THE STATE OF SOUTH CAROLINA In The Court of Appeals

Polly Thompson, Respondent,

v.

Cathy Swicegood, Appellant.

Appellate Case No. 2015-001860

Appeal From Oconee County Diane Schafer Goodstein, Circuit Court Judge Ellis B. Drew, Jr., Master-in-Equity

Opinion No. 5736 Heard September 18, 2019 – Filed July 1, 2020

AFFIRMED AS MODIFIED

John G. Reckenbeil, of Law Office of John G. Reckenbeil, L.L.C., of Mauldi n, and J. Falkner Wilkes, of Greenville, for Appellant.

Margaret A. Chamberlain, of Chamberlain Law Firm, LLC, of Greenville, and Meli ssa Hope Moore, of Law Office of Melissa H. Moore, LLC, of Fountain Inn, for Respondent.

LOCKEMY, C.J.: Cathy Swicegood appeals the master-in-equity's order of partition, arguing the master erred by (1) refusing to consider the issue of the parties' alleged common-law marriage and stay the action pending a resolution of that issue in family court, (2) excluding evidence proving her contributions to jointly owned real property, (3) determini ng her contribution to such property, and(4) failing to apply the correct analysis wh en determining the parties' interests in the property. We affirm as modified.

FACTS

Polly Thompson filed this action in circu it court for partition and ouster in March 2014. She alleged she and Swicegood held title to two properties—a home in Westminster, South Carolina (the Lake Hartwell home) and a condominium in Hilton Head, South Carolina (the Hilton Head condo)—as joint tenants. Thompson alleged she was entitled to so le ownership and title as to both properties.

Swicegood then filed a summons and co mplaint in family court alleging a common-law marriage existed between th e parties and seeking, among other things, recognition of the separation of the parties, an award of separate support and maintenance, a nd equitable division of marital property. 1 Swicegood moved to dismiss or, alternatively, stay the partiti on action, arguing she sought an order from the family court declaring she and T hompson were married by common law. Thereafter, the family court dismissed Sw icegood's complaint for lack of subject matter jurisdiction, finding that pursu ant to the then-existing laws banning same-sex marriage in this state, no co mmon-law marriage existed as a matter of law. Swicegood appealed the family court's order. 2 Meanwhile, in October 2014,
the circuit court denied Sw icegood's motion to dismiss or stay the partition action, finding there was no just cause for granting a stay. The court reasoned in part that Thompson filed her petition in circuit cour t first and Swicegood's subsequent filing in family court did not remove juri sdiction from the circuit court.

The partition action proceeded to a hearing before the master-in-equity in March 2015. At the outset of the hearing, T hompson moved to exclude any evidence or argument concerning whether the parties we re married and any evidence regarding "sweat equity" in any property other than the two properties at issue in the partition action. Swicegood again moved to stay the proceeding, arguing that after the family court dismissed the case for lack of subject matter jurisdiction and the circuit court denied her previous motion to stay, the United States District Court

1 The couple's primary residence was not a pr operty at issue in the partition action.

2 We decided this appeal in Swicegood v. Thompson , Op. No. 5735 (S.C. Ct. App. filed July 1, 2020), which includes a comple te procedural history of the family

court matter.had overturned South Carolina's statutory prohibition of same-sex marriage. 3 The master denied Swicegood's motion to st ay and granted Thompson's motion to exclude evidence of the alleged marriage, reasoning he expressed no opinion as to whether there was a marriage, and even if there were, the matter was "still a partition action" according to the pleadi ngs. Swicegood argued she was entitled to sweat equity because during the thirteen-y ear relationship, a significant amount of assets and sweat equity culminated into the purchase of these properties and she "and others" took actions to bring value to these properties. Ho wever, the master granted Thompson's motion to exclude ev idence of any sweat equity Swicegood may have had in any propert y other than the Lake Ha rtwell home or Hilton Head
condo.

