International Partnerships in Large Science

Projects

July 1995

OTA-BP-ETI-150

GPO stock #052-003-01419-0
Recommended Citation: U.S. Congress, Office of Technology Assessment, International

Partnerships in Large Science Projects, OTA-BP-ETI-150 (Washington, DC: U.S.

Government Printing Office, July 1995).
iii

oreword

ederal investment in research and development (R&D) has been

crucial to many of the nation’s achievements in basic sciences. In

recent years, however, budgetary pressures have made it difficult

to sustain ongoing government R&D efforts and to initiate new

ventures. These pressures and the growing international character of

scientific research have focused greater attention on the potential contributions of international cooperation, particularly for large-scale, longterm science projects.

The United States has several decades of experience with international scientific collaborations. Numerous successful small-scale scientific

cooperative efforts, largely through bilateral agreements, have been conducted. High-energy physics, fusion energy, and space are rich with examples of this type of cooperation. However, U.S. experience in the joint

construction and operation of large-scale experiments and facilities is far

more limited.

This background paper, requested by the Chairman and Ranking Minority Member of the House Committee on Science, reviews U.S. experience with collaborative projects in many different fields and their implications for future activities. It assesses the factors that facilitate

international partnerships in big science projects and those that, conversely, favor the pursuit of purely national projects. The background paper also reviews and identifies several important issues to consider in

structuring future collaborations. These include maintaining U.S. scientific expertise, setting research priorities, developing mechanisms to ensure long-term project stability, and safeguarding economic and national

security interests.

In the course of this study, OTA drew on the experience of many organizations and individuals. In particular, we appreciate the invaluable assistance of the workshop participants, as well as the efforts of the project’s contractors. We would also like to acknowledge the help of the

many reviewers who gave their time to ensure the accuracy and comprehensiveness of this study. To all of them goes the gratitude of OTA and

the personal thanks of the staff.

ROGER C. HERDMAN

Director
iv

orkshop

International Collaboration in Large Science Projects

September 13, 1994

Nancy Carson,

Chair

Nancy Carson Associates

Alexandria, VA

Phillip Anderson

Princeton University

Princeton, NJ

Charles Baker

ITER Project

University of California,

San Diego

La Jolla, CA

David Burke

Stanford Linear Accelerator

Center

Menlo Park, CA

James Decker

Department of Energy

Washington, DC

Lyndon Evans

European Organization for

Nuclear Research

Geneva, Switzerland

Noel W. Hinners

Martin Marietta Astronautics

Denver, CO

John Logsdon

Space Policy Institute

George Washington University

Washington, DC

Akihiro Maki

Japan Society for the Promotion

of Science

Washington, DC

Edward M. Malloy

Department of State

Washington, DC

Rodney W. Nichols

New York Academy of Sciences

New York, NY

David Overskei

General Atomics

San Diego, CA

Ian Pryke

European Space Agency

Washington, DC

J. Thomas Ratchford

George Mason University

Arlington, VA

John D. Schumacher

National Aeronautics and Space

Administration

Washington, DC

Mr. Anatoliy A. Shurygin

Embassy of the Russian

Federation

Washington, DC

Ken Stanfield

Fermi National Accelerator

Laboratory

Batavia, IL

Note: OTA appreciates and is grateful for the valuable assistance and thoughtful critiques provided by the workshop participants. The

participants do not, however, necessarily approve, disapprove, or endorse this report. OTA assumes full responsibility for the report

and the accuracy of its contents.
v

roject Staff

Peter D. Blair

Assistant Director

Industry, Commerce, and

International Security Division

Emilia L. Govan

Program Director

Industry, Commerce, and

International Security Division

CONTRACTORS

Center for Science, Trade and

Technology Policy

George Mason University

John Krige

European University Institute

Kenneth Pechter

Research Center for Advanced

Science and Technology

University of Tokyo

Florence Poillon

Editor

PRINCIPAL STAFF

Joanne Sedor

Project Director

Matthew Weinberg

Project Director

Richard Brody

Analyst

Karen Larsen

Senior Analyst

Robin Roy

Senior Analyst1

ADMINISTRATIVE STAFF

Marsha Fenn

Office Administrator

Tina Aikens

Administrative Secretary

Gay Jackson

PC Specialist

Lillian Chapman

Division Administrator

PUBLISHING STAFF

Mary Lou Higgs

Manager, Publishing Services

Cheryl Davis

Electronic Publishing Specialist

Susan Hoffmeyer

Graphic Designer

Chip Moore

Production Editor

________________

1 Served as project director until January 1995.
vi

eviewers

Charles Baker

U.S. ITER Home Team Office

University of California,

San Diego

Julie Baker

National Aeronautics and Space

Administration

William A. Blanpied

National Science Foundation

David L. Burke

Stanford Linear Accelerator

Center

Daryl Chubin

National Science Foundation

Alan T. Crane

Office of Technology Assessment

Stephen O. Dean

Fusion Power Associates

Sidney Drell

Stanford Linear Acclerator Center

Gerald Epstein

Office of Technology Assessment

Herman Feshbach

Center for Theoretical Physics

Massachusetts Institute of

Technology

Wendell Fletcher

Office of Technology Assessment

Harold Jaffe

Department of Energy

Don Kash

George Mason University

Genevieve J. Knezo

Congressional Research Service

Akihiro Maki

Japan Society for the Promotion

of Science

Beth A. Masters

National Aeronautics and Space

Administration

John E. Metzler

Department of Energy

David Overskei

SAIC

Francoise Praderie

Megascience Forum

Organization for Economic

Cooperation and Development

Ian Pryke

European Space Agency

J. Thomas Ratchford

George Mason University

Burton Richter

Stanford Linear Accelerator

Center

Michael Roberts

Department of Energy

Don A. Rolt

British Embassy

Rustum Roy

The Pennsylvania State University

Alan Schriesheim

Argonne National Laboratory

Eugene B. Skolnikoff

Massachusetts Institute of

Technology

Marcia Smith

Congressional Research Service

Peter Smith1

Office of Technology Assessment

Rodney Sobin

Office of Techology Assessment

Linda Staheli

Office of Science and Technology

Policy

Albert Teich

American Association for the

Advancement of Science

Alvin Trivelpiece

Oak Ridge National Laboratory

Paul F. Uhlir

National Research Council

Ray Williamson

Office of Technology Assessment

________________

1On detail from the National Aeronautics and Space Administration.

Note: OTA appreciates and is grateful for the valuable assistance and thoughtful critiques provided by the reviewers. The reviewers

do not, however, necessarily approve, disapprove, or endorse this report. OTA assumes full responsibility for the report and the accuracy of its contents.
vii

1 Overview and Findings 1

Background 1

Findings 14

Conclusions 35

2 The Changing Nature of Science 37

Diffusion of Knowledge 34

New Areas of Scientific Inquiry 40

Science and Competitiveness 42

Role of Large Projects 45

Industrial Implications of Large Projects 46

3 U.S. Experience in International

Collaboration 49

U.S. Goals in Scientific Collaboration 49

High-Energy Physics 51

Fusion Energy Research 59

Scientific Activities in Space 72

Neutron Sources and Synchrotrons 86

4 Opportunities and Challenges of

International Collaboration 93

Benefits of Collaboration 93

Challenges of Collaboration 101

Conclusion 112

APPENDICES

A Science Goals of Other Nations 113

B Acronyms 123

INDEX 125

ontents
Overview

and

Findings

ver the past several decades, the federal government has

supported a wide range of research projects in science

and technology. Federal support has been crucial to many

of the most important research and development (R&D)

achievements in defense, space, energy, environmental, and other

science and technology programs. Recently, however, federal

budget deficits and concerns about the effectiveness of research

efforts have intensified pressures on government R&D spending,

making it difficult to sustain many ongoing efforts and limiting

opportunities for new ventures. These pressures, coupled with the

increasingly international character of science and technology

R&D activities, have focused greater attention on bilateral and

multilateral collaborative arrangements, particularly for largescale, long-term projects in areas such as particle physics, energy

and environmental science, and space. 

The United States has pursued international collaborative

projects in R&D to raise the likelihood of scientific success for

particularly complex endeavors, to take greater advantage of international scientific expertise and facilities, to address science

and technology issues that have global implications, to extend national scientific capabilities, and especially for very large science

projects, to share costs and risks with other nations. International

collaboration, however, poses special challenges, such as establishing R&D priorities within and across different scientific disciplines, developing funding and planning mechanisms that ensure

the long-term stability of projects, and maintaining U.S. economic and national security interests.

| 1
2 | International Partnerships in Large Science Projects

This background paper, requested by the Chairman and Ranking Minority Member of the House

Committee on Science,1 examines the factors that

may warrant or facilitate international collaboration in large science projects or, conversely, that

may favor the United States pursuing projects independently. It identifies the challenges raised by

international collaboration, such as reconciling

collaboration with U.S. science goals, achieving

equitable distribution of costs and benefits among

nations, understanding the advantages and disadvantages of technology transfer, and dealing with

increased project management complexity. In

addition, the paper explores approaches that can

promote the successful planning and execution of

international projects.

Chapter 1 presents the principal findings of this

background paper. Chapter 2 provides an overview of the broad trends in science and the rise of

large projects. Chapter 3 examines U.S. science

goals, the U.S. experience with collaborative projects in science, and their implications for future

activities. The areas discussed include high-energy physics, fusion, space, neutron sources, and

synchrotron radiation facilities. Chapter 4 explores the benefits and disadvantages of participating in international partnerships.

The issues addressed here are relevant to congressional authorization, appropriation, and oversight of ongoing and upcoming large science

projects. These include the International Space

Station and the International Thermonuclear Experimental Reactor (ITER), as well as U.S. participation in the Large Hadron Collider (LHC)

project at the European Laboratory for Particle

Physics (CERN).

Other important issues, however, are beyond

the scope of this background paper. The overall

process of priority setting and planning in federal

research is not examined, nor are the relative benefits of big versus small science.2 Also, the role of

international collaboration as it relates to the area

of defense R&D is not addressed.3 In addition,

the paper does not examine the broad commercial

aspects of government-sponsored basic science

research. Basic research can provide the underpinning for commercial innovation and technology

development. The possible commercial implications of large science research projects (which are

not limited to the consequences of basic research)

will continue to be an important issue in structuring international partnerships, selecting projects

for collaboration, and sharing their benefits and

burdens (see chapter 2).

BACKGROUND

❚ The Internationalization of Science and

the Role of Big Science Projects

International collaboration in scientific research

and the rise of large science projects are two significant outgrowths of the scientific revolution of

the past century. This revolution has brought unprecedented increases in the speed of scientific

and technical innovation. The sheer pace of this

change has transformed the fabric of daily life, affecting the course of economic and social development as well as the relationship between society

and the natural world. Along with an increased

rate of scientific innovation and knowledge generation, there has also been (especially in the past

50 years) a marked expansion of the breadth, cre1Previously, the House Committee on Science, Space, and Technology.

2For a discussion of these issues see U.S. Congress, Office of Technology Assessment, Federally Funded Research: Decisions for a Decade, OTA-SET-490 (Washington, DC: U.S. Government Printing Office, May 1991).

3Cooperation with its allies in the supply and joint production of defense technology has been an important element of U.S. national security

policy over the past four decades. See U.S. Congress, Office of Technology Assessment, Arming Our Allies: Cooperation and Competition in

Defense Technology, OTA-ISC-449 (Washington, DC: U.S. Government Printing Office, May 1990).
Chapter 1 Overview and Findings | 3

ativity, and sophistication of basic and applied research.4 These qualitative changes have been

accompanied by the growth of interdisciplinary

research, which in turn has opened up new fields

of inquiry. With the development and diffusion of

powerful information and communications technologies,5 the extraordinary pace of scientific

discovery continues to accelerate. These new

technologies have facilitated collaboration within

and across scientific disciplines.

The expanding range of scientific and technological undertakings, and the development of new

tools to expedite the exchange of information,

have reinforced and augmented the international

dimension of scientific research. This internationalization affects the nature of scientific inquiry,

the transmission of information among scientists

and programs, the development of interdisciplinary research, and the structure of transnational research initiatives. For example:

 The increased ability to coordinate research

across international borders has stimulated ambitious research on global scientific questions

such as climate change.

 The rapid global exchange of information has

internationalized the results of almost all scientific research, even projects and investigations

that are essentially national in character.

 The growth of cross-disciplinary research has

been closely linked to greater interaction

among researchers across international borders, stimulating the expansion of international

scientific collaborations supported by a variety

of national and international agencies and institutions.

The scale and scope of scientific research have

expanded simultaneously with the growth of international activities. Although much research is

still conducted on a small scale by individual investigators working in small laboratories, the past

few decades have witnessed the development of

very large science projects—called big science or

megascience projects.

❚ Defining “Big Science”

Although it is relatively easy to identify certain

extremely large projects as megascience, it is

more difficult to devise a generic definition of the

term. Big science projects exist in a range of fields

and share a number of common traits. Typically,

and most simply, big science has meant “big

money plus big machines.” Megascience projects

involve large, interdisciplinary teams of researchers, including both engineers and scientists. Such

projects usually employ more complex and hierarchical management structures than smaller science projects. Big science ventures are almost

always supported by governments. However, industry plays a more central role (as a contractor

and recipient of federal funds) than it does in

“small” science because of the need to build large,

capital-intensive, high-technology facilities. Big

science projects vary in scale and complexity, and

reflect the different R&D goals and scientific capabilities of nations. They also vary in their commercialization potential and in the degree to

which they address broad national or global needs.

Some big science projects are based around a

single facility, whereas others are distributed

among several locations and institutions.6

4Although there is some overlap between basic and applied research, the following distinction can be offered: “Basic research pursues fundamental concepts and knowledge (theories, methods, and findings), while applied research focuses on the problems in utilizing these concepts

and knowledge.” Office of Technology Assessment, Federally Funded Research, see footnote 2.

5For example, the Internet—a set of interconnected computer networks that share a common set of communications protocols—links tens

of millions of users worldwide via electronic mail and other communications services. Internet access is currently available in more than 160

countries, with connections being added almost daily.

6This aspect of project structure—single-site versus distributed projects—can profoundly alter the character of international collaboration

and the benefits and challenges that underlie it. For example, the siting of international scientific facilities has been a contentious issue in some

collaborations. See finding below.
4 International Partnerships in Large Science Projects

Year of completion

Project [estimated) Capital costa Participants

High-energy and nuclear physics

Stanford Linear Collider

Continuous Electron Beam

Accelerator Facility

Advanced Photon Source

B-Factory

Japanese Spring-8 Synchrotrons

Relativistic Heavy Ion Collider

Superconducting Super Collider

Proposed neutron spallation

source b

Large Hadron Collider (LHC)

Fusion

Tokamak Physics Experiment

International Thermonuclear

Experimental Reactor (ITER)

1987

1995

1996

1998

1998

1999

Canceled

2005-preliminary

planning stage

2005

2001

2005

$115 million

$513 million

$812 million

$293 million

$1 billion

$595 million

$8 billion-$11 billion

~$1 billion (no definite

estimate available)

$2.3 billionc

$694 million

$8 billion-$1 0 billiond

Us.

Us.

U.S.

Us.

Japan

Us.

Us.

Us.

Europe (CERN), U. S., Japan

Us.

U. S., Europe (Euratom)

Japan, Russia

Although it downplays other factors, cost is

probably the most important characteristic of big

science projects. If project funding is used as the

main criterion, a few very large projects clearly

stand out as megaprojects. These include the

space station (total estimated capital cost, $38 billion7

), ITER (total estimated construction cost, $8

billion to $10 billion), CERN’s Large Hadron

Collider (current estimated cost, $2.3 billion8

),

and the proposed neutron spallation source 9 (esti-

(continued on next page)

mates begin at $1 billion). All of these projects are

in the billion-dollar (plus) class, and all—with the

exception of the neutron spallation source—involve significant international collaboration. The

failure to attract international support was a principal factor in the decision to terminate the multibillion dollar Superconducting Super Collider

(see finding below). Table 1-1 shows estimated

completion dates and costs for selected big science projects.

7 This figure is based on the following costs as reported by the National Aeronautics and Space Administration (NASA): pre-FY 1994 costs:

$10.2 billion; shuttle launch costs (based on an average cost of about $500 million per flight): $14 billion. NASA reports $17.4 billion in

construction costs from FY 94 through station completion. However, this figure includes $3.7 billion in operations and science costs, as identified by the General Accounting Office. This $3.7 billion has been excluded from OTA analysis. Source: NASA, Space Station Program Office,

April 1995. NASA provided data to the House Committee on Science, Space, and Technology that account for the above costs, plus civil service

and operations costs through the first 10 years of operations. These figures indicate that total costs for the station will be $72.3 billion. See

Marcia Smith, Space Stations (Washington, DC: Library of Congress, Congressional Research Service, Apr. 6, 1995), p. 4; and U.S. General

Accounting Office, “Space Station: Estimated Total U.S. Funding Requirements,” GAO/NSIAD-95-163, June 1995, p. 4.

8The estimated cost for the LHC would be roughly twice as large ($4 billion to $5 billion) if it were developed on the same accounting basis

as U.S. cost estimates. Also this figure does not include the detectors, which may total as much as $2 billion. CERN has asked the United States to

contribute approximately $400 million to this project. This contribution could also include in-kind contributions such as equipment. The Department of Energy, however, will not be in a position to recommend any specific level of LHC funding until overall Department cost reduction

goals through 2001 are developed. Harold Jaffe, Department of Energy, Office of High Energy and Nuclear Physics, personal communication,

April 1995.

9

The accelerator-based neutron spallation source has been proposed by the Clinton Administration as an alternative to the recently canceled

nuclear reactor-based Advanced Neutron Source. The European Union is also in the preliminary planning stage for a spallation source, but no

formal efforts have yet been made to explore the possibility of collaboration. See chapter 3.
Chapter 1 Overview and Findings 5

Project

Space e

Hubble Space Telescope

Compton Gamma Ray Observatory

Advanced X-Ray Astrophysics Facility

Cassini

Earth Observing System

Space station

Canadian Mobile Servicing System for

the space station

Japanese Experimental Module for

the space station

Proposed European Space Agency

(ESA) module and equipment for

the space station

Ground-based astronomy and physics

Gemini telescopes

Laser Interferometer Gravitational

Wave Observatory

Year of completion

(estimated)

1990

1991

1998

1998

2000 (initial

components)

2002

1998-2002

1998-2002

1998-2002

1998-2000

1999

Capital costa

$2.3 billion

$957 million

$2.1 billion

$1.9 billion

$8 billion

$38 billion

$1 billion

$3 billion

$3 billionf

$176 milliong

$231 million

Participants

U. S., Europe (ESA)

U. S., Germany

U. S., Germany,

Netherlands, U.K.

U. S., ESA, Italy

U. S., ESA, Canada,

Japan, France,

Eumetsat

U. S., Russia

Canada

Japan

ESA

U. S., U. K., Canada,

Chile, Argentina,

Brazil

Us.

a Figures represent construction and development, exclusive of operational expenses, which can raise project costs considerably. Figures represent dollars as spent or projected, unadjusted for Inflation.

b The Neutron Spallation Source IS being proposed to replace the canceled Advanced Neutron SOUrCe

c The estimated cost for the LHC would be roughly twice as large ($4 billion to $5 billion) if it were developed on the same accounting basis as U.S.

cost estimates. Also this figure does not include the detectors, which may total as much as $2 billion. The proposed U.S. contribution to the project

IS $400 million U.S. scientists are already deeply involved in the design and construction of two LHC detectors.

dThe U.S. share is currently 25 percent of the engineering design cost. Detailed cost estimates for ITER are not yet available. There has been no

agreement among the parties about whether ITER wiII be built or what the U.S. share of construction costs would be.

e For U S space projects, figures reflect U.S. cost only.

f Unofficial ESA estimate.

g The U.S. share IS $88 million.

SOURCE U S Congress, Office of Technology Assessment, 1995, based on figures from: William Boesman, Congressional Research Service,

“Big Science and Technology Projects: Analysis of 30 Selected U.S. Government Projects,” August 1994; Genevieve. Knezo, Major Science and

Technology Programs: Megaprojects and Presidential Initiatives, Trends Through FY 1996, Requested, CRS Report for Congress (Washington,

DC Congressional Research Service, Mar. 27, 1995); NASA Budget Operations Office; and Tormod Riste, Synchrotron Radiation Sources and

Neutron Beams (Pans, France Organization for Economic Cooperation and Development, Megascience Forum, 1994).

Below the billion-dollar project level, it be- ence and technology (S&T) projects identified 30

comes more difficult to use funding to determine S&T development projects that cost more than

what constitutes megascience. A recent Congres- $100 million in 1980 dollars.10 Of these, 10 had

sional Research Service report on civilian big sci10 William Boesman, Big Science and Technology Projects: Analysis of 30 Selected U.S. Government Projects, CRS Report for Congress,

94-687 SPR (Washington, DC: Congressional Research Service, Aug. 24, 1994).
6 International Partnerships in Large Science Projects

been terminated,ll leaving 20 projects completed

or currently under way. Of these 20 projects, 16

were single-facility, basic science projects, accounting collectively for more than $50 billion of

past, current, and proposed federal science spending (exclusive of operations costs). For the purposes of this report, the Office of Technology

Assessment (OTA) has chosen to concentrate on

the class of megaprojects that cost more than $100

million.

The budget impacts of these megaprojects have

drawn considerable attention in the scientific

community and Congress. In the United States,

megaprojects account for about 10 percent of the

federal (defense and nondefense) R&D budget 12

(see figure l-l). Although the growth of megaprojects appears to have leveled off somewhat, this

trend could be reversed as several big science projects are brought up for congressional consider13 Thus, megapro- ation over the next few years.

jects merit attention not just because of their

extraordinary size, but also because their large and

potentially growing share of federal spending

poses fundamental questions about the character

of the nation’s R&D portfolio.

In recent years, the high costs and scientific rationale of some megaprojects have been severely

criticized, especially by those who regard small

science as the foundation of the nation’s R&Denterprise. In some cases, however, there can be a

complementary relationship between small science and big science. For example, the National

High Magnetic Field Laboratory and the Advanced Photon Source (an advanced x-ray

synchrotrons facility) will essentially serve as platforms for small science, and thus reinforce the re2 - ------------- -

1991 1992 1993 1994 1995 1996, req

Fiscal year

SOURCE: Genevieve J. Knezo, Major Science and Technology Programs, Megaprojects and Presidential Initiatives, Trends Through FY

1996, Requested, CRS Report for Congress (Washington, DC: Congressional Research Service, Mar 27, 1995), p. CRS-4

search support given to individual investigators

across many disciplines.

14 Telescopes provide

another example of large devices or facilities that

serve individual investigators. But many other

large projects do not directly complement small

science activities. Priority setting is therefore becoming much more of an issue because all proposed megaprojects may not be supportable

without affecting the underlying national science

base.

11 An additional two programs (Advanced X-Ray Astrophysics Facility and Comet Rendezvous Asteroid Flyby Mission/Cassini) were partially terminated.

12 This figure is based on a “basket” of large projects tracked by the Congressional Research Service. See Genevieve J. Knezo, Major Science and Technology Programs: Megaprojects and Presidential Initiatives, Trends Through FY 1996, Requested, CRS Report for Congress

(Washington, DC: Congressional Research Service, Mar. 27, 1995).

13 For example, carrying out the present development plan for a tokamak fusion reactor implies a doubling or even tripling of the annual

magnetic fusion budget from its present level ($373 million in FY 1995). See chapter 3.

l4These facilities will be used by researchers in a number of different fields, including materials science, condensed matter physics, chemistry, and molecular biology.
Chapter 1 Overview and Findings 7

The International Space Station is depicted in its completed operational state, with elements from the United States, Europa,

Canada, Japan, and Russia.

❚ Why Are Big Science Projects So Big?

The development of large projects has been driven

by several factors. In some fields of inquiry, scientific projects or undertakings must be large in

scale in order to advance and demonstrate the underlying science or to achieve specific technical

goals. For example, probing the high-energy

domains that will provide new insights into the

fundamental characteristics of matter, or demonstrating the feasibility of controlled nuclear fusion, will require apparatus (accelerators,

detectors, reactors) of unusual size and sophistication. The International Space Station project—an

effort to build and operate a permanently occupied

Earth-orbiting facility-is, by its very nature, a

complicated, immense undertaking. Other classes

of problems, such as climate change, are truly

global in nature. They require broad-based multinational, multidisciplinary initiatives to develop

better scientific understanding of fundamental
8 International Partnerships in Large Science Projects

physical processes and to ensure the international

credibility of scientific results. 15

Other motives, less directly related to basic research questions, also underlie the development

of megaprojects. Large science projects are often

viewed as symbols of national prestige. They may,

in addition, serve as vehicles for building up domestic capabilities indifferent scientific and technical fields, and thus enhancing national

economic productivity. 16 Political or foreign

policy imperatives confronting governments can

play an important role in launching large projects,

as can the desire of research institutions to sustain

or enlarge their portfolio of programs.

❚ Experience in International Scientific

Collaboration

The United States has participated in a variety of

international science undertakings, both large and

small, over the past few decades. Some of these international activities have developed from U.S.

domestic projects. The United States has also participated in joint research organizations and projects, and is a contributing member in still other

arrangements and organizations. This scientific

collaboration can take many different forms involving varying degrees of research integration,

financial and legal obligations, and management

oversight, as described in box 1-1. Large projects

have covered a broad spectrum of activity from

pure fundamental research to near-commercial

demonstrations (e.g., coal gasification).

For decades, the United States has enjoyed numerous successful small-scale scientific cooperative efforts, principally through bilateral

agreements. Typically, these agreements involve

1 5The worldwide global change research program, as presently conceived, could have a cumulative multinational cost approaching $l00

billion by the year 2020. See President’s Council of Advisors on Science and Technology, Megaprojects in the Sciences (Washington, DC:

Office of Science and Technology Policy, Executive Office of the President, December 1992). 1 6For example, the expertise gained from the development of superconducting magnet technology for particle accelerators and for magnetic fusion could ultimately be applied to such commercially important applications as magnetic resonance imaging, electric motors, advanced

materials processing, and energy storage. U.S. Congress, Office of Technology Assessment High-Temperature Superconductivity in Perspective, OTA-E-440 (Washington, DC: U.S. Government Printing Office, April 1990).

The Ocean Topography Experiment (TOPEX)/Poseidon is a

cooperative project between the United States and France to

develop and operate an advanced satellite system dedicated

to observing the Earth's oceans.

the exchange of information ardor scientists and

provide for access to facilities. There have also

been a number of small- to medium-scale collaborative efforts involving the development of specialized instrumentation sponsored by the

Department of Energy (DOE), the National Science Foundation, and the National Aeronautics

and Space Administration (NASA) .17

Big science projects, however, present a different picture. Until recently, the United States has

approached most megascience projects as primar1 7For example, DOE has been involved with a variety of multilateral cooperative activities under the auspices of the Internationd Energy

Agency. See chapter 3 for a discussion of NASA’s long history of collaborative activity.
Chapter 1 Overview and Findings | 9

ily domestic ventures. Most U.S. high-energy

physics, space, and fusion facilities have been designed and funded as national projects, even

though there has been growing collaboration in

these fields at operational levels.18 The U.S. experience in international collaboration in science

and technology R&D—where research efforts are

highly interdependent and jointly funded and conducted—is actually quite limited. The United

States is only now starting to participate in the

joint planning, construction, and operation of

large facilities or platforms (e.g., ITER and the

U.S.-Russian activities associated with the space

station.)19 These represent more integrated forms

of collaboration than the compartmentalized approaches in which partners work independently

on discrete elements of a project, as in the case of

the European and Japanese components of the

space station. The United States is still discovering what particular approaches to international

collaboration can lead to stable, successful execution of long-term projects.

In contrast to the United States, other industrialized countries, especially the nations of Western Europe, have had more extensive experience

with scientific collaborations in projects of all

sizes. Europe’s long history of collaboration has

been motivated and facilitated by a variety of factors including close geographic proximity, demography, high levels of nonscientific

interchange among partner countries, and joint

competition with the United States. In addition,

the treaty establishing the European Union calls

for joint research activities and programs among

member states. Yet, it must also be noted that European countries collaborate extensively in large

measure because they effectively have little

choice. The funding requirements and technical

breadth of modern science R&D—especially megaprojects—often make it necessary for European

countries to join forces across a broad spectrum of

projects and disciplines. This trend has strengthened in recent years. In the eyes of some observers, European scientific collaboration has now

become the norm, driven by European political integration and the need to pool scientific and financial resources.

❚ Why Collaborate?

Given the breadth, ingenuity, and vitality of the

modern scientific enterprise, policymakers in

virtually all countries are confronted with difficult

choices in establishing priorities for R&D. Included in this process of priority setting and project selection is determining whether large-scale

international science undertakings complement

national science goals and to what extent they

should be supported. At a time when all governments are sensitive to the strategic economic advantages that can accrue from knowledge-based

or technology-based industries, participation in

international projects is evaluated closely. Although some countries may see distinct benefits

associated with multinational partnerships, others

may deem participation in particular projects inconsistent with the national interest. The latter

may be particularly true if a nation is attempting

18Examples of national facilities are the Fermi National Accelerator Laboratory, the Stanford Linear Accelerator Center, the National High

Magnetic Field Laboratory at Florida State University, and the Advanced Photon Source at Argonne National Laboratory. Each of these facilities have open access policies that encourage collaboration with foreign scientists.

19 Although Canadian robotics have been on the space station’s critical path from the beginning, the U.S. agreement with Canada provides

for all Canadian hardware, drawing, and materials to be turned over to NASA in the event Canada withdraws from the program. This gives the

agency ultimate control over the contribution and its underlying technology. The same provisions governed the development of Canada’s robotic arm for the space shuttle.
10 International Partnerships in Large Science Projects

International scientific cooperation ranges from simple exchange of information and personnel in

particular areas of research to joint planning, design, and construction of equipment or facilities. As

cooperative arrangements become more complex in scale or scope, the need for more formalized organizational and managerial arrangements increases. The levels of program integration, information

transfer, and financial and political commitment depend on the nature of the collaborative activity. Historically, many areas of international cooperation have proceeded on the basis of mutual trust. However,

big science activities involving significant expenditure of human and financial resources require welldefined agreements that delineate specific project objectives and responsibilities.

International scientific collaborative activities can be classified into four broad categories: 1

The joint construction and operation of large-scale experiments and facilities IS the most highly

structured and Interdependent form of multilateral collaboration. It involves close partnership among

project participants, with each country having a roughly equal voice in project planning, financing, and

management. This type of cooperation sometimes involves the creation of elaborate institutional mechanisms to facilitate project decisionmaking and execution. Examples include the European Laboratory

for Particle Physics (CERN), a 17-nation consortium that pursues research in high-energy physics; the

International Thermonuclear Experimental Reactor (ITER) engineering design activity being pursued by

the United States, Japan, Europe, and Russia; and the European Space Agency (ESA), a 14-member

organization to pursue joint European activities in space.

Lead country collaborations are a less integrated mode of collaboration. Here, one country assumes the lead in pursuing a particular project while inviting other countries to make technical and financial contributions without taking on significant management responsibilities. The space station is

one example of this type of collaboration. The National Aeronautics and Space Administration retains

principal decisionmaking authority over its design and planning, while integrating specific technical

modules or components from Russia, Japan, and Europe. Another example is the Hadron-Electron Ring

Accelerator In this project, foreign countries are paying about 30 percent of the costs of operating this

German national facility. Other illustrations of this type of cooperation include the international Ocean

Drilling Program, initiated and led by the U.S. National Science Foundation; detector experiments at the

Fermi National Accelerator Laboratory, to which Japan and Italy contributed key components; and the

Japanese Planet-B mission to Mars, which involves five different countries.

to preserve or develop national expertise in a par- U.S. approach to collaboration through the late

ticular scientific or technological field.20

In the United States, the decision to collaborate

rather than pursue research on a domestic basis

has been determined by a set of factors specific to

U.S. science goals and other interests. The goal of

establishing and maintaining leadership in as

many scientific fields as possible was especially

important during the Cold War and dominated the

1970s. However, the development of scientific

ambitions and expertise abroad, the constriction

of U.S. government resources at home, and the

end of the Cold War may require both a redefinition of U.S. leadership and a reformulation of the

U.S. approach to international scientific collaboration. In addition, other goals—including

economic competitiveness, foreign policy and na20As an illustration, the construction of Japan’s Subaru telescope in Hawaii is linked to building up its domestic astronomy program and

attracting young people to the field. For this reason, Japan chose not to join the multilateral Gemini collaboration. Other examples include various national efforts to develop sophisticated capabilities in launching and deploying satellites.
Chapter 1 Overview and Findings 111

Distributed science projects, in which countries separately design, fund, and direct portions of

a larger coordinated project, are another form of collaboration. Examples of distributed science projects

include data gathering under the auspices of the worldwide Global Change Research Program; harmonization efforts for human genome research under the Human Genome Organization, sponsored by the

United States and Europe; and the International Solar-Terrestrial Physics Programme involving Japan,

Europe, the United States, and others.

The final category of international cooperation entails specific user group projects, in which individual researchers or governments use the experimental facilities or capabilities of other countries, but

provide the necessary equipment or financing for specific experiments. The use of another country’s

space capabilities to launch satellites illustrates this type of cooperation. Building instrumentation that

can be used at large neutron beam or synchrotrons radiation facilities is another example. When large

facilities are involved, formal and informal arrangements have allowed scientists from one country “reciprocal” access to similar facilities in other countries.

Each of these collaborative forms permits, to differing degrees, the opportunity to reduce or share

costs; to leverage intellectual resources and technical capabilities; and depending on the nature of the

project, to address wider global concerns such as improved international stability.

1This Classification has been suggested by William A Blanpied and Jennifer S Bond, “Megaprojects in the Sciences, ” Megascience and its Background, OECD Megascience Forum (Paris, France: Organization for Economic Cooperation and Development, 1993), pp. 43-44.

tional security priorities, and environmental and The scope and complexity of some scientific

social considerations—increasingly affect the

U.S. attitude toward collaboration.21

Current and recent collaborations illustrate the

difficulty in deciding whether to collaborate and

the challenges in clearly defining U.S. goals.

OTA’s review of the U.S. experience in international cooperation in high-energy physics, fusion,

and space has identified several advantages and

disadvantages associated with collaborative ventures.

initiatives may by their very nature require a multinational collaborative effort to ensure that research objectives are successfully achieved.22

Indeed, collaboration has long been used to enhance the scientific and engineering capabilities

in R&D projects. The pooling of intellectual and

technical resources from throughout the world has

led to important experimental and theoretical advances in a variety of scientific fields. Moreover,

2lSee, for example: William J. Clinton and Albert Gore, Jr., Science in the National Interest (Washington, DC: Executive Office Of the president, August 1994), which sets forth broad science and technology policy goals of the Clinton Administration; and National Academy of

Sciences, Science, Technology, and the Federal Government: National Goals for a New Era (Washington, DC: National Academy Press, June

1993), which suggests a framework for establishing science goals and priorities and rethinking the role of “scientific leadership.” See also:

Ralph Gomory and Hirsh Cohen, “Science: How Much Is Enough?” Scientific American, July 1993, p. 120; and Eugene B. Skolnikoff, The

Elusive Transformation: Science, Technology, and the Evolution of International Politics (Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press, 1993).

22For example, some scientific initiatives, such as climate change research, may require that research be carried out at several geographic

locations around the world. For other initiatives that involve great technical complexity, such as the effort to harness fusion power, collaboration

is viewed by many scientists as an important and even necessary vehicle for achieving project goals.
12 | International Partnerships in Large Science Projects

with the emergence of new centers of innovation

abroad, the only way for the U.S. scientific community to extend its expertise in particular areas

may be through collaboration.23 As the scientific

and technical competencies of other nations become comparable to or even surpass U.S. capabilities,24 the United States may have to place a

greater emphasis on having access to foreign facilities and participating in multilateral R&D projects if it is to remain competitive in different

technical fields. In addition, the upgrading of U.S.

scientific facilities may be necessary to encourage

other countries to cooperate with the United States

on both large and small projects.25 These considerations underscore the need for reassessing the

concept of leadership and how national scientific

expertise can be most effectively advanced, as

well as examining the nature of partnership and

the various approaches to collaboration.

Another motivation for pursuing collaboration

is economic. Concerns over the huge scale and

large cost of some new projects have led scientists

and policymakers in many countries to suggest

sharing the burdens internationally. Collaboration

is seen by some as particularly important to capital-intensive research endeavors that lack short- or

medium-term commercial viability. This view has

been presented to support international research

projects such as ITER and the space station. Collaboration can reduce the net costs that individual

nations must bear, though the aggregate cost of a

multinational project may sometimes be greater

than that of a project carried out by a single country. International projects may require the creation

of elaborate management and logistical arrangements. For example, engineering design activities

for the proposed ITER project are being carried

out at three separate locations in the United States,

Japan, and Germany. Also, in some cases, cost

savings may not be as great as expected, because

participation in international ventures still requires that investments be made in national programs. Without such investments, it may not be

possible for individual countries to benefit fully

from the advances coming from international

projects.

Domestic and international political considerations can also be factors in pursuing collaboration. Projects are sometimes internationalized to

raise their political profile and thereby ensure the

continuity of funding. For instance, the formal involvement and integration of Russia in the planning and operation of the International Space

Station project was to some degree motivated by

the U.S. desire to support the Russian reform process and to promote Russian adherence to the Missile Technology Control Regime.26 Political

goals have also been an important aspect of European collaborative science projects.27

Other factors, related to changes in the nature

of R&D itself, have induced both scientists and

23For example, after the cancellation of the Superconducting Super Collider, a DOE advisory panel recommended that the United States

formally join the Large Hadron Collider project at CERN to ensure that U.S. scientists remain at the forefront of accelerator design and physics

investigation. See U.S. Department of Energy, Office of Energy Research, Division of High Energy Physics, High Energy Physics Advisory

Panel’s Subpanel on Vision for the Future of High Energy Physics, DOE/ER-0614P (Washington, DC: May 1994).

24See footnote 21.

25Many large U.S. science facilities operate at limited capacity because of funding constraints. In addition, there is a need for upgrading

equipment and instrumentation. The fiscal year 1996 budget of the Clinton Administration proposes “adding $100 million above the 1995 level

to significantly enhance the usage of major DOE-operated basic research facilities.” This initiative will “facilitate a more efficient use of the

facilities, boost the number of users by several thousand over 1995, and improve the quality of service.” See Budget of the United States Government, Fiscal Year 1996 (Washington, DC: U.S. Government Printing Office, 1995), p. 97.

26See U.S. Congress, Office of Technology Assessment, U.S.-Russian Cooperation in Space, OTA-ISS-618 (Washington, DC: U.S. Government Printing Office, April 1995).

27See Antonio Ruberti and Michel Andre, “The European Model of Research Cooperation,” Issues in Science and Technology, spring 1995,

pp. 17-21.
Chapter 1 Overview and Findings | 13

policymakers to give greater consideration to international cooperation. The global nature of

some scientific areas, such as the environment,

may necessitate a more international orientation

for basic research. The widespread applicability

of new technologies coupled with the globalization of business may also support a more explicit

international approach to scientific innovation.

Increasingly, R&D activities in the private sector

involve strategic alliances among companies

from many different countries.28

❚ Challenges and Limitations of

International Collaboration

While international collaboration may play an increasingly prominent role in R&D, there remains

a variety of challenges and limitations. Collaboration raises fundamental questions about national

goals and the U.S. role in scientific and technological innovation. Efforts to increase U.S. participation in international cooperative ventures

potentially conflict with the U.S. desire to maintain scientific leadership, prestige, and project

control.

A number of issues associated with project financing also can make it difficult to initiate, structure, and execute international projects. The

difficulty in guaranteeing long-term financial

commitment by all project partners introduces an

element of instability to international undertakings. In discussions with OTA, European and Japanese government officials and scientists

particularly questioned the reliability of the

United States in maintaining the continuity and

level of funding necessary for international R&D

agreements. Distributing project costs and benefits in a more or less equitable manner among partners continues to complicate collaborations.

Furthermore, some projects may be so expensive

or involve such a high level of technical uncertainty that, even with multilateral burden sharing, the

cost of U.S. or any other nation’s participation

could be prohibitively high. And this of course

could make it difficult to generate the political

support necessary to initiate and sustain such projects.

Another challenge to multinational projects is

that the collaborative process itself may inhibit innovation by limiting competition among researchers. Due to the need to achieve technical

consensus, collaboration that involves many partners might lead to projects that have somewhat

conservative technical or scientific goals. ITER,

for example, has been criticized by some observers for having a fairly conservative design because

planners want to ensure that ignition of fusion fuel

can actually be achieved. However, collaboration

can also give rise to creative approaches or solutions because of the wider base of scientific talent

that can be tapped. The success of the LHC project

at CERN, for instance, is dependent on some extremely ambitious magnet and detector technologies. Moreover, it is possible to retain elements of

competition within single large science projects—for example, when two or more research

groups independently build and operate detectors

while using the same particle accelerator. A key

objective for all collaborative activities is to ensure that project objectives can be realized without

suppressing innovative ideas or techniques.

Other challenges to international collaboration

include the need for elaborate management and

decisionmaking mechanisms and the possible

loss of commercial advantage through the transfer

of leading-edge national technologies. An additional issue involves striking an appropriate balance between the resources dedicated to

collaboration and the need for maintaining a domestic education and R&D infrastructure to sustain and profit from a collaboration. Finally, for

28One example is the multi-billion dollar development effort of IBM, Toshiba, and Siemens to develop next-generation semiconductor

memory technology. See “Computer Chip Project Brings Rivals Together, But the Cultures Clash,” Wall Street Journal, May 3, 1994, p. A1.
14 | International Partnerships in Large Science Projects

some R&D projects, there may exist significant

scientific and economic implications that could

warrant the pursuit of purely national efforts.29

Policymakers within both the legislative and

the executive branches have suggested various

strategies to address the challenges of project

selection and funding stability. Under one approach, countries would cooperate in prioritizing

and selecting proposed big science projects from

a variety of disciplines by placing these projects

in a common “basket” where their relative costs

and benefits could be traded off against each other.

Others have suggested creating new international

organizations to coordinate information, facilitate

collaborations, or manage new international projects. Potential mechanisms for ensuring greater

administrative and funding stability in multinational collaborations have also received the attention of policymakers and the scientific

community. Proposals have been made that Congress adopt specific multiyear authorizations or

appropriations for large projects to promote their

long-term viability.

FINDINGS

The opportunities and challenges of international

collaboration indicate a series of important issues

to consider in structuring future large science undertakings. OTA’s principal findings are presented

below.

 Big science projects cover an array of disciplines and vary considerably in form and

purpose. Thus, funding and research prioritization decisions for big science projects are

likely to be more effective and appropriate

within their respective research fields, rather than among a group of unrelated costly

projects.

Large science projects are relatively few and

highly diverse. They differ in scale, complexity,

structure and the degree to which broad national

or global needs are addressed. As a consequence

of their differences, the scientific and social returns from big science projects tend to be incommensurate both within a particular project and

among projects. For example, some projects involve the design and construction of a single large

instrument such as an accelerator, while others

like the Human Genome Project entail coordination of research activities that are widely dispersed. One project may have an explicit scientific

rationale, while another may have broad economic, educational, or foreign policy objectives.

Although it may appear reasonable to lump big

projects together for policy and budgetary reasons, in practice their disparate characteristics

generally preclude concrete project-to-project

comparisons. These characteristics of diversity

and the difficulty in balancing costs and benefits

among projects have important implications for

policies addressing big science:

 Generic frameworks for setting priorities

among large science projects on a national or

international basis are probably not workable.

 The overall scientific merit as well as the

associated costs and benefits of different projects are most effectively evaluated within the

broader research and budgetary context of each

specific scientific field.

 The appropriateness and extent of international

collaboration in any large science project can

be determined only on a case-specific basis.

While big science projects continue to draw

congressional attention, they are only one example of the major budget challenges facing federal

R&D efforts overall. Priority setting occurs

29For example, synchrotron radiation facilities are heavily used by U.S. academia and private industry, and thus might be regarded as essential investments in national scientific infrastructure. In the area of applied research, the federal government has spent nearly $800 million over

an eight-year period in supporting the SEMATECH consortium. This consortium of U.S. semiconductor producers and suppliers was created to

bolster U.S. capabilities in semiconductor processing and manufacturing to ensure a viable microelectronics commercial and defense base. U.S.

member companies matched the government contributions to the project.
throughout the federal government at many different levels. At the highest level, scientific priorities

are compared to other conscience needs. Priorities

are also determined within particular disciplines.

.However, attempts at setting priorities across different scientific fields have suffered from a lack of

consensus and have been largely unsuccessful.

Because large projects are not readily comparable,

and their political components make each

unique, 30 any attempt to develop a priority-setting

scheme for big projects is likely to encounter a variety of obstacles. Consequently, the largely ad

hoc funding process for big projects will be diffi

cult to change. Still, many observers believe that

some mechanism of priority setting for large projects, whether domestic or international, is essential.31

These observations have particular relevance to

the proposed basket approach, under which major

science projects in different disciplines would be

identified and placed in a common group or basket

for nations to select or trade off one project against

another. For example, if two or more big science

projects were being built contemporaneously,

there hypothetically could be some trading of

costs and benefits between them. Under this scenario, one nation might agree to host a new highenergy physics facility, while another might host

a fusion facility. In theory, this would provide a

means for different countries to share both the burdens and the benefits of international science facilities. It could also be a vehicle for building

political support for projects by demonstrating

that foreign partners are willing to contribute to

projects in other countries, as well as those that are

based at home.

In practice, however, the basket approach has a

variety of limitations. The timing and development of various projects usually differ significantChapter 1 Overview and Findings 15

Under a bilateral agreement, the Japanese contributed to

operations and upgrade of the Doublet III-D (0/1/-0) tokamak

at General Atomics in San Diego in exchange for “hands-on”

operating experience later transferable to their new JT-60

tokamak.

ly, and thus they cannot easily be lumped together.

In addition, projects can encompass very different

technologies, and consequently individual countries may be interested in participating or hosting

particular projects and not participating in others.

Big projects also have a variety of objectives. For

example, while some large science projects may

have very specific goals such as achieving controlled ignition of fusion fuel (ITER) or discovering anew class of fundamental particles (the LHC

at CERN), others may have a broader set of purposes. As an illustration, neutron sources and synchrotron facilities essentially serve as platforms

for small science undertakings. Although the

costs of these platform facilities maybe considerable, 32 they could be regarded as long-term

investments that provide the underlying infrastructure for decades of research in a variety of

different disciplines (e.g., materials science, sol3 0For example, some programs and projects, particularly those that are capital-intensive, have developed strong industrial constituencies.

