Automated Record Checks for Firearm

Purchasers: Issues and Options

July 1991

OTA-TCT-497

NTIS order #PB91-219980

GPO stock #052-003-01247-2
Recommended Citation:

U.S. Congress, Office of Technology Assessment, Automated Record Checks of Firearm

Purchasers: Issues and Options, OTA-TCT-497 (Washington, DC: U.S. Government Printing

Office, July 1991).

For sale by the Superintendent of Documents

U.S. Government Printing Office, Washington, DC 20402-9325

(order form can be found in the back of this report)
Foreword

About 70 million Americans own an estimated 200 million firearms. All but a few are

law-abiding citizens who use firearms for hunting, sports shooting, gun collections, and self

protection. This report focuses on automated checks of criminal records to identify the small

percentage of persons who are prohibited from purchasing firearms under Federal law because

they have been charged or convicted of a disqualifying offense or are fugitives from justice.

Perhaps one-third of the most violent crimes involve the use of firearms. Most of these

crimes are committed by repeat offenders who are legally prohibited from purchasing or

possessing firearms. The firearm purchaser record check will not necessarily keep firearms

from the hands of determined criminals, but it can make it tougher for criminals to obtain

firearms from licensed gun dealers.

Our report assesses the proposals and prospects for automated checks, ranging from the

point-of-sale “instant” check now used by the State of Virginia, to the establishment of a

computerized national felons file, to live scanning of fingerprints, or the issuance of ‘smart’

cards to identify firearm purchasers. It considers the benefits, costs, and risks of automated

checks. The report examines the relationship between automated record checks and waiting

periods, the wide variability in State criminal record systems, and the challenges of improving

the automation and quality of record systems.

This study was requested by Sen. Howard Metzenbaum, Chairman, Subcommittee on

Antitrust, Monopolies, and Business Rights, Senate Committee on the Judiciary.

OTA benefited from discussion at an April 1991 OTA workshop, comments on earlier

drafts by many firearm and criminal record experts, and prior reports on this topic prepared

by or for the U.S. Department of Justice, OTA appreciates the assistance of the Federal Bureau

of Investigation; Bureau of Justice Statistics; Bureau of Alcohol, Tobacco, and Firearms; State

and local law enforcement and criminal justice agencies; and groups representing gun owners,

dealers, manufacturers, and others concerned with the use, regulation, and distribution of

firearms in the United States. The report is, however, solely the responsibility of OTA and not

of those who assisted us.

- Directo r

.,, Ill
Automated Record Checks of Firearm Purchasers:

Issues and Options

John Andelin, Assistant Director, OTA

Science, Information, and Natural Resources Division

James W. Curlin, Program Manager

Telecommunication and Computing Technologies Program

Project Staff

Fred B. Wood, Project Director

Administrative Staff

Liz Emanuel, Office Administrator

Jo Anne Price, Secretary

Karolyn St. Clair, Secretary
Automated Firearm Purchaser Checks

Workshop Participants

April 22, 1991

Bill Bridgewater Mary Kaaren Jolly

National Alliance of Stocking Gun Dealers Institute for Legislative Action

George Butterfield

National Rifle Association

National School Safety Center Max Krupo

Don Cahill Metropolitan Police Department, District of Columbia

Fraternal Order of Police Gary D. McAlvey

Prince William County Police Dept. Bureau of Identification

Lynn Cheatwood Illinois State Police

Firearms Division Larry Pratt

Bureau of Alcohol, Tobacco, and Firearms Gun Owners of America

Gary R. Cooper

SEARCH Group, Inc.

Patrick J. Doyle Criminal Justice Information Systems

Florida Department of Law Enforcement

Richard Feldman

American Shooting Sports Coalition

Janlori Goldman

Dean Renfrow

Criminal Investigative Division

Oregon State Police

Shelley Rife

Property and Firearms Information

California Department of Justice

Maurice Ross

U.S. Department of Justice

Privacy and Technology Project R. Lewis Vass

American Civil Liberties Union Virginia State Police

Bernie Horn Virgil L. Young, Jr.

State legislation Identification Division

Handgun Control, Inc. Federal Bureau of Investigation

NOTE: OTA appreciates and is grateful for the valuable assistance and thoughtful critiques provided by the workshop participants.

The workshop participants do not, however, necessarily approve, disapprove, or endorse this report. OTA assumes full

responsibility for the report and the accuracy of its contents.

v
Reviewers and Contributors

James R. Amos

Records and Information Services

Pennsylvania State Police

Keith Bea

Congressional Research Service

Kier T. Boyd

Federal Bureau of Investigation

Robert Bradley

Information Services

Missouri State Highway Patrol

Gray Buckley

Colorado Bureau of Investigation

Bruce Cavanaugh

Krasne’s Gun Shop, San Diego, CA

Rick Cook

Firearms Division

Bureau of Alcohol, Tobacco, and Firearms

William C. Corley

Criminal Information

North Carolina Bureau of Identification

Gail Hoffman

Handgun Control, Inc.

Richard Jankowski

New Jersey State Police

John Jones

Bureau of Justice Statistics

Emanuel Kapelsohn

American Shooting Sports Coalition

Carol Kaplan

Statistical and Information Policy

Bureau of Justice Statistics

Stanley Klein

Federal Bureau of Investigation

Neal Knox

The Firearms Coalition

Ronald L. Lulfs

Delaware State Police

Charles Mandigo

Federal Bureau of Investigation

Gene P. Marlin

Illinois State Police

Thomas J. McGreevy

Georgia Crime Information Center

Paul McNulty

Policy Development

U.S. Department of Justice

Karen Michell

Bureau of Alcohol, Tobacco, and Firearms

Jack Patterson

Bureau of Alcohol, Tobacco, and Firearms

Dallas G. Piper

Central Records

Michigan State Police

Bernie Shipley

Bureau of Justice Statistics

Douglas A. Smith

Criminal Identification

California Department of Justice

John Snyder

Citizens Committee for the Right to Keep

and Bear Arms

Ron Stillwell

Colt Manufacturing Co., Inc.

John E. Stoos

Gun Owners of California

Elmer H. Tippitt

Maryland State Police

Velva Walter

Office of Justice Programs

U.S. Department of Justice

Joan Winston

Office of Technology Assessment

Fred Wynbrandt

California Department of Justice

NOTE:

vi

OTA appreciates and is grateful for the valuable assistance and thoughtful critiques provided by the reviewers. The reviewers

do not, however, necessarily approve, disapprove, or endorse this report. OTA assumes full responsibility for the report and

the accuracy of its contents.
Contents

Page

Overview, Summary, and Introduction .o*ooo. .**. ..0* ooeo. eo*o***   ... ..**  *.@* *.*. o. . 1

Overview . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1

summary . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 4

Record Quality . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 4

National Felon File . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 5

National Crime Information Center (NCIC) . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 6

Fingerprint Identification . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 6

waiting Periods . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 6

Overall Effectiveness . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 8

Other Record Check Realities . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 8

Introduction . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . ......... . 10

The Debate Over Criminal Record Checks .....00. .0..0...0 ● .0...... ● 0.....0. . . . . . . . . . 13

The Proposals and Prospects for Automated Record Checks ● ..*.**.* ● *...***.. .......0 19

Point-of-Sale (POS) Systems . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . ... 19

How POS Checks Work . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 19

The Problem of Record Quality . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 21

The Problem of Positive Identification-the Promise of Live Scans . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 23

National Felons File . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 24

Smart Cards . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 26

Automated Record Checks and Waiting Periods . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 27

How Waiting Periods Work . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 27

State Computerized Criminal History (CCH) Files-A Key Prerequisite . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 28

Wide Variability in State CCH Systems . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 29

Problem offending . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 30

Challenge of Improving Record Quality . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 33

Crosscutting Issues . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . ....*...** . . . . . . . . . . ...*****.* ....***.** ● .******. 37

Value of Criminal Record Checks . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 37

Valueof Waiting Periods for Record Checks . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 41

Value of Fingerprint Identification . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 45

Value of the National Fingerprint File/Interstate Identification Index (NFF/III) . . . . . . . . . . . 48

Value of a Firearm Safety and Security Education Program . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 49

Box

Box Page

A. Federal Firearms Purchaser Prohibitions . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1

Figures

Figure Page

l. Violent Crime by Type of Weapon,1989 . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 10

2. Number of Federal Firearms Licenses, 1975-90 . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 14

3. Automated Criminal Record Checks of Firearm Purchasers: An Overview . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 20

