UNPUBLISHED

UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS

FOR THE FOURTH CIRCUIT

No. 10-4954

UNITED STATES OF AMERICA,

Plaintiff – Appellee,

v.

OLUSOLA IDOWU,

Defendant - Appellant.

Appeal from the United States District Court for the District of 

Maryland, at Baltimore. Marvin J. Garbis, Senior District 

Judge. (1:09-cr-00298-MJG-1)

Submitted: August 4, 2011 Decided: August 24, 2011

Before WILKINSON, DAVIS, and WYNN, Circuit Judges.

Affirmed by unpublished per curiam opinion.

James Wyda, Federal Public Defender, Susan A. Hensler, Staff 

Attorney, Baltimore, Maryland, for Appellant. Rod J. Rosenstein, 

United States Attorney, Peter M. Nothstein, Bonnie S. Greenberg, 

Assistant United States Attorneys, Baltimore, Maryland, for 

Appellee.

Unpublished opinions are not binding precedent in this circuit.
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PER CURIAM:

Olusola Idowu appeals from her wire fraud convictions, 

asserting that the district court improperly instructed the jury 

on the materiality of the false statements transmitted by wire. 

The charged wire fraud concerned loan applications transmitted 

in 2004 and 2005 and containing false information regarding 

income and assets. Idowu’s defense at trial was that the false 

statements at issue were not material because, in 2004 and 2005, 

mortgage funders did not rely on these statements as lenders 

were just hoping to make a quick profit and sell the mortgages. 

Finding the jury instructions were proper, we affirm.

Idowu claims the district court erred by not using the 

materiality instruction she provided to the court, which 

specified that the false statements must have been material to a 

reasonable person approving mortgage loans in 2004 and 2005. 

Idowu asserts that the failure to give this instruction impaired 

her ability to mount an effective defense because the jury was 

not directed to consider the relevant time frame. Idowu 

contends that her defense rested on the drastic difference in 

underwriting standards during the relevant time period, when 

compared to today, and that the court’s instruction was not 

specific enough to alert the jury to the issue. 

The Government notes that Iduwo did not object to the 

district court’s jury instructions when given the opportunity 
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and thus review is for plain error. Iduwo claims that her 

request for a different instruction was sufficient to preserve 

her objection. Iduwo is incorrect. 

In United States v. Nicolaou, 180 F.3d 565, 569 (4th 

Cir. 1999), we reviewed for plain error the Appellant’s claim 

that the jury instruction was improper. Like in this case, the 

Appellant submitted a proposed instruction but did not object 

when the court gave different instructions to the jury. Under 

Rule 30 of the Federal Rules of Criminal Procedure, objections 

to the jury instructions or to the failure to give a requested 

instruction must be specific and the court must be informed of 

the grounds for objection before the jury retires to deliberate. 

Under Rule 30, “[f]ailure to object in accordance with this rule 

precludes appellate review” except for plain error. 

By virtue of not objecting to the district court’s 

materiality instruction, Idowu failed to preserve her claim. 

Thus, our review is for plain error. See also United States v. 

Arthurs, 73 F.3d 444, 447-48 (1st Cir. 1996) (requiring strict 

compliance with Rule 30 and holding that pre-charge colloquy or 

written objections will not suffice; an objection is required 

after the jury is charged and before the jury retires). Under 

the plain error standard, Idowu must show: (1) there was error; 

(2) the error was plain; and (3) the error affected her

substantial rights. United States v. Olano, 507 U.S. 725, 
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732-34 (1993). When these conditions are satisfied, we may 

exercise our discretion to notice the error only if the error 

“seriously affect[s] the fairness, integrity or public 

reputation of judicial proceedings.” Id. at 736 (internal 

quotation marks omitted). The burden of showing plain error is 

on the defendant. United States v. Strickland, 245 F.3d 368, 

379-80 (4th Cir. 2001). 

Initially, we note that Idowu does not address the 

plain error review standard in her brief and thus fails to 

support her burden of establishing plain error. In fact, in her 

reply brief, Idowu does not dispute that she cannot show plain 

error. She rests solely on her contention that plain error 

review does not apply.

In any event, Idowu has failed to show any error, much 

less plain error. The district court gave a legally correct 

instruction on materiality which was the functional equivalent 

of Idowu’s requested instruction. Idowu’s assertion of error 

rests on her conclusion that the jury was not properly 

instructed that materiality should be viewed in light of what a 

reasonable and prudent lender would have relied upon in 2004 and 

2005. However, the instruction given informed the jurors that 

they were to consider a reasonable and prudent lender in the 

circumstances of those who decided whether to make the loans at 

issue. As the loans at issue were made in 2004 and 2005, the 
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jury was instructed, albeit in different words, as Idowu 

requested. See United States v. Lighty, 616 F.3d 321, 366 (4th 

Cir. 2010) (holding that this court will reverse for failure to 

give requested instruction only if requested instruction was not 

substantially covered by the court’s charge).

Moreover, even had the instruction been improper, 

Idowu has failed to make any showing as to the remaining prongs 

of the plain error test. Accordingly, we affirm Idowu’s wire 

fraud convictions. We dispense with oral argument because the 

facts and legal contentions are adequately presented in the 

materials before the court and argument would not aid the 

decisional process.

AFFIRMED