3 1For example, see William A. Blanpied and Jennifer S. Bond, “Megascience Projects: Challenges for the 21st Century,” prepared for the

International Workshop on Equipping Science for the 21st Century, Amsterdam, The Netherlands, April 1992. For a discussion of possible

criteria that might be used in cross-discipline priority setting see Office of Technology Assessment, Federally Funded Research, footnote 2. 3 2For instance, the recently terminated Advanced Neutron Source had an estimated cost of $3.2 billion, and the nearly completed Advanced

Photon Source will cost approximately $800 million (including both construction and related R&D costs).
16 | International Partnerships in Large Science Projects

id-state physics, chemistry, and structural biology). Having ready access to such facilities could

have long-term implications for scientific and industrial competitiveness.

In general, the development of proposals for

scientific projects is very much a “bottom-up”

process. The scientific community plays a major

role in setting the scientific agenda, and years are

often required for specific and detailed research

proposals to take shape.33 Depending on how the

basket idea is applied, it could undermine this bottom-up process. An ad hoc procedure of apportioning projects among different countries might

come into conflict with a previously agreed on national R&D strategy, or might weaken a nation’s

effort to develop specific scientific or technical

expertise. For these reasons, the basket approach

is considered by some policymakers to be infeasible.34

At some level, though, there must be a linking

of bottom-up planning and review procedures

with top-down priority setting, and thus some

multilateral decisionmaking framework for large

projects will probably need to evolve (see finding

below). In the near term, it is possible that an informal distribution of big projects to different regions of the world will still occur.

Since future large science projects are likely to

be relatively few in number, approaching them on

an individual basis should not be burdensome for

policymakers or scientists. For the foreseeable future, megascience projects will probably best be

realized when the most interested parties simply

choose to collaborate.

 Early and explicit consideration of international collaboration in the planning and authorization process for large projects would

better identify opportunities for cooperation.

There are clear reasons to consider international collaboration in any large, complex scientific

undertaking. Among them are the potential for reducing costs, sharing risks, and enhancing scientific capabilities. Indeed, some scientifically

worthy but expensive projects might not be pursued at all unless carried out on a collaborative basis. A more proactive approach to international

cooperation would provide the United States with

a broader set of scientific and budgetary options,

and would ensure more effective and mutually advantageous collaborations in the future.

A variety of benefits could result if international collaboration for large science projects were

considered as an option early in the planning process. Projects can benefit from formal cooperative

arrangements even in their preliminary R&D

stages. Such arrangements can foster “buy-in” to

later technical choices and decisions by potential

partners, and can result in a more efficient project

development phase as well as a more thoroughly

considered final proposal. An example of this approach is in the field of high-energy physics,

where the development of the underlying accelerator physics and technology for the Next Linear

Collider (NLC)35 is being coordinated and reviewed by a collaborative working group representing laboratories in the United States, Europe,

Japan, and the former Soviet Union.

33The U.S. government, for example, relies extensively on expert advisory panels to review scientific project proposals and to determine the

long-term agenda of particular research fields. In Europe, the newly opened European Synchrotron Radiation Facility required almost two decades of discussion and planning before it was completed.

34In OTA discussions with European and Japanese science policy officials, the basket approach was dismissed as being impractical. However, under certain circumstances, it may be feasible to have a “small basket” for a specific field of research. For example, the effort to develop

fusion power has a variety of different requirements including the construction of an engineering reactor such as ITER, an advanced physics

machine such as the Tokamak Physics Experiment, and a materials irradiation facility. Nations participating in the international fusion effort

could perhaps decide to share costs and distribute benefits by building each of these facilities in different countries.

35The NLC is an electron-positron collider now in the concept and early development stage. It is regarded as a complementary instrument to

the Large Hadron Collider at CERN.
Chapter 1 Overview and Findings | 17

The United States has sometimes pursued international partnerships after facing budget constraints well into a project, as in the case of the

Superconducting Super Collider (SSC), the space

station, and the Earth Observing System (EOS).36

In the case of the SSC, the United States sought

foreign partners as a way of sharing costs well after key scientific and engineering decisions had

been made and therefore had difficulty in securing

commitments. In the case of the two space projects, the United States might have saved time and

money, increased program technical sophistication, and avoided tensions with partners if it had

planned more extensive and integrated collaborations from the beginning (see chapter 3). In other

cases, scientists and project planners gave serious

consideration to collaboration only after being directed to do so by Congress. For example, this occurred when Congress directed the National

Science Foundation to pursue the Gemini telescope project on an international rather than a national basis.

One approach Congress might consider is to require agencies to provide justification for pursuing or not pursuing international collaboration if

projects exceed a certain monetary threshold—for

example, $100 million. The specific threshold

value is less important than the exercise of exploring the possible scientific and fiscal benefits of internationalizing a proposed project or elements of

a project. As an alternative, policymakers might

compare the projected annual peak spending for a

project to the annual appropriations for the relevant overall program. For example, the SSC needed a peak appropriation of nearly $1 billion on top

of a base program in high-energy physics that was

being funded at a level of $600 million. Thus,

from this perspective, the SSC was a strong candidate for international collaboration.

As part of the procedure for funding new projects, agencies could be required to prepare an

analysis that includes the following elements:

 an assessment of whether a proposed project is

too costly or technically challenging for any

one party;

 the international scientific context of the project: other countries’ programs, capabilities,

and goals;

 the nature of U.S. discussions with other countries about collaboration;

 prospective commitments of other countries

(technical and financial) to the project or to

competing projects;

 national security, commercial, legal, and

technology-transfer implications of international collaboration; and

 justification for seeking or avoiding such collaboration.

Such a review process would force consideration of collaboration at the start of projects, thereby better ensuring that opportunities to collaborate are not missed and that inappropriate collaborations are screened out. It should be noted

that under this framework, the decision to pursue

a project on a national or international basis would

still depend on the specific nature of the scientific

undertaking.

In each case, policymakers need to ascertain

whether the greatest scientific, budgetary, and

commercial leverage can be achieved by entering

into partnerships or by pursuing projects domestically. In some circumstances, collaborative

arrangements can enhance U.S. scientific capabilities; in others, scientific and national objectives

can be met better by pursuing projects on a domestic basis. Collaboration may not always be the

most desirable or efficient means for achieving

36 The space station program contained collaborative elements from the beginning, but until only recently all critical aspects of the project

remained firmly under U.S. control. Although the Canadian robotics contribution has been on the project’s “critical path” from the beginning,

the U.S.-Canadian agreement assures ultimate project control for NASA in the case of Canadian withdrawal from the program. The EOS program originally envisioned foreign technical contributions that would complement data provided by planned U.S. instruments or which, in one

case, would provide unique sensor capability. Subsequent budget reductions caused NASA to downsize the program, eliminate some U.S.

instruments, and greatly expand its reliance on foreign instruments for certain data.
18 | International Partnerships in Large Science Projects

technical goals. Moreover, if particular projects

can strengthen the national skill base, or provide

opportunities to improve economic productivity,

collaboration might not necessarily be in the national interest.

Furthermore, in some instances, it may be

beneficial to construct multiple facilities. Having

parallel facilities—whether within a country or in

different countries—can broaden access to facilities or instrumentation and encourage more competition and innovation in particular disciplines.

For example, the United States, Europe, and Japan

are each sponsoring major new x-ray synchrotron

radiation facilities (see chapter 3). Although each

of the projects (varying from $800 million to $1

billion in their respective construction and development costs) has similar technical characteristics, they are not necessarily redundant because of

the utility of synchrotron sources to a variety of

scientific fields and industries.

 Although the United States has generally

met its fiscal and performance obligations

under international arrangements for scientific cooperation, and often assumed a large

share of funding responsibility for projects,

concerns persist among potential partners

about the reliability of U.S. commitments.

Future partnerships may have to be more

formally structured to address these concerns.

Questions about the reliability of U.S. commitments to international scientific collaborations

were frequently raised by U.S. and foreign government officials, and other interested observers

in interviews with OTA. These concerns can be

traced to a few international projects canceled in

the early 1980s, U.S. design changes on the International Space Station, the cancellation of the

SSC, and to funding uncertainties associated with

the U.S. practice of making annual appropriations

for major science projects. Differences in government structure and in approaches to science research planning, budgeting, and funding

processes among the United States and its partners

also contribute to the perception that the United

States is less able to sustain its obligations.

Commonly cited as examples of shifting U.S.

international commitments are two projects that

were terminated after the United States had

entered into international collaborative agreements—the Solvent Refined Coal II demonstration project canceled in 1981 (see box 1-2) and the

U.S. spacecraft for the International Solar Polar

Mission canceled in 1982 (see box 1-3).

Among the factors leading to the termination or

rescoping of projects were changes in administrations and policies, and increasing budget pressures. These changes in U.S. priorities may not have

surprised seasoned political observers, but foreign

partners were in some cases dismayed by the

abruptness in which the U.S. decided to withdraw

from specific international endeavors. In particular, foreign scientists were largely unprepared for

the sudden cancellation of the SSC and the redesigns of the space station.37

Although these project histories provide some

basis for the widely expressed view that the

United States has been an unreliable partner in science collaborations, changes in U.S. positions

have generally occurred for identifiable reasons,

and often involved extensive thought and debate.

In some cases, projects have been terminated due

to serious cost escalation or poor project management. Others have been canceled in the face of

specific agency budget constraints. These decisions have tended to be exceptions to the U.S. record in international collaboration. In other

instances, U.S. research agencies have given

priority to support of international efforts over domestic projects in the face of unexpected budget

cuts. For example, the U.S. Department of Energy

37See discussions of these projects in chapter 3 of this report.
Chapter 1 Overview and Findings 19

The SRC-II demonstration project was one of a number of aggressive efforts to develop commercial synthetic fuels begun in the energy crisis atmosphere of the 1970s. The SRC-II project was to be a

$1.5 billion (1981 dollars) demonstration plant in Morgantown, West Virginia, that would convert 6,000

tons per day of high-sulfur, high-ash bituminous coal into a light distillate through a direct coal liquefaction process.

The project was initially begun as a phased effort between the U.S. Department of Energy (DOE)

and the Gulf Oil subsidiary, Pittsburgh and Midway Coal Mining Company. The project had been jointly

initiated by Congress and DOE under the Federal Non-Nuclear Energy Research and Development Act

of 1974.

According to some DOE fossil energy officials, the decision to pursue the SRC-II demonstration

project as an international collaboration was made after DOE agreed to construct both the SRC-II Iiquid

fuel demonstration plant in West Virginia and the related SRC-I solid fuel demonstration plant in Kentucky. DOE had originally planned to select one of the plants for construction after completion of the

design phase. To help offset the costs of budding the two plants, DOE solicited participation from the

Japanese and Germans who had earlier expressed interest in the direct coal liquefaction technology.

In July 1980, an agreement was signed among the governments of the United States, West Germany, and Japan to sponsor the project, A joint venture was formed with Gulf and with Japanese and

German industrial firms to carry out the project. Under the agreements, DOE was to contribute about 50

percent of the total cost, Japan and Germany were to provide about 25 percent each, and corporate

participants were to provide $100 million in cash and in kind,

In 1981, the Reagan Administration sought to terminate funding for SRC-II and a number of other

energy demonstration and commercialization efforts, The objections were both economic and political,

By 1981, oil prices were trending downward and the crisis atmosphere had abated, Concerns over federal spending were leading to increased pressure for cutting back programs of all kinds, As a policy

matter, the Reagan Administration felt that such demonstration and commercialization efforts were not

appropriate for funding directly through the government but rather should be done by the private sector

or the Synthetic Fuels Corporation, The project was eventually terminated by a joint decision of DOE,

West Germany, and Japan in June 1981, The remaining unobligated funds were transferred to energy

conservation activities.

Although U.S. and German government officials were somewhat indifferent to the fate of SRC-II,

Japanese government officials were dismayed by its demise, according to OTA interviews, The careers

of Japanese government employees who had been instrumental in Japan’s participation in SRC-II were

said to have been adversely affected as a result. Still other sources suggested that Japanese participation in SRC-II had been a quid pro quo for granting them access to the General Atomics DIII-D fusion

tokamak technology and had been an attempt to insulate the troubled synthetic fuels project from political attack.

interestingly, the cancellation of SRC-II, just one of many early synthetic fuels ventures abandoned amid falling oil prices, has not been of high concern in the area of fossil fuels research, but has

attained the status of legend among high-energy physicists, fusion researchers, and space scientists,

Despite the rather clear rationale for its termination, foreign policymakers frequently cite the SRC-II endeavor as an example of the United States failing to honor its International obligations.

SOURCES: J Freel et al , “Synfuels Processing The SRC-II Demonstration Project, ” Chemical Engineering Progress, vol 77, May

1981, pp. 86-90; William C Boesman, Big Science and Technology Projects: Analysis of 30 Selected U.S. Government Projects, CRS

Report to Congress, 94-687-SPR (Washington, DC: Congressional Research Service, Aug 24, 1994), pp. 24-25, and Off Ice of

Technology Assessment, 1995
20 International Partnerships in Large Science Projects

Between 1974 and 1979, the National Aeronautics and Space Administration (NASA) and the European Space Agency (ESA) designed a highly collaborative two-satellite mission to study the poles of

the Sun. In March 1979, NASA and ESA signed a Memorandum of Understanding (MOU) that planned

for launch in 1983. Obtaining funding for the mission proved to be more difficult than designing the

project, Although funding for the ESA satellite was not in doubt, the pressures of financing the completion of the space shuttle constrained NASA’s ability to fund its $250-million ISPM budget. The ISPM received its first request of $13 million for fiscal year (FY) 1979, despite intense shuttle-related budgetary

pressures. In FY 1980 and 1981, with pressures to complete the shuttle further constraining NASA’s

budget, ISPM survived two attempts by the House Committee on Appropriations to terminate it.

The final challenge to ISPM came in FY 1982, when the Administration cut NASA’s science budget from $757.7 million to $584.2 million. NASA could meet this cut only by terminating one of its three

large, scientific, satellite development programs: Galileo, Hubble, or ISPM. NASA decided to cancel the

U.S. spacecraft in the ISPM and to delay launch of the European satellite until 1986.

The Europeans reacted with surprise and indignation—both at having been given no prior notice

of cancellation and at the idea that an international agreement could be canceled at all. At a heated

meeting between ESA and NASA officials in Washington shortly thereafter, ESA noted that it had chosen

ISPM above a number of purely European missions to foster transatlantic cooperation and argued that

the United States had unilaterally breached the MOU. NASA noted that the MOU had a clause allowing

either partner to withdraw from its obligations if it had funding difficulties, but ESA officials said they

thought that NASA would invoke this provision only in an extreme case.

The Europeans mounted intense diplomatic pressure at the Office of Management and Budget

(OMB), the Office of Science and Technology Policy, the Department of State, and NASA to save the

mission, proposing that NASA fly a simpler spacecraft, costing $40 million instead of the original $100

million, based on what was being built in Europe for ESA. NASA supported the new plan, but was told

by OMB that no additional funding would be made available and that, if NASA wanted to keep ISPM, it

would have to find the resources in its existing budget. In September 1981, NASA informed ESA that

funding would not be sought for the European alternative, although the Europeans were encouraged to

continue with the mission using just one spacecraft.

magnetic fusion energy program has consistently governments can effectively make and uphold

supported ITER design activities. 38 long-term commitments. Under the U.S. system,

Further complicating international scientific executive branch officials cannot offer guarantees

collaborations are the differences between the par- to the same extent. Additional action by Congress,

liamentary government systems of our partners, in such as support of authorizations, appropriations,

which executive and legislative authorities are treaty ratifications, or resolutions of approval,

merged, and the separate executive and legislative would be needed for an equivalent indication of

branches associated with the U.S. system of government support.

checks and balances. Ministers of parliamentary

38For a recent history of the DOE fusion energy research programs, see U.S. Congress, Office of Technology Assessment, The Fusion Energy Program: The Role of TPX and Alternate Concepts, OTA-BP-ET1-141 (Washington, DC: U.S. Government Printing Office, February 1995),

ch. 2. DOE’s decision to give priority to maintaining ITER funding over the U.S. base program was supported in reviews by U.S. fusion scientists.
Chapter 1 Overview and Findings 121

Cancellation of the U.S. satellite degraded the mission’s scientific potential, eliminating about half

of the originally planned instruments, and 80 positions for U.S. and European scientists, Cancellation

also meant that the $15 million spent by European scientists on experiments for the U.S. spacecraft

would be wasted, In 1982, ESA decided to proceed with a one-spacecraft mission, renamed Ulysses.

Ulysses was scheduled to be launched in May 1986 but was delayed for more than four years by the

Challenger accident, It was finally placed in orbit around the Sun by the Shuttle Discovery in October

1990,

Europeans contend that the ISPM cancellation deeply weakened their confidence in the reliability

of U.S. commitments, According to ESA officials who participated in the ISPM negotiations with the

United States: “NO one can deny that the ISPM crisis had a profound and lasting effect on the attitude of

ESA towards NASA and on international cooperation in general, ” They contrast the attitudes of the two

partners to the MOU, seen as binding by ESA but a “sort of—loose---gentlemen’s agreement” for NASA

that was irrelevant to its internal deliberations when NASA was faced with budgetary cuts in its annual

reviews, In subsequent negotiations, the Europeans have sought deeper cooperation and consultation,

They contend, however, that a basic problem remains, ISPM and the negotiations over the space station (which they also describe) “show how difficult it is to conduct m a cooperative framework a space

project whose funding requires yearly authorizations without a long-term commitment, ”1

U.S. analysts also lament the ISPM cancellation and the manner in which Europe was informed,

However, they note that NASA did provide a nuclear power source (radioisotope thermal generator) for

onboard electrical power, a space shuttle launch, and tracking and data support for the Ulysses mission, These elements translate to a U.S. financial commitment of over $500 million to the project. Moreover, as one analyst notes, ESA may have overestimated the legal status of an MOU and the strength of

U.S. congressional commitment to the project from the beginning, Further, ESA has been adept at emphasizing the legacy of ISPM cancellation and using American contrition as a “bargaining chip” in subsequent negotiations,2

1 Roger M. Bonnet and Vittorio Manno, International Cooperation in Space: The Example of the European Space Agency

(Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press, 1994), p. 118.

2Joan Johnson-Freese, Changing Patterns of International Cooperation in Space (Malabar, FL: Orbit Book CO . ), 1990, P 44

Parliamentary systems, however, are not immune to changes in government and resultant

shifts in policy, and under both systems, funds for

research projects are subject to periodic legislative

approval. But as noted later in this chapter, European and Japanese governments commonly approve multiyear scientific research programs. In

contrast, the risks of periodic legislative reviews

have been heightened in recent years for U.S. researchers. Specific authorizing bills for many

large science research projects have not passed

Congress; instead, many projects have relied on —

annual appropriations.

Changes in project scope and commitment, and

the unpredictable nature of the U.S. budget process, continue to make foreign partners hesitant

about collaborating with the United States. This is

particularly true in areas where foreign programs

are dependent on a U.S. program, as in human

space flight operations. Since the Japanese, European, and to some extent, Russian human space

flight programs are now focused around their con-
22 | International Partnerships in Large Science Projects

tributions to the space station, cancellation or further major redesign could have highly disruptive

consequences for these U.S. partners.39 In contrast, in a coequal and phased collaboration such

as ITER, concerns about U.S. reliability are less

acute. Since ITER partners have fusion programs

that are comparable in size and sophistication, a

pullout by one partner or even cancellation of the

entire project would likely have a less significant

impact on the direction and viability of the partners’ domestic fusion programs than cancellation

of the space station would have on some foreign

space programs.

Various mechanisms are available for addressing the concerns of potential partners about the

reliability of U.S. international commitments and

to meet the added challenges of multinational efforts. These include a shift in how the U.S. components of international projects are authorized

and funded—from annual to multiyear approaches—and the use of explicit provisions in international agreements to enhance project

stability. International scientific projects inherently bring a more complicated structure, with

additional layers of decisionmaking and management, than purely domestic ventures. The success

of international collaborations may require compromises and special institutional arrangements

that accommodate the differences among parties

in procedures and schedules for planning, approving, and funding large science projects.

There are established multiyear funding mechanisms in the U.S. budgetary, appropriations, and

procurement processes that could be tapped for

more predictable funding of international efforts

if policymakers so choose. Among them are providing multiyear authorizations, multiyear appropriations, advance appropriations, and full

funding of the total estimated project costs. For

example, legislation has been introduced in the

104th Congress authorizing over $13.1 billion, in

annual installments of about $2.1 billion over fiscal years 1996 to 2001, for construction of the

space station.40 This step is being taken primarily

to increase the confidence of foreign partners in

the U.S. commitment to the project.41 Appropriations that remain available beyond one fiscal year

are not uncommon for large defense and space

construction and procurement programs. Congress can also provide specific contract authority

to allow sponsoring agencies to enter into multiyear contracts to support project activities.

Although multiyear funding can provide a

greater measure of assurance to foreign partners,

it can raise difficult budget challenges and is not

irrevocable. Upfront appropriations may limit the

flexibility of both a particular project and of future

federal budgets. It is important to remember that

unexpended appropriations may be rescinded by

Congress and subsequent Congresses are not required to appropriate funds to meet full authorized

levels. Given recent experiences with some large

science projects, management reforms to assure

more accurate project cost estimates and improved project planning, may be necessary to

boost congressional confidence in such multiyear

commitments (see finding below).

Greater care in structuring the processes by

which the United States enters into international

partnerships and in the terms of those agreements

can also enhance stability. Early consideration of

the possibility for international collaboration on

large science projects and continuing consultation

with prospective partners could help avoid the

problems encountered when partners were sought

late in project design. In negotiating agreements,

the partners can include provisions that detail re39In interviews with OTA, Japanese space officials indicated that cancellation of the space station could have “catastrophic” consequences

for their space program.

40H.R. 1601, International Space Station Authorization Act of 1995, was introduced May 10, 1995. The cap of $2.1 billion per year is designed to impose spending discipline.

41Robert S. Walker, Chairman, House Committee on Science, comments at media briefing, Apr. 6, 1995.
Chapter 1 Overview and Findings | 23

sponsibilities in case a partner is forced to withdraw or cannot fulfill financial commitments. In

projects where there are substantial uncertainties

about technical feasibility and costs, a phased

approach to project commitments can aid collaboration.42 Encouraging opportunities for collaboration will have to be balanced against the need to

ensure that U.S. agencies and Congress fully

understand and support the financial and other

commitments needed to carry the project to completion.

Some have suggested that the use of treaties

might be effective in formalizing collaborative

commitments in cases where projects are of strategic importance to the United States and its foreign

partners. Since treaty commitments require the

approval of the Senate, proponents of this approach reason that such agreements could effectively insulate key projects from changing budget

priorities and improve the confidence of our partners. On closer examination, use of treaty arrangements for large international science projects is

not attractive. Due to the inevitable changes

associated with long-term scientific and technological undertakings, treaties are a rather inflexible and process-intensive vehicle for structuring

scientific collaborations. No single U.S. science

project has ever been subject to the treaty ratification process. Few, if any, collaborations are likely

to require such a high level of government commitment or the associated institutional structures

characteristic of treaties. Moreover, the existence

of treaty obligations has not prevented Congress

from refusing to fund the U.S. contributions under

these arrangements, and there are generally few

mechanisms available to enforce such requirements. Treaty obligations have in the past been

used to sanction U.S. participation in multinational organizations such as the International Atomic

Energy Agency (IAEA), which does facilitate

some international research efforts in addition to

its responsibilities for nuclear arms control.

Treaty agreements among European nations form

the basis for CERN, the European Space Agency

(ESA), and collaborative research on fusion.43

Even if there is a deeply held belief that the

United States can be unreliable, it seems not to

have outweighed the benefits to other nations of

including the United States in projects. There continues to be no shortage of international interest in

having the United States as a partner in collaborative science projects. Among the current examples, all at various stages of planning, are: the

LHC, the NLC, and ITER. In certain areas, such

as space, countries such as Japan and Russia have

tied their own national efforts directly to U.S. activities and goals. As new areas of scientific inquiry

and new types of problems emerge (e.g., global

climate change), the United States will no doubt

continue to be regarded as an indispensable partner, if not the principal leader in addressing such

issues.

 To assure long-term political and funding

support of large science projects, early and

thorough project cost and performance

analyses are essential. However, improvements in project planning and cost estimation alone will not be sufficient to ensure

project stability or greater reliability on the

part of the United States in fulfilling its international commitments.

The withdrawal of the United States from particular international and domestic projects has

been precipitated by a variety of factors including:

changing national goals and budgetary priorities,

steep cost overruns following submission of unrealistic cost estimates to secure initial political

approval of projects, inadequate project planning,

and the difficulties of dealing with unforeseen

42Such a phased approach is being used in the ITER collaboration with separate agreements for conceptual design, engineering design activities, and construction and operations. The parties are now in the midst of the engineering design activities and will negotiate a new arrangement on whether and how to support construction and operation.

43In addition, the space station agreement was treated as an intergovernmental compact by European nations, as it was discussed and approved by the parliaments of all ESA member states.
24 International Partnerships in Large Science Projects

technical challenges. All of these played a role in

eroding support for megaprojects that initially had

strong backing in both the legislative and executive branches.

Although more detailed engineering and cost

estimation procedures could enhance the viability

of large and complex scientific undertakings, such

improvements still might not be enough to ensure

the ultimate completion of projects. For example,

in early 1995, after almost a decade of rigorous

planning and review costing nearly $100 million,

the Advanced Neutron Source was terminated before entering the construction phase, principally

because of its high cost of $2.9 billion (see chapter

3). In other cases, projects entailing particularly

risky technological aspects could encounter cost

escalations, despite the thoroughness of the planning and management procedures.

Nevertheless, extensive and careful preliminary work on the technical and economic feasibility of a project is essential to sustained

commitment and success. As an illustration, the

original EOS plans were restructured and rescoped due to questions about the initial design

concept and overall project implementation (see

table 1-2). The first EOS plan was criticized for its

cost, the long period of time before the system

could provide policy-relevant data, and its dependence on just two platforms to carry the program’s

instruments. Difficulties also plagued the SSC

project and eroded congressional support.

Changes in magnet design led to increased project

costs, which in turn raised questions about SSC

management and performance.44 The United

States sought foreign partners as a way of sharing

costs, but only after key engineering and siting dePhase

Mission planning

Announcement of opportunity

Peer review process

Letter review

(academia/government)

Panel review

(academia/government)

Prioritization panel (government)

Announcement of selection

Definition phase

New start

Execution phase

Restructuring process

Restructuring confirmation

Rescoping process

National Space Policy Directive 7

Rescoping confirmation

Year

1982-1987

1988

1988-1989

1989

1989-1990

1990

1990 on

1991-1992

1992

1992

1992

1993

SOURCE National Aeronautics and Space Administration, “EOS

Program Chronology, ” 1993 EOS Reference Handbook (Washington,

DC: 1993), p. 9

cisions had been made. When the desired $2 billion in foreign commitments did not materialize,

support for the project diminished further, which

ultimately led to its termination in 1993.

Changes in the way U.S. science projects are

selected, funded, structured, and managed could

aid the success of international collaborations.

Given the role that unexpected cost escalations

have played in the termination or redefinition of

several big science projects, improvements in the

planning and cost estimation of megaprojects

44Initially, the project was estimated to cost about $4.4 billion (in 1988 dollars without an allowance for contingencies); but by 1993, cost

estimates had escalated to over $11 billion. At the time of termination, 15 miles (out of a total of 54) of tunnel had been dug. magnets had been

tested, and $2.2 billion spent, mostly on salaries. Some observers argue that the management of the SSC was politicized and taken out of the

hands of DOE technical managers who had a good record in overseeing the planning and execution of large projects. As a consequence, the

various problems that developed over the course of the SSC endeavor might have been either avoided or addressed in a more effective manner.
Chapter 1 Overview and Findings | 25

would have several benefits.45 More rigorous information about project costs and performance

and about the potential for international collaboration could be useful in the authorization and appropriations processes and could lead to more

stable project decisions. Better mechanisms for

planning, engineering analysis, and cost estimation would permit policymakers to weigh more

accurately the technical and financial tradeoffs of

large scientific endeavors.46 This is beneficial—

and perhaps essential—regardless of whether other mechanisms, such as multiyear budgeting, are

adopted to enhance project stability or to assure

foreign partners.

Different modalities of funding may also be

needed to address technical risks. If, for example,

certain elements of a large project entail particularly high technical risks, a sequential development approach might be used to deal with such

uncertainties. This could limit the cost of an undertaking by requiring that extensive prototyping

or modeling be completed before commitment to

the next phase of the full project can be made. For

instance, if elaborate prototyping of magnets had

been carried out before the entire project was approved, some of the cost overruns that plagued the

SSC might have been avoided. Although a staged

approach to large projects could provide a means

for managing risk, such a strategy might require

that project schedules be extended. In some cases,

however, excessive conservatism could prevent

promising or creative initiatives from ever being

realized.

It may be desirable to make the initiation of

large projects more difficult. However, the need

for project stability may require the adoption of

mechanisms that also make it more difficult to terminate such projects after they are approved. The

challenge for policymakers is to develop a funding approach that ensures long-term commitment

but simultaneously affords some elasticity in project design and execution.

 Many nations have decisionmaking processes quite dissimilar to those in the United

States. These may lead to greater stability,

but less flexibility, in project decisions.

There are signs, however, that increased

budgetary pressures are also affecting the

ability of other countries to sustain their international commitments.

Other countries have elaborate planning and

cost estimation procedures, as well as a phased approach to project implementation. The United

States might draw on this experience in project

planning and funding. In Japan, for example, the

project planning process is a highly interactive,

consensus-building exercise that evolves over a

long period of time. The outgrowth of this consensus building has been commitment and stability.

Carefully conceived project proposals with welldefined scientific and technical objectives and detailed cost breakdowns emanate from the bottom

up. These proposals move through a hierarchy of

administrative channels from the laboratory level

through the bureau responsible for the laboratory,

to the ministry in which the bureau is located,47

and ultimately to the Ministry of Finance.

Throughout the planning process, a tremendous

amount of feedback is elicited. The larger the project, the more individuals are included in delibera45It should be noted that several projects ($500 million or less) have been completed on time and on budget. Examples of successfully completed domestic projects include the Continuous Electron Beam Accelerator Facility ($513 million), the Stanford Linear Collider ($115 million), and the Advanced Light Source ($100 million).

46For example, large projects like ITER require a clear strategy for funding and managing R&D and construction activities. Issues related to

the site, host country regulations, contingency funding, and contract methods can directly affect cost estimates. Frequently, these factors are not

well-defined during the conceptual and preliminary engineering stages when cost estimates are initially developed. Charles Baker, Leader, U.S.

ITER Home Team Leader, personal communication, April 1995.

47For large science projects, the relevant ministries are the Science and Technology Agency and the Ministry of Education, Science, and

Culture.
26 | International Partnerships in Large Science Projects

tions and the longer it takes for a consensus to be

reached.

This process establishes accountability for

overall project feasibility at the research level and

also ensures administrative support until the project is completed.48 In particular, the long planning

process strengthens cost estimations. The high

level of interaction among researchers and government administrators during the planning process reduces the possibility of “low-ball”

estimates being made merely to secure funding.49

These commitments are crucial to Japanese funding stability and stand in contrast to the funding

and planning mechanisms of the United States.

Project planning and funding by the Commission

of the European Community and individual European countries is also quite interactive in nature.

Proposed projects in Europe undergo a great deal

of technical and financial scrutiny.

Furthermore, in Europe and Japan, scientific

priorities are usually determined for fixed periods

(five-year projects or programs are typical), thus

insulating projects from year-to-year changes in

the political and economic climate. Decisions to

fund a project or program cannot be easily reversed or funding easily changed. Historically,

projects have been funded with the clear intention

of seeing them through to completion. In contrast,

even long-term projects in the United States are

subject to annual review and can be sharply reduced or terminated by Congress or a new administration.

Although multiyear budgets have been an integral part of project planning and have promoted

project stability in Japan and Europe, this does not

mean that long-term budgets are approved and appropriated at the same time. A staged approach is

used to fund multiyear projects. The project budget is divided into segments, which are appropriated in given years. For very large projects such

as fusion and space, obligations are made to fund

a portion of the budget in each fiscal year.

However, whether these processes can withstand growing budgetary pressures is open to

question. Europe and Japan are now experiencing

some of the same budgetary constraints and political pressures that the United States has confronted

in recent years. The Japanese Ministry of Education, Science, and Culture, which is the principal

supporter of university research in Japan, has

adopted a zero-growth budget for the next fiscal

year. It is possible that in the future our overseas

partners will have to adopt a more flexible decisionmaking process that is closer to the U.S. model. They may also experience the unexpected

project changes that have been criticized in the

U.S. system.

As an illustration, the prospective European

commitment to the space station has changed

markedly in the past few years and is still uncertain. Originally, ESA planned to participate in the

station through the development of an attached

pressurized laboratory facility and a Man-Tended

Free Flyer (MTFF) that could dock with the station or operate independently. ESA also coupled

its station-related activities to the development of

its Hermes reusable spacecraft. This placed station participation within a larger plan to develop

independent European human space capabilities.

However, in the past few years, due in large part

to funding pressures, both the MTFF and Hermes

were canceled. Cancellation of these programs

has produced sharp disagreements within ESA

over how to allocate limited funds, how to structure European space station participation, and

whether ESA should make additional contributions to the station program. As a result, plans to

build a downsized version of the European at48For a detailed discussion of this process, see Kenneth Pechter, “Assessment of Japanese Attitudes Toward International Collaboration in

Big Science,” contractor report prepared for the Office of Technology Assessment, December 1994.

49There have been cases, though, where project cost projections in Japan proved to be unrealistic. For example, the H2 rocket launch vehicle

program experienced a $700 million cost overrun because of needed engine design changes. An accelerator project at Japan’s Institute of Radiological Sciences doubled in cost from $200 million to $400 million. Masakazu Murakami, Director, Policy Planning for International Programs, Science and Technology Agency, personal communication, November 1994.
Chapter 1 Overview and Findings | 27

tached pressurized laboratory—the sole remaining European commitment to the station—have

yet to be approved.

It is important to note, that the European and

Japanese approaches to project selection and planning, while more stable, might sometimes result

in projects that have more conservative technical

objectives than comparable U.S. projects. The

additional levels of approval required to initiate a

project in Europe or Japan could serve to minimize technical and financial risk or to narrow

overall program goals. Historically, the sheer size

and scope of U.S. research efforts have allowed a

much broader portfolio of projects to be pursued,

including those that are more speculative or risky

in nature. This approach allowed the United States

to achieve leadership positions in a variety of different disciplines.

However, as Europe and Japan have developed

leading-edge scientific capabilities, their research

projects have increasingly set aggressive scientific and technological goals. The magnet and detector technologies being developed for the LHC

project at CERN are in some respects much more

technically challenging than those planned for the

SSC. The Joint European Torus (JET) was the first

tokamak to produce significant quantities of fusion power using a deuterium-tritium fuel mix.

Also, the Japanese decision to develop an indigenous rocket-launching capability has by its very

nature required a technology development effort

that involves considerable programmatic risk.

 Developing approaches for allocating project costs and benefits in an equitable manner will continue to present challenges to all

participants in international cooperative

ventures. This especially will be the case in

scientific collaborations involving technologies with potentially high industrial or commercial returns. The two issues that are

likely to be a source of contention in almost

all future negotiations are technology transfer and facility siting.

The United States can study the experiences of

international science organizations, such as

CERN and ESA, that have established approaches

for apportioning costs and benefits in collaborative efforts. However, the lessons learned by these

organizations in bringing a number of smaller

countries together for joint scientific and industrial development may prove of limited relevance

to U.S. concerns and goals.

CERN and ESA policies on basic membership

contributions and voting illustrate the difficulty of

applying their procedures to U.S. participation in

international science projects. CERN and ESA

determine basic membership contributions as a

share of each member’s gross national product

and assign each member country an equal vote in

decisionmaking.50 This method of allocating

costs would be unrealistic for the United States, as

it would result in a gross imbalance between the

magnitude of U.S. contributions and its say in decisionmaking.

European science organizations have also developed industrial return policies to ensure that

project contributions are channeled back to companies and research institutions in member countries. ESA, for example, has attempted to satisfy

member demands for equity in contract apportionment by instituting a system of “equitable geographic return,” whereby each country receives a

percentage of project contracts proportionate to its

funding contribution, both for mandatory and optional projects. ESA’s system of fair return appeared to work well in the past when contracts

were distributed over several years and over a series of projects. But political and budget pressures

in member countries in recent years have led to demands for equitable returns on each project, re50At ESA, basic membership contributions are used to fund mandatory science programs. Member governments may contribute additional

funds to finance optional programs outside the agency’s mandatory science budget. In these optional programs, countries receive project contracts proportionate to their financial contribution.
28 | International Partnerships in Large Science Projects

ducing the organization’s flexibility and possibly

increasing costs.51 CERN and the European Synchrotron Radiation Facility (ESRF) employ

somewhat looser industrial return rules to ensure

that prices of contracts come close to the lowest

bid.

Rather than adopting such prearranged formulas for collaboration, it appears more consistent

with U.S. national interest to continue to negotiate

the allocation of costs and benefits on a case-bycase basis. The formula and procedures for distributing costs and benefits will depend on the

origin and national sponsorship of each project,

the science goals and priorities of the participants,

and the resources each nation is willing to commit. These resources might involve not only

funds, but also in-kind contributions such as expertise, instrumentation, or materials. Since the

United States has joined few international scientific organizations or “umbrella” agreements in

the past,52 this approach may be the most practical

path for U.S. policymakers to pursue.

Technology Transfer

Given increased domestic political pressures to

link basic science research more closely to national economic development, and the increasing

globalization of R&D, an international project’s

potential for technology transfer (from or to the

United States) is likely to receive closer scrutiny

in the future. Historically, U.S. policymakers have

attempted to safeguard areas in which the United

States has developed a clear lead or a significant

commercial/industrial advantage (e.g., space

technologies). Meanwhile, a more open approach

has been pursued in areas where the United States

is less dominant or where the industrial return is

less certain (e.g., fusion research and some areas

of high-energy physics). As the global community

becomes increasingly integrated, scientific and

technological knowledge will no doubt diffuse

more rapidly. Over the past several decades, this

process of knowledge diffusion has stimulated advances in many fields (e.g., biotechnology and

computer and communications technology).

Thus, preventing technological leakage to other

countries or preserving U.S. dominance in particular fields will be an increasingly difficult task. In

certain cases, the national interest may dictate that

the United States closely control leading-edge

technologies as part of a collaborative arrangement.

It should be noted, though, that multilateral

collaborations may also be a source of new knowledge and technology, and thus participation in

such ventures will likely have a number of benefits for the United States and other nations. In

addition, the involvement of developing countries

in collaborative projects can serve to improve international political stability as well as transfer vital skills and technologies to other parts of the

world. Technology transfer should therefore not

necessarily be viewed as being at odds with national goals.

Siting

Decisions over siting have also been a source of

tension in international collaborations and could

exacerbate competitive pressures in the future.

The right to host an international science project

has been a highly sought-after prize—a source of

economic benefit and political and scientific

51ESA increased its overall country-by-country fair return goal to 95 percent in 1993 and is trying to reach 96 percent by 1996, with a goal of

90 percent within each of its programs. See John Krige, “ESA and CERN as International Collaborative Science Organizations,” contractor

report prepared for the Office of Technology Assessment, December 1994.

52 The most significant exception to this rule is U.S. participation in ITER, which is an equal partnership dedicated to a specific project, but is

not an institution. The United States has signed international agreements to coordinate and participate in international Earth observation activities. However, these Earth observation agreements have been established between independent national programs rather than through a joint

organization.
Chapter 1 Overview and Findings 29

Aerial view of the European Laboratory forParticle Physics

prestige. One study found that between 40 and 70

percent of the funds used to operate large international facilities are spent in the host nation.53

However, the types of economic benefits accruing

to the host may be in areas of low technology (e.g.,

construction, materials, chemicals, and services)

rather than high technology (project design and

components). Still, local companies that provide

technical support or equipment to facilities can

enhance their underlying scientific or engineering

expertise. A large facility can also attract new

companies and thereby raise the skill base of a region’s population.

In most cases, though, contracts for the most

knowledge-intensive components of large projects are typically assigned to companies in many

different countries. The distribution of key project

components among international partners may diminish the economic return to the country hosting

the project. Thus, it may be more advantageous

for the United States in future projects to forego

opportunities to host a facility, in exchange for the

opportunity to develop technologies and expertise

that will advance the leading sectors of U.S. science and industry.54

Moreover, development of the “information

superhighway” will enable scientists all over the

world to gain access to a project’s data or even to

operate an instrument remotely. Thus, access to

the site itself may be less important in future years

than it has been in the past.

Also, although siting a facility in a country may

result in a net economic or technical benefit to that

country, it may have drawbacks or cause domestic

political concerns for the host nation. For example, hosting ITER may be attractive to the national

science community and to industry, but the prospect of hosting a research facility that uses radioactive materials may arouse political opposition

in the locality chosen as host.

Siting should therefore be considered in a comparative context. Although the siting decision is

important, it is not necessarily in the U.S. interest

to treat siting as a paramount issue. Policymakers

should compare the economic, technical, and

political advantages of hosting a project with the

benefits offered by taking responsibility for other

parts of the project, especially the development of

high value-added knowledge-intensive components and processes. These opportunities suggest

that U.S. policymakers adopt a broader perspective on siting issues.

■ U.S. science and technology goals and priorities may have to be reevaluated as international collaboration becomes a more

integral component of R&D activities.

53This analysis was based on the spending patterns of CERN, located on the Swiss-French border, the JET fusion experiment in England;

and the ESRF and the Institute Laue-Langevin for neutron research, both in France. See “International Facilities Said To Boost National Economy,” Nature, vol. 363, May 6, 1993. 5 4For example, even if ITER was built in Japan or Europe, U.S. industry could still participate in the design and construction of the reactor

and support facilities, as well as reactor components such as superconducting magnets and associated computational and electronic systems.
30 | International Partnerships in Large Science Projects

The benefits and challenges presented by international collaboration raise basic questions

about how U.S. scientific capabilities can be most

effectively advanced.

The chief goal of U.S. R&D programs is to

maintain or develop leading-edge capabilities

across a broad spectrum of scientific fields. Other

science goals are linked to economic competitiveness, foreign policy initiatives, and national security concerns. These goals influence decisions

about whether to participate in international collaborative projects. Historically, the United States

has collaborated only when its participation did

not affect domestic science activities or when

leadership could be maintained.

Some U.S. science goals are difficult to reconcile with international collaboration. Notably, the

goal of U.S. leadership in science poses a potential

conflict with the very nature of collaboration. This

may be especially true if leadership is defined as

“dominance” in any particular field. Thus, future

U.S. participation in large-scale collaborative

projects may necessitate a redefinition of what

constitutes scientific leadership. For example, if

leadership means the development of world-class

capabilities in any particular scientific or technical field, then expanded international collaboration may not necessarily diminish—and may even

enhance—underlying U.S. scientific prowess.

Building up national scientific capabilities and

joining international partnerships are not necessarily mutually exclusive strategies. In many

cases, having access to scientific facilities in other

countries or participating in the planning and operation of particular projects may strengthen and

diversify the U.S. science base. Moreover, participation in collaborative endeavors can allow nations to avoid duplication of major facilities and

thereby permit a broader array of R&D projects to

be pursued. The ITER collaboration and the many

cooperative ventures of NASA are good examples

of this.

Furthermore, an emphasis on leadership can

strain alliances with other nations because it appears to ignore the many achievements of the European and Japanese science communities,

particularly in high-energy physics, space exploration, and fusion. As other nations continue to develop and refine their science programs and

facilities, it will become increasingly difficult for

the United States to exercise sole control over

projects. Other nations will demand recognition

of their achievements as well as a voice in key

technical and administrative decisions.

The goal of promoting national economic competitiveness provides little guidance in deciding

whether projects should be internationalized. Because pure science research is curiosity driven, it

is often difficult to assess its short-term impact,

even though over the long term, its benefits to society can be substantial.55 Basic scientific discoveries in and of themselves usually possess little

intrinsic value without further investments.56 In

those cases where commercial spinoffs are possible (e.g., advanced-materials development resulting from neutron-scattering research),

economic competitiveness could play a role in

shaping specific policies related to international

collaboration. Whether large scientific projects

can be used effectively to facilitate the development and deployment of new commercial technologies is an open question. As a general

proposition, however, it is difficult to demonstrate

that large science projects or specific aspects of

large projects can be efficiently utilized for this

purpose.

55One study concluded that rates of return for R&D in particular industries and from university research can be 30 percent or more. See

Edwin Mansfield, “Estimates of the Social Returns from Research and Development,” AAAS Science and Technology Policy Yearbook, 1991,

Margaret O. Meredith et al. (eds.) (Washington, DC: American Association for the Advancement of Science, 1991). Also see Edwin Mansfield,

“Academic Research and Industrial Innovation,” Research Policy, vol. 20, 1991, pp. 1-12.

56See Paul David et al., Center for Economic Policy Research, Stanford University, “The Economic Analysis of Payoffs from Basic Research—An Examination of the Case of Particle Physics Research,” CEPR Publication No. 122, January 1988.
Chapter 1 Overview and Findings | 31

The support of foreign policy goals has also

shaped decisions about whether to participate in

collaborative science projects. As noted earlier,

the United States uses scientific agreements to

help forge and reinforce alliances and friendships.

Most recently, the United States has used scientific agreements to support Russia’s science base. In

some instances, however, political goals can have

a negative impact on scientfic research objectives

and must be weighed against foreign policy benefits.

Overall, U.S. science goals provide little guidance to policymakers in developing a policy

framework for future collaborations. In particular,

the goal of leadership, as understood in the past,

does not provide a clear basis for developing fundamental policies that address whether international collaboration should be pursued or what

level of finding is appropriate. Reconciling U.S.

goals with the benefits of collaboration will be a

critical first step in this process.

■ More formal mechanisms for information

exchange among science policymakers

could enhance opportunities for effective international collaborations.

An important need of decisionmakers is to have

effective mechanisms for exchanging information

about emerging scientific priorities and projects in

various disciplines. OTA discussions with U.S.,

European, and Japanese science officials indicate

that new intergovernmental mechanisms for information exchange could be beneficial.

There are advantages to having more formal information-sharing arrangements among governments. In some scientfic fields, several countries

have facilities that are complementary or parallel

to those found in the United States. Better usage

of some national facilities and resources could be

achieved by identifying how similar facilities

around the world are utilized. Although there is

growing demand for access to many domestic and

foreign scientific facilities, they often operate for

limited time periods because of funding

constraints. In some fields, there is a need for

greater intergovernmental coordination in both

Section of the CERN tunnel showing a model of the Large

Hadron Collider on top of the Large Electron-Positron Collider

the use of existing facilities and the construction

of new facilities. This could permit nations to consolidate and improve the efficiency of various

R&D programs.

In some cases, essential U.S. scientific capabilities could be maintained or even extended in a

particular field of inquiry by participating in existing ventures overseas (e.g., by joining the LHC

project at CERN or the Institute Laue-Langevin

European neutron facility). In specific fields of research, such as high-energy physics, U.S. and foreign programs might be designed to take

advantage of existing infrastructure and expertise

around the globe.