4. Telephone “Instant” Check by Gun Dealers . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 22

5. Automation of State Criminal History Records, 1989 . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 29

6. Final Dispositions in State Criminal History Files, 1989 . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 29

7. Typesof Crim‘ inal History Information Submitted to State Repositories, 1989 . . . . . . . . . . . 34

vii
Figure Page

8. Interstate Movement of Firearms: The Case of Boston, MA, October 1989 to

June 1990 . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 38

9. Interstate Movement of Firearms: The Case of New York City, 1987-90 . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 39

10. Homicides by Type of Firearm, 1989 . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 40

11. State-by-State Capabilities To Support Automated Firearm Purchaser Checks:

Automated Records and Final Dispositions, 1989 . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 43

12. State-by-State Capabilities To Support Automated Firearm Purchaser Checks:

Automated Name Index and Felony Flags, 1989 . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 44

13. Arrests Supported by Fingerprints in State Criminal History Files, 1989 . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 47

14. Firearm Death Rates per 100,000 Population, Males 15 to 19 Years Old, 1979-88 . . . . . . . 49

Tables

Table Page

1. Maximum Time Periods Required for Initial Firearm Purchase by State Resident . . . . . . . . . 27

2. Average Time Required To Receive and Enter Final Dispositions Into State Criminal

History Records, 1989 . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 34

3. Average Time Required To Receive and Enter Arrest Information Into State Criminal

. . . . . . . . .

History Records, 1989 . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 34

viii
Overview, Summary, and Introduction

Overview

Record checks of firearm purchasers are intended

to make it tougher for criminals and certain other

individuals to obtain guns from licensed firearm

dealers. Federal law prohibits the sale of firearms to

persons convicted of a felony offense (see box A for

other prohibitions), but does not require a criminal

records check.

Proposals for criminal record checks-manual or

automated—must be considered in light of the

realities of firearms ownership: 1) the vast majority

of persons purchasing firearms from gun dealers are

law-abiding citizens who use firearms for sport,

collection, or protection; 2) the estimated 200”

million firearms already in circulation would not be

affected by record checks unless resold through

licensed dealers; and 3) criminals also get guns from

other sources, e.g., thefts, sales by individuals, and

the black market. Thus criminal record checks-by

themselves-will not prevent criminals from getting

firearms. Checks can, however, reduce dealer sales

to disqualified persons and complement other crime

controls (e.g., stiffer, mandatory sentences for firearms offenses; clampdown on illegal gun trafficking; tighter security by gun dealers and owners).

Automated checks of up-to-date criminal records,

if available, can quickly and accurately determine if

purchasers have a disqualifying criminal record.

Automated checks could be made at the point-ofsale, during waiting periods, or while processing

applications for permit-to-purchase cards. Automated checks could reduce the purchase delay

caused by the need to conduct manual record checks

of purchasers. Record checks, automated or manual,

are quicker when record quality is high and when

prospective firearms purchasers can be accurately

identified.

The capability to conduct automated checks of

criminal records varies widely among States. State

or national point-of-sale “instant” checks would

require substantially automated, complete, and up-todate files of persons convicted of felony offenses.

But State and FBI criminal history files have major

gaps in automation and record completeness.

A felony arrest is not, of itself, disqualifying

under Federal firearms law. The prospective firearms purchaser must be convicted of the offense, or

Box A—Federal Firearms Purchaser

Prohibitions

The following are prohibited from purchasing or

receiving firearms (or ammunition):

1. persons under indictment for a crime punishable by imprisonment for a term exceeding 1

year (defined as a felony in most States; under

Federal law, a misdemeanor punishable by

more than 2 years imprisonment also is

disqualifying);

2. persons convicted of such a crime;

3. fugitives from justice (persons who have fled

from any State to avoid prosecution for any

crime);

4. unlawful users of any controlled substance;

5. persons adjudicated as mentally defective or

committed to any mental institution;

6. illegal aliens;

7. persons dishonorably discharged from military service; and

8. denunciates of U.S. citizenship.

SOURCE: 18 U.S.C. 44, secs. 921 and 922.

formally charged (i.e., by a prosecutor or grand jury),

to be disqualified. A felony arrest is not disqualifying if: 1) the police subsequently drop charges; 2) the

prosecutor declines to bring charges; or 3) the court

dismisses the charges or finds the defendant not

guilty.

Nationwide, one-third of the final outcomes

(“dispositions”) of arrest cases are estimated to be

missing from criminal history records. Some States

do much better than average; others much worse.

Given time, missing dispositions usually can be

located by checking with police, prosecutors, or

courts. But firearm purchaser decisions made at the

point-of-sale do not allow time to locate missing

information.

Because of these missing dispositions, firearm

purchasers with felony arrest records alone (i.e., not

convicted or formally charged) could be initially

disapproved, but would eventually be found qualified after verification. This would inconvenience

those whose purchases were thus delayed. If, on the

other hand, disapprovals were based on listed felony

convictions only, many purchasers who should be

disqualified would be approved. This poses a

-1-
2 ● Automated Record Checks of Firearm Purchasers: Issues and Options

particular dilemma for States with low levels of

disposition reporting.

The FBI’s computerized Interstate Identification

Index (III) could be used as a national felon file by

“flagging” (with a special indicator) the index

entries of all persons with disqualifying convictions.

State or local law enforcement agencies could then

run national criminal history record checks on

firearms purchasers by querying the III. But the

quality of III information is only as good as the

quality of State criminal history records. States

would first need to ensure that their own criminal

history records are complete and up-to-date. This is

not generally the case today. And neither the III or

most State files distinguish between persons arrested

and those formally charged.

Point-of-sale checks are presently based on the

purchaser’s name and personal identifiers (e.g., date

of birth, sex, height) but not on fingerprint identification-considered by many criminal justice officials to be the only reliable positive identification.

But the few States with instant checks have not

reported problems with phony identification.

The time and resources that would be needed to

perform automated checks depends on the level of

record quality desired and whether and how fingerprint checks are included. Building the systems to

support reasonably complete and accurate ‘instant’

name checks of State and Federal criminal history

records probably would take several years and $200

to $300 million. Other options would take longer

and cost more-up to several billion dollars over a

decade for point-of-sale electronic fingerprint

checks.

The time needed for thorough criminal record

checks should decline in the future, if Federal and

State resources continue to be applied. In a few

States, “instant” checks seem practical today; in

many, waiting periods of several days (and sometimes weeks) are needed to check a combination of

manual and automated records. Over time, more

States can be expected to develop the capabilities

needed for instant checks. The average waiting time

could correspondingly shorten, assuming States did

not retain gun purchase waiting periods for other

reasons (e.g., cooling off, checks of noncriminal

justice records).

Several related automated record check issues

warrant congressional consideration:

All record check systems need to ensure

privacy, security, and protect constitutional

rights. Many gun owners consider the right to

keep and bear arms a fundamental freedom.

Record check systems can be designed to

prevent the listing of law-abiding gun owners

and guns and to prohibit or severely limit

access by gun dealers to the actual criminal

record information of would-be purchasers.

Good record quality, quick response, and fast

verification of initial disapprovals can be required to protect the rights of firearm purchasers. Periodic audits, simple and speedy appeal

procedures, and appropriate sanctions may be

needed to help ensure compliance and public

confidence.

Knowledge of how and where criminals obtain

firearms is limited. The National Institute of

Justice (NIJ), Bureau of Justice Statistics (BJS),

FBI, and Bureau of Alcohol, Tobacco, and

Firearms (BATF could sponsor research on

firearms purchases in States and at gun shows

(or other outlets) that do not use record checks,

and on the use of phony identification in

firearm purchases. BATF could conduct more

frequent criminal record checks of licensed

firearms dealers, possibly including fingerprint

checks.

Difficult as criminal record checks may be, the

challenges posed by checking other types of

records are even greater. NIJ and BJS could

sponsor research on how to check for other

types of persons disqualified from purchasing

firearms (e.g., illegal drug users, illegal aliens,

persons coremitted to mental hospitals).

The U.S. Department of Justice does not have

a detailed, coordinated plan for implementing

automated firearm purchaser record checks.

