United States General Accounting Office

GAO Report to the Chairman, Subcommittee

on National Security, Committee on

Appropriations, House of

Representatives

May 1996 SATELLITE CONTROL

CAPABILITIES

National Policy Could

Help Consolidation and

Cost Savings

G O A

years

1921 - 1996

GAO/NSIAD-96-77

GAO United States

General Accounting Office

Washington, D.C. 20548

National Security and

International Affairs Division

B-270718 

May 2, 1996

The Honorable C. W. Bill Young

Chairman, Subcommittee on National Security

Committee on Appropriations

House of Representatives

Dear Mr. Chairman:

As you requested, we have been reviewing several issues associated with

the Department of Defense (DOD) and intelligence community space

programs and activities. This report discusses the potential opportunity for

consolidating satellite control functions within the government.

Satellite control is an operation that uses ground antennas for (1) tracking

satellites to record their location and trajectory, (2) collecting satellite

health and status data by telemetry, and (3) commanding satellites to

perform certain functions. This operation is commonly referred to as

tracking, telemetry, and commanding.

Background Congressional committees have expressed concern about the (1) lack of

standardization, commonality, and interoperability associated with

national security satellite control networks and (2) high costs associated

with operating, maintaining, and upgrading these networks.1

 Within the

defense and intelligence space sectors, the Air Force, the Navy, the Army,

and the National Reconnaissance Office (NRO) operate separate satellite

control networks. Within the civil space sector, the National Aeronautics

and Space Administration (NASA) and the National Oceanic and

Atmospheric Administration (NOAA) also operate separate networks.

Defense and civil (excluding intelligence) agencies budgeted a total of

$806 million in fiscal year 1996 to control over 132 communications,

missile warning, navigation, meteorological, environmental, and scientific

satellites or missions. Based on the President’s fiscal year 1996 budget,

these agencies plan to spend over $1.3 billion on upgrading their satellite

control systems during the next 5 years.

1

Senate Armed Services Committee’s July 27, 1993 report (103-112) accompanying the fiscal year 1994

DOD authorization bill, p. 86 and House Appropriations Committee’s June 27, 1994 report

(103-562) accompanying the fiscal year 1995 DOD appropriations bill, p. 43.

Page 1 GAO/NSIAD-96-77 Satellite Control Capabilities
B-270718 

Results in Brief Development of separate satellite control networks parallel the historical

establishment of the three space sectors—defense, intelligence, and

civil—within the government. These sectors were created over three

decades ago and evolved under separate organizational structures for

management, budgetary control, and policy oversight. Despite the

potential for overlapping programs and duplicate facilities, these sectors

were maintained for national security reasons and to benefit from an open,

unclassified civil program. One result, however, was a lack of strong

coordination and cooperation incentives among the respective agencies,

which encouraged both different solutions to similar problems and overlap

in capabilities in such areas as technology development, launch, and

support services. As the agencies tended to independently customize their

satellite systems to fit particular needs, including satellite control

networks, the result was a lack of interoperability among the systems and

less than optimal use of resources and facilities.

Efforts to reduce costs by combining government satellite control

capabilities need more attention. Two studies completed within the past

2 years by the U.S. Space Command and one study completed last year by

an interagency working group discussed opportunities to combine satellite

control capabilities.2

 Although these three studies focused on increasing

network efficiency and effectiveness and achieving economies, they were

either limited in scope, lacking in detailed analysis, or subsumed by

another study. Now, a fourth interagency study, addressing the same topic,

is ongoing by DOD and NASA to examine the potential for cooperation and

savings.

Implementation of the past studies’ recommendations have been

hampered by the lack of a national policy that could provide the necessary

impetus and direction for more efficient use of the nation’s satellite

control capabilities. The government has several space policies that direct

inter-sector cooperative efforts, including special management structures,

but none that specifically apply to satellite control. Considering the

opportunities for (1) interoperability and standardization among satellite

control networks and (2) cost savings and greater efficiencies through

network consolidation, it appears prudent to view satellite control from a

governmentwide perspective. We, therefore, believe that a national

satellite control policy that addresses the objective of interoperability and

standardization through integration, consolidation, and sharing of the

2

The group consisted of representatives from DOD; NASA; and the Departments of Commerce, Energy,

and Transportation.

Page 2 GAO/NSIAD-96-77 Satellite Control Capabilities
B-270718 

defense, intelligence, and civil space sector’s satellite control capabilities

is needed.

In November 1993, the President established the National Science and

Technology Council (NSTC) by Executive Order 12881 to coordinate

science, space, and technology policies throughout the federal

government. The President is the NSTC Chairman and membership consists

of the Vice-President and cabinet-level and other officials. Included among

the principal purposes of the NSTC is to ensure that science, space, and

technology policies and programs are developed and implemented to

effectively contribute to national goals. The NSTC developed specific space

policies within the last 2 years and is currently reviewing other existing

space policies for possible revision.

We believe the NSTC could provide the necessary impetus and direction for

integrating the nation’s satellite control networks to reduce costs. Similar

to other space policies, inter-sector guidelines are needed to address

interoperability, common requirements, network standards, and the

potential use of commercially available designs. The guidelines also need

to address an inter-sector management structure with participation by

defense, intelligence, and civil space agencies to ensure policy

implementation, that includes establishing schedules, coordinating

network upgrades, and reporting on the progress being made.