Since 1992, member countries of the Organization for Economic Cooperation and Development

(OECD) have exchanged information and explored opportunities for international scientific

cooperation under the auspices of the OECD

Megascience Forum (see box 1-4). Before establishment of the Megascience Forum, science policymakers from different nations had limited

opportunities to discuss R&D priorities as well as

ideas and plans for future large projects. The Forum has sponsored both meetings for senior government officials and expert meetings where

scientists and science policymakers can explore

the needs of various scientific fields and proposals

for new experiments or facilities. Although some

major scientific fields such as high-energy phys-
32 International Partnerships in Large Science Projects

The OECD1 Council created the Megascience Forum in June 1992 primarily as a means for information exchange and open discussion on existing and future large science projects and programs,

and to facilitate international scientific cooperation among member governments. The Forum does not

set priorities or conduct scientific research; it has no decisionmaking authority. Twenty-three out of the

25 OECD member countries participate in the Forum, which has a mandate of three years.

Several factors prompted the creation of the Megascience Forum. For countries with large research programs, much of the impetus came from the rising costs of big science projects and increasing budget constraints. For others, especially smaller countries, ensuring or expanding access to facilities and data was the primary concern. For all countries, the new opportunities for scientific cooperation presented by the end of the Cold War provided an additional impetus.

To facilitate discussion, the Forum has organized expert meetings in six specific scientific disciplines or broad research areas, excluding near-term commercial areas and national defense. Leading

scientists in a particular field from all member and observer countries, and occasionally from other

scientifically important countries (for example, China and India), are invited to attend, along with government policymakers. Discussions focus on identifying opportunities for international collaboration and

mechanisms to ensure the success of cooperative projects. Meetings have been held on astronomy,

deep drilling, global climate change research, oceanography, advanced neutron and synchrotrons radiation sources, and particle physics. The results of each meeting are conveyed to the Forum as a basis

for further discussion. The Forum has approved publication of the results of the expert meetings and its

own deliberations for all six research areas.

1OECD is an intergovernmental organization founded in 1960. Its primary aim is to promote economic promotes that stimulate

growth, employment, and the expansion of world trade throughout the OECD area. The organization’s 25 members are Australia, Austria, Belgium, Canada, Denmark, Finland, France, Germany, Greece, Iceland, Ireland, Italy, Japan, Luxembourg, Mexico, the Netherlands, New Zealand, Norway, Portugal, Spain, Sweden, Switzerland, Turkey, the United Kingdom, and the United States Iceland and

Luxembourg do not participate in the Forum. Forum observer status has been granted to the European Union, Russia, Hungary,

Poland, the Czech Republic, and Korea.

ics already have international scientific organizations in which ideas and plans for future

experiments are discussed, the Megascience Forum is viewed by policymakers as being complementary to these organizations. The Forum is

essentially designed to facilitate communication

among governments.

OTA discovered a broad range of opinion regarding the usefulness of the OECD Megascience Forum. Whereas some participants found

OECD’s activities beneficial (e.g., the forums on

astronomy, deep-sea drilling, and neutron sources

were viewed by some government policy makers

as quite useful), others, particularly scientists,

have questioned its utility. Nevertheless, there has

been foreign support for a U.S. proposal to establish a follow-on activity to the Forum that would

continue to provide an intergovernmental venue

for discussion and information exchange. In addition, proposals for the development of improved
Chapter 1 Overview and Findings 33

With the Forum’s three-year term due to expire in fall 1995, the United States proposed a followon activity Based on extensive discussions with OECD member government officials, the U.S. proposal

was modified and formally adopted by the Forum at its January 1995 meeting. The proposal will be fine

tuned and a specific workplan developed at the final meeting of the Forum in June 1995. The proposal

and workplan will be submitted for the consideration of the Ministers of Science of the OECD countries

at their meeting in September 1995.

Under terms of this proposal, a new organization, tentatively called the Group on Large Scientific

Projects (GLSP), would provide a venue for government science policy officials to explore generic issues related to megascience projects and make recommendations to member governments. The new

organization would also have the authority to establish ad hoc working groups in selected scientific

disciplines where adequate mechanisms for intergovernmental discussion are lacking. The working

groups would exchange information on each country’s domestic research plans and projects, compare

project priorities, and explore prospects for international cooperation. If the working group identifies opportunities for cooperation, interested governments could enter into discussions leading to the negotiation and implementation of an international project. The responsibility for negotiating final agreements

and administering projects would reside with the participating governments rather than with OECD.

Senior science policy-level officials from OECD member governments will be delegates to GLSP.

Delegates to the working group meetings will include senior government program officials and, at the

discretion of each government, nongovernment scientists. Working groups would meet as frequently as

required and would be authorized to invite nonmember countries to participate on a case-by-case basis.

SOURCES: Organization for Economic Cooperation and Development, What Is the OECD Megascience Forum? (Paris, France.

1995); “The Dawn of Global Scientific Co-operation, The OECD Megascience Observer, No. 187, April/May 1994; and Off Ice of Science and Technology Policy, “The OECD Megascience Forum: Past Activities and Proposed Future Plans, ” reformational material,

n.d.

coordination mechanisms among G-757 countries international endeavor be evaluated on a case-spehave recently been offered.58 - cific basis.

Despite the acknowledged usefulness of information exchange, there is little support among ■ The different levels of scale and complexity

U. S., European, and Japanese policymakers for of large collaborative projects require distinct management structures. the creation of international operational entities

that would organize and supervise collaborations. Management frameworks for different projects

Regardless of the consultation mechanisms must necessarily vary in structure because each

created, the disparate characteristics of big science cooperative enterprise involves different degrees

projects will still probably necessitate that each of program integration, information transfer, and

51G-7 is the term applied to the group of large industrial economics (United States, Canada, Japan, France, Germany, United Kingdom, and

Italy) that meet regularly to consider the state of the global economy.

58In order to have more focused discussions about large projects among key industrialized nations, U.S., German, and Japanese officials are

exploring the possibility of creating formal consultation mechanisms at the G-7 level.
34 International Partnerships in Large Science Projects

The impetus for the ITER collaboration originated at the 1985

Geneva summit between President Reagan and Soviet

General Secretary Gorbachev.

financial or political commitment. For example,

distributed science activities such as data gathering on global climate conditions may have only

informal or limited project coordination requirements. 59 Scientific facilities that offer particular

services, such as neutron or synchrotrons sources,

have a more developed, but rather straightforward, management organization.60 Projects that

involve the design and construction of large, sophisticated apparatus or instrumentation usually

require more elaborate institutional mechanisms

for overseeing project planning and execution.

In reviewing the experience of past and ongoing international projects, it becomes apparent

that careful balance must be struck between the

need for integrated project planning and oversight

and the flexibility that is often necessary to successfully design project subsystems and components. For some types of projects it is fairly easy

to develop modular designs that allow the different collaborators to each focus on very specific

goals and essentially be concerned only with the

interfaces between their subsystems and the overall system. The European and Japanese components of the International Space Station serve as an

example of such a compartmentalized management approach. In other cases, however, a greater

level of integration maybe required. The several

hundred researchers who are now developing the

technical specifications for the LHC particle detectors at CERN must work closely with LHC accelerator experts to ensure that the ultimate

physics objectives of the project can be met. As a

result of this requirement, specific management

review processes have been created to guarantee

that overall technical and financial targets of the

LHC project are being achieved. The strong institutional structure provided by the CERN organization provides additional support to project

planners and designers.

The ITER fusion project presents perhaps some

of the most significant management challenges in

terms of the way in which technical decisions are

made, and how human or financial resources are

deployed. At present, engineering design activities for the proposed ITER reactor are being carried out at three separate locations in the United

States, Japan, and Germany.

At each site, a “joint central team” consisting of

American, European, Russian, and Japanese researchers specifies R&D tasks that have to be

completed. “Home teams” for each of the four

partners provide additional technical support to

the joint central teams, and coordinate the work of

local researchers and contractors. Specific assignments and tasks are being defined as the overall

design and engineering specifications of the fusion reactor are being developed. Responsibility

for the overall reactor design and project management is in the hands of the ITER director based in

San Diego, California, who reports to the ITER

5 9For example, data-collection and storage standards might have to be developed, and entities for data sharing and analysis might need to be

organized.

6 0For instance, the European Synchrotrons Radiation Facility in France is a 12-nation private consortium that offers researchers access to

high-intensity x-rays. This and similar facilities in the United States provide researchers in a variety of disciplines access to powerful experimental tools and thus are managed primarily as user-support organizations. Traditionally, such facilities have reciprocal access policies that

allow scientists from different countries to take advantage of the unique capabilities of each installation.
Chapter 1 Overview and Findings 35

council. 61 Because the reactor subsystems are integrally linked to each other, the ITER project

does not especially lend itself to decentralization.

Even after a reactor site is chosen, a geographically diffuse management operation will still be required to work with researchers and industrial

contractors indifferent countries. This will necessitate a management structure that is capable of

devolving responsibility, but also of developing

strong oversight capabilities and effective communications channels. These requirements represent a formidable challenge. If ITER’s management principle were to be characterized, it

might be defined as “decentralization with coordination.” The ITER experience will no doubt

provide important lessons for other large-scale

multinational projects that give each participating

nation an equal role in project planning, financing,

and decisionmaking.

CONCLUSION

As budget pressures in all countries mount and as

the complexity and scale of scientific projects increase, international scientific collaboration,

whether on an institutional or an informal level,

will become increasingly common. Policymakers

will therefore be required to carefully assess R&D

projects to determine whether it is critical to the

national interest that they be conducted by the

United States alone, or whether they can and

should be internationalized.

Although large science projects continue to

draw congressional attention, they represent only

a subset of a larger domain of issues relating to national R&D goals and national well-being. In the

current difficult fiscal climate, one can at best expect moderately increasing R&D budgets, especially for big science. Flat or declining budgets are

more likely. Because of these pressures, some

scientifically worthy but expensive projects might

not be pursued at all unless carried out on a colA portion of the Advanced Photon Source storage ring shows

the electromagnetic devices used to guide the 7 GeV position

around the 0.7 mile circumference.

laborative basis. Yet, despite the burden sharing

that collaboration can provide, it still maybe difficult to generate the political support necessary to

initiate and sustain large projects. This study identifies several major issues relevant to congressional consideration of U.S. participation in

international collaborative science undertakings.

First, since large projects are not readily comparable, attempts to develop a priority-setting

scheme for big projects are likely to encounter a

variety of obstacles. The relatively small number

of such projects should allow policymakers to rely

on “bottom-up” scientific review processes to determine which projects should be pursued. The

scientific community plays a major role in setting

the scientific agenda, and years are often required

for specific and detailed research proposals to take

shape. Although there must inevitably be some

linking of bottom-up planning and review with

overall government R&D priority setting, selection and funding of large projects will most probably remain ad hoc. The development of

61The ITER Council has eight members, two from each of the four partners: the United States, the European Atomic Energy Community

(Euratom),Japan, and the Russian Federation. Euratom is represented by officials from the European Commission, the executive Agency of the

European Union.
36 | International Partnerships in Large Science Projects

intergovernmental mechanisms to identify scientifically worthy projects and to explore opportunities for collaboration could bring greater

coherence to the process of project selection and

siting. Proposals for the creation of improved

coordination mechanisms are now under consideration by OECD countries.

Second, questions about U.S. reliability in international collaborations are somewhat overstated. The United States has generally fulfilled its

international obligations, except in a few cases.

Nevertheless, these few instances of U.S. withdrawal from international ventures and the uncertainties associated with the U.S. practice of

making annual appropriations for major science

projects have made foreign partners hesitant about

collaborating with the United States. International

collaboration can require special institutional arrangements or concessions that are not needed for

domestic projects. Although multiyear funding

mechanisms and improved project planning and

cost estimation procedures can enhance project

stability and provide additional assurance to U.S.

partners, Congress can always reevaluate and

even terminate projects (as can U.S. partners). The

use of treaties to formalize U.S. commitments is

too cumbersome a vehicle for structuring scientific projects, and will not necessarily guarantee

funding stability. Despite these uncertainties, other countries continue to seek U.S. participation in

a variety of scientific projects.

Third, active consideration of international

cooperation before projects are authorized could

provide the United States with a broader set of

scientific and budgetary options. For big projects

that exceed a certain monetary threshold (e.g.,

$100 million), or make up a large fraction of a program budget, Congress might consider requiring

agencies to provide a formal justification for seeking or avoiding international collaboration. This

strategy could ensure that important opportunities

to collaborate are not missed and that inappropriate collaborations are screened out.

Finally, the opportunities and challenges of international partnerships raise fundamental questions about the concept of scientific leadership, of

the nature of partnership, of what constitutes the

national interest, and how scientific capabilities

can be most effectively advanced. Traditional

U.S. science goals potentially conflict with the requirements of collaboration or are too ambiguous

to provide useful guidance for policymakers in deciding whether or how to collaborate. Congressional review of U.S. science goals and U.S. relations

with the global scientific community in the postCold War era could provide guidance about where

and how the nation should engage in future international partnerships.
The 

Changing

Nature

of Science

his chapter provides an overview of the fundamental

changes that are occurring in scientific research, including the rapid diffusion of information, new areas of scientific inquiry, and the role of large projects. These changes,

the link between science and economic competitiveness, and

growing budget constraints have spurred U.S. and other nations’

interest in international collaboration. 

DIFFUSION OF KNOWLEDGE

Over the past century, the pace of scientific and technical innovation has expanded at historically unprecedented rates. Currently, the scope and rate of human inquiry are leading to a

doubling of scientific information roughly every 12 years.1 It is

estimated, for example, that nearly half of the roughly one million

publications in the field of mathematics have been published in

the past decade alone.2 The sheer velocity of this scientific and

technological change has transformed the very fabric of daily life,

affecting the course of economic and social development as well

as the relationship between human society and the natural world.

Yet, the modern scientific enterprise cannot be characterized

simply by the speed at which information is generated or exchanged, but also by its breadth, creativity, and degree of sophistication. The very character of research and development (R&D)

activities is experiencing fundamental change as greater interaction across disciplines is giving rise to new fields of investigation

and new methods for defining, measuring, and understanding

1Gary Stix, “The Speed of Write,” Scientific American, December 1994, p. 107.

2Ibid.

| 37
38 International Partnerships in Large Science Projects

physical, biological, and ecological phenomena.

Increasingly, advances in one field are accelerating developments in others. 3 Successive advances

in underlying scientific knowledge and technology have an enabling or multiplier effect in that

they permit deeper examination of more complex

scientific problems. From understanding and manipulating essential genetic processes, to discovering new classes of materials, to exploring the

fundamental aspects of natural law, modem science is laying the foundation for even more profound discoveries and novel applications. On

many fronts, new areas of study and innovation

are emerging that will no doubt have important social and economic consequences.

With the rapid development and diffusion of information and communications technologies, the

extraordinary pace of scientific discovery is undergoing further acceleration. By effectively removing barriers of time and distance, new

electronic networks are fundamentally altering

traditional patterns of R&D. These networks have

greatly expedited the exchange of information

among researchers and promoted new possibilities for international collaboration within and

across disciplines.

The emergence of these new tools of communication is serving to reinforce the international

dimension of basic scientific research.4 Even if

science projects and investigations have been

essentially national in character, the resulting

scientific knowledge has, in most disciplines,

High-performance computers and high-speed electronic

communications networks are essential tools for ITER fusion

collaborators located around the world.

spread globally. This diffusion of information has

taken on a dramatically different character in recent years. Both formal and informal global research networks now exist in practically every

major domain of science. Leading scientific journals increasingly publish the work of multinational research teams. With access to the Internet and

other forms of communication, the manner in

which scientists design experiments, analyze

data, and interact with each other is undergoing

major change. In virtually every scientific field,

researchers throughout the globe have daily communications in which data are exchanged, preliminary experimental findings are discussed, and

new concepts and theories are debated.5 In addi3

For example, the tremendous advances in the field of microelectronics have been a result of advances in such disparate fields as condensed

matter physics, optics, metallurgy, plasma chemistry, accelerator physics, electronic circuit theory, and software architecture. These developments in microelectronics have, in turn, affected virtually every scientific and technical discipline from aeronautics to molecular biology.

4

The globalization of business is also strengthening the international character of scientific research. Elaborate webs of production now

span the globe. These production networks often includeR&D centers in many parts of the world. Multinational companies increasingly draw

on the intellectual resources of a variety of different countries in both basic research and product development. In addition, corporations from

different counties are increasingly forming strategic relationships to jointly carry out research and introduce new products. 5

There is thus far limited empirical reserach on how communication technology is affecting the social or organizational aspects of collaboration. As communications capabilities advance, the need for face-to-face interaction could to a certain. degree be supplanted by sophisticated

interactive multimedia networking. However, such networking will obviously have limits, such as the need to oversee and operate complicated

instrumentation. For a discussion of these issues see BruceV.Lewenstein, ‘The Changing Culture of Research: Processes of Knowledge Transfer,"contractor report prepared for the Office of Technology Assessment, Sept. 21, 1992; and Lisa Heinz, Coates & Jarratt, Inc., "Consequences

of New Electronic Communications Technologies for Knowledge Transfer in Science: Policy Implications," contractor report prepared for the

Office of Technology Assessment, August 1992.
Chapter 2 The Changing Nature of Science 39

As part of the U.S. Global Change Research Program to monitor global ecosystems, the National

Aeronautics and Space Administration (NASA) is now constructing one of the most sophisticated and

ambitious data storage and distribution systems ever developed. The Earth Observing System Data

and Information System (EOSDIS), the centerpiece of NASA’s Mission to Planet Earth, is designed to

provide continuous, high-quality data to support better scientific understanding of the Earth’s oceans,

land, and atmosphere. When the multisatellite Earth Observing System (EOS) becomes fully operational, sensors aboard EOS instruments will generate immense quantities of data. EOS satellites could produce as much as 300 trillion bytes of information per year, an amount roughly comparable to 250 million, 1.2 megabyte floppy disks. In addition to gathering and processing data, EOSDIS will calibrate

satellite instruments, control EOS spacecraft, and schedule the observation periods of remote sensors.

EOSDIS will also integrate data from non-EOS spacecraft and non-NASA space systems, as well as

key data from land-based and ocean-based sensors from around the planet. Moreover, the EOS data

system is being designed to detect subtle changes in ecosystem behavior over long periods of time.

In order to facilitate interdisciplinary global change research, NASA plans to make these large

quantities of experimental data easily available to a wide body of researchers at locations throughout

the world. More than 10,000 physical scientists and as many as 200,000 other researchers could become regular users of the EOSDIS data repositories. This will create considerable data management

and networking challenges. Having readily accessible, user-friendly data retrieval and management

tools could be an important step for promoting online collaboration among researchers who are geographically dispersed. To meet these challenges, NASA is implementing a “distributed architecture” for

EOSDIS rather than having a single central processing facility. Distributed Active Archive Centers, located at regional sites across the country, will each process, store, and distribute data related to specific scientific disciplines. For instance, the EROS Data Center in South Dakota will archive and distribute

satellite and aircraft data, the Jet Propulsion Laboratory in California will store data on ocean circulation

and atmospheric-oceanic interactions. However, researchers throughout the U.S. and the globe will

have routine access to the EOSDIS data archives.

SOURCE: U.S. Congress, Office of Technology Assessment, Remotely Sensed Data: Technology, Management, and Markets, OTA1SS-604 (Washington, DC: U.S. Government Printing Office, September 1994.)

tion, network-based scientific communications pository. For example, a number of biological

can broaden the base of research by opening up

data sources and publications to researchers who

previously did not have access to such information. Small institutions, in particular, can

strengthen their R&D activities by accessing data

provided by larger, well-established institutions.6

Scientists can now use sophisticated information search tools that effectively link databases in

different countries to a single integrated data redatabases are now linked together. This is particularly useful for researchers in the areas of biotechnology and molecular biology. Another

illustration of sophisticated data management is

the Earth Observing System Data and Information

System now being developed by the National

Aeronautics and Space Administration (NASA)

(see box 2-l).

6

There is some evidence that scientists who are geographically or institutionally isolated can improve their scientific productivity through

the usage of electronic network resources and communications. See Heinz, ibid.
40 | International Partnerships in Large Science Projects

Other potentially important developments include the emergence of electronic publications, or

so-called multimedia journals, that do not simply

present experimental results and analysis, but may

also contain interactive computer simulations that

illustrate the behavior of physical phenomena.7

“Virtual” experimental communities or “collaboratories” that permit real-time interaction among

researchers have also begun to appear.8 In some

cases, experimental data are transmitted immediately from instruments to investigators throughout the world.9 Yet, perhaps a more significant

development is the ability of researchers in farflung locations to actually witness and participate

in experiments as they occur. For example, neuroscience investigators in Tennessee and Scotland

recently controlled an electron microscope in

California to study various tissue specimens.10 In

the future, remote access to telescopes, meteorological instrumentation, and other computer-controlled apparatus will likely be common.

These trends have a number of implications for

big science projects. With the advent of new communications and data transfer tools, design and

engineering activities can be decentralized more

readily. For example, the development of engineering parameters and specifications for the International Thermonuclear Experimental Reactor

(ITER) has been divided among teams working in

the United States, Europe, and Japan. These teams

frequently exchange detailed engineering analyses and documentation. In addition, distributed

science activities such as the Human Genome

Project and global change research, which involve

the coordination of thousands of individual investigators, can be managed more effectively. Whether working in conjunction with a large group of

investigators, or independently, scientists at particular geographic sites can now draw on the expertise of a much wider technical community.

Thus, the existence of new information networks

and technologies can serve to reduce some of the

practical obstacles associated with large collaborative undertakings (see chapter 4).

NEW AREAS OF SCIENTIFIC INQUIRY

❚ The Environment

Although the scientific and technological progress of the past century undoubtedly represents a

new phase in human creativity and intellectual accomplishment, these advances have given rise to

a new set of challenges. In particular, the largescale expansion of economic and industrial activities over the past several decades has raised

concerns about the impact of such activities on local and global ecosystems.11 For the first time in

history, humankind can potentially alter the basic

biophysical cycles of the Earth. Human activities

are now resulting in materials flows commensurate with those of nature. Human releases of elements such as mercury, nickel, arsenic, and

vanadium are now several times those of nature,

and the amount of lead released is nearly 300

times as great as natural processes.12 Concentrations of carbon dioxide in the atmosphere are increasing 30 to 100 times faster than the rate

observed in the climatic record; methane con7A recent paper placed on the Internet by IBM researchers included a computer simulation of how cracks propagate in materials. Stix, see

footnote 1.

8See “Scientists Predict Internet Will Revolutionize Research,” The Scientist, May 2, 1994, pp. 1, 8-9.

9For example, data from high-energy physics and fusion laboratories are routinely disseminated to researchers in different parts of the world

either during or immediately following experiments.

10See “New Internet Capabilities Fueling Innovative Science,” The Scientist, May 16, 1994, p. 9.

11The world economy is consuming resources and generating wastes at unprecedented rates. In the past 100 years, the world’s industrial

production increased more than fiftyfold. See W.W. Rostow, The World Economy: History and Prospects (Austin, TX: University of Texas

Press, 1978), pp. 48-49.

12See James Galloway et al., Atmospheric Environment, vol. 16, No. 7, 1982, p. 1678. Also see Robert U. Ayres, “Toxic Heavy Metals:

Materials Cycle Optimization,” Proceedings of the National Academy of Sciences, vol. 89, No. 3, Feb. 1, 1992, pp. 815-820.
Chapter 2 The Changing Nature of Science | 41

centrations are increasing 400 times faster than

previously recorded.13

Understanding and addressing the impacts of

global climate change are likely to require unprecedented levels of global coordination and cooperation across a broad spectrum of disciplines.

Gaining a predictive understanding of the Earth’s

physical, chemical, and biological processes will

require collaboration among ecologists, microbiologists, atmospheric chemists and physicists,

oceanographers, botanists, space scientists, geologists, economists, and researchers from many

other fields. The challenges are indeed formidable. For example, decoupling the effects of natural

change from human-induced change is an extremely difficult task. Decades of continuous

monitoring of the Earth’s oceans, land, and atmosphere will be necessary to document possible climate and ecosystem changes.

The United States is spending billions of dollars in a multidisciplinary, multiyear effort to measure, understand, and ultimately predict the extent

and underlying mechanisms of global environmental change.14 However, given that these environmental questions are inherently transnational

in character, the efforts of the United States or a

few other countries will likely not be sufficient.

Any credible global environmental monitoring

program will require thousands of strategically

located, ground-based instruments around the

planet, as well as satellite and aircraft-based

instruments.15 Systematic and carefully calibrated measurements over many decades will be

necessary to develop even a limited predictive understanding of climatological and ecosystem processes. The involvement of many if not all nations

will be necessary to design and implement an effective monitoring effort. Moreover, developing

the appropriate tools—whether technical, behavioral, or institutional—for adaptation to widespread ecological change will also require

considerable global coordination. Thus, in the environmental area, international collaborative undertakings will likely increase in both number and

complexity.16

❚ Biotechology

Another significant revolution in scientific inquiry is in the field of biological sciences.17 Since the

early 1970s, considerable progress has been made

in research in genetics, cellular and molecular

biology, virology, and biochemistry. This progress has led to the creation of biotechnologies,

which are defined as tools or techniques used in

research and product development, and to the

growth of related industries. Biotechnologies

have enabled the diagnosis of human genetic disorders that would not have been detected by conventional methods; they have led to increases in

food production and to the discovery of new drugs

and vaccines. Biotechnologies also have several

potential environmental applications, such as

pollution remediation and pest control. The potential to improve human health and environmental

13See U.S. Congress, Office of Technology Assessment, Changing by Degrees: Steps To Reduce Greenhouse Gases, OTA-O-482 (Washington, DC: U.S. Government Printing Office, February 1991), p. 45.

14This effort, designated the U.S. Global Change Research Program (USGCRP), consists of a number of existing and new programs. The

largest element of USGCRP is the National Aeronautic and Space Administration’s (NASA) Mission to Planet Earth, a program that uses spaceand ground-based instruments to observe changes in Earth’s ecosystems. NASA’s Earth Observing System is the principal component of the

Mission to Planet Earth effort. See U.S. Congress, Office of Technology Assessment, Global Change Research and NASA’s Earth Observing

System, OTA-BP-ISC-122 (Washington, DC: U.S. Government Printing Office, November 1993).

15Ibid.

16For a detailed discussion of how natural and human systems may be affected by climate change and what tools are available to adjust to

such change, see U.S. Congress, Office of Technology Assessment, Preparing for an Uncertain Climate, OTA-O-563 (Washington, DC: U.S.

Government Printing Office, September 1993).

17For an indepth discussion of biotechnologies, see U.S. Congress, Office of Technology Assessment, Biotechnology in a Global Economy,

OTA-BA-494 (Washington DC: U.S. Government Printing Office, October 1991).
42 | International Partnerships in Large Science Projects

quality is truly global in nature and requires that

the best ideas be sought out, regardless of the nation in which they originated.

Because of the strong biological science research base and entrepreneurial spirit that exist in

this country, commercial development of biotechnologies has been strongest in the United

States. A multiyear, research initiative is now under way to maintain and extend U.S. leadership in

biotechnology and to spur economic growth. The

Biotechnology Research Initiative is supported by

12 federal agencies. Another initiative, the Human Genome Project, is a 15-year, $3-billion, distributed effort to locate and characterize human

genes for biomedical research in the 21st century.

In recent years, many nations have focused increasing attention on developing and/or expanding biotechnology research programs and the

capacity to convert research into new products.

The link between biotechnology R&D and future

economic competitiveness is a primary motivation for funding these programs. This link is likely

to continue to grow in the future. However, the increasing internationalization of scientific research

may be a challenge to the pursuit of strictly national biotechnology programs.

❚ Other Trends in Science

In recent years, there has been a marked increase

in the level of interaction among researchers from

different disciplines. The availability of satellite

imagery of the Earth’s oceans and land masses, for

example, has led to research initiatives that explore the linkages among agriculture, meteorology, geology, and ecology. Materials scientists and

molecular biologists are collaborating in the synthesis of new classes of high-performance materials that are biocompatible and biodegradable;

chemists, physicists, and electrical engineers have

joined forces to create innovative optical and computational devices. Psychologists, mathematicians, and linguists are developing software

concepts that emulate natural language structures.

Social and physical scientists are exploring the applications of complexity and chaos theory to human behavior. As the barriers between disciplines

become more porous, previous trends toward specialization may be supplanted by a broader movement toward interdisciplinary research. The ease

with which researchers from far-flung locations

around the globe can now exchange and debate

ideas is likely to reinforce this trend toward crossdisciplinary interaction.

Finally, with the end of the Cold War, a fundamental shift in the focus of R&D activities is occurring in the United States and abroad. Public

and private expenditures on R&D now reflect a

greater emphasis on civilian applications. Yet,

comparable levels of spending for civilian and defense R&D activities will probably come about

only over the long term, and will be subject to

changing national security requirements. In fiscal

year 1993, spending on defense R&D still represented about 60 percent of total federal support for

R&D activities. In contrast, the national expenditure on civilian basic research amounted to about

25 percent of total government R&D spending.18

SCIENCE AND COMPETITIVENESS

Scientific and technological innovation have been

closely linked to economic growth since the

Middle Ages.19 In the 20th century, efforts to harness the benefits of science have resulted in a

highly structured and institutionalized approach

to both basic and applied research. The essential

premise underlying public support of fundamen18William J. Clinton and Albert Gore, Jr., Science in the National Interest (Washington, DC: Executive Office of the President, Office of

Science and Technology Policy, August 1994).

19See N. Rosenberg and L.E. Birdzell, How the West Grew Rich: The Economic Transformation of the Industrial World (New York, NY:

Basic Books, 1986).
Chapter 2 The Changing Nature of Science | 43

tal scientific research is that it expands the base of

human knowledge and thereby opens new possibilities for improving societal well-being.20

Although it is often difficult to assess the nearterm impact of basic scientific research, its benefits to society over the long term, can be substantial.21 For example, fundamental research in

solid-state physics in the early decades of this century ultimately laid the groundwork for the modern electronics and computer industries. The

emerging biotechnology industry can trace its

origin directly to discoveries in the fields of molecular biology and biochemistry. Frequently, discoveries or insights from disparate fields of

research can lead to fundamental advances. For

instance, magnetic resonance imaging, a noninvasive medical diagnostic tool now in wide use, resulted from nuclear physics research dealing with

the magnetic behavior of atomic nuclei. Even with

a more structured approach to basic research,

many significant technological developments

have originated from research that was driven

principally by curiosity. As an illustration, the

study of bacteria that live in hot springs led to a

new technique for rapidly cloning DNA (deoxyribonucleic acid), a discovery of potentially great

scientific and commercial importance.22 The process of understanding and harnessing natural phenomena has often been a serendipitous affair.

Although basic research can provide the essential inputs for commercial innovation, it alone is

not sufficient to bring about improvements in national economic well-being. This is illustrated in

one way by the lack of correlation between the

number of Nobel prizes awarded to a particular nation and its overall economic and technological

prowess.23 Basic scientific discoveries in and of

themselves usually possess little intrinsic value

without further investments.24 These investments

might include more focused applications of research, the development of organizational and

educational capabilities,25 or greater awareness of

how discoveries in different disciplines can

improve existing manufacturing processes and

products.

With the diffusion of knowledge throughout

the world, many countries have developed comparable technical capabilities in a variety of industries. This has given rise to a highly competitive

global arena that, in turn, has created an underlying tension between basic and applied research.

Increasingly, policymakers are calling for national research efforts that are tied more directly to

20For some categories of R&D, particularly those that explore the frontiers of scientific understanding or entail significant risk, government

support may be required if socially optimal levels of investment are to be realized. Government involvement may be particularly crucial when

fundamental scientific or technological barriers need to be overcome in a short time. The challenge for policymakers is to determine where

government can best use its R&D resources to complement, rather than replicate, the activities of the private sector. Government support of

R&D activities can take many forms, including tax credits; direct financing of R&D through government labs, university research grants, or

private contracts; or joint public-private partnerships.

21One study concluded that rates of return for R&D in particular industries and from university research can be 30 percent or more. See

Edwin Mansfield, “Estimates of the Social Returns from Research and Development,” AAAS Science and Technology Policy Yearbook, 1991,

Margaret O. Meredith et al., (eds.) (Washington, DC: American Association for the Advancement of Science, 1991). Also see Edwin Mansfield,

“Academic Research and Industrial Innovation,” Research Policy, vol. 20, 1991, pp. 1-12.

22The polymerase chain reaction method for cloning DNA is now being used in a number of applications ranging from “DNA fingerprinting” to the production of genetically engineered drugs.

23For example, from 1960 to 1992, the Japanese received only four Nobel Prizes in science but had over 22,000 patents issued by the U.S.

Patent Office. See Center for Science, Trade and Technology Policy, George Mason University, “Large Science Priorities of Selected Countries,” contractor report prepared for the Office of Technology Assessment, Jan. 23, 1995.

24See Paul David et al., Center for Economic Policy Research, Stanford University “The Economic Analysis of Payoffs from Basic Research—An Examination of the Case of Particle Physics Research,” CEPR Publication No. 122, January 1988.

25The world’s fastest growing economies have placed an extraordinary emphasis on primary and secondary education. This investment in

education has often been complemented by investments in science and technology.
44 International Partnerships in Large Science Projects

X-ray beams originating from the Advanced Photon Source

storage ring are directed through a beamline (as shown) to an

experimental station.

meeting the needs of society.26 In both government and the private sector, there has been an inclination to shift funding priorities to the applied

research area, where returns on investment can be

more immediately realized. What is not clear,

however, is whether there is an ideal mix of basic

and applied research programs, or whether a major

shift to applied programs will limit the range of

new discoveries and innovations.27 Regardless of

the way in which national science priorities are

set, it is important to recognize that there is not

necessarily a linear relationship between basic and

applied research. Rather, a complex interaction

exists that cannot easily be characterized. Although additional funding for both basic and applied research would permit the pursuit of a

broader range of scientific opportunities and possible commercial applications, enlarging the U.S.

research system could lead to additional problems

in the future. As the Office of Technology Assessment report Federally Funded

sions for a Decade concluded:

Research: DeciGiven the extraordinary strength of the U.S.

research system and the character of scientific

research, there will always be more opportunities than can be funded, more researchers competing than can be sustained, and more

institutions seeking to expand than the prime

sponsor-the Federal Government-can fund.

The objective, then, is to ensure that the best research continues to be funded, that a full portfolio of research is maintained, and that there is a

sufficient research work force of the highest caliber to do the job.28

At a time when all governments are sensitive to

the strategic economic advantages that can accrue

from knowledge-based or technologically based

industries, participation in large-scale international science projects is carefully scrutinized. Whereas some countries may see distinct benefits

associated with multinational collaboration, others may deem participation in particular projects

as militating against the national interest. This can

be especially true if a nation is attempting to develop its expertise in a particular scientific or technological field.

Yet, building up national scientific capabilities

and joining international collaborations are not

necessarily mutually exclusive strategies. In

many cases, having access to scientific facilities

in other countries or participating in the planning

and operation of particular projects may strengthen and diversify a nation’s science base. Over the

past several decades, the diffusion of scientific

and technological knowledge has, in fact, accelerated progress in many fields (e.g., biotechnology,

2 6See, for example, George E. Brown, "New Ways of Looking at U.S. Science and Technology," Physics Today, September 1994. Also see

Chancellor of Duchy of Lancaster, Realising Our Potential, A Strategy for Science, Engineering and Technology, presented to Parliament by

Command of Her Majesty (London, England: Her Majesty’s Science Office, May 1993). 2 7Currently, total nondefense U.S. support of R&D is about 1.9 percent of the gross domestic product (GDP). The major portion of that

funding is industrially sponsored appliedR&D. The portion of funding directed toward basic research is 0.42 percent of the GDP, two-thirds of

which comes from the federal government. See footnote 18. 2 8U.S. Congress, Office of Technology ASSessment, Federally Funded Research: Decisions for a Decade, OTA-SET-490 (Washington,

DC: U.S. Government printing Office, May 1991).
Chapter 2 The Changing Nature of Science 45

computer and communications technology).

Also, as many Asian nations have demonstrated,

long-term investments in education or science and

technology can be particularly productive when

 linked to international networks of research. Increased global cooperation in science will no

doubt provide economic and social benefits for

many nations. The challenge for policymakers is

to ensure that the costs and benefits of collaborative activities are shared more or less equitably.

ROLE OF LARGE PROJECTS

Large projects have been a key component of our

nation’s science portfolio for several decades. Although small science is the backbone of the modem scientific enterprise, big science has steadily

encroached onto the scene. Unlike small science

projects, almost no knowledge can be generated

from a megaproject in the area of direct inquiry

until some large-scale investment has occurred.

However, significant indirect benefits can be realized throughout the course of a project. For example, ITER research may produce major indirect

benefits in the areas of materials science and magnet design even if the ITER project is not brought

to completion.

Over the past few years, expenditures on large

projects and facilities have essentially leveled off

at about 10 percent of the total federal (defense

and nondefense) R&D budget, but this situation

could change as several big science projects are

brought up for congressional approval.29 Although some large undertakings such as the National High Magnetic Field Laboratory and the

Advanced Photon Source (an advanced x-ray synchrotrons facility) provide platforms for small science, and thus reinforce the research support given

to individual investigators across many disciplines, many other projects do not complement

small science programs.

Scientists making adjustments to DELPHl particle detector.

In recent years, the role of large, costly projects

has stimulated considerable debate in Congress

and the science community. Priority setting is becoming much more of an issue because all proposed megaprojects may not be supportable

without eroding the underlying national science

base. The Superconducting Super Collider (SSC),

the International Space Station, the Earth Observing System (EOS), and ITER are just a few examples of recent megaprojects.

There are several reasons for engaging in large

scientific ventures. In some fields of inquiry,

scientific projects must be large in scale in order

to advance and demonstrate the underlying science or to achieve specific technical goals. For example, probing the energy domains that will

provide new insights into the fundamental characteristics of matter, or demonstrating the feasibility

of controlled nuclear fusion, will require apparatus (accelerators, detectors, reactors) of unusual

size and sophistication. The International Space

Station project-an effort to build and operate a

permanently inhabited Earth-orbiting facility—is

by its very nature, a complicated, immense undertaking. Other classes of problems, such as climate

change, are truly global in nature and require

2 9This figure is based on a "basket"of large projects tracked by the Congressional Research Service. See Genevieve J. Knezo, Major Science and Technology Programs: Megaprojects and Presidential Initiatives, Trends Through FY 1996 Requested, CRS Report for Congress

(Washington, DC: Congressional Research Service, Mar. 27, 1995).
46 | International Partnerships in Large Science Projects

broad-based multinational, multidisciplinary initiatives to develop a better scientific understanding of fundamental physical processes and to

ensure the international credibility of scientific results.

Although large science projects are often symbols of national prestige, their principal justification is that they serve as a means for strengthening

essential national capabilities in different scientific fields. For example, the U.S. high-energy physics program has, over the course of several

decades, led to the development of leading-edge

capabilities in the areas of accelerator design and

detector methods. Other examples are Japan’s

Subaru telescope project, which is being used to

strengthen the Japanese research base in astronomy, and strategic programs such as the various national efforts to develop sophisticated capabilities

in launching and deploying satellites. Admittedly,

some projects have strong scientific rationales,

whereas others are being pursued less for science

and more for broad social, economic, and technological reasons. 

In addition, there is sometimes a strong political rationale for pursuing large collaborative undertakings. For instance, European governments

support a number of extensive research programs

through the European Union Research Commissariat. In addition, separate facilities and institutions have been created including the European

Laboratory for Particle Physics (CERN), the European Synchrotron Radiation Facility (ESRF),

and the European Space Agency (ESA). The governments involved believe that promoting scientific cooperation among scientists throughout

Europe will strengthen the political processes

associated with the unification of Europe. Coordinated small science projects have had a unifying

effect as well.

Finally, if pursued in a multidisciplinary or

multilateral fashion, large science projects permit,

to differing degrees, the opportunity to leverage

intellectual resources and technical capabilities.

Synergies can often be achieved simply by bringing individual investigators or research groups together. Depending on the nature of the

undertaking, large projects may also provide opportunities for addressing scientific questions that

will benefit humankind (e.g., human genome research).

INDUSTRIAL IMPLICATIONS

OF LARGE PROJECTS

Although the principal purpose underlying

large scientific endeavors centers on the pursuit of

basic research and engineering goals, some megascience activities have been used to varying

degrees as a means for developing industrial capabilities in certain spheres of technology (e.g.,

rocket-launching capabilities, satellite design, superconducting magnets, advanced materials). As

a consequence, some programs and projects, particularly those that are capital-intensive, have developed strong industrial constituencies. In the

United States, Europe, and Japan, for example,

major industrial enterprises perform key system

and component development work for national

space agencies. ESA has, in fact, evolved a contracting system that is designed to return a significant proportion of member-state contributions to

national companies. Thus, in certain cases, large

science undertakings have been used by governments as an instrument of industrial policy.

Whether large scientific projects can be effectively used to facilitate the development and deployment of new commercial technologies is an

open question. As a general proposition, though,

it is difficult to demonstrate that large projects or

specific aspects of large projects can be efficiently

utilized for this purpose. There have been varying

results in different fields.

Although over the course of many decades

there has been considerable transferability of advances in high-energy and nuclear physics to the

commercial sector, such spin-off technologies

have developed in a rather unpredictable and discontinuous fashion. These spin-offs include ion

implantation in the semiconductor industry, accelerator-based cancer therapy, CAT (computerized axial tomography) scanner systems, positron

emission tomography, free electron lasers, and

synchrotron generated x-ray beams. None of these

technologies were conceived in a deliberate or di-
Chapter 2 The Changing Nature of Science

rect manner; rather they were unanticipated offshoots of basic experimental research. Moreover,

these transfers from high-energy and nuclear

physics research to the marketplace have taken

place over a considerably long time.

In contrast, the development of rocket-launching systems, satellites, and space platforms has

been a direct and integral objective of different national space programs. Unlike the basic research

focus of high-energy physics projects, some space

activities have an explicit technological orientation and can be more naturally geared to achieving

the specific engineering or performance goals

necessary for commercial applications.

Other programs have objectives that require

progress both in basic scientific understanding

and in certain underlying technologies. In pursuing nuclear fusion as a commercial power source,

which is primarily a basic research undertaking,

there are certain technological imperatives that

must be met before further fusion advances can

occur. The attainment of these technical goals

could also provide opportunities for spin-offs to

other fields. In particular, the goals of demonstrating the technical and economic feasibility of fusion power using magnetic confinement schemes

envision the development of advanced materials

and greater use of superconducting magnet

technologies. Proposed advanced tokamak fusion

reactor designs, for example, call for extremely

powerful superconducting magnets. Research on

high-performance, low-activation materials and

on the design and fabrication of superconducting

magnetic coils for fusion reactors have become

critical elements of all major fusion programs, and

major industrial companies in Japan, Europe, and

the United States have emerged as key project par47

The European Spacelab module in the cargo bay of the

orbiting space shuttle Columbia.

ticipants. 30 These companies could be well positioned to apply their expertise with magnets to

areas outside fusion, such as magnetic resonance

imaging, free electron lasers, electric motors, advanced materials separation processing, and energy storage.31

Apart from the development of technological

systems or components for projects, large scientific facilities themselves can also provide benefits

to national economies. One study found that between 40 and 70 percent of the funds used to operate large international facilities are spent in the

30 For exampIe, in Japan, Toshiba, Hitachi, and Mitsubishi have contracts to advance superconducting magnet technology. In the United

States, Westinghouse and Lockheed-Martin are active in fusion-relevant superconducting magnet technology development. 3 1See U.S. Congress, Office of Technology Assessment, High Temperature Superconductivity in Perspective, OTA-E-440 (Washington,

DC: U.S. Government Printing Office, April 1990). See also U.S. Department of Energy, Office of Energy Research, The U.S. Fusion Program

as a Source of Technology Transfer (Washington, DC: September 1993).
48 | International Partnerships in Large Science Projects

host nation.32 Although substantial portions of

these funds are used to provide basic services such

as construction, materials, chemicals, or food, local companies that provide technical support or

equipment can enhance their underlying scientific

or engineering expertise. A large facility can also

attract new companies and thereby raise the skill

base of a region’s population. However, contracts

for the most knowledge-intensive components of

large projects are typically assigned to companies

in many different countries. Thus, in most cases,

the particular location of a facility is generally not

of strategic economic importance.

32This analysis was based on the spending patterns of CERN, located on the Swiss-French border; the Joint European Torus fusion experiment in England; and the ESRF and the Institute Laue-Langevin for neutron research, both in France. See “International Facilities Said To Boost

National Economy,” Nature, vol. 363, May 6, 1993.
U.S. Experience

in International

Collaboration

he United States has a long history of collaboration in science dating back to the 1940s. Scientific cooperation is

conducted primarily through informal agreements among

scientists and institutions and through bilateral agreements between governments. High-energy physics, fusion, and

space-related science activities are rich with examples of this type

of cooperation. U.S. experience is more limited in large-scale collaborative projects where research efforts are highly interdependent and jointly funded and constructed. The International

Thermonuclear Experimental Reactor (ITER) and U.S.-Russian

activities associated with the space station are examples of largescale collaborative efforts that involve close participation among

nations. Although experience with this type of collaboration has

been limited, valuable lessons have been learned.

National science goals influence whether the United States

participates in scientific collaborative efforts; these goals provide

the context for establishing national science programs and for developing government agency policy. In this chapter, our nation’s

overarching science goals are described briefly, followed by a discussion of the U.S. experience with collaborative projects in science and their implications for future activities. Several research

areas are discussed: high-energy physics, fusion, scientific activities in space, and neutron sources and synchrotrons.

U.S. GOALS IN SCIENTIFIC COLLABORATION

A review of the literature suggests that since World War II, the

overriding goal of U.S. megascience projects has been to establish and maintain leadership in as many scientific fields as possible. The view that maintaining scientific leadership is important | 49
50 | International Partnerships in Large Science Projects

has been reaffirmed in a recent White House report, Science in the National Interest.

1

The significance assigned to this primary goal

of leadership may have to be reevaluated, however, given the development of sophisticated science

programs and facilities worldwide, the increasing

costs of science, and the rapid diffusion of information. The United States is no longer the clear

leader in all scientific disciplines. Other industrialized countries have developed comparable or

competitive capabilities in many technical fields.

Europe and Japan, for example, have leadingedge, high-energy physics and fusion programs

and facilities. The ambiguous nature of the goal of

maintaining scientific leadership also raises fundamental questions about what projects to fund

and what level of commitment is most appropriate. Resolving these questions is the challenge

that lies ahead for U.S. policymakers and for the

scientific community.

Even so, leadership in science can be a source

of national prestige. A classic illustration of the

relation of megaprojects to national prestige is the

Apollo mission to the Moon more than 25 years

ago. The unexpected Soviet launching of two

Sputnik satellites had rocked the foundations of

the U.S. science community and its assumed technological superiority. Putting a man on the Moon

was the culmination of a massive U.S. commitment to meet the Soviet challenge and win the

space race. National prestige has also been cited

as one of the reasons for justifying U.S. commitment to the space station.

