occur with the vigorous support of the governments

of those countries.
ENFORCEMENT ORGANIZATIONS

An alphabet soup of Federal agencies is involved

in carrying out the Nation’s efforts to combat contraband drugs. The agencies with direct drug enforcement and/or interdiction responsibilities are:

the Drug Enforcement Administration, the Federal

Bureau of Investigation, the Customs Service, the

Coast Guard, and the Immigration and Naturalization Service (Border Patrol). In addition, a wide

variety of other agencies support the interdiction

efforts. And other organizations have been set up

to coordinate activities, including large-scale, multiagency special operations.

Most of the organizations have multiple responsibilities, frequently responsibilities that are of equal

or higher priority than drug interdiction. Drug interdiction activities include the routine efforts that

are worked into the normal operations of the agencies and special intensive multi-agency operations.

The complex of organizations responsible for

drug interdiction is characterized by fragmentation,

and there are many impediments to effective cooperation. This fragmentation makes information

exchange, coordination, and cooperation difficult.

Many of these problems are resolved at least temporarily, during large-scale, intensive, special interdiction operations.

What follows is a brief characterization of the capabilities and responsibilities of the organizations

that carry out and support the Nation’s efforts to

block drug smuggling. Routine operations are described for the agencies. Special multi-agency operations are described with the coordination organizations.

Drug Enforcement Administration

The Drug Enforcement Administration (DEA)

was established in 1973 as the lead agency in the

Federal Government’s efforts to suppress the illegal drug trade. A division of the Department of Justice, DEA is the only Federal agency that has drug

violations as its sole responsibility. DEA has primary responsibility for investigating drug-related

events and operations; for collecting and disseminating drug-related intelligence information; and

for securing cooperation and coordination between

those Federal, State, and local agencies which have

responsibilities and capabilities for conducting drug

interdiction operations and other drug-related activities. DEA’s responsibility directly related to border interdiction is mainly gathering, analyzing, and

providing intelligence, and investigating the violators when drug smugglers are caught.

DEA’s mission is both domestic and foreign with

a total of over 2,400 special agents and intelligence

analysts located throughout the United States and

in 42 countries worldwide. These agents and

analysts provide intelligence not only on the general character of international drug trafficking systems but also on specific smuggling activities. This

intelligence collection begins in the source countries and includes information and analysis on drug

production and processing laboratories. DEA is able

to provide information from source countries on

smuggling routes; and, by tracking and analyzing

that intelligence over a period of time, is then able

to draw conclusions regarding trafficking trends and

organizations involved in smuggling.

Intelligence collected by DEA agents is a major

source of information alerting the agencies with direct operational responsibility for interdiction of

drugs in transport. DEA, through the El Paso Intelligence Center (EPIC), also collects, analyzes,

and disseminates tactical drug intelligence from all

enforcement agencies.

The dominant philosophy of the Drug Enforcement Administration is to eliminate drugs as close

as possible to their source and to disrupt the drug

trafficking system by collecting evidence on

traffickers leading to arrests and convictions. Investigations resulting from interdiction provide useful evidence. DEA, in seeking to identify drug

trafficking networks and key individuals in those

networks, sometimes prefers to allow drug shipments to enter the United States so that it can follow their movement and obtain the necessary evidence to convict leaders of the organizations. The

DEA focus on convictions as opposed to immediate interdiction is sometimes in conflict with the

strategy of other agencies whose goal is to interdict drugs. Mechanisms are available, however, for

DEA to notify Customs or Coast Guard when it

does not want a drug shipment seized at the border and for Customs’ inspectors at ports to contact DEA when drugs are detected to determine

whether or not to seize them immediately.

33
34

Federal Bureau of Investigation

The Federal Bureau of Investigation, as the chief

law enforcement arm of the Federal Government,

exercises jurisdiction over violations of all U.S.

laws. In 1982, the FBI was designated by the Attorney General to exercise concurrent jurisdiction

with DEA for the overall drug law enforcement

effort.

The FBI currently has 1,000 special agents assigned to drug cases. The primary focus of the FBI’s

drug investigative activity centers on organized

crime families trafficking in drugs and illegal financial transactions. If, in the course of pursuing one

of the above, the FBI receives information of transborder smuggling that might lead to a seizure of

drugs or arrest of a smuggler, it passes that information to DEA, or the appropriate interdiction

agency.

Both the FBI and DEA are responsible for enforcing the Controlled Substances Act. However,

the FBI has stated it is usually more concerned with

drug-related violations of such laws as the Continuing Criminal Enterprise (CCE) statute and the

Racketeer Influenced and Corrupt Organizations

(RICO) law.

The FBI brings considerable experience and expertise to the drug law enforcement effort and

attempts to define its role as complementary to

DEA’s. However, some degree of conflict, overlapping responsibilities, and confusion about jurisdiction between the FBI and DEA was noted by

OTA’s advisory panel as detrimental to aspects of

drug law enforcement.

Coast Guard

The Coast Guard focuses on identification and

interdiction of maritime drug smuggling, principally by private, sea-going vessels. The Coast

Guard focuses major drug law enforcement efforts

on the open ocean, although it also conducts patrols

and makes seizures in near-shore areas where it has

concurrent jurisdiction with the U.S. Customs

Service. The major portion of the Coast Guard’s

drug law enforcement efforts is concentrated in the

Gulf of Mexico, the Caribbean, and around south

Florida.

1 .

Photo credit U.S. Coast Guard

The Coast Guard boards and searches suspect vessels

on the high seas as part of their drug interdiction mission.

Coast Guard seizures are of three distinct types.

First, seizures that occur incidentally in the course

of carrying out other missions. Most incidental seizures occur in connection with search-and-rescue

operations where the vessel in trouble turns out to

be involved in smuggling. Second, seizures resulting from hard intelligence that provides the approximate position and time of the smuggling operation. These operations are usually high-payoff.

Because of this characteristic, the Coast Guard is

now developing its own intelligence capabilities.

The third and predominant type of seizure results

from drug interdiction patrol operations. Coast

Guard cutters, frequently supported by aircraft,

search for, identify, visually inspect, and board suspicious targets.

Coast Guard routine drug patrol operations concentrate on four Caribbean and Gulf of Mexico

choke points (shown in figure 8). The primary foci

of these patrols are mother ships that meet contact

boats near the coast that deliver the drugs into the

United States. The Coast Guard has established

profiles of the vessels commonly used as mother

ships.

The vast majority of Coast Guard seizures are

of marijuana, although the quantity of cocaine

seized in 1984 and 1985 increased markedly. Available data indicate that the Coast Guard interdicts

10 to 15 percent of marijuana transported by sea.

Most seizures result from dedicated drug patrols.
35

The constraints on the Coast Guard’s ability to

interdict drug smuggling are several. First, although

the Coast Guard focus is on choke points, these may

be expanses of ocean 100 miles wide patrolled by

a single cutter. Thus, surveillance, identification,

and capture is difficult. Second, the quantity of vessel traffic through choke points is large, and only

a small number of the vessels can be stopped and

searched. Third, the Coast Guard is currently able

to maintain choke point coverage only part of the

time. Several factors explain this. The Coast Guard

has limited equipment and personnel resources.

When a drug seizure occurs, the cutter must escort the seized vessel to a U.S. port, and this escort often ties up the cutter for several days leaving the choke point unpatrolled. Finally, even when

Coast Guard vessels are committed to dedicated

drug patrols, their highest priority is search and rescue. Faced with a choice between seizing a vessel

and search and rescue, the Coast Guard will carry

out the search-and-rescue operation.

The Coast Guard states that its drug interdiction goal is to ‘ ‘eliminate the maritime routes as

a significant trafficking mode for the supply of drugs

to the U.S.”8 Its operational strategy is directed

at apprehension of smugglers, vessels, and the

drugs. Existing resources and capabilities suggest

that success in achieving the goal of eliminating

maritime routes is not a near-term prospect.

Customs Service

The Customs Service has primary interdiction

responsibilities for drugs smuggled through official

ports of entry and by general aviation, as well as

concurrent jurisdiction with the Coast Guard vessels in coastal waters of the United States, up to

12 miles off shore, the ‘ ‘Customs zone. Responsibilities for these three areas are assigned to separate units within the Customs Service.

As of late 1986, the Customs Service had about

4,200 full-time inspectors (with about 500 assigned

to special contraband enforcement teams) located

at 290 ports of entry. They have responsibility for

processing all individuals entering the United

States. The total number of such persons is almost

‘U.S. Coast Guard, ‘ ‘U.S. Coast Guard Drug Interdiction Mission, ” Operational Law Enforcement Division Report, Washington,

DC, January 1986.

290 million annually. Customs inspectors also have

responsibility for processing all international cargo,

all vessels entering sea ports from foreign countries,

all aircraft entering the United States from foreign

countries (including general aviation aircraft), all

land vehicles (trucks, buses, trains, and cars) entering from both Mexico and Canada, plus all international mail. In addition to drug interdiction,

Customs officers have responsibility for regulations

and laws related to immigration, agriculture,

health, trade restrictions, and, of course, collection

of duties. Some of these responsibilities are shared

with other agencies. Customs indicates that it assists in the enforcement of some 400 provisions of

law on behalf of 40 government agencies. The Immigration and Naturalization Service helps perform

some drug enforcement activities at ports-of-entry.

