United States General Accounting Office

GAO Testimony

Before the Committee on National Security, Subcommittee

on Military Research and Development, House of

Representatives

For Release on Delivery

Expected at

3:00 p.m., EDT

Tuesday,

March 12, 1996

CHEMICAL AND

BIOLOGICAL DEFENSE

Emphasis Remains

Insufficient to Resolve

Continuing Problems

Statement of Mark E. Gebicke, Director, Military

Operations and Capabilities Issues, National Security and

International Affairs Division

G O A

years

1921 - 1996

GAO/T-NSIAD-96-123

Mr. Chairman and Members of the Subcommittee:

We appreciate the opportunity to provide our assessment of the capability

of U.S. forces to fight and survive while under attack by chemical and

biological agents. Our work was requested by the Subcommittee on

Readiness, House Committee on National Security, and addresses

early-deploying U.S. Army and Marine Corps ground forces. Information

was obtained from a wide range of officials to include those in the Office

of the Secretary of Defense, the Joint Chiefs of Staff (JCS), the war-fighting

commanders in chief (CINC), Department of the Army, Headquarters U.S.

Marine Corps, U.S. Army Forces Command, U.S. Army Reserve Command,

and at corps, division, and individual unit levels. We plan to issue a report

on our work in April 1996.

As GAO and the Department of Defense (DOD) have reported on numerous

occasions, during the Persian Gulf Conflict (1) many units arrived in the

Persian Gulf without needed protective equipment and adequate training,

(2) plans to vaccinate personnel to protect them from the effects of

biological agents were inadequate, and (3) medical units lacked the ability

to treat casualties in a chemically or biologically contaminated

environment. U.S. forces would have been highly vulnerable to chemical

or biological attack had they not had 6 months after arrival in the Gulf to

deal with these shortcomings before offensive operations began.

Today U.S. forces face a continually increasing threat of chemical and

biological warfare. A steadily increasing number of potential enemies now

possess the technologies and capabilities to produce and deliver a wide

range of chemical and biological agents. Although DOD has somewhat

improved its forces’ defensive capability, units designated for early

deployment today face many of the same problems that were experienced

during the Persian Gulf Conflict in 1990 and 1991. U.S. forces still lack the

ability to adequately defend against chemical and/or biological agents and

a degraded war-fighting capability could still result from persistent

equipment, training, and medical shortcomings.

This situation is a result of the inconsistent but generally lower priority

DOD—especially the Joint Chiefs of Staff (JCS) and the war-fighting

Commanders-in-Chief (CINC)—assigns chemical and biological defense as

evidenced by the limited funding, staffing, and mission priority chemical

and biological defense activities receive. Shortcomings in chemical and

biological defense are likely to continue unless the Secretary of Defense

and the JCS Chairman specifically assign a higher priority to this area. DOD

Page 1 GAO/T-NSIAD-96-123
has spent less than 1 percent of its budget on chemical and biological

warfare defense, and over the period 1992-1995, funding in real terms

decreased by 30 percent. Our work gives us no reason to expect DOD to

place greater emphasis on this area in the future. The salient details on

past and present problems in the U.S. defense against chemical and

biological warfare are discussed below.

Early-Deploying Units

Lack Required

Equipment

Shortages of chemical and biological defense equipment are a

long-standing problem. After the Persian Gulf Conflict, the Army changed

its regulations in an attempt to ensure that early-deploying units would

have sufficient equipment on hand upon deployment. This direction,

contained in U.S. Forces Command Regulation 700-2, has not been

universally implemented. Presently, neither the Army’s more than five

active divisions composing the crisis response force nor the

early-deploying Army reserve units we visited had complied with the new

stocking level requirements. All had shortages of critical equipment; three

of the more than five active divisions had 50 percent or greater shortages

of protective suits, and shortages of other critical items were as high as

84 percent, depending on the unit and the item. This equipment is normally

procured with operation and maintenance funds.