Scientific leadership can also provide intellectual benefits to the United States by attracting

top-notch foreign scientists to conduct research

here. For decades, foreign scientists have made

significant contributions to U.S. science efforts

and have enriched its scientific community.

Other U.S. science goals are linked to economic productivity, foreign policy, national security imperatives, and environmental and social

considerations. Scientific research can provide

the foundation for innovation and technological

development, which contributes to national economic well-being. Technological development in

some fields, such as biotechnology and computers, relies on advances in basic science research.

For example, research done on particle colliders

and synchrotron radiation has stimulated the development of magnet technologies that have important medical and industrial applications.

Likewise, basic research in solid-state physics in

the 1950s laid the foundation for U.S. dominance

in computer technologies today. These and other

new products and processes fuel U.S. economic

growth here and contribute to its competitiveness

abroad.

As economic activities become more global,

competition will continue to get tougher: new

countries will join the competition, and new markets will emerge. It is in this context that the

United States may rely even more on the results

yielded by basic scientific research. In the words

of Frank Press, former President of the National

Academy of Sciences, “Basic research is our comparative advantage in the world. In time, a lot of

countries will be able to manufacture as well as the

Japanese. We’re different in being able to create

wealth with science.”2

It is important to note, however, that other

countries are leaders in technology development,

yet they devote fewer relative resources to basic

science research than the United States. Both Germany and Japan promote applications-oriented research with a view to developing products and

processes for new markets. Based on the successes of the German and Japanese models, ensuring the proper mix of applied and basic research

may be key to economic development.

1William J. Clinton and Albert Gore, Jr., Science in the National Interest (Washington, DC: Executive Office of the President, Office of

Science and Technology Policy, August 1994).

2Lee Smith, “What the U.S. Can Do About R&D,” Fortune, Oct. 19, 1992, p. 75.
Chapter 3 U.S. Experience in International Collaboration | 51

U.S. scientific preeminence and expertise have

also contributed to foreign policy success and in

the achievement of American goals around the

world. Bilateral scientific research agreements,

for example, have been used for years to build and

strengthen alliances or signal displeasure. In the

1960s, bilateral science and technology (S&T)

agreements between the United States and the

Peoples Republic of China encouraged contact

among scientists as well as government officials.

As a symbolic message, the United States scaled

back its S&T agreements with the Soviet Union

after the Soviet invasion of Afghanistan.

Scientific agreements may also provide incentives to observe and maintain other treaties or

agreements. For example, Russia’s invitation to

participate in the Space Station Project was, in

part, contingent on its adherence to the Missile

Technology Control Regime, an informal, voluntary agreement among suppliers of space technology to restrict the export of systems and

components used for ballistic missiles. Moreover,

bilateral scientific agreements may play a role in

sustaining the science base of the former Soviet

Union, promoting its stability, and preventing the

proliferation of weapons-related expertise. With

the end of the Cold War, however, S&T agreements may be less important as foreign policy

tools.

Science has contributed in significant ways to

national security goals as well. Our military technological superiority is the result of advances in

fundamental science and engineering. As our national security goals are redefined by the end of

the Cold War, basic science will continue to figure

prominently. One of the most troublesome security challenges now facing the United States is the

proliferation of nuclear weapons. New and improved technologies, particularly in arms monitoring and verification, will be required to meet

this challenge.

Over the years, scientific research has enjoyed

the strong support of different administrations and

Congress. However, funding priorities have

shifted in response to international events and domestic politics (see box 3-1).

Recently, complex and costly science projects,

such as the Superconducting Super Collider

(SSC), the Advanced Neutron Source, and the Tokamak Physics Experiment,3 have motivated debate in the Administration and Congress about

national research goals and the capacity of the

U.S. government to fund basic research. In this

context, there has been much discussion about the

potential for international collaboration in large

science projects. Collaborative efforts are now under way in space, fusion, and high-energy physics.

HIGH-ENERGY PHYSICS

High-energy physics is a field of basic scientific

inquiry that explores the fundamental characteristics of matter and the basic forces that govern all

physical phenomena. To gain insights about elementary particles and their interactions, physicists probe energy domains far removed from

those encountered in daily life.4 In its attempt to

extend the frontiers of human knowledge about

underlying natural processes and laws, and to answer questions about the origin of the universe,

the high-energy physics field has especially

defined itself by drawing on the intellectual resources of scientists throughout the world. 

3The TPX is a fusion device proposed to be built at the Princeton Plasma Physics Laboratory. Congress has not yet authorized funds to begin

construction of the approximately $700 million TPX. For an indepth discussion on the TPX, see the recent report, U.S. Congress, Office of

Technology Assessment, The Fusion Energy Program: The Role of TPX and Alternate Concepts, OTA-BP-ETI-141 (Washington, DC: U.S.

Government Printing Office, February 1995).

4Existing and new particle accelerators operate at energies in the billion electron volt (GeV) to trillion electron volt range (TeV). By comparison, the thermal combustion of a single carbon atom contained in coal releases about four electron volts. Thus, a single particle (e.g., a proton or

electron) being accelerated to 1 TeV would have an energy about a trillion times greater than that associated with the burning of a carbon atom.
52 International Partnerships in Large Science Projects

Broad-based federal support for scientific research has spanned five decades. During this period, the ability of the United States to conduct research has grown considerably and so, too, has the

demand for funding. Today, there are far more opportunities for research than there are funds to support

projects. Consequently, research funding decisions have been challenging and sometimes contentious

for Congress, the Administration, and the scientific community.

Since federal support began in the mid-1940s, a key consideration in allocating federal funds

has been the need to maintain a diverse portfolio of large and small science projects. Other considerations have included enhancing the U.S. science base in specific research areas, and training scientists and engineers In recent years, budgetary considerations have focused increased attention on the

need for more explicit priority setting as a way to help allocate federal resources and strengthen the

nation’s portfolio. Currently, priority setting is distributed throughout the federal government at many different levels. At the highest level, scientific priorities are compared to other conscience needs. Priorities

are also determined across research fields and within particular disciplines. The OTA report, Federally

Funded Research: Decisions for a Decade, identified priority setting as a pressing challenge for the

U.S. research system in the 1990s.1

A snapshot of historical funding priorities reveals that during World War II, federal investment focused on military and atomic energy-related projects. In the 1950s and 1960s, Soviet achievements in

space and expanded military spending prompted the United States to increase funding for its own

space initiatives and defense programs. By the late 1960s, however, research funding had declined

due, in part, to the enormous costs of the Vietnam War and the expansion of domestic social programs.

The decade of the 1970s brought renewed interest in space projects, the expansion of funding for energy and health research, and cuts in defense research and development (R&D). In the 1980s, during the

Reagan Administration, defense projects regained top funding priority, and energy and health research

funding declined. At the same time, basic science funding also increased Big science and technology

projects, such as the space station, the Superconducting Super Collider, the Strategic Defense Initiative, and the Human Genome Project figured prominently on the national agenda. Finally, the belt-tightening of the early 1990s brought yet more changes, including termination of the SSC project, redesign

of the space station, and the addition of Russia as a space station partner in 1994.

Despite the vicissitudes of funding during this period, megascience projects, including presidential science initiatives, have continued to command a noticeable portion (about 10 percent) of total federal R&D expenditures. 2 However, because of the disparate characteristics of large projects, comparisons and priority setting have proven difficult, resulting in a funding process for large projects that remains largely ad hoc.

1 See U.S. Congress, Office of Technology Assessment, Federally Funded Research: Decisions for a Decade, OTA-SET-490

(Washington, DC: U.S. Government Printing Office, May 1991)

2 Genevieve J Knezo, Major Science and Technology P

1996, CRS Report for Congress, 95-490 SPR (Washington, DC: Congressional Research Service, Mar. 27, 1995

The principal scientific tool of this field of re- structure of matter. This is done by observing the

search is the particle accelerator. By accelerating debris from collisions using extremely sophistiparticles to extremely high energies and bringing cated detectors. Because energy and mass are inthem together in collisions, researchers are able to terchangeable, high-energy particle collisions

develop greater understanding of the innermost essentially redistribute mass and energy to create
Chapter 3 U.S. Experience in International Collaboration 53

First-generation family Second-generation family Third-generation family

Electron Muon Tau neutrino

Electron neutrino Muon neutrino Tau Iepton

Up quark Charm quark Top quark

Down quark Strange quark Bottom quark

Force carriers Force

Photon Electromagnetic force

W boson Weak nuclear force

Z boson Weak nuclear force

Gluons Strong nuclear force

SOURCE: U S Department of Energy, Office of Energy Research, Division of High Energy Physics, High Energy Physics Advisory Panel's Subpan.

el on Vision for the Future of High Energy Physics, DOE/ER-0614P (Washington, DC: May 1994).

new particles.5 The higher the impact energy, the

more massive these new particles can be, thus revealing hitherto unknown or hidden properties of

matter. As a consequence of the need for higher

energies, accelerators have increased considerably in size over the years. Accelerators and detectors are large, elaborate, expensive devices, and

experiments typically involve the collaboration of

hundreds of scientists and engineers.

Over the past 50 years, the experimental discoveries and theoretical insights of researchers

worldwide have led to the construction of a remarkably successful model that describes the

types of particles that exist in nature and how they

interact with each other. This so-called Standard

Model depicts all matter as consisting of only

three families of fundamental particles. (See table

3-l.) Each family contains two types of quarks 6

and two types of leptons. 7 The protons and neutrons that form atomic nuclei are combinations of

two different types of quarks, and the electrons

that surround atomic nuclei are leptons. The remaining quarks and leptons are not found in ordinary matter and can only be studied in high-energy

processes. The forces that operate among quarks

and leptons are mediated by additional particles.8

Although the Standard Model has proved a successful predictive and explanatory tool, physicists

believe that it cannot answer a number of questions. For example, why are there so many elementary particles and why do they appear as three

5

This phenomenon is described by Einstein’s formula E = mc2. The process by which new heavy particles are created from the collisions of

lighter particles is akin to a bowling ball emerging from the collision of two tennis balls. For example, the recently discovered top quark, the

heaviest of known elementary particles, has a mass equivalent to that of a gold atom. Evidence for the existence of the top quark, the last quark to

be identified, was announced in March 1995 by two independent teams of researchers at the Fermi National Accelerator Laboratory.

6

The names given to these six quarks are: up, down, strange, charm, bottom, and top. They each have different masses and charges. The

proton consists of two up quarks and one down, while a neutron consists of two downs and one up. For further information see Daniel Morgan,

High-Energy Physics Accelerator Facilities, CRS Report for Congress (Washington, DC: Congressional Research Service, Sept. 17, 1993),

appendix, pp. CRS-22 to CRS-23.

7

Each elementary particle also has a corresponding antiparticle with identical mass but opposite charge. For example, the antiparticle of the

electron is the positron. Positrons are produced in accelerator collisions and have found important use as a medical diagnostic tool, a technique

called positron emission tomography. Combinations of quarks and antiquarks can account for the roughly 200 known particles or hadrons that

have been discovered.

8Quarks and leptons interact by exchanging particles known as force earners. The strong force that holds quarks together to form protons

and neutrons is mediated by gluon particles; the weak force is mediated by W and Z bosons, and the electromagnetic force is mediated by photons. It is speculated that the force of gravity is also mediated by a particle earner, but no such carrier has been discovered.
54 | International Partnerships in Large Science Projects

families as opposed to any other number? What is

the origin of mass and why do the fundamental

particles exhibit no regularity in their masses?9

Why is the universe made primarily of matter

when the Big Bang theory would predict the creation of equal amounts of matter and antimatter?10

Can the missing mass of the universe be explained

by an as-yet undiscovered class of super-heavy

particles?11 The high-energy physics community

believes that experimental clues to these questions

could be provided by the next generation of highenergy particle accelerators. With the termination

of the SSC, the Large Hadron Collider at CERN

is the only currently approved project that will be

capable of addressing most of these issues.12

❚ U.S. Goals

Since World War II, the United States has been a

global leader in both the experimental and the

theoretical domains of high-energy physics. U.S.

high-energy physics facilities are among the best

in the world and have provided unique opportunities to conduct research and to advance scientific

understanding.13 In addition, these facilities have

stimulated interest in science among the nation’s

young and have served as an important component of graduate-level education and training. Although establishing and maintaining a leadership

position in high-energy physics research has been

a major goal of U.S. programs, a policy of open access has also encouraged many researchers from

Europe, Japan, and other parts of the world to participate in U.S. projects. Indeed, several prominent foreign scientists have received their training

at U.S. facilities.

In recent years, U.S. leadership in high-energy

physics has been challenged by scientific developments in Europe and Japan. Additionally, domestic budget constraints have limited various

experimental endeavors, and some new or existing projects have been either deferred or canceled.

The recent termination of the SSC project was a

major blow to the U.S. program.14 In the early

1980s, the U.S. high-energy physics community

embraced the construction of the SSC as its top

priority. The project was expected to open new

windows of discovery and thereby solidify the

leadership position of the United States well into

the next century. Questions about its management, performance, and spiraling cost estimates,

9One theory suggests that particles acquire mass through interaction with a ubiquitous force field known as the Higgs field. Confirmation

that such a field exists would come from the discovery of very heavy particles known as Higgs particles. Theory predicts that Higgs particles

would have masses in the 1 TeV range, energies that cannot be produced by any existing accelerator. The Large Hadron Collider (LHC) device at

CERN (as well as the canceled SSC) is designed to explore the energy range where Higgs particles might exist if the Standard Model is correct.

10This particular question is being addressed specifically by the B-factory projects being carried out at the Stanford Linear Accelerator Center and at the KEK facility in Japan.

11A central problem of modern astronomy is that most of the mass of the universe (90 percent) cannot be seen (so-called dark matter), but

can be inferred from the gravitational behavior of galaxies. One possible theory accounts for this missing mass by positing the existence of

neutral, stable particles that have not yet been detected. Such supersymmetric particles might be seen at the energies provided by the LHC facility now under construction at CERN.

12Although the LHC will have a combined beam energy roughly three times lower than the SSC, the luminosity or beam intensity of the

LHC will be 10 times greater than that of the SSC. The LHC will be able to probe energies up to about 2 TeV. However, because of its higher

luminosity, there will be a greater number of undesired collisions (so-called noise) that must be filtered by sophisticated detectors. The detector

technologies that will be deployed at the LHC will be much more complex than those planned for the SSC.

13The Department of Energy operates several high-energy physics and related nuclear physics facilities. They include the Alternating Gradient Synchrotron and the Relativistic Heavy Ion Collider at Brookhaven National Laboratory, the Tevatron at Fermilab, the electron linac at the

Stanford Linear Accelerator Center, and the Continuous Beam Accelerator Facility (CEBAF) in Newport News, Virginia. The National Science

Foundation funds the Cornell Electron Storage Ring.

14Murray Gell-Mann, a recipient of the Nobel Prize for his work in particle physics, described the termination of the SSC as a “conspicuous

setback for human civilization.” “Physicists Ponder Life After the Demise of the Supercollider,” New York Times, Aug. 9, 1994, p. C5.
Chapter 3 U.S. Experience in International Collaboration 155

The ALEPH detector at CERN.

however, severely damaged support for the project.15 Because of its cancellation, the United

States is now exploring ways to maintain a presence at the high-energy frontier by utilizing and

upgrading existing facilities and participating in

international efforts.

In 1994, a subpanel of the Department of Energy High Energy Physics Advisory Panel (HEPAP)

presented options for the future U.S. program.

The HEPAP subpanel noted the importance of international collaboration in preserving U.S. scientific and technological capabilities. U.S. scientists

already participate in experiments at several laboratories in Europe and Japan. For example, several

hundred American physicists and engineers are

now involved with various experiments at the

DESY (Deutches Elektronen-Synchrotron) facility in Germany and at CERN in Switzerland. As

a specific measure to ensure that U.S. scientists remain at the forefront of accelerator design and

physics investigation, the subpanel recommended

that the United States also join the LHC project at

CERN. 16 However, the subpanel concluded that

the long-term future of U.S. high-energy physics

will depend on the research and development

(R&D) foundation built here, not in Europe or Japan.

While many important technical innovations

have resulted from high-energy physics research

and related areas of nuclear physics research,

these spinoffs have invariably been unanticipated,

have occurred over a period of decades, and have

often resulted from scientists from many countries

working together.17In light of this history and the

somewhat esoteric character of high-energy physics research, it is difficult to argue that participa1 5 Initially, the project was estimated to cost about $4.4 billion (in 1988 dollars without an allowance for contingencies), but by 1993, cost

estimates had escalated to more than $11 billion. At the time of termination, 15 miles (of a total of 54) of tunnel had been dug, magnets had been

tested, and $2.2 billion spent, mostly on salaries. Some observers argue that the management of the SSC was politicized and taken out of the

hands of Department of Energy technical managers who had a good record in overseeing the planning and execution of large projects. As a

consequence, the various problems that developed over the course of the SSC endeavor might have been either avoided or addressed in a more

effective manner. 1 6U.S. Department of Energy,Office of Energy Research, Division of High Energy Physics, High Energy Physics Advisory Panel’s Subpanel on Vision for the Future of High Energy Physics, DOWER-0614P (Washington, DC: May 1994). 1 7Some examples of spinoffs from high-energy physics and nuclear physics research include ion implantation in the semiconductor industry, accelerate-based cancer therapy, computerized axial tomography (the CAT scanner), positron emission tomography, free electron lasers,

synchrotrons generated x-ray beams, and large data-handling and transfer software. See Paul David et al., Stanford University, Center for Economic Policy Research, ’’The Economic Analysis of Payoffs from Basic Research-An Examination of the Case of Particle Physics Research,”

CEPR Publication No. 122, January 1988.
56 I International Partnerships in Large Science Projects

Project Decade Nominal capital cost

Bevatron (U. S.) 1950s $10 million

Stanford Linear Accelerator (U. S.) 1960s $115 million

Fermilab Tevatron (U. S.) 1970s $250 million

Continuous Electron Beam Accelerator Facility (U.S.) 1980s-1990s $51 @million

Relativistic Heavy Ion Collider (U. S.) 1990s $595 a million

Superconducting Super Collider (U. S.) 1980s-1990sb $8Iillion-$11 billiona

Large Hadron Collider (Europe) 1990sc

$2.3 billiond

a Estimated total project cost.

b project terminated, 1993.

c Completion planned 2005 to 2008.

d The estimated cost for the Large Hadron Collider would be roughly twice as large ($4 to $5 billion) if it were developed On the same accounting

basis as U.S. cost estimates, Also this figure does not include the detectors, which may total as much as $2 billion.

SOURCE: Organization for Economic Cooperation and Development, Megascience and Its Background (Paris, France: 1993), p 19; Congressional Research Service, “Big Science and Technology Projects’ Analysis of 30 Selected U.S. Government Projects, ” August 24, 1994; and Harold

Jaffe, Department of Energy, Office of High Energy and Nuclear Physics, personal communication, April 1995,

tion in multinational particle physics projects

could undermine a country’s technological competitiveness (see chapter 2).

■ Role of International Collaboration

High-energy physics research is a particularly

good candidate for international collaboration for

two reasons: 1) research in this field is essentially

curiosity driven with little or no expectation of

short-term commercial returns, and 2) the knowledge generated from particle physics experiments

is more of a global than a national asset. Indeed,

the most exciting advances in particle physics

have resulted from the pooling of intellectual resources throughout the world. In light of the great

expense required to build new accelerators (see

table 3-2), collaboration among nations is likely

to deepen in coming years.

The most recent accomplishment of researchers—the experimental verification of the existence of the top quark18—provides a compelling

illustration of the universal character of the highenergy physics enterprise. More than 800 scientists from Brazil, Canada, Colombia, France,

India, Italy, Japan, Korea, Mexico, Russia, Taiwan, and the United States collaborated on the two

colliding beam experiments at Fermilab (CDF

and DZero) that discovered the top quark. Moreover, about one-third of the funds for the

5,000-ton, $100 million CDF detector were provided by the Japanese and Italian governments.

Over its entire history, 151 foreign institutions

from 34 nations have been actively involved in research at Fermilab. Similar collaborative efforts

have also occurred at Stanford Linear Accelerator

Center (SLAC), the National Laboratory for

High-Energy Physics (KEK) facility in Japan, and

CERN. Because the high-energy physics community has evolved into a tightly linked network in

which researchers from throughout the world

communicate almost daily, collaboration has become an integral feature of nearly all empirical

and theoretical undertakings.

Even with greater collaboration, innovation

and competition in high-energy physics can be

achieved by having multiple detectors at a single

facility. For example, evidence for the discovery

of the top quark was reinforced by the fact that two

18See S. Abachi et al. (The D0 Collaboration), “Observation of the Top Quark,” Fermilab preprint, February 1995; and F. Abe et al. (The

CDF Collaboration), “Observation of Top Quark Production in [proton-antiproton] Collisions,” Fermilab preprint, February 1995.
Chapter 3 U.S. Experience in International Collaboration 57

Electron-positron collider Hadron collider and fixed target machines

Name Institution Country Name Institution Country

LEP CERN European Consortium Tevatron FNAL United States

SLC SLAC United States SPS CERN European Consortium

CESR Cornell University United States AGS BNL United States

TRISTAN KEK Japan UNK 600 Russia

BEPC China P S KEK Japan

VEPP-4M Russia HERA DESY Germany

LHC CERN European Consortium

CEBAF United States

KEY: AGS = Alternating Gradient Synchrotrons; BEPC = Beijing Electron-Positron Collider; BNL = Brookhaven National Laboratory, CEBAF = Continuous Electron Beam Accelerator Facility; CERN = European Laboratory for Particle Physics; CESR = Cornell Electron Storage Ring, DESY =

Deutches Elektronen Synchrotrons; FNAL = Fermi National Accelerator Laboratory; HERA = Hadron Elektron Ring Anlage; KEK = National Laboratory for High Energy Physics; LEP = Large Electron-Positron Collider; LHC = Large Hadron Collider; PS = Proton Synchrotrons; SLAC = Stanford

Linear Accelerator Center; SLC = Stanford Linear Collider; SPS = Super Proton Synchrotrons; TRISTAN = Transposable Ring Intersecting Storage

Accelerator in Nippon; UNK 600 = Accelerating and Storage Complex; VEPP = Very Large Electron-Positron Project

SOURCE: OECD Megascience Forum

independent detector teams—the CDF and DZero

groups—provided empirical findings. The LHC

will also have two detector groups using different

approaches—the ATLAS and CMS detectors.

In some cases, having parallel facilities—

whether within a country or in different countries—is desirable. For example, both the United

States and Japan are constructing B-meson factories as a means to understand the fundamental differences between matter and antimatter.19 Even

though the ultimate goals of the two projects are

similar, they will employ different underlying

technologies. This diversity of approach could

lead to the development of new accelerator designs. In this particular case, construction of the

B-factory in Japan was an integral component of

its long-term strategy to develop expertise in the

construction of advanced linear colliders.20 As in

the case of the top quark, having parallel efforts

can provide important experimental verification

of newly observed phenomena.

Although the design and management of future

experimental facilities will likely involve many

nations, existing high-energy physics facilities

around the world (see table 3-3), with the exception of CERN, are currently funded and operated

on a national basis. This is due principally to the

fact that planning for most high-energy physics

projects started 20 years ago or more. In addition,

at various points in the past, high-energy physics

research was regarded as a possible source of defense-related information. Even during the Cold

War, however, scientists from Western countries

19A B-factory produces pairs of B mesons and anti-B mesons for the purpose of studying the phenomenon known as charge-parity (CP)

violation. CP violation, which could explain why the universe appears to contain much more matter than antimatter, is an important concept in

the Standard Model of particle physics. The U.S. B-factory is being built at the SLAC at a cost of $293 million. A similar factory is also being

constructed at the KEK facility in Japan for about $350 million. Relative to other projects such as the LHC ($2.3 billion), the B-factory costs are

low enough to be pursued on a noncollaborative basis. Some observers, however, argue that only one B-factory was necessary.

20Hirotaka Sugawara, Director, KEK National Laboratory for High Energy Physics, personal communication, NOV. 16, 1994.
58 | International Partnerships in Large Science Projects

were invited to work at the U.S.S.R.’s high-energy

physics facilities on well-defined programs.21

❚ Implications for the Future

In light of its many achievements over the past

several decades, the U.S. high-energy physics

program has been generally regarded as quite successful. U.S. capabilities are world class, and policies that encourage collaboration through open

access arrangements have advanced the underlying science and strengthened ties with the international high-energy physics community. Because

of the sophisticated nature of experimental work

and the significant capital investments required,

the level of this multinational interaction can be

expected to intensify in coming years.

The history of the U.S. high-energy physics

program, along with tightening budgets, suggests

some important issues for consideration by policymakers and scientists alike:

 If it is determined that future high-energy physics projects should be carried out on an international basis, such initiatives will most likely

fare better if they are truly collaborative from

the outset: in planning, financing, construction,

and operation. In the SSC project, the United

States sought foreign partners as a way of sharing costs well after key engineering decisions

had been made. This did not prove to be a good

formula for successful development of an international venture.

 U.S. participation in the LHC project at CERN

could lay the foundation for future cooperative

efforts in high-energy physics. Regardless of

the particular form of the U.S. contribution to

the LHC—whether knowledge, dollars, or

equipment—an important precedent is being

set in the area of international collaboration.22

Participation in the LHC could maintain and

perhaps even extend American capabilities in

the design of accelerator and detector systems

and components (e.g., superconducting magnets). The HEPAP subpanel concluded that

participation in the LHC project could also

“strengthen our [U.S.] credibility as a capable

host for such [large] projects in all fields of science.”23 The Department of Energy (DOE) is

expected to recommend that U.S. contributions

to the LHC project be roughly $40 million

annually over the next decade.24

 Government decisionmakers from countries

with major high-energy physics programs

could benefit from the creation of mechanisms

that facilitate multilateral planning of future

large high-energy physics facilities. This

would apply to hadron colliders that succeed

the LHC25 and to proposed electron-positron

colliders such as the Next Linear Collider

21See Center for Science, Trade and Technology Policy, George Mason University, “Large Science Project Priorities of Selected Countries,”

report prepared for the Office of Technology Assessment, December 1994.

22CERN’s member states contribute both to the infrastructure costs of the laboratory in proportion to their gross domestic product, and to the

costs of their experimental teams who build and use detectors. Nonmember states, including the United States, need bear only the second of

these financial burdens. However, because nearly 500 American physicists are involved with the two LHC detectors, the CERN Council is

seeking U.S. contributions to the LHC accelerator project itself. John Krige, “ESA and CERN as International Collaborative Science Organizations,” contractor report prepared for the Office of Technology Assessment, January 1995.

23U.S. Department of Energy, see footnote 16.

24See testimony of Martha Krebs, Director of DOE’s Office of Energy Research, before the Subcommittee on Energy and Water Development, House Committee on Appropriations, Mar. 9, 1995. DOE, however, will not be in a position to recommend any specific level of LHC

funding until overall Department cost reduction goals through 2001 are developed.

25The HEPAP subpanel (chaired by Sidney Drell) points out that “preliminary examination indicates that it may become practical to build a

proton collider with beams of up to 10 times the energies of the LHC, using technology that could be developed in the next decade.” Such a

collider could be used to search for so-called supersymmetric or superheavy particles that may lie beyond the energy range of the LHC. U.S.

Department of Energy, see footnote 16.
Chapter 3 U.S. Experience in International Collaboration | 59

(NLC).26 The NLC is already a multinational

grass roots effort among scientists from more

than 20 nations (preliminary experiments involve researchers from the United States, Japan, and Russia). Some scientists believe that

the NLC should be set up as an international organization similar to CERN.27 Even though it

is only at an early concept stage, this embryonic

collaboration could receive greater attention

from relevant governments. 

 Policymakers could explore opportunities for

consolidation of high-energy physics research

activities, as well as the possible elimination of

duplicative programs and facilities. Strategies

for efficiently utilizing existing high-energy

physics facilities could also be developed. This

could mean closing down some facilities and

using the funds to extend operations at others.

The DOE budget for fiscal year (FY) 1996

takes a step in this direction by providing funds

to increase the effectiveness of high-energy

physics facilities at Fermilab, SLAC, and

Brookhaven. Cost-effectiveness can also be

achieved by upgrading existing facilities. The

construction of the new Main Injector28 at Fermilab is one such undertaking. The United

States could also examine where high-energy

physics objectives might be met by using facilities in other nations. U.S. and foreign high-energy physics programs could be designed to

take advantage of existing expertise and infrastructure throughout the world.

 Greater attention and possibly higher levels of

funding could be given to nonconventional

(e.g., nonaccelerator) approaches to high-energy physics. In light of the extraordinary costs

of state-of-the-art accelerator facilities, support

of novel approaches to particle acceleration

could ultimately provide a fundamentally different and less costly means for probing the

high-energy frontier. Although work in this

area is now quite speculative, some interesting

nonconventional approaches have emerged.29

 Given the success of the U.S. high-energy physics program over the past several decades, policies of open and reciprocal access for foreign

scientists to national installations should be

maintained. However, at a time of tightening

budgets in virtually all industrial countries,

strategies for ensuring equitable sharing of

high-energy physics facility costs and benefits

should also be explored.

FUSION ENERGY RESEARCH

For more than four decades, researchers in the

United States and elsewhere have been working to

understand and control nuclear fusion, the reac26Hadron colliders and electron-positron colliders are complementary experimental approaches. Hadron colliders provide great reach in

energy, while electron-positron colliders provide a precise method to search for new phenomena in finer detail. The Large Hadron Collider at

CERN and the Tevatron at Fermilab are designed to collide particles (hadrons) that are comprised of quarks. These collisions result in considerable debris, which makes it difficult to analyze data. In electron-positron collisions, however, the colliding particles (electrons and positrons,

which are fundamental particles like quarks) annihilate each other; thus the only particles remaining after the collision are those created by the

energy released. This makes it relatively easy to identify collision products. David Burke, Stanford Linear Accelerator Center, personal communication, Sept. 13, 1994.

27Japanese physicists are quite interested in taking a lead role in constructing the NLC facility. However, the Japanese government has taken

no official position on this matter. Sugawara, see footnote 20; and Wataru Iwamoto, Ministry of Education, Science, and Culture, Research

Institute Division, personal communication, Nov. 15, 1994.

28The new Main Injector at Fermilab, which is scheduled to begin operating in 1999, will greatly increase the number of high-energy collisions that experimenters can observe, and thus provide the opportunity for new discoveries. The Main Injector will be the most powerful proton

accelerator in operation until the completion of the LHC in about 2004.

29For example, some researchers are exploring how particles can be accelerated by plasma waves. Some preliminary work suggests that in

just one meter, plasma wave accelerators could reach energies around 30 GeV—about one-third of the energy that can be attained by the 27-kilometer circular electron-positron collider at CERN. A variety of serious technical hurdles must be surmounted before such a plasma wave

scheme becomes workable. See Jonathan Wurtele, “Advanced Accelerator Concepts,” Physics Today, July 1994, pp. 33-40.
60 International Partnerships in Large Science Projects

A fusion reaction occurs when the nuclei of atoms of two light elements fuse to form an atom of a

heavier element and additional particles, releasing energy. Scientists have found it easiest to produce

fusion reactions using isotopes of hydrogen, the lightest element. The reaction illustrated in figure 3-1

shows the fusion of deuterium (D) and tritium (T) nuclei to produce a helium nucleus and a free neutron.

The reaction releases a total of 17.6 million electron volts (MeV) of energy.1 The neutron carries 14.1

MeV or four-fifths of the energy. In a fusion power reactor, the 14-MeV neutrons would be captured in

the material surrounding the reaction chamber and converted into heat. The helium nuclei carrying 3.5

MeV would remain in the chamber, heating the fuel and making more reactions possible.

For the reaction to occur, certain conditions of temperature, density, and confinement time must

be met simultaneously. Theoretically, there are a broad range of approaches that could be used to

create fusion reactions.2 In the laboratory, scientists have heated fusion fuels to over 100 million degrees Centigrade to form a plasma, a state in which individual atoms are broken down or ionized into

their constituent electrons and nuclei. At these extremely high temperatures, the positively charged nuclei are able to overcome their natural repulsion and fuse. However, the plasma must be kept together

long enough for enough of the nuclei to fuse to be a net producer of energy.

Several approaches to confining the plasma have been explored. In magnetic confinement,

strong magnetic fields are used to control and shape the charged particles making up the plasma.

These fields prevent the plasma from touching the reaction chamber walls, which would instantly cool

and stop the reaction. The most technically successful magnetic confinement concept is the tokamak,

which confines the plasma in a toroidal or donut-shaped vessel.

Inertial confinement fusion, the process used on a much larger scale in the hydrogen bomb, represents another approach under investigation. In this process (shown in figure 3-2), a pellet of fusion

fuel is rapidly heated and compressed by intense lasers or heavy-ion drivers to such high densities that

the fuel’s own inertia is sufficient to contain it for the very short time necessary for the reaction to occur.

Gravitational fields are sufficient to confine the fusion reactions in the Sun and other stars, but this approach cannot be duplicated on Earth.

1 For comparison, burning a single atom of the carbon contained in coal produces about 4 electron volts. A fusion reaction

therefore releases more than 4 million times as much energy per atom as coal combustion. An electron volt is the amount of energy that

a single electron can pickup from a 1 -volt battery One electron volt equals 1.52X 10-22 Btu (British Thermal Unit), or 4.45X 10-26

kilowatt-hours, or 1.6X10-19 joules.

2For more detail on fusion science and the history of magnetic fusion research, see U.S. Congress, Office Of Technology Assessment, Starpower: The U.S. and the International Quest for Fusion Power, OTA-E-338 (Washington, DC: U. S. Government Printing

Office, October 1987). See also, U.S. Congress, Office of Technology Assessment, The Fusion Energy Program: The Role of TPX and

Alternate Concepts, OTA-BP-ETI-141 (Washington, DC: U.S. Government Printing Office, February 1995), pp. 65-80, for recent developments and more on the state of research into other fusion concepts.

tion that powers our Sun, the stars, and the hydro- Among the advantages cited by fusion supportgen bomb, in the hopes of one day tapping that

process as a safe, environmentally attractive, and

economical energy source. Fusion reactions occur

when the nuclei of two lightweight atoms combine, or fuse, releasing energy (see box 3-2). Fusion research gave birth to and nourished the new

field of plasma physics, which explores the behavior of plasmas, the fourth state of matter.

ers are a virtually limitless fuel supply and potentially less serious environmental impacts than

competing fossil or nuclear fission technologies.

Developing fusion power requires first demonstrating its scientific and technical feasibility and

then establishing it as a commercially attractive

(i.e., economically competitive and publicly acceptable) power source. Significant domestic and
Chapter 3 U.S. Experience in lnternational Collaboration 61

- Hydrogen isotopes

Reaction conditions

(density, temperature, time)

Products

Proton MeV = Million electron volts

Neutron

SOURCE: Office of TechnologyAssessment 1995, based on figure from U.S. Department of Energy, Office of Fusion Energy.

international resources have been devoted to

achieving this goal, and substantial scientific and

technical achievements have been realized to date.

Most experts, however, readily concede the world

is still several decades and several tens of billions

of dollars away from realizing commercially relevant fusion-generated electricity.

Notable progress has been made in addressing

the scientific and technical challenges to fusion

power development. Researchers at the Princeton

Plasma Physics Laboratory attained a world record in fusion energy production of 10.7 megawatts (MW) in experiments on the Tokamak

Fusion Test Reactor (TFTR) in 1994. This marked

an increase in fusion power production by a factor

of about 100 million over that achievable 20 years

ago. Fusion temperatures of 400 million degrees

Centigrade have also been attained in experiments.

Among the scientific challenges remaining to

be met in fusion research include achieving highenergy gain (energy output that is many times

higher than energy input to create the reaction) and

ignition (the point at which a reaction is self-sus-
62 lnternational Partnerships in Large Science Projects

Heating Compression Ignition Bum

Laser or particle beams Fuel is compressed by The fuel core reaches high Thermonuclear bum

rapidly heat the surface rocket-like blowoff of the density and ignites. spreads rapidly through

of the fusion target, surface material. the compressed fuel,

forming the plasma envelope. yielding many times the

input energy.

SOURCE: Lawrence Livermore National Laboratory.

taining even when external heating is turned off).

To develop a magnetic fusion powerplant, scientists must also be able to achieve high-energy gain

in a steady state (continuous, rather than intermittent, operation). Reaching the critical milestone of

breakeven (the point at which the energy produced

by fusion reactions equals the energy input to heat

the plasma) remains beyond the reach of current

facilities. The TFTR experiments reached just

over one-quarter of breakeven for a few moments.

The proposed ITER is being designed to reach

ignition and to operate for long pulses of several

hundred to more than 1,000 seconds. If successful, ITER would accomplish several critical milestones in the development of a fusion power

reactor. Substantial engineering challenges in developing materials, components, and systems for

operating fusion reactors also remain and will

have to be met through a broad-based program of

scientific, technical, and industrial R&D.

Under plans established a few years ago, tens

of billions of dollars and about three decades of

continued successful R&D are expected to be required before the science and technology are sufficiently advanced to enable construction of a

demonstration commercial fusion power reactor.

This facility (dubbed DEMO) is scheduled to follow ITER in about 2025. An actual commercial

prototype is anticipated to be operational around

2040 under this schedule.

DOE sponsors two fusion research programs:

the Magnetic Fusion Energy (MFE) program of

the Office of Fusion Energy under the Office of

Energy Research, and the Inertial Confinement

Fusion (ICF) program in the Office of Defense

Programs. The Office of Fusion Energy has responsibility for research on the energy aspects of

both magnetic and inertial confinement fusion.

Work on ICF science and technology in defense

programs advances eventual energy applications

of inertial fusion energy. DOE-sponsored fusion

research activities are carried out at national laboratories, universities, private companies, and international research centers.
Chapter 3 U.S. Experience in International Collaboration | 63

❚ Program Goals and Funding

Fusion research program goals have been established by legislation and by presidential and secretarial decisions.30 The overarching goal of the

program is to demonstrate that fusion energy is

a technically and economically viable energy

source, specifically by developing an operating

demonstration fusion power reactor by about

2025 to be followed by an operating commercial

prototype reactor by about 2040. Other goals include the development of fusion technologies, the

education and training of fusion scientists and engineers, and the encouragement of industrial participation and international collaboration. Budget

realities, however, have tempered the expectations for achieving this optimistic development

schedule.31 Civilian energy goals for the ICF energy program are directed at the development of

components for fusion energy systems that can

take advantage of the target physics developed by

the Defense Programs ICF research. Underlying

both the MFE and the ICF research programs is a

desire to maintain the U.S. position in the forefront of fusion research internationally and to preserve U.S. capability to participate in any future

fusion technology advances.

Legislative authority for fusion energy research

is found in the Atomic Energy Commission Act of

1954 (AEC Act);32 the Magnetic Fusion Energy

Engineering Act of 1980 (MFEEA);33 and the Energy Policy Act of 1992 (EPACT).34 Further legislative direction has been provided in committee

reports accompanying the annual appropriations

acts.35

EPACT calls for: support of a broad-based fusion energy program; participation in ITER engineering design activities and related efforts;

development of fusion power technologies; industrial participation in technology; the development, design and construction of a major new U.S.

machine for fusion research and technology development;36 ICF energy R&D; and the development of a heavy-ion ICF experiment. EPACT

builds on the framework established by MFEEA

for a broad-based fusion research and technology

development program, including support of research on alternative confinement concepts and

fuel cycles. The 1980 act marked a shift in the program from a focus on fundamental fusion science

and plasma physics to technology development.

The AEC Act is another source for DOE support for fusion-related nuclear physics (including

plasma physics) and engineering education and

training missions. Fusion research activities advance the general purposes of the AEC Act to:

“encourage maximum scientific and industrial

30For more on the goals and structure of the DOE fusion energy programs see Office of Technology Assessment, The Fusion Energy Program, see footnote 3.

31DOE’s FY 1995 budget request candidly admits that “budgetary constraints over the past few years may mean that the schedule for meeting such objectives is delayed.” U.S. Department of Energy, Office of the Chief Financial Officer, FY 1995 Congressional Budget Request:

Energy, Vol. 2, Supply Research and Development, DOE/CR-0021 (Washington, DC: February 1994), p. 425.

32Act of Aug. 30, 1954, ch. 1073, 60 Stat. 921, as amended, 42 U.S.C. 2011 et seq.

33Public Law 96-386, Oct. 7, 1980, 94 Stat. 1539, 42 U.S.C. 9301.

34Public Law 102-486, Oct. 24, 1992, sec. 2114, 106 Stat. 3073-3074 (codified at 42 U.S.C. 13474).

35See, for example, Conference Report on H.R. 2445, H. Rept 103-292, 103d Cong., 1st sess., at 139 Cong. Rec. H7948, Oct. 14, 1993

(daily ed.). The conferees directed DOE to give highest priority to participation in ITER and supporting TFTR experiments.

36The language in EPACT referring to a major new machine has been interpreted by some as authorization for the proposed TPX, and as

others as referring to ITER, still others maintain that federal expenditures for construction of either facility have yet to be authorized specifically.

In any case, the appropriations bills have deferred spending on TPX construction pending review, while allowing procurement for long leadtime component technologies to continue.
64 | International Partnerships in Large Science Projects

progress”; aid education and training; promote

widespread participation in the development of

peaceful uses for atomic energy;37 and encourage

international cooperation.38 The act authorizes a

broad range of research on nuclear processes,

atomic energy theory and production, and the use

of nuclear energy or materials for the generation

of usable energy and for commercial and industrial applications.

Over the past two decades, fusion energy programs have been the subject of extensive

reviews.39 Most of these reviews have complimented the steady technical and scientific progress that has been achieved. Over the past decade,

however, reviewers have expressed concern about

increased risk to the success of the program from

what many have seen as a premature narrowing of

magnetic fusion research to a single focus on the

tokamak path and curtailment of research on alternative confinement concepts in response to budget constraints. Even so, the reviewers strongly

endorsed pursuit of further critical advances in fusion science relying on the tokamak as the most

developed (and successful) concept available. Reviewers have also raised concerns that existing

budget levels will not be adequate to carry out

even the narrowed program objectives on the

scales and schedules proposed.

Funding for the fusion programs in FY 1995 is

$362 million for magnetic fusion energy and $177

million for inertial fusion. About $157 million of

the MFE funds are allocated for activities that directly or indirectly support the ITER collaboration. Funds supporting ITER are spent on U.S.

research activities designated as advancing ITERrelated R&D. Only about $600,000 is for direct

support of joint ITER administrative activities.

The FY 1996 budget request for magnetic fusion

is $366 million and includes support of the ongoing ITER collaboration and initial construction

funds for the proposed new Tokamak Physics Experiment (TPX) at the Princeton Plasma Physics

Laboratory. The $257 million, FY 1996 budget request for ICF activities includes construction

funds for the National Ignition Facility

(NIF)—the next major facility required for advancement of inertial confinement fusion.40

❚ International Collaboration in Fusion

Research

International cooperation and collaboration in fusion research date from the late 1950s, when much

fusion research was declassified for the Second

Geneva Convention on the Peaceful Uses of

Atomic Energy. Since then, cooperation among

researchers in the United States, the Soviet Union,

Europe, and Japan has grown from informal exchanges between research laboratories, to formal

bilateral collaborative agreements between gov37Atomic energy is defined as all forms of energy released in the course of nuclear fission or nuclear transformation. 42 U.S.C. 2014. Transformation is interpreted to include fusion.

3842 U.S.C. 2013.

39 See: U.S. Department of Energy, Fusion Policy Advisory Committee (FPAC), Report of the Technical Panel on Magnetic Fusion of the

Energy Research Advisory Board, Final Report, DOE/S-0081 (Washington, DC: September 1990); Fusion Energy Advisory Committee, Report on Program Strategy for U.S. Magnetic Fusion Energy Program, DOE\ER-0572T (Washington, DC: U.S. Department of Energy, Office of

Energy Research, September 1992); Fusion Energy Advisory Committee, Advice and Recommendations to the U.S. Department of Energy in

Response to the Charge Letter of September 18, 1992, DOE/ER-0594T (Washington, DC: U.S. Department of Energy, Office of Energy Research, June 1993); Fusion Energy Advisory Committee, Advice and Recommendations to the Department of Energy in Partial Response to the

Charge Letter of September 24, 1991: Part D, DOE\ER-0555T (Washington, DC: U.S. Department of Energy, Office of Energy Research, June

1992). For a more detailed summary of these reviews, see Office of Technology Assessment, The Fusion Energy Program, see footnote 3. For

more on prior reviews, see U.S. Congress, Office of Technology Assessment, Starpower: The U.S. and the International Quest for Fusion Power, OTA-E-338 (Washington, DC: U.S. Government Printing Office, October 1987).

40NIF is primarily motivated by the desire to maintain technological expertise in areas of nuclear weapons design as a component of the

DOE’s Stockpile Stewardship program. NIF’s contribution to the development of fusion energy and other scientific applications are adjunct

functions of the project.
Chapter 3 U.S. Experience in International Collaboration | 65

ernments, to the ongoing collaboration on the

ITER design.

The ITER Collaboration

The United States, the European Atomic Energy

Community (Euratom), Japan, and the Russian

Federation are engaged in an unprecedented collaboration on the engineering design of the proposed International Thermonuclear Experimental

Reactor. This collaboration has its roots in discussions among the leaders of the European Community, Japan, the Soviet Union, and the United

States in the mid-1980s. The impetus for the start

of the ITER collaboration came from the discussions between President Ronald Reagan and Soviet General Secretary Mikhail Gorbachev at the

1985 Geneva Summit.

ITER’s purpose is: 1) to establish the scientific

and technological feasibility of magnetic fusion

energy as a source of electric power by demonstrating controlled ignition and extended burn of

deuterium-tritium (D-T) plasmas; and 2) to demonstrate and test technologies, materials, and nuclear components essential to development of

fusion energy for practical purposes. It would not

be equipped, however, to actually generate electricity. Demonstrating the production of electricity in a magnetic fusion energy powerplant would

be left to the DEMO reactor, a device anticipated

for construction no sooner than 2025.

If built, ITER would be by far the largest, most

capable, and costliest fusion experiment in the

world. ITER uses a tokamak design; it would be

more than eight stories tall and 30 meters in diameter. The device is intended to sustain controlled

fusion reactions in a pulsed mode for periods of at

least 15 minutes. ITER is expected to be capable

of producing more than 1,000 MW of thermal fusion power. Plasma temperatures inside the confinement chamber would be more than 150

million degrees Centigrade. Due to the radioactivity that will be generated, maintenance and monitoring of the reactor vessel will have to be carried

out by remote methods. The impressive scale of

ITER is dictated by the physical requirements of

heating and containing a plasma to fusion conditions on a steady-state basis using available

technology and materials.

ITER offers not only great scientific challenges, but practical technological challenges as

well. For example, ITER’s superconducting magnetic coils will be the largest ever manufactured.

Each coil will weigh more than 400 tons. The

amount of superconducting materials required to

make them exceeds the currently available

manufacturing capabilities of any one party;

therefore, a cooperative effort is under way to

coordinate the materials manufacture, fabrication,

and assembly.