Customs also has responsibility for assisting the

Commerce Department in protecting against illegal exports of high-technology products. Finally,

Customs inspectors are expected to facilitate movement of traffic through ports of entry. Under the

present administration, Customs inspectors are

directed to give priority attention to law enforcement, specifically drugs.

The Agency’s interdiction strategy at ports of entry has several components. First, it operates most

effectively when it has good prior intelligence. Such

intelligence comes from paid informants, private

citizens, transporation companies, and intelligence

agencies. Customs has increased its efforts to gain

the cooperation of major carriers and facility

managers. Second, inspectors select individuals,

cargo, and vehicles for detailed inspection on the

basis of profiles. Profiles may include such data as

the origin of the individual or cargo; the sex, age,

or citizenship of the individual; or any of a variety

of other characteristics associated with individuals,

luggage, cargo, or vehicles. Third, inspectors carry

out periodic, random checks of passengers and

cargo which may involve intensive blitz operations.

Finally, Customs uses dogs to sniff out hidden

drugs, metal probes, and a variety of support and

detection technologies.

Using the above strategy, Customs processed the

following traffic through official ports of entry during 1985: 506,000 aircraft, 89 million land vehicles, 204,000 sea-going vessels, 100 million parcels

and letters, and 253 million persons who crossed
36

Photo credit: U.S. Customs Service

The Customs Service inspects international mail parcels

from selected regions using X-ray technology.

the Canadian-American and Mexican-American

borders.

The amount of illegal drugs coming through

ports of entry is believed to be much higher than

the amount that is seized. Clearly, Customs has a

formidable task, given the quantity and diversity

of people and items processed through ports of

entry.

Customs responsibilities for interdicting drugs

in the Nation’s near-shore waters rest with its Marine Branch. In 1986 it had 472 personnel and 155

operational vessels distributed among 54 Marine

stations. About 80 percent of the fleet is located in

regions that cover Customs waters from Virginia

to Texas. Florida has the largest concentration of

Customs’ Marine capabilities. Customs units typically go to sea for the purpose of stopping and

searching in-coming vessels that have been identified by intelligence or are behaving suspiciously.

Small, high-speed vessels (called “go-fast boats”)

illustrate one type of suspect vessel.

Effective near-shore interdiction frequently requires a quick response since the focus is on small

and often fast smuggling vessels used to make the

transit from the Bahamas or from mother ships.

Normally, Customs interceptor craft are directed

to targets by land-based radar or radar located on

other boats that are part of the interceptor team.

Interceptors are usually unmarked and chosen to

blend into the mix of boats operating in their area.

The best-developed Customs marine interdiction

capabilities appear to be in the Miami area, where

the Blue Lightning Operations Center (BLOC),

was established in February 1986. BLOC will collect and coordinate radar information from air-,

land-, and marine-based radars. It is intended to

be a joint Customs and Coast Guard marine command and control center. It can track certain suspicious vessels, display information on video

screens, plot the course and speed of suspect targets and direct interceptors to them. BLOC also

is developing the capability for communicating with

operational units of local law enforcement agencies.

Finally, the center maintains tactical intelligence

files and coordinates with other enforcement agencies in the Miami area.

The Customs’ Marine Branch faces a formidable challenge since it is responsible for the entire

U.S. coast line that smugglers assault using a wide

array of techniques. Drugs may be hidden in containers, carried by crew members of vessels, swum

in from ships anchored close to shore, or airdropped with attached beacons relatively close to

shore for immediate or delayed pickup by small

boats which leave from and return to the U.S. coast.

Given the heavy concentration of craft in urban

coastal areas, Customs’ Marine Branch faces a difficult problem in determining where the threat will

justify deployment of its limited resources. Since

it has joint authority with the Coast Guard in these

waters, the agencies also face a major challenge of

cooperative planning, setting strategies, and jointly

allocating resources.

The Customs Air Branch is responsible for interdicting airborne drug smuggling. In 1985 general aviation aircraft were estimated to be the mode

of transport for over 50 percent of cocaine and 4

percent of marijuana entering the United States.

In April 1986, the Air Branch had 234 personnel and 100 aircraft, 23 specially equipped for air

interdiction, the others being used in various support roles. An OTA analysis, using 1984 data, estimated that between 1,300 and 3,500 drug smuggling flights enter the United States each year, an

average of 3.5 to 10 flights a day. Drug smugglers

prefer light, twin-engine general aviation aircraft
37

and normally fly at low altitudes which puts them

under the line-of-sight coverage of coastal radar.

Smugglers typically operate at night to minimize

the chances of visual sighting.

Air interdiction begins with aircraft identification and sorting. Identification may come from

prior intelligence or from radar coverage. The Air

Branch relies on surveillance by Federal Aviation

Administration (FAA) radar as well as its own.

Once suspicious aircraft have been identified,

they are normally tracked both by radar and/or by

chase planes. Interdiction normally involves the

Customs Service utilizing strike teams carried to

the landing site by helicopters.

Carrying out an air interdiction operation is a

complex communications and coordination activity. Following a plane from Colombia to a landing

site in, for example, Tennessee may involve not

only a team of aircraft and helicopters but coordination with FAA, the North American Air Defense

Command (NORAD), and a variety of Federal,

State, and local police organizations. The problem

is made more difficult because the drug smugglers

may not have the drugs on board when they land

the airplane. In some instances smugglers fly in,

air drop, or land their cargo at prearranged sites

and then fly on to landing sites elsewhere in the

United States. Interdicting drugs under these circumstances is particularly difficult.

Border Patrol

Minimal effort has been devoted to interdicting

drugs that bypass ports of entry on the Mexican

border. Until the early 1980s, the Customs Service had some presence along this border, but most

of those resources have been moved to other areas.

The Federal agency most actively involved in interdiction on land between ports-of-entry is the Border Patrol (under the Immigration and Naturalization Service, Department of Justice). While the

Border Patrol has no specific statutory authority

for interdicting drug shipments, it intercepts drugs

and smugglers in the course of performing its primary function—enforcing laws related to the admission, exclusion, and expulsion of aliens. All Border Patrol officers along the Mexican border have

been given more formal authority to perform drug

interdiction and related law enforcement tasks by

designation from DEA. Cross designation of 1,000

Border Patrol officers by Customs was recently announced as part of a stepped-up Southwest Border initiative known as “Operation Alliance, ” and

some Border Patrol agents are being trained by

DEA, enhancing their ability to conduct drug

searches and arrest violators in the course of their

normal duties.

At the close of 1986 the Border Patrol had approximately 3,700 officers, with 3,000 located along

the 2,000-mile U.S./Mexican border. Most of the

drugs coming into the United States from Mexico

are thought to pass through ports of entry. There

is growing evidence, however, of an increasing volume of drugs crossing the border between ports of

entry. As interdiction efforts in other areas increase

in effectiveness, the U.S.-Mexican border offers an

attractive alternative. Historically, Mexican marijuana has been the primary drug smuggled across

the border. Transport modes include groups of people carrying marijuana in backpacks, cars, trucks,

horses, and rafts. Some drug smugglers enter the

United States through the same routes used by illegal aliens, and some of the people who smuggle

aliens also smuggle drugs.

The challenge faced on the Mexican border is

clear when it is recognized that the Border Patrol

made almost 1.8 million illegal immigrant apprehensions in fiscal year 1986. The Border Patrol believes that an even greater number—in part made

up of persons previously apprehended and released

—successfully entered the United States without being captured. Law enforcement coverage of the border is so sparse that it is doubtful whether a clear

picture of this drug smuggling mode exists.

Support Agencies

Several Federal agencies cooperate with and support the Coast Guard and Customs Service in carrying out drug interdiction. Support and participation ranges from intelligence to equipment and/or

personnel to participation in special concentrated

interdiction operations. The Department of Defense

and the Federal Aviation Administration and State

and local enforcement agencies are discussed here.

Other support agencies include the Department of

State; the Intelligence agencies; the Internal Revenue Service; the Bureau of Alcohol, Tobacco and

Firearms; and the U.S. Marshals Service.
38

State and local law enforcement agencies also cooperate with and support Federal interdiction activities on a case-by-case basis. In many areas, special task forces exist to facilitate coordinated drug

enforcement operations among Federal, State, and

local organizations.

Department of Defense

The largest scale support for Coast Guard and

Customs Service interdiction is provided by the Department of Defense (DOD). DOD support has

been growing since 1981 and, under several new

initiatives, it is likely to continue to expand.

The historical separation of police and military

authority is defined by the Posse Comitatus Act.

It was revised in 1981 amendments to relax the

proscriptions against using military equipment and

personnel for civil law enforcement. While the

DOD personnel still may not make arrests, their

support role was redefined to include sharing of intelligence, providing facilities and equipment, and

assisting in certain operations leading to arrest and

seizure.

DOD now plays an important role in drug interdiction. DOD loans various types of aircraft and

other equipment to the law enforcement agencies.

DOD aircraft fly regular surveillance missions to

detect potential smugglers, and Navy ships frequently carry Coast Guard Tactical Law Enforcement Teams (TACLETS) to board suspect vessels.

Resources from all the military services support

various special interdiction operations. An April

1986 National Security Decision Directive (NSDD)

on Narcotics and National Security, coupled with

anticipated additional resources to be provided by

the military for air detection, reemphasize the DOD

support role in interdiction and drug law enforcement. The NSDD calls for an expanded role for

U.S. Military Forces in supporting counter-narcotics efforts. The Anti-Drug Abuse Act of 1986

authorizes DOD to procure and loan additional

equipment to law enforcement agencies and to

transfer funds to the Department of Transportation to be used for the Coast Guard’s TACLET

program.