The Bureau of Justice Assistance (BJA) and

BJS could conduct a State-by-State examination of: needed improvements in criminal

record systems; the cost of needed improvements; how quickly (and by how much) these

improvements might reduce record check response time, and improve completeness and

accuracy; and State actions necessary to fully

implement the FBI’s III and related National

Fingerprint File (NFF). The results could form

the basis for a phased implementation of

automated record checks.
Automated Record Checks of Firearm Purchasers: Issues and Options ● 3

Photo credits: Virginia State Police

Top left

A licensed firearms dealer calls the Virginia State Police

toll-free 800 number to obtain a criminal records check on

a prospective firearms purchaser. Dealers typically receive

an initial approval or disapproval from the State Police in

less than 2 minutes.

Top right

A Virginia State Police operator conducts an immediate

check of State and Federal computerized criminal records

while the firearms dealer waits on the phone line.

Operators are on duty 8 a.m. to 10 p.m., 7 days a week.

Bottom Ieft

Computerized criminal history records checked by the

Virginia State Police include information on the arresting

agency, date, charge, and, when available, disposition for

each arrest.
4 ● Automated Record Checks of Firearm Purchasers: Issues and Options

Summary

Every day at least 20,000 new or used firearms are

sold by federally licensed firearm dealers in the

United States.l The vast majority are sold to

law-abiding citizens .

2 Federal law prohibits persons

convicted of a felony offense from purchasing

firearms. 3 Despite this prohibition, a small percentage of purchasers-in the range of 1 to 2 percent—

may be convicted felons. This could add up to tens

of thousands of firearms per year going from dealers

unknowingly to criminals. Anyone purchasing firearms from federally licensed gun dealers must

complete a Federal form4 and state whether he or she

has been convicted of a felony. But Federal law does

not require a criminal records check to verify if the

information provided is true and accurate. Checks of

criminal records are intended to help prevent illegal

firearm purchases. Some States require record

checks; others do not.

Record checks using manual, labor-intensive

systems take days to weeks.5 Automated systems

can cut the time to hours, minutes, or even seconds.

The State of Virginia has an operational point-ofsale (POS) system that checks computerized State

criminal history (and State and Federal wanted

person)6 records for every firearm purchase called in

on an 800 telephone number by licensed dealers. The

Virginia State Police conducts the record. checks and

provides a response to dealers within about 90

seconds that the sale is either approved or disapproved (subject to verification).

Can what appears to work for Virginia work for

other States and the entire Nation? Virginia is one of

only a few States that have all the necessary components of an automated POS record check system:

a fully computerized name index of criminal offenders; a substantially computerized criminal history

(CCH) file; a high level of disposition reporting (in

Virginia, 95 percent for recent arrests); and flagging

(in the computer file) of offenders with felony

convictions. Many States lack one or more of these

components and will need significant time and

resources to build the infrastructure to support POS

record checks. The challenge will be greatest for

roughly half the States that still have a very

incomplete CCH file or a very low percentage of

final dispositions (e.g., less than 50 percent automated records [21 States], less than 50 percent

disposition reporting [13 States] ).8

Record Quality

High criminal record quality is the key to success

of POS systems. Even the Virginia system is not

perfect. For every 100 firearm purchasers in Virginia, 94 are approved within seconds, based on

record checks that show no criminal activity. The

other 6 are initially disapproved. Only one or two of

the six initial disapprovals are confirmed, on the

average. The other four or five are ‘‘false positives,’ meaning the initial disapproval was based

IA~~Ues 7.5 ~ion annual sales of new and used f~~> as estimated by the Bureau of AlcohoL Tobacco, and Firearms (BA~. Some gun owner

groups believe the BATF estimate is low; the uncertainty lies in estimating used gun sales.

zMostuse fuem forh~fig, ~o~ shoo~, gun Collwting, gunsmithing, or personal protection. For an overview, seew.s. J~ett (ed.)~ ~~ooter’s

BibZe 1991, No. 82 (South Hackensack, NJ: Stoeger Publishing CO., 1990); K. Warner (cd.), Gun Digest 1991, 45th annual ed. (lJorthbroo~ IL: DBI

Books, Inc., 1990); and the numerous books, periodicals, associations, and directories cited therein.

318 us-c. 44, s=. 922@ ~d sec. 921(a)(20) sate tit a disq-ingconviction s~l & for a crime punishable by imprisonment for a term

exceeding 1 year, or a misdemeanor punishable by imprisonment for a term exceeding 2 years. 18 U.S.C. 44, sec. 922(d) and (g) prohibit f~

purchases by: persons formally charged (under indictment or information) as well as convicted of a felony offense (as defiied above), fugitives ffom

justice, users of illegal drugs, persons adjudicated as mental defective or committed to mental institutions, illegal aliens, dishonorably discharged

military service personne~ and those who have renounced U.S. citizenship.

4~om as BATF FOMI 4473.

s,, R=ordchWb, refer tO ch~k of c-records based on the purchaser’s name and identi.tiers (e.g., sex, date of birth) but not on the purchaser’s

fingerprints. The time required for manual name checks typically ranges from hours to days but can take up to 2 weeks or longer in States with limited

staffii, high volume, or both.

%e Virginia State Police plan to check the Federal Bureau of Investigation’s (FBI’s) Int&state Identification Index (III) (for out-of-State crhnind

history records) at the immediate point-of-sale, beginning about July 1, 1991. TIM State police expect to continue providing an initial response to dealers

within about 90 seconds.

7~e dismsition of ~ ~est is the fji outcome, e.g., me ~est charges may be &opped by the police or prosecutor hfore go~g to @ or hey

may result in a court conviction or acquittal.

8A~ut 65 Pmcent of sate c-~story r~ords are automated ~d ficlude f~ dispositions, ~ a natiorld aV6Xage.

9A “false positive‘‘ is a record check that indicates a person has a crhnimd record and therefore is initially disapproved to purchase a f~earq but

where subsequent veritlcation determines that the criminal record is not disqdifying (and the purchase is therefore approved or that the crimhal record

is on another person perhaps with a similar but d.iffercmt name).
Automated Record Checks of Firearm Purchasers: Issues and Options . 5

on a record “hit” on the wrong person (similar but

different name), a felony arrest that did not result in

conviction, or a misdemeanor conviction that is not

disqualifying. 10 The Virginia State Police verifies all

initial disapprovals and corrects any false positives

within hours or by the close of the next business day.

Premature use of POS systems would, in States

with much lower disposition reporting levels than

Virginia, predictably result in the following:

1.

2.

3.

4.

5.

higher false positive rates than Virginia;

frustrated criminal justice officials;

unhappy law-abiding firearm purchasers;

substantial time and effort spent verifying

records after an initial disapproval; and,

in States with incomplete arrest as well as

disposition reporting, an unknown number of

felons and fugitives who are unintentionally

authorized to, in effect, illegally purchase

firearms (“false negatives’ ’).ll

This points up the dilemma for POS systems in

States with low record quality. If every firearm

purchaser with any kind of criminal history record is

initially disapproved, most of these record “hits”

will turn out not to be disqualifying after verification

(false positives). If only firearm purchasers with

listed felony convictions are disapproved, purchasers with disqualifying convictions may also be

inadvertently approved (false negatives) because

disposition (and perhaps arrest) information is

missing from the criminal records. A key concern is:

what levels of false positives and false negatives are

acceptable for States to participate in POS systems,

until such time that all States have substantially

complete and up-to-date criminal history records?

This involves a balancing of: the effort and time,

ranging from minutes to hours to days, required to

verify initial disapprovals; the inconveniencing of

lawful firearm purchasers whose purchases are

delayed due to “false positive” record checks; and

the effort, time, and risk associated with retrieving

firearms from ineligible purchasers who had been

inadvertently approved because of faulty records.

(The same considerations apply to any type of record

check—manual or automated, whether at the POS or

during a waiting or proapproval period.)

National Felon File

One possible shortcut to POS systems is the

creation of a national felon file—an option identified

by a U.S. Department of Justice task force.12 This

new computerized file would contain the names and

personal identifiers of all convicted felons. It would,

in theory, solve State and Federal record quality

problems and be more cost effective than checking

firearm purchasers against all criminal records. A

national felon file would be difficult to implement in

the short-term because it would first require the

following:

1.

2.

3.