ITER is being conducted in four phases under

formal intergovernmental agreements among the

parties: 1) the now-completed conceptual design

activities (CDA); 2) the ongoing engineering design activities (EDA); 3) the possible, future

construction phase; and 4) the operations phase.

Each phase is governed by a separate agreement

among the parties. To date the costs of ITER activities have been shared equally among the four

parties.

The CDA phase ran from January 1988 to December 1990 under the auspices of the International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA).41 All four

parties contributed personnel and support to the

ITER team for development of a conceptual design, scope, and mission for the project.

The EDA phase is being conducted under an intergovernmental agreement concluded in July

1992 and extending to July 1998.42 Each of the

parties has committed the equivalent of $300 million (1993 dollars) worth of personnel and equipment to the design effort over that period. The

41The CDA was conducted under a set of Terms of Reference developed by the ITER Parties, but formally transmitted by the IAEA Director

General to the Parties for their individual acceptance. The ITER CDA agreement was in actuality a set of four acceptances of the same letter from

the IAEA Director General.

42The ITER EDA agreement was executed on behalf of the U.S. government by Secretary of Energy Admiral James Watkins.
66 International Partnerships ln Large Science Projects

The Proposed International

Thermonuclear Experimental Reactor

SOURCE: US. Departmentt of Energy.

Inside the vacuum vessel of the TFTR at the

Princeton Plasma Physics Laboratory

Graphite and graphite composite tiles

protect the inner wall of the vessel.
Chapter 3 U.S. Experience in International Collaboration | 67

The ITER Engineering Design Activities agreement was formally signed by the United States, Euratom, Japan, and the Russian

Federation in July 1992.

purpose of the EDA phase is to produce a “detailed, complete, and fully integrated engineering

design of ITER and all technical data necessary

for future decisions on the construction of ITER.”

On completion, the design and technical data will

be available for each of the parties to use either as

part of an international collaborative program or

in its own domestic program. Other objectives of

the EDA phase are to conduct validating R&D

supporting the engineering design of ITER, to establish siting requirements, to perform environmental and safety analyses related to the site, and

to establish a program for ITER operation and decommissioning.

EDA activities are overseen by an ITER Council composed of two representatives of each party

and the ITER Director who is responsible for

coordinating the activities of the Joint Central

Team (JCT) and other R&Din support of ITER.

The JCT is an international design team composed

of scientists, engineers, and other professionals

assigned to the project by the parties. The formal

seat of the Council is in Moscow. JCT activities

are carried out by the parties and the four home

teams at three joint work sites-Garching, Germany; Naka, Japan; and San Diego, California.

Each work site is responsible for a different aspect

of ITER design. In consultation with the ITER

Council, the JCT, and each party’s designated

Home-Team Leader, the ITER Director assigns

and coordinates R&D activities by the four home

country fusion programs that support the JCT.

The next major step in ITER development will

be the negotiation of a process for deciding on a

host site. Exploratory discussions on a site selection process are currently under way. Site selection will have to be completed before specific

site-related safety, environmental, and economic

analyses and design work for the ITER facility can

be finalized. A decision on a site and whether to

proceed to ITER construction and operations

phases is scheduled to be made before 1998.

These subsequent phases would require anew international agreement. None of the parties is committed to proceed beyond the EDA phase.

The ITER construction phase is tentatively

planned to start in 1998 and to be completed by

2005. Initial estimates of ITER construction costs

were about $6.9 billion in 1993 dollars. More recently, some analysts have projected ITER costs

of between $8 billion and $10 billion. Detailed

cost estimates for this one-of-a kind research facility await completion of ITER engineering design

work. Interim design and cost analyses are expected in rnid-1995. Final design and cost estimates are due in January 1998, if site selection has

been completed.

The fourth or operating phase of ITER is proposed to begin in 2005 and run through approximately 2025. The early years would be dominated

by a focus on the physics issues relating to achieving and sustaining an ignited plasma. A more intense engineering phase will follow. As an

engineering test facility, ITER will be designed to
68 | International Partnerships in Large Science Projects

allow researchers to install, test, and remove numerous ITER components, experimental packages, and test modules to examine materials

properties, component characteristics, performance, and lifetimes in an environment approximating the conditions of an operating fusion

powerplant. This experience will aid efforts in the

design and development of a demonstration fusion powerplant.

Other Fusion Collaborations

Although they are not on the scale of the ongoing

ITER collaboration, other precedents exist for

cooperation in fusion research under various bilateral and international agreements. Among the

most recent examples are the Large Coil Task

(LCT) test facility at Oak Ridge National Laboratory, and collaboration on the DIII-D tokamak at

General Atomics with the Japanese Atomic Energy Research Institute.43 Positive experiences on

the LCT experiments contributed to the confidence of the parties in entering into the ITER collaboration. Contributions from the Japanese in

exchange for access to and operating time on the

DIII-D helped pay for upgrades to the device. Efforts are ongoing to negotiate an agreement for

collaboration among the ITER parties on a conceptual design for a 14-MeV (million electron

volt) neutron materials test facility.

The 14 MeV neutron source would be an accelerator-based materials testing facility that would

be used to expose fusion reactor materials to intense bombardment by high-energy 14 MeV neutron beams to approximate over a few short years

the effects of a lifetime of exposure in an operating

fusion reactor. The availability of a 14 MeV materials testing facility is considered by all world fusion programs to be essential to the development

of low-activation alloys and other materials for

use in fusion powerplants.

There is experience with international collaboration in the operation of a major fusion facility.

The joint European fusion research program is

carried out under the Euratom Treaty. The European fusion community consists of the magnetic

fusion programs of member states of the Euratom

Treaty plus Sweden and Switzerland. Research

projects and funding levels are established under

successive, but overlapping five-year research

programs developed by the European Commission (EC) in consultation with fusion researchers

and government ministers of member countries.

The research programs are approved by the Council of the European Union (EU). Member-nation

fusion programs carry out the research and receive

contributions of up to 80 percent for projects included in the EC research program.

The Joint European Torus (JET), a large tokamak facility near Culham, England, is jointly

funded and staffed by the Euratom fusion program

and 14 European countries. JET was established

as an independent collaborative undertaking that

is separate from, but cooperates with, memberstate fusion programs. The goal of JET is to confirm fusion’s scientific theories and to demonstrate the scientific feasibility of nuclear fusion

for power generation. JET is currently the world’s

largest tokamak; it hosts about 370 staff scientists

and an equal number of contractors. In 1991, JET

was the first tokamak to produce significant quantities of fusion power using a D-T fuel mix, reaching a record plasma current of 7.1 million

amperes. JET researchers have been able to

achieve, individually, all the required conditions

(i.e., plasma temperature, density, and confinement time), for a fusion power reactor, but the JET

is too small to achieve them all simultaneously. In

1996, JET is scheduled to begin a final phase of

experiments involving fusion power production

with D-T plasmas, using a recently installed

pumped divertor. These experiments are intended

to support ITER design activities.

Negotiations to establish JET were begun in

1973 and concluded in 1978. Several years of negotiation were necessary to concur on an appropriate site following completion of the design in

43These collaborations are discussed in Office of Technology Assessment, Starpower, see footnote 39.
Chapter 3 U.S. Experience in International Collaboration | 69

1975. JET is operated under statutes adopted by

the European Community (now the European

Union) and governed by the JET Council, which

includes representatives of the member countries.

The EC fusion program provides 80 percent of

JET funding; the 14 participating countries provide 20 percent, with the United Kingdom paying

a 10-percent host premium on its share.

❚ Implications for Future Collaborations

Early successes in international cooperation in fusion led to today’s unprecedented ITER collaboration in which four equal parties are working

together in an effort to design and construct the

world’s largest tokamak to achieve the critical

goal of an ignited plasma. The earlier efforts

created relationships among fusion researchers internationally and laid the groundwork for a more

formal partnership in ITER. Budgetary strains

facing science research also contributed to the desire for international collaborative efforts to continue progress in fusion and plasma science. The

ITER team has been progressing in its design efforts supported by R&D and technology development activities in the parties’ home-team fusion

programs. The level of cooperation and success in

ITER to date has led analysts to suggest that this

collaboration could prove to be a model for future

international efforts.

The ITER project and other international collaborative efforts in fusion, such as the proposed

14-MeV neutron source materials testing facility,

still face a number of scientific, technical, political, and budgetary hurdles. Many difficult issues

concerning funding, technology transfer, siting,

intellectual property rights, project management,

and allocation of benefits and costs remain to be

negotiated before ITER can proceed to the next

and considerably more expensive construction

phase. The United States and its ITER partners are

currently engaged in preliminary discussions concerning the form that such future negotiations will

take.44

The U.S. fusion program faces substantial budgetary challenges and has come under increasing

scrutiny as Congress is confronted by tough

choices about the future of fusion energy research

and other megascience activities. Carrying out the

present development plan for a tokamak fusion

reactor, currently the most technically advanced

magnetic fusion concept, implies a doubling, or

even tripling of the annual magnetic fusion budget

($373 million in FY 1995). This amount assumes

that the United States will continue to pay an equal

one-quarter share of the cost of ITER, with the

other three parties international partners picking

up the other shares (see figure 3-3). However, no

agreements on ITER construction have yet been

negotiated, including how much each of the participating parties will pay.45

The most immediate decision is whether to

fund construction of the TPX, an approximately

$700 million superconducting, steady-state advanced tokamak intended to replace the existing

TFTR when the reactor is decommissioned after

the current round of experiments. If the TPX is not

built, the United States will soon be left without

a new domestic leading-edge magnetic fusion device. In the view of many in the fusion research

community, U.S. researchers and industry will

also be deprived of vital experience that could

44 On November 21, 1994, Secretary of Energy Hazel O’ Leary transmitted the “Interim Report to the Congress on Planning for International Thermonuclear Experimental Reactor Siting and Construction Decisions,” to several congressional committees in partial response to requests for a detailed ITER siting and development plan in the FY 1993 and FY 1994 Energy and Water Development Appropriations conference

reports. The Secretary advised the committees that a more complete response could not be provided until the ITER Interim Design Report is

completed and accepted by the parties.

45Some at DOE and in the fusion research community are exploring what role, if any, the U.S. fusion program could play in a future ITER

collaboration if U.S. fusion program budgets remain flat as projected, or are reduced. Some have suggested that the United States might attempt

to negotiate a role as a junior partner in ITER to preserve access to the facility and the technology for the U.S. fusion program. But it is not at all

clear whether the other parties would react favorably to this approach.
70 International Partnerships in Large Science Projects

1990 92 94 96 98 2000

Fiscal year

NOTE: This figure is based on internal Office of Fusion Energy planning

estimates and the funding levels shown are not reflected in FY 1995

budget request documentation. The increase in base program funding

in FY 1997-2001 reflects increased activity in support of TPX and ITER

and for a proposed fusion materials test facility

SOURCE: Office of Technology Assessment 1995, based on information from the U.S. Department of Energy.

position them to compete for ITER contracts and

take advantage of ITER technology.

If Congress or the executive branch decides not

to increase fusion budgets to the extent that would

be needed to pursue expensive new devices at this

time, or even to reduce fusion budgets, a dramatic

rethinking of the structure and priorities of the

U.S. fusion effort will be required.46 At a minimum, a flat or reduced budget will mean that continuing to support ITER collaboration at currently

projected levels will cut even more deeply into the

U.S. base program and constrain any efforts to expand investigation of alternative concepts.

A decision to reduce U.S. commitment to the

ITER collaboration would pose difficult problems

not only for us, but also for our partners. The

United States has committed to provide resources

to support its one-quarter share of the ITER EDA

through 1998 in an international agreement signed

on behalf of the Government by Energy Secretary

James Watkins. 47 Changes to the EDA agreement

require consent of all parties. The United States

and any other party can freely elect not to participate in the next and more expensive ITER

construction phase. Pulling back from the existing

EDA commitment would certainly prove disruptive to the successful completion of ITER since

the collaborative efforts of the parties are highly

integrated and interdependent. The decision

would have profound consequences not only for

fusion research, but also for the future of U.S. involvement in international collaborative efforts

on large science facilities. U.S. withdrawal from

ITER would trigger an extensive reexamination of

the U.S. fusion program, in which ITER participation has had a central role, backed by EPACT and

directives from congressional appropriators. U.S.

withdrawal from ITER would also require our

partners to reexamine and possibly restructure

their fusion research programs because ITER

R&D activities now occupy a dominant role in

those programs. It is by no means clear that the

governments of the remaining parties would be

willing to fund ITER design completion and

construction on the scale and schedule currently

envisioned.

The United States is not alone in pondering

whether it is ready to take the next ambitious and

highly expensive step in the development of fu46 Office of Technology Assessment, The Fusion Energy Research Program, see footnote 3; and Robin

Technology Assessment, testimony at hearings before the Subcommittee on Energy and Environment, House Committee on Science, Feb. 15,

1995.

47As is typical in such agreements, the ITER EDA Agreement and Protocol provides that the parties agree “subject to their laws and regulations” to carry out the collaboration. The agreement may be amended or terminated only by written agreement of the parties. International

Atomic Energy Agency, “International Thermonuclear Experimental Reactor (ITER) Engineering Design Activities (EDA) Agreement and

Protocol 2,” ITER EDA Documentation Series No. 5, 1994.
Chapter 3 U.S. Experience in International Collaboration | 71

sion as an energy source for the future. In 1990, a

review panel for the EC fusion program also expressed some reservations about the pace of progress and, in calling for a reevaluation of the EC

fusion program in 1995, noted:

The Board wishes to advise the European fusion community that, while prospects and results may by then be so encouraging as to justify

pressing ahead, either independently or in the

ambit of a convincing international agreement,

one possible outcome of such an evaluation

would be to redirect the whole European Programme should the 1995 Report not favour immediately proceeding with construction of the

Next Step device. Without prejudice to a possible increase in the fusion effort should conditions warrant, the Board wishes to make it clear

that, in its view, the present scale of fusion

spending cannot be considered an automatically

assured expenditure floor unless there is clear

evidence of progress toward the Programme’s

ultimate goal.48

The European review panel commented favorably on the benefits to be derived in reducing the

technical and financial risks of proceeding with a

next-step fusion machine by relying on an international collaboration. It also raised a suggestion

that the ITER program be expanded into an extended and articulated international fusion program that would share all the main functions of

fusion reactor development including the development of a neutron source for materials testing,

and a major investigation of alternative fusion

concepts.49

Japanese fusion research programs have been

funded at levels comparable to U.S. and European

fusion efforts and, like them, have devoted a significant share of current budgets to support of the

ITER collaboration. The future of the Japanese fusion program also hinges on decisions to be made

about construction of ITER. The Japanese government is deferring any decision on funding for a

new large tokamak, the JT-60 Super Upgrade, proposed by the Japanese fusion research community

as a successor to the Japanese JT-60U. According

to OTA interviews, continued funding of the fusion program at current levels beyond the end of

the existing research plan is by no means secure.

The significant integration of the major world

fusion programs resulting from collaboration on

ITER and other projects has created a situation in

which, at present, no party supports a fully independent broadly based national fusion research

program. The United States and its partners have

heavily invested the future of their research programs on progress in ITER. Decisions on whether

to proceed with ITER construction will mark a

critical point both in the development of fusion

power and in the success of international collaborations in big science. Proceeding with ITER as

currently envisioned will demand an increase in

the fusion budgets of all the partners and a longterm commitment to construction and operation

of the facility in addition to maintaining the supporting infrastructure of domestic fusion programs. Should the United States (or any of the

other partners) elect to delay or reduce its contribution, or withdraw entirely from the ITER collaboration, it would force a reevaluation and

restructuring of all the partner’s national fusion

programs and would put the future of ITER in

question. It would also heighten concerns about

the risks of international collaboration and the

reliability of commitments.

The U.S. fusion research program is currently

facing a critical decision point on whether or not

to build the TPX to explore advanced tokamak regimes in steady-state conditions as a replacement

for the TFTR which is being shut down this year.

TPX is intended as a national fusion research facility to be managed and used by scientists from

laboratories and universities across the country.

Without TFTR or a replacement such as TPX, the

U.S. fusion program will not have any domestic

48Fusion Program Evaluation Board, “Report Prepared for the Commission of the European Community,” July 1990, p. 56.

49Ibid.
72 | International Partnerships in Large Science Projects

large tokamaks to advance fusion research and

will become even more focused on ITER.

Our ITER partners will face similar choices in

a few years when their major national machines

are scheduled for closure. Plans for new ambitious

national fusion research devices in Europe and Japan have been deferred in favor of ITER. However, all parties eventually will have to define the

appropriate roles and levels of support for domestic fusion programs in an era of expanded international collaboration.

Failure to pursue construction of ITER, or even

a considerable delay in startup of construction and

operations could prove disruptive to the partners’

own fusion programs and could trigger a redefinition of fusion goals and priorities. One possible

outcome could be that the partners might elect to

build on past successful collaborations on the

LCT, and ITER CDA and EDA to forge a new collaborative path on future fusion research facilities,

perhaps at a less ambitious scale, schedule, and

cost than originally envisioned for ITER.

SCIENTIFIC ACTIVITIES IN SPACE 50

International collaboration has long been a vital

part of U.S. scientific activities in space. The National Aeronautics and Space Administration

(NASA) oversees most U.S. civilian international

space activities. The National Oceanic and Atmospheric Administration, in coordination with

NASA and non-U.S. partners, supports a smaller

number of space-based Earth observation projects. Since its inception in 1958, NASA has concluded nearly 2,000 cooperative agreements.

Virtually all of its science projects involve at least

a minor international component, and collaboration has played a major role in several of NASA’s

largest science-related projects.51

NASA engages primarily in bilateral collaborations. Its most extensive collaborative relationships have been with Canada, the European Space

Agency (ESA),52 and Japan. In addition, NASA

conducts major bilateral cooperative projects with

individual European countries such as France,

Germany, Italy, and Russia.

NASA is currently involved in 11 science-related programs that have a U.S. development cost

of more than $400 million. Of these, six projects

have costs more than $1 billion: the International Space Station, the Earth Observing System

(EOS), the Advanced X-Ray Astrophysics Facility (AXAF), the Cassini mission to Saturn, the

Hubble Space Telescope, and the Galileo mission

to Jupiter. All of these projects involve significant

international collaboration. Table 3-4 lists these

projects, U.S. partners and their roles, the project

status, and NASA’s current estimates of development costs. Because of the complexity of accounting for all shuttle- and personnel-related expenses,

these figures may not fully reflect each project’s

ultimate cost.53

50 This discussion encompasses science and technology development activities that support NASA’s Space Science program (astronomy,

astrophysics, lunar and planetary exploration, solar physics, and space radiation), as well as other activities in geosciences, life sciences, and

microgravity research.

51 The National Aeronautics and Space Act of 1958 identified international collaboration as a fundamental goal. NASA’s first international

cooperative science project was the 1962 Alouette mission with Canada, a basic science project to investigate the ionosphere. For a list of more

than 60 international cooperative ventures in space science between 1962 and 1985, many involving U.S. participation, see U.S. Congress,

Office of Technology Assessment, International Cooperation and Competition in Civilian Space Activities, OTA-ISC-239 (Washington, DC:

U.S. Government Printing Office, July 1985), pp. 379-380.

52 ESA is a 14-member European space research organization. Its members are Austria, Belgium, Denmark, Finland, France, Germany,

Ireland, Italy, the Netherlands, Norway, Spain, Sweden, Switzerland, and the United Kingdom.

53 These figures also do not account for operations costs. Mission operations and data analysis (MO&DA) costs vary considerably and,

when included in the analysis, can raise the costs for some projects significantly. For example, MO&DA costs for the Compton Gamma Ray

Observatory (CGRO) through FY 1995 are $112 million, 20 percent of development costs. MO&DA costs for the Galileo program are $331

million, 37 percent of development. And MO&DA expenditures for the Hubble Space Telescope—$1.7 billion—have already reached 110

percent of the program’s development costs.
Chapter 3 U.S. Experience in International Collaboration 73

Us. Costa

(spent to

Project Partners and project roles status FY 1995)

Space station

Earth Observing System

(EOS and EOSDIS)

Advanced X-Ray

Astrophysics Facility

(AXAF)

Cassini

Global Geospace

Science (GGS)

Collaborative Solar

Terrestrial Research

Program (COSTR)

Ocean Topography

Experiment (TOPEX)

Compton Gamma Ray

Observatory (CGRO)

Ulysses

Hubble Space

Telescope (HST)

Galileo

U. S.: Project leadership, overall design,

construction, launch, operations

Russia: Pressurized modules, fuel resupply,

“lifeboats,” launch, operational expertise

Japan and ESA: Pressurized modules,

launch, servicing equipment

Canada: Robotics

U. S.: Spacecraft, instruments, launch,

operations

Canada, Japan, France, ESA, Eumetsat:

Instruments, IEOSb spacecraft

U. S.: Spacecraft, instruments, launch,

operations

Germany, Netherlands, UK: Instruments

U. S.: Spacecraft, instruments, launch,

operations

ESA: Titan probe (Huygens)

Italy: Antenna

U. S.: Spacecraft, instruments, operations,

launch

Russia, France: Instruments, science

support

U. S.: Instruments, operations, launch

ESA: Spacecraft, instruments, launch

Japan: Spacecraft, instruments, operations

U. S.: Spacecraft, instruments, operations

France: Launch, instruments

U. S.: Spacecraft, instruments, launch,

operations

Germany: Instruments

U. S.: Power unit, launch, tracking

ESA: Spacecraft, instruments, operations

U. S.: Spacecraft, instruments, launch,

operations

ESA: Instrument, solar arrays, operations

U. S.: Spacecraft, probe, instruments,

launch, operations

Germany: Retro-propulsion module,

instruments, tracking

Design currently under way. $38 billion

Assembly planned 1997-2002, ($14.4 billion)

followed by 10 years of

operations

EOS-AM1 launch planned for 1998 Total program:

EOS-PM1 launch planned for 2000 $8 billion

Other launches planned for 2000 ($2.6 billion)

and beyond

AXAF-I launch planned for 1998 $2,1 billion

($1.1 billion)

Launch planned for 1997 $1.9 billion

($1.3 billion)

Wind launched in 1994 $583 million

In operation

Polar launch planned for 1995

Geotail launched in 1992 $511 million

In operation

SOHO launch planned for 1995

Cluster launch planned for 1995

Launched in 1992 $407 million

In operation

Launched in 1991 $957 million

In operation

Launched in 1990 $569 million

Mid-mission in solar orbit

Launched in 1990 $2.3 billion

In operation

Launched in 1989, arrival at $1.3 billion

Jupiter planned for 1995

aCapital costs include development, launch, orbital assembly, and construction of facilities. National Aeronautics and Space Administration

(NASA) civil service, non-program facility, and administrative support expenses are not included. For Space Station (27 missions), CGRO,

Ulysses, Hubble (two missions) and Galileo, NASA reports average shuttle launch costs of $400 million to $500 million. Figures represent dollars as

spent or projected, unadjusted for inflation.

bThe International Earth Observing System (IEOS) includes: NASA—EOS; NASA/Japan-Tropical Rainfall Measuring Mission (TRMM); NOAA--

Polar-Orbiting Operational Environmental Satellite (POES); Japan: Advanced Earth Observing Satellite (ADEOS); European Space Agency (ESA)

& Eumetsat—Polar-Orbit Earth Observation Mission (POEM).

SOURCE: National Aeronautics and Space Administration-Julie Baker, Resources Analysis Division, personal communication, May 1, 1995; Office of Legislative Affairs; and Space Station Program Office.
74 International Partnerships in Large Science Projects

❚ Nature of International

Collaboration in Space

The character of international collaboration in

space differs significantly from the nature of U.S.

involvement in cooperative activities in other

areas of science. Large collaborative ventures in

other disciplines often rely on international scientific teams working interdependently at single facilities. These international teams work on both

technology development and scientific investigations. In these collaborations, the level of information transfer about technical design and

fundamental science is high. For example, several

hundred researchers and accelerator experts are

working closely at CERN to develop technical

specifications for the LHC accelerator and particle

detectors to ensure that the ultimate physics objectives of the project can be met.

Cooperative scientific projects in space have

been more compartmentalized, with partners

working more independently of one another in

highly segmented projects. NASA often competitively selects the design of instruments proposed

by internationally constituted scientific teams responding to competitive notices of opportunity.

But space technology development-especially

for the critical infrastructure elements that constitute a large portion of the cost of space projects

(launchers, satellites and platforms, and so forth)

—is typically conducted without any exchange of

detailed design or manufacturing information.

Compartmentalization was originally a high

priority because of the need to ensure the success

of collaborative projects with partners whose

technical capabilities fell below those of the

United States and to prevent the transfer of potential dual-use civilian-military technologies. The

heightened attention to preventing technology

●

■

■

●

■

■

■

Preference for project-specific agreements.

Preference for agency-to-agency cooperation.

Technical and scientific objectives that contribute

to NASA program objectives.

Distinct (“clean”) technical and managerial interfaces.

No or minimal exchange of funds between cooperating partners.

No or minimal technology transfer.

Open sharing of scientific results.

1 These guidelines were developed during the 1960s and

last revised in December 1991 in NASA Management instruction (NMI) 1362.1C. For a discussion of the guidelines, see

Space Policy Institute and Association of Space Explorers, “International Cooperation in Space---New Opportunities, New

Approaches,” Space Policy, vol. 8, August 1992, p 199

transfer has also been a reflection, in part, of both

the much higher commercial potential of space

technologies versus those in areas such as highenergy and nuclear physics, and the historical importance of maintaining U.S. leadership in

space-related activities. Maintaining this leadership position is a fundamental consideration in

guiding U.S. participation in international cooperative efforts .54

NASA long ago codified its approach to international collaboration in a set of guidelines.

Among other provisions, these guidelines call for

minimizing the transfer of technologies; the creation of “clean technical and managerial interfaces”; and collaboration on a project-by-project

basis, rather than making the United States party

to multiproject umbrella agreements (see box

3-3).

54 The National Space Policy defines leadership as preeminence in areas critical to achieving national security, scientific, economic, and

foreign policy objectives. But U.S. government agency efforts to pursue international projects are also guided by other broad goals, defined by

the National Space Policy, which are to: 1) strengthen national security; 2) achieve scientific, technical, and economic benefits; 3) encourage

private sector investment in space; 4) promote international collaboration; 5) maintain freedom of space for all activities; and 6) expand human

activities beyond Earth. National Security Council, “National Space Policy,” National Space Policy Directive 1, Nov. 2, 1989. This policy was

formulated by the Bush Administration. The Clinton Administration, through the Office of Science and Technology Policy (OSTP), is currently

undertaking a review and update of the policy.
Chapter 3 U.S. Experience in international Collaboration | 75

An additional issue, NASA’s dependence on

other countries for technologies on a mission’s

critical path, has featured prominently in recent

congressional debate on U.S. space policy.55 Al-

 though NASA has no official policy on the issue

of critical paths, dependence on other countries

for critical-path items has been controversial because it raises questions about U.S. independence

and control in collaborative space projects.

■ History of Space Collaboration

Despite NASA’s longstanding and highly explicit

guidelines for collaboration, its policies and approach to collaboration have changed over time.

The agency’s compartmentalized approach to collaboration was initially designed in the 1960s to

foster space cooperation while preserving and enhancing U.S. leadership and independence in

space-related science and technologies. World

leadership was a primary, longstanding, and wellarticulated U.S. space goal in the 1960s and

1970s. During this period, NASA was able to

achieve this goal because its budget and technical

capabilities far exceeded those of other Western

industrialized nations. With Western partner

countries eager to learn from the United States,

NASA pursued collaboration largely on its own

terms, creating what might be called a period of

U.S. preeminence in international space cooperation. According to Vice President Quayle’s Space

Policy Advisory Board:

[T]he United States . . . approached international cooperation from a position of strength, at

its own initiative, largely on its own terms, and

usually as a discretionary, “value-added” activity that complemented core U.S. elements of a

particular mission or capability. The size of the

U.S. space program and the preeminence of U.S.

space capabilities made such an approach posThe European Spacelab module being loaded onto the space

shuttle Columbia.

sible. International partners were willing to accept American dominance in cooperative

undertakings as the price of associating themselves with the recognized leader in space.56

By the late 1970s and early 1980s, however, the

situation had changed in important ways. Partly as

a result of extensive cooperation with the United

States, some partner nations had developed significant and sophisticated autonomous capabilities.

Partner nations expressed increasing desires to

participate more substantively in critical decisions about the development and operation of collaborative projects, and objected to playing junior

partner to the United States. ESA, founded in

1975 to give European autonomous space launch

55 The term critical path refers to an element essential to a project’s operation and success, in contrast to technologies and services that am

strictly value-added in nature. For an example of discussion of the subject see the 1994 floor debate on space station funding. Congressional

Record, June 29,1994, pp. H5394-5395. 56 Vice President's Special Policy Advisory Board, A Post Cold War Assessment of U.S. Space Policy: A Task Group Report (Washington, DC:

Office of the Vice President December 1992), p. 9.
76 | International Partnerships in Large Science Projects

capability and to raise Europe’s technical standard

in space, has been particularly active in expressing

this desire.57

Europeans cite their experience with the Spacelab project as a turning point in relations with

NASA. In this program, Europe’s first large-scale

venture into human space activities, ESA developed a laboratory for use aboard the space shuttle.

From NASA’s point of view, the Spacelab program was successful. It provided a value-enhancing addition to the space shuttle at low cost to the

United States58 and gave the shuttle program an

international dimension that increased its political

prestige at home. Europe’s gains from the project

included valuable experience in building humanrated space equipment and access to the benefits

of the shuttle program. However, ESA, which was

hoping to recoup at least part of its investment

(and large cost overruns) in the project through serial production of several laboratories, was disappointed that NASA bought only the two modules

stipulated in the agreement. Moreover, many Europeans felt the project was a poor bargain. They

asserted that Europe had built merely an accessory

for the U.S. space shuttle with little practical return for European space-related science or industry. European scientists and engineers further

complained that NASA treated Europe condescendingly, not as a partner.59

Questions about the stability of U.S. funding

and periodic project redesigns also created challenges to collaboration by raising questions about

U.S. reliability among potential partners. Foreign

partners most frequently cite the 1981 cancellation of U.S. plans to build a spacecraft for the International Solar Polar Mission (ISPM), a joint

project with ESA (see box 1-3). In 1979, NASA

and ESA started a program to send two spacecraft

out of the Earth’s orbital plane to study the poles

of the Sun. In 1981, NASA canceled plans to build

the U.S. ISPM spacecraft, basing its decision on

the need to close a $500 million budget shortfall

in the fiscal 1982 budget. Europeans expressed

surprise and dismay at the NASA decision but

were unable to reverse the cancellation.

Although NASA kept its commitment to

launch and track the European probe (renamed

Ulysses), and provide its nuclear power source,

Europeans have long cited the ISPM cancellation

to illustrate their claims about the unreliability of

U.S. commitments.60 However, the real impact of

the ISPM experience is less certain. Other countries may cite the ISPM example as part of a strategy to obtain more favorable terms in negotiations

for joint space projects with the United States.

Nevertheless, ISPM was an important milestone

in the U.S.-European collaborative relationship.

As a result of these developments, in the 1980s,

U.S. collaborative space policy entered an extended period of transition from the earlier era of

U.S. preeminence to one in which the goal of leadership was less sustainable and more ambiguous.

The ambiguity of the period was reflected in U.S.

space policy documents, which moved from

broad and unequivocal statements in the late

1970s and early 1980s about the need to maintain

U.S. space leadership, to more opaque statements

in the late 1980s and early 1990s that called for the

United States to maintain leadership in certain

57 ESA was formed by the merger of the European Space Research Organization and the European Launcher Development Organization,

both of which were founded in 1964.

58 An earlier OTA report noted that “Spacelab cost (ESA) in excess of $1 billion. . . . For budgetary reasons, the alternative to an ESA Spacelab was not a less capable U.S. Spacelab, but rather no Spacelab at all.” Office of Technology Assessment, International Cooperation and Competition in Civilian Space Activities, see footnote 51, p. 409.

59For a description and analysis of the Spacelab experience, see Joan Johnson-Freese, Changing Patterns of International Cooperation in

Space (Malabar, FL: Orbit Book Co.), 1990, pp. 25-30.

60In virtually every interview conducted with U.S. space science partners in research for the present report, questions about U.S. stability

were highlighted prominently by reference to the ISPM experience.
Chapter 3 U.S. Experience in International Collaboration | 77

loosely defined critical areas (usually involving

space transportation and human space flight).61

A final development in the late 1980s and early

1990s—constrictions in the space budgets of the

United States and its foreign partners—spurred

further changes in the U.S. and multilateral approaches to collaboration. The result of all these

developments has been a significant change in

NASA space policy: a greater willingness in several projects to accept foreign contributions as

critical-path elements;62 a more active program of

flying U.S. instruments on foreign spacecraft; and

a NASA strategic plan that speaks of keeping the

United States at the forefront of space-related science and technology, rather than maintaining

world leadership.63 Although NASA policy still

leaves much ambiguity about the role of U.S.

space leadership, the agency’s practices over the

past few years have demonstrated greater flexibility in dealing with the issue. The continuing challenges to collaboration and the U.S. experience in

the largest current international collaborative

projects are discussed below.

❚ Challenges to Collaboration

Although collaboration has worked well in several automated, small- and medium-scale science

projects, NASA has encountered significantly

more difficulty in structuring and executing collaborations in a few large programs, especially

those involving human spaceflight. Instability in

project financing and technical design (at NASA

and, more recently, among U.S. partners) has also

rendered collaboration more difficult.

The scale of large space projects—in terms of

budgets and public profile—has made it difficult

for NASA to structure stable, effective, and—

when necessary—interdependent collaborations.

This has been especially true in human space

flight because of its enormous expense and its importance for U.S. leadership and prestige in space

activities.

In large, high-profile projects (often involving

human space flight), the pressures on the United

States to maintain control over international collaborations have been greater than in smaller, automated missions. These pressures have come

from NASA, as well as from outside, and were especially intense through the end of the Cold War.

For example, in 1990, the Advisory Committee on

61The debate about space goals within and outside NASA was vigorous, but filled with ambiguity. Sally Ride’s 1987 report, Leadership and

America’s Future In Space, strongly advocated the pursuit of space leadership. And President Reagan’s February 1988 National Space Policy

directive confirmed “leadership in space” as the basic goal of U.S. policy. But a new Bush Administration national space policy directive in

November 1989 noted that although leadership would continue to be a fundamental objective, “Leadership in an increasingly competitive international environment does not require United States preeminence in all areas and disciplines of space enterprise. It does require United States

preeminence in the key areas of space activity critical to achieving our national security, scientific, technical, economic, and foreign policy

goals.” Nevertheless, in 1992, Vice President Quayle’s Space Advisory Board focused on the importance of international collaboration as a way

“to influence the direction of future space undertakings around the world.” The Clinton Administration has not yet issued a new space policy,

but the first goal of the new 1994 U.S. science policy is to “maintain leadership.” See National Security Council,”National Space Policy,” see

footnote 54; and Vice President’s Space Policy Advisory Board, A Post Cold War Assessment of U.S. Space Policy: A Task Group Report (Washington, DC: Office of the Vice President, December 1992), p. 42; Clinton and Gore, see footnote 1, p. 7.

62 Kenneth Pedersen notes that the U.S. preference for retaining control over critical path items will change because the increasing size and

complexity of projects will produce “numerous critical paths whose upkeep costs alone will defeat U.S. efforts to control and supply them all.”

Moreover, Pederson argues, “It seems unrealistic today to believe that other nations possessing advanced technical capabilities and harbouring

their own economic competitiveness objectives will be amenable to funding and developing only ancillary systems.” Kenneth S. Pedersen,

“Thoughts on International Space Cooperation and Interests in the Post-Cold War World,” Space Policy, August 1992, p. 217.

63 It must be noted that the United States is still the acknowledged leader in many areas. In a worldwide scientific consensus unique to space

research, European and Japanese space officials acknowledge overall U.S. leadership. With a yearly space budget of $14 billion, the United

States spends more than Europe and Japan combined on civilian space activities. Only the Soviet Union has pursued a space program of comparable scale and technical breadth. Since the disintegration of the U.S.S.R., Russia has continued the space program, but under severe financial

constraints.
78 | International Partnerships in Large Science Projects

the Future of the U.S. Space Program (the Augustine Committee) recommended that international

collaboration be used to demonstrate U.S. space

leadership, but cautioned that the United States

should retain operational control over criticalpath elements in areas such as human space exploration.64

Pressures to maintain control have been especially strong in NASA’s largest international human space project—the space station. The

problems of international collaboration in the

space station illustrate both the challenges of international cooperation in large projects and how

the evolution of U.S. cooperative policy has affected ongoing projects. Although the space station program contained collaborative elements

from the beginning, until very recently all critical

aspects of the project remained firmly under U.S.

control.65 Consistent with the earlier U.S. approach to collaboration, the original station partners were not invited to assist in its basic design

or construction; rather, they were invited to contribute supplementary elements. This approach to

international collaboration had the advantage of

adding elements to the station at no extra cost to

the United States (see box 3-4.)

However, this approach to collaboration caused

resentment among U.S. partners. According to

one space policy analyst, the Europeans and Japanese saw the U.S. position as “arrogant and, particularly in Europe, insufficiently sensitive to a

partner’s ability to contribute significantly to the

station program.” It was further noted that the foreign partners were further dismayed by official

NASA statements that the space station was critical to U.S. leadership and that international collaboration would “engage resources that

otherwise might be used in support of programs

competitive to the United States.” This philosophy of collaboration conflicted with fundamental

European and Japanese desires to achieve areas of

autonomy in their space programs and more equal

technical cooperation with the United States.66

This made it more difficult to forge commitments

among partners and to reach detailed agreements

on management and utilization issues.67 A 1989

NASA internal design review excluded the space

station’s foreign partners and caused further tension in the cooperative relationship. Since 1990,

NASA has made a greater effort to include partners in station redesign activities. Despite these

efforts, OTA has concluded that “the space station

experience appears to have convinced the partners

that they should not enter into such an asymmetrical arrangement [with the United States] again.”68

However, with the addition of Russia as a station partner in 1993, the U.S. position on collaboration changed fundamentally. Under the new

International Space Station program, the United

States will rely on Russia for several critical elements, including: guidance, navigation, and con64Advisory Committee on the Future of the U.S. Space Program, Report of the Advisory Committee on the Future of the U.S. Space Program

(Washington, DC: U.S Government Printing Office, December 1990), p. 8.

65 Although the Canadian Mobile Servicing System has been on the station’s critical path from the beginning, the U.S. agreement with Canada provides for all Canadian hardware, plans, and materials to be turned over to NASA in the event Canada were to withdraw from the program.

As in the agreement for the shuttle’s Canadarm, this gives the agency ultimate control over the contribution and its underlying technology, in

case of default.

66 John M. Logsdon, “Together in Orbit: The Origins of International Participation in Space Station Freedom,” December 1991, pp.

139-140.

67 The desire (or need) to maintain U.S. control may also have reduced the potential financial savings offered by collaboration by excluding

opportunities to take advantage of partners’ expertise in critical areas of station design, construction, and operation. For example, NASA might

have capitalized on Europe’s experience in building Spacelab and satisfied the European desire to use this expertise by assigning construction

of all (or most) pressurized station laboratories to ESA. Instead, the United States, ESA, and Japan will each build separate pressurized facilities.

68 U.S. Congress, Office of Technology Assessment, U.S.-Russian Cooperation in Space, OTA-ISS-618 (Washington, DC: U.S. Government Printing Office, April 1995), p. 65.
Chapter 3 U.S. Experience in International Collaboration 79

The space station is a U.S.-led international effort to build and operate a permanently occupied

Earth-orbiting research facility. The station is designed to play several roles: an orbital scientific laboratory for microgravity, Earth observation, and other experiments; a facility to study and develop skills for

long-term human duration in space; and a model of international cooperation.

The program began officially in January 1984, when President Reagan announced the U.S. intention to build a space station and invited international participation in the endeavor. In 1988, after almost

four years of discussions and negotiations, the European Space Agency (ESA), Canada, and Japan

signed cooperative agreements to participate with the United States in building and operating the station. The original plan called for a station, named Freedom, to be built by the early 1990s. However,

several program redesigns and funding reductions delayed station construction. In 1993, the United

States invited Russia to participate in the station. 1 The new International Space Station project, based

on the downsized Alpha design, is divided into three phases and calls for 34 construction-related

space flights.

■ Phase 1, 1994 to 1997—Joint Space Shuttle-Mir program.

■ Phase 2, 1997 to 1998-Building of station “core” using: U.S. node, lab module, central truss and

control moment gyros, and interface to Shuttle; Russian propulsion, initial power system, interface

to Russian vehicles, and assured crew-return vehicle; Canadian remote manipulator arm.

■ Phase 3, 1998 to 2002—Station completion. Addition of U.S. modules, power system, and attitude

control; and Russian, Japanese, and ESA research modules and equipment.

Russian cooperation on the station is of a different nature than European and Japanese participation. Whereas Europe and Japan are making value-added contributions of pressurized research modules, the Russians are providing several critical space station components. These include the FGB

module (for guidance, navigation, and control), reboost and refueling, a service module, a power mast,

and a Soyuz/ACRV (emergency return vehicle).

Like Russia, Canada is also on the station’s critical path. Based on its experience developing the

Canadarm for the space shuttle, Canada is supplying robotic systems for station assembly and maintenance, However, unlike the U.S. agreement with Russia, the agreement with Canada would provide

NASA with all Canadian hardware, plans, and materials should Canada withdraw from the program.

The United States is responsible for the vast majority of the station budget. It spent about $10

billion on pre-Alpha station work and will have spent an additional $28 billion on design, construction,

launch, and assembly to complete the station. In a unique cooperative feature, the United States anticipates spending nearly $650 million in direct payments to Russia to pay for procurement of Russian

equipment for the station. The Japanese anticipate spending $3 billion on the JEM (Japanese Experimental Module). ESA is considering a $3-billion station-related program. And Canada is spending

about $1 billion.

1 A new intergovernmental agreement and revised Memoranda of Understanding are now being negotiated, bringing Russia

into the program.

SOURCES. National Aeronautics and Space Administration; and Office of Technology Assessment, 1995.

trol in Phase 2; habitation until the U.S. habitation States and among the space station’s foreign partmodule is launched; crew-return (“lifeboat”) ners. Domestic objections to dependence on Rusmodules through 2002; and reboost and fuel re- sian technology are based on concerns about

supply. The Russian collaboration policy has Russia’s political and economic stability, quesevoked high levels of controversy in the United tions about its technical reliability, the potential
80 International Partnerships in Large Science Projects

for loss of U.S. jobs, and traditional pressures to

maintain U.S. control over critical mission elements. 69 Foreign partners expressed resentment

over not having been consulted about Russia’s

sudden entry into the program.70

These concerns have been much less prominent

in smaller and robotically operated science collaborations with Western Europe, Japan, and Russia.

In these projects, NASA has for a longer time been

receptive to new, more interdependent forms of

collaboration. The agency has formed collaborations with European and Japanese space agencies,

relying in some cases on partners for critical mission components. NASA has relied on ESA for

critical solar power panels for the Hubble Space

Telescope and on Germany for retro-propulsion

systems and other critical components of the Galileo program. Although EOS has gone through

several reorganizations and downsizings, it is extensively collaborative on both a mission and a

programmatic level (see box 3-5). Out of the limelight of human space flight and without the huge

price tag of the space station, these science projects have enjoyed greater flexibility and have not

been burdened with carrying the full weight of

U.S. leadership and prestige.

Another factor contributing to successful collaboration in science projects is financial and technical stability. This has affected both large- and

medium-scale projects. Over the past decade,

budgets for several NASA science projects were

cut significantly while these projects were under

development. Cuts have occurred both because of

The NASA Hubble Space Telescope solar panels were built by

the European Space Agency. Here the Canadian-built robot

arm on the space shuttle Endeavors being used to inspect

the telescope.

budget constraints and because funding requirements rose considerably above initial estimates. 71

For example, funding concerns prompted the restructuring of the space station in 1987, 1989, and

1991. The projected cost (originally $8 billion)

rose considerably before it was downsized again

in 1993. The program is now projected to cost $38

billion. As noted above, funding for EOS was also

reduced several times within a few years, from

$17 billion to $8 billion.72 After large midprogram cost increases, AXAF and the CRAF/

6 9NASA reports that it is “prudently developing contingency plans to allow the program to go forward in the event an international partner

is unable to fulfill its obligations. Congressional representatives have endorsed the need for such planning in the case of Russia.” Beth A. Masters, Director of International Relations, National Aeronautics and Space Administration letter to OTA, Apr. 26, 1995. 7 0The issue of Russian reliability, NASA contingency plans, the reactions of foreign partners to Rusaia’s inclusion in the program, and the

general risks and benefits of U.S.-Russian space cooperation are discussed in Office of Technology Assessment, U.S.-Russian Cooperation in

Space, see footnote 68. 71 For description of funding cuts in large science, see William C. Boesman, Big Science and Technology Projects: Analysis of 30

Selected U.S. Government Projects (Washington, DC: Congressional Research Service), Dec. 7, 1994. 72 This figure accounts for EOS costs only through the year 2000.
Chapter 3 U. S. Experience in lnternational Collaboration 81

The Earth Observing System (EOS) is a multisatellite program to provide long-term, continuous

data on global climate change, The program began in 1989, with National Aeronautics and Space Administration (NASA) plans to build three copies of two 15-ton polar-orbiting platforms, However, congressional concerns about cost and the risks of concentrating resources on two large spacecraft led

NASA in 1991 to reduce the original program from $17 billion to $11 billion and to spread EOS instruments among several smaller orbiters, Since 1991, further funding cuts have reduced the program’s

budget to $8 billion (exclusive of EOS science costs) through the end of the century, The House Committee on Science has asked the National Academy of Sciences to review the EOS program with an

eye to reducing its costs even further.

EOS is a highly collaborative project, involving instruments and spacecraft from the United

States, Europe, Canada, and Japan. In exchange, these countries will fly several U.S. instruments on

their own missions, EOS was originally coupled to the space station agreement in 1989, The two programs were later separated, and EOS is now NASA’s contribution to the International Earth Observing

System (IEOS), a joint project of the United States, Europe, Canada, and Japan. In addition to EOS, the

IEOS includes a joint U, S.-Japanese project, the Tropical Rainfall Measuring Mission; data from the

National Oceanic and Atmospheric Administration’s Polar-Orbiting Operational Environmental Satellite

program; Japan’s Advanced Earth Observing System program; and the Polar-Orbiting Earth Observation Mission, a joint project of the European Space Agency and Eumetsat.

NASA plans to launch the first two EOS satellites (EOS AM-1 and PM-1) in 1998 and 2000,

NASA has spent about $2 billion to date on the program. Although EOS has a budget of $8 billion, this

wiII finance the program only through the year 2000. NASA has designated $2.2 billion of the current

EOS budget for EOSDIS, the system to manage and distribute the enormous amounts of data generated by the project.

SOURCE: Office of Technology Assessment, 1995.