While the Anti-Drug Abuse Act of 1986 calls for

DOD to loan or transfer to drug enforcement agencies a number of specific additional technologies

(airplanes, radars, aerostats, communication equipment), expectations also are for increased use of

DOD surveillance systems in identifying and tracking drug smugglers. Possibilities could range from

land-based detection systems operated by NORAD,

to detection systems carried by Air Force, Army,

and Navy aircraft, to the shipborne detection systems operated by the Navy. DOD is also required

to provide a list of options and a plan to assist drug

interdiction agencies for congressional approval

during 1987.

Many observers believe that another of the assets DOD could bring to drug enforcement operations is its extensive command and control capabilities. Other areas, which have not received much

attention, include DOD assistance in systems design as well as R&D including sharing of capabilities in national laboratories. The personnel and

equipment resources of the Department of Defense

offer the possibility of significantly increasing the

pressure on drug traffickers.

Federal Aviation Administration

The Federal Aviation Administration supports

drug interdiction with its radar and flight information systems. Recently, FAA has required all flights

by private aircraft originating in other countries to

file flight plans 24 hours in advance and to land

at the airport nearest to its point of entry that has

a Customs officer. By coordinating flight plan information with radar surveillance, any aircraft

crossing a U.S. border without a flight plan can

be identified as suspicious. A major problem is that

significant areas of the U.S. southern border do not

have low-altitude coverage by FAA radar, so small

craft flying at low altitudes frequently go undetected.

State and Local Enforcement Agencies

State and local law enforcement agencies are

regularly involved in drug interdiction activities on

a case-by-case basis. Frequently, the State and local organizations provide a substantial portion of

the manpower involved in drug arrests, and cooperation between these agencies and the Federal enforcement agencies is important to effective drug

interdiction activities. In numerous instances there

are enforcement groups made up of Federal, State,
39

and local officials that operate on a continuing basis. For example, at the airport in Honolulu, a continuing enforcement group involves Federal agents

and members of the Honolulu Police Department.

Coordination Organizations

Effective drug interdiction requires cooperation

and coordination among a large number of agencies. Consequently, a number of coordinating

mechanisms have emerged. The National Drug Enforcement Policy Board, under the chairmanship

of the Attorney General, seeks to provide unified

direction and to develop and coordinate overall national policy.

The National Narcotics Border Interdiction System (NNBIS) was created to provide guidance for

interdiction operations. Under the chairmanship

of the Vice President, NNBIS seeks to coordinate

the activities of the national enforcement agencies

and to facilitate other agency assistance—especially

from DOD and the intelligence community. Regional NNBIS units have been created at six locations, These regional components of NNBIS are

chaired by the heads of various regional enforcement organizations that have primary responsibility

in a particular area. For example, three of the regional NNBIS units are chaired by Coast Guard

admirals. The regional NNBIS organizations have

been particularly important in coordinating operations among Federal drug enforcement, Department of Defense, and local law enforcement

agencies.

To supplement routine interdiction activities,

NNBIS has coordinated major special operations

involving both national and international drug law

enforcement activities in recent years. Some of these

operations are designed to disrupt the flow of drugs

through particular geographic areas. Others are

broader in scope with objectives to improve intelligence, to disrupt and deny the primary and alternate routes of shipment used by drug traffickers,

and to seize and destroy illicit drugs at or near their

source. NNBIS is also planning a number of future operations such as: special operations along

the U.S. borders; coordinated, foreign in-country

efforts; interoperable and secure command and control communications; an integrated, coordinated

intelligence effort; and preparation of a joint operations plan.

Special operations are evaluated in “after-action”

reports, which are often classified. In addition to

comparatively high levels of seizures, major accomplishments described often include improvements

in coordination and particular elements of the operation such as planning, intelligence, communications, and foreign country cooperation. Recommendations are made that are incorporated into

plans for future special operations as well as the dayto-day operations of drug interdiction agencies.

Photo credit: Aerojet Electro Systems

Several of the Coast Guard’s medium-range surveillance

aircraft are being fitted with a multi-sensor system for

detecting suspect ships and boats.
INTERDICTION

The process of interdicting drug smugglers consists of five broad categories of activity: intelligence,

command and control, surveillance, pursuit, and

capture. Figure 11 illustrates the general nature of

these activities.

Intelligence plays an important role throughout

the interdiction process. Intelligence simplifies the

separation of smugglers from legitimate traffic and

may provide advanced information on departures,

routes, destinations, and where drugs are hidden.

Intelligence also provides information on the effects

of interdiction activities on smugglers. Technologies

for intelligence are not discussed in this report for

security reasons, although the types of intelligence

collected and the mechanisms for distribution are

noted.

Command and control provides the mechanism

to manage information about a potential target and

to select, distribute, or display that needed for operational decisions. Data links, computer systems,

and secure communications are important components and are key to effective command and control systems. Central command structures for operations involving more than one agency or branches

of an agency are also essential to make effective use

of command and control technologies.

Surveillance is the process of watching for and

detecting potential targets. Surveillance technologies cover a broad spectrum from binoculars to

advanced radar.

Pursuit is the process of tracking a suspected target either remotely or by close visual or sensor contact. The actual identification of a target is made

by sighting, with or without the aid of sensors (some

of which may be used for surveillance), and comparing distinguishing features, such as aircraft tail

numbers and vessel names, with smuggler profiles

and intelligence information obtained through computer databases and command and control systems.

Capture is the process of stopping and searching the suspect, seizing drugs, making arrests, and

collecting evidence. Technologies for pursuit and

capture are often the same, including airplanes,

helicopters, ships, and land vehicles. ” -

Interdiction at ports of entry involves these

basic activities, but is discussed separately

same

since

TECHNOLOGIES

different technologies are used. Technologies to find

drugs at ports of entry range from computer data

systems and vapor detectors to probes (pointed

metal rods).

Following is a summary of available and prospective technologies, their capabilities and limitations,

and the capabilities and limitations of enforcement

agencies in using technologies.

Generic Limitations

The contribution that technologies can make to

drug interdiction is constrained by three generic

factors. First, all technologies presently or potentially available have inherent limitations. For example, radars have range, discrimination, and

reliability limitations. Airplanes have range and

speed limitations. X-ray machines can detect only

certain objects or abnormalities. Second, even the

best technologies are no better than the organizational, human, and financial resources available to

deploy them. For example, the best radar operated

by an organization with limited funding and personnel is of little value during those periods when

it is not in operation. Third, strategies for using

technologies establish limitations. For example, the

Air Force system disregards targets of greatest interest to law enforcement agencies. It is not that

the radars fail to detect those airplanes. Rather, the

Air Force has an information management problem with a massive number of aircraft entering the

United States. The Air Force, thus, collects and

uses only information directly relevant to its primary mission, and that is not drug interdiction. To

give another example, the need to rapidly process

individuals at ports of entry results in only limited

use of technical aids that slow down processing.

Intelligence

The principal Federal agencies involved in drug

interdiction operations have their own intelligence

collection and analysis apparatus. Three kinds of

intelligence information—strategic, tactical, and

operational—support interdiction activities.

Strategic intelligence is collective information on

all aspects of drug availability, use, abuse, cultivation, production, and smuggling. Such informa41
42

Figure ll.— Interdiction Functions

To legal system

for prosecution

SOURCE: Office of Technology Assessment, 1987.

tion provides a comprehensive overview of the drug

environment. It is used to keep managers and policymakers advised on the drug situation, to make

projections, and to provide a basis for decisions

about resource deployments.

Tactical intelligence is immediate, actionable information on an anticipated drug smuggling activity

that can be used as a basis for pre-positioning interdiction resources. DEA’s El Paso Intelligence

Center (EPIC) is primarily responsible for managing this type of information.

EPIC manages an extensive database on drug

smuggling levels, routes, individuals, organizations,

equipment, and seizures. Consolidated and evaluated intelligence information is disseminated in both

hard copy and verbal form, as appropriate. Many
43

automated data systems maintained by individual

agencies are accessible through EPIC. Such systems include information on suspect individuals,

aircraft, boats, and vehicles.

Operational intelligence is systematically organized information on a specific active or potential

drug smuggling individual or organization. The information relates to the individual target’s activities, resources, and apparent vulnerabilities.

Intelligence is collected by special agents operating in source countries and the United States as

well as by other methods. Communication of tactical and operational intelligence to interdiction

agencies occurs through EPIC, NNBIS, and the

individual agencies’ command centers.

Some experts believe that the best prospects for

increasing the effectiveness of the Federal drug interdiction program lie in expanding and improving

the intelligence collection, consolidation, analysis,

and dissemination process. According to a Customs’ analysis of their 1985 seizures, prior information was used in a majority of large cocaine seizures, accounting for the bulk of the volume seized.

The current procedures for sharing time-sensitive

intelligence data are sometimes cumbersome. The

Customs Service and the Coast Guard each maintain and operate their own marine interdiction

C

3

I (command, control, communications and intelligence) centers; in fact, the Customs Service

maintains separate marine and air interdiction

C

3

1 centers. Separate Coast Guard, Customs, and

DEA intelligence activities have created problems

in coordination of operations on a day-to-day basis. These agencies do not always cooperate on collecting and distributing vital tactical intelligence,

they cannot usually communicate on secure lines

with each other, and information from the intelligence community is not always equally available

to field units. A lack of intelligence flow could be

a major impediment to effective use of any new

C

3

I technology to be developed in the future. The

problem of secure communications was resolved for

a recent special operation, but much remains to be

done to incorporate this progress into routine operations.