A

the screening of each State’s criminal history

records against each State’s firearm laws, since

the definition of disqualifying felony offenses

varies from State to State;

the flagging of disqualifying in-State felony

convictions in every individual State criminal

history file; and

the resolution of privacy and security issues,

especially regarding the possibility of noncriminal justice direct access (e.g., by gun

dealers) to such a file.

national convicted felon file would not, by

definition, include other persons who are prohibited

from purchasing or receiving firearms under Federal

law (those who are formally charged13 with a felony

offense or who are fugitives from justice); nor would

it necessarily include persons with misdemeanor

convictions that are disqualifying under State or

Federal laws. Virginia has interpreted Federal law as

justifying the checking of State and National wanted

person files as well as State and National criminal

loc~record managers consider initial false positives to be a routine occurrence when record checks are based on name and personal descriptors

rather than f~erprints. Name checks frequently identify several persons with sixnilar names and descriptors. Criminal records persomel review these

initial record “bits” to detamine if any of the records actually match the person being check~ conduct fhrther veritlcation if needed, and request

relevant CrimiMl history information. In this view, an initial name check is simply the fwst step in a process leading to a determination as to whether

the person does or does not have a miminal history record. A true “false positive” would occur only if a misidentifhxkion is made and not corrected

by the end of the records checking process, including cases of mistaken identity (the purchaser is erroneously linked to a criminal record).

11A “false negative“ is a record check that indicates a person does not have a crirnkd record and therefore is approved to purchase a f~earm, when

the person in fact has a disqualifying criminal record but escapes detection due to incomplete records (or use of phony identi.tication).

lzAt~mey ~n~~’slhsk Force on Felon Identification in Firearm Sales.

Isundm ~dic~ent or ~omtion. ~fidic~ent is a fomlal accusation of a crime presen~d by a grandjq; an information is a foti aCCUSWiOn

made by a prosecuting attorney.
6 ● Automated Record Checks of Firearm Purchasers: Issues and Options

history files. If one accepts the Virginia approach, a

national felons file may never be needed-only the

further improvement and automation of the basic

State and Federal criminal record systems, which is

needed anyway.

National Crime Information Center (NCIC)

Another POS shortcut is to use-like Virginia

does today-existing systems for the interstate

exchange of criminal justice information. The backbone of this interstate network consists of the FBI’s

NCIC (for locating wanted persons and fugitives

from justice) and Interstate Identification Index (III)

(for locating persons with out-of-State criminal

history records). The III can be used in conjunction

with firearm purchaser checks, but the quality of the

criminal history records exchanged via III will be no

better than the quality of the records in the source

States. The NCIC and III can be important supplements or complements to, but not substitutes for,

State wanted person and criminal history files, since

many wanted persons, fugitives, and criminal offenders are not (and may never be) included in the

FBI files. The III could serve as a de facto national

felons file, but only after State criminal history

records are screened and flagged.14

Fingerprint Identification

The lack of positive identification of the prospective firearm purchaser is a potential weakness with

the Virginia-style POS system. Firearm purchasers

are required to present one government-issued

photo-identification card, such as a Virginia driver’s

license (which has name, address, sex, date of birth,

height, and social security number as well as a

photo). Virginia officials have not detected a problem with phony identification; but other criminal

justice officials remain skeptical.15 Many in the

criminal justice community consider fingerprints to

be the only reliable form of positive identification.

Possible POS technical solutions include live

scanning of fingerprints (with video or laser beams,

rather than using inked prints), and smart cards (with

fingerprint and criminal record information stored

on magnetic or laser-readable strips or computer

chips).l6 Both of these technologies exist today; but

their further development and deployment to support POS firearm purchaser checks is likely to take

years. Realistically, this will probably not happen

until: States adopt smart cards for other, broader

governmental purposes, such as driver’s licenses;

and fingerprint (or other biometric)17 identification

becomes a standard adjunct to, for example, credit

card transactions for purposes of reducing retail

fraud.

Waiting Periods

Waiting periods help provide the time needed for

criminal record checks in many States using whatever combination of manual and automated capabilities exists. The amount of time required for checks

is, all other things being equal,18 inversely related to

automation, record quality, and the ability to accurately identify firearm purchasers. The more automated and complete a State’s criminal records, and

the lower the incidence of false identification, the

less the need for waiting periods for purposes of

criminal record checks.

Even in the more automated States, time is needed

to confirm initial record hits. States like Virginia

with high levels of automation and disposition

reporting can usually do this in a matter of minutes

to hours (although Virginia can take, and sometimes

needs, up to 2 working days—the close of the next

business day—to verify initial POS disapprovals).

States with intermediate levels of automation and

dispositions are likely to need up to several days.

Florida, which also has a Virginia-style POS system,

allows and frequently needs up to 3 working days to

verify initial disapprovals. Some intermediate States

14@~ use of the III for automated f~purchaser checks would require full implementation of the III/NIT (National FingerprintFile) concep~

including enactment of an interstate compact or Federal legislation on the interstate exchange of crimimd history and identifkation information. For

discussio~ see U.S. Congress, Office of lkchnology ~sessmen~ The FBI Automated Fingeqwint Identification Program: Issues and Options, in

preparation.

ls~e ~1 ~fi~~ tit about one in s~ ~record hits involves persons using alias names and identilcation that could only be detected using

fingerprints. Whethertbis percentage applies to fnearm purchasers in unknown. The Oregon State Police found that about 1 in 14 handgun purchasers

Withcrimirud records usedphonynames and identification but thatveryfewpurchasers using phony identification(l out of 70) actually had disqw@ing

. . crmunal records.

l~r~it or debit type cards with ~gnetic strips have limited capability, but can store personal identitlcation informtiion tht cm b reti by

inexpensive card scanners. The true “smart” card can process and transmit as well as store information.

17Unique human descriptors or measurements.

lsL&e tie Sbte’s pop~ation, volume of fmearm sales, and resources available to conduct ch=b.
Automated Record Checks of Firearm Purchasers: Issues and Options ● 7

Photo credits: Oregon State Police

Top left

A prospective handgun purchaser in Oregon is thumbprinted

by the Iicensed firearm dealer. The prints along with name

and personal identifiers are forwarded to local and State

police for checking during the mandatory 15-day waiting

period.

Top right

local law enforcement agencies check the criminal history

records of handgun purchasers in Oregon.

Bottom left

The Oregon State Police check the thumbprints of

handgun purchasers in Oregon. The thumbprints are

processed by an automated fingerprint identification

system; possible matches with prints on file are displayed

on a computer screen.
8 ● Automated Record Checks of Firearm Purchasers: Issues and Options

require 3 to 15 days to conduct and verify record

checks. States with little automation and few dispositions may need up to several weeks.

Over the next few years, each additional day of

waiting period would permit additional States to be

able to complete criminal record checks of firearm

purchasers within the time allowed.19 The average

time needed for record checks should decline in the

future, if Federal and State resources continue to be

applied to improving the automation and completeness of criminal record systems. Over time, more

States can be expected to develop the capabilities

needed to expedite criminal record checks and

ultimately to conduct POS checks. The average

waiting time should correspondingly shorten, assuming States do not retain waiting periods for other

purposes (e.g., cooling off, checks of noncriminal

justice records).

Overall Effectiveness

The effectiveness of criminal record checks—

whether manual or automated, at the POS or during

waiting periods-depends in part on their coverage

as well as their accuracy. About half of the States

authorize or require a record check of some sort. The

majority of these apply to both dealer and private

transactions, and about two-fifths cover some or all

long guns20. The absence of a Federal record check

requirement combined with the patchwork quilt of

State record checks means that criminals intent on

obtaining firearms may be able to avoid a record

check altogether by going to a State with no record

check requirement. For maximum coverage, record

checks could be authorized or required of all States,

and could be extended to all firearm purchases

(handguns and long guns) from all firearm dealers

and at gun shows or other organized, public outlets.

The effectiveness of criminal record checks is

tempered by the large number of firearms already in

circulation in the United States (an estimated 200

million21), and the many ways criminals obtain

firearms that are outside the direct reach of record

checks-including black market and individual

transactions.

Some gun owner groups remain skeptical that the

benefits of record checks-automated or not—are

worth the costs and risks. They question whether

such checks will effectively deter a significant

number of criminals, or are more likely to delay

law-abiding citizens from purchasing firearms (and

compromise their right to keep and bear arms), with

very few active criminals detected or deterred from

obtaining firearms. Criminals might, it is argued,

simply resort even more to the black market or use

of ‘stooge’ purchases22. Law enforcement officials

counter with statistics on the numbers of convicted

felons disqualified and wanted persons identified

trying to purchase firearms in those States with

record checks. The Department of Justice (DOJ)

could help clarify the factual uncertainties by

periodically compiling statistics (and issuing reports) on firearm purchaser checks, including the

number of: purchasers screened, initial disapprovals,

confirmed disapprovals, appeals of disapprovals

(with results of these appeals), and prosecutions of

illegal purchasers (and resulting convictions).