Cassini program each eliminated a proposed ty continues to affect other projects under analysis

spacecraft. 73

In addition to these periodic downsizings for

large projects, the congressional budget review

has generated annual uncertainties about the stability of funding for virtually all space projects.

Uncertainty about continued or stable yearly

funding has been particularly acute for the space

station. The program survived by only one vote in

the House of Representatives in 1993. Uncertainhere, such as the Cassini mission to Saturn. -

Periodic downsizings and the uncertainties of

the annual appropriations process make collaboration difficult by generating questions among

foreign partners about the reliability and stability

of U.S. commitments. As noted earlier, cancellation of the U.S. ISPM spacecraft reverberates to

this day. Yet, questions about funding stability can

73 NASA originally planned the AXAF x-ray telescope as one large telescope. However, in 1992, the agency eliminated some instruments

and divided the project into two telescopes--AXAF-I (x-ray imaging) and AXAF-S (x-ray spectroscopy)-to reduce costs. In 1994, further

budget pressures resulted in cancellation of funding for AXAF-S. At that time, Congress instructed NASA to undertake discussions with Japan

about the possibility of flying the AXAF-S spectrometer on a Japanese craft. These discussions are still underway. Cassini is a joint U.S.-ESA

mission to investigate Saturn and its moon Titan. When it was initiated in 1990, the project called for two spacecraft: Cassini to fly to Saturn and a

Comet Rendezvous Asteroid Flyby (CRAF) mission to rendezvous with and investigate a comet and asteroid. However, by 1992, estimated

project capital costs had risen from $1.6 billion to $1.9 billion. Simultaneously, Congress reduced funding for the project. Under these

constraints, CRAF was canceled the next year, leaving Cassini as the sole U.S. component of the project.
82 | International Partnerships in Large Science Projects

affect even projects that are successfully concluded.

In the past, analysts contrasted uncertainty

about the funding of U.S. projects with the more

stable budgets of its foreign partners, particularly

ESA and the Japanese space agency (NASDA).

During the 1970s and 1980s, funds for projects at

ESA and NASDA—once approved—were less

subject to the annual uncertainties of U.S budgets.

However, over the past five years, ESA has experienced severe budget reductions (in its nonmandatory programs) that have necessitated the

cancellation of its Hermes space plane program

and Man-Tended Free Flyer (MTFF), reductions

in Earth observation budgets, and substantial uncertainty about the agency’s long-term plans. Like

U.S. programs, ESA projects now face more rigorous and uncertain yearly budget reviews, with

more frequent delays and downsizings than before. Of central concern to the United States, continued disagreements within ESA about the

agency’s proposed program to build a pressurized

module, a Crew Rescue Vehicle (CRV), and an

Autonomous Transfer Vehicle for cargo raise

questions about ESA’s commitment to the space

station.74 Recently, ESA dropped the CRV from

its proposed contribution. France may seek to develop the CRV in a collaborative project with Russia.75

Canada’s commitment to build the robotic Mobile Servicing System (MSS) for the station has

also come into question. In early 1994, Canada decided to terminate its critical path contribution to

the station, but was dissuaded from doing so by

President Clinton. Instead, Canada reformulated

its contribution, with the U.S. assuming financial

responsibility for portions of the MSS. Canada

also delayed for two years a decision on whether

to build an auxiliary contribution to the MSS, the

Special Purpose Dexterous Manipulator.76 Thus,

the reliability of its partners has now become a

concern for the United States.

Finally, financial stability—in both U.S. and

foreign projects—also depends on the clarity of

science goals and changes in project specifications that affect collaborative relationships. In this

area, there is a stark contrast between human space

flight and robotic space projects. In smaller and

robotic projects, scientific goals have often been

much clearer and less subject to dispute than in

ventures involving human space flight. For example, consensus among partners about the scientific

goals of planetary missions has been much stronger than about the space station. Whereas planetary and astronomical projects tend to focus

clearly on scientific questions, the enormous cost

of building facilities for human space programs

such as the space station renders them infrastructure projects designed to satisfy a variety of

goals—scientific, technical, economic, and political. These multiple goals complicate the execution of larger space projects, whether domestic or

international in character.

All of these factors—NASA’s history of midproject downsizing, the annual congressional

budget cycle, the ISPM experience, and questions

about scientific goals—make it more difficult for

the United States to engage in large-scale cooperative ventures. Collaboration has been easier in

smaller projects where funding has been more

stable and the financial risks are lower. This greater financial stability makes it easier to build the

relationships of mutual trust among partners that

are crucial to effective collaboration.

❚ Results of NASA Collaborations

NASA’s collaborative efforts have produced significant successes for the U.S. space program and

74 According to a NASA official, “There is a growing program downside to not knowing whether we can count on Europe in this program.”

See “ESA Accord Postponed,” Aviation Week and Space Technology, Ap. 3, 1995, vol. 142, No.14, p. 29; and Craig Covault, “Station Partners

Reassess ESA’s Role,” Aviation Week and Space Technology, Mar. 27, 1995, vol. 142, No. 13, pp. 27-28.

75See Declan Butler, “France May Break Ranks Over Space Station,” Nature, vol. 374, Apr. 27, 1995, p. 756.

76 For a discussion of this issue, see Marcia Smith, Space Stations (Washington, DC: Congressional Research Service, Apr. 6, 1995), p. 11.
Chapter 3 U.S. Experience in International Collaboration | 83

served U.S. interests and goals well. NASA indicates that it has saved money and increased the

scientific yield of many U.S. projects by adding

instruments and expertise from partner countries

without sacrificing operational control or space

leadership. Spacelab and the Canadian arm for the

space shuttle are good examples of this type of

cooperation.77 Collaboration in space activities

has also strengthened relations with U.S. allies

and served other foreign policy interests.

Yet, in part due to changes in U.S. and foreign

space policy, the reduction in available resources,

and monumental events in world politics, the results of space-science collaboration over the past

decade, although mostly positive, have been uneven. Recent U.S. experience in collaboration on

large science projects in space has been paradoxical: although NASA initially designed projects

that for the most part preserved U.S. independence, leadership, and operational control, its two

largest projects—the space station and EOS—

have evolved into highly interdependent collaborations.

Although the current rescoped EOS program

might be seen as a model of interdependence in

collaboration, this was not NASA’s original vision. Rather than planning an extensively integrated international project from the beginning,

NASA significantly expanded the program’s dependence on foreign instruments when funding

restraints dictated a dramatic downsizing of the

U.S. contribution to the program. The downsizing

of the EOS budget was the prime motive for expanding the program’s international aspect.

EOS began as a project to build three copies of

two U.S. polar-orbiting platforms with contributions of instruments from Europe and Japan. Foreign instruments were intended in some cases to

complement proposed U.S. instruments. For example, data from the Japanese Advanced Spaceborne Thermal Emission and Reflection

Radiometer (ASTER) were originally intended to

complement NASA’s proposed High-Resolution

Imaging Spectrometer (HIRIS). In one case,

ESA’s Multifrequency Imaging Microwave Radiometer, NASA chose to rely exclusively on a foreign instrument for critical measurements.

However, the original EOS plan was criticized

for its cost, the long period of time before the system could provide policy-relevant data, and its dependence on two large platforms to carry all the

program’s instruments. As a result, it was reviewed, rescoped, and downsized several times

(see table 1-2).

NASA accomplished the downsizing of EOS

with little loss of capability. However, in doing so,

NASA has now come to depend much more extensively on several foreign instruments as critical

U.S. mission elements78 or on foreign spacecraft

for flying critical U.S. instruments.79 NASA acknowledges that reduced funding has increased

U.S. dependence on foreign instruments and

flights:

At $8 billion, EOS must depend increasingly

on the international partners. Failure to accomplish planned international cooperation on [Japan’s] Advanced Earth Observing System

(ADEOS), [ESA’s] Polar-Orbit Earth Observa77 An earlier OTA report noted that “[C]anadian expenditures (over $100 million) for the Shuttle’s highly successful remote manipulator

arm freed the United States from this Shuttle expense.” Office of Technology Assessment, International Cooperation and Competition in Civilian Space Activities, see footnote 51, p. 409.

78 The cancellation of HIRIS, for example, left NASA much more dependent on Japan’s ASTER. NASA also eliminated the planned EOS

synthetic aperture radar (SAR) and will now rely instead on data from European, Japanese, and Canadian SARs.

79 NASA originally planned to fly 30 instruments on two U.S. platforms with no involvement of foreign spacecraft. In the rescoped program, NASA will fly 24 U.S. instruments on 21 U.S. and 10 non-U.S. platforms. NASA has retained all six foreign instruments originally slated

for the program. National Aeronautics and Space Administration, Office of International Relations, fax communication, Jan. 27, 1995.
84 | International Partnerships in Large Science Projects

tion Mission (POEM), [U.S.-Japanese] Tropical

Rainfall Measuring Mission (TRMM), and their

follow-on missions will leave gaping holes in

IEOS [International Earth Observing System].80

For the space station—designed as the U.S.

flagship for human activities in space—NASA

also designed a U.S.-controlled project with international enhancement. Although the United

States sought supplementary international contributions from the inception of the station program, NASA insisted that the United States would

build the station, with or without foreign participation.81 Originally, this vision of collaboration

was consistent with the goals and technical capabilities of potential partners. Although negotiations with European partners proved difficult, the

United States was able to maintain operational

control and to use international contributions as

supplementary enhancements for two reasons: 1)

no partner country or organization had the resources to mount an independent station program,

and 2) U.S. partners had different priorities for human space flight.

For example, ESA initially planned to use the

space station as an adjunct to its plans for achieving an autonomous human space flight capability

in low Earth orbit. Its original plan therefore

called for free-flying elements (such as Hermes

and the MTFF) that could dock with the station or

operate independently of it. This fit well with

NASA’s desire for “enhancing” contributions.

From the beginning of their involvement with the

program, the Japanese have seen the JEM (Japanese Experimental Module) as a chance to develop technologies for human space flight. Canada’s

contribution (robotics for station assembly and

maintenance) builds on expertise developed for

the shuttle program.

However, throughout the late 1980s and early

1990s—under increasingly intense funding pressures—NASA’s station plans changed several

times and were the subject of considerable uncertainty. Financial constraints reached a pinnacle in

1993. Simultaneously, the United States had undertaken discussions with Russia about technical

cooperation. Technical cooperation with Russia

was seen as an important tool for supporting U.S.

foreign policy goals, which included Russian adherence to the Missile Technology Control Regime and the general goal of supporting the

transition to a market-oriented democracy in Russia. This conjunction of financial, domestic political, and foreign policy imperatives resulted in a

U.S.-Russian agreement to cooperate in a broad

range of station design, construction, and supply

activities.

Russia’s inclusion in the space station program

parallels the internationalization of the EOS program. Both projects originally envisioned cooperation of a mostly value-added nature, but

evolved into deeply collaborative enterprises. In

the case of the station, Russia’s inclusion as a critical-path partner was motivated originally by both

financial82 and foreign policy considerations. The

process was similar, however: contrary to its original intentions, well into each project, NASA

“backed into” highly interdependent foreign collaborations.

The EOS and space station experiences demonstrate the complexity and difficulty of planning

long-term collaborations on a large scale. In both

cases, the original U.S. goals for international col80National Aeronautics and Space Administration, EOS Reference Handbook (Washington, DC: 1993), p. 12.

81”[T]he U.S. position was that the United States would develop a fully capable space station on its own, but that potential partners were

welcome to suggest enhancements to that core station which would increase its capability.” Logsdon, “Together in Orbit,” see footnote 66,

p. 137.

82 The General Accounting Office has since reported that Russian participation will provide no significant cost savings to the United States.

See U.S. General Accounting Office, Space Station: Update on the Expanded Russian Role, GAO/NSIAD-94-248 (Washington, DC: U.S. Government Printing Office, July 1994).
Chapter 3 U.S. Experience in International Collaboration | 85

laboration changed, as a result in large measure of

financial pressures and project downsizings. Given the benefit of hindsight, NASA might have

saved time and money, increased program technical sophistication, and avoided tensions with

partners if it had planned more integrated collaborations from the beginning. This may very well

have been possible in the EOS program. Rather

than undertaking a very large $17 billion U.S.

project, NASA might have planned a more coordinated, international effort with a much smaller

U.S. contribution.83

However, it is doubtful that the United States

could have pursued a similar course in planning

the space station. In the early 1980s, the goals and

financial and technical capabilities of partner

space agencies in Europe and Japan would have

made a mutually interdependent collaboration

less likely. Also, collaboration with the then Soviet Union was completely out of the question. Although downsizing did play a large role in forcing

NASA to alter the character of its space station

collaboration, the political changes that made

cooperation with Russia possible were sudden and

unexpected.

❚ Future of Space Collaboration

There is a consensus—inside and outside NASA

—that reduced budgets will necessitate expanded

international collaboration on future large science

projects in space. With the end of the Cold War,

and the lessening of competitive pressures vis-avis the former Soviet space program, there will

also be new opportunities to collaborate on a

broad range of space-related science activities.

NASA’s two largest current projects—EOS and

the space station—already demonstrate levels of

interdependence with both Western partners and

Russia that would have been impossible a decade

ago. NASA’s future plans for astronomy and planetary exploration also include significant international components. The agency is already

discussing joint work with Russia and/or ESA for

missions to the Moon and Mars, as well as projects to study the opposite ends of the solar system:

the Sun and Pluto.

If collaboration is to be effective in these future

cooperative activities, the United States must first

decide on its goals for space. If leadership continues to be a paramount goal of U.S. space activities,

this will complicate future, more integrated collaborative efforts because:

 No space agency, including NASA, has the financial resources to maintain the type of world

leadership that the United States established in

the past.

 The goal of maintaining U.S. leadership

through collaboration creates fundamental tensions with partners who have developed sophisticated autonomous capabilities and are

pursuing independence in some areas of spacerelated science. These partners are unlikely to

accept future collaborations on past U.S. terms.

 The experience of the space station and EOS

demonstrates that maintaining U.S. control

over critical mission components has proved an

elusive and perhaps unattainable goal in very

large projects.

 The goal of U.S. leadership in space can be ambiguous and in some cases contradictory.

Moreover, as one space policy analyst notes,

the end of the Cold War may devalue the traditional goal of leadership. In this scenario, “[T]he future scope, pace and vitality of the USA’s

approach to space cooperation would depend on

other, less political interests—principally, economic, technological and scientific in nature.”84

83 A smaller EOS with greater international collaboration planned from the beginning may also have become a different program than the

present EOS. Participants in an OTA workshop on EOS noted that had the project “initially been designed as an $8 billion program, it likely

would be different than today’s EOS.” See U.S. Congress, Office of Technology Assessment, Global Change Research and NASA’s Earth Observing System, OTA-BP-ISC-122 (Washington, DC: U.S. Government Printing Office, November 1993), p. 31.

84Pedersen, “Thoughts on International Space Cooperation,” see footnote 62, p. 212.
86 | International Partnerships in Large Science Projects

Aerial overview of the Advanced Photon Source facility under construction.

Instability and uncertainty in funding for U.S.

space projects may also continue to complicate

space collaboration efforts. Although the United

States has thus far avoided direct harm from the

ISPM cancellation, project downsizings, and the

annual certainties of the budget process, continued lack of confidence among U.S. partners could

impede future collaborative opportunities--especially those in which the United States would take

a leading role. Likewise, new instabilities and uncertainties in funding for foreign space agencies

pose challenges for U.S. collaboration with its

traditional partners.

Nevertheless, the United States still dominates

many areas of space research and has space resources matched by no other single country. This

will continue to give the United States wider latitude in choosing projects and collaborative opportunities.

NEUTRON SOURCES AND

SYNCHROTRONS

Over the past several decades, the use of neutron

and synchrotron beams has led to fundamental advances in understanding the properties of matter.

These tools have opened new areas of research and

application in materials science, structural biology, polymer chemistry, and solid-state physics.

Neutron sources and synchrotrons are large science facilities that essentially serve as platforms

for small science. They could be regarded as infrastructure investments for several fields of science

and technology. Thus, having access to state-of-
Chapter 3 U.S. Experience in International Collaboration | 87

the-art neutron-scattering and x-ray synchrotron85

facilities could have long-term competitive implications. For this reason, many industrial nations have supported their own independent

facilities. Although the cost and complexity of

neutron and synchrotron installations have escalated with advances in the underlying science, international cooperation has been limited primarily

to information sharing and joint experimental

work by researchers, rather than the joint development of large international facilities.

Neutron scattering and x-ray scattering are

complementary techniques that have been used to

elucidate much of what we understand about the

structure of many important materials. X-rays interact strongly with matter and thus can provide

significant information about the surface and bulk

properties of a given material. Due to their electrical neutrality, neutrons can penetrate deeply into

compounds to provide information about the

structural and nuclear properties of materials.

Neutrons can pinpoint the location of light atoms

such as hydrogen and carbon, which are difficult

to locate with x-rays. The identification of such

light atoms is particularly important in completing the structural blueprint of organic and biological substances. When used at low energies,

neutrons can be employed to study the dynamic or

vibrational characteristics of matter. The use of

both neutron and x-ray beams has allowed researchers to develop extraordinary precision in

understanding the basic behavior of both natural

and synthetic substances.86

❚ Neutron Sources

History

The use of neutron structural probes has provided

the technical foundation for the successful development of many different types of polymers (plastics), novel alloys, ceramics, liquid crystals,

pharmaceuticals, catalysts, and magnetic materials. For example, the introduction of magnetic recording heads in electronic equipment directly

benefited from the understanding provided by

neutron-scattering studies. The widespread

introduction and use of plastic materials has also

been greatly facilitated by the use of neutron scattering. Properties such as flexibility, hardness, and

wear resistance are determined principally by the

way in which long polymer chain molecules are

packed together. Developing plastics that have a

greater range of properties and improved performance depends directly on the structural analysis

that neutron probing provides. In addition, neutron physics has provided the means to analyze residual stress and to identify defects in metals,

ceramics, and advanced composites.87 It has allowed us to better understand the structure of viruses, as well as to profile surface impurities and

irregularities in semiconductors—materials that

serve as the basis of virtually all electronic and

computational products. Because neutron probing

provides information on how atoms vibrate, greater understanding of the dynamic behavior of materials has also been achieved. For these and other

reasons, neutron scattering will continue to be an

85Charged particles orbiting at a fixed rate through a magnetic field emit a form of electromagnetic radiation known as synchrotron radiation. Synchrotron sources are circular accelerators that can be tuned to emit radiation with a broad range of frequencies including soft and hard

x-rays.

86See OECD Megascience Forum, Synchrotron Radiation Sources and Neutron Beams (Paris, France: Organization for Economic Cooperation and Development, summer 1994).

87Neutron radiography is used for quality control of aerospace and energy production components and to test weld seams on pipelines,

ships, and offshore drilling platforms.
88 | International Partnerships in Large Science Projects

important technique for understanding both manmade and biological substances.88

Neutron beams can be produced in two different ways: from reactors in which neutrons are byproducts of nuclear fission, or from spallation

sources in which neutrons are generated by accelerating high-energy protons into heavy-metal targets. To some degree, reactors and spallation

sources have overlapping capabilities, but each

has different attributes. Reactors produce high integrated fluxes of neutrons across a broad spectrum of energies, but particularly at low energy,89

whereas spallation sources can more readily provide pulsed high-energy neutrons. Reactors, however, can also be used to produce a variety of

isotopes for medical applications90 and for materials radiation studies.

Implications for the Future

The fact that the highest neutron flux reactors in

the United States (at Oak Ridge and Brookhaven

National Laboratories) are both 30 years old,91

and that Europe and Japan have invested heavily

in neutron facilities in recent years, have raised

concerns that U.S. capabilities in neutron science

may be lagging behind other nations. Because the

most important breakthroughs in neutron research

have depended on the availability of high neutron

fluxes and nuclear reactors are more technologically mature than spallation sources, a 1993 DOE

scientific panel recommended that a new reactor,

the Advanced Neutron Source (ANS), be constructed to meet the growing needs of U.S. researchers and industry.92

The ANS design provides for neutron fluxes at

least five times higher than those of the newly upgraded Institute Laue-Langevin (ILL) neutron facility in Europe. This ANS capability would be

particularly important for studying small samples

(e.g., biological crystals or material fragments) or

where short exposure times are necessary. However, the proposed 1996 federal budget calls for discontinuation of the ANS project, principally

because of its high cost (approximately $2.9 billion).93 A secondary factor in the Clinton Administration decision to terminate the ANS program

was that the use of enriched uranium in the ANS

reactor came into conflict with U.S. nuclear nonproliferation policy. Although engineers had redesigned the reactor to use lower levels of enriched

uranium, even these levels were not sufficiently

low to completely resolve the underlying policy

problem.

In recognition of the potential contributions

that an advanced neutron-scattering capability

could provide to a broad range of scientific disciplines, technological applications, and industries,

DOE has proposed to undertake a conceptual de88In the past two decades four Nobel prizes have been awarded for work relating to neutron scattering. In addition, a host of other prestigious

awards in condensed matter physics and chemistry have been given to researchers that have used neutron probes as an essential part of their

work.

89Neutrons are often slowed down to produce low energy or so called “cold” neutrons. Cold neutron research is a rapidly developing area of

inquiry that could lead to major commercial applications for new classes of polymers. The importance of cold neutrons is due to interatomic and

intermolecular structure and dynamics. See U.S. Department of Energy, Office of Energy Research, “Neutron Sources for America’s Future,”

Report of the Basic Energy Sciences Advisory Committee Panel on Neutron Sources, January 1993.

90While some types of radioisotopes can be produced by proton accelerators, the radioisotopes used for many essential medical and technological applications are primarily produced by reactors. For example, the element californium is increasingly used in cancer therapy. Ibid.

91The High Flux Beam Reactor run by Brookhaven National Laboratory and the High Flux Isotope Reactor at Oak Ridge National Laboratory were built in 1965 and 1966 respectively, and are nearing the end of their useful lives. A smaller, lower power reactor was built by the

National Institute of Standards in 1969, and is expected to have a somewhat longer lifetime than the two DOE reactors.

92U.S. Department of Energy, see footnote 89.

93The ANS was deleted from the 1996 budget request after a decade of planning costing about $100 million. See Budget of the United States

Government, Fiscal Year 1996 (Washington, DC: U.S. Government Printing Office, 1995), appendix, p. 435.
Chapter 3 U.S. Experience in International Collaboration | 89

sign study of a 1-MW pulsed spallation source as

a replacement for the ANS.94 Although such a

spallation source would offer some technical advantages over the ANS (e.g., a higher peak neutron flux, which allows more complex physical

phenomena to be investigated), it would be inferior in other respects (e.g., a lower time-averaged

flux, which is key for small-sample analysis and

reduced cold-neutron capabilities).95 The proposed spallation source would not produce transuranic waste or hazardous fission products.96

However, without the ANS, DOE might find it

necessary to build a dedicated reactor to meet the

growing radioisotope needs of the U.S. medical

community and other industries. Although some

preliminary estimates have placed the cost of a

1-MW spallation source at around $500 million,

the technical uncertainties97 associated with this

technology led the 1993 DOE scientific panel on

neutron sources to conclude that the cost “will increase considerably with more refined estimates.”98 Some observers believe that the costs

will be in the $1-billion range.99 A 1-MW spallation facility would surpass the neutron intensity of

the world’s most powerful existing spallation

source (the ISIS source in the United Kingdom)

by roughly a factor of six.100

If Congress concurs with the Clinton Administration decision to terminate the ANS program

and if existing facilities are not upgraded,101 U.S.

researchers could well be compelled to rely on access to foreign facilities while a spallation source

is being constructed. The ANS was not conceived

as an international project. Since other countries

have made substantial investments in developing

their own neutron-source capabilities, it is not

clear whether the ANS project could have become

a multinational collaborative endeavor. Although

U.S. scientists and industry would have been the

primary beneficiaries of ANS, there most likely

would have been many users from overseas.

Assuming the ANS is not built, the United

States could still maintain critical capabilities in

the field of neutron scattering by exploring the

possibility of joining the European ILL facility,

for example. The United States could also establish its own beam line and contribute to the development of new instrumentation at ILL.102 This

would be analogous to the proposed U.S. contribution to the Large Hadron Collider project at

CERN. It could be done at a fraction of the cost of

the ANS but would not substitute for the capabilities that the ANS would have provided. In addi94Some in the neutron scattering community have called for the construction of a 5-MW spallation source, but this would be a much more

challenging and expensive undertaking.

95It is estimated that the time averaged flux of a 1-MW spallation source would be roughly 100 times lower than that of the ANS. For cold

neutron research in the areas of polymers, complex fluids, biomolecules, and magnetic materials, “the ANS would be decidedly superior

compared to a 1-MW spallation source.” To match the ANS flux, a 5-MW spallation source would be required, and would involve considerable

technical uncertainty. U.S. Department of Energy, see footnote 89.

96The proposed spallation source would use a tungsten target that would produce low-level radioactive byproducts. However, if uranium is

used as the target material, there would be more serious radioactive byproducts.

97The central technical challenge of spallation sources is cooling the target. Existing spallation sources are quite limited in the amount of

heat that they can dissipate, and this problem is compounded as the power is increased.

98U.S. Department of Energy, see footnote 89.

99Colin West, Oak Ridge National Laboratory, personal communication, February 1995.

100See footnote 89.

101The Brookhaven neutron reactor, for example, could be upgraded for approximately $200 million. See “The Looming Neutron Gap,”

Science, vol. 267, Feb. 17, 1995.

102Developing new approaches and techniques for neutron instrumentation is a vital component of neutron scattering science. Upgrading

of instrumentation at the European ILL facility has established ILL as the premier neutron center in the world. Organization for Economic Cooperation and Development, see footnote 86.
90 | International Partnerships in Large Science Projects

tion, the United States could also consider joining

the ISIS spallation facility in the United Kingdom, which is capable of having its available

beam time doubled with some modest additional

investment ($60 million).103

Historically, use of both neutron and synchrotron facilities around the world has been based on

the policy of open access to foreign scientists. Indeed, many advances in neutron scattering, particularly in instrumentation, have been brought

about by multinational research teams. However,

with increasing budget pressures on virtually all

national science programs, this policy of open access is now being reviewed by various facilities.104

Since many facilities in different countries offer complementary approaches to neutron-scattering and synchrotron radiation research, there is an

opportunity for improving international cooperation by having a more substantive global planning

and coordination process among nations. This approach could facilitate more effective utilization

of existing facilities. Paradoxically, there is a great

demand for access to neutron and synchrotron facilities, but most facilities operate for limited time

periods because of funding constraints. There is a

need for greater international coordination in both

the use of existing neutron facilities and the

construction of new facilities. In particular, the

European Union is now in the early stages of planning a 5-MW spallation source.105 With the

United States apparently also pursuing the development of a spallation facility, greater interaction

between U.S. and European scientists and engineers could perhaps lead to innovative approaches

to spallation source design and construction. At

the most recent Organization for Economic Cooperation and Development Megascience Forum on

neutron sources, several participants emphasized

that investments should be directed to state-ofthe-art multinational facilities that have high-flux

capabilities, not to smaller national facilities.106

Synchrotron Facilities: A Bright Future

One of the most important and powerful tools

available to scientific researchers in a broad number of disciplines is x-rays. X-ray beams generated from synchrotron sources have provided the

means to study a wide array of physical and biological phenomena. An understanding of the

underlying molecular structure of DNA (dioxyribonucleic acid), RNA (ribonucleic acid), and viruses has come principally from x-ray research.

X-ray studies of ceramics, semiconductors, and

other materials have directly aided the development of a host of commercially important technologies.107 Because of their utility to a variety of

scientific fields and industries, the number of synchrotron radiation sources operating throughout

the world has grown rapidly. There are about 40

partially or fully operational synchrotron facilities

worldwide, with nearly the same number either in

the design stage or under construction.108 The ex103”The Looming Neutron Gap,” see footnote 101.

104For example, the ILL neutron facility in Europe has established new guidelines that partially restrict facility access to researchers who

come from nonmember countries.

105The 5-MW European Spallation Source and the ANS were viewed by many neutron scientists as complementary programs. There was an

expectation among some that researchers from Europe and the United States would have reciprocal access to these facilities. If Europe builds a

5-MW source and the U.S. proceeds with a 1-MW source, then in the eyes of many, Europe would have the leading international neutron facility.

106Other observers, however, pointed out that smaller facilities, particularly at the university level, have been responsible for some important advances in neutron scattering instrumentation. OECD Megascience Forum, Knoxville, TN, unpublished proceedings, Nov. 3-4, 1994.

107Another potentially important application of synchrotron radiation is x-ray lithography. The use of x-rays might offer the most viable

means of improving the performance of microelectronic devices. As dimensions of these electronic chips shrink, visible light and ultraviolet

light can no longer be used. Several companies including IBM, AT&T, and Motorola, as well as a number of Japanese and European companies,

are developing x-ray lithography for chip manufacture.

108Organization for Economic Cooperation and Development, see footnote 86.
Chapter 3 U.S. Experience in International Collaboration | 91

A closeup of a synchrotron insertion device called an

undulator that generates super-intense x-ray beams.

pansion of synchrotrons light source capacity has

been driven by a strong demand for x-ray beam

time and by the desire to develop more intense

sources to investigate a larger and more complex

domain of problems.10

Three new major synchrotrons facilities—the

European Synchrotrons Radiation Facility

(ESRF), the U.S. Advanced Photon Source

(APS), and the Japanese Super Photon Ring-8

(SPring-8)--will offer extremely intense x-ray

beams that will allow researchers to study smaller

samples, more complicated systems, and faster

processes and reactions, as well as acquire data at

unprecedented rates and levels of detail. *10 Researchers from industry, universities, medical

schools, and national laboratories will exploit the

capabilities of these machines.

At the APS at the Argonne National Laboratory, researchers will explore the following areas:

structural biology, medical imaging, biophysics,

chemical science, materials science, structural

crystallography, time-resolved studies, basic energy science, tomography, topography, real-time

studies, time-resolved scattering and spectroscopy, and geoscience. Collaborative teams from industry, national laboratories, and academia have

been formed to explore new pharmaceutical products and polymer manufacturing techniques, as

well as underlying processes associated with the

formation of proteins.lll The APS will be completed in 1996 at a cost of about $800 million, very

close to the original estimate.112 The ESRF and

the SPring-8 have comparable construction and

development costs.

Apart from the ESRF, which is a multinational

effort of 12 European nations, there have not been

any large international collaborative efforts in the

planning and construction of new synchrotrons facilities. However, a cooperative exchange agreement has been established among ESRF, APS,

and SPring-8 to address common problems of

instrument development. These superbright light

sources require sophisticated optical components,

extremely tight mechanical tolerances, and novel

detector systems.113 The technical expertise for

l09As an example of the demand for x-ray beamtime, the National Synchrotron Light Source at Brookhaven National Laboratory is used on

an annual basis by more than 2,000 scientists representing 350 institutions, including researchers from more than 50 corporations.

ll0Each of these so-called "third-generation" synchrotron facilities will complement each other by providing a different range of synchrotron radiation frequencies and intensities. They each rely on “insertion devices” to produce x-rays of unprecedented brilliance. Insertion devices consist of alternating magnetic fields along the straight sections of the synchrotron ring. These alternating magnetic fields cause charged

particles (electrons or positrons) to deviate in their trajectory giving off x-rays in the process. Insertion devices allow synchrotron radiation to be

tuned over abroad spectrum of wavelengths from the infrared to hard x-rays.

111"Switching On a Brilliant Light," Science, vol. 267, Mar, 21, 1995, pp.. 1904-1906.

ll2The $800 million figure is a total project cost, which includes related R&D as well sd construction costs. Another synchrotron facility

recently completed in the United States is the Advanced Light Source (ALS) at the Lawrence Berkeley National Laboratory. The ALS is a lower

energy light source that provides the world’s brightest light in the ultraviolet and soft x-ray regions of the light spectrum. The ALS complements

the hard x-ray capability of the APS. It is being used for basic materials science studies, the fabrication of microstructures, and structural

biology.

113Organization for Economic Cooperation and Development, see footnote 86.
92 | International Partnerships in Large Science Projects

these areas is found in many different countries

and many advances in x-ray instrumentation have

resulted from multilateral collaboration. The

coordination agreement among the three new synchrotron facilities will no doubt enhance the networks of cooperation that have developed in

recent years.

Like neutron sources, synchrotron light

sources essentially serve as vehicles for small science. Because of the wide range of uses for synchrotron radiation—in particular, its role in the

development of new materials, processes, and

products—there has been a strong imperative for

the United States and other countries to build national facilities. Having multiple facilities ensures

that demands for beam time can be met and, perhaps more importantly, provides a means for competition and thus greater innovation. However, as

the technology advances and the costs of

constructing new facilities increase, greater attention is likely to be paid to the possibility of building international facilities.
Opportunities

and Challenges

of International

Collaboration

revious chapters of this study have analyzed U.S. science

goals in an international context and examined U.S. collaboration in several scientific disciplines. Although experience has demonstrated that collaboration offers distinct

advantages, it can also have drawbacks. The decision about

whether to collaborate depends on an assessment of the relative

benefits and disadvantages of a particular undertaking. The present chapter identifies the main benefits from, and impediments to,

collaboration. It offers policymakers a framework for analyzing

the appropriateness of future collaborative opportunities.

BENEFITS OF COLLABORATION

Increased U.S. participation in international collaborative research and development (R&D) ventures could offer a variety of

economic, technical, political, and institutional benefits. Although these benefits may not be realizable in every case, collaboration does offer a range of potential opportunities that may

justify U.S. participation in future multilateral science efforts.

These opportunities include:

 reducing net U.S. costs,

 enhancing scientific capabilities,

 enhancing the stability of science goals and funding,

 supporting U.S. foreign policy, and

 addressing global science and technology issues.

These different categories are analyzed below.

❚ Reducing Net U.S. Costs

In government agencies and among science policy officials, saving money is consistently cited as a principal motive for undertak- | 93
94 | International Partnerships in Large Science Projects

ing international collaboration in large science

projects. Two financial trends have made international collaboration more attractive to both scientists and policymakers. First, the cost of big

science has risen sharply, making it increasingly

difficult for individual countries to undertake such

projects alone. In the United States, megaprojects

account for about 10 percent of the federal (defense and nondefense) R&D budget.1

Second, aggregate demands on national science and technology (S&T) budgets have also

grown dramatically, outpacing government appropriations for basic science research. This has

been the result of increases in the amount of R&D

being conducted and in the cost of the projects

(large or small) themselves. For example, since

1958, the average expenditures per U.S. scientific

investigator, expressed in constant dollars, have

tripled.2 The ability of governments to meet these

demands is being limited by the growing budget

pressures of the 1990s. These factors have

prompted policymakers to search for alternative,

less expensive means of achieving S&T goals,

particularly in large, high-cost projects.

One way to reduce the cost of achieving national science goals may be to undertake big science

on an internationally collaborative basis. Although the international framework may raise total project costs, it is designed to lower the net cost

to each country by distributing project tasks and

expenses among a group of partners or by pooling

international resources in a single project. In some

cases, however, cost savings for individual countries may not be as great as expected, because participation in international ventures still requires

that investments be made in national programs.

Without such investments, it may not be possible

for individual countries to fully benefit from the

advances coming from international projects.3

In addition to lowering project costs for individual countries, international partnerships on

large science projects may also maximize the effectiveness of each dollar spent on research. By

cooperating in big science endeavors, countries

can coordinate construction and optimize the utilization of large, capital-intensive, special-purpose facilities. By avoiding duplication of these

major facilities, nations can also free funds for

other research or for nonscience uses.

International collaboration also provides a

means by which countries can share the financial

and technical risks of R&D projects. This is particularly important in big science projects, where

the risks are often quite high. For example, the

possibility of catastrophic failure of a space

launch vehicle or its payload brings high levels of

risk to space-related science. And although the

claims of the National Aeronautics and Space Administration (NASA) that Russian participation in

the space station will save the United States

money have been discounted by General Accounting Office analysis,4 it does appear that the addition of Russian equipment and the Russians’

considerable expertise in long-duration human

space flight will reduce the immense technical and

1These figures are based on a selection of large projects tracked by the Congressional Research Service. See Genevieve J. Knezo, Major

Science and Technology Programs: Megaprojects and Presidential Initiatives, Trends Through FY 1996, CRS Report for Congress (Washington, DC: Congressional Research Service, Mar. 27, 1995).

2Increased R&D spending can be attributed to a growing number of qualified scientists (relative to the general population) able to perform

research, pressure on individual investigators to produce more research, and the increasing complexity of equipment and facilities. See U.S.

Congress, Office of Technology Assessment, Federally Funded Research: Decisions for a Decade, OTA-SET-490 (Washington, DC: U.S.

Government Printing Office, 1991), p. 199.

3It is important to note, however, that there have been no studies quantifying the net cost savings to individual countries from international

collaboration or the value added by international collaboration of scientists. Moreover, as will be discussed below, international partnerships

may increase total project costs.

4See U. S. General Accounting Office, Space Station: Update on the Impact of the Expanded Russian Role (Washington, DC: U.S. Government Printing Office, July 1994).
Chapter 4 Opportunities and Challenges of International Collaboration | 95

financial risks inherent in the U.S. program. According to NASA’s space station business manager, the addition of Russian hardware has “reduced

risk in many areas of the program.”5

The financial savings offered by international

collaboration enable countries to maintain the

breadth of their national programs. For example,

given NASA’s substantial budget resources, the

agency could, on its own, completely fund virtually any single one of the large international space

research projects if they were carried out sequentially. However, doing so would severely limit the

number of projects in which NASA is involved

and would restrict the scope of U.S. scientific activities in space. By pursuing at least some projects

collaboratively, NASA officials note that the

agency has been able to spread its budget over a

greater number of projects simultaneously, thereby diversifying its activities and increasing the net

scientific yield of its budget. This has also enabled

NASA to keep several research disciplines alive

during times of budget stringency. For example,

neither Cassini-Huygens (a mission of NASA and

the European Space Agency (ESA) to Saturn) nor

Topex-Poseidon (a U.S.-French oceanographic

research satellite program) would have been possible without international participation. NASA

alone could not have financed these missions simultaneously. Spacelab, the pressurized research

module built for the space shuttle by ESA, has significantly increased the shuttle’s research capacity. Given the severe funding pressures on the

shuttle program, NASA probably would have

been unable to fund Spacelab’s full development

cost.

Finally, some project managers voice the perception that Congress prefers that large science

projects include international collaboration. For

example, although NASA plans originally called

for the United States to finance and build the core

space station, agency executives also sought international collaboration from the beginning of

the project, in part, to meet anticipated congressional requirements that some costs be shared

with international partners. Planners of the Superconducting Super Collider (SSC) designed an exclusively national project. However, when cost

overruns multiplied, the project was heavily criticized in Congress for failing to attract international support. Efforts to obtain foreign support failed

in large part because they were undertaken too

late.6 In another case, Congress refused an initial

National Science Foundation (NSF) proposal to

fully fund the $176 million Gemini project to

build two new eight-meter telescopes. Instead,

Congress authorized only half of the amount requested and instructed NSF to internationalize the

project and obtain the remaining funding from the

partners. In this way, NSF successfully internationalized the venture from the beginning and the

project is now proceeding on schedule. (See box

4-1.)

❚ Enhancing Scientific Capabilities

Despite the importance of reducing net costs, the

desire to save money generally does not by itself

motivate international collaboration. Another important reason for pursuing international cooperative research is “to do the best science.” Whereas

policymakers may emphasize the financial advantages of partnerships, scientists and other advocates of increased international collaboration

stress as their primary motive the immense technical advantages of working cooperatively. Enhancement of scientific capabilities ranks near the

5Jeffrey M. Lenorovitz, “So Much Hardware, So Many Nations,” Aviation Week & Space Technology, vol. 140, No. 14, Apr. 4, 1994, p. 43.

6For a discussion of these issues, see chapter 3. See also John M. Deutch, “A Supercollision of Interests,” Technology Review, vol. 95, No. 8,

November/December 1992, p. 66; and Bob Johnstone, “Superpowers Collide,” Far Eastern Economic Review, vol. 155, No. 3, Jan. 23, 1992,

p. 66.
96 International Partnerships in Large Science Projects

Ground-based telescopes are essential components of astronomical research. Over the past 30

years, large ground-based optical/infrared telescopes have played a key role in advancing scientific

understanding of the cosmos. Further advances in the field of astronomy are expected with the

construction of a new generation of even larger telescopes, including the University of California/Caltech twin 10-meter Keck telescopes, the European Southern Observatory’s Very Large Telescope (VLT)

project, and the Gemini Project,

The Gemini Project is a U, S.-led international partnership to build, design, and operate two

8-meter telescopes. One of the telescopes will be based at Mauna Kea, Hawaii, and the other on Cerro

Pachon, in northern Chile, Initially, the project was envisioned as a purely U.S. effort. However, in 1991

Congress capped U.S. spending on the project at $88 million and directed that the U.S. contribution not

exceed 50 percent of the project’s total cost. As a result, Gemini was internationalized.

The United Kingdom, Canada, Chile, Argentina, and Brazil are project partners Under the terms

of the partnership, outlined m the Gemini Agreement, the United States will provide half of the funding

for the $176 million project, The United Kingdom will pay 25 percent of the project costs; Canada, 15

percent; and Chile, 5 percent. Argentina and Brazil will contribute 2,5 percent each. Estimated annual

operating costs for both telescopes are $12 million, of which the United States will pay half.

The National Science Foundation acts as the executive agency for the partnership, and the

Association of Universities for Research in Astronomy (AURA), Inc. manages the construction of the

telescopes, AURA IS a consortium of 20 universities, which also manages 3 major National Optical Astronomy Observatories facilities.

The Gemini telescopes are designed to operate in the optical and infrared ranges and provide

complete coverage of both the Northern and Southern Hemispheres, with spatial resolution better than

the Hubble Space Telescope. Construction of the Hawaii telescope began in October 1994, with “first

light” expected in 1998. The second telescope will be constructed by 2000.

top of NASA’s policies governing international entists abreast of cutting-edge work being concollaboration, 7 and is an integral part of U.S.

cooperative research programs in fusion.

In an ideal international project, researchers

take advantage of each country’s strengths to ensure that the project is on the cutting-edge of science, employs the very latest in technologies, and

incorporates the broadest range of technical capabilities. Science policy analysts contend that the

international situation has changed and that the

United States is no longer dominant in many

fields of science and technology. In this context,

collaboration is often necessary to keep U.S. sciducted abroad. In some fields, U.S. scientists may

remain at the cutting-edge only by conducting research internationally. As one observer has noted:

“We need to collaborate if we are to compete, paradoxical as it may sound.”8

In addition, the diversity of individuals and research styles encompassed by collaborative ventures may stimulate creativity and facilitate

discovery. As noted by a Fusion Policy Advisory

Committee report, in international collaborative

work “the synergistic effects of sharing knowl7

See discussion of NASA guidelines in chapter 3. See also National Security Council, “National Space policy,” National Space Policy Directive 1, Nov. 2, 1989.

8

Eugene B. Skolnikoff, personal communication, Apr. 18, 1995.
Chapter 4 Opportunities and Challenges of International Collaboration 97

The project was initially troubled by a number of factors, which illustrate some of the challenges

of international collaboration. The most serious challenge was sustaining partner commitments. For example, Canada reduced its initial funding commitment from 25 percent to 15 percent. Further uncertainty over the Canadian budget caused delays in signing the agreement. Increased management complexity has affected the project, too. Project managers reported that formulating an acceptable collaborative agreement and standardizing different fiscal policies and accounting practices were difficult

tasks. For example, different dates for fiscal years complicate budgeting. In addition, foreign laboratories employed accounting procedures that were inconsistent with U.S. government rules,

Disagreements also arose about the mirror technology. The astronomy community was divided

over whether the mirrors should be ultra-low expansion glass menisci or borosilicate honeycombs. The

borosilicate honeycomb mirror was developed by the University of Arizona’s Steward Observatory Mirror Laboratory, as part of a 10-year, $24 million project, about 50 percent of which is publicly funded. In

1992, the decision was made to use the meniscus mirror, which will be made by Corning, Inc. The

Gemini meniscus mirror is similar to those being produced by Corning for the Japanese Subaru telescope and by Scott Glaswerke (a German firm) for the VLT. The Corning mirror was chosen for its lesser

cost and, because the same technology is being proven in these other large telescopes, lowering technical risk, Some astronomers voiced strong disagreement with the decision, based on technical

grounds, but these objections were laid to rest after the Preliminary Design Review.

Despite the project’s financial, administrative, and technical challenges, Gemini is a good example of the benefits of collaboration and how challenges can be overcome. In this project, partners are

collaborating to construct cutting-edge facilities that no single partner was willing to build on its own.

Even in the case of the United States—the project’s largest contributor—the $88 million cap on spending would have been insufficient to build even one of the telescopes as a national facility. ’ But as part of

the international collaboration, U.S. astronomers will have access to two 8-meter telescopes that will

help keep them competitive with European and Japanese investigators.

1 Economies of scale make it possible to build two telescopes for $176 million. Building just one telescope would cost $106 million

SOURCE: Leif J Robinson and Jack Murray, “The Gemini Project: Twins in Trouble?” Sky & Telescope, voI 85, No 5, May 1993, p

29; and National Science Foundation, personal communication, May 1995

edge and trained personnel” can be quite strong. 9

scientists can widen their sphere of access to re

By facilitating the use of the most advanced

technologies, promoting consideration of the fullest range of technical ideas, and creating new research dynamics, international projects can also

reduce the risks inherent in R&D projects.

In addition to the technical benefits that accrue

to the project as a whole, international collaboration can benefit U.S. national R&D programs. By

participating in international partnerships, U.S.

search data from projects in which they play only

a contributing role. By enhancing the capabilities

of U.S. science, international cooperative research also attracts the brightest American and

foreign students to careers in scientific research in

the United States. Although many students

eventually return to their native countries to build

stronger (and competitive) research programs, the

continuing attraction of foreign researchers en9U.S. Department of Energy, Fusion Policy Advisory Committee, “Report of the Technical Panel on Magnetic Fusion of the Energy Research Advisory Board, Final Report,” DOE 1S-0081, September 1990, p. 15.
98 International Partnerships in Large Science Projects

The ITER San Diego Joint Work Site operations host political

and scientific Ieaders in an unparalleled in international

collaborative effort.

riches high-energy physics, fusion, and spacerelated science research in the United States.

❚ Enhancing Stability of Science

Goals and Funding

From the standpoint of scientists and partner nations, one of the most serious problems for U.S.

science policy and research projects in recent

years has been the uncertainty of long-term funding. All science projects-large and small, domestic and international---compete for funds in

the annual congressional appropriations process.

In the scientific community, this has produced uncertainty about the stability of project funding and

the U.S. commitment to international collaboration. In addition, several large projects have experienced extensive mid-course revisions to meet

reduced budget allocations (e.g., the space station,

the Earth Observing System (EOS), and the fusion

research program). A few projects already under

way have been canceled (e.g., the International

Solar Polar Mission and the SSC). These funding

reductions and cancellations have resulted from a

variety of causes, including inadequate project

planning, unrealistically low initial cost estimates

by scientists and project managers, unforeseen

technical difficulties, severe budget pressures,

and changes in administration policies.