Recommendation We recommend that NSTC develop an inter-sector space policy, to be

included with its revisions of other space policies, that would direct

integration, consolidation, and sharing, to the extent feasible, of the

nation’s satellite control networks. Moreover, NSTC should require the

Secretaries of Defense and Commerce and the Administrator of NASA, with

appropriate input from the Director of Central Intelligence, to establish a

coordinated management structure to implement the policy by completing

the necessary studies, preparing an integrated architecture, and making

cost-effective decisions on the respective agencies’ network upgrades.

Agency Comments

and Our Evaluation

The Assistant to the President for Science and Technology, DOD, NASA, and

the Department of Commerce provided official comments on a draft of

this report (see apps. III, IV, and V, respectively).

The Assistant to the President stated that the Office of Science and

Technology Policy and the National Security Council are leading a

Page 3 GAO/NSIAD-96-77 Satellite Control Capabilities
B-270718 

comprehensive review of the administration’s national space policy and

are looking at opportunities for convergence and consolidation of facilities

and operations where it is cost-effective and feasible. In this context, the

Assistant to the President stated that national satellite control facilities

will be addressed and this report will be a useful input to the process.

DOD generally concurred with the draft report’s findings and

recommendations. However, it stated that the draft report did not

adequately reflect (1) DOD’s efforts to reduce costs, consolidate activities,

or increase standardization; (2) the history of cooperation among the

agencies involved; or (3) the fact that there are fundamental technical

incompatibilities among current generation satellites that preclude direct

consolidation of satellite control capabilities in the near future.

We recognized some shortcomings of the draft report in these areas and

have incorporated additional comments provided by DOD, where

appropriate. However, our focus was not oriented toward individual

agency efforts as much as it was toward inter-sector opportunities for

consolidations and cost savings. In fact, if greater interoperability and

standardization among the space agencies had been a goal in the past,

there would not be the fundamental technical incompatibilities among

satellite control capabilities today. Although achieving governmentwide

consolidations and significant cost savings may be a long-range prospect,

we believe it is an effort that needs to start as soon as possible.

NASA concurred with (1) the draft report’s assessment of interoperability

and consolidation of satellite control capabilities, (2) the report’s

recommendation that would enhance these desirable goals, and (3) most

of the report’s factual content. NASA commented that under the ongoing

DOD-NASA study of satellite control, the study team has recognized that

interoperability can be achieved in a variety of ways. One way is to

implement capabilities to communicate with various agencies’ network

resources, and another way is to implement the same architectures at all

agencies’ network and control facilities.

This latter method, according to NASA, would result in (1) high ground

system cost to achieve commonality and (2) the need for two issues to be

addressed by an inter-sector space policy. The first issue was identified as

“an apparent incompatibility between national security and the goal of

international cooperation.” According to NASA, it concerns the defense and

intelligence space sectors’ reluctance to involve themselves in areas of

civil and international cooperation (such as the use of international

Page 4 GAO/NSIAD-96-77 Satellite Control Capabilities
B-270718 

standards for interoperability), whereas the civil space sector seeks such

cooperation and establishes agreements with foreign space agencies that

often preclude DOD involvement. The second issue deals with “the use of

the frequency spectrum that allows the spacecraft to communicate with

the network systems.” According to NASA, government space agencies

operate in different parts of the radio frequency spectrum, not necessarily

because they wish to, but because national and international regulatory

bodies have partitioned the spectrum to meet distinct agencies’ needs.

NASA stated that the ongoing study team is formulating recommendations

to mitigate these issues in the short term and establish forums to deal with

them in the long term. It encouraged the NSTC to build upon these

forthcoming recommendations, if it seeks to develop the inter-sector

policy. In addition, NASA expressed concern about congressional

authorization and appropriation committee coordination and budget

approval that will be required if the space agencies establish closer

relationships.

The Department of Commerce provided official comments on a draft of

this report to the Assistant to the President for Science and Technology.

Commerce stated that the majority of the our (draft) report historically

recounted several efforts over the past years of looking at alternative ways

to “consolidate, converge, and standardize” satellite TT&C. It agreed with

the fact that most of the previous recommendations have not been acted

upon, only studied repeatedly. It stated that most satellite TT&C systems

have been designed with a specific satellite in mind and with different

mission requirements.

Commerce stated that the two recommendations in the draft report—that

(1) an inter-sector space policy on the nation’s satellite control networks

be developed and (2) the government’s space agency heads establish a

coordinated management team to implement the space policy—seemed to

be a good idea from a cost and efficiency standpoint as long as

implementation is sensitive to programmatic concerns.

Scope and

Methodology

We reviewed three satellite control studies that represented DOD’s and

other agencies’ efforts to determine how to improve efficiencies and

achieve economies in satellite control operations. We examined the scope

and terms of reference associated with these studies, the extent of various

agencies’ participation in the studies, and whether the agencies’ satellite

Page 5 GAO/NSIAD-96-77 Satellite Control Capabilities
B-270718 

control assets were evaluated as part of each study. We ascertained the

reasons for not implementing study recommendations and reviewed the

status of recommendations being implemented. In addition, we discussed

the objectives and scope of an ongoing satellite control study with DOD and

NASA representatives. Finally, we reviewed guidelines contained in national

space policies and analyzed plans and budgets associated with operations,

maintenance, and upgrades of various agencies’ satellite control networks.