Photo credit: Border Patrol

Command and control centers are the key to effective

use of modern sensor technology for interdiction.

Command and Control

Effective drug interdiction requires the capability for rapid information exchange and reliable, secure, and quick command and control of operational units. The Customs Air Branch, Customs

Marine Branch and Coast Guard each have their

own command and control centers and networks.

The Coast Guard has a nationwide command system that is probably the most comprehensive in coverage. Customs Air Branch has four operating

centers. Three of these (in Miami, Houston, and

Albuquerque) are colocated with the FAA air traffic control centers and the fourth is at the Regional

Operations Control Center, March Air Force Base,

Riverside, California. In 1986, the Customs’ Marine Branch initiated a new center in Miami. There

are many opportunities for technological improvements (data handling, sorting and analysis, display,

etc. ) in all the centers but the most serious deficiency is that a working plan for coordinated operations and command is not in place. Customs has

initiated the development of new C3

1 centers and

the 1986 Anti-Drug Abuse Act calls for the several

agencies to cooperate on a center design.

The technologies available to provide secure

voice communications, which cannot be monitored

by drug smugglers, are generally unsatisfactory but
44

slowly improving. None of the individual agencies

appear to have the kind of technology for information exchange and command and control that they

believe to be necessary. The problems in some instances are lack of resources to procure the necessary secure communications technology. In addition, each of the agencies tends to have its own

communication equipment and standard operating

frequencies that are often incompatible. The problem is a particularly serious one in terms of the ability of operational units of the various agencies to

communicate with each other. Even when there are

coordinated command and control centers such as

that represented by the Blue Lightning Operations

Center in Miami, incompatible communication

equipment sometimes precludes the Center from

communicating with operational units. During recent special operations, military equipment was

used to resolve this problem. But, there may be

higher priority national security concerns that

would preclude the use of this military equipment

for routine drug law enforcement.

Surveillance

Aircraft

The Nation’s largest civilian aircraft surveillance

system is operated by the Federal Aviation Administration. This system provides two types of radar

coverage: control over airport approaches and

departures, and surveillance of flights between airports (the en-route system). The en-route system

covers virtually all of the continental United States,

but generally at altitudes above 10,000 feet and with

almost no coverage below 5,000 feet. The FAA radar system provides a basic map of the Nation’s

air traffic including all flights operating on instrument flight rule (IFR) plans. Its value to interdiction is primarily in detecting, and separating out,

many planes not likely to be smugglers, since smugglers normally fly below 1,000 feet and without

flight plans. However, the altitude band below

10,000 feet also contains large numbers of general

aviation aircraft operating on visual flight rules,

flights that are very difficult to distinguish from

smugglers by means of radar.

The Customs Service seeks detection of smugglers through the FAA radar network, equipment

under its own control, and equipment operated by

DOD agencies.

.

Photo credit: Westinghouse, TCOM

A surveillance radar is mounted on this large, tethered

balloon to detect low-altitude smuggler aircraft.

One recent addition to Customs’ surveillance capability is an aerostat-mounted radar (a tethered

balloon supporting a radar antenna) in the Bahamas. This radar provides Customs with surveillance of the Bahamas and the northeastern reaches

of the straits of Florida and has enhanced detection of flights coming through this area bound for

Florida. Customs plans to add additional aerostat

radars along the Mexican border as well.

Customs also operates radar surveillance aircraft.

In addition to their surveillance capability, some

of these aircraft can lock on and track targets. On

a recurrent basis, Navy surveillance aircraft provide support during regular training and routine

patrol flights. On occasion, they fly designated

surveillance missions at the express request of Customs. During 1985 Navy aircraft flew several hundred sortees for Customs. The Air Force’s airborne

warning and control system (AWACS) aircraft provide similar support to Customs.

There is also a Navy radar at Guantanamo Bay,

Cuba, which provides surveillance of air and surface targets. Air Force operated aerostat-mounted

radar at two locations in Florida provide both air

and surface target information. Information from
45

these systems is shared with the Coast Guard and

Customs Service.

As extensive as this coverage may appear, it has

many limitations. Large areas of the southern border have no radar coverage under certain conditions and at certain times. Even where radar coverage is available from the FAA, it can seldom pick

up airplanes flying at the altitudes normally used

by drug smugglers. The aerostats and the various

airborne radar platforms available to Customs cover

relatively small areas, albeit corridors of heavy drug

traffic, and their coverage is not continuous.

Improved radars with longer ranges and greater

detection capability could contribute to interdiction.

Similarly, operation of more radars or existing radars for longer periods of time could enhance interdiction. Providing continuous coverage of all

possible smuggling corridors by airborne radar

would be very expensive, assuming that the equipment could be made available at all. A possible

alternative to designing a radar surveillance barrier is to develop an approach similar to a military

air defense system that provides increasing levels

of detection, identification, and tracking of targets

as they approach U.S. borders.

Perhaps a significant improvement in long-range

and wide coverage radar surveillance of the Southern border could be added when DOD installs the

planned south-looking, over-the-horizon (OTH) radar in the 1990s. This radar could provide nearly

complete coverage of the Caribbean and Gulf of

Mexico, at least in theory. If it is to be used for

drug interdiction purposes, however, there is a need

to incorporate certain special features into the system, and provide links to transmit data to the

appropriate drug enforcement agencies. Alternatively, it may be possible to develop a dedicated

OTH system for detection of smuggler aircraft.

In sum, existing capabilities for surveillance and

detection of smuggler aircraft are limited over most

of the Southern border. Increases in this capability are planned but, with present uncertain knowledge about trends in the air threat, it does not appear wise to invest in a large fixed radar barrier.

Rather, it may be more prudent to make incremental improvements, make use of existing defense

programs, and gain more insight on future smuggling patterns. Flexibility is necessary in responding to any specific current threat.

Vessels

Surveillance of vessels smuggling drugs into the

United States is being modified to use a wide variety of technologies,

Airborne sensor systems, mounted on fixed-wing

aircraft or helicopters, are either now in use or being brought into operation by the Coast Guard.

Surveillance radars are mounted on two types of

aircraft. In addition, the Coast Guard has forwardlooking infrared systems, and a new multi-sensor

surveillance package known as AIREYE is being

evaluated. AIREYE has the potential capability of

both wide area surface search by radar and shortrange target identification using a laser-enhanced

TV. -

The Coast Guard has tested aerostat-mounted

radars tethered to ships which provides long-range

surface search capability. The Coast Guard plans

to acquire several of these systems principally for

the purpose of locating suspect vessels in the channels and passages between South America and the

U.S. coast. Finally, the Coast Guard uses its medium- and long-range aircraft and helicopters for

radar and visual surveillance of suspected drug

smuggling vessels. Some have advocated that, in

the future, the Coast Guard could also contribute

to surveillance and tracking of private aircraft

smuggling since many Coast Guard missions in the

Caribbean operate over the same regions known

to be air smuggling routes.

The surveillance technologies used by the Customs Service to detect vessels suspected of smuggling drugs—mainly in coastal and inland waters

—roughly parallel but are more limited in scope

and coverage than those used by the Coast Guard.

Coast Guard surveillance technologies, at times,

generate data which are provided to Customs.

The Customs Marine Branch also operates its

own radars. It has installed a few radars on the tops

of tall buildings and towers in south Florida and

plans to add more in Florida and along the Gulf

Coast. It also has small vessels equipped with surface search radars.

The limitations of marine surveillance technologies are similar to those used for air surveillance.

Both the Coast Guard and the Customs Service are

investigating improved technologies. The goal is

to provide more extended and/or more discriminat-
46

ing coverage for longer periods of time and for reasonable costs. None of the proposals for new technologies, however, offer the likely prospect of a

fundamental breakthrough. Rather, they offer incremental improvements.

Land Border

The Border Patrol uses a variety of technologies

on the Mexican border to detect illegal intrusions.

There are a large number of unmanned sensing devices linked to computer-equipped base stations that

can direct Patrol officers to investigate intrusions.

Sensors include several types. Buried seismic sensors detect soil disturbances created by intruders.

Magnetic sensors detect metal in the small amounts

carried by people, while magnetic vehicle direction

sensors detect the presence and direction of vehicles. Infrared sensors detect heat emissions from

humans or animals. A number of manned infrared

systems for vehicles and persons are also in use.

The Patrol also has night vision goggles and pocket-

-sized starlight scopes. Low-light-level television systems are installed on the Mexican border and more

are planned. The Border Patrol uses cars, trucks,

and other types of land transportation. It also has

fixed-wing airplanes and helicopters for visual surveillance. Plans are for forward-looking infra-red

systems to be mounted on some helicopters. The

Patrol is also testing four-wheel drive vehicles outfitted with either an infra-red imaging device or a

low-light-level camera TV mounted on a telescoping mast that can extend in the air.

None of the devices used by the Border Patrol

has the capability of discriminating drug smugglers

from the millions of other intruders that come across

the Mexican border.