However, researchers also express strong dissatisfaction about what they perceive as uncertain

and shifting federal funding policies, as well as the

need to rejustify finding for ongoing projects

each year. This has been an especially difficult

problem for megaprojects, which require longterm commitment to large outlays for capital and

operational costs. In conversations with the Office

of Technology Assessment (OTA), some U.S. scientists working on large, long-term projects have

emphasized their desire to obtain-at best-full

multiyear government funding. Short of this, they

have asked that other mechanisms be sought to increase the certainty of continuing U.S. government support for science projects.

Some scientists have suggested that placing

megascience projects in international collaborative contexts may provide the increased stability

desired. Although this motivation is not often discussed explicitly, U.S. scientists who support increased international collaboration may be doing

so at least partly because of their perception that

Congress would be less likely to reduce funding

for or cancel an international project than a purely

domestic one. As noted in recent congressional

testimony, “International projects offer many significant advantages, among which are. . . candidly . . . making it difficult to back out of a project

once begun.”10 This view is fueled both by perceptions of congressional priorities and by experience with past projects. Both scientists and

science policy analysts have voiced tie strong perception that Congress maybe reluctant to reduce

or discontinue funding for international projects if

formal intergovernmental agreements have been

1 0Statement of Norman R. Augustine, Chairman and Chief Executive Officer, Martin Marietta Corp., Will Restructuring NASA Improve Its

Performance? hearing before the Subcommittee on Science, Technology and Space, Committee on Commerce, United States Senate, Nov. 16,

1993, Serial No. 103-4O6, p. 13; and U.S.-CREST,Center for Research and Education on Strategy and Technology, Partners in Space---International Cooperation in Space: Strategies for the New Century (Arlington, VA: May 1993), p. 24.
Chapter 4 Opportunities and Challenges of International Collaboration | 99

signed, because of the foreign policy implications

of such modifications and impacts on other collaborations.11

There is evidence that in some cases international cooperation has been sought at least partially to bolster project stability. In an analysis of

NASA’s motivations for seeking international

collaboration in the space station project, it was

noted that “NASA is hoping to use the ‘international commitment’ aspect of the Space Station to

protect it from devastating domestic budget

cuts.”12 Although the commitments of Europe

and Japan did not protect the program from major

downsizings in the late 1980s and early 1990s, the

recent addition of Russia may have saved the

space station from cancellation. Before Russian

involvement, the U.S.-ESA-Japan project had escaped termination in the House of Representatives

by only one vote in 1993. However, in 1994, after

Russia had been brought into the project—partly

in support of high-priority foreign policy objectives—the House approved funding for the station

by a much wider margin. Administration officials

and House members attributed this wider margin

of support in part to the station’s increased importance for U.S. foreign policy goals.13

It should be noted that there is no evidence that

a major science project has been pursued on an international collaborative basis solely to bolster its

funding stability. However, the perception that inclusion of an international component enhances a

large science project’s political stability may contribute to the decision to seek such a collaboration.14

❚ Supporting U.S. Foreign Policy

As discussed in chapter 3, the goals of U.S. foreign policy include enhancing national security,

decreasing international tensions, strengthening

U.S. alliances and friendships, and increasing

cross-cultural understanding. U.S. cooperation

with other countries in areas of mutual interest, including scientific research, has long been an important tool in support of these foreign policy

objectives. Joint scientific research pays dividends not only in scientific discovery, but also in

strengthening bonds of friendship with our allies

and establishing levels of trust with our rivals.

The United States has been most active in cooperating with Canada, Western European allies, and

Japan in a wide spectrum of scientific research.

These ties helped build and maintain allied relationships during the Cold War. Collaboration occurred in areas of both civilian and defense-related

research.

During this period, the United States conducted

limited cooperative efforts with the Soviet Union

in fields such as space exploration and fusion.

This joint research helped decrease tensions and

increase cross-cultural understanding during the

Cold War. In fact, analysts have contended that the

political significance of the best known collaboration, the Apollo-Soyuz Test Project, far exceeded

11For example, commenting on possible cuts in the requested congressional appropriation for the Gemini telescope project for fiscal year

1993, Professor Bob Bless of the University of Wisconsin noted: “NSF has assured us that they consider the project to be very important, and the

fact that it’s an international effort gives it a high visibility.” Jeffrey Mervis, “Gemini Telescope Project Shifts into High Gear,” Nature, vol. 357,

No. 6378, June 11, 1992, p. 430.

12Joan Johnson-Freese, Changing Patterns of International Cooperation in Space (Malabar, FL: Orbit Book Co., 1990), p. 91.

13According to Representative Dick Zimmer, who sponsored a measure to terminate station funding, the cooperation agreement with Russia “created considerably more support for the program on the Democratic . . . [and] Republican side.” See Phil Kuntz and Jeffrey L. Katz,

“Space Station Bounces Back with Strong House Vote,” Congressional Quarterly Weekly Report, vol. 52, No. 26, July 2, 1994, p. 1803.

14OTA interviews with Japanese science officials indicated that such a perception does exist among scientists and policy planners in Japan.
100 | International Partnerships in Large Science Projects

the scientific and technical dividends that it produced. The symbolism of the two nations cooperating in a space linkup was a graphic illustration

of the policy of detente, perhaps more powerful

and important than the knowledge gained about

space rendezvous operations.15

Since the end of the Cold War, joint undertakings have continued to be important to the maintenance of ties with longstanding U.S. allies.

Perhaps more significantly, however, the United

States has strengthened and expanded ties with its

former Eastern bloc rivals. These new collaborations are important for establishing friendships

with former enemies and enhancing U.S. national

security. For former Soviet nations such as Russia, collaboration with U.S. scientists represents a

way to sustain scientists, institutes, and research

during a time of great economic stress, when previously lavish state support for the sciences has almost dried up. Collaborative work between

Western and Eastern scientists also builds relationships of good will among individuals, institutes, and governments.

A longstanding example of this is the international fusion research program. Since the late

1950s, U.S., European, and Soviet fusion researchers have been engaged in productive scientific exchanges and cooperation under formal

U.S.-Soviet agreements and under the auspices of

the International Atomic Energy Agency. Soviet

researchers developed the tokamak16 confinement concept and shared their successful results

with their peers in the United States and Europe.

This information sharing quickly made the tokamak the leading magnetic confinement concept in

all national programs.17 The Russian Federation

has succeeded the former Soviet Union as one of

four partners in the International Thermonuclear

Experimental Reactor (ITER). The ITER collaboration was launched by discussions between President Reagan and General Secretary Gorbachev at

the 1985 Geneva summit.

Collaborative projects in support of science in

the former Soviet Union are also important from

the standpoint of U.S. national security. By engaging scientists and institutions formerly dedicated

to military research in civilian projects with Western partners, the United States may support defense conversion and prevent scientists from

selling their expertise to hostile countries. The

United States has also used science collaboration

as an incentive to former Soviet states to adhere to

nonproliferation agreements. For example, the

U.S. invitation to Russia to participate in the space

station was conditioned on Russia’s not violating

the Missile Technology Control Regime by a proposed sale of cryogenic rocket engines to India.

Finally, U.S. science policy has also included

collaboration with and training of scientists from

developing countries, both during and after the

end of the Cold War. As an illustration, large U.S.

facilities, such as the Fermi National Accelerator

Laboratory, have involved developing-country

scientists in a variety of projects. More importantly, this scientific cooperation has reinforced U.S.

foreign aid and development policies. In areas

such as environmental monitoring, collaboration

with scientists from the developing world has

been essential to gathering data on global ecosystem behavior and establishing international policies to address global environmental problems.

❚ Addressing Global Issues

The final motive for pursuing international partnerships derives from the changing nature of the

world science agenda. In the past, the United

15Johnson-Freese, see footnote 12, pp. 31-34; and U.S. Congress, Office of Technology Assessment, International Cooperation and Competition in Civilian Space Activities, OTA-ISC-239 (Washington, DC: U.S. Government Printing Office, July 1985), p. 377.

16”Tokamak” is a Russian acronym for TOroidal’naia KAMera s AKsial’nym magnitnym polem (toroidal chamber with axial magnetic

field).

17For a description, see U.S. Congress, Office of Technology Assessment, Starpower: The U.S. and the International Quest for Fusion Energy, OTA-E-338 (Washington, DC: U.S. Government Printing Office, October 1987), p. 163.
Chapter 4 Opportunities and Challenges of International Collaboration | 101

States has focused most of its resources on noncollaborative national research programs, in part

because the research issues confronting U.S. scientists were national in scale or did not necessitate

the collaboration of other countries. However, the

issues confronting U.S. scientists (in both large

and small projects) are becoming increasingly

global in nature. This is especially true in environmental research, where scientists are embarking

on complex, long-term studies of the global ecosystem in connection with challenges presented

by possible global climate change and ozone

depletion.

Although some U.S. environmental R&D will

continue to require only a domestic perspective,

much new work will necessitate cooperation with

many countries on land and sea, in the air, and in

space. In many cases, ecological interdependence

makes it impossible to study U.S. environmental

problems in isolation from their global environmental context. The United States is taking a leading role in one of the most ambitious of these

collaborations, the EOS, a multibillion dollar network of satellites to study Earth’s ecosystems.

CHALLENGES OF COLLABORATION

Despite the many potential benefits deriving from

collaborative research, there are also potential

downsides associated with almost all of these opportunities. Such disincentives to collaboration

can in some cases be quite serious. For example,

although collaboration may reduce the net cost of

research to each participating nation, it may increase total project costs.18 In many cases, this

cost escalation may not be a significant issue.

However, in other circumstances, collaboration

may result in the promotion of projects so financially disadvantageous that they would not be undertaken by individual countries acting alone.

There are additional deterrents to collaboration. Although international cooperation may enhance a project’s scientific capabilities, it may

also transfer critical knowledge and skills to other

nations, thus enabling them to compete more effectively with the United States in both science

and commerce. Moreover, although pursuing research through international collaboration could

provide increased stability for large projects, this

framework may also enforce an organizational

and investigative rigidity that is harmful to overall

research goals.

Finally, although scientific cooperation can in

some cases support foreign policy, there is a risk

that international scientific collaborations driven

by foreign policy goals might act to the detriment

of science. Politically motivated collaborations

may be more likely to produce scientifically inappropriate or politically unstable projects. This has

been one of the strongest criticisms of Russian

participation in the space station, where analysts

and policymakers have noted that the risks posed

by that country’s political instability may outweigh the benefits gained from its considerable

technical expertise.19 These potential downsides

are listed in table 4-1.

They represent only a partial list of the disincentives to international cooperation in scientific

research. Other factors that might preclude a nation from pursuing collaboration include:

 the loss of national leadership, prestige, and

project control;

 the need for reliable mechanisms to guarantee

long-term commitment to a project;

 the difficulty of distributing costs and benefits

in an equitable manner;

 transfer of leading national technologies;

 sociocultural differences; and

 increased management complexity.

18However, just as there have been no studies documenting savings from international collaboration, there is no research quantifying increased costs from cooperative ventures. Moreover, analysts have suggested that an accurate accounting of possible additional costs would

have to discount for the value added by bringing together top scientists from different countries for work on the project.

19See, for example, Jeanne Ponessa, “Wariness Over Russia’s Role,” Congressional Quarterly, May 7, 1994, p. 1114.
102 International Partnerships in Large Science Projects

Opportunity Downside

Reduce net U.S. costs. Increase total project costs.

Enhance U.S. scientific capabilities, Enhance competitive capabilities of U.S. partners.

Enhance stability of science goals and funding. Increase rigidity of goals and funding.

Maintain U.S. science leadership. Dilute U.S. scientific leadership

Support U.S. foreign policy. Distort or undermine science because of political goals.

SOURCE Office of Technology Assessment, 1995

❚ Loss of National Leadership,

Prestige, and Project Control

In the words of one observer: “Very large facilities

are symbols of power. Consequently, individual

countries will only agree to cooperate in

constructing them if they have no other alternative.” 20 Although this somewhat overstates the

point and discounts other reasons for collaborative undertakings, large science projects are closely related to feelings of national leadership and

prestige. While the desire to maintain U.S. scientific leadership can motivate collaboration in

some cases, it is usually a much stronger disincentive to cooperate with other nations in large science ventures. The goal of establishing and

maintaining leadership in scientific R&D is deeply embedded in the culture of U.S. science; it is reinforced by the system of financial and

intellectual incentives that govern the activities of

U.S. scientists and research institutions. Among

the most important of these incentives are the criteria for awarding research grants and academic

tenure, competitive salaries for top research scientists, and review criteria for publications.21

This culture can act as an obstacle to international collaboration. Since the highest rewards

(e.g., the Nobel Prize) are generally based on individual achievement, many U.S. scientists prefer to

conduct research independently. They are often

very reluctant to participate in joint projects—

domestically as well as internationally-in which

rewards and recognition are shared. Even when

budgets are severely constricted and research

goals can be achieved at lower cost through international collaboration, U.S. scientists have

sometimes pressed for strictly national research

programs. For example, U.S. scientists, supported

by NSF funds, are conducting gravitational wave

experiments through the Laser Interferometer

Gravitational Wave Observatory, completely independent of parallel research efforts in Europe.

In addition, U.S. astronomers initially advocated

that the two Gemini telescopes be strictly national

projects. As noted above, foreign partners were

sought only when Congress denied funding for

strictly national telescopes and mandated international collaboration. Many attribute termination

of the SSC—perhaps the most prominent failure

of a big science project—partly to physicists pursuing a strictly national project too long, despite

the financial advantages of building such an expensive project collaboratively. In this case, to researchers, the competition for scientific discovery

outweighed the potential for saving public funds.

When U.S. scientists and institutions do participate in collaborations, the “culture of national

leadership” may strongly influence the character

of these cooperative ventures. Then too, the desire

to maintain national leadership is often accompanied by the desire to maintain project control.

20Francoise Praderie, project Head, OECD Megascience Forum, Megascience and Its Background (Paris, France: Organization for Economic Cooperation and Development, 1993), p. 35.

21 Although foreign scientists are governed by similar incentive systems that encourage individual achievement, they are subject to often

stronger countervailing incentives (e.g., limitations on national funding abilities) to collaborate with other scientists both at home and abroad.
Chapter 4 Opportunities and Challenges of lnternational Collaboration 1103

For example, NASA has been the U.S. agency

most actively involved in international collaboration and has employed an explicit set of roles to

govern its collaborative efforts. (See chapter 3,

box 3-3.) At the heart of NASA’s approach to collaboration is a preference for maintaining control

over critical paths.22 This policy was designed to

ensure that the United States minimizes technical

risk and maintains both leadership and project

control in its collaborative space efforts. 23 However, this approach has also meant that most U.S.

space partnerships have been compartmentalized,

value-added projects, rather than integrated collaborative work.

This approach has worked relatively well at

NASA, where the building of instruments for

scientific activities in space is conducive to compartmentalization and where the United States

continues to enjoy a very strong lead in scientific

and technical capabilities, as well as higher levels

of funding. However, it may not be easily applicable to other scientific areas, where the research enterprise is more integrated and where other nations

have comparable scientific and technical capabilities.

As their domestic science programs grow more

sophisticated and competitive, potential partners

in Western Europe and Japan are demanding more

substantive involvement in collaborative research

and a share of at least some leadership roles. In

fact, Europe’s two principal collaborative science

organizations, the European Laboratory for Particle Physics (CERN) and ESA, were established

explicitly to bridge the technical gap that emerged

between Europe and the United States in the postWorld War II era and to place Europe in a position

Mock-up of the CERN tunnel that will be the home of the

large Hadron Collider.

to cooperate with the United States from a position of strength, as equal partners. In this, ESA

and CERN have been largely successful. They

have stopped the “brain drain” of European scientists to the United States, and they have developed

high-energy physics facilities, telescopes, and

space systems at least comparable and, in some

cases, superior to those of the United States.24

Maintaining scientfic leadership and project

control may also conflict with a primary motive

for undertaking international collaboration-saving money. As other countries contribute a greater

share of project funding, they will demand greater

control. Even when the United States funds the

bulk of a collaboration, partners are unlikely to

cede complete discretion in project management.

Writing about the lessons learned from the space

station experience thus far, space policy analysts

at NASA and the International Space University

22NASA policies on cricical-path technologies are discussed in chapter 3. Prior to Russian participation in the Space Station, the Canadian

robot arm for the space shuttle was the only exception to these policies. However, NASA maintained ultimate control overcritical pathways by

stipulating in the contract for the robot arm that the Canadiand provide full access to all production plans and materials should they not fulfill the

agreement.

23NASA has been able to establish collaborations under these guideline in part because the United States has usuallyprovided the bulk of

project funds.

24John Krige< "ESA and CERN as International Collaborative Science Organizations,’’ contractor report prepared for the Office of Technology Asscsstnent, January 1995, p. 1.
104 | International Partnerships in Large Science Projects

noted that although the space station partners

agreed from the beginning that the United States

would be the senior partner, “there was considerable discussion on the level of protection for the

minority partners in the preservation of management roles.”25

In contrast, the ITER project conceptual and

engineering design phases have been true quadripartite collaborations from the beginning. Each

partner has contributed one-quarter of the costs,

and decisions have been reached through consensus. The project is overseen by the ITER Council,

consisting of two representatives from each party.

Engineering design activities are being coordinated by a multinational central team that has been

tasking the respective national fusion programs to

provide supporting R&D and technology development. Except for a relatively modest amount of

funds transferred to support the Joint Central

Team administration, the ITER parties have met

their commitments through in-kind contributions

of personnel, services, and equipment. That structure may have to evolve if and when the project

moves into a construction phase to accommodate

the management demands of overseeing and directing a large ($8 billion to $10 billion) construction project.

Nevertheless, U.S. goals can create a basic conflict with collaboration. This conflict is related

less to money than to scientific leadership. To

structure successful partnerships, the United

States must provide adequate incentives for other

parties to collaborate. Yet U.S. desires to maintain

scientific leadership may undermine these efforts

and provide a substantial disincentive to collaboration. As one European science official commented to OTA, “Why should I, as Europe,

collaborate with the United States to maintain

[U.S.] leadership?”26

❚ The Need for Reliable Mechanisms

To Guarantee Long-Term

Project Commitment

One of the most often-cited impediments to future

international collaborations has been the difficulty of guaranteeing long-term commitments on the

part of all project partners. Countries are reluctant

to agree to expensive, long-duration research projects unless they are confident that their partners’

commitments are reliable. Once projects are under

way, uncertain or changing commitments can

complicate project planning, contracting, and

budgeting. Questions about the commitment of a

partner government can have a domino effect on

the other partners, making it more difficult for

them to raise money and sustain political commitment to the project at home. Lack of confidence in

the reliability of partners also makes it difficult to

establish the mutual trust necessary to do the best

science in the most efficient manner.

Perceptions that it is an unreliable or unpredictable partner have been a particular problem for the

United States. Yet these perceptions are based in

part on recollections of only a few cases in which

the United States has withdrawn from cooperative

science projects. The cases usually cited by Western European and Japanese partners are the U.S.

decision to withdraw from the Solvent Refined

Coal Demonstration Plant-II (SRC-II) and the Solar Polar project. SRC-II was a joint project of the

United States, Germany, and Japan to build a demonstration plant to produce liquid fuels from coal.

(See chapter 1, box 1-2.) The project, established

in 1980, was terminated by joint decision in 1981.

The Solar Polar Project is described in box 1-3.

Although these two cases occurred more than a

decade ago, they are remembered and are cited frequently by our European and Japanese partners to

25 Lynn F.H. Cline and George Van Reeth, “Space Station—An International Venture,” prepared for the Workshop on International Space

Cooperation: Learning from the Past, Planning for the Future, November 1992, p. 5.

26OTA Workshop on International Collaboration in Large Science Projects, Sept. 13, 1994.
Chapter 4 Opportunities and Challenges of International Collaboration | 105

bolster claims that U.S. commitments are unstable.

An even more prominent issue among U.S.

partners is the U.S. budget process, in which funding for all projects must be rejustified yearly. In

virtually all of OTA’s discussions with U.S. partners, foreign governments, and organizations, the

annual uncertainty over U.S. appropriations was

cited as among the most formidable challenges to

prospective and ongoing collaborations.27 It is

important to note that differences in budget processes contribute to foreign perceptions that the

U.S. process promotes instability. Our major partners have parliamentary systems in which the

combination of legislative and executive authority gives majority political parties greater power

to control the agenda and implement policy. For

partners accustomed to this system, the U.S. budget process seems to lead to greater uncertainty.

The U.S. budget process frequently creates tensions for collaborations already under way. In the

case of the space station, continuing struggles

over funding have increased tensions between the

United States and its partners. Even in less contentious cases where appropriations are virtually assured, U.S. partners report concern about what

they perceive as an annual process that calls U.S.

funding formally into question. Although international projects are rarely canceled in the yearly

budget process, the cancellation of domestic science projects such as the SSC has contributed to

uncertainty about the strength of funding for international projects as well.28

The annual budget process does allow flexibility in planning that European countries and Japan

lack. Having made multiyear commitments to science projects, these countries often find it difficult

to revise or terminate inefficient or nonperforming

projects.29 However, some partners see a contradiction between U.S. claims of world scientific

leadership and its annual budget process.

In contrast to instabilities in the U.S. funding

process, funding for science research in Europe—

by country or in multilateral organizations—has

generally been more stable. This increased stability cannot be attributed to different statutory procedures, such as multiyear appropriations for

science projects. Like the United States, European

countries generally appropriate science funds

yearly, as part of the annual budget process.

Instead, two other factors account for this increased stability. First, although these countries

and organizations generally do not provide multiyear appropriations, their planning processes,

both for research programs and individual large

science projects, are more extensive, which results in more realistic funding estimates and research time lines. Once governments commit to a

project—and this is generally a longer process

27 This perception is prominent in public discussion of international science projects as well. For example, commenting on the Gemini telescope project, Julie Lutz, Director of the National Science Foundation’s astronomy division, said “[I]t is harder for the United States than for

other countries to sustain a long-term scientific collaboration because the entire U.S. budget is reviewed annually by Congress.” Mervis, see

footnote 11, p. 430.

28 In an analysis of 30 selected projects, several of which were canceled, the Congressional Research Service notes that “One . . . tentative

conclusion is that significant technical, cost, political, foreign policy, and other events following an initial authorization and/or appropriation

may overshadow initial congressional support.” Sharp escalations in project cost or lower agency appropriations were an especially significant

cause of project terminations. See William C. Boesman, Big Science and Technology Projects: Analysis of 30 Selected U.S. Government Projects (Washington, DC: Congressional Research Service, Aug. 24, 1994), p. 7.

29 It should be noted that although individual countries lack flexibility, multinational European scientific organizations such as CERN, ESA,

and ESO have in recent years shown flexibility in canceling, reducing funding for, and restructuring projects.
106 | International Partnerships in Large Science Projects

than in the United States—funding and participation are virtually guaranteed.30 Second, almost all

basic science research in Europe contains a significant international component. This applies not

just to research conducted in multilateral organizations, but also to national research projects.

Given their extensive interdependence in science

research, stability of funding and adherence to international commitments are absolutely vital to

the viability of European national research programs. The strength of international commitment

in Europe has a nonscientific and historical component as well—the countries’ relatively small

size, close proximity, and closely interwoven

economies. Moreover, the European Union treaty

encourages joint research efforts among member

states. The consequences of breaking an international commitment would likely be much more

serious for a European country than they would be

for the United States.

Similar factors apply in Japan. Projects receive

approval only after undergoing a rigorous technical and financial evaluation that typically occurs

over a three- to five-year period. Although Japan

is generally slow to enter into commitments, once

having agreed to a project, it adheres strongly to

its commitments in part because of the desire to

maintain and foster good international relations.

However, participation in large international projects is usually not pursued by the Japanese unless

there is a sound scientific or strategic motivation.31

Nevertheless, growing budget constraints

within Europe may weaken multiyear funding

arrangements or commitments to collaborative

projects. Signs of strain are already showing within CERN, where Germany has lobbied successfully to reduce its yearly contribution and where the

future of the Large Hadron Collider (LHC) was

complicated by heated disputes over funding contributions. ESA itself has recently undergone dramatic budget reductions in its optional programs,

necessitating project cancellations. Disagreements about funding priorities have delayed approval and resulted in a downsizing of the

organization’s plan to build a pressurized laboratory and other compenents for the space station.

However, despite the concern among partner

nations that the United States can sometimes be an

unreliable or unpredictable partner, some question

whether the United States has actually paid a price

for being perceived as unreliable. Although this

perception has unquestionably complicated U.S.

negotiations in prospective collaborations, OTA

cannot identify a case in which efforts to collaborate or initiate a project have failed because of

questions about U.S. reliability. In fact, concerns

about U.S. reliability may be ameliorated by the

disproportionately large share the United States

has paid into some collaborations. Nevertheless,

future partnerships may have to be more formally

structured to address the concerns of potential

U.S. partners.

Finally, reliability is not related solely to the

ability to deliver promised funds. Reliability also

has a technical aspect—the ability to deliver properly designed and tested project components in a

timely manner. In a purely domestic project, oversight and project control may be much simpler

than in an international venture, where multiple

agencies and firms in various countries have technical responsibilities. If there are only a few items

30 European countries employ four- to five-year long-term planning processes for R&D decisions. Programs that have been approved at the

cabinet level in these countries are reviewed on a two-year basis and generally can be canceled only if feasibility studies have not been conclusive or if the country is under economic constraints. Moreover, “[T]he most striking difference between the United States and other democratic

countries is the action of Congress which can, more easily than anywhere else, shut down or create new programs without the agreement of the

Administration/White House. In other countries, such behavior for major programs could lead to a political crisis.” Center for Science, Trade

and Technology Policy, George Mason University, “Large Science Project Priorities in Selected Countries,” contractor report prepared for the

Office of Technology Assessment, January 1995, p. 13.

31For a detailed discussion of this process, see Kenneth Pechter, “Assessment of Japanese Attitudes Toward International Collaboration in

Big Science,” contractor report prepared for the Office of Technoloy Assessment, December 1994.
Chapter 4 Opportunities and Challenges of International Collaboration | 107

on critical paths or if critical technologies are distributed among a smaller group of countries and

firms, technical risks and concerns about the reliability of partners are reduced. However, the

greater the number of partners that have responsibility over items on critical project paths, the more

difficult it will be to ensure technical control.

NASA’s policies and preferences governing critical paths and project control are designed in part

to meet these concerns.

❚ Difficulty of Equitably Distributing

Costs and Benefits

Apportionment of funding contributions and contracts can also impede cooperation. Successful

collaboration requires convincing all international partners that project financing is structured fairly. Partners must also be satisfied with the policies

that determine how and where money is spent.

Distributing costs and benefits has been a continuing and difficult problem. The equitable allocation of costs and benefits has generally been a

more serious problem for collaborative science organizations, with pooled funding and contracting

operations, than for ad hoc collaborations in

which there is often no exchange of funds or contracts.

The United States has collaborated more often

using the latter arrangement and has placed heavy

reliance on “clean interface” collaborations with

no exchange of funds. This has reduced potential

problems over the distribution of project costs and

benefits. The Europeans, with their reliance on

joint research organizations, have dealt with the

problem more often and in greater depth. However, if the United States collaborates more actively

in the future, it too will have to grapple with the

issue of how to distribute project obligations and

benefits. The United States may face this in

awarding contracts and making the siting decision

on the ITER project. The issue has also arisen at

CERN over potential U.S. participation in the

LHC project. CERN has informed the Department

of Energy that U.S. physicists may be unable to

conduct research on the Large Hadron Collider if

the U.S. government does not contribute to the

capital costs of building the LHC.32 U.S. policymakers may therefore benefit from an assessment

of the challenges that Europeans have encountered in this area.

In practice, it has been easier to formulate systems for determining each country’s funding contribution than to apportion project contracts. ESA

and CERN employ formulas based on the gross

domestic product to determine each country’s

funding contribution. This system is designed to

ensure proportionality: each country contributes

funds relative to its resources. In ESA’s case, the

proportionality formula applies to the organization’s “mandatory” science programs. ESA allows countries to contribute additional funds to

“optional” projects in which they are especially

interested.

Yet even in this area, there has been substantial

difficulty in assessing and compensating for the

costs and benefits that may accrue to a country

hosting a science facility. Some organizations

spread their facilities among participating countries. In areas of ad hoc collaboration, there may

be informal agreements among governments

about which country is next “in line” to host a major facility. The benefits of hosting a facility may

also be factored into a country’s funding contribution to a facility or organization. In the case of the

European fusion community’s Joint European Torus (JET), Great Britain agreed to pay an additional 10 percent as its share of project costs in

exchange for hosting the facility. However, there

was recently sharp disagreement at CERN between Germany and Great Britain, on the one

hand, and France and Switzerland, on the other,

over how much the latter two countries should

32C. Llewellyn Smith, Director General of CERN, letter to U.S. Department of Energy Secretary Hazel O’Leary, Feb. 15, 1994.
108 | International Partnerships in Large Science Projects

contribute to the LHC in exchange for being its

hosts. Final approval for building the LHC was

held up while CERN members negotiated over

this issue.33

Ensuring some balance in the procurement of

goods and services has been even more difficult.

There is a fundamental tension between each

country’s desire to receive financial returns commensurate with its contribution and the need for

the project itself to contract work most efficiently

and effectively. ESA, for example, has attempted

to satisfy member demands for equity in contract

apportionment by instituting a system of “fair return” (often referred to as juste retour or, in ESA’s

case, “equitable geographic return”), whereby

each country receives a percentage of project contracts proportionate to its funding contribution,

both for mandatory and optional projects. Observers report that this system worked relatively well

in the past because ESA managers were allowed

to meet the fair-return requirement by calculating

contract distribution over several years and over

a series of projects. ESA managers report that this

gave them leeway to meet the distribution requirement and to place contracts where they were most

technically and financially appropriate.

However, others argue that fair return discourages competitiveness and efficiency, and may prevent organizations from contracting with the best

or most appropriate firms.34 Recent experience at

ESA may support this point. Although ESA’s system of fair return appeared to work well in the

past, political and budget pressures in member

countries in recent years have led to demands for

equitable returns on each project, reducing the

organization’s flexibility and possibly increasing

costs.35

To avoid this problem, which can affect even

the best functioning fair-return arrangements,

CERN until recently had no requirement to distribute contracts among partners. CERN was

mandated instead to place contracts where most

appropriate—technically, logistically, and financially. However, the following factors have resulted in pressure on CERN to enact some variant

of fair return as well: budgetary constraints among

member countries of CERN; the fact that hoststates France and Switzerland have consistently

won almost 60 percent of CERN contracts; and

the fact that about 8 percent of CERN’s annual

budget is spent outside its member states (more

than 5 percent is spent in the United States).

CERN now employs a relatively loose return coefficient of 80 percent and contracting rules that

keep prices of fair-return contracts close to the

lowest bid. These provisions allow much greater

flexibility than ESA has for placing contracts

where they are most technically and financially

advantageous.36

Fair return is an issue of contention not only because each country seeks to recoup its immediate

contribution to each project. Differences also arise

over the distribution of contracts because of the

possible commercial potential of the technologies

involved in developing megascience projects. For

example, contracts to develop superconducting

magnets for a collider or for Earth-observing

instruments on an orbiting vehicle may finance

new technologies with commercial implications

33In December 1994, the CERN Council approved the construction of a $2.3 billion Large Hadron Collider to be built in two stages. France

and Switzerland, who will host the facility, agreed to pay proportionally more than they have for previous CERN projects. If additional funding

is received from the United States and Japan, the LHC will likely be built in one stage and completed around 2004. If CERN is unable to secure

funding from these and other nonmember states, construction will be stretched out into a second phase, which will end in 2008. See Dennis F.

Cioffi, “CERN Reaches Consensus on Two-Stage LHC,” Physics Today, vol. 48, No. 2, February 1995, pp. 48-50.

34See, for example, “Will Europe be Lost in Space?” Nature, vol. 373, Feb. 16, 1995, p. 545.

35ESA increased its overall country-by-country fair return goal to 95 percent in 1993 and is trying to reach 96 percent by 1996, with a goal of

90 percent within each of its programs. Krige, see footnote 23, p. 4.

36Ibid.
Chapter 4 Opportunities and Challenges of International Collaboration | 109

far beyond the initial science-oriented project

goals. For this reason, not only are countries anxious to receive contracts for path-breaking

technologies, they are also reluctant to finance,

through their project contributions, contracts that

develop these technologies (and create jobs) elsewhere—in effect, financing foreign commercial

competitors.

Because of the differing commercial potential

of various technologies, distribution of contracts

has been a more important issue in some fields

than in others. European collaboration has worked

most smoothly when the science or technology

concerned is not of direct commercial importance.

For example, CERN’s success, its lack of a fair-return policy, and the absence of large national facilities in all member states except Germany reflect

European governments’ perception that high-energy physics is a field of research with little potential for practical application, at least in the short to

medium term. In space research, the situation is

different, as evidenced by the existence of several

independent European national space programs in

addition to ESA, by ESA’s industrial policy of fair

return, and by the demand, particularly from the

smaller or technologically less advanced member

states, to move even closer to 100-percent return

on their contributions.

Intellectual property issues also complicate

collaborative arrangements. In structuring a research venture, managers must decide how to acquire, use, and safeguard technologies that are

necessary to the project, but proprietary to a certain firm or country. Research projects must also

design intellectual property mechanisms for processes and products produced by the venture itself. These issues may be even more complex than

deciding where to assign contracts because they

require, additionally, mechanisms for dispute resolution.

Ironically, the most difficult benefit to assign

may be the least commercially important: where

to site a project. There are unquestionably many

financial benefits to be derived from hosting a major science facility, most of which come from

construction, operation, and maintenance contracts, as well as payrolls, that can give a significant boost to a local economy. Also, a major

science facility could attract new companies to an

area. However, rather than the benefits derived

from hosting the facility and its infrastructure,

contracts to produce path-breaking technologies

with commercial implications or spinoffs may actually be much more beneficial to a country’s

economy as a whole, helping to create entirely

new sectors of industry and employment. Thus,

for example, the United States might place a much

lower priority on hosting ITER than on maximizing opportunities to develop and produce the magnets, other reactor components, integration

systems, or advanced materials that could have

considerable commercial potential beyond fusion. In effect, the United States could use the siting decision as a bargaining chip to obtain

concessions for critical advanced technologies

and services.37

Nevertheless, siting remains an important issue

in collaboration because it is so closely related to

prestige—the national prestige of the country

hosting the project, as well as the status of a nation’s scientific community. Thus, decisions

about siting are a challenge to collaboration due to

questions of both national prestige and distribution of project benefits.

❚ Transfer of Leading National

Technologies

The potential for transfer of technologies that have

national security or commercial implications represents another impediment to collaboration.

With respect to scientific and commercial considerations, the challenges presented by technology

transfer are closely related to those posed by the

distribution of benefits and the maintenance of national leadership. Countries and firms are reluc37Even site-related contracts, such as construction and management services, need not accrue solely to the host country.
110 | International Partnerships in Large Science Projects

tant to participate in projects that may result in the

transfer to potential competitors of technologies

in which they hold a scientific or commercial advantage.

Countries with cutting-edge technologies essential to a project have used a variety of means to

protect their edge while participating in collaborative research. For example, a country can try to

safeguard its lead by compartmentalizing work in

collaborations or by stipulating project rules that

clearly spell out the ways in which the technology

may be used. NASA has employed this approach

through the rules described in box 3-3. When it is

impossible to safeguard a technology, a country

may still participate in joint research because it

derives other scientific or commercial benefits

that compensate for the costs of sharing its leading

technologies.38 For example, the United States

has developed considerable and unique expertise

in the design of superconducting magnets as an

outgrowth of the SSC program. By participating

in the LHC effort, this important expertise can be

utilized and sustained over the next decade. Not

sharing this expertise could hurt overall U.S. capabilities in hadron accelerator technologies, because U.S. physicists would not have access to a

machine (LHC) that is at the edge of the energy

frontier.

However, despite all precautions, technologies

may still be “leaked.” Moreover, when countries

sacrifice a lead in one technology for the sake of

access to other technologies or benefits, calculation of the relative tradeoffs is difficult and imprecise. Countries, institutions, or firms may also

choose to solve the potential technology transfer

problem by withholding their leading technology

and using less advanced technologies on a collaborative project.

The national security aspects of technology

transfer—the transfer of technologies with proven

or potential military applications—may be even

more formidable. It is difficult to proceed with

scientific collaborations that involve the transfer

of militarily relevant technology. The United

States has encountered serious obstacles in joint

government-level military-related research with

its allies.39 This type of technology transfer is out

of the question if the partner is a potential U.S. enemy or rival. Yet even when the United States is

willing to share these technologies with friends, it

may prove too difficult to design a collaborative

and regulatory framework that would prevent further transfer or proliferation of the technology or

technical capabilities.

❚ Sociocultural Differences

Although often given short shrift in policy-related

reviews of collaboration, sociocultural differences among scientists in an international research venture can pose obstacles to a successful

collaboration. These impediments range from the

obvious to the more subtle.

The first set of sociocultural obstacles involves

daily life-style changes. Of these, the most obvious is the difference in language. For scientists

working together in a single research venture,

clear communication is vital, not only in daily

scientific discourse, but also in establishing the

mutual trust and collegiality that can foster creative synergies. Other differences in life-style, including working habits, housing, and cuisines,

can also have negative effects on a scientist’s ability to feel relaxed, “at home,” and able to devote

maximum mental energy to the project.

38 In the private sector, IBM, Toshiba, and Siemens have decided to pool resources to develop the next-generation semiconductor DRAM

(dynamic random access memory) technologies. Each of the companies has developed leading-edge capabilities in semiconductor design and

fabrication. However, the financial and technical challenges associated with the 64-megabit and 256-megabit memory technologies compelled

these companies to share the risks and costs of development. Each is revealing important information to the other in order to make this effort

successful. In so doing, these companies are hoping to achieve synergies and new technical approaches that will reduce manufacturing costs.

39 See U.S. Congress, Office of Technology Assessment, Arming Our Allies: Cooperation and Competition in Defense Technology, OTAISC-449 (Washington, DC: U.S. Government Printing Offfice, May 1990).
Chapter 4 Opportunities and Challenges of International Collaboration | 111

The stress of living in a foreign culture can increase in direct proportion to the “distance” of that

culture from a scientist’s own. Thus, it may be easier for a Western scientist to adjust to life in another Western country than in an Asian country, and

vice versa. Furthermore, scientists from the countries of Western Europe, which are smaller than

the United States, as well as more closely interwoven geographically and culturally, share a long

history of collaboration in economics, politics,

and culture, as well as science. These scientists

often adapt more readily to life abroad than scientists from larger, more geographically isolated

countries. For example, some U.S. citizens have

a more difficult time adapting to life abroad because preparation for international living played a

much smaller role in their personal and professional upbringing than it did for their European

counterparts. 

Perhaps the most serious of these sociocultural

challenges—highlighted by international participants at OTA’s workshop on international collaboration—is the retention of cultural identity within

families, especially among children. Scientists

from the United States, Europe, and Japan noted

that the biggest problem they face while working

abroad is finding culturally appropriate educational services for their children. Whatever the

difficulties and rewards of foreign life for them as

adults, they place strong emphasis on being able

to educate their children in their home culture or

provide employment opportunities for spouses.

Officials at Fermilab, an institution with a

strong history of international cooperation, say

that to ensure a successful environment for collaboration, a host institution or country must invest

resources to address the needs of foreigners. These

include not only education, but also housing,

food, and other areas. Addressing these sociocultural issues can be an unanticipated expense in an

international partnership, in both large and small

science projects. Fermilab, for example, employs

someone full time to work exclusively on these

matters.

❚ Increased Management Complexity

Managing an international venture is a more challenging and complex enterprise than managing a

strictly national project. Increased management

complexity can manifest itself in several ways.

These include increased transaction costs, increased complexity of multinational decisionmaking at both the administrative and the

scientific levels, and in some cases, reduced financial scrutiny and accountability. All of these factors make international projects more costly than

purely national ones, in terms of both budgets and

management time. The factors that increase management complexity are reviewed below.

Transaction costs take many forms. These include the cost of constructing and maintaining

multiple, parallel, and geographically disparate

administrative structures on the national and international levels. International projects also involve higher expenses for certain overhead line

items, such as translation services and travel. Differences in equipment and standards may create

costly and confusing obstacles to joint research.

Moving and maintaining scientists abroad can be

extremely expensive, much more so than the cost

of maintaining the same scientists at home on exclusively national projects.

Transaction costs in international collaborations can be considerable, far beyond normal expenses for exclusively national projects. Critics of

international collaboration maintain that due to

these costs, international collaborative projects

are always more expensive (in the aggregate) than

national ones. However, it should be noted that

since these higher costs are spread among all participating countries, the net project cost to each

country is still likely to be substantially lower than

the cost of undertaking the project alone.

In addition to the transaction costs of collaboration, increased management complexity can be

reflected in complex, binding international agreements that reduce project flexibility (and serendipity) and increase the time required to reach
112 | International Partnerships in Large Science Projects

decisions collectively. For projects in which

policy and funding decisions require consensus or

the approval of several different countries, it can

be difficult to make decisions and change direction as needed in the course of the project. With

science projects that have important commercial

implications for their member states, policy decisions may require high-level meetings. For example, major policy decisions at ESA are made by

meetings of the ministers for space-related affairs

from all member states. At CERN, an organization with more limited commercial applications,

decisions seldom require such high-level meetings. Other aspects of increased management

complexity include boundaries to the movement

of people and materials across borders, problems

in obtaining work permits for spouses of scientists, and so forth.

More serious in its consequences for scientific

discovery is the greater difficulty in reaching consensus decisions. Although this type of consensus

may compel greater care in research before the

publication of new discoveries, it may also produce a conservatism that is counterproductive to

the basic mission of scientific discovery. Thus, innovation and individualism may be discouraged.

For example, some analysts have criticized

ITER’s planners for using a fairly conservative design in an effort to ensure that the ignition of fusion fuel can actually be achieved.40

In some cases, international projects are complicated by differences in management and accounting systems, which make it difficult to

evaluate the contributions and activities of each

member country or institution. U.S. public science institutions, which operate under extremely

tight and well-elaborated rules, have at times had

particular trouble obtaining the necessary financial information from partner institutions abroad.

This makes it difficult for them to account for expenditures of collaborative funds and time.

CONCLUSION

The decision to pursue scientific research on an international cooperative basis is complex. It involves balancing the relative benefits of

collaboration against the disadvantages of international research. OTA has found that the most

concrete benefits of partnerships include opportunities to reduce net U.S. costs and to enhance a

project’s scientific capabilities. The desire to reduce costs and/or “to do better science” has featured prominently as a motive in all the

collaborations that OTA investigated. In addition,

some collaborations have also been motivated by

the desire to enhance funding stability, to support

U.S. foreign policy goals, and to address global

scientific questions.

Although these motives to collaborate can be

attractive, the potential disadvantages of scientific

cooperation must also be considered. In the past,

the strongest disincentives to U.S. participation in

collaborative endeavors have been the potential

loss of national leadership and project control, difficulty in distributing a project’s costs and benefits, and the risk of technology transfer. From the

standpoint of U.S. partners, the inability of the

United States to guarantee long-term political and

funding support for international projects has

been the most serious challenge to collaborations

with the United States. However, there is evidence

that these concerns have been overstated. There is

also reason to believe that U.S. partners may soon

experience the same types of instability. Finally,

some sociocultural challenges may exist that complicate collaboration. These problems, however,

are almost always outweighed by the benefits that

can be derived by pooling intellectual talent from

around the world and by the increased understanding that results from the close interaction of diverse groups of people.

40Because ITER is an ambitious, very expensive international collaboration (one of the first), a conservative and probably more expensive

design is being used to reduce the chances that the machine will not perform as intended.
| 113

Appendix A:

Science

Goals of

Other

Nations

nternational scientific activities influence

U.S. science policies and vice versa. This influence is likely to become more pronounced as research costs rise and the technological expertise of other countries increases.

Since World War II, Europe and Japan have developed world-class scientific research programs and

facilities. For example, the European Union has

assumed a leadership position in high-energy

physics research with its facilities and programs at

the European Laboratory for Particle Physics

(CERN). The Japanese have made important

strides in their work on linear electron-positron

accelerators and silicon tracking detectors used in

particle physics research. Such advances in these

and other research areas make it necessary for the

United States to examine other nations’ science

policy goals and to reassess ours in terms of both

the potential for international collaboration and

our own goals. Accordingly, this appendix discusses other nations’ science goals and funding

priorities.1

Table A-1 presents a comparison of research

and development (R&D) spending in the United

States and several other nations. In 1991, the

United States spent nearly $150 billion on R&D.

Industry was the leading source of funding, contributing 56 percent of the total. Defense-related

R&D commanded the largest share (more than 50

percent) of the federal contribution.

As a share of gross domestic product (GDP),

U.S. R&D expenditures rank second. Japan’s rank

first. If only nondefense R&D is considered, the

U.S. position would be lower. (See figure A-1 for

a comparison of the Organization for Economic

Cooperation and Development (OECD) countries’ R&D expenditures as a share of GDP.)

GERMANY

In basic science, Germany’s main goal is to secure

its place as a major player in the world science

arena. Closely linked to this goal is the commitment to maintaining and enhancing the quality of

science.2 The Federal Ministry for Research and

Technology (BMFT) reports that international

recognition of Germany’s scientific achievements

has grown in the last decade. Germany has

1For an indepth discussion of international research organizational structures and mechanisms, see U.S. Congress, Office of Technology

Assessment, Federally Funded Research: Decisions for a Decade, OTA-SET-490 (Washington, DC: U.S. Government Printing Office, May

1991).

2Federal Ministry for Research and Technology, Report of the Federal Government on Research 1993 (Bonn, Germany: July 1993).
114 | International Partnerships in Large Science Projects
Appendix A Science Goals of Other Nations 115

■ Canada Germany U.K.

3.5 France Japan U.S.

1987 1933 1989 1990 1991 1992

SOURCE: Organization for Economic Cooperation and Development, Main Science and Technology Indicators, No. 1 (Paris, France: 1994),

p. 15.

developed and maintained a high profile in several

disciplines, including nuclear physics, high-energy physics, and synchrotrons radiation research.

The Hadron-Electron Ring Accelerator (HERA)

electron-proton collider has attracted physicists

from around the world. Germany is also looking

to expand its role in other areas such as bioscience

and materials science.

Although basic science continues to serve as

the foundation for technological innovation and

economic competitiveness, applications-oriented

research is growing in importance. Priority is given to scientific endeavors that translate into marketable processes and products (e.g., computer

sciences, materials, bioscience, and environmental research). Agricultural research is also a top

government priority. In the future, this trend may

translate into fewer national large-scale basic science projects.

