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80–295 PDF 2002

S. Hrg. 107–506

A LICENSE TO BREAK THE LAW? PROTECTING

THE INTEGRITY OF DRIVER’S LICENSES

HEARING

BEFORE THE

OVERSIGHT OF GOVERNMENT MANAGEMENT,

RESTRUCTURING, AND THE DISTRICT OF COLUMBIA

SUBCOMMITTEE

OF THE

COMMITTEE ON

GOVERNMENTAL AFFAIRS

UNITED STATES SENATE

ONE HUNDRED SEVENTH CONGRESS

SECOND SESSION

APRIL 16, 2002

Printed for the use of the Committee on Governmental Affairs

(

(II)

COMMITTEE ON GOVERNMENTAL AFFAIRS

JOSEPH I. LIEBERMAN, Connecticut, Chairman

CARL LEVIN, Michigan

DANIEL K. AKAKA, Hawaii

RICHARD J. DURBIN, Illinois

ROBERT G. TORRICELLI, New Jersey

MAX CLELAND, Georgia

THOMAS R. CARPER, Delaware

JEAN CARNAHAN, Missouri

MARK DAYTON, Minnesota

FRED THOMPSON, Tennessee

TED STEVENS, Alaska

SUSAN M. COLLINS, Maine

GEORGE V. VOINOVICH, Ohio

PETE V. DOMENICI, New Mexico

THAD COCHRAN, Mississippi

ROBERT F. BENNETT, Utah

JIM BUNNING, Kentucky

JOYCE A. RECHTSCHAFFEN, Staff Director and Counsel

HANNAH S. SISTARE, Minority Staff Director and Counsel

DARLA D. CASSELL, Chief Clerk

OVERSIGHT OF GOVERNMENT MANAGEMENT, RESTRUCTURING, AND

THE DISTRICT OF COLUMBIA SUBCOMMITTEE

RICHARD J. DURBIN, Illinois, Chairman

DANIEL K. AKAKA, Hawaii

ROBERT G. TORRICELLI, New Jersey

THOMAS R. CARPER, Delaware

JEAN CARNAHAN, Missouri

MARK DAYTON, Minnesota

GEORGE V. VOINOVICH, Ohio

TED STEVENS, Alaska

SUSAN M. COLLINS, Maine

PETE V. DOMENICI, New Mexico

THAD COCHRAN, Mississippi

MARIANNE CLIFFORD UPTON, Staff Director and Chief Counsel

MARK L. KEAM, Counsel, Senator Durbin

ANDREW RICHARDSON, Minority Staff Director

MASON C. ALINGER, Minority Professional Staff Member

JULIE L. VINCENT, Chief Clerk

(III)

C O N T E N T S

Opening statement: Page

Senator Durbin ................................................................................................. 1

WITNESSES

TUESDAY, APRIL 16, 2002

Theodore W. Wren, Victim of Idnetity Theft ......................................................... 4

Mary Ann Viverette, Chief of Police, Gaithersburg, Maryland, on behalf of

the International Association of Chiefs of Police ............................................... 7

richard J. Varn, Chief Information Officer, State of Iowa, on behalf of the

National Governors Associaiton .......................................................................... 9

Hon. Barbara P. Allen, State Senator, Eighth District, State of Kansas ........... 11

Betty L. Serian, Deputy Secretary for Safety Administration, Pennsylvania

Department of Transportation, on behalf of the American Association of

Motor Vehicle Administrators ............................................................................. 13

Barry J. Goleman, Vice President, Public Sector, American Management Systems, Inc. .............................................................................................................. 15

J. Bradley Jansen, Deputy Director, Center for Technology Policy, Free Congress Foundation .................................................................................................. 17

ALPHABETICAL LIST OF WITNESSES

Allen, Hon. Barbara P.:

Testimony .......................................................................................................... 11

Prepared statement with an attachment ....................................................... 53

Goleman, Barry J.:

Testimony .......................................................................................................... 15

Prepared statement with an attachment ....................................................... 66

Jansen, J. Bradley:

Testimony .......................................................................................................... 17

Prepared statement .......................................................................................... 80

Serian, Betty L.:

Testimony .......................................................................................................... 13

Prepared statement .......................................................................................... 58

Varn, Richard J.:

Testimony .......................................................................................................... 9

Prepared statement with attachments ........................................................... 35

Viverette, Mary Ann:

Testimony .......................................................................................................... 7

Prepared statement .......................................................................................... 29

Wren, Theodore, W.:

Testimony .......................................................................................................... 4

Prepared statement .......................................................................................... 27

APPENDIX

Chart submitted by Senator Durbin entitled ‘‘Forged Documents (Identity

Cards, Record Books, Passports)’’ with attached photos ................................... 85

Chart submitted by AAMVA entitled ‘‘77% of Americans favor Congressional

legislation to modify the licensing process and ID security’’ ............................ 95

Food Marketing Institute, prepared statement ..................................................... 96

Raul Yzaguirre, President and CEO, National Council of La Raza, prepared

statement .............................................................................................................. 98

Michael J. Eastman, Director, Government Relations, LPA, Inc., prepared

statement .............................................................................................................. 112

Page

IV

Letter submitted by Mr. Jansen from Marc Rotenberg, Executive Director

and Mihir Kshirsagar, IPIOP Fellow, epic.org, electronic privacy information center, with attachments ............................................................................. 124

Article entitled ‘‘IDs—Not That Easy, Questions About Nationwide Identity

Systems,’’ Stephen T. Kent and Lynette I. Millett, Editors, National Academy Press .............................................................................................................. 151

(1)

A LICENSE TO BREAK THE LAW?

PROTECTING THE INTEGRITY OF

DRIVER’S LICENSES

TUESDAY, APRIL 16, 2002

U.S. SENATE,

OVERSIGHT OF GOVERNMENT MANAGEMENT, RESTRUCTURING,

AND THE DISTRICT OF COLUMBIA SUBCOMMITTEE,

OF THE COMMITTEE ON GOVERNMENTAL AFFAIRS,

Washington, DC.

The Subcommittee met, pursuant to notice, at 10:03 a.m., in

room SD–342, Dirksen Senate Office Building, Hon. Richard J.

Durbin, Chairman of the Subcommittee, presiding.

Present: Senator Durbin.

OPENING STATEMENT OF SENATOR DURBIN

Senator DURBIN. Good morning. This hearing will come to order.

Thank you all for being here. Today, the Senate Subcommittee on

Oversight of Government Management holds a hearing entitled, ‘‘A

License to Break the Law? Protecting the Integrity of Driver’s Licenses and State IDs.’’

On August 1, 2001, two men named Hani Hanjour and Khalid

Al-Mihdhar drove a van from New Jersey to the Virginia Department of Motor Vehicles office located across the Potomac River just

a few miles from where we are sitting this morning. In the parking

lot of that DMV, they asked around until they found someone willing to lie and to vouch for their Virginia residency. They met Luis

Martinez-Flores and Herbert Villalobos, who, for a price, were willing to help. Hanjour and Al-Mihdhar paid these strangers $50 each

and received notarized forms which claimed that the two transients

were, in fact, Virginia residents.

Using these fake documents, Hanjour and Al-Mihdhar walked

into the DMV, stood in line, like all of us would, had their photos

taken, and walked out with authentic State-issued Virginia photo

ID cards. The next day, on August 2, 2001, Hanjour and AlMihdhar returned to the same Arlington DMV office with two

friends, Salem Al-Hazmi and Majed Moqed. Hanjour and AlMihdhar helped Al-Hazmi and Moqed obtain Virginia ID cards of

their own by vouching that they lived together in the State of Virginia. After all, why should the clerk behind the DMV counter have

any doubts? Hanjour and Al-Mihdhar produced their Virginia IDs

to prove their in-State residence.

On the same day, Abdul Al-Omari and Ahmed Al-Ghamdi, who

were renting a room at a Maryland motel, contacted Kenys Galicia,

2

a Virginia legal secretary and notary public, through a referral

from Luis Martinez-Flores, the same person who was hanging

around the Arlington DMV the day before. Al Omari and AlGhamdi paid Galicia to have her prepare false notarized affidavits

stating that the two men lived in Virginia. Using these fake documents, the two went to a Virginia motor vehicles office and received State-issued ID cards.

On the morning of September 11, 2001, Al-Mihdhar, Hanjour, AlHazmi, and Moqed boarded American Airlines Flight 77 from

Washington Dulles Airport headed for Los Angeles. They all used

their Virginia ID cards to board the plane. The same morning, AlOmari used his Virginia ID card to board American Airlines Flight

11 in Boston, bound for Los Angeles. At the same airport, AlGhamdi used his ID card to board United Airlines Flight 175, also

bound for Los Angeles.