Thompson purchased the Hilton Head condo in June 2013 for $372,500. The deed listed both parties as owners. Thom pson paid the down payment with an
inheritance she received fro m her parents, a nd Swicegood contributed no funds. The mortgage on the Hilton Head condo wa s in Thompson's name only, and she paid all of the mortgage payments on th e property as well as all regime fees, insurance premiums, utility bills, and fitn ess club fees. According to Thompson, the Hilton Head condo required some improve ments, such as wallpaper removal, painting, plumbing repair, and replacing li ght fixtures, switches, and the washer and dryer. She stated she paid for all of the labor and construction associated with these improvements, and although she acknowledged Swicego od performed some of this labor, she stated she paid Sw icegood for her work. Thompson explained
she rented out the Hilton Head condo wh en possible and had earned $22,000 in rental income since purchasing the home. Thompson testified she contributed $ 142,477.01 , less the rental income , to the Hilton Head condo.

The Lake Hartwell home consisted of tw o lots: Lot 58 and Lot 59. Thompson purchased the first lot, Lot 59, in Ma y 2010 for $38,500; she paid a down payment of $ 10,209.98 and obtained a mortgage for the balance of the purchase price. Thompson purchased the second lot, Lot 58, in July 2012 for $35,000 and paid the full purchase price with her inheritance. Thompson then had a home constructed on the lots. Swicegood contributed $22,0 00 of the total $ 28,678.43 down payment on the construction of the home, and Thompson contributed the remaining $ 6,678.43 . Thompson obtained a mortgage for the remaining $151,500 of the purchase price. She testified the $10,209.98 and $6,678.43 she paid for the purchase and construction of the Lake Hartwell home came from her checking

3 See Condon v. Haley , 21 F. Supp. 3d 572, 587 (D.S.C. 2014) (striking down
South Carolina's ban on same-sex marriage as unconstitutional).account, and none of those funds came from Swicegood. Additionally, Thompson paid all mortgage payments, homeowners' association fees, taxes, and insurance premiums on the property. She explained she hired a builder to build the home and paid for other construction and improveme nts to the property. Thompson stated she paid $ 42,735.41 for the construction and improvements, including $7,000 paid on Swicegood's Lowe's credit card and several checks for Swicegood's labor. Thompson again acknowledged Swicegood pe rformed some labor and agreed she was often present during the building of the Lake Hartwell home but insisted she paid Swicegood for this work.

Swicegood moved into the Lake Hartwell home in December 2013 after the couple separated. Thompson alle ged Swicegood changed the lo cks and denied her entry to the home thereafter. During this time, Thompson continued to pay the mortgage, homeowner's association fees, insurance, and taxe s on the home. She claimed $ 14,143.77 in damages due to Swi cegood's ouster but later stipulated she sent Swicegood a letter in December 2013 giving her perm ission to live there.

Thompson stated that in exchange fo r Swicegood's work on the Hilton Head condo, she gave her a 2009 Bu ick and paid her with checks. She conceded Swicegood paid her $9,500 for the Buick but stated it was worth "at least $18,000." Thompson acknowledged she previously owne d a villa in Hilton Head, which she purchased in 2003 with proceed s from the sale of stock sh e owned. She stated she sold this property in December 2013, it was titled in her name only, and no funds from its sale were applied to any othe r purchase. Thompson admitted Swicegood transferred title in property she owned to Thompson by quitclaim deed in 2010. Although the master refused to admit evid ence concerning this transfer, Thompson acknowledged the $22,000 Swicegood contribu ted to the purchase of the Lake
Hartwell home came from the sa le of that property.