Other Record Check Realities

Building the infrastructure necessary for automated POS firearm purchaser record checks will

require a continued, strong Federal and State resource commitment. The additional funding is likely

to be in the $200 to $300 million dollar range over

the next 3 to 5 years for the State computerized

criminal history record systems (including timely,

substantially complete arrest and disposition reporting) needed to support automated POS name

checks. 23 If fingerprint checks of firearm purchasers

are desired, an additional roughly $200 million for

State and Federal automated fingerprint identification systems would be needed over the next 5 years.

Most of these funds would be needed anyway for

criminal record and identification system improvements supporting a wide range of criminal justice

purposes. If POS fingerprint checks are desired, an

l~e -g~~~i~ of ea~hadditio~ day of waiting period could be estimated, but wotid r- a dewed State-by-State examilla tiom+erhaps

best conducted by the Bureau of Justice Statistics.

%cludes rifles and shotguns.

21BATF estimate.

~~chases made by persons without ~records who are acting on behalf of criminals.

~’r’his is t. ~ distinguished from the cost of setting Up individual State telephone “hot lines” at a cost of about $25 million. The “hot lhe” Cost

excludes the cost of needed State criminal record system improvements.
Automated Record Checks of Firearm Purchasers: Issues and Options ● 9

additional half a billion to several billion dollars

would be needed over the next 5 to 10 years. Firearm

purchaser “smart’ cards would cost another several

hundred million dollars.

Possible revenue sources for the State and local

portion of record system improvements include

additional State and local general revenues, Federal

block or discretionary grants, licensing fees (from

gun dealers), and user fees (from firearm purchasers). Most State and local government budgets are

strained, and many of the States with the most

serious record system deficiencies are strapped for

funds. This makes Federal funding even more

important.

The Bureau of Justice Assistance (BJA) and

Bureau of Justice Statistics (BJS) could conduct a

State-by-State examination of the following:

1.

2.

3.

4.

needed criminal record system improvements;

the cost of needed improvements;

how quickly (and by how much) these improvements might reduce record check response time, and upgrade completeness and

accuracy; and

how police, prosecutors, judges, and criminal

record managers might- best cooperate in

making these improvements.

Such an examination could be included in the

program evaluation BJA/BJS are planning for fiscal

year 1992, and could cover both State/local criminal

record system improvements and full implementation of the FBI’s separate but related III and National

Fingerprint File (NFF).24 The results could form the

basis for a phased implementation of automated

record checks.

The National Institute of Justice (NIJ), BJS,

Federal Bureau of Investigation (FBI), and Bureau

of Alcohol, Tobacco, and Firearms (BATF) could

collaborate to improve understanding of how and

where criminals obtain firearms; research on firearm

purchasers in States and at gun shows (or other

outlets) without record checks would be useful, as

would studies on the use of phony identification and

stooge purchases.

BATF has fallen behind in issuing the annual

compilation of State firearm laws required to be

provided to licensed gun dealers. BATF could issue

periodic updates on a more timely and cost-effective

basis consistent with legislative intent.

All record check systems—automated or not—

need to be sensitive to privacy, security, and

constitutional concerns. Many gun owners attach

great importance to the right to keep and bear arms.

Record check systems can be designed, as in

Virginia, to prevent the compiling of lists of

law-abiding gun owners and guns, and to prohibit or

severely limit noncriminal justice access to criminal

record information. High record quality, quick

response, and expeditious verification of initial

disapprovals can be mandated for automated POS

systems, to protect the rights of firearm purchasers.

Periodic audits, simple and speedy appeal procedures, and meaningful sanctions may be needed to

help ensure compliance and public confidence.

Difficult as criminal record checks may be, the

challenges posed by checking other types of records

are even greater. Federal law also prohibits firearm

purchase or possession by: unlawful users of controlled substances; persons adjudicated as mental

defective or committed to mental institutions;

illegal aliens; persons dishonorably discharged (from

military service); and denunciates (of U.S. citizenship). The outlook is not good for including these

other disqualifying categories in automated firearm

purchaser checks. Records do not exist on perhaps

four-fifths of the people in these categories; half the

records that do exist are not automated and many are

of unknown quality. Nationwide POS checks of

these categories of persons are not likely to be

feasible for many years-if ever—with the possible

exception of the dishonorably discharged and renunciates and perhaps persons involuntarily committed

to mental institutions.

Further improvements in State and FBI automated

fingerprint identification systems (AFIS) would be

needed if automated firearm purchaser checks are to

include fingerprints. There should be no illusion,

however, that even these systems will permit instantaneous POS fmgerprint identification; several hours

or, more likely, days is the best that can be expected

to the year 2000.

Improvements in FBI and State automated fingerprint identification capability will make it more

feasible for BATF to conduct fingerprint as well as

name checks on gun dealer license applicants and

%See OTA, FBI AutoMted Fingerprint Identificata”on Program, op. Cit., footnote 1A, b pmptUdiOII.

292-868 0- 91 - 2
10 . Automated Record Checks of Firearm Purchasers: Issues and Options

renewals. BATF could, in the interim, seek FBI and

State and local law enforcement assistance in

running fingerprint checks where feasible with

existing systems. BATF also could run periodic

name checks on licensees, rather than only at the

time of initial application.

Firearm purchaser record checks should be

viewed as only one of many actions needed to help

reduce firearm-related crime. other actions might

include stiffer, mandatory sentences for repeat or

violent firearm offenders, intensified investigation

and prosecution of illegal gun trafficking, and

firearm safety and security courses.

Introduction

Interest in automated criminal record checks has

increased for several reasons. First, about one-fourth

to one-third of the most violent crimes involve the

use of firearms (see figure 1),25 and three-fifths or

more of these crimes are committed by repeat

offenders who are prohibited from legally purchasing or possessing firearms.x The proportion of

firearms illegally purchased from licensed dealers

by felons is uncertain; most apparently are obtained

through the black market or by theft.27 In the absence

of Criminal record checks, the current system maybe

lea@ and open to abuse. Gun traces conducted by

BATF show significant movement of firearms from

States without record checks to States with record

checks. 28

Second, proposals for waiting periods before a

purchaser can take possession of firearms are based

in part on the time required to conduct record checks.

These checks can take days to weeks with manual

record systems. Automated record checks can reduce the time down to hours, minutes, or even

seconds, if records are complete and up-to-date.

Figure l—Violent Crime by Type of Weapon, 1989

8 0 f

60

4 0

2 0

0

 Murder

 Robbery

 Aggravated assault

Firearm Knife Other Strong

weapon arm

SOURCE: Federal Bureau of Investigation, 1991.

Third, automated record checks depend on improvements to the criminal record systems in Federal, State, and local jurisdictions. Current technology permits almost instantaneous exchange of

criminal record information among the States and

Federal Government. However, its potential cannot

be realized as long as some States or the Federal

Bureau of Investigation (FBI) still have manual files,

incomplete files, or both. Response time is slowed

considerably in these situations, because information must be retrieved and processed manually

before it can be transmitted electronically.

Fourth, the information being checked must be

complete and accurate to minimize wrong decisions.

If a felony acquittal is missing from a record, a

purchase could be denied or delayed until the

criminal history information is updated. If a felony

 Reports provided by the FBI indicate that, 1989, were used in 62 percent of murders, 33 percent of robberies, and

22percent of aggravated assaults. Comparable figures in 1980 were 62 percent of murders, of robberies, percent of aggravated assaults.

Comparable figures for California in 1989 were 66 percent of murders, 33 percent of robberies, and 19 percent of aggravated assaults. See California

Department of Justice, Bureau of Criminal Statistics, Crime and Delinquency in 1980-1989 (S CA: California July 1990).

Roughly 650,000 violent crimes of types are committed in the United States with handguns each year, and perhaps another 150,000 with long guns.

For handguns, see Rand, Handgun Crime Victims, special report (Washington DC: U.S. of Justice, Bureau of Justice Statistics, 1990).