We performed our work primarily at the U.S. and Air Force Space

Commands, Colorado Springs, Colorado, and Air Force Space and Missile

Systems Center, Los Angeles, California. In addition, we held discussions

with representatives and obtained documentation from NASA Headquarters,

Washington, D.C.; NOAA’s Satellite Operations Center, Suitland, Maryland;

Naval Space Command, Dalgren, Virginia; Naval Satellite Operations

Center, Point Mugu, California; Air Force Space Command’s 50th Space

Wing, Falcon Air Force Base, Colorado; and Air Force’s Phillips

Laboratory, Albuquerque, New Mexico. We also interviewed

representatives of the Office of the Secretary of Defense, Joint Staff, Naval

Research Laboratory, NRO in Washington, D.C., and of the Onizuka Air

Station, Sunnyvale, California.

Appendix I provides more information on efforts to combine government

satellite control capabilities. Appendix II briefly describes agency satellite

control networks.

We performed our work from February 1995 through December 1995 in

accordance with generally accepted government auditing standards.

We are sending copies of this report to the responsible authorization and

appropriations committees and subcommittees of the Senate and House of

Representatives. We are also sending copies to the Assistant to the

President for Science and Technology; the Director, Office of Management

and Budget; the Secretaries of Defense, the Air Force, the Navy, and the

Army; the Acting Secretary of Commerce; the Administrators of NASA and

NOAA; and the Directors of Central Intelligence and the NRO. We will make

copies available to others upon request.

Page 6 GAO/NSIAD-96-77 Satellite Control Capabilities
B-270718 

This report was prepared under the direction of Thomas J. Schulz,

Associate Director, Defense Acquisition Issues, who may be reached on

(202) 512-4841 if you or your staff have any questions. Major contributors

are listed in appendix VI.

Sincerely yours,

Henry L. Hinton, Jr.

Assistant Comptroller General

Page 7 GAO/NSIAD-96-77 Satellite Control Capabilities
Contents

Letter 1

Appendix I 

Efforts to Combine

Government Satellite

Control Capabilities

Need Greater

Attention

10

Three Studies Discuss Consolidation Opportunities 10

A Fourth Study Is Underway 12

A National Policy and Management Structure Are Lacking 14

Appendix II 

Satellite Control

Network Descriptions

and Plans

17

Air Force Satellite Control Network 18

Naval Satellite Control Network 19

Naval Research Laboratory Satellite Control Network 20

Army Satellite Communications Network 20

NASA Space Network 21

NOAA Satellite Control Network 21

Appendix III 

Comments From the

Assistant to the

President for Science

and Technology

23

Appendix IV 

Comments From the

Department of

Defense

24

Appendix V 

Comments From the

National Aeronautics

and Space

Administration

26

Page 8 GAO/NSIAD-96-77 Satellite Control Capabilities
Contents

Appendix VI 

Major Contributors to

This Report

30

Table Table II.1: Satellites or Missions Controlled by Agency and

Associated Funding

18

Abbreviations

AACB Aeronautics and Astronautics Coordinating Board

AFSCN Air Force Satellite Control Network

DOD Department of Defense

FITAS Future Integrated TT&C Architecture Study

GPS Global Positioning System

NASA National Aeronautics and Space Administration

NOAA National Oceanic and Atmospheric Administration

NRO National Reconnaissance Office

NSCN Naval Satellite Control Network

NSTC National Science and Technology Council

TDRSS Tracking and Data Relay Satellite System

TT&C tracking, telemetry, and commanding

Page 9 GAO/NSIAD-96-77 Satellite Control Capabilities
Appendix I 

Efforts to Combine Government Satellite

Control Capabilities Need Greater Attention

Three separate studies completed within the past 2 years by various

working groups have discussed opportunities to combine or share intraand interagency satellite control capabilities. Although these study efforts

focused on increasing efficiency and effectiveness and achieving

economies, they were either limited in scope, lacking in detailed analysis,

or subsumed by another study. Now, a fourth study, addressing the same

topic, is underway to examine the potential for cooperation and savings.

Implementation of the past studies’ recommendations have been

hampered by the lack of a national policy that could provide the necessary

impetus and direction for more efficient use of satellite control capabilities

from a governmentwide perspective. In addition, a management structure

similar to those identified in other space policies does not exist to

implement such a policy. As a result, efforts to combine or share satellite

control capabilities, achieve greater interoperability among satellite

control systems, and reduce costs need greater attention.

Three Studies Discuss

Consolidation

Opportunities

In January 1994, the U.S. Space Command issued a report on space

systems roles and missions as directed by the Secretary of Defense and the

Director of the Joint Staff. Among the report’s recommendations was one

calling for Air Force and Navy satellite bus operations to be merged into a

common satellite control network.1

 The recommendation was based on

plans that (1) several satellites under Navy control would be phased out in

the near term and (2) an upgraded Air Force network could control all

Department of Defense (DOD) satellites. The belief was that such a merger

would have the potential of improving efficiency and effectiveness, while

ensuring maximum support for the combatant commanders. The

recommendation called for the merger to be done as soon as possible, but

not later than 1999.