We all know what happened to those three flights and another,

United Airlines Flight 93, that never made it to their intended destinations that day. Instead, the commercial jets tragically became

weapons of mass destruction at the hands of these terrorists. These

terrorists bought their way into our shaky, unreliable, and dangerous system of government-issued identification. With these

phoney cards, doors opened across America, including the doors of

these doomed aircraft.

Since September 11, our Nation has been struggling to understand how such heinous crimes could have occurred here in America. As we reflect upon the events of the past few months, we have

come to realize that our system of democracy which allows all of

us to enjoy our freedom is vulnerable to abuse by those who seek

to destroy that freedom.

The terrorists mentioned above, along with their co-conspirators,

knew exactly how to take advantage of our open and free society.

In addition to Virginia, these terrorists targeted Florida, a State

that at the time did not require any proof of residency from anyone. In fact, any tourist could walk into a motor vehicle office, fill

out a form on his own, and receive a Florida license or ID card at

that time. At least 13 of the 19 terrorists held driver’s licenses or

ID cards from Florida. A few of the 19 held licenses or cards from

more than one State, including from California, Arizona, and Maryland, while only one did not appear to hold any American ID.

Some received duplicate cards from the same State within

months of September. These foreign terrorists knew that a key to

their devious plans was to come to America and blend in with everybody else until they were ready to take on their murderous mission, and one way they blended in with the rest of America was to

obtain a driver’s license or a State-issued ID card that helped them

present a cover of legitimacy.

They knew that the driver’s license is the most widely-used form

of personal identification. Across America, law enforcement agencies, retailers, financial institutions, airlines, and employers acknowledge the presentation of a person’s driver’s license as an acceptable and reliable method of verifying a person’s identity.

The driver’s license is also a key that opens many doors. Anyone

who can produce a valid driver’s license can access just about anything. It can get you access to a motel room, membership in a gym,

3

airline tickets, flight lessons, and even the purchase of weapons, all

without anyone ever questioning you about who you really are. If

you can produce a driver’s license, we assume you are legal, you

are legitimate, you are for real.

The use of fake IDs is one of the oldest tricks in the book for

criminals. It is also one of the oldest traditions of adolescence and

a rite of passage for teenagers, to casually use a borrowed or tampered ID to buy alcohol or tobacco products or just to get into a

nightclub. But after September 11, use of fake IDs is no longer just

a teenage trick or merely about drunk drivers, as serious as that

is, trying to hide their bad driving records using multiple licenses.

It is about our national security.

I want to show you a page from the al Qaeda terrorist manual.

I am sure you cannot read it from there, but this was found in

Manchester, England. Police officials during the search of an al

Qaeda member’s home found this particular document and Attorney General Ashcroft presented it to our Senate Judiciary Committee last year. It is obvious that the September 11 terrorists

were well trained by al Qaeda. They followed the instructions flawlessly. Here is an example of how successful they were.

Each obtained the form of a photo ID, but it is not only foreign

terrorists who use fake IDs or IDs obtained through fraudulent

means. Seven years ago this week, Timothy McVeigh used a fake

ID to rent the Ryder truck that he drove into Oklahoma City. As

part of his plot to blow up the Federal Building, McVeigh picked

up a fake driver’s license in the name of ‘‘Robert King.’’ The card

even listed a false birthday of April 19 as some cruel inside joke.

That is the day that McVeigh executed his terrorist attack against

fellow Americans, which was planned to fall exactly 2 years after

the Waco incident of April 19, 1993.

Another example, fugitive James Charles Kopp was arrested in

France in March of last year after evading our law enforcement officials for almost 3 years. Kopp was accused of the October 1998

murder of abortion clinic doctor Barnett Slepian, who was shot and

killed as he stood in the kitchen of his home in Amherst, New

York. With help from other antiabortion activists, Kopp used a variety of fake driver’s licenses and passports, changed aliases frequently, and moved in and out of the country.

So as we look to defending America, it is critical that we carefully examine how our States issue driver’s licenses and ID cards

today and determine if it makes sense for every State to continue

to maintain its own unique policy and procedures for the issuance

process. For example, some States independently verify the breeder

documents, such as birth certificates and passports provided by applicants, while others accept them at face value. Some States ask

the applicants’ Social Security numbers, others do not. Some States

ask for proof of legal status in the country, others do not. Some

States take fingerprints of the applicants, others do not.

We also need to examine how secure the cards are themselves.

For example, each of the 50 U.S. States and the District of Columbia issues driver’s licenses and ID cards that vary widely in the

level of security and resistance to tampering, from States that incorporate high-tech biometric identifiers to States that do not even

require a photo on their cards.

4

1The prepared statement of Mr. Wern appears in the Appendix on page 27.

I recognize many States since September 11 are taking proactive,

sensible steps to tighten their DMV systems, but I believe we need

a nationwide effort to coordinate those activities.

To help us understand the extent of the weaknesses and loopholes that exist in our driver’s license issuance process and the

usage of cards today, this Subcommittee has invited seven individuals to discuss these problems and to offer solutions. I am pleased

to introduce the following witnesses and look forward to their testimony.

I would like to welcome and introduce today’s panel, Ted Wern,

an attorney with Kirkland and Ellis in Chicago, thank you for

being here; Mary Ann Viverette, Chief of Police of Gaithersburg,

Maryland, on behalf of the International Association of Chiefs of

Police; Richard Varn, Chief Information Officer for the State of

Iowa, who is here on behalf of the National Governors Association;

the Hon. Barbara Allen, State Senator representing the Eighth

District of Kansas; Betty Serian, Deputy Secretary for Safety Administration of the Pennsylvania Department of Transportation,

here on behalf of the American Association of Motor Vehicle Administrators, who have been extremely helpful in putting together

this hearing; Barry Goleman, Vice President of AMS State and

Local Solutions; and Bradley Jansen, Deputy Director of the Center

for Technology Policy at the Free Congress Foundation.

Thank you all for coming. We are looking forward to your testimony. It is customary in this Subcommittee to swear in all witnesses, so if you would please rise and raise your right hand.

Do you swear the testimony you are about to give is the truth,

the whole truth, and nothing but the truth, so help you, God?

Mr. WERN. I do.

Chief Viverette. I do.

Mr. VARN. I do.

Ms. ALLEN. I do.

Ms. SERIAN. I do.

Mr. GOLEMAN. I do.

Mr. JANSEN. I do.

Senator DURBIN. Let the record reflect that the witnesses answered in the affirmative and will not be asked to leave. [Laughter.]

That was a joke. I would ask that you limit your oral statements

to about 5 minutes. I know that is tough because this is a complicated issue. I will remind you, your entire statement will be entered into the record.

Mr. Wern, would you like to begin?

TESTIMONY OF THEODORE W. WERN,1 VICTIM OF IDENTITY

THEFT

Mr. WERN. Thank you. First, I would like to thank you all for

the opportunity of coming here and just let you know how truly

honored I am to be a part of this process in any way.

My name is Ted Wern. I am an attorney in Chicago, Illinois, and

4 years ago, beginning in the spring of 1998, a person in Columbus,

Ohio, stole some of my mail, and in that mail were documents conVerDate 11-MAY-2000 09:42 Dec 04, 2002 Jkt 000000 PO 00000 Frm 00008 Fmt 6633 Sfmt 6633 80295.TXT SAFFAIRS PsN: SAFFAIRS
5

taining three vital pieces of information, my name, my Social Security number, and my date of birth. Using that information as well

as a fake identification card, that person departed on a crime and

spending spree that was unimaginable to me at the time, and I still

cannot quite put it into perspective.

There are two categories of crimes that he committed. First, fi- nancial crimes. He incurred up to $50,000 in bad debt that I knew

about. He had telephone accounts, cable bills, and utility accounts.

He was able to board airline flights using tickets issued in my

name, of course, purchased with credit cards issued in my name.

He was able to rent a U-Haul truck. He was able to rent vehicles.

He was able to enjoy all of the financial freedoms that we all take

for granted.

The second category of crimes were a bit more bold and these involved traffic violations. This man would be stopped by police—he

apparently was not a very good driver. He was stopped by police

on four separate occasions and he told the police that he was me,

that he forgot his driver’s license, and on those four occasions,

somehow, the violations went onto my driving record. All along, I

had no idea this was happening and these arrest warrants were

issued in my name and all along I am just driving around in Ohio

thinking that there are not any problems.

One of those occasions was actually a DUI, and under the same

circumstances, he was able to convince the officers, by giving all of

this information that he had memorized so well and claiming that

he has lost his driver’s license. In those situations, we think that

there was not an actual identity card presented, but it is hard to

really know.

The end result was that warrants were issued in my name. I was

forced to go to court and appear as Ted Wern under these traffic

violations and convince numerous judges that these were not committed by me. Those were the difficulties in remedying the traffic

violations, but to be honest, what took more time and much more

expense was to remedy each one of the credit accounts that this

person created.

