UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS FOR THE TENTH CIRCUIT

________________ _________________ RONALD C. CALHOUN, Petitioner - Appellant,

v. CAROLYN W. COLVIN, Acting Commissioner Social Security Administration, Respondent - Appellee. No. 15-1285 (D.C. No. 1:13- CV-02837-CBS) (D. Colo.)

________________ _________________ ORDER AND JUDGMENT *

________________ _________________ Before GORSUCH , McKAY , and BACHARACH , Circuit Judges.

________________ _________________ Ronald C. Calhoun appeals from the denial of his motion to extend the time to file a notice of appeal in his Social Security case. Exercising jurisdiction under 28 U.S.C. § 1291 and 42 U.S.C. § 405(g), we affirm in part and dismiss in part. Mr. Calhoun worked as a civil engineer a nd mechanical engineer. In 1995, he was awarded Social Security disability benefi ts because of kidney disease. After he received a kidney transplant, his cond ition improved, and his benefits were

* After examining the briefs and appellate record, th is panel has determined unanimously that oral argument would not ma terially assist in the determination of this appeal. See Fed. R. App. P. 34(a)(2); 10th Cir. R. 34.1(G). The case is therefore ordered submitted without oral argument. This order and judgment is not binding precedent, except under the doctr ines of law of the case, res judicata, and collateral estoppel. It may be cite d, however, for its persuasi ve value consistent with Fed. R. App. P. 32.1 and 10th Cir. R. 32.1. FILED United States Court of Appeals Tenth Circuit 

### February 11, 2016
Elisabeth A. Shumaker Clerk of Court2 terminated (effective Septembe r 2003) in a 2005 decision. He did not appeal at the time, but since then he has tried to challenge that termination by filing new applications for benefits and raising the issue in those proceedings. He does not contend that he is unable to work; to the co ntrary, he concedes th at he is physically able to work. The real i ssue, he asserts, is that his benefits were improperly terminated in 2005. This appeal arises from an April 2, 2013, administrative law judge decision denying a 2011 application fo r benefits. That decisi on became the Commissioner’s final decision when the Appeals Council deni ed review. Mr. Calhoun appealed to the district court, where he cons ented to have a magistrate judge preside over the case. He again challenged the 2005 termination of benefits. On March 24, 2015, the magistrate judge held that he could not consider the termination because the only administrative decision prope rly before the district c ourt was the 2013 denial of benefits. The magistrate j udge affirmed the 2013 decision. On May 26, 2015, Mr. Calhoun inquired as to the status of the case. The next day, on May 27, the court informed him th e case had been decided and enclosed a copy of the March 24 decision. Mr. Ca lhoun received this ma iling by the end of May. On June 29, he moved for an exte nsion of time to appeal from the March 24 decision. Identifying Fed. R. App. P. 4( a)(5) and 4(a)(6) as the only sources of authority to grant an extension, the magi strate judge determin ed that Mr. Calhoun could satisfy neither rule and denied relief. Mr. Calhoun th en appealed to this court.3 Although Mr. Calhoun proceeds pro se, he must “follow the same rules of procedure that govern other litigants.” Garrett v. Selby Connor Maddux & Janer , 425 F.3d 836, 84 0 (10th Cir. 2005) (internal quotation marks om itted). “[T]he timely filing of a notice of appeal in a civil case is a jurisdictional requirement.” Bowles v. Russell , 551 U.S. 205, 214 (2007). The only time ly notice of appeal relates to the July 6, 2015, order denying the extension, and so that is the only order before this court for review. We have no jurisdiction to review the district court’s March 24 merits decision. Mr. Calhoun argues he was denied due pr ocess because he was not notified of the March 24 decision in a timely manner. He complains that there is no proof that the court mailed the decision to the correct addr ess. But even assuming Mr. Calhoun did not receive a copy of the March 24 d ecision until the court responded on May 27, Mr. Calhoun was afforded due process. Fed. R. Civ. P. 77(d)(2) provides that “[l]ack of notice of the entry does not affect the time for appeal or relieve—or authorize the court to relieve—a party for failing to appeal within th e time allowed, except as allowed by Federal Rule of Appellate Procedure 4(a).” Fe d. R. App. P. 4(a)(5) allows the district court to grant an extension if a party moves for one within 30 days of the expiration of the original appeal period. And Fed. R. App. P. 4(a)(6 ) preserves a party’s ri ght to appeal if the party did not receive a court judgment—so l ong as the party acts within 180 days of the decision or 14 days of receiving actua l notice of the decision, whichever is earlier. Mr. Calhoun acknowledges receivi ng a copy of the March 24 decision by the4 end of May. If he had promptly filed hi s motion for an extension, he would have been eligible for relief under either Rule 4(a)(5) or 4(a)(6 ). But he did not file his motion until June 29, more than 30 days afte r his original appeal period expired and more than 14 days after he r eceived the March 24 decision. Because of this delay, by the time he filed his motion for extension, the magistrate judge had no power to grant it. Mr. Calhoun’s inability to appeal th e March 24 decision thus was caused by his own delay, not a failu re of process. Mr. Calhoun also seeks to attack the Ma rch 24 merits decision, asserting that he was denied due process because the magistrate judge misconstrued his case, complaining that the magistrate judge ru led differently than the district judge previously assigned to the case, and raising issues related to th e 2005 termination of benefits. But as stated, the only decision properly before th is court is the denial of the extension of time to app eal. Because we la ck jurisdiction to review the March 24 merits decision, we do not address these arguments. The district court’s July 6, 2015, orde r denying an extension of time to appeal is affirmed. The arguments as to the March 24, 2015, d ecision are dismissed for lack of jurisdiction.

Entered for the Court
Monroe G. McKay Circuit Judge