Because of budget constraints, BMFT has indicated that over the next few years, the government

will focus on utilizing existing large-scale facilities and equipment rather than financing new

ones. For example, Germany has no plans to upgrade its synchrotrons facility (DESY) in the near

future. In this regard, building cooperative partnerships and networks may intensify. Germany already has science and technology (S&T) agreements with more than 50 countries. Bilateral S&T

agreements with the United States cover space research and technologies, biotechnology, nuclear

reactor safety research, and energy technologies.

The German government views these cooperative

arrangements as important components of its

overall research program. The government also

promotes international scientific collaboration as

a way to exchange information, pool resources,

and tackle thorny global problems. Moreover, international collaboration may be necessary to sustain existing big science projects.

Germany is a member of several international

organizations, including CERN, the European

Space Agency (ESA), the European Southern Observatory, and the European Research Coordinating Agency (EUREKA). Germany contributes

22.5 percent of CERN’s budget, the highest percentage of all member states. As a major contributor, Germany has played a pivotal role in recent

decisions about the Large Hadron Collider (LHC)

project at CERN.
116 | International Partnerships in Large Science Projects

In 1991, Germany spent a total of $35.6 billion

on R&D. Most of the budget was earmarked for

medium- to long-term research projects with high

technology and economic potential.3 Like the

United States, German industries fund more than

half of its nation’s R&D. However, Germany expends considerably less on defense R&D. (See

table A-1.)

FRANCE

France’s primary science goal is to maintain a

presence and, in some cases, to be competitive in

several fields. Scientific excellence is closely tied

to this goal. World leadership is neither a motivation nor a goal of French science. The concept of

leadership is viewed only in the context of the European Union. To achieve its goals, France looks

increasingly to international collaboration in big

science projects. The pooling of financial, technical, and intellectual resources is the main motivator to participate in international projects.

In France, the science community plays a major

role in setting the nation’s scientific agenda. Projects generally move from the bottom up, and science budgets are estimated in five-year cycles.

Unlike the United States, French government

agencies do not have to go through the annual budget process once project commitments are made.

France has strong science programs in highenergy physics, space, astronomy, fusion, biological science, and nuclear physics. In the field of

high-energy physics, national projects are funded

by the Institute for Nuclear Physics and Particle

Physics. Although France does not have a large,

national high-energy physics facility, it is a major

participant and contributor to CERN. France is

also the host nation of the Institute Laue-Langevin

(ILL) neutron facility, the preeminent neutronscattering facility in the world. In addition, France

hosts the 12-nation European Synchrotron Radiation Facility (ESRF) in Grenoble, the first of a

new generation of high-intensity x-ray sources.

Among European countries, France is the leader in space science. Also, France was a driving

force behind the creation of ESA. The National

Center for Space Research is responsible for national space projects, which focus primarily on

providing assistance at Ariane launches, spacecraft acquisition, long-range planning, and managing contractors. Most scientific research is carried out at ESA or through bilateral agreements,

primarily with the United States and Russia.

France commits about 60 to 70 percent of its space

budget to ESA.4

France has actively pursued collaborative projects with many countries, including the United

States, Japan, India, and several in Eastern Europe

and Latin America. The United States and France

have a long tradition of scientific cooperation and

numerous cooperative projects. Franco-Japanese

scientific collaboration is more recent, but it is

growing in importance. As part of the European

Union, France is a partner in the International

Thermonuclear Experimental Reactor (ITER)

project.

In 1991, gross domestic expenditures on R&D

totaled $25 billion. Government outlays accounted for 57 percent of the total. Large science

projects account for about 9 percent of the total

science budget.

RUSSIA

The former Soviet Union (FSU) has a well-developed and respected scientific research community. During the Cold War, the Soviet government

targeted several priority areas for extensive scientific research, partially in support of potential military applications, but also as part of the competition with capitalist countries to prove which

system was the more innovative and productive.

3Glenn J. McLoughlin, International Science and Technology: Issues for U.S. Policymakers, CRS Report for Congress, 94-733 SPR (Washington, DC: Congressional Research Service, Sept. 16, 1994), p. 20.

4Gerard Petitalout, National Center for Space Research, personal communication, Nov. 9, 1993.
Appendix A Science Goals of Other Nations | 117

Basic research in priority areas including space,

high-energy physics, high-temperature superconductivity, and oceanography was well financed,

and scientists working on these subjects enjoyed

social status, high remuneration, and preferential

access to goods and services.

Since the breakup of the Soviet Union, fundamental changes have occurred in the political,

economic, and social orders. These changes have

had a profound impact on S&T policy in the former Soviet Union. The huge military budgets of

the Cold War, which underwrote much of the research, have been slashed, and the competition

with the West to prove which system is the best

(through science or by other means) has ceased.

With civilian budgets strained to the limit, many

research institutes lack the financial resources

even to pay salaries. According to one expert,

funding for Russia’s S&T programs has declined

significantly in recent years: 26 percent from 1991

to 1992; 17 percent from 1992 to 1993; and 8.7

percent from 1993 to 1994.5 In addition, the skyrocketing cost of living and the more lucrative financial opportunities in the commercial economy

have driven thousands of scientists out of research

completely. Even where scientists remain at their

posts, there is often no money to finance the research itself. For example, oceanographic research ships are stranded for lack of funds, and no

new research reactors have been funded.6 Even

subscriptions to foreign journals are beyond the

means of some institutes.

Nevertheless, efforts to reconstruct and continue research are under way. Russia inherited the

bulk of the FSU’s scientific expertise, although

other former republics have research facilities and

well-respected scientists. In 1994, Russia funded

38 S&T programs. The programs selected were

chosen from a group of 150. Top-priority items on

Russia’s scientific agenda include space, high-energy physics, global climate change, and synchrotron radiation sources. Russia’s space program is

given special priority—a separate line item budget, and funding almost equal to the entire S&T

budget. High-energy physics also commands a

huge share of the total Russian S&T budget, accounting for about 27 percent.7

The Russian government is trying to integrate

some of its scientists into the world scientific

community, and is attempting to use international

collaboration and support to preserve the country’s scientific and technical expertise. For example, in high-energy physics, Russia has signed a

bilateral scientific cooperative agreement with

CERN. Russia is interested in becoming a full

member of CERN and is supportive of plans to

build the LHC. In space, the Russians have become a critical partner in the International Space

Station project. Russia will provide expertise and

equipment developed from its long-duration activities in orbit, for which it will be paid $650 million by the United States. Russia will use the payment to partially finance its involvement in the

project. Additionally, Russia is one of the four

partners in ITER.

The U.S. government has undertaken several

activities to support Russian scientists. Given the

proliferation risk represented by unemployed former Soviet arms scientists, the U.S. government

has financed a program, the Moscow International

Science and Technology Center, to reemploy

them in peaceful uses of their expertise.

The outlook for Russian science is troubled by

continued economic and political uncertainties,

and difficulties are likely for the next several

years. However, stabilization of the Russian economy and successful transition toward markets

could provide a sounder economic basis for the

government to finance an effective, though much

smaller, basic research program than in the Soviet

era. Under these circumstances, Russian scientists

would increase their engagement with the world

5Irina Dezhina, “Russia’s Science and Technology Priorities,” n.d.

6Sergei P. Kapitza, “Russian Science: Snubbed and Sickly,” Bulletin of Atomic Scientists, May/June 1994, p. 48.

7Dezhina, see footnote 5.
118 | International Partnerships in Large Science Projects

scientific community, and international collaboration would become essential to the Russian research enterprise.

INDIA

The goal of India’s science policy is a practical

one: to apply scientific knowledge and its related

benefits to advancing the well-being of its population. Tied to this goal is the development of a selfreliant S&T base.8

India has a strong tradition of basic science research, and its scientists are highly respected. Science gained even more prominence after independence in 1947, with the goal of developing

economic and political power. Nehru’s government developed large programs in physics, astronomy, chemistry, and nuclear energy, and several

national laboratories were built. With the help of

the United States, India developed a highly sophisticated nuclear energy program.

Also, India has successfully developed its own

satellites and launch vehicles. Its first experimental satellite was launched on a Soviet rocket in

1975. India’s space program is oriented toward

Earth observation, weather prediction, and telecommunications; space exploration is negligible.

India has no high-energy physics facility, but

its scientists participate in experiments at other

nations’ facilities. India had agreed, in principle,

to contribute to the proposed, and now defunct,

Superconducting Super Collider and has expressed interest in contributing to the LHC project

at CERN.

Indian scientists are also actively involved in

other international science projects, including astronomy, nuclear physics, and materials science.

It has S&T agreements with many countries, and

its collaboration with the United States is particularly strong.

In 1991, R&D expenditures totaled $6 billion,

which is modest by industrialized country standards but above average for developing countries.

The Indian government funds the lion’s share of

R&D and conducts most of the research. Defenserelated R&D is the top priority for India, followed

by space and health research. In recent years, government support for R&D has been declining. The

outlook is for further cuts in government funding

and more reliance on commercially funded projects.9

CHINA

Basic science has long been an important part of

Chinese culture. Scientific achievements in astronomy, mathematics, medicine, and chemistry

date as far back as ancient times. In fact, Chinese

leadership in science was not challenged by Western countries until the 17th century.

In recent years, however, economic reforms

have dictated China’s emphasis on applied, rather

than basic, science research. The primary goal of

scientific research today is to contribute to the

economy and provide a foundation for international competitiveness. Research that can contribute to doubling the gross national product (GNP)

by the year 2000 and programs aimed at developing new high-technology industries are given the

greatest government support.

In 1989, the Chinese Academy of Sciences issued a report on the status of basic research in China. The report characterized China’s basic research structure as weak and its programs as well

behind other nations in several fields, including

biology, chemistry, and mathematics. Basic science has taken a back seat in China’s changing

economy.10

A bright spot is in the field of high-energy

physics. Completion of the Beijing Electron-Pos8McLoughlin, see footnote 3, p. 39.

9”Time To Catch Up,” Far Eastern Economic Review, vol. 155, No. 49, Dec. 10, 1992, p. 45.

10Chinese Academy of Sciences, Investigation of the National Basic Research Disciplines of the Natural Sciences (Beijing, China: Beijing

Science Press, 1989), as reported in World Science Report 1993 (London, England: UNESCO Publishing, 1993), p. 105.
Appendix A Science Goals of Other Nations | 119

itron Collider in 1988 provided a boost to China’s

high-energy physics program. However, other

disciplines, such as condensed-matter physics,

and atomic and molecular physics, remain

weak.11

Another bright spot is China’s space program.

China is one of a few countries that has a national

space program. It has been marketing its launch

capabilities in international markets, and its satellites have been used for Earth observation and

telecommunications.

Annual expenditures on S&T have averaged

about 1 percent of the GNP, with basic science

funding accounting for about 4.8 percent of the total. Both of these figures are well below the world

average.12 Given China’s goals, it is not surprising that industrial development commands the

largest share (47 percent) of R&D spending. Other

priority items for funding are health and agriculture (about 10 percent of civilian R&D outlays).13

In the past, S&T projects were funded by the

central government, according to state economic

plans. Since 1986, funding has diversified somewhat, with several state ministries and private sector organizations supporting science research.

However, limited funding remains a thorny problem for science. In addition to funding constraints,

China’s science community faces another serious

problem—its aging scientists. Moreover, there is

a dearth of younger scientists due, in part, to past

political policies (e.g., the Cultural Revolution),

and the decision of Chinese scientists trained in

the West to remain rather than return home.

Most of China’s scientific endeavors are national projects. The desire to tailor scientific projects to national economic needs, the reluctance to

provide access to research work and information,

plus the need to build up its own scientific infrastructure all contribute to China’s high rate of unilateral projects. Nevertheless, China does have a

large number of S&T cooperative agreements

with other nations. For example, China and Brazil

are jointly building two remote sensing satellites

to collect weather data. Also, China has a broad

range of bilateral S&T agreements with the

United States and Europe. U.S. and French scientific cooperation with China is particularly strong.

The foundation for U.S.-China scientific cooperation was established by the 1979 U.S.-China

Agreement on Cooperation in Science and Technology. Agreements cover space technology (the

National Aeronautics and Space Administration

(NASA)), high-energy physics (the Department

of Energy (DOE)), medicine, earthquake studies,

nuclear safety, aeronautics, transportation, and

telecommunications. Activities are generally

funded under existing agency budgets.

BRAZIL

Budget constraints, the lack of human resources,

and limited regional and international cooperation

have hampered scientific development in Latin

America. Therefore, science policy goals in Latin

America focus primarily on building up its scientific infrastructure through education, cooperation, and integration or coordination with other

sectors of the economy, particularly those having

strong scientific components. Attracting young

people to science professions and actively pursuing collaborative projects are important strategies

for achieving scientific goals.14

Of all Latin American countries, Brazil has the

largest R&D budget and the highest rate of scientific publications. In 1991, Brazil’s science R&D

expenditures were about $3.2 billion, roughly 0.7

11Ibid.

12United Nations Educational, Scientific and Cultural Organization, “China,” World Science Report (London, England: UNESCO Publishing, 1993), p. 104.

13Center for Science, Trade and Technology Policy, George Mason University, “Large Science Project Priorities of Selected Countries,”

report prepared for the Office of Technology Assessment, Jan. 23, 1995, p. 18.

14Ibid., pp. 39-40.
120 | International Partnerships in Large Science Projects

percent of its GDP. The largest R&D expenditures

are for agriculture, accounting for about 20 percent of government outlays. Health research and

space research are also R&D priorities.15

In 1992, Brazil’s civilian space budget was $98

million, a significant drop from the $247 million

funded in 1991. Exploration accounts for about 36

percent of the total space budget.16 As noted earlier, Brazil and China are jointly developing satellites to gather weather data.

In the field of high-energy physics, Brazil’s

budget is rather modest. It has no large facilities

but does participate in programs in other countries. Brazil does, however, have a synchrotron radiation facility.

CANADA

Industrial and economic goals dominate Canada’s

science policy. The 1991 Science Council report

noted the importance of the linkage between

scientific research and technical innovation and

competitiveness. Several research areas have been

identified as vital to sustained economic growth in

Canada. These include biotechnology, space, advanced industrial materials, and environmental

and marine sciences.17

In 1991, total R&D expenditures totaled $7.8

billion. The private sector funded nearly 60 percent of Canada’s R&D activities. Industrial development commanded the largest share of funds.

Other priority areas included defense, space, and

energy.18

Faced with growing budgetary pressures and

the need to pool resources, Canada’s basic science

programs have both national and international elements. In high-energy physics, national efforts

have centered on the construction and development of a relatively large national facility called

TRIUMP. This national facility is funded by several government agencies and managed by four

universities. Foreign experts serve as members of

the facility’s planning and advisory committees.

Canada’s investment in high-energy physics has

been about $300 million per year, with annual operation costs budgeted at about $35 million.

Canada’s space program is oriented toward

Earth observation, including weather data, and

communications. On the international level, Canada has alliances with NASA (e.g., for the space

station) and with ESA. In the latter case, Canada

submits proposals to the ESA board that, if accepted, are included in ESA’s programs.

Canada has a strong tradition of scientific cooperation with the United States, Europe, and more

recently, Japan. Canadian scientists are participating in international projects, such as the Global

Climate Change Program, the Ocean Drilling Program, the Human Genome Project, the Gemini

project, and ITER.

UNITED KINGDOM

Science policy in the United Kingdom focuses on

two primary goals: 1) maintaining and enhancing

the quality of science, and 2) providing economic

and social benefits to the nation. In recent years,

the government has strengthened the link between

science and the creation of wealth. In its first review of science policy in more than 20 years,19 the

government outlined a strategy for ensuring the

success of the industry-science marriage. The

strategy hinges on developing stronger relationships between science and industry, participating

in international research efforts, and improving

the training and education of scientists and engineers. In particular, the research councils responsible for funding science projects have been re15Ibid., pp. 14, 38.

16Ibid., table 10, figure 6f.

17Science Council of Canada, “Reaching for Tomorrow: Science and Technology Policy in Canada, 1991,” 1992.

18Center for Science, Trade and Technology Policy, see footnote 13, table 4.

19Chancellor of the Duchy of Lancaster, Realising Our Potential, A Strategy for Science, Engineering and Technology, presented to Parliament by Command of Her Majesty (London, England: Her Majesty’s Science Office, May 1993).
Appendix A Science Goals of Other Nations | 121

organized and given the explicit mission of

enhancing industrial competitiveness. In addition, the Technology Foresight Programme (TFP)

was created to identify strategically important

technologies and high-priority research areas. Information collected by TFP contributes to longrange R&D planning and funding decisions.

In 1991, total expenditures on R&D amounted

to $19.2 billion, or 2.1 percent of GDP.20 This percentage has remained fairly stable over the last decade. Defense research is given high funding

priority, followed by industrial development,

health, and the environment. Not surprisingly, the

Ministry of Defense is the leading government

supporter of R&D, contributing about 40 percent

of total government outlays for R&D. Industry

funds about half of all R&D activities. The electronics, chemical, and aerospace industries receive the largest share of industrial funding.21

Basic science is viewed as an international enterprise that depends on the pooling of intellectual

and financial resources. The United Kingdom has

been active in international activities at all levels

in all areas of science, including high-energy

physics, astronomy, fusion, and space. Collaboration ranges from informal agreements among scientists and institutions to bilateral agreements between governments, to international partnerships.

The United Kingdom is a member of CERN,

ESA, ILL, ESRF, and EUREKA. In addition to its

membership in European consortia, the United

Kingdom has a strong tradition of cooperation

with the United States.

The United Kingdom has significant national

research programs in fusion, astronomy, and nuclear physics. The reputation and expertise of its

Culham Laboratory for fusion research contributed to the decision to site the European Unionfunded Joint European Torus (JET) facility in

England. It is also a member of the ITER project

team.

Although the United Kingdom does not have a

major high-energy physics facility, its scientists

are actively involved at CERN. The United Kingdom contributes about 14 percent of the CERN

budget.

JAPAN

Technology is the driving force behind science

policy in Japan. Science is viewed as a foundation

for technological and economic development and

international competitiveness. Japan’s focus on

applications-oriented research can be attributed,

in part, to industry’s large share of R&D funding.

In 1991, industry contributed 84 percent of the total R&D funds.

Another priority of science programs and industry is to “catch up” to the West, specifically the

United States, in areas in which Japan feels it lags.

National prestige and capacity building also figure into decisions about undertaking expensive

national projects, such as the B-factory, and collaborating on international big science projects.

Research priorities are set at the highest government levels and are reached after extensive interagency consultation. Consensus decisionmaking drives this consultative process. The Council

for Science and Technology (CST), which is

chaired by the Prime Minister, is the cabinet-level

coordinating body for S&T. It consists of distinguished representatives from academia, industry,

and government. The Science and Technology

Agency is the secretariat for CST, but other powerful agencies, such as the Ministry of Science,

Education, and Culture, the Ministry of International Trade and Industry, and the Ministry of Finance, are also members of CST. CST is responsible for outlining the national research agenda,

approving government agency plans, and ensuring that funding is appropriate to meet needs. New

materials research (particularly superconducting

20Center for Science, Trade and Technology Policy, see footnote 13, table 4.

21McLoughlin, see footnote 3, p. CRS-54.
122 | International Partnerships in Large Science Projects

materials), biotechnology, space, fusion, and

high-energy physics are top priorities.

In recent years, government support for basic

research has increased, although industry is still

likely to continue to fund and do the bulk of the

work. This increase in support is viewed as a way

to build Japan’s science infrastructure and develop

its standing in the world scientific community.

The Japanese have come to believe that being

leaders in technology innovation, manufacturing,

and marketing is not sufficient to gain the respect

of other major industrialized nations.

The government promotes international collaboration in big science projects as another way

for Japan to develop as a world science leader.

Also, the Japanese view international collaboration as an opportunity to pool resources and to address global issues. Japan has extensive cooperative agreements in space, fusion, high-energy

physics, astronomy, ocean and environmental

sciences, and health. The United States and Japan

have a strong tradition of scientific cooperation.

The U.S.-Japan Science and Technology Agreement fosters scientific information exchange and

access to facilities, and provides for the protection

of U.S. intellectual property rights.

The International Space Station project is the

largest cooperative space venture in which the

Japanese are engaged. Japan’s contribution to the

space station—an experimental module—is its

most expensive space project to date. The module

will cost about $3 billion to build, and Japan will

share in operating costs as well.22 National space

efforts, directed by the National Space Development Agency, concentrate on developing satellites and rocket launchers. Satellites are used for

Earth observation and telecommunications. In fiscal year 1994, funding for space was $2.18 billion.

Japan is also a partner in ITER. The potential

for an unlimited, economical energy source and

the development of advanced materials and magnet technologies are among the driving forces behind Japan’s participation in this project. However, enhancing Japan’s stature in science was an

important selling point for both the space station

and the ITER projects. In 1991, Japan spent nearly

$300 million on fusion research.23

Japan has a very respected national high-energy

physics program. Its National Laboratory for

High Energy Physics (KEK) has attracted scientists from around the world. Japan also sends scientists to CERN facilities and has decided to contribute $60 million toward the construction of

CERN’s LHC project. KEK has cooperative

agreements with the Stanford Linear Accelerator

Center, the Brookhaven National Laboratory, and

the Fermi National Accelerator Laboratory. Japan’s top-priority national project is building the

B-factory machine. Development of the B-factory

machine is one area of high-energy physics in

which Japan and the United States are pursuing

parallel paths. Both countries can afford to build

their own machines, which will not only provide

their scientists with more opportunities to conduct

experiments, but will contribute to national prestige. Japan’s 1993 budget for particle physics was

about $350 million.

In 1991, Japan spent about $67 billion on

R&D. Industrial development accounted for the

largest share of funds.24 As a share of GDP, Japan’s R&D expenditures are the highest. Unlike

the United States, Japan spends less than 2 percent

on defense-related R&D.

22John M. Logsdon, “US-Japan Space Relations at a Crossroads,” Science, vol. 295, Jan. 17, 1992, p. 299.

23Center for Science, Trade and Technology Policy, see footnote 13, figure 8c.

24Ibid., table 4.
| 123

Acronyms

ADEOS Advanced Earth Observing Satellite

AEC Act Atomic Energy Commission Act of

1954

ANS Advanced Neutron Source

APS Advanced Photon Source

ASTER Advanced Spaceborne Thermal

Emission and Reflection Radiometer

AURA Association of Universities for

Research in Astronomy

AXAF Advanced X–ray Astrophysics

Facility

BMFT German Federal Ministry for

Research and Technology

CAT computerized axial tomography

CDA conceptual design activities

CGRO Compton Gamma Ray Observatory

CERN European Laboratory for Particle

Physics

CST Council for Science and Technology

DAAC Distributed Active Archive Center

DESY Deutches Elektronen–Synchrotron

facility

DNA deoxyribonucleic acid

DOE U.S. Department of Energy

D–T deuterium–tritium

EDA engineering design activities

EOS Earth Observing System

EOSDIS Earth Observing System Data and

Information System

EPACT Energy Policy Act of 1992

ESA European Space Agency

ESO European Southern Observatory

ESRF European Synchrotron Radiation

Facility

FSU Former Soviet Union

GCRP Global Change Research Program

GDP gross domestic product

GLSP Group on Large Scientific Projects

GNP gross national product

HEPAP High Energy Physics Advisory Panel

HERA Hadron–Electron Ring Accelerator

HIRIS High–Resolution Imaging

Spectrometer

IAEA International Atomic Energy Agency

ICF inertial confinement fusion

IEOS International Earth Observing System

ILL Institute Laue–Langevin

ISPM International Solar Polar Mission

ISSA International Space Station Alpha

ITER International Thermonuclear

Experimental Reactor

JCT Joint Central Team

JEM Japanese Experimental Module

JET Joint European Torus

KEK National Laboratory for High Energy

Physics (Japan)

LHC Large Hadron Collider

LIGO Laser Interferometer Gravitational

Wave Observatory
124 | International Partnerships in Large Science Projects

MFEEA Magnetic Fusion Energy Engineering

Act of 1980

MIMR Multifrequency Imaging Microwave

Radiometer

MOU Memorandum of Understanding

MSS Mobile Servicing System

MTCR Missile Technology Control Regime

MTFF Man–Tended Free Flyer

MW megawatt

NASA National Aeronautics and Space

Administration

NASDA Japanese Space Agency

NIF National Ignition Facility

NLC Next Linear Collider

NOAA National Oceanic and Atmospheric

Administration

NOAO National Optical Astronomy

Observatories

OECD Organization for Economic

Cooperation and Development

OMB Office of Management and Budget

POEM Polar–Orbit Earth Observation

Mission

POES Polar–Orbiting Operational

Environmental Satellite

SAR synthetic aperture radar data

SLAC Stanford Linear Accelerator Center

SPring–8 Super Photon Ring–8

SRC–II Solvent Refined Coal-II

Demonstration Plant

SSC Superconducting Super Collider

STA Science and Technology Agency

TFTR Tokamak Fusion Test Reactor

TPX Tokamak Physics Experiment

TRMM Tropical Rainfall Measuring Mission

VLT Very Large Telescope
ndex

A

Advanced Earth Observing System, 81. See also

Earth Observing System

Advanced Neutron Source, 24, 51, 88, 89

Advanced Photon Source, 6, 45, 91

Advanced Spaceborne Thermal Emission and

Reflection Radiometer, 83

Advanced X-Ray Astrophysics Facility, 72, 73,

80-81

Advisory Committee on the Future of the U.S.

Space Program, 77-78

AEC. See Atomic Energy Commission Act of 1954

ANS. See Advanced Neutron Source

Apollo mission to the Moon, 50

Apollo-Soyuz Test Project, 99-100

APS. See Advanced Photon Source

Argentina

Gemini project, 96

Argonne National Laboratory, 91

Association of Universities for Research in

Astronomy, 96

ASTER. See Advanced Spaceborne Thermal

Emission and Reflection Radiometer

ATLAS detector, 57

Atomic Energy Commission Act of 1954, 63-64

The Augustine Committee, 77-78

Autonomous Transfer Vehicle, 82

AXAF. See Advanced X-Ray Astrophysics Facility

B-meson factory, 57, 121

B

Basic and applied research

tension between, 43-44, 50

Beijing Electron-Positron Collider, 118-119

Biological databases, 39

Biotechnology

commercial development of, 42

definition, 41

origins, 43

potential environmental applications, 41-42

Biotechnology Research Initiative, 42

Brazil

agreement with China, 119

Gemini project, 96

R&D expenditures, 114, 119-120

science goals, 119-120

Brookhaven National Laboratory, 122

C

California

ITER home team work site, 67

Canada

EOS collaboration, 81

Gemini project, 96, 97

Mobile Servicing System plans, 82

NASA collaborations, 72

R&D expenditures, 114, 120

science goals, 120

space station responsibilities, 79, 82, 84

Special Purpose Dexterous Manipulator, 82

TRIUMP facility, 120

Cassini-Huygens mission to Saturn, 72, 73, 80-81,

95

CDF experiment, 56, 57

CERN. See European Laboratory for Particle

Physics

Changes in scientific research

competitiveness, 42-45

diffusion of knowledge, 37-40

industrial implication of large projects, 46-48

new areas of scientific inquiry, 40-42

role of large projects, 45-46

Chile

Gemini project, 96

China

agreement with Brazil, 119

Beijing Electron-Positron Collider, 118-119

Chinese Academy of Science, 118

R&D expenditures, 114, 119

science goals, 118-119

S&T agreements, 51, 119

Clinton, William

Canada’s space station contribution and, 82

Clinton Administration

ANS discontinuation, 88

CMS detector, 57 | 125
126 | International Partnerships in Large Science Projects

Cold War end

collaboration benefits, 100

devaluation of traditional goal of U.S. leadership,

85-86

new collaboration possibilities, 85

pressures on U.S. to maintain control over collaborations, 77

redefinition of national security goals, 51

shift in R&D focus, 42

S&T agreements and, 51

Collaboration benefits, 9-13

addressing global issues, 100-101

attraction of students to scientific research, 97

opportunities and potential downsides, 102

reducing net U.S. costs, 93-95

scientific capability enhancement, 95-98

stability of science goals and funding enhancement, 98-99

supporting U.S. foreign policy, 99-100

widening of scientists’ sphere of access to research data, 97

Collaboration challenges, 13-14

cost and benefit distribution, 13, 107-109

differing commercial potential of technologies,

109

fusion energy research, 61-62

increase in total project costs, 101

intellectual property issues, 109

long-term project commitment mechanisms, 13,

104-107

loss of national leadership, prestige, and project

control, 13, 102-104

management complexity, 13-14, 111-112

opportunities and potential downsides, 102

reluctance of scientists to share recognition and

rewards, 102

sociocultural differences, 110-111

space programs, 77-82

technology transfer, 27-28, 109-110

Collaborative Solar Terrestrial Research Program,

73

Competitiveness

contribution of new products and processes, 30,

50

economic and social benefits, 44-45

tension between basic and applied research,

43-44

Compton Gamma Ray Observatory, 73

Corning, 97

Crew Rescue Vehicle, 82

D

DEMO facility, 62

DESY. See Deutches Elektronen-Synchrotron

Deutches Elektronen-Synchrotron, 55, 115

Diffusion of knowledge

electronic networks and, 29, 38-39

electronic publications and, 40

velocity of scientific and technological change,

37-38

“virtual” experimental communities and, 40

DIII-D tokamak facility, 68

Distributed Active Archive Centers, 39

DNA cloning, 43

DOE. See U.S. Department of Energy

DZero experiment, 56, 57

E

Earth Observing System, 72, 73

Congressional debate over, 45

description, 81, 101

downsizing of, 83-84

funding, 80, 81

as interdependence model, 83

program history, 24

Earth Observing System Data and Information

System

budget for, 81

description, 39

Electronic networks, 29, 38-39

Electronic publications, 40

Energy Policy Act of 1992, 63, 70

Environmental research, 40-41. See also Global

change research

EOS. See Earth Observing System

EOSDIS. See Earth Observing System Data and

Information System

EPACT. See Energy Policy Act of 1992

EROS Data Center, 39

ESA. See European Space Agency

ESRF. See European Synchrotron Radiation Facility

Eumetsat, 81

Euratom Treaty, 68

EUREKA. See European Research Coordinating

Agency

Europe. See also specific countries by name

EOS collaboration, 81

fusion research program, 68

high-energy physics and fusion programs, 50

multiyear funding for science projects, 21, 26

resentment towards U.S. over lack of inclusion in

space station plans, 78

science project funding, 105-106

S&T agreements with China, 119

European Commission, 68, 71

European Laboratory for Particle Physics. See also

Large Hadron Collider

American physicists and engineers working at, 55
Index | 127

contract distribution, 27, 108

cost and benefit distribution formula, 28, 107

creation of, 46

description, 10

funding, 27

high-energy physics collaborative efforts, 56

management decisions, 112

membership, 115, 116, 121, 122

purpose, 103

Russian scientific cooperative agreement with,

117

treaty agreements as basis for, 23

European Research Coordinating Agency, 115, 121

European Southern Observatory, 115

European Space Agency

budget, 82, 106

contracting system, 27, 46

cost and benefit distribution formula, 27-28, 107

creation of, 46

description, 10

fair return policy, 27-28, 108, 109

Hubble Space Telescope power panels, 80

management decisions, 112

membership, 115, 121

MOU with NASA, 20

Multifrequency Imaging Microwave Radiometer,

83

NASA collaborations, 20, 72

Polar-Orbiting Earth Observation Mission, 81,

83-84

purpose, 75-76, 103

role of France, 116

space station responsibilities, 79

Spacelab project and, 76

treaty agreements as basis for, 23

European Synchrotron Radiation Facility, 45, 91,

116, 121

European Union, 9, 68, 69, 106

European Union Research Commissariat, 46

F

Federal Non-Nuclear Energy Research and

Development Act of 1974, 19

Federally Funded Research: Decisions for a Decade,

44

Fermilab, 10, 100, 122

Main Injector construction, 59

needs of foreign scientists, 111

top quark verification, 56

5-MW spallation source, 90

Foreign policy implications of collaboration, 31,

98-100

Former Soviet Union

cooperative efforts during the Cold War, 98

science goals, 116-117

S&T agreement with United States, 51

14 MeV neutron source, 68, 69

France

CERN contracts, 108

LHC contribution dispute, 107-108

NASA collaborations, 72

R&D expenditures, 114, 116

Fusion energy research

advantages to fusion, 60-61

deuterium-tritium fusion reaction, 61

fusion reactions, 59-60

implications for future collaborations, 69-72

industrial implications, 47

international collaboration, 64-69, 100

program goals and funding, 63-64

scientific challenges to, 61-62

Fusion Policy Advisory Committee, 96-97

G

Galileo mission, 72, 73, 80

Gemini project, 17, 95, 96-97, 102, 120

General Atomics, 68

Geneva Summit, 1985, 100

Germany

applications-oriented research, 50, 115

Federal Ministry for Research and Technology,

113, 115

Galileo components, 80

ITER home team work site, 67

LHC contribution dispute, 107-108

NASA collaborations, 72

R&D budget, 114, 116

reduction of commitment to CERN, 106

science goals, 113, 115-116

S&T agreements, 115

Global change research

electronic management of activities, 40

global nature of, 45-46

Global Climate Change Program, 120

Global Geospace Science, 73

Gorbachev, Mikhail

ITER collaboration, 100

Group on Large Scientific Projects, 33

H

Hadron-Electron Ring Accelerator, 10, 115

HEPAP. See High Energy Physics Advisory Panel

HERA. See Hadron-Electron Ring Accelerator

Hermes space plane, 26, 82, 84

High-energy physics. See also specific projects by

name
128 | International Partnerships in Large Science Projects

accelerator design and detector method development, 46

description, 51

elementary particles and force carriers, 53

facilities, 57

implications for the future, 58-59

international collaboration, 56-58

particle accelerators and, 51-53

Standard Model, 53-54

top quark verification, 56-57

U.S. goals, 54-56

High Energy Physics Advisory Panel, 55, 58

High-Resolution Imaging Spectrometer, 83

HIRIS. See High-Resolution Imaging Spectrometer

Hubble Space Telescope, 72, 73, 80

Human Genome Project, 11, 120

description, 42

electronic management of activities, 40

I

IAEA. See International Atomic Energy Agency

ICF. See Inertial Confinement Fusion program

IEOS. See International Earth Observing System

ILL. See Institute Laue-Langevin

India

R&D expenditures, 114, 118

science goals, 118

Industrial implications of large projects

facilities, 47-48

spin-off technologies, 46-47, 55

Inertial Confinement Fusion program, 62, 63

Institute for Nuclear Physics and Particle Physics,

116

Institute Laue-Langevin, 31, 88, 89, 116, 121

International Atomic Energy Agency, 23, 65, 100

International Earth Observing System, 81, 84

International Solar Polar Mission

description, 20-21

U.S. commitment of funds for, 76

U.S. withdrawal from, 18, 76, 81, 86, 98, 104

International Solar-Terrestrial Physics Programme,

11

International Space University, 103-104

International Thermonuclear Experimental Reactor

CDA phase, 65

collaboration history, 65-68, 104

Congressional debate over, 45

conservative design, 13, 112

construction phase, 67, 72, 104

description, 10

design specifications, 62

EDA phase, 65, 67, 70

funding, 64

home country fusion programs, 67

home teams, 34, 67

host site decision, 67, 107

indirect benefits, 45

interest in having United States as partner, 23

Joint Central Team, 34, 67, 104

management complexities, 34-35

operating phase, 67-68

partners, 116, 117, 120, 121, 122

production capability, 65

purpose, 65

Russian collaboration, 100

scientific and technological challenges, 65, 69

team development of engineering parameters and

specifications, 40

total estimated costs of, 4

U.S. commitment to, 70

Internet, 38-39

ISIS spallation facility, 90

ISPM. See International Solar Polar Mission

Italy

NASA collaborations, 72

ITER. See International Thermonuclear

Experimental Reactor

J

Japan

Advanced Earth Observing System, 81

Advanced Spaceborne Thermal Emission and

Reflection Radiometer, 83

applications-oriented research, 50, 121

B-meson factory, 57, 121

Council for Science and Technology, 121

EOS collaboration, 81

fusion research programs, 71

high-energy physics and fusion programs, 50

ITER home team work site, 67

linear electron-positron accelerator, 113

multiyear funding for science projects, 21, 25-26

NASA collaborations, 72

National Space Development Agency, 122

Planet-B mission to Mars, 10

project planning process, 25-26

R&D expenditures, 114, 122

resentment towards U.S. over lack of inclusion in

space station plans, 78

Science and Technology Agency, 121

science goals, 121-122

science project funding, 106

silicon tracking detector, 113

space agency budget, 82

space station role, 79, 122

Subaru telescope, 46, 97

Tropical Rainfall Measuring Mission, 81, 84

Japanese Atomic Energy Research Institute, 68
Index | 129

Japanese Experimental Module, 79, 84

JEM. See Japanese Experimental Module

JET. See Joint European Torus

Jet Propulsion Laboratory, 39

Joint European Torus, 27, 68-69, 107, 121

JT-60 Super Upgrade tokamak, 71

K

KEK. See National Laboratory for High-Energy

Physics

L

Large Coil Task facility, 68

Large Hadron Collider

American physicists and engineers working at, 55

ATLAS and CMS detectors, 57

as foundation for high-energy physics cooperative efforts, 58

funding disputes, 106, 107-108

German decisionmaking role, 115

India’s proposed contribution to, 118

interest in having United States as partner, 23

magnet and detector technology dependence, 13

termination, 54

total estimated costs of, 4

U.S. contribution to, 89, 107

Large projects. See also specific countries and

projects by name

avoiding duplication of effort, 94

basket approach to funding, 14, 15-16

benefits of multiple facilities, 18

“big science” definition, 3-6

bottom-up process for proposals, 16, 35

budgetary pressure effects, 25-27

collaboration benefits, 93-101, 102

collaboration challenges, 101-112

differences in parliamentary government systems

of partners, 20

distributed science projects, 11

diversity of, 14-16

early planning for international collaboration,

16-18

equitable distribution of costs and benefits, 13,

107-109

expenditures, 45, 94

formal justification for seeking or avoiding collaboration, 35

forms of international collaboration, 10-11

global issues, 100-101

indirect benefits, 45

industrial implications, 46-48

information exchange mechanism, 31-33

internationalization of science, 2-3

issues and findings, 14-35

joint construction and operation, 10

lead country collaborations, 10

long-term project commitment, 104-107

management complexity, 33-35, 111-112

national leadership, prestige, and project control,

30, 102-104

need for long-term project commitment, 104-107

as platforms for small science, 15-16, 45

reasons for collaboration, 9-13, 45-46

reasons for size of, 7-8

reducing net U.S. costs, 93-95

review process, 17

science goals and funding stability, 98-99

scientific capability enhancement, 95-98

siting decisions, 28-29, 109

sociocultural differences, 110-111

technology transfer, 27-28, 109-110

total estimated costs of, 4-5

U.S. costs, 93-95

U.S. foreign policy and, 31, 99-100

Laser Interferometer Gravitational Wave

Observatory, 102

LCT. See Large Coil Task facility

LHC. See Large Hadron Collider

Linear electron-positron accelerator, 113

M

Magnetic Fusion Energy Engineering Act of 1980,

63

Magnetic Fusion Energy program, 62, 64

Magnetic resonance imaging, 43

Man-Tended Free Flyer, 26, 82, 84

Megascience. See Large projects

Megascience Forum, 31, 32-33

MFE. See Magnetic Fusion Energy program

MFEEA. See Magnetic Fusion Energy Engineering

Act of 1980

Missile Technology Control Regime, 12, 51, 84, 100

Mission to Planet Earth, 39

Mobile Servicing System, 82

Moscow International Science and Technology

Center, 117

MSS. See Mobile Servicing System

MTFF. See Man-Tended Free Flyer

Multifrequency Imaging Microwave Radiometer, 83

Multimedia journals, 40

N

NASA. See National Aeronautics and Space

Administration

National Academy of Sciences, 81

National Aeronautics and Space Administration. See

also Space programs; specific programs by name

change in policy, 77
130 | International Partnerships in Large Science Projects

critical path issue, 75, 103

funding for projects, 80-82, 83-84

guidelines for international collaboration, 74,

103, 110

High-Resolution Imaging Spectrometer, 83

Mission to Planet Earth, 39

MOU with ESA, 20

results of collaborations, 82-85

specialized instrumentation collaborations, 8

National Center for Space Research, 116

National High Magnetic Field Laboratory, 6, 45

National Ignition Facility, 64

National Laboratory for High Energy Physics, 56,

122

National Oceanic and Atmospheric Administration,

72, 81

National Optical Astronomy Observatories, 96

National Science Foundation, 8, 95, 96, 102

National security issues, 110

Neutron sources

description, 86-87

history, 87-88

implications for the future, 88-90

reactors, 88

spallation sources, 4, 88, 89

Next Linear Collider, 16, 23, 58-59

NIF. See National Ignition Facility

NLC. See Next Linear Collider

Nobel prizes

economic and technological prowess of nations

receiving, 43

O

Oak Ridge National Laboratory, 68

Ocean Drilling Program, 10, 120

Ocean Topography Experiment, 73

OECD. See Organization for Economic Cooperation

and Development

1-MW pulsed spallation source, 89

Organization for Economic Cooperation and

Development, 31-33

Megascience Forum, 90

P

Pittsburgh and Midway Coal Mining Company, 19

Planet-B mission to Mars, 10

POEM. See Polar-Orbiting Earth Observation

Mission

Polar-Orbiting Earth Observation Mission, 81, 83-84

Polar-Orbiting Operational Environmental Satellite,

81

Press, Frank, 50

Princeton Plasma Physics Laboratory

fusion energy production, 61

TPX funding, 64

Q

Quayle, Dan, 75

R

Reagan, Ronald

ITER collaboration, 100

space station announcement, 79

Reagan Administration

SRC-II funding, 19

Russia, 72. See also Former Soviet Union

budget constraints, 117

Moscow International Science and Technology

Center, 117

R&D expenditures, 114, 117

science goals, 116-118

space station partnership, 12, 51, 78-80, 84,

94-95, 99, 101, 117

S&T budget, 117

S

SAR. See Synthetic aperture radar facility

Science and technology

German agreements, 115

large projects, 5-6

purpose of agreements, 51

Russian budget for, 117

U.S.-China agreement, 51, 119

U.S.-Russian agreement, 51

Science in the National Interest, 50

Scott Glaswerke, 97

Second Geneva Convention on the Peaceful Uses of

Atomic Energy, 64

Silicon tracking detector, 113

SLAC. See Stanford Linear Accelerator Center

Sociocultural issues, 110-111

Solvent Refined Coal II Demonstration Project, 18,

19, 104

Soviet Union. See Former Soviet Union; Russia

Space programs

budget constrictions of collaborating countries,

77

challenges of collaboration, 77-82

compartmentalized approach, 74, 75

current large U.S. projects, 73

future of collaboration, 85-86

history of collaboration, 75-77

international collaboration, 74-75

NASA guidelines, 74

NASA role, 72, 82-85

questions about U.S. funding for, 76

results of NASA collaborations, 83-85

Space station, 72, 73
Index | 131

Congressional debate over, 45

cooperative agreements, 79

description, 45

European commitment, 26-27

international contributions, 84

Japan’s role, 122

as lead country collaboration example, 10

multiyear funding, 22

reasons for size of project, 7

resentment among U.S. partners over lack of inclusion in plans, 78

Russian participation, 12, 51, 78-80, 84, 94-95,

99, 101

total estimated costs of, 4

United States as senior partner, 104

U.S. budget responsibilities for, 79

U.S. design changes, 18

Spacelab project, 76, 83, 95

Spallation sources, 4, 88, 89, 90

Special Purpose Dexterous Manipulator, 82

SPring-8. See Super Photon Ring-8

Sputnik satellites, 50

SRC-II. See Solvent Refined Coal II Demonstration

Project

SSC. See Superconducting Super Collider

S&T. See Science and technology

Standard Model of high-energy physics, 53-54

Stanford Linear Accelerator Center, 56, 122

Subaru telescope, 46, 97

Super Photon Ring-8, 91

Superconducting magnets, 110

Superconducting Super Collider

Congressional debate over, 24, 45, 51, 95

cost-sharing goal, 17, 24, 58

India’s proposed contribution to, 118

termination, 4, 18, 54-55, 98

Switzerland

CERN contracts, 108

LHC contribution dispute, 107-108

Synchrotron facilities

cooperative exchange agreements among new

facilities, 91-92

description, 86-87, 90

number of, 90-91

Synthetic aperture radar facility, 39

T

Technology transfer issue, 27-29, 109-110

TFTR. See Tokamak Fusion Test Reactor

Tokamak fusion reactors, 47

Tokamak Fusion Test Reactor, 61, 62, 69, 71

Tokamak Physics Experiment, 51, 64, 69-70, 71

Top quark verification experiments, 56-57

Topex-Poseidon, 95

TPX. See Tokamak Physics Experiment

TRIUMP facility, 120

Tropical Rainfall Measuring Mission, 81, 84

U

Ulysses, 20-21, 73, 76

United Kingdom

Gemini project, 96

LHC contribution dispute, 107-108

R&D expenditures, 114, 121

science goals, 120-121

United States. See also U.S. Congress; specific

agencies and projects by name

B-meson factory construction, 57, 121

budget impact of large science projects, 6

budget process, 18, 105

challenges of collaboration, 101-112

collaboration benefits, 93-101, 102

cost and benefit distribution, 107

experience in international scientific collaboration, 8-9

fusion energy research, 59-72

Gemini project, 17, 95, 96-97, 102, 120

high-energy physics collaboration, 51-59

leadership position goal, 30, 35, 49-50, 54, 74,

85, 102-104

Moscow International Science and Technology

Center funding, 117

necessity for upgrading facilities, 12

neutron sources and synchrotrons, 86-92

pressures to maintain control over collaborations,

77-78

R&D expenditures, 113, 114

reasons for collaboration, 9-13

science goals, 29-31, 49-51

space programs, 72-86

S&T agreement with China, 51, 119

S&T agreement with Soviet Union, 51

stability and reliability of funding for projects,

18-25, 35-36, 76, 81-82, 86, 98, 104-105,

106-107

superconducting magnet design, 110

technical reliability, 106-107

use of treaties to formalize collaborative commitments, 23

U.S.-China Agreement on Cooperation in Science

and Technology, 119

U.S. Congress

ANS discontinuation, 89

budget review, 81

funding priorities, 45, 51, 52

fusion budgets, 70

Gemini project funding, 17, 96, 102

issues and findings, 14-35
132 | International Partnerships in Large Science Projects

perceived preference for international collaboration, 95, 98

review of U.S. science goals, 35

space station funding, 22

U.S. Department of Energy. See also High Energy

Physics Advisory Panel

Advanced Neutron Source, 88, 89

fusion research programs, 62-63

FY 1996 budget for high-energy physics facilities, 59

magnetic fusion energy program, 18, 20

Solvent Refined Coal II Demonstration Project,

19

spallation source design study, 88-89

specialized instrumentation collaborations, 8

U.S. contribution to LHC project, 58

U.S. Global Change Research Program, 11, 39, 41

USGCRP. See U.S. Global Change Research

Program

V

Vice President’s Space Policy Advisory Board, 75

“Virtual” experimental communities, 40

W

Watkins, James, 70