For every credit card, and there were many, probably into the

twenties, every credit card and every account, there was a halfhour of telephone conversations, numerous letters, notarizing of

documents. There is a very elaborate process that one has to go

through to clear these from your name, and the most difficult aspect is that you get better at clearing these from your name after

you keep doing it. But the better you get and the quicker you clear

your record, the more easy it is for him to get more credit because

you have now cleared your record, your name is clear, and he can

just spend more freely.

The same applies for the traffic violations. Once I cleared the

warrants, I had a clear record, so when he used my information to

a police officer, he did not get arrested for an outstanding warrant

in my name.

With all that said, despite those problems, the financial effects,

the inconveniences, the emotional effects of knowing that there is

someone out there living a much richer lifestyle than you are living

now on your name and on your credit. Aside from all that, I really

do consider myself one of the more fortunate victims.

6

For example, I am an attorney. It is my job to write forceful letters, to navigate corporate bureaucracies and to follow up with people and it was much easier for me to do that. It came natural to

me. But there are quite a few people out there who do not have

those resources. In fact, I volunteer for an organization out of San

Diego, the Identity Theft Resource Center. I help victims in Illinois

deal with these problems and I get a couple of E-mails a week from

people—bright, educated people who just have no idea how to start

and complete the process.

Yesterday, in an attempt to be a little more presentable for this

hearing, I decided to get a haircut and the hairdresser happened

to be a woman from El Salvador who just 3 months after she came

to this country had her identity stolen. At the time, her English

was not very good and it took years for her to clear her record.

So despite my problems and the heartache it caused, I was certainly one of the more fortunate victims, especially given that my

perpetrator was caught. He is now in jail. He is off the streets.

Many people are not that fortunate. Most perpetrators get to stay

out there for a while because, as you will hear today, it is a pretty

difficult crime to catch. It happens sometimes not even on paper.

So with all of that said, what I would like to emphasize here is

that this is an extremely difficult situation to remedy after it has

happened to you. It has taken years for me. I would like to say that

government and that law enforcement are able to correct these

problems really easily, but the reality is, once it is committed, it

is your burden as a victim to clear these things up. You cannot ask

a police officer or a lawyer to go in and convince creditors that you

are who you say you are. That is something, as we all know when

we make telephone calls and prove that we hold a particular account or whatever, it is something only you can do.

So what I would like to emphasize is that once this happens to

somebody, the process for clearing it up is extremely long and extremely painful. So given the limited resources that we have, the

need that we have to deal with this so quickly in light of the September 11 attacks, I think we are doing the right thing to focus on

the prevention end right now. I mean, we will get to how to clear

it up, how to create a system to help people overcome this problem.

Right now, as I look back on my experience, I wish there was a

more rigorous system that would prevent somebody from getting

that information, from using it freely, from getting a fake identification card.

So I think at this point, we are doing the right thing. We are focusing on prevention and I hope that this panel and this system

can do everything in its power to make this all stop.

So once again, thank you for the opportunity for coming here and

it is an honor.

Senator DURBIN. Thank you. Nice haircut. [Laughter.]

Chief Viverette.

7

1The prepared statement of Chief Viverette appears in the Appendix on page 29.

TESTIMONY OF MARY ANN VIVERETTE,1 CHIEF OF POLICE,

GAITHERSBURG, MARYLAND, ON BEHALF OF THE INTERNATIONAL ASSOCIATION OF CHIEFS OF POLICE

Chief VIVERETTE. Good morning. I am pleased to be here today

on behalf of the International Association of Chiefs of Police. As

you may know, the IACP is the world’s oldest and largest organization of law enforcement executives. It was founded in 1893 and

with a current membership exceeding 19,000.

At the outset, I would like to thank you for holding this hearing

today. From a law enforcement perspective, the importance of ensuring the integrity of identification documents cannot be overstated. Even prior to September 11, the IACP had been concerned

with the availability of false identification documents and the ease

in which false information could be used to obtain valid Stateissued driver’s licenses.

Law enforcement has seen that the ability of individuals to

misidentify themselves can have serious, often tragic, repercussions

in our communities. For example, teenagers often seek to obtain

false identification documents so that they can purchase alcohol. As

we all know, underage consumption of alcohol often has fatal results. The National Highway Traffic Safety Administration reports

that in the United States, drivers between the ages of 16 and 21

account for just 7 percent of all drivers in this Nation, yet are involved in 15 percent of all alcohol-related fatalities.

Additionally, individuals who have had their license suspended

or revoked in one State because of their failure to operate a vehicle

in a safe manner have all too often been able to go to neighboring

States and acquire a new license under false pretenses. As a result,

these unsafe drivers are back on the roads of our communities.

Law enforcement officers who may encounter such individuals will

rely on their license to identify the driver’s infraction history and

will, therefore, be unaware of the driver’s actual status.

Off the roadways, the ease with which criminals can fraudulently

obtain a valid license or manufacture a counterfeit one greatly facilitates their ability to commit crimes involving identity theft and

identity fraud. In addition, each year, law enforcement officers expend thousands of hours in efforts to properly identify criminal suspects who have misidentified themselves to police.

However, as we all realize, the events of September 11 greatly

increase our need to ensure that the integrity of the driver’s license

issuance process is enhanced and that the ability of law enforcement officers to detect fraudulent licenses is improved. As the September 11 attacks demonstrated, the local police and other public

safety personnel will often be the first responders to a terrorist attack. However, the role of the State and local law enforcement

agencies is not limited to responding to these events. These agencies can and must play a vital role in the investigation and prevention of future attacks.

Across the United States, there are more than 16,000 State and

local law enforcement agencies. These agencies and the 700,000 officers they employ daily patrol the streets of our cities and towns,

and as a result, have an intimate knowledge of the communities

8

they serve and have developed close relationships with the citizens

they protect. These relationships provide State and local law enforcement agencies with the ability to effectively track down information related to terrorists. Often, State and local agencies can accomplish these tasks in a more effective and timely fashion than

their Federal counterparts, who may be unfamiliar with the community and its citizens.

In addition, police officers on everyday patrol, making traffic

stops, answering calls for service, performing community policing

activities, and interacting with citizens can, if properly trained in

what to look for and what questions to ask, be a tremendous source

of intelligence for local, State, and Federal homeland security

forces.

However, in order to maximize the capabilities of State and local

law enforcement officers, it is vital that we improve the accuracy

and ensure the validity of what has become the de facto means of

identifying individuals in this country, their driver’s licenses. Law

enforcement officials must be able to act with certainty when dealing with citizens in our communities. We need to be certain that

they are who their identification documents say they are and we

need to be certain that the documents themselves are not counterfeit.

The effort to improve the accuracy of driver’s licenses is so vital

because of the simple fact that individuals with a valid driver’s license will have greater success in staying off the radar screen of

State and local law enforcement officials. As subsequent investigations have shown, the ability of the September 11 terrorists to obtain driver’s licenses or State-issued identification documents

greatly facilitated their operation within the United States.

For example, as we all know, on September 9, a trooper from my

home State of Maryland pulled over Ziad Zamir Jarrah, one of the

terrorists on Flight 93, which crashed south of Pittsburgh, for

speeding on Interstate 95 north of Baltimore. During this traffic

stop, Jarrah produced an apparently valid driver’s license from the

State of Virginia, and as a result, the stop proceeded in typical

fashion. However, if Mr. Jarrah had been unable to produce a license or if he had produced a license that the trooper could have

identified as fraudulent, then further investigation would have

been warranted and perhaps future events would have taken a different course.

To address this crucial issue, the International Association of

Chiefs of Police believes that several steps must be taken. First,

certain minimum standards must be established that will help to

ensure that information used to establish an individual’s identity

at the time they apply for the driver’s license is valid and accurate

and consistent from State to State.

Second, agreement should be reached among the States for the

inclusion of both a unique identifier, such as a fingerprint, and

anti-counterfeiting security devices in driver’s licenses.

Third, States should be encouraged to link databases so that licensing agencies and law enforcement personnel in other States

will be able to access an individual’s criminal and motor vehicle

traffic violation history in order to assist in the identification of potential criminal suspects or problem drivers.

9

1The prepared statement of Mr. Varn with attachments appears in the Appendix on page 35.

Finally, the IACP believes that penalties for identity theft and

identity fraud should be increased.

In conclusion, I would like to state that the ability of individuals

to obtain inaccurate identification documents either through fraud

or forgery has been an area of vital concern to law enforcement

agencies throughout the Nation for a number of years. Unfortunately, it took the events of September 11 to catapult this issue to

the forefront of national debate. It is the IACP’s hope that action

to remedy this critical situation can be taken in a timely fashion.

We look forward to working with this Subcommittee, other Members of Congress, and our colleagues around the Nation in this effort.

Thank you for the opportunity to appear before you and I would

be happy to answer any questions.

Senator DURBIN. Thank you for your testimony. I appreciate it

very much. Mr. Varn.