For long guns, the FBI’s Uniform Crime Reports data indicate that long guns (rifles and shotguns) are used in about 20 percent of 

murders, handguns 80 percent.

 for on of from 66 fOr 

to 42 percent for murderers. See AJ. Beck and Shipley, Recidivism of Prisoners Released in DC: U.S. Department of Justice,

Bureau of Justice Statistics, April 1989). Recidivism is defined as a rearrest within 3 years after release prison.

 of Justice,

 Institute of Justice, July 1985).

 of and Boston District Office, and Boston Police Trace City October

 MA: U.S. Department of the 1990).
AutomatedRecord Checks of Firearm Purchasers: Issues and Options . 11

conviction is missing, an illegal purchase could be

approved.

This report focuses on automated checks of

criminal records to identify persons disqualified

from purchasing firearms under Federal law:

. if formally charged with a felony offense (under

indictment or information),

. if convicted of a felony offense, or

. if determined to be a fugitive from justice.29

It briefly considers automated checks of record

systems that cover other disqualifying conditions—

users of illegal drugs; persons adjudicated as mental

defective or committed to mental institutions;

illegal aliens; dishonorably discharged military service personnel; or those who have renounced U.S.

citizenship. 30 The analysis and discussion of firearm

purchaser checks are relevant to pending legislation31 and various U.S. Department of Justice

programs and initiatives.32

2918 U.S.C. 44, sec. 922(d)(1) and (2), sec. W2(g)(l) ~d (2).

~18 U.S.C. 44, sec. 922(d)(3)-(7), and sec. 922(g)(3)-(7).

31H.R. 7 ~ds. 257, the ‘cB~dy ~d~violenm prevention A@” 102d cong., 1st Sess., J~. 3, 1991; H.R. 1412, the “FelonHandgunP urchase

Prevention Act of 1991,” 102d Cong., 1st sess., Mar. 13, 1991.

Szseeu.s. Dep~ent of Justice, (lffice of J~tice Programs, Attorney Generalps Program forImproving the Nan”on’s Crinu”nal History Records ati

Zdenhfiing Felotts Who Attempt To Purchase Firea~, NCJ-128131 (Washington DC: U.S. Department of Justice, Bureau of Justice Statistics, March

1991).
The Debate Over Criminal Record Checks

The debate over criminal record checks of firearm

purchasers centers on how to implement existing

Federal law. Convicted felons are legally proscribed

from purchasing or possessing firearms. It is assumed that felons cannot be trusted to truthfully

complete firearm purchase forms; therefore, it is

argued, some means is needed to check the criminal

records of purchasers to ensure that they qualify for

purchase. Viewed thusly, the debate focuses on

methods to conduct criminal record checks in a

timely, accurate, cost-effective way.

This report narrowly addresses criminal record

checks of firearm purchasers. However, record

check issues relate to the larger debate over guns in

America and the facts and value judgments that

drive these debates. First, there are already an

estimated 200 million firearms in the United States

(excluding the police and military).33 The majority

of these are legally owned by an estimated 70

million persons.34 This is about 2.5 times the total

criminal offenders in the FBI’s criminal identification file.35 An estimated 7.5 million new or used

firearms are sold by licensed dealers annually in the

United States.36 Gun owner groups are concerned

that record checks will excessively burden lawabiding citizens in order to identify the small

percentage of criminal purchasers. Gun owner

groups generally believe that waiting periods for

conducting record checks impose an unfair burden

by delaying lawful firearm purchases and eroding

the constitutional rights of law-abiding citizens.

Opinion polls suggest that a large majority of gun

owners, like the general public, support criminal

record checks and a waiting period to conduct the

checks.37 Personal views and State laws differ on the

preferred or required length of waiting periods—

ranging from no wait to a few minutes to a few hours,

days, or weeks.

Second, the right to keep and bear arms is

cherished by many gun owners (and, opinion polls

suggest, by the general public) .38 One point of view

holds that the second amendment to the U.S.

Constitution establishes the right of American citizens to possess firearms, and was intended by the

framers to protect the people from the possibility of

government tyranny. Another view is that the second

amendment simply reaffirmed a preexisting right to

keep and bear arms. Both of these views are based on

analysis of Anglo-American law and English and

colonial history that documents the pivotal role of

firearms in the struggle for freedom and liberty. The

outcome of the American Revolutionary War could

have been different had the colonials not been

armed. A third perspective suggests that the second

amendment was intended to affirm the right of the

States to raise and maintain militias, presumably for

use in defending the nation from foreign adversaries.

Some argue that this included defending the States

from an oppressive central government, and that at

the time the Bill of Rights was drafted, militias were

mustered from citizens who supplied their own

firearms. Thus, the right to keep and bear arms is

3sBA~ estimate.

34ASSUUES an average of two to three fwearms per ower.

35The FBI criminal history fde included records on about 24 million persons, as of January 1991.

~BA’JT estimate; based on a lo-year average of domestic fiOarmS production (adjusting for imports and exports) plus used gun sales (estimated at

about 50 percent of all sales of new fwearms). Some gun owner groups estimate total sales to be at least double, when private sales of used guns are

included.

37A 1988 Gallup poll found that 91 percent of the general public and 90 percent of gun owners supported a MtiOId bw refit? a 7-*Y w~~g

period before a handgun could be purchased, in order to determine whether the prospective buyer has been convicted of a felony or is mentally ill. See

George Gallup, Jr., The Gallup Report, report No. 280 (Princetoq NJ: The Gallup Poll, January 1989), p. 26, reprinted by permission in TJ. Flauagan

and K. Maguire (eds.), Sourcebook of Crinu”naZJustice Statistics (WashingtoIL DC: U.S. Department of Justice, Bureau of Justice Statistics, 1990), p.

180. This and other polls have found broad support across the demographic and political spectrum (see R.S. ShinrL Guns and Gun Control: National

Public Opinion Polls, CM report for Congress (Washington DC: Congressional Research Service, Nov. 26, 1990). These results are not inconsistent

with surveys indicating that high percentages of gun owner group members are opposed to waiting periods. James Baker of the National Reassociation

has testifkd, for example, that the majority of NRA members oppose waiting periods, but that NRA members represent only a small percentage of all

gun owners (testimony at a Mar. 21, 1991, hearing of the House Committee on the Judiciary, Subcommittee on Crime and CriminalJustice). The NRA

is supporting So-Called ‘ ‘instant checks” of criminalrecords at the point-of-sale. For other gun owner group views, see Gun Owners of America,

Background Checks: Gun OwnerHarassment in Disguise, issue brief, no date; and Citizens Committee for the Right to Keep and Bear Arms, PointBlank

vol. 19, No. 9, p. 7, September 1989, and vol. 20, No. 1, pp. 4-5, January 1990.

38fiblic Opfion ~~s ~=est tit abut 90 ~rcat of U.S. ci~~s believe: a) the right to o- a ~ is protected by the U.S. COmtitUt.iO~ ~d

b) waiting periods and record checks for gun purchasers are appropriate. See ShimL Guns and Gun Control, op. cit., footnote 37.

–13–
14 ● Automated Record Checks of Firearm Purchasers: Issues and options

viewed as key to either a narrow or broad interpretation of the second amendment.39

Regardless of one’s views on the second amendment, it is an important part of the context of the

debate over criminal record checks for firearm

purchasers. These concerns raise anxieties that

record checks and waiting periods might intimidate,

discriminate against, or block law abiding citizens

from legally obtaining firearms, thereby indirectly

abridging their constitutional rights. Information

provided on firearm purchase forms might be used

to create lists or indices of gun owners and guns;

record checks might place too much discretionary

power over firearm purchases in the hands of police.

Proponents of record checks and waiting periods

assert that the intent is not to prevent law-abiding

citizens from legally obtaining firearms, only to

enforce firearm laws. They argue that record checks

and waiting periods do not erode or challenge

constitutional rights. Some also advocate waiting

periods for a “cooling off time’ to deter spontaneous crimes of passion. Opponents question whether

cooling off time would really make a difference.40

Third, the criminals obtain firearms from several

sources. These include: “black market” transactions between individuals (where guns might be

exchanged for drugs or money); thefts from licensed

dealers, manufacturers, military bases, and individuals; illegal interstate transportation of firearms

(gun-running) from States with lax gun laws to

States with strong gun laws; “straw person” or

Figure 2—Number of Federal Firearms Licenses,

1975-90

300

200

100

0

75 80 85 9 0

Year

SOURCE: Bureau of Alcohol, Tobacco, and Firearms, 1991.

