J-S13044-17

NON-PRECEDENTIAL DECISION - SEE SUPERIOR COURT I.O.P. 65.37

COMMONWEALTH OF PENNSYLVANIA IN THE SUPERIOR COURT OF

PENNSYLVANIA

v.

ANTHONY H. PAGE

 Appellant No. 2356 EDA 2016

Appeal from the PCRA Order June 23, 2016

in the Court of Common Pleas of Montgomery County 

Criminal Division at No(s): CP-46-CR-0021037-1986

BEFORE: BENDER, P.J.E., LAZARUS, and FITZGERALD,*JJ.

MEMORANDUM BY FITZGERALD, J.: FILED APRIL 18, 2017

Appellant, Anthony H. Page, appeals pro se from the order of the 

Montgomery County Court of Common Pleas dismissing his fourth petition 

filed under the Post Conviction Relief Act1(“PCRA”) as untimely. Appellant 

claims that his petition was timely filed in light of Montgomery v. 

Louisiana, 136 S. Ct. 718 (2016), and Miller v. Alabama, 132 S. Ct. 2455 

(2012). We affirm.

A detailed recitation of the factual and procedural history is 

unnecessary to this appeal. It suffices to note that on October 15, 1986, a 

jury found Appellant guilty of, inter alia, second degree murder for acts he 

 

*

Former Justice specially assigned to the Superior Court.

1 42 Pa.C.S. §§ 9541-9546. 
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committed when he was twenty years old.2 Appellant was sentenced to life 

imprisonment on August 26, 1987. 

Appellant previously filed two PCRA petitions, without relief being 

granted. Appellant filed a third PCRA petition seeking relief under Miller, 

which was dismissed. Appellant did not appeal from the dismissal of his 

third petition.

On October 24, 2013, Appellant filed a petition for writ of habeas 

corpus challenging his detention without a sentencing order. The trial court 

denied relief on that petition, and this Court affirmed. Commonwealth v. 

Page, 873 EDA 2014 (Pa. Super. Aug. 13, 2014). 

On May 26, 2016, the PCRA court received Appellant’s “motion for 

reconsideration of previously filed PCRA petition,” which gives rise to this 

appeal.3 Appellant sought relief in light of Montgomery, which the United 

States Supreme Court decided on January 25, 2016, and claimed he filed his 

motion within sixty days of that decision. The PCRA court regarded 

Appellant’s motion as his fourth PCRA petition and issued a Pa.R.Crim.P. 907 

notice of its intent to dismiss the petition without a hearing. The court 

dismissed the petition on June 23, 2016. 

 

2 Appellant’s birthday is listed as June 28, 1965. The relevant events took 

place in February of 1986. 

3 Appellant’s motion was dated March 20, 2016. 
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Appellant timely appealed. The PCRA court did not order the filing of a 

Pa.R.A.P. 1925(b) statement, but filed an opinion in which it found that 

Miller did not entitle Appellant to resentencing due his age at the time of 

the offense. PCRA Ct. Op., 11/7/16, at 2. The court further opined that it 

was irrelevant whether Appellant filed the instant petition within sixty days 

of Montgomery. Id. 

Appellant presents the following question for review: “Did the [PCRA] 

court error in finding a PCRA exception inapplicable?” Appellant’s Brief at 2. 

Appellant specifically contends that Miller and Montgomery provide him 

relief from the PCRA time bar under 42 Pa.C.S. § 9545(b)(1)(iii). Id. at 8. 

No relief is due. 

“Our standard of review of a PCRA court’s dismissal of a PCRA petition 

is limited to examining whether the PCRA court’s determination is supported 

by the evidence of record and free of legal error.” Commonwealth v. 

Wilson, 824 A.2d 331, 333 (Pa. Super. 2003) (en banc) (citation omitted).

As our Supreme Court has explained:

the PCRA timeliness requirements are jurisdictional in 

nature and, accordingly, a PCRA court is precluded from 

considering untimely PCRA petitions. We have also held 

that even where the PCRA court does not address the 

applicability of the PCRA timing mandate, th[e] Court will 

consider the issue sua sponte, as it is a threshold question 

implicating our subject matter jurisdiction and ability to 

grant the requested relief. 

Commonwealth v. Whitney, 817 A.2d 473, 477-78 (Pa. 2003) (citations 

omitted). 
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A PCRA petition “must normally be filed within one year of the date the 

judgment becomes final . . . unless one of the exceptions in § 9545(b)(1)(i)-

(iii) applies and the petition is filed within 60 days of the date the claim

could have been presented.” Commonwealth v. Copenhefer, 941 A.2d

646, 648 (Pa. 2007) (some citations and footnote omitted). The three 

exceptions to the general one-year time limitation are:

(i) the failure to raise the claim previously was the result 

of interference by government officials with the 

presentation of the claim in violation of the Constitution or 

laws of this Commonwealth or the Constitution or laws of 

the United States;

(ii) the facts upon which the claim is predicated were 

unknown to the petitioner and could not have been 

ascertained by the exercise of due diligence; or

(iii) the right asserted is a constitutional right that was 

recognized by the Supreme Court of the United States or 

the Supreme Court of Pennsylvania after the time period 

provided in this section and has been held by that court to 

apply retroactively. 

42 Pa.C.S. § 9545(b)(1)(i)-(iii). 

Here, Appellant does not dispute that the instant petition was untimely 

on its face. See Appellant’s Brief at 6. Following our review, we agree with 

the PCRA court that Miller and Montgomery do not afford Appellant relief 

from the PCRA time bar because Appellant was not a juvenile when he 

committed the offenses. See Commonwealth v. Furgess, 149 A.3d 90, 

94 (Pa. Super. 2016) (noting “petitioners who were older than 18 at the 

time they committed murder are not within the ambit of the Miller decision 
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and therefore may not rely on that decision to bring themselves within the 

time-bar exception in Section 9545(b)(1)(iii)”). Under these circumstances, 

we also agree that it is unnecessary to determine whether Appellant filed the 

instant petition within sixty days of Montgomery. Thus, we affirm the 

PCRA court’s dismissal of Appellant’s fourth PCRA petition. See Wilson, 824 

A.2d at 333. 

Order affirmed.

Judgment Entered.

Joseph D. Seletyn, Esq.

Prothonotary

Date: 4/18/2017