These shortages occurred primarily because unit commanders

consistently diverted operation and maintenance funds to meet what they

considered higher priority requirements, such as base operating costs,

quality-of-life considerations, and costs associated with other-than-war

deployments such as those to Haiti and Somalia. Relative to the DOD

budget, the cost of purchasing this protective equipment is low.

Early-deploying active divisions in the continental United States could

meet current stocking requirements for an additional cost of about

$15 million. However, unless funds are specifically designated for

chemical and biological defense equipment, we do not believe unit

commanders will spend operation and maintenance funds for this

purpose. The shortages of on-hand stock are exacerbated by inadequate

installation warehouse space for equipment storage, poor inventorying and

reordering techniques, shelf-life limitations, and difficulty in maintaining

appropriate protective clothing sizes.

The Army is presently considering decreasing units’ stocking requirements

to the levels needed to support only each early-deploying division’s ready

brigade and relying on depots to provide the additional equipment needed

on a “just-in-time” basis before deployment. Other approaches under

Page 2 GAO/T-NSIAD-96-123
consideration by the Army include funding these equipment purchases

through procurement accounts, and transferring responsibility for

purchasing and storing this material on Army installations to the Defense

Logistics Agency.

Progress in Research

and Development Is

Slower Than Planned

New and improved equipment is needed to overcome some DOD defensive

shortfalls, and DOD is having difficulty meeting all of its planned chemical

and biological defense research goals. Efforts to improve the management

of the materiel development and acquisition process have so far had

limited results and will not attain their full effect until at least fiscal year

1998.

In response to lessons learned in the Gulf War, Congress directed DOD to

improve the coordination of chemical and biological doctrine,

requirements, research, development, and acquisition among DOD and the

military services.1 DOD has acted. During 1994 and 1995, it established the

Joint Service Integration Group to prioritize chemical and biological

defense research efforts and develop a modernization plan and the Joint

Service Materiel Group to develop research, development, acquisition, and

logistics support plans. The activities of these two groups are overseen by

a single DOD office —the Assistant Secretary of Defense (Atomic

Energy)(Chemical and Biological Matters). While these groups have begun

to implement the congressional requirements of P.L. 103-160, progress has

been slower than expected. At the time of our review, the Joint Service

Integration Group expected to produce during 1996 its proposed (1) list of

chemical and biological defense research priorities and (2) joint service

modernization plan and operational strategy. The Joint Service Materiel

Group expects to deliver its proposed plan to guide chemical and

biological defense research, development, and acquisition in October 1996.

Consolidated research and modernization plans are important for avoiding

duplication among the services and otherwise achieving the most effective

use of limited resources. It is unclear whether or when DOD will approve

these plans. However, DOD officials acknowledged that it will be fiscal year

1998 at the earliest, about 5 years after the law was passed, before DOD can

begin formal budgetary implementation of these plans. DOD officials told us

progress by these groups has been adversely affected by personnel

shortages and collateral duties assigned to the staff.

DOD efforts to field specific equipment and conduct research to address

chemical and biological defense deficiencies have produced mixed results.

1

The National Defense Authorization Act For Fiscal Year 1994, Public Law 103-160, November 30, 1993.

Page 3 GAO/T-NSIAD-96-123
On the positive side, DOD began to field the Biological Integrated Detection

System in January 1996 and expects to complete the initial purchase of 38

systems by September 1996. However, DOD has not succeeded in fielding

other needed equipment and systems designed to address critical

battlefield deficiencies identified during the Persian Gulf Conflict and

earlier. For example, work initiated in 1978 to develop an Automatic

Chemical Agent Alarm to provide visual, audio, and

command-communicated warnings of chemical agents remains

incomplete. Because of service decisions to fund other priorities, DOD has

approved and acquired only 103 of the more than 200 FOX mobile

reconnaissance systems originally planned. Of the 11 chemical and

biological defense research goals listed in DOD’s 1995 Annual Report to the

Congress, DOD met 5 by their expected completion date of January 1996.