“stooge” purchases from licensed dealers (where

the criminal has someone else buy the guns); direct

but fraudulent purchases from licensed dealers

(where the criminal lies about his/her criminal

history); and direct but fraudulent purchases from

licensed dealers or individuals at gun shows and flea

markets.Al Even among licensed dealers, the situation is complex. Of the 270,000 current federally

licensed firearm dealers (see figure 2), only about

15,000 operate storefront gun shops, and another

5,000 operate retail gun sections in sporting goods or

department stores.42 The rest are gun collectors

gunsmiths, hobbyists, pawnshops, and the like. Most

 of issues, see National of “Comments on [the U.S. Attorney General’s]

Draft Report for Identifying Felons Who Attempt To Purchase Firearms,” 1989; “Police Surveillance and Temporary Suspension of

the Exercise of a Constitutional Right: on S. 1236,” Nov. 21, 1989, prepared for the U.S. Senate, Committee on the Judiciary, Subcommittee

on the “Prior Police Surveillance, and the Purchase of Constitutionally Rotected Firearms: on S.

4@” Aug. 2, 1988, prepared for the U.S. Committee on the Judiciary, Subcommittee on the and “To Keep and

Bear Their Private Arms: The Adoption of the Second 1787-1791,” Northern Kentucky Review vol. 10, pp. 13-39, 1982. For

contrasting views, see and D.A. “The Second Amendment in the Twentieth Century: Have You Seen Your Militia Lately?”

 Law 15, pp. 5-58, 1989, and references cited therein. For a range of viewpoints and analyses, see U.S. Congress, House,

Committee on the Judiciary, Subcommittee on Crime, Handgun Violence Prevention Act of 1989, hearing, 2d (Washington DC: U.S.

Government Printing 1990); and U.S. Congress, Senate, Committee on the Judiciary, Subcommittee on the Constitution The Right to Keep and

BearArms, 97th 2d (Washington DC: U.S. Government Printing Office, 1982).

 for of to Of Of

Police; National Rifle Association Gun Owners of Firearms and Citizens Committee for the Right to Keep and Bear Arms; among

others, at hearings of the U.S. Congress, House, Committee on the Judiciary, Subcommittee on Crime, “Handgun Violence Prevention Act of 1989,”

 sess., Apr. 26, 1990, and Subcommittee on Crime and Criminal Justice, “Brady Handgun Violence Prevention Act of 1991,” 

 1st Mar. 21, 1991.

 to is no national data on the number of firearms entering the criminal community, nor, given the longevity of fii,

 to estimate such a figure based on production,” Mar. 19, 1991, letter and attachments to OTA. initiate criminal investigations inmost

of these categories. year 1990, cases to U.S. Attorneys for prosecution in the following areas: gun show/flea market (280 cases);

 purchase (250 cases); trafficker (543 cases); licensee involved as suspect (167 cases); and interstate firearm (403

cases).

 Alliance of Stocking Gun Dealers. reports 269,079 Federal licensees in 1990, 235,684

firearms dealers (no further available from 9,029 pawnbroker; 14,287 gun collectors; 7,945 ammunition manufacturers; 978

firearms manufacturers; and 946 importers.
Automated Record Checks of Firearm Purchasers: Issues and Options 15

of the BATF’s compliance effort is aimed at

storefront gun shops that account for the largest

share of firearm sales.

The number of illegal firearm sales that could be

avoided by criminal record checks is uncertain. One

survey of prisoners suggests that perhaps one-sixth

of criminals purchase firearms from gun dealers, but

statistically valid national data are lacking.43 The

BATF and National Institute of Justice (NIJ) are

conducting further studies on sources of firearms.44

States with criminal record checks have found that

about 1 to 2 percent of purchasers have prior felony

convictions. 45 Statistics for States without record

checks are not available. Firearm thefts and black

market transactions are not likely to be reduced by

criminal record checks. Some hypothesize that thefts

and black marketeering could increase if legal

outlets were denied to criminals.46 The impact on

straw person purchases is unclear. Such purchases

might be deterred to some degree, to the extent a

record check scares stooges off. Straw person

purchases might increase, if effective record checks

caused more criminals to seek accomplices without

criminal records. Controls over illegal purchases

might be further tightened if record checks covered

even the lowest volume licensed dealers, and dealer

and individual sales at gun shows or other organized

sales outlets.

Record check proponents believe that the illegal

interstate transportation of firearms could be reduced if checks were required uniformly in all

States. This could make it more difficult for criminals to purchase firearms in States without checks

and transport them to States with mandatory checks.

How much more difficult will depend in part on how

the criminal justice system treats firearm offenders

and how society deals with the violent crime

problem. The efficacy of record checks in reducing

the criminal use of firearms and firearm-related

crime is uncertain and is linked to the Nation’s

overall anticrime strategy.

Fourth, the criminal record check of firearm

purchasers is not a panacea for reducing violent

crime. Firearms are involved in about one-fourth to

one-third of the most violent crimes (e.g., homicide,

aggravated assault), and perhaps one-eighth of all

violent crime.47 The impact of record checks would

be greatest if applied to all jurisdictions, assuming

that checks are some deterrence. Opinions on the

causes of crime in America vary widely.48 It is

evident that the criminal record check is just one

weapon in the arsenal for preventing and fighting

crime. Record checks can complement—and be

complemented by-other anticrime actions.

Fifth, success in using criminal record checks

depends on improvements in Federal, State, and

local criminal identification and record systems.

dsS~Wright~dRossi, TheA~dCri~”na/ inA~rica, op. cit., footnote 27. This survey of incareeratedfelons found thlit abOut20 WrCent obti~

firearms from retail outlets-16 percent by purchase and 3 percent by theft. Retail outlets were defined to include gun shops, pawnshops, and hardware

or department stores. The survey found that about 26 percent of felons obtained fiearms from the “gray or black market” (11 percent by purchase, 10

percentby thef~ 5 percent by trade, borrow, or gift), and44pereentfrom family or friends (17 percentby purchase, 10 percent theft 8 percent borrow/renL

6 percent gift 4 percent trade). The study does not state: 1) whether and how gun shows, flea markets, and other less formal sales or lrading outlets (in

which gun dealers might participate) were covered in the survey; or2) the extent to which family, friends, and fences obtained fwearms for felons through

stooge purchases from gun dealers. The study does not purport to be “a ‘mtiomdly representative probability sample’ of States, prisons, or prisoners”

(Wright and Rossi, op. cit., footnote 27); thus the degree to which the study results are representative of the broader convicted felon, prisoner, or erhnind

population cannot be determincd without follow-up validation research.

44B~ con~ues t. tiymtraces of fue~s used in criminal activities to better understand where md how c~ obtain fueanns. NIJ is sponsoring a survey of juveniles in correctional institutions regarding their acquisition and use of fwearms. NIJ is not, however, sponsoring a

much-needed direct follow-up to the 1985 Wright and Rossi, op. cit., foomote 27, survey of prisoners.

fi1990&~ forc~orni% Delaware, Flori@ Illinois, orego~ and Virginia suggest aconfiiedhit range of about 0.6 percent to 3 percent de~ding

in part on the method of calculation. See, for example, Oregon State Police, Study of Retail Firearm Sales and Concealed Handgun Licenm”ng in Oregon

(Saleq OR Oregon State Police, CriminalInvestigation Divisiow 1990). 1991 data for Florida suggest a confiied hit rate of about 3 percent. See

Florida Department of Law Enforcement “First TWO Months Operation of the Firearm Purchase pro-’ memo from Deputy Commissioner

McLaughlin Apr. 3, 1991.

~SWWright~dRoss~ TheAmed&nu”na/in& terica, op. cit., footnote 27; and J.D. Wright, “~ektic~in Americ~” research in brief,

U.S. Department of Justice, National Institute of Justim, November 1986.

4TS=, for eqle,ha Handgun Crime Victims, op. cit., footnote 25.

4S~ roots of ~behavior have been variously attributed to factors such as economic and social conditions, peer pressures, family instability,

mass media violence, and drug addiction. See, for example, U.S. Department of Justice, Bureau of Justice Statistics, Report to the Nation on Cn”me and

Jum”ce (WashingtoUDC: DOJ/BJS, March 1988), andreferencescited therein. For some gunownerperspectives, see, for example, D.B. Kates, Jr., “Gun

Laws Cannot Overcome Basic Cultural Wlues Which Det ermine Violence,” Petersen’ sHandguns, April 1991, pp. 14-15, and “Anti-gunners Skewing

Foreign and Domestic Crime Statistics to Support Their Self-Serving Claims,” Petersen’s Handguns, January 1991, pp. 16-17; and B.S. CenterwalL

“Exposure to l.klevision As A Risk Factor for Violence, “ American Journal of Epidendology vol. 129, pp. 643-652, 1989.
16 ● Automated Record Checks of Firearm Purchasers: Issues and Options

Congress recognized this in requiring the U.S.