Swicegood testified she operated a business that provided landscaping and interior design services. She stated she and Thompson continually tried to "flip" properties in order to have "nice places" to live in upon retirement. Swicegood attempted to explain she contributed labor to the villa that Thompson previously owned, and Thompson objected. Swicegood conceded , acknowledging the master's earlier ruling. Swicegood explained she removed carpet, painted, ch anged outlets and switches, created window tr eatments, covered cornice boards, and replaced new toilets, faucets, and towel racks in the Hilton Head condo. She stated she had furniture reupholstered, purchased bedding, and decorated. Sw icegood testified it took seven days to flip the condo. She st ated she paid someone $1,300 to complete plumbing and electrical work. Swicegood testified she also touched up paint andreplaced light bulbs when she stayed at the Hilton Head condo. She provided an "invoice," consisting of a summary of the work she completed at the Hilton Head condo, which totaled $17,490. Of this amount, Swicegood estimated she was owed $ 5,910.91 . However, she admitted th e invoice was not creat ed at the time the work was done; rather, she "rewrote" all of her invoices for use at the hearing. Swicegood confirmed she had no documenta tion showing her payment for any of
the materials listed on the invoi ce. She averred the refurb ishing of the Hilton Head condo allowed the parties to earn higher re ntal income on the property. Swicegood testified she "drew the plans" for the La ke Hartwell home and was present at the home "every single day" during its construction. She agreed Thompson had paid
her for work on the Lake Hartwell home and the Hilton Head condo, but she denied she had been paid for all of her work. Swicegood identified several checks she received from Thompson. She ag reed the checks ranged from $1,000 and $5,000 but stated some checks were fo r materials. She acknowledged Thompson paid her "to handle the affairs" during th e building of the Lake Hartwell home in Thompson's place. Swicegood admitted she changed the locks at the Lake
Hartwell home after she move d in because Thompson continued to come to the home even though their attorneys had asked her not to.

Swicegood also presented the testimony of Stephanie Computaro, who testified Swicegood did "the majority of the work" during the refurbishing of the Hilton Head condo, and "as far as the hands on construction" a nd "the vision, buying of the materials to do those jobs, that was a hundred percent [Swicegood]."

Following the partition hearing, the par ties made their offers to purchase the properties. They agreed the mortgage balance for th e Lake Hartwell property was $ 143,407.75 , with equity of $67,742, and th e mortgage balance for the Hilton Head condo was $ 269,100.57 , with equity of $ 120,599. Thompson offered to purchase the Hilton Head condo for $ 275,100.57

, and the Lake Hartwell home for $ 188,407.75 , while Swicegood o ffered to transfer title of the Hilton Head condo to Thompson in exchange for Thompson tran sferring title of the Lake Hartwell property to Swicegood. The master f ound Thompson made the greater offer to purchase. Because the remaining balanc e on mortgage for the Hilton Head condo was $ 269,100.57 , the master determined there was $6,000 in proceeds from the
Hilton Head condo to be divided between the parties. Likewise, because the remaining balance on the Lake Hartwell home was $ 143,407.75, the master determined there was $45,000 in proceed s from the Lake Hartwell home to be divided between the parties.The master concluded that with respect to the Hilton Head condo, Thompson paid the entire down payment on the property, ever y mortgage payment, all regime fees, all homeowner's insurance premiums, all ta xes, and all fitne ss club dues and cable fees. He found Thompson's contri bution totaled $ 129,838.70 , and though Swicegood contributed sweat e quity in the form of interior decorating, the amount of work she performed was disputed, a nd Thompson presented evidence she paid Swicegood for her labor and ma terials. The master f ound the equity in the condo was $120,325, and Swicegood c ontributed nothing financia lly to the property and was entitled to no right, title, or interest in that property. With respect to the Lake Hartwell home, the master concluded Swicegood pa id $22,000 of the down payment on the home and Thompson paid $45,679.21 for the two lots and $ 6,678.43 of the down payment on the home. The master determined Thompson paid every mortgage paym ent, all property owners ' association dues, all homeowner's insurance premiums and all taxes. He found Sw icegood contributed sweat equity in the form of interior d ecorating and design, but the amount of work she performed was disputed and Thom pson presented evidence she paid Swicegood for her labor and materials. He concluded Thompson contributed $ 129,838.70 and Swicegood cont ributed $22,000 towards th e Lake Hartwell home, and the equity in the home was $ 67,74 2.25 . The master found Thompson's contributions far exceeded both Swicegood' s contributions and the equity in the property. The master found there was a tremendous disparity between the parties' contributions to the property and Swicegood had no right, title, or interest in the Lake Hartwell property.