Some were not met. For example, a DOD attempt to develop a less

corrosive and labor-intensive decontaminate solution is now not expected

to be completed until 2002.

Army and Marine

Forces Are

Inadequately

Trained for

Chemical/Biological

Defense

Chemical and biological defense training at all levels has been a constant

problem for many years. For example, in 1986, DOD studies found that its

forces were inadequately trained to conduct critical tasks. It took 6

months during the Persian Gulf Conflict to prepare forces in theater to

defend against chemical and biological agents. However, these skills

declined again after this conflict. A 1993 Army Chemical School study

found that a combined arms force of infantry, artillery, and support units

would have extreme difficulty performing its mission and suffer needless

casualties if forced to operate in a chemical or biological environment

because the force was only marginally trained.

Army studies conducted from 1991 to 1995 showed serious weaknesses at

all levels in chemical and biological defense skills. Our analysis of Army

readiness evaluations, trend data, and lessons learned reports from this

period also showed individuals, units, and commanders alike had

problems performing basic tasks critical to surviving and operating in a

chemical or biological environment. Despite DOD efforts— such as

doctrinal changes and command directives—designed to improve training

in defense against chemical and biological warfare since the Gulf War, U.S.

forces continue to experience serious weaknesses in (1) donning

protective masks, (2) deploying detection equipment, (3) providing

medical care, (4) planning for the evacuation of casualties, and

(5) including chemical and biological issues in operational plans. The

Marine Corps also continues to experience similar problems.

Page 4 GAO/T-NSIAD-96-123
In addition to individual service training problems, the ability of joint

forces to operate in a contaminated environment is questionable. In 1995,

only 10 percent of the joint exercises conducted by four major CINCs

included training to defend against chemical and biological agents. None

of this training included all 23 required chemical/biological training tasks,

and the majority included less than half of these tasks. Furthermore, these

CINCs plan to include chemical/biological training in only 15 percent of the

joint exercises for 1996. This clearly demonstrates the lack of chemical

and biological warfare training at the joint service level. There are two

fundamental reasons for this. First, CINCs generally consider chemical and

biological training and preparedness to be the responsibility of the

individual services. Second, CINCs believe that chemical and biological

defense training is a low priority relative to their other needs.

Medical Units Lack

Equipment and

Training

We examined the ability of U.S. Army medical units that support

early-deploying Army divisions to provide treatment to casualties in a

chemically and biologically contaminated environment. We found that

these units often lacked needed equipment and training.

Lack of Equipment Medical units supporting early-deploying Army divisions we visited often

lacked critical equipment needed to treat casualties in a chemically or

biologically contaminated environment. For example, these units had only

about 50 to 60 percent of their authorized patient treatment and

decontamination kits. Some of the patient treatment kits on hand were

missing critical items such as drugs used to treat casualties. Also, none of

the units had any type of collective shelter to treat casualties in a

contaminated environment. Army officials acknowledged that the inability

to provide treatment in the forward area of battle would result in greater

rates of injury and death. Old versions of collective shelters are unsuitable,

unserviceable, and no longer in use; new shelters are not expected to be

available until fiscal year 1997 at the earliest.

Lack of Training Few Army physicians in the units we visited had received formal training

on chemical and biological patient treatment beyond that provided by the

Basic Medical Officer course. Further instruction on chemical and

biological patient treatment is provided by the medical advanced course

and the chemical and biological casualty management course. The latter

course provides 6-1/2 days of classroom and field instruction needed to

save lives, minimize injury, and conserve fighting strength in a chemical or

biological warfare environment. During the Persian Gulf Conflict, this

Page 5 GAO/T-NSIAD-96-123
course was provided on an emergency basis to medical units already

deployed to the Gulf. In 1995, 47 to 81 percent of Army physicians assigned

to early-deploying units had not attended the medical advanced course,

and 70 to 97 percent had not attended the casualty management course.