Pursuit and Capture

Aircraft

The Customs Air Branch uses aircraft for interception, tracking, and apprehension of drug smugglers. The desired capabilities for tracking and intercept airplanes relate to cruise speed, capacity to

stay aloft without refueling for a set amount of time,

and adequate sensor equipment such as radars and

infrared sensors to allow for tracking smugglers at

night without making visual contact. Customs expects to have several aircraft that meet these criteria.

Photo credit: Border Patrol

The Border Patrol has developed imaging sensors for use

on vehicles that can patrol the rough terrain

of the Mexican border.

The Air Branch presently has a few aircraft with

the requisite sensor capabilities and speed, but their

endurance is more limited. Customs also has other

types of aircraft for tracking, but they are not

equipped with radar and must rely on ground controllers or visual intercept methods. Once on the

trail of a suspected drug smuggler, however, these

aircraft do have forward-looking infra-red detection systems that allow them to follow suspected

drug smugglers. Finally, the Air Branch has a support fleet of other twin-engine, single-engine, and

rotary-wing aircraft (none of which have special

sensor equipment) that are used for daylight operations. Suspicious aircraft can be checked against

data systems with information on flight plans, stolen aircraft, etc.
47

All Customs airplanes can be used in the task

of apprehension where no specially equipped aircraft are available or within range of the arrest site.

The most effective aircraft for arrest, however, are

Black Hawk helicopters acquired from the Army.

Of all of the aircraft in its inventory, Customs has

found the Black Hawk to be particularly effective

for apprehension. It has the speed and range needed

and is equipped with night vision goggles for the

aircrew and a powerful search light. Also, the Black

Hawk has a large cabin that accommodates an arrest team in addition to the pilot and co-pilot.

The air interdiction resources of the Customs

Service are clearly limited. First, Customs has a

very small number of aircraft to cover border areas.

Second, only a few Customs aircraft have the necessary performance characteristics—speed, range,

and sensor equipment. The challenge faced by the

Air Branch can be perceived when one remembers

that 3.5 to 10 smuggling flights cross the Southern

border every day.

Vessels

Some of the vessels used by the Coast Guard and

the Marine Branch of the Customs Service for pursuit and arrest differ significantly. The Coast Guard

uses vessels that give it greater fire power and longer

endurance. Further, the Coast Guard is required

to advertise its presence. Coast Guard vessels are

clearly identifiable. By comparison, the Marine

Branch of Customs relies on vessels which are small,

high speed, and capable of only brief sorties. Most

have no distinctive insignia since Customs relies

more heavily on blending in with other boating

traffic.

Coast Guard cutters and patrol boats carry a variety of sensors used to identify vessels suspected

of drug smuggling. These include ship-mounted radars and small optical sensors and night vision devices. The Coast Guard has under development an

electro-optical sensor system to be mounted on its

cutters. Its role is to enhance the capability for identifying vessels during darkness or periods of poor

visibility. In addition, Coast Guard vessels have

night vision scopes and gyro-stabilized binoculars,

plus scanners for both VHF and UHF radio transmissions. Most cutters have been recently fitted

with secure voice radio systems to protect their communications from monitoring by smugglers.

For the capture of drug smuggling vessels at sea,

the Coast Guard mainly uses its cutters and patrol

boats plus some special vessels such as its surface

effect craft fleet and the Navy’s hydrofoil fleet out

of Key West, Florida. The Coast Guard also sends

drug interdiction teams on board a variety of larger

Navy combatant ships when available. Coast Guard

vessels are designed for ruggedness, endurance,

multi-mission capability, and ease of operation.

These characteristics give the Coast Guard a number of advantages that sometimes compensate for

relative lack of speed compared to many smuggling

vessels. For example, when the seas build up, a

larger ‘‘slow’ Coast Guard cutter can often catch

a ‘‘go-fast boat’ which must slow down. The Coast

Guard also uses some portion of its small boat fleet

stationed along the entire U.S. coastline.

Customs, by comparison, uses small fast boats

that are dedicated to drug missions. Customs plans

to have several new interceptors outfitted with radar. Since Customs seeks vessels that blend in with

other boats, they generally use designs that are already commercially available. Customs has on order several high-speed catamarans that it believes

will offer greater maneuverability, tighter turning,

and better stability in rough seas than the boats used

by smugglers. These are meant to be used in a chase

boat strategy.

Both Customs and Coast Guard must make critical judgments about where to place limited num-

● ✎ 9-

Photo credit: US. Customs Service

Customs’ high-speed interceptors operate in coastal

waters such as south Florida where smugglers attempt

to dash from offshore islands to secluded

coves on the mainland.
48

bers of vessels or patrols and other apprehension

resources. Many areas are left unpatrolled, and thus

may be open to smugglers, resulting in no knowledge of their activities. The recent change in smuggler tactics by using air drops at night to small vessels stationed offshore makes the problem very

difficult. Customs also suffers from a lack of trained

boat operators especially since they have recently

acquired a large number of new vessels.

Finally, the Coast Guard has worked with Customs to develop a variety of sensors used to find

hidden compartments on vessels that may be used

for drug smuggling. Much of this equipment was

developed for Customs to find drugs at ports of

entry.

Detection at Ports of Entry

Customs uses a variety of technical aids to help

meet the two goals of detecting drugs at ports of

entry while simultaneously moving legitimate traffic

rapidly through the inspection process.

The TECS (Treasury Enforcement Communication System) database provides information on

specific individuals, vehicles, private aircraft, and

vessels suspected of smuggling or other illegal operations. TECS terminals are available at all ports

of entry, but their use is limited by the time required for entering data and by maintenance problems. These problems are being addressed by programs aimed at development of an automatic

passport reader, an automatic license plate reader,

and equipment replacement. However, such problems as the time and personnel requirements for

entry of names of individuals carrying foreign passports have not been solved by these innovations.

A computer database for cargo is operational at

a few ports and under development at others. At

most ports, manifest and invoice information are

manually compared with profile data on importers,

commodities, manufacturers, and countries of origin. About 20 percent of the cargo entering the

United States is identified as high risk (for all purposes, not just drugs). Roughly 3 percent of high

risk cargo is subjected to an intensive enforcement

examination. The remaining high risk cargo receives a brief compliance examination where one

or more items are inspected. Only documents are

reviewed for the 80 percent of cargo that is not considered to be a high risk. The development of expert systems offers the prospect of refining cargo

selectivity by facilitating the transfer of individual

inspector knowledge and developing risk rankings

and inspection priorities.

The range and quantity of equipment used to

detect drugs at ports of entry is quite limited. At

present there are several parcel X-ray systems used

primarily to inspect airport baggage, a few X-ray

systems located at mail examination facilities, a few

sets of special probes, several fiberscopes, and ultrasonic range finders. Wind tunnels (vapor detectors)

will soon be installed at an airport to screen passengers. In addition, major ports of entry have specially trained dogs to detect drugs. While dogs are

capable of directly detecting scents from drugs, most

tools in use only indicate abnormalities in materials or detect chemicals associated with drugs. In

all cases, manual inspection is necessary to verify

the presence of drugs.

The Customs Service continues to investigate a

range of more advanced detection technologies, but

few have been found that meet the requirements

of Customs inspectors. Two critical requirements

are speed of operation and accuracy (low falsealarm rate), since inspectors must facilitate traffic

through the ports of entry in addition to enforcing

drug laws. Further, the technologies must be

acceptable to the inspectors, that is, they must have

the characteristics of ease of operation, durability,

and compatibility with normal working techniques.

Significantly different technologies and strategies

will be required for anything more than an incremental improvement in drug seizures. However,

Customs has inadequate funds for the new technology development needed to support port-ofentry drug interdiction functions. Available resources are very limited for developing innovative

approaches to detection and testing and refining

commercially available devices. Perhaps the greatest deficiency is the lack of funding for studies of

the chemical and physical properties of drugs.

Customs is pursuing technological developments

in three areas that would be especially helpful for

drug interdiction at ports of entry. First, technologies that speed the inspection process. One example is advance manifest systems for cargo. Such systems allow Customs to select what will be inspected

prior to arrival and low risk cargo can be electron-
49

ically released. Second, technologies are needed that

can detect drugs. Work is well underway on a nuclear magnetic resonance system designed to detect heroin and cocaine in letter mail. Most vapor

approaches have been limited by technical problems associated with obtaining a sample from concealed drugs. Third, technologies are needed that

can more effectively detect hidden compartments.

One example being investigated is an imaging

gamma backscatter detector designed to identify abnormalities in materials,

A critical need of Customs inspectors is the ability

to select people and parcels to inspect. Profiles are

the primary means used for selecting people and

cargo for detailed inspection. Data systems and

analyses that would quickly respond to the changing profiles of drug smugglers and drug smuggling

techniques could potentially be very useful. There

are opportunities for improving selection techniques

and some are being pursued. These may enable

Customs to improve interdiction rates but a statistical database to measure these improvements is not

now available. It would be essential to have such

a measurement system in effect both before and after new techniques are deployed to evaluate their

effectiveness.
FINDINGS

Major findings fall into four general categories:

inadequate direction; data deficiencies; coordination problems; and technological limitations. These

categories are described below.

Inadequate Direction

The Nation drug interdiction efforts suffer from

a lack of clear direction.

Such direction is necessary for assuring that available resources are devoted to the highest priority

problems. It is also necessary if the various agencies are to design and carry out effective, coordinated interdiction strategies.