TESTIMONY OF RICHARD J. VARN,1 CHIEF INFORMATION OFFICER, STATE OF IOWA, ON BEHALF OF THE NATIONAL GOVERNORS ASSOCIATION

Mr. VARN. Thank you, Senator Durbin and fellow panelists, interested guests. I would like to start by saying I am representing

both NASCIO, which is the National Association of State Chief Information Officers, as well as NGA today.

I need to begin by saying that neither organization has an official

position directly on the subject of identity security or enhancing the

driver’s licenses or the life document systems. NGA does not see a

need for Federal action at this time. It believes it is a State issue

and the States need initially to have an opportunity to address it.

NASCIO and its members have a special interest in the information technology issues surrounding identity security and want and

need to play a role in coordinating and an operational role in the

design, development, and implementation of IT solutions and systems. That said, let me point out some of the things I think do

need to be done, some of which I personally believe involved some

Federal action. That is my own personal opinion, though.

Identity security is a critical component, and I will offer my own

personal opinion separate from NGA or NASCIO’s opinions.

Identity security is a critical component of ensuring accuracy and

preventing fraud in the granting of privileges and benefits in many

government programs and processes. Identity is like a critical junction point in the wiring of government and the information society.

If a fault occurs and false positive or false negative identifications

are made, real harm, ranging from financial crime, ruined reputations, exploitation of vulnerable children and adults, and violent

crime can result. Without good identity security, the trustworthy

and deserving can be denied and the dishonest and undeserving rewarded.

A common point of confusion in the discussion around identity is

between the right to anonymity and the right to privacy. Privacy

laws and constitutional protections are plentiful. Anonymity

analogs are scarce. One reason for this is for most of human hisVerDate 11-MAY-2000 09:42 Dec 04, 2002 Jkt 000000 PO 00000 Frm 00013 Fmt 6633 Sfmt 6633 80295.TXT SAFFAIRS PsN: SAFFAIRS
10

tory, we have not been anonymous. We have lived in close-knit

communities and people have known us since birth. We have ridden on that assumption, that we knew each other, and our credit

systems and our business transaction systems have depended on

that for the last 50, 60, 70 years, when, in fact, that system had

fallen apart.

The other reason anonymity is not commonly allowed is that it

only works where behavior, status, age, or individually granted

rights and privileges are not at issue. You have a right to be anonymous when you pay cash or maybe when you look at public

records, but not when you are seeking a license, or a government

benefit, writing a check, using credit, working with children or in

a secure area, or buying protection from risk. The people that do

the transactions need to know who you are. Who they share that

information with is a privacy matter. It is not possible to be anonymous and get those rights and privileges in most cases.

The identity system on which we depend for most of our transactions is broken and is more likely to actually enable identity

theft and fraud rather than prevent it. Sound security in the creation of authentication needs three parts: Something you know,

something you have, and something you are. We often rely on one

or two of these to establish identity and extend privileges and benefits. As a result, facts such as we heard earlier, such as Social Security number, address, and birthday, mother’s maiden name,

which cannot be adequately protected as secrets, are used to create

identity.

It is not these facts or inability to keep them secret that is the

problem. It is that we rely on them alone to establish identity.

Moreover, we have grossly inadequate methods for creating and determining validity of the documents that comprise the ‘‘something

you have’’ component. And finally, as was pointed out, with the exception of photos, we have not yet embraced a common and coordinated system of a biometric for presenting something you are.

Our identity system is broken, therefore, because the parts are

broken. We lack adequate investment, infrastructure standards,

and process in coordination and information sharing among the responsible government entities.

I would like to just point out what others have said by pointing

out that I get on planes—our driver’s license system is one of those

parts that is broken—I get on planes with this identity right here.

It happens to look like a driver’s license, but it is my State ID card.

I needed no more than being an employee of the State of Iowa to

board every plane I have gotten on since September 11, an example

of the problem we have with the security of the driver’s license system.

Cyber security, homeland security, electronic commerce, compliance with many laws such as HIPAA and this whole issue of identity security are related and need a coordinated solution. However,

that is not how these programs are being done or addressed. We

are headed towards years of rework, retrofit, and the integration

of stacks of ID cards and ID systems unless coordination occurs

now.

There is a crying need for this and this coordination could take

many forms. I have listed some of them for you in my written testiVerDate 11-MAY-2000 09:42 Dec 04, 2002 Jkt 000000 PO 00000 Frm 00014 Fmt 6633 Sfmt 6633 80295.TXT SAFFAIRS PsN: SAFFAIRS
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1The prepared statement of Ms. Allen with an attachment appears in the Appendix on page

53.

mony, such things as interstate compacts, committees such as this

looking at how the government spending is taking place in the

agencies and in the programs that you have already authorized and

making sure that it is coordinated both inside the Federal Government and between and among levels of government.

I want to mention one other program that we are doing in Iowa

that might be also part of the solution. It is a relatively simple and

cheap effort to ensure that, what we call life documents are protected from illegal duplication or misuse. We have simply digitized

all 11 million birth records from the State of Iowa since the 1890’s.

This system will allow the creation of an index and a process to reference that single electronic record as the real and unique record

of a person’s birth and databases can reflect when that is used in

other life document issuing processes, and persons who are the

subject of that record can find out when their birth record is being

used to create identity.

Finally, I would like to point out a need for coordination for some

Federal activity concerning the legal entry of people into our country. There is a hodge-podge of systems that need to be coordinated

into a single system which mirrors and is integrated with these

enhanced State and local life document systems. The Federal Government needs to have a document that shows the beginning, the

duration, the course, and the end of a legal entrant’s life into our

country, regardless of whether they are just visiting or making

America their new home.

The multiple Federal systems need to create a common electronic

shared equivalent of a birth and death record. That common electronic record can be used by all levels of government in the same

fashion as a normal birth and death record and would be the reference document for forms of identity and extension of privileges

and benefits. Such a record for legal entrants could include a photo,

biometric, statement and documentation of their life facts, such as

name, date of birth, and so on. Even if different cards or processes

stem from this one record, we will enhance the interoperability and

efficiency of issuance systems and we will prevent fraud.

With that, I would conclude by saying that NASCIO, NGA, and

my department, the Information Technology Department of Iowa,

thank you for the opportunity to testify today and I will be happy

to answer questions.

Senator DURBIN. Thanks very much, Mr. Varn. Senator Allen.

TESTIMONY OF HON. BARBARA P. ALLEN,1 STATE SENATOR,

EIGHTH DISTRICT, STATE OF KANSAS

Ms. ALLEN. Thank you, Senator Durbin. I appreciate the invitation to testify today.

I became interested in the issue of identity theft last December

and January when I personally became a victim of bank fraud. I

will not go into the details here today, but I can say that it was

a very time consuming and frustrating and scary experience.

As I researched this issue in my own State of Kansas, I was

stunned to learn how easy it is to obtain fraudulent identification

12

which is government issued in the form of driver’s licenses and ID

cards.

As we all know, reports of identity theft have increased significantly and exponentially in the United States and, of course, in my

State of Kansas, in the last several years. Today, I regret to say

that Kansas is one of the easiest States in the country in which to

obtain false identification and to steal someone’s identity.

Kansas is one of only a few remaining States that will provide

any applicant an immediately-issued driver’s license or ID card

with no requirement of a Social Security number or any biometric

information. We have no security measures in place to protect Kansans to ensure that the person applying for a driver’s license or a

non-driver’s ID card really is that person. A simple photograph

yields an instant permanent piece of government-issued identification.

Kansas currently requires a photograph, but no Social Security

number or fingerprint, to get a driver’s license or an ID card. The

bill which I cosponsored at the beginning of the 2002 legislative

session would amend State law so that all applicants for driver’s

licenses or ID cards would be required to submit their Social Security number and a biometric identifier, the most common of which

would be a thumbprint, to obtain identification. Applicants would

then receive a temporary license or ID card, and only after

verification of the applicant’s identity would a permanent piece of

identification be issued.

In addition, today in Kansas you can receive an ID card and a

driver’s license concurrently and we would no longer allow that to

happen. That would be prohibited.

The District Attorney’s Office in Johnson County, which is part

of the Kansas City metropolitan area and also near my Senatorial

district, reports that cases of identity theft double every year. Identity theft in the City of Overland Park, where I live, have increased

100 percent in each of the last 2 years. In my county alone, this

crime causes over $1 million annually in losses to retailers, credit

card companies, and banks. These losses are passed on to the consumer in the form of higher costs for products and services.

Of course, the financial implications of identity theft are substantial, but they pale in comparison to the damage that can be done,

including loss of life, when criminals steal our identities and use

them for evil purposes on a broader scale.

I have attached to my testimony today an article by Governor

Tom Ridge, Director of the Office of Homeland Security, who is encouraging governors and other State officials to take steps to improve the security and authenticity of driver’s licenses. Governor

Ridge recently urged governors attending a National Governors Association meeting to draft model legislation setting standards for

more secure licensing procedures. By coming up with their own

procedures, Governor Ridge said the governors would avoid having

standards forced on them by Congress.

