UNPUBLISHED

UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS

FOR THE FOURTH CIRCUIT

No. 12-4978

UNITED STATES OF AMERICA,

Plaintiff - Appellee,

v.

RAFAEL HERNANDEZ-RODRIGUEZ,

Defendant - Appellant.

Appeal from the United States District Court for the Middle 

District of North Carolina, at Greensboro. William L. Osteen, 

Jr., Chief District Judge. (1:11-cr-00309-WO-5)

Submitted: September 24, 2013 Decided: October 1, 2013

Before NIEMEYER, KING, and FLOYD, Circuit Judges.

Affirmed by unpublished per curiam opinion.

Louis C. Allen III, Federal Public Defender, Gregory Davis, 

Senior Litigator, Winston-Salem, North Carolina, for Appellant. 

Randall Stuart Galyon, OFFICE OF THE UNITED STATES ATTORNEY, 

Greensboro, North Carolina, for Appellee.

Unpublished opinions are not binding precedent in this circuit.
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PER CURIAM:

Rafael Hernandez-Rodriguez pled guilty, pursuant to a 

written plea agreement, to conspiracy to distribute five 

kilograms or more of cocaine, in violation of 21 U.S.C. § 846 

(2006). The district court sentenced Hernandez-Rodriguez to 121 

months’ imprisonment, and he timely appeals. 

Counsel for Hernandez-Rodriguez has filed a brief 

pursuant to Anders v. California, 386 U.S. 738 (1967), stating 

that there are no meritorious issues for appeal but questioning 

(1) whether the district court erred in denying HernandezRodriguez’s motion to suppress evidence found in a traffic stop 

of his vehicle; and (2) whether Hernandez-Rodriguez’s sentence 

is substantively reasonable. Hernandez-Rodriguez, informed of 

his right to file a pro se supplemental brief, has not done so. 

Finding no merit to either issue raised by counsel, we affirm.

In the first issue, Hernandez-Rodriguez seeks to 

challenge the constitutionality of a traffic stop of a vehicle 

driven by Hernandez-Rodriguez that resulted in the discovery of 

a quantity of cocaine. Hernandez-Rodriguez did not, however, 

enter a conditional guilty plea pursuant to Fed. R. Crim. P. 

11(a)(2), by which he could have preserved this issue for 

appeal. A knowing and voluntary guilty plea forecloses all 

antecedent, nonjurisdictional defects “not logically 

inconsistent with the valid establishment of factual guilt and 
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which do not stand in the way of conviction if factual guilt is 

validly established.” Menna v. New York, 423 U.S. 61, 62 n.2

(1975); see Tollett v. Henderson, 411 U.S. 258, 267 (1973); 

United States v. Moussaoui, 591 F.3d 263, 279 (4th Cir. 2010) 

(“[T]he defendant who has pled guilty has no non-jurisdictional 

ground upon which to attack that judgment except the inadequacy 

of the plea or the government’s power to bring any indictment at 

all.” (internal quotation marks omitted)). The legality of the 

traffic stop underlying this conviction and whether HernandezRodriguez was “in custody” as that term is defined in Miranda v. 

Arizona, 384 U.S. 436 (1966), are just such antecedent, 

nonjurisdictional issues, and Hernandez-Rodriguez is therefore 

entitled to no relief on his first claim.

Counsel next challenges the substantive reasonableness 

of Hernandez-Rodriguez’s sentence of 121 months’ imprisonment, 

the bottom of the applicable Sentencing Guidelines range. We 

review the sentence for reasonableness “under a deferential 

abuse-of-discretion standard.” Gall v. United States, 552 U.S. 

38, 41 (2007). A sentence is procedurally reasonable if the 

court properly calculates the defendant’s advisory Guidelines 

range, gives the parties an opportunity to argue for an 

appropriate sentence, considers the 18 U.S.C. § 3553(a) (2006) 

factors, does not rely on clearly erroneous facts, and 

sufficiently explains the selected sentence. Id. at 49–51. Our 
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review of the sentencing transcript pursuant to Anders convinces 

us that Hernandez-Rodriguez’s sentence is procedurally 

reasonable.

As to substantive reasonableness, the 121-month 

sentence, at the bottom of Hernandez-Rodriguez’s properlycalculated Guidelines range, is entitled to a presumption of 

reasonableness, United States v. Strieper, 666 F.3d 288, 295 

(4th Cir. 2012), which Hernandez-Rodriguez has not rebutted. 

See United States v. Montes-Pineda, 445 F.3d 375, 379 (4th Cir. 

2006) (“A defendant can only rebut the presumption by 

demonstrating that the sentence is unreasonable when measured 

against the [18 U.S.C.] § 3553(a) factors.” (internal quotation 

marks and alteration omitted)). The district court therefore 

did not abuse its discretion and imposed a reasonable sentence.

In accordance with Anders, we have reviewed the 

remainder of the record in this case and have found no 

meritorious issues for appeal. We therefore affirm the district 

court’s judgment. This court requires that counsel inform

Hernandez-Rodriguez, in writing, of the right to petition the 

Supreme Court of the United States for further review. If 

Hernandez-Rodriguez requests that a petition be filed, but 

counsel believes that such a petition would be frivolous, then 

counsel may move in this court for leave to withdraw from 
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representation. Counsel’s motion must state that a copy thereof 

was served on Hernandez-Rodriguez.

We dispense with oral argument because the facts and 

legal contentions are adequately presented in the materials 

before this court and argument would not aid the decisional 

process.

AFFIRMED