Individual enforcement agencies have generally

chosen those interdiction goals that they are best

organized and equipped to accomplish. For example, route denial is a goal of the Coast Guard, but

no attempt is made to evaluate the ease or difficulty of a smuggler changing routes or modes if one

of many is closed. More attention to priorities is

essential when faced with a situation where the

problems are much greater than the resources

available.

A goal of interdiction is a reduction in illegal

traffic-i.e., the total quantity of illegal drugs that

are imported. While this goal appears simple, it is

considered, by most, impossible to measure accurately. Which actions would best lead toward that

goal is also a matter of considerable debate. Some

believe that since international narcotics traffickers

are immensely wealthy and powerful criminal organizations, the law enforcement effort should be focused on apprehending the leaders, breaking up the

groups, and seizing their assets. In this way, a sizable reduction in smuggling would logically result.

Others believe that seizing drugs would be more

effective since this would force prices up and reduce demand. This debate about cause and effect

has left individual agencies to sometimes stress individual goals. This highlights the need for more

central direction.

Measures of effectiveness for interdiction are difficult, if not impossible, to quantify. One commonly

stated interdiction measurement has been total drug

seizures or seizure rates. While seizure quantities

can be easily collected, they are difficult to interpret. No seizures may indicate great success—that

Photo credit: U.S. Coast Guard

Photo credit: Border Patrol

drugs are no longer being smuggled through a particular location. Or, a lack of seizures may indicate that smugglers are circumventing interdiction

efforts. In fact, the limited seizure and trafficking

data available indicate seizures increasing as smuggling increases, Agencies have not attempted to rou51
52

tinely collect or analyze information that would help

to evaluate interdiction strategies or technologies.

Data Deficiencies

Data on drug smuggling, the trafficking system,

and interdiction programs are inadequate to make

informed selection of best strategies, optimum allocation of enforcement resources, and technical design and management decisions for the future.

Trafficking Data

Present estimates of the quantity of drugs coming into the United States and their means of transport are based on conflicting data. Prior year estimates of total quantities being smuggled are made

annually by the National Narcotics Intelligence

Consumers Committee (NNICC) and are derived

from estimates of source country production, analyses of data on seizures accumulated on a year-byyear basis, and analyses of drug consumption indicators. The U.S. Customs Service makes l-year

projections of the drug smuggling threat. The estimates from NNICC (which consists of 11 Federal

agencies) and the Customs estimate rarely agree

and they do not attempt to make year-to-year or

retrospective analyses.

Seizure Data

Data on drug seizures are collected and compiled

in a variety of ways by each agency involved. The

El Paso Intelligence Center (EPIC) is the repository of seizure data from all sources but, because

of agency differences over credit for seizures, EPIC

never identifies the agency responsible for seizures.

OTA was unable to resolve a number of conflicts

and contradictions between seizure data provided

by various agencies. Some of the reasons for contradictory data appear to be double-counting and

differing standards of estimating. The doublecounting problem may have been eliminated by a

new system initiated in October 1986. However the

data available cannot be reliably attributed to specific interdiction efforts by individual programs or

agencies.

Price Data

Data on drug prices are collected by the Drug

Enforcement Administration (DEA) and appear to

be consistent and reliable. OTA could not find any

agency making analytical use of price data to provide indicators of the effect of law enforcement efforts. In the past, price/purity data were used as

goals and measurement of success. While such a

measurement is vague, it has at least as much value

as seizures.

Sampling Techniques

Neither Coast Guard nor Customs Service has

made systematic use of statistical sampling techniques to project the levels of drug trafficking and

evaluate the effectiveness of interdiction technologies and strategies. No data are collected with that

end use in mind.

Data Collection

Reliable and consistent data can contribute both

to effective resource allocation and to the agencies’

operational interdiction strategies. To be most useful, the appropriate information must be collected

in a form consistent across agencies and time, and

subjected to consistent, continuing analysis. One

example of the data problem can be found at ports

where customs inspectors report drug seizures on

a common form. At present, this information has

little use except totalling the number and quantity

of seizures. The forms do not include accessible information on why or how the inspection leading

to seizure occurred. Possible reasons include: prior

intelligence, the courier or cargo fit a suspect profile, or the inspection was random. Analysis of such

information could indicate areas of high payoff.

Coordination Problems

Fragmented command, control, and jurisdictional responsibilities characterize the Federal drug

interdiction enterprise and are a major impediment

to the adoption of existing and new technologies

for drug interdiction.

Headquarters Coordination

Problems with interagency coordination and cooperation exist at every level. At the Washington

level, coordination is facilitated by such groups as

the Drug Enforcement Policy Board chaired by the

Attorney General and the National Narcotics Border Interdiction System (NNBIS) chaired by the
53

Vice President. Coordination and cooperation occur through meetings and the development of consensus, Decisionmaking, however, is usually slow.

Very little comprehensive planning is done—e.g.,

setting priorities among agencies or development

of strategies needed for total interdiction system

designs.

Regional Coordination

Regional NNBIS groups have been established

in seven locations. They include representatives of

the regional offices of drug enforcement agencies.

The degree of cooperation and coordination through

NNBIS is good in some regions and poor in others.

Operational Coordination

At the operational level there are a diversity of

mechanisms used to facilitate cooperation and coordination among drug enforcement agencies. Successful cooperation and coordination generally rests

on specific arrangements made by the officials in

charge of regional enforcement units. Impediments

to cooperation and coordination at the regional level

are several. Each agency has its own structure,

goals, operating style, and communication system.

For example, the Coast Guard and the Marine

Branch of the Customs Service use different communication frequencies, so operational units cannot communicate directly with each other. Even

in the case of the marine operational system, the

Blue Lightning Operations Center in Miami, conceptually a joint Customs-Coast Guard command

and control center, there is not yet a capacity to

communicate directly with Coast Guard vessels.

Multi-Mission Agencies

The multiple and sometimes conflicting operational goals of agencies impede cooperation and coordination. The agencies responsible for interdiction have other important responsibilities. The

Drug Enforcement Administration emphasizes

eradication, investigation, arrest, and conviction

of key drug smugglers. DEA also has a major role

in providing intelligence for interdiction.

Shared Jurisdiction

Because both Coast Guard and Customs share

responsibility for marine interdiction within the 12-

mile zone, very close cooperation is necessary for

efficient operation. When this cooperation and coordination is lacking, present interdiction efforts

suffer.

Technology Operations

With the introduction of new long-range surveillance systems that are capable of locating both air

and sea potential targets, opportunities exist to centralize the operation of these systems in one agency

and the need for much improved coordination and

cooperation becomes even greater.

Technological Limitations

No single existing or potential technology has

been identified that would, by its simple addition,

solve the Nation overall drug interdiction problem. Many opportunities exist for technologies to

make incremental contributions to the Nation interdiction program. These opportunities rang-e from

improvement in technical performance, to procurement of increased numbers of existing technologies,

to more effective use of technologies, to development of new, advanced systems.

Whenever technological improvements result in

more effective interdiction, the drug traffickers will

take rapid and, based on their record, effective actions to neutralize that effectiveness. These actions

can range from changing smuggling routes and/or

modes of transport to the use of countermeasures.

The contribution to drug interdiction from all

existing and proposed technologies is limited by

three factors: 1) inherent technical limitations (e.g.

range, discrimination, speed); 2) the personnel,

training, and financial resources to utilize and

maintain the technologies in an optimal way; and

3) the strategies and operational procedures which

govern the use of the technology.

No Single Technology Solution

Single technologies may be very effective in stopping smuggler’s from using one mode of transport

for a particular drug, but smugglers will likely respond by shifting to another transport mode. For

example, a nuclear magnetic resonance (NMR) device developed by Customs can detect certain drugs

within small packages directly. It may be used to
54

search all letter mail for smuggling cocaine and

heroin. But there remain many ways to smuggle

these drugs that are not easily detected with current or emerging technologies. As another example, installing an ‘‘acoustic fence’ at marine choke

points could help prevent the use of such routes by

marijuana smugglers, but without other measures

to place pressure on other routes or modes of transport, the availability of imported marijuana is not

likely to change over the long term. Some individual technologies may be useful in sorting potential

smuggling targets, but may have a high false alarm

rate. Use of additional sensors in a multiple screening system could potentially help reduce the false

alarms to a manageable level.

Limited R&D

None of the drug interdiction agencies has significant financial, organizational, or personnel resources devoted specifically to developing drug interdiction technologies. Without a comprehensive

development, test, and evaluation program for major technologies, future performance will be questionable and resources may be wasted.

Needed Test and Evaluation

Many recently acquired technologies devoted to

border interdiction by the drug law enforcement

agencies are not yet deployed operationally and

have not been integrated into an effective, comprehensive system designed to counter the formidable threat posed by international narcotics

traffickers. These new technologies require considerable operational evaluations, operator training,

and an overall system design before their potential can be realized. Most new systems have not

had sufficient field testing to make judgments about

their effectiveness. Lacking a uniform and comprehensive approach for the total Federal effort, each

new sensor, platform, or other technology will have

only limited future impact.

Limited Technologies to Date

Most of the field operators of the agencies involved in drug interdiction to date have had limited

technologies beyond basic vehicles, sensors, and

simple inspection tools for carrying out the very

labor-intensive tasks required. Success in drug interdiction in recent years has usually resulted from

hard work rather than technological advances.