Both the advanced and casualty management courses are optional, and

according to Army medical officials, peacetime demands to provide care

to service members and their dependents often prevented attendance.

Also, the Army does not monitor those who attend the casualty

management course, nor does it target this course toward those who need

it most, such as those assigned to early-deploying units.

Vaccine Stocks and

Immunization Plans

DOD has inadequate stocks of vaccines for known threat agents, and an

immunization policy established in 1993 that DOD so far has chosen not to

implement. DOD’s program to vaccinate the force to protect them against

biological agents will not be fully effective until these problems are

resolved.

Though DOD has identified which biological agents are critical threats and

determined the amount of vaccines that should be stocked, we found that

the amount of vaccines stocked remains insufficient to protect U.S. forces,

as it was during the Persian Gulf Conflict. Problems also exist with regard

to the vaccines available to DOD. Only a few biological agent vaccines have

been approved by the Food and Drug Administration (FDA). Many remain

in Investigational New Drug (IND) status. Although IND vaccines have long

been safely administered to personnel working in DOD vaccine research

and development programs, the FDA usually requires large-scale field trials

in humans to demonstrate new drug safety and effectiveness before

approval. DOD has not performed such field trials due to ethical and legal

considerations. DOD officials said that they hoped to acquire a prime

contractor during 1996 to subcontract vaccine production and do what is

needed to obtain FDA approval of vaccines currently under investigation.

Since the Persian Gulf Conflict, DOD has consolidated the funding and

management of several biological warfare defense activities, including

vaccines, under the new Joint Program Office for Biological Defense. In

November 1993, DOD established a policy to stockpile sufficient biological

agent vaccines and to inoculate service members assigned to high-threat

areas or to early-deploying units before deployment. The JCS and other

high-ranking DOD officials have not yet approved implementation of the

immunization policy. The draft policy implementation plan is completed

Page 6 GAO/T-NSIAD-96-123
and is currently under review within DOD. However, this issue is highly

controversial within DOD, and whether the implementation plan will be

approved and carried out is unclear. Until that happens, service members

in high-threat areas or designated for early deployment in a crisis will not

be protected by approved vaccines against biological agents.

Problems Stem From

Lack of Emphasis on

Preparation for

Chemical/Biological

Warfare

The primary cause for the deficiencies in chemical and biological defense

preparedness is a lack of emphasis up and down the line of command in

DOD. In the final analysis, it is a matter of commanders’ military judgment

to decide the relative significance of risks and to apply resources to

counter those risks that the commander finds most compelling. DOD has

decided to concentrate on other priorities and consequently to accept a

greater risk regarding preparedness for operations on a contaminated

battlefield.

Funding Chemical and biological defense funding allocations are being targeted by

the Joint Staff and DOD for reduction in their attempts to fund other, higher

priority programs. DOD allocates less than 1 percent of its total budget to

chemical and biological defense. Annual funding for this area has

decreased by over 30 percent in constant dollars since fiscal year 1992,

from approximately $750 million in that fiscal year to $504 million in 1995.

This reduction has occurred in spite of the current U.S. intelligence

assessment that the chemical and biological warfare threat to U.S. forces

is increasing and the importance of defending against the use of such

agents in the changing worldwide military environment.

Funding could decrease even further. On October 26, 1995, the Joint

Requirements Oversight Council and the JCS Chairman proposed to the

Office of the Secretary of Defense (OSD) a cut of $200 million for the next 5

years ($1 billion total) to the counterproliferation budget. The

counterproliferation program element in the DOD budget includes funding

for the joint nuclear, chemical, and biological defense program as well as

vaccine procurement and other related counterproliferation support

activities. If implemented, this cut would severely impair planned chemical

and biological defense research and development efforts and reverse the

progress that has been made in several areas, according to DOD sources.