Although the scope of the study was limited to the defense space sector,

the study group did not determine the full technical capabilities of the Air

Force and the Navy networks to control all satellites. As a result, the

report stated that another study on merging the networks would be done

to determine the most efficient and cost-effective solution. This follow-on

study, called the Future Integrated TT&C Architecture Study (FITAS), was

initiated by the Chairman, Joint Chiefs of Staff in January 1994—the same

month that the U.S. Space Command’s report was released.

1

Bus operations refers to the tracking, telemetry, and commanding (TT&C) associated with the

satellite platform—the physical structure upon which mission, or payload, equipment is installed.

Page 10 GAO/NSIAD-96-77 Satellite Control Capabilities
Appendix I 

Efforts to Combine Government Satellite

Control Capabilities Need Greater Attention

In April 1994, an interagency study group consisting of representatives

from DOD, National Aeronautics and Space Administration (NASA),

Department of Commerce, Department of Energy, and Department of

Transportation completed the National Facilities Study—a review of the

nation’s aeronautics and space facilities. The purpose was to develop a

national plan to meet government and commercial needs for aeronautics

and space research and development and space operations. The report,

issued to top officials of the participating agencies, made numerous

recommendations—one of which was oriented toward a unified approach

to government satellite control networks to optimize existing capabilities,

consolidate operations, increase efficiency, and save money. However, the

study lacked a detailed analysis of the subject, and its final

recommendation merely called for a multiagency task force to perform

additional study on feasibility and implementation planning.

Our review indicated that no action was taken on this National Facilities

Study recommendation. Although DOD was to have taken the lead, DOD

representatives informed us that plans to take action on the

recommendation were overtaken by FITAS, which had already been

initiated in January 1994 by the Chairman, Joint Chiefs of Staff.

In April 1995, the U.S. Space Command completed FITAS, which involved

participants from DOD, NASA, the National Reconnaissance Office (NRO), and

the National Oceanic and Atmospheric Administration (NOAA). FITAS

concluded that (1) the government could gain efficiencies through sharing

satellite control resources and (2) there was a clear need for a common

satellite control architecture.2 FITAS also concluded that there was no

central, interagency authority to coordinate common planning and

resource sharing or to effectively orchestrate interagency guidelines and

standards with the goal of achieving cost savings through an integrated

system architecture.

One of FITAS’ recommendations involved establishing an enduring

interagency group to guide development of an efficient common user

network by addressing various architectural objectives that would lead to

cost savings. However, our review indicated that little action had been

taken on this recommendation, partly because the study efforts were

overtaken by another satellite control study under a DOD-NASA cooperation

initiative, which is discussed in the next section of this report. Another

FITAS recommendation, which involved merging the Air Force and the

2

It also stated that some satellites would not be appropriate for a common use network, particularly

those requiring continuous contact at high data rates, which was defined as greater than 45 million bits

per second, but likely to be redefined as greater than 155 million bits per second in the next decade.

Page 11 GAO/NSIAD-96-77 Satellite Control Capabilities
Appendix I 

Efforts to Combine Government Satellite

Control Capabilities Need Greater Attention

Navy networks, is beginning to be implemented. Hardware and software

changes are expected to provide greater interoperability between the Navy

and the Air Force networks in the near future.

A Fourth Study Is

Underway

In June 1995, top officials from DOD and NASA initiated a cooperative effort

to study seven different aeronautics and space topics of mutual interest

with a view toward reducing investment and operations costs while

enhancing mission effectiveness and efficiencies.

Satellite TT&C was one of the seven study topics. Specific subtopics to be

addressed by an integrated product team were identified that could

possibly increase efficiencies and allow for consolidations and closures.

They included (1) NASA’s use of DOD’s satellite control network remote

tracking stations, (2) DOD’s use of NASA’s satellite ground stations and the

feasibility of DOD assuming operation of these stations, (3) DOD’s increased

use of NASA’s Tracking and Data Relay Satellite System (TDRSS) and the

feasibility of DOD assuming operation of TDRSS and other NASA satellites,

and (4) the establishment of TT&C standards. Despite the merits of this

effort, NASA officials alluded to the study’s limited scope by emphasizing

that the study excludes (1) the control of satellite mission data, which is

often transmitted separately and through various receiving sites and

(2) the intelligence space.

The study team plans to provide recommendations to the Aeronautics and

Astronautics Coordinating Board (AACB) in April 1996. The AACB is a senior

management review and advisory body to DOD and NASA to facilitate

coordination of aeronautics and space activities of mutual interest to the

two agencies. It was established by the agencies several years ago, and the

memorandum of agreement was renewed in 1993 by the Deputy Secretary

of Defense and the Administrator of NASA. Although not an official member

of the AACB, NOAA is participating in the satellite TT&C study at the invitation

of the DOD and NASA co-chairmen.

A significant element of this study, which was not emphasized in the three

previous studies, is the potential for increased use of NASA’s TDRSS. TDRSS is

a space-based communications relay system currently consisting of two

operational satellites and one spare satellite in the constellation, which is

in geostationary orbit approximately 22,300 miles above the equator. NASA

launched the first TDRSS in 1983 as a cost-effective alternative to the

network of ground stations that the agency previously used to

communicate with its orbiting spacecraft. TDRSS is particularly suited for

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Appendix I 

Efforts to Combine Government Satellite

Control Capabilities Need Greater Attention

almost continuous communications, if needed, with low-altitude satellites,

such as a few hundred miles above the Earth. It does so by relaying

transmissions to and from these satellites and their ground stations. If only

ground stations were used for these satellites, but continuous

communications were needed, numerous stations would have to be

available around the Earth to ensure that the orbiting satellites were

always in view of a station.