Driver’s licenses are much more than a license to drive. They

allow us to open bank accounts, to cash checks, to write merchants

checks, and to step onto airplanes. They are the most widely used

and accepted domestic document to verify a person’s identity, but

they are not reliable and they will not be reliable until we

13

1The prepared statement of Ms. Serian appears in the Appendix on page 58.

strengthen the verification identity process before a license is

issued.

As Americans, we have two choices. We can leave the current

identification system as it is and risk the personal and financial security of private citizens, the finances of the business community,

and the lives of fellow Americans, or we can improve the system.

Going through this experience in my own State of trying to get

legislation passed which would strengthen the identification system

for licenses and ID cards, I found that there are some who argue

a personal identification system is, in fact, an evasion of privacy or

a limitation on personal freedom, but only those who have something to hide will lose from providing proof positive that they are

who they say they are. Identity cards, and that, in fact, is what

driver’s licenses are today, should be as close to foolproof as technology can make them to protect us.

S. 559 is not about invading Kansans’ privacy. It is about preserving Kansans’ privacy and protecting Kansans’ security.

Senator Durbin, you mentioned the nationwide effort to coordinate activities and I want to comment about a question you raised

in our invitation letter, which was what should the role of the Federal Government be in enhancing the reliability and security of the

driver’s license system. Based on my own experience in Kansas, I

feel quite strongly that a national ID card is not the answer. Perhaps the role of the Federal Government should be two things.

First of all, to set standards for more secure licensing procedures,

and second, to offer financial incentives to States that take every

step possible to ensure that government-issued identification is authentic.

Personally, I would welcome incentives from the Federal Government to help convince legislators in my State it is critical we improve the security and authenticity of driver’s licenses in Kansas.

Many of them still do not appreciate the magnitude of this threat

to our personal safety and financial security.

I just wanted to comment in closing that this bill passed the

Kansas Senate in March on a vote of 25 to 15. It passed out of the

House Judiciary Committee and it is currently lingering in the

House of Representatives, but I am still hopeful that we will get

it passed this session. Thank you.

Senator DURBIN. Thank you. Ms. Serian.

TESTIMONY OF BETTY L. SERIAN,1 DEPUTY SECRETARY FOR

SAFETY ADMINISTRATION, PENNSYLVANIA DEPARTMENT

OF TRANSPORTATION, ON BEHALF OF THE AMERICAN ASSOCIATION OF MOTOR VEHICLE ADMINISTRATORS

Ms. SERIAN. Good morning, Mr. Chairman. I am Betty Serian,

Vice Chair of the American Association of Motor Vehicle Administrators, AAMVA. I want to thank you for the opportunity to speak

this morning.

AAMVA is a nonprofit association representing DMV administrators and law enforcement officials throughout the U.S. and Canada.

And let me tell you about a few Americans.

14

Larry and Rita Beller, Edward and Alice Ramaeker spent their

golden years traveling across the country. They were killed on a

New Mexico highway by a repeat DUI offender. The driver, holding

eight prior convictions from different States, was under the influence of alcohol and plowed head-on into the retirees’ car.

Emeke Moneme, an Ohio resident, had his wallet stolen at the

local gym. Within weeks of having his license disappear, Emeke

discovered an identity thief had opened 13 fraudulent accounts in

his name totaling $30,000 in bad credit debt. It took him months

to straighten out his life.

Sara Clark, a schoolteacher, was killed after her flight was overtaken by terrorists and crashed into the Pentagon. Terrorists

boarded her flight using a fraudulently obtained driver’s license.

Sara Clark shared this sad fate with more than 3,000 other Americans on September 11.

Larry and Rita Beller, Edward and Alice Ramaeker shared a list

of DUI fatalities with more than 16,000 Americans every single

year. And Emeke Moneme shares identity theft with hundreds of

thousands of American victims.

A common thread to these tragedies? The driver’s license. The

driver’s license has become the most requested form of ID in the

United States and Canada. Financial institutions require it to open

an account. Retailers ask for it when you write a check. And the

airlines demand it of you before you board a plane.

The United States has more than 200 different valid forms of

driver’s licenses and ID cards in circulation. Each State and D.C.

has different practices for issuing licenses. Individuals looking to

undermine the system, whether it be a terrorist, a drunk driver,

or an identity thief, shop around for licenses in those States that

have become the weakest link.

In addition, the lack of standard security features on a driver’s

license allows individuals to exploit this system. This makes it difficult for law enforcement to verify the validity of a license from

another State, not to mention the identity of the person who is

holding that license. The situation is worsened by the availability

of counterfeit driver’s licenses and fraudulent documents, breeder

documents, over the net and in underground markets.

We already maintain driving records. However, the country

needs more effective tools to manage them. Problem drivers who

obtain multiple licenses spread their bad driving history from State

to State. They avoid detection, they avoid penalties, they avoid

punishment. We need a system, such as the proposed Driver

Record Information Verification System, to keep bad drivers off the

road and save the lives of those who responsibly use the privilege

to drive.

DMVs already exchange driver history on commercial drivers

through the 1986 federally mandated Commercial Driver License

Information System, also known as CDLIS, and within a 4-year period, CDLIS kept 871,000 potentially dangerous commercial drivers

off the road.

The American public wants a more secure license and there are

five ways we believe that Congress can help. Support minimum

standards and requirements for each State that each State must

adopt when issuing a license. Help DMVs identify fraudulent docuVerDate 11-MAY-2000 09:42 Dec 04, 2002 Jkt 000000 PO 00000 Frm 00018 Fmt 6633 Sfmt 6633 80295.TXT SAFFAIRS PsN: SAFFAIRS
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1The prepared statement of Mr. Goleman with an attachment appears in the Appendix on

page 66.

ments. Support an interstate network for confirming a person’s

driving history. Impose stiffer penalties on those committing fraudulent acts. And provide funding to make this happen, funding so

that States can help ensure a safer America.

Based on a recent survey, the public expects you to help. Eightythree percent of the respondents use their driver’s licenses for purposes other than driving. Sixty-five percent think it is too easy to

obtain a fake license or ID card. Seventy-seven percent of the respondents favor Congressional action to modify the licensing process and ID security.

For years, AAMVA has worked to strengthen the driver licensing

process. Following September 11, Americans quickly learned how

easily terrorists obtain driver’s licenses. What is saddening is that

it took this catastrophic event to heighten America’s awareness of

the importance of secure ID credentials.

We want to ensure that every driver has one license and one

driving history and Congress can make that happen. When you can

verify identity, we are certainly one step closer to preventing fraud,

protecting privacy, and saving lives. Thank you very much for the

opportunity to testify.

Senator DURBIN. Thank you, Ms. Serian. Mr. Goleman.

TESTIMONY OF BARRY GOLEMAN,1 VICE PRESIDENT, PUBLIC

SECTOR, AMERICAN MANAGEMENT SYSTEMS, INC.

Mr. GOLEMAN. Thank you, Mr. Chairman, for your leadership

and the opportunity to be here today.

Senator Durbin, we at AMS believe that this Subcommittee is on

exactly the right track by holding this hearing and advocating the

development of a more secure driver’s license. We believe technology can advance identification security while preserving our personal freedoms.

I work for American Management Systems of Fairfax, Virginia,

and I have been involved for nearly 30 years at the State and Federal level in how licenses are issued and in the information systems

that support that process. I started as a driver’s license examiner

in the State of California issuing licenses. I ran a motor vehicle office and I worked to implement the one standard Federal license

program that we have today, the commercial driver’s license. Before I came to AMS, I worked at AAMVA, where I built and operated the information systems for the exchange of commercial driver

information. And I know from personal experience that the system

can be attacked.

When I was an examiner, I was presented with counterfeit documents to obtain a license. I stopped people from stealing identities

for the purpose of cashing stolen checks. I was even offered bribes

of cash or sexual favors in exchange for issuing driver’s license. For

the record, I refused those attempted bribes. [Laughter.]

But unfortunately, not all employees do.

As has been described by others on the panel here today, we

have learned that in the aftermath of September 11 that terrorists

obtained multiple driver’s licenses and ID documents from State

16

motor vehicle agencies with ease, some using fraudulent documents

or bribes.

Despite this security breach, there is encouraging news. This is

a problem we can fix. With technology that exists today, we can

stop the fraud and counterfeiting of State licenses. A model for the

kind of Federal and State cooperative effort that is needed is a development of the licensing program to meet the requirements of the

Commercial Motor Vehicle Safety Act.

In helping to develop the information systems for this licensing

program, I have seen firsthand how State and Federal agencies can

work together. With Federal funding made available, State licensing experts can adopt and implement new strict Federal standards.

Do not let detractors tell you this cannot be done.