Many Technologies Available for

Enhancing Specific Capabilities

There are a number of technologies and technological systems that are not now in routine/general use and have the potential of enhancing Federal drug interdiction efforts. Among these are:

modern airborne radar systems for both air and sea

surveillance (e. g., APS-137, APS-138); tethered

Aerostat (balloon) borne radars, both land- and

ship-based for both air and surface surveillance; integrated airborne sensor systems such as Coast

Guard’s AIREYE—including radar, infrared and

laser enhanced TV; over-the-horizon radar systems

that could provide thousands of miles of coverage

from one land-based station; remotely piloted vehicles with advanced infrared and optical sensors

for surveillance; acoustic sensing systems for ship

detection; long-line, land border, intrusion sensors

using seismic or other techniques under development; high-performance vehicles (air, land, and

sea) for tracking and apprehension of suspected

smugglers; improved X-ray and other nondestructive devices for inspection of cargo and baggage at

ports: and advanced vapor analysis systems for finding drugs carried by persons or in baggage and

cargo.

The list of specific technological improvements

is so long and so interconnected that no single or

even small group of equipment can be adopted effectively without a total system design. For a surveillance and detection technology to be effective,

both a command and control network strategy for

apprehension is needed first. For a baggage inspection device to be effective a system for selecting and

handling the huge flow of goods to be inspected is

needed. A fixed system directed at one aspect of

the drug trafficking threat will not be effective for

very long when the smuggler has the option of rapidly switching tactics. Federal decisions on basic

strategies and comprehensive system designs have

not been made to the extent necessary for a costeffective and appropriate selection of new technologies for future drug wars.

Opportunities for Enhanced Surveillance

When considering the problem of smuggling

across borders outside of official ports of entry, the
55

greatest opportunity for enhanced technological capabilities is in the area of surveillance of aircraft,

vessels and other vehicles.

●

●

●

●

Radar coverage of the Nation’s Southern border that is capable of detecting aircraft used

for smuggling is very limited. First, most general surveillance radar are not capable of detecting aircraft flying at low altitudes and slow

speeds. Smugglers fly at low altitudes and slow

speeds precisely to take advantage of this limited radar coverage. Second, some areas of the

Southern border have no radar coverage.

Third, in those limited areas where appropriate radar capabilities exist, surveillance is not

continuous. Intermittent surveillance results

from: limited personnel to operate groundbased radar, the relatively short endurance of

aircraft with surveillance radar, and the fact

that fixed aerostat-mounted radars can be easily seen and avoided by smuggler aircraft.

Desired air and surface surveillance capabilities would have: 1) broad area coverage, 2)

long-distance detection (maximize lead time

for mobilizing pursuit and capture forces), 3)

maximum capability for discrimination among

aircraft or vessels (size, speed, etc.), and 4) enhanced short-range sensors for inspection of

vessels.

Among the currently available surveillance

systems, aerostat-mounted radar is particularly

attractive for filling low-altitude gaps at borders

and for extending sea surveillance coverage

offshore. Advanced airborne radars are attractive for providing long-range coverage and

flexibility of deployment. Over the longer

term, comprehensive surveillance coverage of

the Nation’s Southern border may be available from over-the-horizon radar and a zone

defense approach to the network design.

Surveillance capability provided by Air Force

and Navy airplanes and Navy vessels has the

potential for contributing to the effectiveness

of drug interdiction. However, military equipment and operators are not always suited to

the drug enforcement mission; equipment

modifications and personnel training is often

necessary. DOD surveillance of potential

smugglers is necessarily at a much lower prioritv than is national securitv.

Pursuit and Capture Technologies

Effective pursuit and capture of suspected drug

smugglers, whether in aircraft or vessels, is significantly improved with good intelligence, identification, and target selection information. Pursuit

and capture is always a time-constrained activity.

Early information, which allows for longer periods

to mobilize pursuit and capture forces, and good

information on the routes and, ideally, the destination of smuggling aircraft and vessels, is invaluable to effective pursuit and capture. Technologies

are presently available that meet most of the requirements each of the interdiction agencies have

identified as necessary to carry out pursuit and

capture functions. The primary technological constraint on pursuit and capture effectiveness is associated with the limited number of available platforms or vehicles with appropriate capabilities.

●

●

●

The Customs Service has defined the desired

pursuit aircraft as one with an endurance of

8 hours, detection equipment (radar and infrared sensors) that allows smuggling aircraft to

be pursued without being aware of it, and

sufficient capacity to carry a bust team. Customs has found the Black Hawk helicopter to

be very suitable for most capture missions.

The Customs’ Marine Branch generally relies on pursuit and capture technologies that

involve minimally two boats: one with radar

capabilities that are used to direct the other—a

high-speed interceptor—to the target. The

Customs’ Marine Branch has sizable numbers

of these vessels only in south Florida and even

here is severely hampered by a lack of trained

operators.

Coast Guard technologies are designed to support that organization’s multiple missions. The

primary limitation of Coast Guard technical

capabilities for pursuit and capture is available vessels. The vessels used for pursuit and

capture are mostly the same vessels used for

surveillance. The Navy (especially the hydrofoil fleet) has provided significant support to

the Coast Guard’s pursuit and capture mission. New Coast Guard patrol boats with advanced capabilities are just now entering the

fleet.
56

Command and Control

Command and control capabilities and the technologies that support those capabilities are to a

greater or lesser extent a problem for all enforcement agencies. Command and control technologies

that provide a capability for coordinated drug interdiction activities among the various agencies are

seriously deficient and most believe that they need

to be improved before the potential for either surveillance or pursuit and capture technologies can

be realized.

● Some continuing deficiencies pervade the area

of command and control. First, all enforcement agencies are deficient in secure voice

communication systems and the agencies have

yet to devise an adequate system using compatible frequencies. Second, no single command strategy has been devised that would

make a comprehensive system design practical. Third, the centers that are in use are deficient in sensor capability and have yet to evaluate their operational effectiveness to determine

changes needed for optimum future designs.

Technological Needs at Ports-of-Entry

The technology used to support drug interdiction at ports of entry is limited in its availability

and, in some categories, its capability. Port detection technologies divide into two categories: 1) those

that provide capability for managing data; and 2)

those that support detection of drugs on persons,

in baggage, in cargo, in mail, or concealed in carriers (i. e., land vehicles, aircraft, or vessels).

●

●

Data management and analysis technologies

are in limited use at ports of entry. These technologies have the capability of providing information on both individuals and cargo useful to drug interdiction. Customs is making

increasing use of data management and analysis technologies. Resources are the primary

limitation.

Most of the technologies both in use and being investigated to support the direct detection of drugs have serious technical limitations.

One category identifies anomalies where drugs

may be hidden. Another category detects either by sensing chemicals associated with drugs

or directly sensing the drugs. Many technol-

●

●

ogies are considered unsatisfactory because

they have high false alarm rates. Limited personnel resources cause Customs to reject technologies with false alarm rates that are higher

than the ability of the inspectors to conduct

detailed manual searches without disrupting

movement of port traffic.

Resources available to Customs are insufficient

to allow systematic investigation of the potential for technical aids to enhance port inspection. Major deficiencies include:

—Basic information on the physical and chemical characteristics of drugs is not available

to permit the evaluation of detection technologies used for other substances.

—Inspection resources are often not available

for a comprehensive evaluation of new detection technology effectiveness.

—Efforts have not addressed multiple sensor

systems to minimize false alarms. They have

focused primarily on the development of single technologies.

—Limited training of inspectors has resulted

in some available equipment not being utilized. Newly developed sophisticated inspection equipment must be designed to be user-

-friendly.

Technology for detection of drugs at ports of

entry could probably be advanced with a consistent and long-range R&D program. Such

a program would need to include adequate

staff; continuing programs to characterize fundamental properties of drugs, technology

transfer, and equipment loans; mechanisms

for getting information on how drugs are

smuggled through ports of entry, stimulating

fresh ideas or R&D approaches; and adequate

facilities and resources to test and refine new

systems.

Land Border Technologies

A range of technologies are in use and being investigated by the Border Patrol to support the identification of illegal intrusions across the Mexican

border, Drug interdiction is made enormously more

difficult because of the large numbers of illegal

aliens continuously crossing the border. The sensors in use generally perform well but apprehension of suspects is very labor-intensive and no tech-
57

nologies will alleviate the basic need for more agency capabilities. Technologies and systems

personnel to pursue and capture. of interest include ground radar, remotely

● There are currently available technologies for piloted vehicles (RPVS), aerostats and airships,

buried line sensors, and infrared improvements. land border interdiction that could increase
APPENDIX A

ANTI-DRUG ABUSE ACT OF 1986, PUBLIC LAW 99-570 (OCT. 27, 1986)

OTA SELECTED SUMMARY OF

Title III—Interdiction

Subtitle A—Department of Defense Drug

Interdiction Assistance

Section 3052—Authorization.—Funds authorized to

be appropriated to DOD for Fiscal Year 1987 for enhancement of drug interdiction:

●

●

●

$138 million for refurbishment and upgrading of

four E-2C Hawkeye aircraft, or any other Navy aircraft which the Secretary considers better suited to

perform the interdiction mission; and for the procurement of four replacement aircraft of the same

type and related spares for the Navy;

$99.5 million for procurement of seven aerostats;

and

$40 million for procurement of eight Blackhawk

helicopters.

Two of the Hawkeyes (or whatever aircraft is chosen) are to be made available on loan to Customs, and

the other two to the Coast Guard. Customs and Coast

Guard shall be responsible for operation and maintenance costs.