The current justification for TDRSS is being driven primarily by the Space

Shuttle, Hubble Space Telescope, Space Station, and Earth Observing

System programs and by classified users, thus the use of a TDRSS-like

capability could exist for some time. NASA has been searching for ways to

enhance TDRSS’ use within the defense and civil space sectors. NASA has

stated that substantial TDRSS capacity remains to meet TT&C and mission

data needs for future DOD and NOAA programs. Currently, however, there

are radio frequency incompatibilities that limit the use of TDRSS with other

agency satellites.

Despite these incompatibilities, an example of increased use did occur in

October 1995 when NASA and the Air Force signed a 9-year agreement for

TDRSS support during launches of Titan IV/Centaur expendable launch

vehicles. This effort is intended to reduce, and in most cases replace, the

support provided by the Air Force’s Advanced Range Instrumentation

Aircraft. The Air Force is claiming some cost savings under this

agreement. In addition, the Office of Management and Budget has been

studying ways of making improvements and reducing the cost of TDRSS. It

asked NASA to respond to several recommendations concerning TDRSS

before or concurrent with the agency’s fiscal year 1997 budget proposal

that involve (1) charging user fees, (2) the impact of off-loading some or all

of NASA’s future communication needs to commercial and foreign systems,

and (3) any “privatization” opportunities.

An opportunity for cost savings may also exist by analyzing the

cost-effectiveness of using TDRSS with DOD’s and NOAA’s low-altitude

meteorological and environmental satellite systems. In a May 5, 1994,

Presidential Decision Directive, DOD and Commerce were required to

integrate their independent systems into a single, converged national

polar-orbiting operational environmental satellite system. NOAA was

assigned the primary responsibility for all command, control, and

communications functions, with DOD having an austere, backup capability.

Included in the concept are plans to close Air Force satellite operations

centers at Fairchild Air Force Base, Washington, and Offutt Air Force

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Appendix I 

Efforts to Combine Government Satellite

Control Capabilities Need Greater Attention

Base, Nebraska. Although this convergence effort was initiated

independent of the various satellite control studies, the two subjects are

interrelated and need to be assessed together. In commenting on a draft of

this report, Commerce stated that the National Environmental Satellite

Data and Information Service’s integrated program office has investigated

the alternative of using TDRSS and that the initial results showed it may be a

viable consideration. It also stated that additional studies were needed and

the integrated program office was proceeding with further analysis of this

and other options.

In addition, an opportunity for cost savings may exist by using TDRSS to

support the Air Force’s Global Positioning System (GPS) navigational

satellites. We have discussed this idea with NASA and Air Force

representatives, but there has not been sufficient technical analysis done

on its feasibility. In fiscal year 1996, the Air Force plans to begin

developing a follow-on capability (called Block IIF) to its current design of

GPS satellites. In doing so, it could make changes to the satellite design that

would be interoperable with TDRSS, eliminating some GPS ground antennas.

However, an assessment of the trade-offs and cost-effectiveness would be

needed.

A National Policy and

Management

Structure Are Lacking

The government currently has several national space policies directing

inter-sector (defense, intelligence, civil, and commercial) cooperative

efforts to ensure efficient use of the nation’s resources in selected space

areas. However, none of these policies specifically address acquisition,

operation, integration, consolidation, or sharing of government satellite

control capabilities. In addition, there is no existing management structure

similar to those identified in other space policies or the one recommended

by FITAS, to implement an inter-sector policy on satellite control. The

following are four examples of policies that direct specific inter-sector

efforts:

• President Bush’s National Space Policy, issued as Directive 1 on

November 2, 1989, specifically called for maintaining close coordination,

cooperation, and technology and information exchange among the

national security, civil, and commercial space sectors to avoid

unnecessary duplication and promote attainment of U.S. space goals.

Specific inter-sector guidelines were established in some high-priority

areas such as space transportation. Parts of this policy are still in effect.

• President Clinton’s Landsat Remote Sensing Strategy, issued on May 5,

1994, discusses the importance of data acquired from remote sensing

Page 14 GAO/NSIAD-96-77 Satellite Control Capabilities
Appendix I 

Efforts to Combine Government Satellite

Control Capabilities Need Greater Attention

satellites and the benefits to civil, commercial, and national security

interests of the United States. Implementing guidelines that restructured

management of the Landsat program required substantial cooperation

among NASA, DOD, and the Departments of Commerce and the Interior,

including satellite development, launch, operations, and funding.

• President Clinton’s policy on Convergence of U.S. Polar-Orbiting

Operational Environmental Satellite Systems, issued on May 5, 1994, was

intended to reduce the cost of acquiring and operating two separate

systems, while continuing to satisfy U.S. operational requirements.

Implementing actions called for considerable interagency coordination

among DOD, Commerce, and NASA, including the establishment of an

integrated program office and an executive committee at the Under

Secretary level. These management organizations were subsequently

established.