As to both properties, the master foun d the disparities between the parties' contributions to the acquis ition and maintenance of the properties was in favor of Thompson and awarding Swicegood any intere st in the property would be unjust and inequitable. Thus, the master awarded Thom pson full right, title, and ownership of both properties, and awar ded the remaining $6,000 and $45,000 to Thompson. The master denied Thomps on's claim for ouster, finding although Swicegood committed ouster Thompson faile d to establish damages. Swicegood filed a motion to reconsider, which the mast er denied. This appeal followed.

STANDARD OF REVIEW

"The question of subject matter ju risdiction is a question of law." Porter v. Labor Depot , 372 S.C. 560, 567, 643 S.E.2d 96, 100 (Ct. App. 2007). "This Court reviews all questions of law de novo." Fesmire v. Digh , 385 S.C. 296, 302, 683 S.E.2d 803, 807 (Ct. App. 2009). "A partition action is an equitable action and, as such, we may review the ev idence to determine facts in accordance with our ownview of the preponderance of the evidence." Zimmerman v. Marsh , 365 S.C. 383, 386, 618 S.E.2d 898, 900 (2005). "However, th is broad scope of review does not require this court to disregard the findings at trial or ignore the fact that the trial judge was in a better positi on to assess the credibility of the witnesses." Laughon

v. O'Braitis , 360 S.C. 520, 524-25, 602 S.E.2d 108, 110 (Ct. App. 2004). On the other hand, "evidentiary and procedural rulings of the fa mily court are reviewed for
an abuse of discretion." Brown v. Odom , 425 S.C. 420, 429, 823 S.E.2d 183, 187 (Ct. App. 2019). "An abuse of discretion occurs wh en the conclusions of the trial court either lack evidentiary support or are controlled by an error of law." Burke v. Republic Parking Sys., Inc. , 421 S.C. 553, 558, 808 S.E.2d 626, 628 (Ct. App. 2017) (quoting State v. Pagan , 369 S.C. 201, 208, 631 S. E.2d 262, 265 (2006)).

LAW/ANALYSIS

I. Denial of Motion to Stay

Swicegood argues the circuit court erred by refusing to consider the issue of marriage and stay the partition action pendi ng a resolution of the marriage issue.
She contends that if the courts were to determine she and Thompson were married, the order of partition would be void for lack of subject matter jurisdiction because the family court would have exclusive ju risdiction to determine their respective interests in the properties. Swicegood furthe r asserts the court's refusal to stay the matter prejudiced her because the family court would have applied a different analysis in determining the parties' inte rests in the properties. We disagree.

"The granting of a motion for a stay of proceedings rests entirely within the discretion of the trial [court]." City of Spartanburg v. Belk 's Dep't Store of Clinton

, 199 S.C. 458, 20 S.E.2d 157, 167 (1942). Section 63-3-530(A)(2) of the South Carolina Code (2010 & Supp. 2019) provides,

The family court has exclusive jurisdiction . . . to hear
and determine actions for di vorce a vinculo matrimonii, separate support and maintena nce, legal separation, and in other marital litigation be tween the parties, and for settlement of all legal and e quitable rights of the parties
in the actions in and to the real and personal property of the marriage . . . .

(emphasis added). "[M]arital property" is defined as "all real and personal property which has been acquired by the pa rties during the marriage and which isowned as of the date of filing or commenc ement of marital litigation . . . ." S.C. Code Ann. § 20-3-630(A) (2014). "The [family] court does not have jurisdiction or authority to apportion nonmarital prope rty." S.C. Code Ann. § 20-3-630(B) (2014); see also Tipton v. Tipton , 351 S.C. 456, 459, 570 S.E.2d 195, 196 (Ct. App. 2002) (holding the family court "l acked subject matter jurisdiction to determine the parties' property rights in any way" when the family court found no common-law marriage existed between the pa rties and the appellant did not appeal that finding).