Your leadership and that of the others on this Subcommittee,

however, is going to be necessary to make this happen. It is imperative that we improve the integrity of the driver’s license to enable

it to live up to its reputation as a reliable personal identification

document. The reality is that, today, the license is the trusted de

facto identification used by Americans to prove their identity within our borders. Retailers use them for cashing checks, banks for account verification, and airports for access to secure areas.

Our newly revealed security vulnerabilities demonstrate how important it is that the next generation of ID documents adhere to

standardized security features and use the highest level of tamperresistant technologies available. Biometrics, such as fingerprints or

facial recognition, for example, can complete a positive one-to-one

authentication of an individual to the card. Smart cards will also

make the driver’s license into a carrier of important data, including

the biometric identifier on the card itself.

Used without improved verification techniques, however, these

cards will be useless as secure, reliable forms of identification. I

urge you to consider new technologies to ensure that people with

counterfeit or false IDs will not be able to obtain better, more secure licenses.

The first step is a thorough verification of the individual’s identity before he or she enters into the system. To accomplish this,

State examiners must have access to the data that backs up the

documents, such as birth records and immigration data. Today’s

web services technologies can verify information in multiple databases while protecting the personal information from unintended

disclosure.

At AMS, we are currently working with Federal and State agencies in an effort to improve the basis for making identification decisions. Without improved identity verification, it is clear that we

will not be able to achieve our goal of a more trustworthy document.

I would also like to draw your attention to the importance of preventing or deterring employee fraud. Just as I was occasionally offered bribes, today’s examiners have their integrity challenged

when criminals seek any path to obtain a valid State license. To

detect and deter fraud, licensing administrators must rely on technology for internal auditing and business intelligence tools. These

are tools commonly used today in the commercial world.

17

1The prepared statement of Mr. Jansen appears in the Appendix on page 80.

1The letter submitted by Mr. Jansen for EPIC with an attachment appears in the Appendix

on page 124.

For example, States issue commercial licenses today according to

Federal standards and it takes about 45 minutes to complete a required driving test. As a supervisor, I would be concerned about an

examiner who issued a commercial license in only 10 minutes and

I would want to investigate that transaction, but I cannot do that

unless I have the data.

The steps I have outlined are not only necessary, but achievable

with Federal, State, and private cooperation. With your leadership,

we can achieve success in improving our identification systems and

homeland security. I thank you and I look forward to your questions.

Senator DURBIN. Thank you very much, Mr. Goleman. Mr. Jansen.

TESTIMONY OF J. BRADLEY JANSEN,1 DEPUTY DIRECTOR,

CENTER FOR TECHNOLOGY POLICY, FREE CONGRESS FOUNDATION

Mr. JANSEN. Mr. Chairman, thank you for having us here. I

wanted to say that there are a lot of debates on this in the public

fora and I have met with some of the other people in this room

today. A lot of the other fora are more prone to sound bites and

do not necessarily advance a solution to the debate and I congratulate you for bringing together a lot of people who do offer positive

solutions. All of the groups that I know of here and from what I

have heard from the other testimony are all trying to reach actual

solutions, and there is not a simple one-size-fits-all approach that

is going to fix this and I look forward to working with many of the

other people here in the future.

The Free Congress Foundation works with Eagle Forum, the

Electronic Privacy Information Center, and the ACLU to head a

loose ad hoc coalition of groups that are opposed to a national ID

system. I would like to, with that in mind, indulge the Chairman

to include a letter that EPIC asked me to have included in the

record.1

Senator DURBIN. Without objection.

Mr. JANSEN. I would like to highlight some of our concerns briefly and then go into some other comments. The coalition that we are

working with put a letter to President Bush on the AAMVA proposal. We oppose Federal funding for that proposal for a variety of

reasons, the first of which is that a national ID system would not

prevent terrorism. An ID card is only as good as the information

that establishes the identity in the first place and there are other

solutions that need to be done.

A national ID would depend on a massive bureaucracy that

would limit our basic freedoms. There are problems there in terms

of just what the identification is. It is not just necessarily an identification system, but it could easily become a data collection system

and there are broader and complex issues that need to be addressed there which could also contribute to identity fraud.

A national ID system would be expensive and it would direct resources away from more effective counterterrorism measures.

18

There have been a lot of varying estimates on this proposal and

there are lots of other proposals that might be done. We do not

know what the costs and benefits of these are and we need not

rush into some kind of a solution for that.

Our organizations believe very strongly that a national ID system would contribute to identity fraud and make it much more difficult to remedy instances when victims have suffered identity

theft.

Americans have consistently rejected the idea of a national ID

and limited the uses of data collected by the government. In the

1970’s, both Presidents Nixon and Carter rejected the use of Social

Security numbers as a uniform identifier because of privacy concerns. A national ID would be one-stop shopping for perpetrators

of identity theft, who usually use Social Security numbers and

birth certificates for false IDs.

Even with the biometric identifier, such as a fingerprint, on a national ID, there is no guarantee that individuals will not be identified or, more importantly, misidentified in error. The accuracy of

biometric technology varies, depending on the type and implementation, and it would be more difficult to remedy identity fraud

when a thief has a national ID card with your name on it but his

biometric information.

As an example of some of the problems that might happen if we

were to standardize some of these issues, the letter that I received

from the Subcommittee here asking me to testify had my name

spelled differently in the two different times that it mentioned my

name. Again, I am sure there was no intent to defraud or anything

else, but transposition errors can happen.

Senator DURBIN. It was a test. [Laughter.]

Mr. JANSEN. A national ID could require all Americans to carry

an internal passport at all times. That would compromise our privacy, limit our freedom, and expose us to unfair discrimination

based on national origin or religion. The national driver’s license

right now is not used for many of these purposes, but other speakers here are right that it is used more broadly, and the more it is

linked with other purposes, the more it could be used and abused

for other purposes.

If it is linked with, for example, our educational backgrounds, it

will not be difficult to determine that I went to a parochial grade

school and Jesuit high school that began with the word ‘‘Saint’’ and

determine, therefore, that I am Catholic. We need to be very careful what a national identification system is that we are talking

about and also how it might be linked and used with data collection.

In addition to the concerns that we raised in this coalition letter,

the Federal Government already has a lot of authority to address

some of these concerns. Richard Clarke, who is the chairman of the

new Critical Infrastructure Protection Board, was quoted in Wired

magazine recently as saying, ‘‘On the government systems side, we

already have a lot of authority to use standards and enforce them.

We have never done that.’’

What we need to do is for the Federal Government to focus on

systems that are directly affected by the Federal Government. Another speaker here today made reference to a use of a mailing that

19

helped perpetuate identity fraud. The post office has a national

change of address system that needs to be addressed for uses for

identity fraud.

We also need to be concerned that standardizing these procedures across the States would truncate the discovery process during a period of great technological change. Some States might

adopt different types of biometric identification or different types of

systems, such as the one advocated by Senator Allen, that might

be a best system. Even if we adopt what might be an overall best

system now, there is no guarantee that that system would always

be the best system, and by actually having different States adopting different standards, we have a way of comparing and contrasting which systems work and which ones do not and adopting

the better systems more broadly.

In conclusion, I would just like to applaud the Subcommittee for

taking an active role in such an important question. The development of new technologies, including biometrics, might be able to

improve the quality of identification systems, but their capability

should not be exaggerated. The focus of the Federal Government at

this point should be to address the inadequacies of their own systems, such as the passport and INS systems, and again, I thank

you again for this opportunity.

Senator DURBIN. Thank you, Mr. Jansen.

Mr. Jansen, let me ask you, you have undoubtedly flown since

September 11 and have been asked to produce a photo ID at an airport, is that correct?

Mr. JANSEN. Yes.

Senator DURBIN. Do you have problems with that? Do you object

to that?

Mr. JANSEN. To producing ID or a driver’s license to getting on

an airplane?

Senator DURBIN. Right.

Mr. JANSEN. No, not at all.

Senator DURBIN. Why?

Mr. JANSEN. I think that it is a good protection for Americans

and it is also a private commercial enterprise, and if I choose not

to do that, I do not have to, as opposed to a government ID or a

government-imposed system where citizens do not have that choice.

Senator DURBIN. You are getting way ahead of me here. The airports, of course, now are under Federal jurisdiction and the standards that are being used at those airports are subject to Federal

rule, and one of those standards which is ubiquitous is the presentation of a photo ID. I think most people would understand that

that is the entry into the system, and as you said, that is not an

unreasonable request that you verify that you are, in fact, Bradley

Jansen with one ‘‘s’’ and that you are the person who purchased

the ticket. So if that standard of proof is reasonable, what is wrong

with making certain that it is accurate?

Mr. JANSEN. There is nothing wrong with making sure that that

system is accurate, and again, I applaud the Subcommittee for addressing these in a much more constructive fora than we have debated these in the past.