The agencies that will be in charge of the aerostats

and helicopters are to be designated by the Chairman

of the National Drug Enforcement Policy Board.

The equipment procured under this Act may be obligated for enhancement of drug enforcement activities

only if it is fully supportable within the existing service

support system of DOD, and it reasonably related to

an existing military, war reserve, or mobilization requirement.

Section 3053—Coast Guard Activities. —The Navy

shall transfer $15 million from Fiscal Year 1987 O&M

appropriations to the Secretary of Transportation to be

available for members of the Coast Guard assigned to

duty on Navy vessels.

The Fiscal Year 1987 active duty strength level for

the Coast Guard is increased by 500 above any number otherwise provided by law.

A new section is added to Title 10 Chapter 18 U.S.C.

providing that for each fiscal year, no fewer than 500

active duty personnel of the Coast Guard trained in law

enforcement shall be assigned on board appropriate surface naval vessels, with the power to make arrests and

carry out searches and seizures. (Such personnel may

be assigned other duties if it is determined that there

are insufficient naval vessels available. )

INTERDICTION PROVISIONS

Forty-five million dollars shall be authorized from

DOD funds for the installation of 360 degree radar systems on Coast Guard long range surveillance aircraft.

Section 3057—Additional Department of Defense

Drug Law Enforcement Assistance.—Within 90 days after the enactment of this Act, the Secretary of Defense

shall submit to Congress a detailed list of all forms of

assistance that shall be made available by DOD to civilian drug law enforcement and drug interdiction agencies, and a detailed plan for promptly lending equipment and rendering interdiction related assistance to

such agencies.

The list shall include:

●

●

●

●

●

●

●

surveillance equipment;

communications equipment, including secure communications;

support available from the reserve components of

the armed forces;

intelligence on growing, processing, and transshipment of drugs;

support from the Southern Command and other

commands available to assist in interdiction;

aircraft suitable for use in air-to-air detection, interception, tracking, and seizure;

marine vessels suitable for use in maritime detection, interception, tracking, and seizure; and

land vehicles appropriate for interdiction operations.

The House and Senate Committees on Armed Services shall submit their approval or disapproval of such

a list to the Secretary of Defense within 30 days after

receiving it. Upon receipt of approval or disapproval,

the Secretary shall immediately convene a conference

of the heads of Federal drug law enforcement agencies

to determine appropriate distribution of assets and assistance. Not later than 60 days after the convening of this

conference, the Secretary and heads of the agencies shall

enter into appropriate memoranda of agreement specifying such distribution.

Compliance with this section is to be monitored by

the Comptroller General, who shall transmit to Congress a report containing his/her findings, including a

review of memoranda of agreement, no later than 90

days after the convening of the conference described

above.

59
60

Subtitle B—Customs Enforcement

Section 3141—Authorization of Appropriations for

Fiscal Year 1987 for the United States Customs Service. —An appropriation of $1,001,180,000 is authorized

for Customs salaries and expenses for Fiscal Year 1987:

● $749,131,000 for salaries and expenses to maintain

current operating levels, including sums necessary

to complete testing of and implement the automatic

license plate reader program;

● $80,999,000 for salaries and expenses of additional

personnel to be used in carrying out drug enforcement activities; and

● $171,050,000 for the air interdiction program.

Of the sum for the air interdiction program:

● $93.5 million is for additional aircraft, communications enhancements, and C3

1 centers; and

● $350,000 is for a feasibility and application study

for a low-level radar detection system in collaboration with the Los Alamos National Laboratory.

Subtitle D—Coast Guard

Section 3251—Coast Guard Drug Interdiction Enhancement. —Eighty-nine million dollars is authorized

to be appropriated to the Coast Guard for acquisition,

construction, and improvements.

Thirty-nine million dollars is authorized to be appropriated for operating expenses. This amount shall be

used to increase the Fiscal Year 1987 full-time equivalent strength level for active duty personnel to 39,220,

and to increase the utilization rate of Coast Guard

equipment.

Subtitle E—United State-Bahamas Drug

Interdiction Task Force

Section 3301—Establishment of a United StatesBahamas Drug Interdiction Task Force.—The Secretary of State, Coast Guard Commandant, Attorney

General, and head of NNBIS shall immediately commence negotiations with the Government of the Bahamas to enter into a detailed agreement for the establishment and operation of a drug interdiction task force.

The Attorney General shall report quarterly to appropriate Congressional committees on the progress of this

Task Force. $10 million is authorized to be appropriated: $9 million for 3 pursuit helicopters and $1 million for communications.

Five million dollars is authorized to be appropriated

to the Coast Guard for Fiscal Year 87 for initial design

engineering and other activities for the construction of

a drug interdiction docking facility in the Bahamas to

facilitate Coast Guard and Bahamian drug interdiction

operations in and through the Bahama Islands.

Subtitle F—Command, Control,

Communications, and Intelligence Centers

Section 3351—Establishment of Command, Control,

Communications, and Intelligence Centers (C3I).—

Twenty-five million dollars is authorized to be appropriated to Customs for the establishment of C3

1 centers,

including sector operations centers and a national C31

center. The coordination of the establishment and location of these centers is to be conducted by the Commissioner of Customs together with the Commandant of

the Coast Guard, the Attorney General, and NNBIS.

Subtitle H—Department of Justice Funds for

Interdiction Operations in Hawaii

Section 3421—Additional Funds for the Department

of Justice. —Seven million dollars is authorized to be

appropriated to the Department of Justice for Fiscal

Year 1987 for helicopters with FLIR devices for drug

interdiction operations in Hawaii.

Title VII—National Antidrug

Reorganization and Coordination

Section 7003—Submission of Legislation

Not later than 6 months after the enactment of this

title, the President shall submit to each House of Congress recommendations for legislation to reorganize the

Executive Branch to more effectively combat drug traffic

and abuse. In preparation of such recommendations,

the President shall consult with the Comptroller General, State and local law enforcement authorities, relevant committees of Congress, the Attorney General, and

the Secretaries of State, Treasury, Transportation,

Health and Human Services, Defense, and Education.
APPENDIX B

ACKNOWLEDGMENTS

Contractors/Consultants

The following individuals and firms prepared specific data and analyses for OTA that were used in this study:

Jeffrey Callahan, Sigma Research, Inc.

Horace Feldman, Consultant

Larry Lausten, Decision Science Applications

John Munson, Engineering & Science Associates

Max Nunenkamp, Decision Science Applications

Denzil Pauli, Consultant

George Pugh, Decision Science Applications

Stephen Riter, University of Texas at El Paso

Workshop Participants

The following individuals and organizations participated in one or more of the workshops OTA held during

their study on Advanced Marine Vehicles, Marine Sensors, and Drug Detection at Ports of Entry. Some of the

participants prepared material and presentations for the workshops; all assisted in evaluating technologies and providing their expert views on capabilities or potential.

Don Blount Robert J. Johnston

Naval Sea Engineering Station Advanced Marine Systems Associates

Lowell Burnett Richard Jones

San Diego State University U.S. Coast Guard

Joel Carter Wayne Justice

Oak Ridge National Lab U.S. Coast Guard

Steven Cohen Bernard Kessler

U.S. Coast Guard Naval Surface Weapons Center

Frank J. Conrad Craig Kohler

Sandia National Lab U.S. Coast Guard

William M. Ellsworth Jack Ligon

Engineering and Science Associates U.S. Coast Guard

Greg Gladden Paul Nicholas

U.S. Customs Service U.S. Customs Service

Lee Grodzins Larry Nivert

Massachusetts Institute of Technology U.S. Coast Guard

Russell Hibbs Daniel Savitsky

Systems Research Corp. Stevens Institute of Technology

Milton Holdridge Howard Schlesinger

U.S. Customs Service Drug Enforcement Administration

William Johnson Moe Shea

U.S. Customs Service U.S. Customs Service

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Jim Shipley

Los Alamos National Lab

Jerry Thorensen

U.S. Coast Guard

Daniel Shorey

U.S. Coast Guard

Merrill Skolnik

Naval Research Lab

Leslie Smith

U.S. Coast Guard

Shawn Smith

U.S. Coast Guard

Richard Snyder

Mercury Marine, Inc.

William Wall

Federal Aviation Administration

Fred Whitehurst

Federal Bureau of Investigation

Robert Wilson

Naval Ship Research & Development Center

Ted Wojiechowski

U.S. Customs Service

David Wolfe

U.S. Coast Guard

Cathy Thodas

U.S. Customs Service

Agency Advisors

OTA maintained close contact with each of the agencies and coordinating groups concerned with drug interdiction. Individuals within those agencies who were particularly helpful during the course of our study are listed below.

U.S. Customs Service DOD Task Force on Drug Enforcement

Robert Asack

William Beard

William Cecil

Michael Cross

Lyal Hood

Raymond Mintz

Louis Razzino

Douglas Smith

U.S. Coast Guard

David Cunningham

Harold B. Thorsen

Jack C. Trainor

Kent Williams

Drug Enforcement

Judith E. Bertini

Tony Bocchichio

Leo DeFranco

John M. Zienter

Roger B. Bertsch, U.S. Navy

Harvey G. Pothier, U.S. Air Force

Federal Aviation

James J. Given

Immigration and

Harry Frankel

Thomas Leupp

Gary Messina

Administration

Naturalization Service

National Narcotics Border Interdiction System

Howard B. Gehring

James Howell

Administration National Drug Enforcement Policy Board

Patrick Tarr

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