"Under South Carolina law, the Court of Common Pleas has jurisdiction in all cases of real and personal estates held in joint tenancy or in common to make partition in kind or by allotment." Eichor v. Eichor , 290 S.C. 484, 487, 351 S.E.2d 353, 354 (Ct. App. 1986). "[P]roperty held in joint tena ncy is subject to partition."
Smith v. Cutler , 366 S.C. 546, 551, 623 S.E.2d 644, 647 (2005). "An action for partition of undivided interests is not marita l litigation, and thus is not within the jurisdiction of the family court." Gilley v. Gilley , 327 S.C. 8, 10, 488 S.E.2d 310, 312 (1997) (quoting Eichor , 290 S.C. at 487, 351 S.E.2d at 355).

As a threshold matter, we find the circu it court had subject matter jurisdiction to hear the partition action. See Eichor , 290 S.C. at 487, 351 S.E.2d at 354 ("Under South Carolina law, the Court of Common Pleas has jurisdiction in all cases of real and personal estates held in joint tenancy or in common to make partition in kind or by allotment."). In Swicegood , Op. No. 5735, we concluded no common-law marriage existed between the parties as a matter of law and affirmed the family court's dismissal of Swicegood's compla int based on lack of subject matter jurisdiction. Absent a marri age, there can be no marital property. The family court therefore lacked subject matt er jurisdiction to divide the parties' property. Thus, the circuit court had subject matter ju risdiction over the partition action.

Next, we find the master was not obligated to grant a stay of the partition action
under the circumstances of this case. See City of Spartanburg , 199 S.C. 458, 20 S.E.2d 157 ("The granting of a motion for a stay of proceedings rests entirely within the discretion of the trial [court]."). The parties' marital status in and of
itself does not affect the circuit court's subject matter jurisd iction over a partition action between such parties. See Gilley , 327 S.C. at 10, 488 S.E.2d at 312 ("An action for partition of undivided interests is not marital litigation, and thus is not within the jurisdiction of the family court." (quoting Eichor , 290 S.C. at 487, 351 S.E.2d at 355)). Here, the family court di smissed the complaint for lack of subject matter jurisdiction, finding the parties had no common-law marriage as a matter of law pursuant to state laws prohibiting same-s ex marriage, which were still in effectat the time. See S.C. Code Ann. § 20-1-15 (2014 ) ("A marriage between persons of the same sex is void ab initio and ag ainst the public policy of this State."); see also S.C. Const. art. XVII, § 15 ("A marri age between one man and one woman is the only lawful domestic union that shall be valid or recognized in this State");

S.C. Code Ann. § 20-1-10 ( 2014) (stating "[a]ll persons, except . . . persons whose marriage is prohibited by this section, may lawfully contract matrimony"); id. (stating "[n]o man shall marry . . . another man" and "[n]o woman shall marry . . . another woman"). Thus, at th e time the circuit court and master ruled upon Swicegood's motion to stay, the fa mily court lacked subject matter jurisdiction to determine the parties' pr operty rights. Under these circumstances, we find the master did not err by refusi ng to stay the partition action pending resolution of the family court matter.

II. Partition

Swicegood argues the master erred in de termining the value of each party's contribution to the properties. She assert s the master erred by excluding evidence
of the value she contributed to each property, including evidence relating to properties other than the Lake Hartwe ll home and Hilton Head condo. Swicegood contends she and Thompson purchased and "flipped" multiple properties, culminating in the purchase of the Hilton Head condo. She asserts her efforts in renovating properties the couple formerly owned attributed to the appreciation realized from the sale of those proper ties, and the "net gain" therefrom was "funneled into" the funds Thompson used to purchase the Hilton Head condo and Lake Hartwell home. Swicegood argues th e master excluded ev idence of the chain
of sales that would have demonstrated su ch accumulation of equity. Further, she
contends the master erred by failing to "adequately consider" her contribution of "sweat equity" of $20,000 in the Lake Hartwell home. T hus, she argues the
master's decision should be reversed and remanded for a determination of the full value of her contributions to and interest in the properties based on all of the relevant evidence. We disagree.