OSD supported only an $800 million cut over 5 years and sent the

recommendation to the Secretary of Defense. On March 7, 1996, we were

told that DOD was now considering a proposed funding reduction of

$33 million.

Page 7 GAO/T-NSIAD-96-123
Staffing and Monitoring The battle staff chemical officer/chemical noncommissioned officers are a

commander’s principal trainers and advisers on chemical and biological

defense operations and equipment operations and maintenance. We found

that chemical and biological officer staff positions are being eliminated

and that when filled, staff officers occupying the position are frequently

assigned collateral tasks that reduces the time available to manage

chemical and biological defense activities. At U.S. Army Forces Command

and U.S. Army III Corps headquarters, for example, chemical staff

positions are being reduced. Also, DOD officials told us that the Joint

Service Integration and Joint Service Materiel Groups have made limited

progress largely because not enough personnel are assigned to them and

collateral duties are assigned to the staff. We also found that chemical

officers assigned to a CINC’s staff were frequently tasked with duties not

related to chemical and biological defense.

The lower emphasis given to chemical and biological matters is also

demonstrated by weaknesses in the methods used to monitor their status.

DOD’s current system for reporting readiness to the Joint Staff is the Status

of Resources and Training System (SORTS). We found that the effectiveness

of SORTS for evaluating unit chemical and biological defense readiness is

limited largely because (1) it allows commanders to be subjective in their

evaluations, (2) it allows commanders to determine for themselves which

equipment is critical, and (3) reporting remains optional at the division

level. We also found that after-action and lessons-learned reports and

operational readiness evaluations of chemical and biological training are

flawed. At the U.S. Army Reserve Command there is no chemical or

biological defense position. Consequently, the U.S. Army Reserve

Command does not effectively monitor the chemical and biological

defense status of reserve forces.

Mission Priority The priority given to chemical and biological defense varied widely. Most

CINCs assign chemical and biological defense a lower priority than other

threats. Even though the Joint Staff has tasked CINCs to ensure that their

forces are trained in certain joint chemical and biological defense tasks,

the CINCs we visited considered such training a service responsibility.

Several DOD officials said that U.S. forces still face a generally limited,

although increasing, threat of chemical and biological warfare.

At Army corps, division, and unit levels, the priority given to this area

depended on the commander’s opinion of its relative importance. At one

early-deploying division we visited, the commander had an aggressive

Page 8 GAO/T-NSIAD-96-123
system for chemical and biological training, monitoring, and reporting. At

another, the commander had made a conscious decision to emphasize

other areas, such as other-than-war deployments and quality-of-life

considerations. As this unit was increasingly being asked to conduct

operations other than war, the commander’s emphasis on the chemical

and biological warfare threat declined.

Officials at all levels said training in chemical and biological preparedness

was not emphasized because of higher priority taskings, low levels of

interest by higher headquarters, difficulty working in cumbersome and

uncomfortable protective clothing and masks, the time-consuming nature

of the training, and a heavy reliance on post-mobilization training and

preparation.

We have no means to determine whether increased emphasis on chemical

and biological warfare defense is warranted at the expense of other

priorities. This is a matter of military judgment by DOD and of funding

priorities by DOD and the Congress. We anticipate that in our report due in

April 1996, we will recommend that the Secretary of Defense reevaluate

the low priority given to chemical and biological defense and consider

adopting a single manager concept for the execution of the chemical and

biological program given the increasing chemical and biological warfare

threat and the continuing weakness in the military’s defense capability.

Further, we anticipate recommending that the Secretary consider

elevating the office for current oversight to its own Assistant Secretary of

Defense level, rather than leaving it in its present position as part of the

Office of the Assistant Secretary for Atomic Energy. We may make other

recommendations concerning opportunities to improve the effectiveness

of existing DOD chemical and biological activities.

We would be pleased to respond to any questions you may have.

(703142) Page 9 GAO/T-NSIAD-96-123
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