• President Clinton’s National Space Transportation Policy, issued on

August 5, 1994, contained specific guidelines for DOD, NASA, Commerce, and

Transportation to (1) share responsibilities for evolving the expendable

launch vehicle fleet, (2) develop a next generation reusable vehicle, and

(3) promote innovative types of arrangements between the government

and private sector. This policy called for the four agencies to provide a

common set of requirements and a coordinated technology plan to address

the needs of the national security, civil, and commercial space sectors. In

addition, DOD and NASA were directed to combine their expendable launch

service requirements into single procurements when cost savings or other

advantages to the government could be achieved.

These four current space policies are examples of the kinds of impetus

and direction that can be provided to ensure more efficient use of national

space resources. Considering (1) the lack of interoperability and

standardization, (2) the actions of individual agencies to upgrade their

own networks without regard for the capabilities of other agencies, and

(3) opportunities for cost savings and greater efficiencies and

effectiveness through consolidation, it appears prudent to view satellite

control from a governmentwide perspective, focusing on ways in which it

could be jointly managed.

Regarding a space management structure, DOD began, in December 1994,

establishing a central office to consolidate its responsibilities for space

policy, architectures, and acquisitions. This office led by a Deputy Under

Secretary of Defense for Space and reporting to the Under Secretary of

Defense for Acquisition and Technology is intended to provide a DOD focal

point for all space matters, including representing DOD in all interagency

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Appendix I 

Efforts to Combine Government Satellite

Control Capabilities Need Greater Attention

space deliberations. Its responsibilities and functions were further

delineated in March 1995. In September 1995, DOD established a separate

Space Architect organization for the purpose of consolidating the

responsibilities for DOD space missions and system architecture

development. The Architect reports through the Air Force Acquisition

Executive to the Defense Acquisition Executive. The intent was to

eliminate unnecessary vertical stovepiping of programs, achieve

efficiencies in acquisitions and future operations through program

integration, and thereby improve space support to military operations. In

December 1995, the Secretary of Defense and the Director of Central

Intelligence established a board of directors for defense and intelligence

space programs, called the Joint Space Management Board. The purpose

of this Board is to ensure that defense and intelligence needs for space

systems are satisfied within available resources, using integrated

architectures to the maximum extent possible.

Collectively, these three organizational actions established a framework

for greater coordination within DOD and between the defense and

intelligence space sectors. The importance of these actions is reflected in

the fact that the President’s fiscal year 1996 budget request included plans

for DOD to spend about $84 billion through 2001 on defense and

intelligence space programs and activities. This represents over 5 percent

of the planned DOD budgets for that period.

Regarding coordination with the civil space sector, the only major

management structure we identified was the previously discussed AACB. It

is a separate DOD-NASA organization and does not officially include NOAA.

Although it does include the Director of NRO as a Board member, it does

not provide for full intelligence community representation similar to the

Joint Space Management Board. Panels and working groups can be

established under the AACB to address functional areas and specific issues,

such as satellite TT&C, that are of mutual interest to DOD and NASA. If AACB

was expanded to officially include NOAA and full participation by the

intelligence sector, or an interagency group was established similar to the

one recommended by FITAS, the prospects for implementing a national

policy on satellite control would be better assured.

Page 16 GAO/NSIAD-96-77 Satellite Control Capabilities
Appendix II 

Satellite Control Network Descriptions and

Plans

All satellites must be controlled to ensure that they perform as required.

Satellite control is usually divided into two parts—platform (or bus)

control and payload (or mission) control. Platform control involves

monitoring the health and status, and managing the operation, of the

satellite’s physical structure upon which payload equipment is installed.

Payload control involves monitoring the health and status, and managing

the operation, of the satellite’s mission equipment. Ground antennas

communicate with satellite antennas to perform the TT&C function.

Tracking involves recording such information as satellite location,

trajectory, and velocity. Telemetry involves collecting satellite health and

status data, such as temperature, electrical power, and propulsion fuel, as

well as the payload data. Commanding involves directing satellites to

perform various tasks such as electronic equipment switching, battery

charging, and certain payload functions.

The U.S. government operates several separate satellite control networks

within the defense, intelligence, and civil space sectors. These networks

lack standardization, commonality, and interoperability. This means the

lack of compatible operational and technical procedures, the lack of

interchangeable equipment or components, and the inability of systems to

provide services to and accept services from other systems to enable them

to operate effectively together.

Six government agency networks are briefly described below, including

plans for network upgrades. Defense and civil (excluding intelligence)

agencies budgeted about $806 million in fiscal year 1996 to operate,

maintain, and upgrade these networks, which control over 132 separate

communications, missile warning, navigation, meteorological,

environmental, scientific, and classified satellites or missions. Based on

the President’s fiscal year 1996 budget request, these agencies plan to

spend over $1.3 billion during the next 5 years on upgrading their satellite

control systems. (See table II.1.) Intelligence sector networks are not

discussed because of national security classification reasons.