A. Exclusion of Evidence

"The admission or exclusion of evidence is a matter within the trial court's sound discretion, and an appellate court may only disturb a ruling admitting or excluding evidence upon a showing of a 'manifest abuse of discretion accompanied by probable prejudice.'" Burke , 421 S.C. at 558, 808 S.E.2d at 628 (quoting State v.
Commander , 396 S.C. 254, 262-63, 721 S.E.2d 413, 417 (2011)). "An abuse of
discretion occurs when the conclusions of the trial court either lack evidentiarysupport or are controlled by an error of law." Id. (quoting State v. Pagan , 369 S.C. 201, 208, 631 S.E.2d 262, 265 (2006 )). "The general rule is that a joint tenant who, at his own expense, places permanent improvements upon the common
property , is entitled in a partition suit to compensation for the improvements
whether the co-tenants assented thereto or not." Shumaker v. Shumaker , 234 S.C. 421, 425-26, 108 S.E.2d 682, 685 (19 59) (emphasis added) (quoting Dalgarno v.

Baum , 30 S.E.2d 559 (Va. 1944)). "In the absence of consent . . . the amount of compensation is estimated by and limited to the amount by which the value of the common property has been enhanced." Ackerman v. Heard , 287 S.C. 626, 629, 340 S.E.2d 560, 562 (C t. App. 1986).

First, we find the master did not abus e his discretion in excluding evidence of Swicegood's contributions to former properties. See Shumaker , 234 S.C. at 425-26, 108 S.E.2d at 685 ("The ge neral rule is that a join t tenant who, at his own expense, places permanent improvements upon the common property , is entitled in a partition suit to compensation for the improvements whether the co-tenants assented thereto or not." (emphasis added) (quoting Dalgarno , 30 S.E.2d 559)). Here, the only properties at issue in th e partition action were the Lake Hartwell
home and the Hilton Head condo. Sw icegood testified she and Thompson "flipped" several properties and ultimatel y purchased the Lake Hartwell home and Hilton Head condo; however, she proffered no evidence as to any specific value realized from her work on previous proper ties. Neither did she proffer evidence that Thompson used proceeds from any prio r sale of such properties to purchase
the Lake Hartwell home or the Hilton Head condo. Rather, Thompson testified she paid the entire down payment on the Hilt on Head condo and the entire purchase price for Lot 58 with the inheritance she re ceived from her parents. She stated the $ 10,209.98 and $6,678.43 she paid on th e Lake Hartwell home came from her checking account. Thus, we find the master did not err by excluding evidence of any indirect contributions Swicegood ma de to properties other than the two properties at issue in this case. 4

Further, as evidenced by the master's or der, the master admitted and considered evidence of Swicegood's direct contributi ons to the Lake Hartwell Home and the

4 We note Thompson admitted Swicegood's di rect contribution of $22,000 for the purchase of the Lake Hartwell home came from the sale of property Swicegood owned. However, the master considered this direct contribution in reaching its conclusion, and we like wise consider this contribution in our review of the master's findings.Hilton Head condo, which consisted of te stimony as well as exhibits documenting
her contributions of labor and materials.

B. Swicegood's Contributions 5

Although we review actions in equity de novo, we are not required to disregard the findings of the circuit court or its superior position to assess witn esses' credibility.

See Zimmerman , 365 S.C. at 386, 618 S.E.2d at 900 ("A partition action is an equitable action and, as su ch, we may review the evidence to determine facts in
accordance with our own view of th e preponderance of the evidence."); Laughon

, 360 S.C. at 524-25, 602 S.E.2d at 110 ("However, this broad scope of review does not require this court to disregard the findings at trial or ignore th e fact that the trial judge was in a better positi on to assess the credibility of the witnesses.").