Having a photo ID does not necessarily require a specific identification card. I have traveled using my passport as well as my drivVerDate 11-MAY-2000 09:42 Dec 04, 2002 Jkt 000000 PO 00000 Frm 00023 Fmt 6633 Sfmt 6633 80295.TXT SAFFAIRS PsN: SAFFAIRS
20

er’s license. For example, in the situation of the terrorists, one of

the terrorists used a passport that was stolen, and when the initial

list of alleged hijackers came out, it included the name of someone

who had had his passport stolen, had reported it stolen, and the

State Department itself did not keep a record of passports that

were stolen.

Shunting responsibility to the States on this, I think would risk

absolving the Federal Government for their responsibility in maintaining the accuracy and identification of the systems for which

they should be responsible.

Senator DURBIN. That is a good point, and let me assure you that

no matter what we say about driver’s licenses and State IDs or

other forms of identification, it is not at the expense of the Federal

Government meeting its own obligation, whether it is through the

passports or whatever source of Federal ID is used.

But I want to make it clear that this hearing is about Stateissued driver’s licenses, not a national ID, that the States will still

have the authority to issue and revoke those driver’s licenses.

There is nothing in legislation we are considering that would take

that authority away from the States. What I am trying to explore

here is ways to make certain that on a national basis, we have an

accurate, reliable standard so that if I present an Illinois driver’s

license and Senator Allen presents a Kansas driver’s license at

Reagan National Airport, that they know going in that it is more

likely that they are accurate. That is all that we are seeking to do

here and it is not to establish a national ID, which brings a whole

range of other issues into this discussion.

Mr. Wern, let me start with you, if I might, in my questions.

Senator Allen has been a victim of identity theft and so have I,

about 2 years ago. I was lucky. I did not go through what you did,

but I got a phone call at my home in Springfield, Illinois, one day.

My wife was nearby and they said, ‘‘Well, Durbin, we finally caught

up with you.’’ And I said, ‘‘What are you talking about?’’ They said, ‘‘Did you think you could get by making charges at

Home Depot in Denver, Colorado, and not paying thousands of dollars that you owe us?’’ I said, ‘‘I have never been to a Home Depot

in Denver, Colorado.’’ ‘‘Oh, yes, you have. Is this your Social Security number?’’ They gave it to me. ‘‘And this is your mother’s

name?’’ ‘‘Yes.’’ ‘‘Well, you had a Home Depot credit card and these

charges were made and you have ducked it and we have finally

caught you here in Springfield.’’

In fact, someone had stolen my identity and it took me, I think,

about 2 months to finally go through the credit system and clear

it up. And to their credit, no pun intended, it worked, and when

it was all said and done, my record was cleared.

You went through a much longer, more involved, and obviously

painful process, but ultimately, the person who did this was apprehended, is that correct?

Mr. WERN. Yes.

Senator DURBIN. How did that happen, do you know?

Mr. WERN. It was soon after he got a DUI from an Ohio State

patrolman and was able to give my information and basically walk

scot free from that. I think that the vigilance that they took after

that event, both the Mansfield Division of the Ohio State Patrol

21

and the local Mansfield Police Department, they really focused

their energies on catching this guy because he basically crossed the

line.

That is not to say that other law enforcement was resistant to

following up on these things. It is just hard to catch somebody unless they really do something that bold and visible. Most of the

time, these things happen over the phone, they happen on the

Internet, and it is just hard to track a person down.

Senator DURBIN. A curious situation, though, that he would be

pulled over for a traffic offense, not have a driver’s license, and be

able to talk his way out of it.

Mr. WERN. Yes.

Senator DURBIN. That is what happened?

Mr. WERN. That is what happened.

Senator DURBIN. Did you have the assistance of any State or

Federal agencies in this effort to clear up your identity theft?

Mr. WERN. Aside from law enforcement, there were two investigators working on the case. I contacted the FTC, which has jurisdiction over identity theft cases. Now, at least from a research perspective, they do gather data. I also contacted the Secret Service

and the post office, because a lot of what he was doing would be

considered mail fraud.

The agencies were responsive, but I ultimately came to the decision that this is the kind of problem that I can better deal with myself. Their response was, well, send us everything you have. You

send them everything you have and it is very hard from their perspective, sitting in an office far away, to really approach it from a

granular level and talk to the creditors and track the person down.

And also, there has to be thresholds. There are thousands of

these cases out there, and at the time when I contacted those agencies, it was at the beginning stage and I do not think that the numbers were quite high enough nor the incidents serious enough.

Those agencies have to prioritize their time.

But I think I probably could have looked to those agencies more.

I think, in retrospect, I probably could have benefited more from

their resources, but it became routine. I learned how to deal with

it and I tackled it, I guess, in my own way.

Senator DURBIN. And as you said, as a lawyer, you know how to

write a forceful letter.

Mr. WERN. Yes.

Senator DURBIN. Chief Viverette, have you worked the Highway

Patrol for the State of Maryland, or at least enforced traffic?

Chief VIVERETTE. Within my community, yes, sir.

Senator DURBIN. And so when someone is pulled over and presents a driver’s license, which is the first thing that you are asked

for, what is normal in terms of verification at the site of the stop

or the arrest when it comes to that driver’s license?

Chief VIVERETTE. Sir, it is normal for us to use that document

fair on its face unless we have a computer available to us where

we can check that documentation. It may be that the computer is

down and we have to believe that what we receive is fair on its face

and write the citation.

Senator DURBIN. If the computer is working, what can you learn?

22

Chief VIVERETTE. Well, we can learn more about that individual

and ask additional questions. Sometimes we will ask for a registration and we can compare the information. But it is not unusual to

find tickets in a stolen vehicle where someone has provided false

information. The car is stolen and the tickets are left in the car as

the culprit leaves the vehicle behind.

Senator DURBIN. But you have a computer system that links you

to the Maryland State Police, is that how it works?

Chief VIVERETTE. That is correct, sir. Not all the cars have computers, just the fortunate agencies that can afford them. You can

run them through communications, but sometimes air traffic and

a busy night precludes that, or the computer may be down, or you

just get very specific information that the person is not suspended.

Senator DURBIN. Ms. Serian, let us talk about the system now.

Assume that Chief Viverette has pulled someone over and gone

into the State computer system to get some more information to

see if that driver’s license is valid. Does that, for example, if she

picks someone’s license from the State of Pennsylvania, does her

Maryland system check with the State of Pennsylvania at that

point?

Ms. SERIAN. Yes. I believe there is a nationwide system that can

check on the driver’s status of records through the State police systems. Ideally, in police officers’ cars in any State, eventually, you

should be able to pull up the photo so that would tell you then if

that really is the person or is not. But once again, photos are not

even commonplace on all licenses and the technology has not—it is

not available, I guess I should say. It is advanced, but not available

everywhere.

So yes, there are communication links that can allow those

things to happen, and perhaps Mr. Wern’s record would have been

flagged. But in this case, it probably was not. In the case when it

would be flagged, the local or State police officer would know that

this is a potential fraud issue here.

Senator DURBIN. But the communication between States is critical in the world of interstate commerce.

Ms. SERIAN. The communication between States is very critical,

especially, Senator, between DMVs and driver licensing organizations. We right now have a critical communication in terms of information for the commercial drivers. The Commercial Driver Licensing Information System provides not only a status, but also the

driving histories that can be transferred from State to State.

That is a very good system, and that is why the AAMVA

proposal also calls for a system that includes the Drivers Record

Information Verification System so that driving records and the information that surrounds that driver or ID card holder can be

transferred from State to State. That will, indeed, help local law

enforcement officials.

Senator DURBIN. Of course, some of the things that we are in the

process of putting into a piece of legislation include trying to make

certain that the issuance of the driver’s license in the first instance

is valid, that the person does prove their identity going in.

I was recently interviewed by one of the television networks.

They sent a reporter to the streets of Los Angeles with $150. It

took her 2 hours to come up with something that looked like a drivVerDate 11-MAY-2000 09:42 Dec 04, 2002 Jkt 000000 PO 00000 Frm 00026 Fmt 6633 Sfmt 6633 80295.TXT SAFFAIRS PsN: SAFFAIRS
23

er’s license, and those of us who walk through airports know how

closely those licenses are examined. People look at them quickly

and off they go. I think it would be easy to counterfeit them under

the current circumstances.

There has been talk here about a smart card, about more information and transfer. The idea, I guess, is if you can swipe a credit

card and in a hurry determine whether or not there is any credit

to be issued, the same thing could be true for driver’s licenses in

the future, is that correct?

Ms. SERIAN. Yes, it is. However, I would say that right now, we

need to really focus on improving the driver licensing document as

the product that needs improvement. What States may wish to do

in the future are taking a driver’s license and making it other

things, including health care benefits, those types of things. Many

States are researching those possibilities right now. But that really

needs to be a State-to-State decision.

What we have is a system that is broken and a product that is

not very reliable. So I would really encourage the Subcommittee to

stay focused on improving the driver’s license.