Page 17 GAO/NSIAD-96-77 Satellite Control Capabilities
Appendix II 

Satellite Control Network Descriptions and

Plans

Table II.1: Satellites or Missions

Controlled by Agency and Associated

Funding

Dollars in millions

Agency

Satellites or

missions controlled

Fiscal year

1996 budget

Fiscal years

1996-2000

planned upgrades

Air Force 80a $505.7 $569.3

Navy 15 16.2 1.4

Naval Research

Laboratory 28 12.1 2.3

Army 11 23.2 Unavailable

NASA 9b 206.7 639.1

NOAA 8 42.0 95.3

Total 132c $805.9 $1,307.4

aThe actual number is larger than 80, but is not shown because of national security classification

reasons.

bThis number refers to NASA missions and does not represent the number of satellites or

spacecraft in orbit.

cThe total does not add because the Air Force and the Navy have split responsibilities for 8

satellites, and the Air Force and the Army have split responsibilities for 11 satellites.

Air Force Satellite

Control Network

The Air Force Satellite Control Network (AFSCN) controls over 80

communication, navigation, missile warning, and meteorological satellites

and other missions for DOD, NASA, and the United Kingdom. It consists of

(1) two operational control nodes located at Falcon Air Force Base,

Colorado, and Onizuka Air Force Station, California;1

 (2) 17 TT&C antennas

at 9 geographical locations worldwide;2

 (3) a communications calibration

site at Camp Parks, California; (4) space vehicle checkout facilities at

Cape Canaveral Air Station, Florida, and Vandenberg Air Force Base,

California; and (5) communications connectivity among these locations.

The Air Force divides satellite control networks into two

classes—common and dedicated. Its common network can support

several satellite systems, allowing its antennas and software to be shared

among many satellites and therefore reducing costs. Such a network is

generally associated with satellites that are only contacted intermittently

using relatively low data rates. The primary function of a common

network is platform control. However, it can also provide other supporting

1

The Onizuka location is to be closed by the end of fiscal year 2000 based on a 1995 Commission on

Base Realignment and Closure recommendation that was approved by the President.

2

DOD stated that an Indian Ocean station would be closed at the end of fiscal year 1996, reducing the

antennas and locations to 16 and 8, respectively.

Page 18 GAO/NSIAD-96-77 Satellite Control Capabilities
Appendix II 

Satellite Control Network Descriptions and

Plans

functions such as launch and early orbit tracking of satellites until normal

operations are achieved and telemetry and commanding of satellites that

are experiencing anomalies. Examples of DOD satellite systems that are

controlled by the Air Force common network include the Defense Satellite

Communications System and the Fleet Satellite Communications system

and its Ultra-High Frequency Follow-On system.

A dedicated network supports only one satellite system, and its assets are

generally not shared with other satellite systems. Such a network is

usually associated with satellites that require continuous contact using

relatively high data rates. A dedicated network usually performs both

platform and payload control through the same antenna. Examples of DOD

satellite systems currently controlled by a dedicated network include the

Defense Meteorological Satellite Program, Global Positioning System,

Defense Support Program, and Milstar Satellite Communications System.

Despite the dedicated configuration of these satellite systems, only the

Defense Support Program and Milstar require continuous contact with

their ground antennas. Thus, these antennas cannot be shared with other

satellite systems. Conversely, the meteorological and global positioning

satellite systems are in contact with their ground antennas on an

intermittent basis. Thus, these systems may be more readily adaptable for

future operation on a common network.

Planned Network

Upgrades

The Air Force fiscal year 1996 budget for operating, maintaining, and

upgrading the AFSCN is about $506 million. Currently, AFSCN lacks adequate

standards for hardware, software, procedures, and interfaces, making it

only partially interoperable with other defense or civil agency satellite

control systems. This reduces the ability of AFSCN to provide backup

support for some other space missions. Based on the President’s fiscal

year 1996 budget request, the Air Force programmed about $569 million

for AFSCN upgrades alone during the next 5 years. It expects to (1) move

from the current mainframe-based, centralized computer architecture to a

workstation-based, open architecture using advanced high speed data

links and (2) enhance the communications system by applying DOD-wide

standard protocols that are to be implemented with standard commercial

hardware and software. The stated objective of the upgrade efforts is to

reduce future operations and maintenance costs.

Naval Satellite

Control Network

The Naval Satellite Control Network (NSCN), which is much smaller than

AFSCN, currently supports the operation of 15 communication and

Page 19 GAO/NSIAD-96-77 Satellite Control Capabilities
Appendix II 

Satellite Control Network Descriptions and

Plans

navigation satellites and some communication packages that are hosted on

other satellites. NSCN consists of one primary control node and antennas at

Point Mugu, California, and secondary nodes and antennas in Maine,

Minnesota, and Guam.

Planned Network

Upgrades

The Navy’s fiscal year 1996 budget for operating, maintaining, and

upgrading the NSCN is about $16 million. Although NSCN has not been

interoperable with other defense or civil agency satellite control systems,

modifications are being made so that the Navy can use AFSCN antennas to

begin fully controlling two satellite systems—the Fleet Satellite

Communications System and its Ultra-High Frequency Follow-On

system—both of which are partially controlled by the Air Force. For fiscal

years 1996 through 2000, the Navy programmed about $1.4 million to

convert NSCN to standard hardware using open system software.

Naval Research

Laboratory Satellite

Control Network

The Naval Research Laboratory operates a satellite control network in

support of 28 classified and scientific satellite missions. The network

consists of one primary control node located at Blossom Point Tracking

Facility, Maryland; a remote facility at Vandenberg Air Force Base,

California; and transportable antennas.