The court of common pleas has jurisdiction in all cases of real and personal estates held in joint tenancy or in common to make partition in kind or by allotment to one or more of the parties upon their accounting to the other parties in interest for their respective shares or, in case partition in kind or by allotment cannot be fairly and impartially made and without injury to any of the parties in interest, by the sale of the property and the division of the proceeds according to th e rights of the parties.

S.C. Code Ann. § 15-61-50 (20 05). "The general rule is th at a joint tenant who, at his own expense, places permanent im provements upon the common property, is entitled in a partition suit to compensation for the improvements whether the
co-tenants assented thereto or not." Shumaker , 234 S.C. at 425-26, 108 S.E.2d at 685 (quoting Dalgarno , 30 S.E.2d 559)).

We find the master did not err in dete rmining Swicegood was not entitled to any interest in the subject properties base d upon her indirect contributions. Here, Thompson admitted Swicegood purchased so me materials and contributed some labor to the improvement of the proper ties; however, Thompson also presented evidence she paid Swicegood several thousand dollars for this labor and material. Additionally, Thompson testified she paid $42,735.41 for construction and improvements to the Lake Hartwell home . Swicegood admitted Thompson paid her but denied she completely reimburse d her for her work. Swicegood did not

5 We have combined Swicegood's third a nd fourth issues under this heading.dispute Thompson paid all of the mo rtgage payments, utilities, insurance premiums, taxes and other dues on both properties. We find the evidence supports the master's findings that Thompson's cont ributions to both properties significantly outweighed Swicegood's. Although Swi cegood performed some labor at both properties, we find the evidence s hows Thompson reimbursed her for her
contributions.

However, we find the mast er erred by concluding Swi cegood was not entitled to a portion of the $45,000 remaining on the Lake Hartwell home. The master correctly concluded Thompson made the gr eater offer to purchase the properties and determined the remaining amounts to be divided between the parties was $6,000 in the Hilton Head condo and $45,000 in the Lake Hartwell home. The evidence shows Swicegood contributed noth ing financially to the Hilton Head
condo and therefore the master did not err by concluding Swicegood was not entitled to a portion of the $6,000 remaini ng therein. As to the Lake Hartwell home, the master concluded Thomps on contributed $ 129,838.70 , Swicegood contributed $22,000, and the equity in the home was $67,742.25

. We acknowledge Thompson's contributions exceeded Sw icegood's. Nevert heless, because Swicegood contributed $22,000 to the purch ase of the home, we find the master erred in failing to apportion any of th e $45,000 remaining in the Lake Hartwell home to Swicegood. Swicegood is entitled to a percentage of the $45,000 proportionate to her financial contribu tion of $22,000 to the purchase of the property and Thompson's contribution of $129,838.70. Swi cegood's contribution of $22,000 was 14.49 percent 6 of the parties' total c ontributions of $151,838.70 toward the purchase price. Thus, we fi nd she is entitled to 14.49 percent of the $45,000 remaining in the Lake Ha rtwell home for a total of $6,520.50. 7

Accordingly, we affirm the master's finding Thompson was entitled to sole ownership, title, and interest in both properties and to the $6,000 remaining in the Hilton Head condo. We modify the master's order by awarding Swicegood a portion of the $45,000 remaining in the La ke Hartwell home. According to our calculations, Swicegood is entitled to $ 6,520.50 , which is equal to 14.49 percent of $45,000.

6 The actual figure was 14.489, which we r ounded to two figures for simplicity.

7 Thompson argues we should affirm the mast er's findings as to this issue because he found Swicegood committed ouster. Howe ver, the master denied Thompson's claim for ouster—a ruling Thompson did not appeal. Therefore, we decline to affirm the master's findings on this basis.CONCLUSION

For the foregoing reasons, the mast er's order of partition is

AFFIRMED AS MODIFIED

.

HUFF and HILL, JJ., concur.