For example, this is not a valid Pennsylvania driver’s license. I

know it. It is a counterfeit. But it would be very difficult, and it

is very difficult for the 16,000 police organizations throughout the

country, or in California, as you mentioned, to know if that is a

valid license or not. That is why minimum standards are an important thing to consider.

Senator DURBIN. Let me ask you this, Mr. Varn, because I

thought you made some very important philosophical distinctions

about anonymity and when you surrender it in our society. In the

National Governors Association, how far along are you in discussing this issue?

Mr. VARN. Not very far along, Senator. I would say the governors

are at the beginning of discussing this issue. The technologists are

a little further along. NASCIO has been looking at this issue of

identity security for some time and you will find a number of efforts in different States to improve identity security, but I would

say the governors just started to examine it.

Senator DURBIN. In fairness, we are just starting to work on this

bill, so I am not being critical of your lack of effort, but I think

when we look at what has happened in the 7 months or so since

September 11, we now realize this is going to be the coin of the

realm in America. You are going to have to produce a photo ID,

and the question is, is it reliable and is it accurate?

Senator Allen, in the State of Kansas, you have gone through

this experience. What kind of political resistance have you run into

in terms of making your process a little more accurate?

Ms. ALLEN. The issue has been the issue of loss of privacy and

loss of personal freedom, and I guess it just depends on your perspective on the issue, but to me, we are protecting privacy and protecting security and it is really those people who have something

to hide who do not want to verify their identity. Those people who

do not have anything to hide, I think are happy to provide whatever means are necessary to prove their identification.

Senator DURBIN. I guess the privacy issue is the most important

part of this conversation. How far can or should government go in

24

asking questions? As Mr. Varn mentioned, when you walk in and

say, ‘‘I want to drive a car in this State,’’ you have basically said, ‘‘I am part of your system now. What are the standards you use

in your system? Do I have to take a test, have my photo taken, a

thumbprint?’’ Whatever it happens to be, I have really voluntarily

submitted myself to a system that has been established in the

State.

I want to make it clear for the record that what we are trying

to establish here in this legislation are the basic minimum standards of identification. Each State can then decide where they want

to go in terms of additional information, and that is something that

will be debated in Kansas or Illinois or Pennsylvania, as to what

other information might be included in that card. But when Chief

Viverette and her officers with the International Association of

Chiefs of Police stop someone across America, there ought to be

some basic standards that they can look to and say, we know that

this is a valid Pennsylvania driver’s license and this one is not because there are certain elements we are going to look for that are

common to each and every one of them.

I might also add, it is interesting, if you would go to the City of

Chicago on virtually any weekday morning, just south of Wacker

Drive, you will see hundreds of people standing on the sidewalk

outside of an office building. They are trying to get into the Mexican consulate because the country of Mexico is now issuing a card

called a matricula and the matricula is a national ID card in Mexico, and these Mexicans in the United States are anxious to get it

because with that card, they can get into the financial system in

our country. They can open bank accounts and do other things.

The standard of proof for those cards is far beyond any driver’s

license that I have seen in the United States. They have to produce

original copies and certified copies of birth documents, a copy of a

driver’s license, for example, from Mexico, local identification as

well. It is a very high standard which is being used.

And it is interesting that we are saying to people from other

countries in our Nation, you are held to this high standard, but yet

for those within our Nation, we do not seem to establish the same

standard of proof in terms of what we can achieve.

Mr. Goleman, let me ask you about the technology. You have

talked about that for a second. How expensive is this? Where is

this going to take us in terms of what it will cost to make these

cards less easy to counterfeit?

Mr. GOLEMAN. The card production itself, States probably spend

today in the neighborhood of about $1 per card to produce the current type of driver’s license. Actually, Ms. Serian can probably tell

you more accurately what she pays in Pennsylvania. But I would

estimate that card production costs would probably go up substantially, up into the $2, $3, $4, $5 range in order to put much higher

security features on the licenses, or if you go to smart cards or

imbed biometric technology into the card itself. It is still not a high

cost, more similar to the costs that Europeans pay for identity

cards.

Senator DURBIN. The range of $1 to $5, you think, is a reasonable range for our conversation here in terms of current cost versus

additional expense to make them more reliable?

25

Mr. GOLEMAN. Yes, I do. On a mass production basis, I think

that the costs would be that.

Senator DURBIN. Senator Allen, did you want to comment on

that?

Ms. ALLEN. Well, I did. In our bill, we originally doubled the fees

for everything to cover the costs of implementation and there was

a lot of resistance to that. So what we ended up doing was amending the bill and we just raised the photo fee by $1, from $2 to $3,

and we estimated that that would cover the cost of implementing

even the biometric piece. So it is really not a big increase.

Senator DURBIN. That takes that argument to a different level.

Let me ask you about the other question, about the use of databases by the States in issuance of driver’s licenses. Getting back to

the point Mr. Jansen and others have made about privacy here,

can you tell me what you think the standard should be, should

there be any national standard, let us say, about the use of the

database of information beyond law enforcement and verification of

identification? Ms. Serian.

Ms. SERIAN. There absolutely should be, Senator. Motor vehicle

agencies right now are governed by some of the strictest privacy

standards anywhere, and that is the Driver Privacy Protection Act.

We take those very seriously. In fact, many States have even more

stringent privacy regulations and laws than the DPPA requires.

We take that very seriously and we certainly follow that law.

I do believe that with any new proposal, we should probably consider additional amendments or considerations to change the Driver Privacy Protection Act in terms of strengthening it even further.

Even though we have very stringent privacy laws and regulations

and we take those very seriously and we treat that as a great responsibility, I think there is still a need to even consider stronger

amendments to the Driver Privacy Protection Act.

For an example, if I may——

Senator DURBIN. Sure.

Ms. SERIAN. An example of taking your license right now and not

using it for verification procedures—this is a real Pennsylvania license here—and using it in bars or nightclubs, not just for

verification of age, or in convenience stores for verification to be

able to buy tobacco, taking that information that is on there and

storing it, even though you might give it up freely to go into that

bar, or even though you might give it up freely to go to the convenience store or stay in a hotel, I think we need to consider greater

uses in terms of more stringent requirements so that it can only

be used for verification purposes and certainly not retaining the

data.

Senator DURBIN. Mr. Goleman, you also made a reference to Federal standards when it came to commercial driver’s licenses. What

are those standards that currently apply when the States issue

these commercial driver’s licenses, the Federal standards?

Mr. GOLEMAN. There are several standards. There are standards

for the actual tests that the driver has to take. But as far as the

information system goes, the States issue the licenses according to

the Federal standards and the States maintain that driving record,

but once they issue that license, they essentially register that driver into the Commercial Drivers License Information System, which

26

is merely an index of the fact that this driver, Joe Smith, with this

date of birth and this driver’s license number was issued a license

in the State of Illinois.

If that driver attempts to get a license in any other State, the

State is required to check first to see if he is already registered in

the system, and if he is, then that record is pulled back into the

new State for combining with his existing record.

So the States retain the data in their own systems. It is a very

critical aspect of the system, that they retain ownership of that

data and are responsible for it. Yet there is a centralized index that

allows them to locate the record wherever it is.

Senator DURBIN. Good. Thank you very much.

I might say that we had a number of witnesses who wanted to

join us today from a variety of different groups, Mothers Against

Drunk Driving and others. Each group kind of came to this from

a little different angle, but they all started with the same premise,

that the misuse of driver’s licenses had caused terrible problems,

and I think we have heard about quite a bit of that today.

The identity theft question, which involves not just credit but

traffic offenses and, in fact, reputation of an individual, which has

to be reconstructed, and fortunately, Mr. Wern, you were able to

do that because of your own skills.

Chief Viverette has talked to us about the law enforcement side

of this. But for a driver’s license issued to one of the would-be terrorists and used on September 9 to avoid any further investigation,

people may be alive today who were killed on September 11. It is

a matter of that sort of gravity.

We have also heard and probably know from personal experience

these young people who use these driver’s licenses for alcohol and

tobacco and to hide bad driving records.

The list goes on and on, and I think it really calls on us to try

to come up with a reasonable means of cooperating with the State

issuing agencies so that we can establish meaningful standards so

that people know that it is a serious process in the issuance of

State IDs and driver’s licenses so that we can verify that they are

not defeating the system by forum shopping in different States for

the easiest place to find a driver’s license, so that we can also find

out whether someone has a bad driving record in one State and is

trying to avoid that knowledge in another.

It is a way to crack down on fake ID mills and to deter internal

fraud, and I think Chief Viverette made the point, and others, as

well, we need to stiffen the penalties. We need to take this seriously. If we are going to go through what I consider to be the acceptable hassle of producing photo IDs, let us make certain that

they are accurate from the start.

Thank you all very much for joining us. It was a good panel and

we will proceed in preparation of this legislation.

The Subcommittee meeting will stand adjourned.

[Whereupon, at 11:24 a.m., the Subcommittee was adjourned.]

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