Planned Network

Upgrades

The Naval Research Laboratory’s fiscal year 1996 budget to operate,

maintain, and upgrade its network is about $12 million. Of this amount,

about $2.3 million is for upgrading an antenna. The Naval Research

Laboratory considers all facility upgrades to be completed and is not

currently planning on new hardware or software systems during the next

5 years.

Army Satellite

Communications

Network

The Army and the Air Force have split responsibilities for controlling the

11 orbiting Defense Satellite Communications System satellites. The Army

controls the satellites’ payload equipment and communications network,

and the Air Force controls the satellites’ platforms. The Army’s function

basically means that operators control the radio transponders on the

satellites, to include reallocating power among available communication

channels, configuring communication antenna beams, and changing the

characteristics of various antijam features.

Page 20 GAO/NSIAD-96-77 Satellite Control Capabilities
Appendix II 

Satellite Control Network Descriptions and

Plans

The Army operates five Defense Satellite Communications System

operation centers located at Camp Roberts, California; Fort Detrick,

Maryland; Fort Meade, Maryland; Landstuhl, Germany; and Fort Buckner

on Okinawa. In addition, the Army operates three transportable tactical

(ground mobile forces) communications network control systems located

at Fort Detrick, Maryland; Landstuhl, Germany; and Torii Station on

Okinawa. The Army also operates a mobile classified facility that is

capable of providing platform, payload, and network control if some of the

other facilities became inoperable. In fiscal year 1996, the Army budgeted

about $23 million for network operations.

NASA Space Network NASA’s Space Network is a space-based tracking, commanding, and data

acquisition capability that currently controls nine NASA space missions,

including the Space Shuttle and Hubble Space Telescope, and certain

classified missions. The Network consists of TDRSS and its ground

processing complex located at White Sands, New Mexico. TDRSS satellites

currently in orbit include two fully functional, two partially functional, and

two spare satellites that provide two-way data communications relay

between user spacecraft and the ground processing complex.

Planned Network

Upgrades

NASA’s fiscal year 1996 budget included about $207 million to operate,

maintain, and upgrade its space network. The radio frequency used by

TDRSS to communicate with satellites and ground stations is not

interoperable with DOD radio frequencies, precluding TDRSS’ ability to

support DOD space operations. For fiscal years 1996 through 2000, NASA

programmed about $639 million for its space network, including the recent

procurement of three new TDRSS spacecraft to replenish existing satellites

beginning in 1999. Design modifications are planned to make the new

spacecraft more capable. NASA has installed a second TDRSS ground

terminal, and now has plans to refurbish its original ground terminal at

White Sands. These terminal upgrades are expected to reduce operating

costs. The reliability, quality, and volume of TDRSS service available to

users are expected to increase as a result of these upgrades.

NOAA Satellite

Control Network

NOAA’s satellite control network supports four operational environmental

satellites—two in low-Earth polar and two in high-Earth equatorial orbits.

In addition, the network supports four standby satellites—two in each of

the orbital regimes—that were once fully operational, but are now

degraded. The network consists of a satellite control operations facility at

Page 21 GAO/NSIAD-96-77 Satellite Control Capabilities
Appendix II 

Satellite Control Network Descriptions and

Plans

Suitland, Maryland, and two ground stations located at Wallops Island,

Virginia, and Fairbanks, Alaska. In addition, a ground station located in

Lannion, France, and operated by a French space agency, supports certain

telemetry and command requirements.

Planned Network

Upgrades

NOAA’s fiscal year 1996 budget for operating, maintaining, and upgrading its

satellite control network is about $42 million. For fiscal years 1996

through 2000, NOAA programmed about $95 million just for network

upgrades. Although a portion of these upgrades are to be coordinated with

the Air Force as part of converging civilian and military polar-orbiting

environmental and meteorological satellites, NOAA’s network is currently

not interoperable with other defense and civil networks.

Page 22 GAO/NSIAD-96-77 Satellite Control Capabilities
Appendix III 

Comments From the Assistant to the

President for Science and Technology

Page 23 GAO/NSIAD-96-77 Satellite Control Capabilities
Appendix IV 

Comments From the Department of Defense

Page 24 GAO/NSIAD-96-77 Satellite Control Capabilities
Appendix IV 

Comments From the Department of Defense

Page 25 GAO/NSIAD-96-77 Satellite Control Capabilities
Appendix V 

Comments From the National Aeronautics

and Space Administration

Page 26 GAO/NSIAD-96-77 Satellite Control Capabilities
Appendix V 

Comments From the National Aeronautics

and Space Administration

Page 27 GAO/NSIAD-96-77 Satellite Control Capabilities
Appendix V 

Comments From the National Aeronautics

and Space Administration

Page 28 GAO/NSIAD-96-77 Satellite Control Capabilities
Appendix V 

Comments From the National Aeronautics

and Space Administration

Page 29 GAO/NSIAD-96-77 Satellite Control Capabilities
Appendix VI 

Major Contributors to This Report

National Security and

International Affairs

Division, Washington,

D.C.

Homer H. Thomson

Accounting and

Information

Management Division,

Washington, D.C.

Keith A. Rhodes

Denver Field Office Arthur Gallegos

Maricela Camarena

Frederick G. Day

(707093) Page 30 GAO/NSIAD-96-77 Satellite Control Capabilities
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