Attorney General (AG) to study and implement a

system for the immediate, accurate identification of

felons attempting to purchase firearms.4g Several

reports from the AG’s study team emphasized that

any effective felon identification system—whether

on a proapproval, waiting period, or POS basis—

requires accurate, automated FBI and State and local

record systems.50

The Attorney General has endorsed a POS instantaneous criminal record check, and is moving to

improve the record systems needed to support such

record checks.51 These improvements should expedite record checks for firearm purchaser waiting

periods, firearm owner identification cards, concealed weapons permits, and other preapprovals of

firearm purchase or ownership required by some

States.

The AG’s plan include the following:

1. survey of current record quality and automation in State criminal record systems (completed, will be updated in 1992);

2. development of a voluntary standard for State

and Federal reporting and the flagging of

felony convictions in criminal history record

systems (completed);52

3.

4.

5.

6.

allocation of $9 million per year for 3 years for

State and local record systems improvements

[fiscal year (FY) 1991 grant awards completewill continue for FY92 and FY93];

allocation of $12 million in FY92 funds to

reduce the arrest, disposition, and manual

record backlog in the FBI’s Identification

Division.53

allocation of an additional $20 million per year

for State/local record system improvements (in

response to the Crime Control Act of 1990’s

requirement for a 5-percent set-aside of Bureau

of Justice Assistance block grants for this

purpose, beginning in FY92); and

support of the revitalization and modernization

of-the FBI’s Identification Division (Congress

appropriated $185 million in FY91 funds for a

new site and building near Clarksburg, WV—

the automated equipment is estimated to cost

several hundred more million dollars, although

the President’s FY92 budget includes no

additional funding).54

The AG views firearm purchaser checks as part of

a comprehensive approach to crime control that also

includes stiffer, mandatory sentences for repeat

firearm offenders, especially violent offenders, coupled with intensified criminal investigations of

illegal gun and drug trafficking.55

a~e Anti.D~g Abuse Act of 1988, ~blic hiw 100-690, sec. 6213, requires that: a) “The Attorney General shall develop a system for immtiate

and accurate identification of felons who attempt to purchase 1 or more fuearrn s but are ineligible to purchase firearms by reason of section 922(g)(1)

of title 18, United States Code. The system shall be accessible to dealers but only for the purpose of determiningg whether a potential purchaser is a

convicted felon. . .The Attorney General shall begin implementation of the system 30 days after the report to the Congress provided in subsection (b)”;

b) “Not later than 1 year after the date of the enactment of this ACL the Attorney General shall report to the Congress a description of the system referred

to in subsection (a) and a plan (including a cost analysis of the proposed system) for implementation of the system. . .“; and c) “The Attorney

General. . shall conduct a study to determine ifan effective method for immediate and accurate identilcation of other persons who attempt to purchase

1 or more fmarms but are ineligible to purchase firearms by reason of section 922(g) of title 18, United States Code. . .Such study shall be completed

with 18 months after the &te of emctment of this Act. . .’

~See U.S. Dep~ent of Justice, Task Force on Felon Identification in Firearm Sales, Report to the Afrmzey General on ~yNe~fOr Zdentifiing

Felons Who Attempt To Purchase Firearms (Washingto~ DC: U.S. Department of Justice, Assistant Attorney General for Justice Programs, October

1989); J.M. Tien and ‘IF. RiclL Enforth Corp., Identifying Persons, Other Than Felons, Ineligible To Purchase Firearms: A Feasibility Study

(Washington DC: U.S. Department of Justice, Bureau of Justice Statistics, May 1990); and SEARCH Group, Lnc., Legal and Policy Issues Relating

to Biometric Identification Technologies (Washingto~ DC: U.S. Department of Justice, Bureau of Justice Statistics, June 16, 1989).

slSee Nov, 20, 1989, letter from Attorney @neraJ Dick Thomburghto The Honorable Dan Quayle, President, U.S. Semte; U.S. DWZUIIUent of Justic%

Office of Justice Programs, Attorney General’s Program , op. cit., footnote 32; and U.S. Congress, House, Committee on the Judiciary, Subcommittee

on Crime, The Attorney General’s Report to Congress on the Option Selected for Identifying Felons Who Attempt To Purchase Firearms, hearing, IOlst

Cong., 2d sess. (Washingto@ DC: U.S. Government Printing Office, Jan. 25, 1990).

Szsee u.S. Dep~ent of Justice, Federal Bureau of Investigation and Bureau Of Justice fk3tistics, ‘‘Recommended Voluntary StandaIds for

Improving the Quality of Criminal History Record Information” Federal Register 56:5849-5850, Feb. 13, 1991.

53 See U.S. Dep~ent of Justice, Attorney General’s program, op. cit., foomote 32; and testimony of pad J. McNuI~, Acting Director, offlCe Of

Policy Development U.S. Department of Justice, and Dennis G. Kurre, Deputy Assistant Director, Identitlcation Divisio~ Federal Bureau of

Jnvestigatiou before a Mar. 21, 1991, hearing of the House Committee on the Judiciary, Subcommittee on Crime and Criminal Justice.

fl~id.; OTA is Conducfig a sepwate but ~lat~ as~ssment of the FBI’s plan for mod~~tion of its f~erprint identilcation o~mtiolls. See OTA

The FBI Automated Fingerprint Identification Program, op. cit., footnote 14. The FBI does have some identitlcation automation funds available from

user fees.

55see s~tement of U.S. Afiomey Gener~ ~c~d Tfrombugh before an Apr. 18, 1991, hearing of tie Senate COmmiHm on the Judiciary.
Automated Record Checks of Firearm Purchasers: Issues and Options 17

Improvements in Federal, State, and local crimi- booked, charged, or sentenced for criminal offenses;

nal record systems could facilitate record checks for those seeking Federal or State employment and

other purposes in addition to screening felons from licenses requiring record checks; and applicants for

purchasing firearms, such as: persons arrested, U.S. citizenship or permanent visas.
The Proposals and Prospects for Automated Record Checks

National criminal record checks of firearm purchasers would require: means to determine the

purchaser’s identity; and query of local, State, and

Federal criminal record systems, which could include State or Federal felon identification files

listing the names and identifiers of persons with

disqualifying felony convictions. Proposals that

have been advanced include record checks conducted:

●

●

●

at the POS (e.g., at a gun shop or gun show

while the customer is present);

during a waiting period (typically 3, 7, or 15

days from the time a customer purchases a

firearm to delivery); and

during an application and prior approval period

(typically several weeks or months) before an

identification card or purchase permit is issued

(see figure 3).56

About half the States currently require record checks

during a waiting or prior approval period (e.g.,

California, Oregon, and Illinois) or at the POS (e.g.,

Virginia, Florida, Delaware). About half the States

do not require record checks. The States that require

checks vary widely in how the checks are carried out.

Automated checks are essential for any POS

system. Manual checks take hours to days, under the

best conditions, and can take weeks. The feasibility

of automated checks depends on the use of computer

technology by each State to maintain criminal record

files (criminal history and wanted person), including

automated fingerprint identification files when needed

for firearm purchaser checks. The efficacy of the

checks depends on the completeness and accuracy of

these files. These criteria also apply to Federal

criminal record systems maintained by the FBI.

If these requirements are met, automated checks

could be made through a combination of gun dealer

options:

1. direct access to State and Federal computerized felon identification or criminal record

files via a touchtone telephone or computer

terminal;

2.

3.

4.

5.

indirect access to felon or criminal history

information (not the records themselves) via a

telephone connection with a local, State, or

Federal law enforcement agency;

live scanning of the purchaser’s fingerprints

(using laser or video scarming instead of ink);

live scarming of other purchaser biometric

identifiers (e.g., retina, voiceprint); and

scanning of the purchaser’s smart card (that

includes a magnetic or laser data strip or

computer chip with identification information).

These technologies could be used as part of POS

waiting period, or prior approval systems for automated checks of firearm purchasers.

Point-of-Sale (POS) Systems

How POS Checks Work

POS record checks make the most demands on

criminal record systems. The records must be

computerized, indexed, and accessible online in real

time. The FBI’s computerized National Crime

Information Center (NCIC) responds to remote

inquiries from criminal justice agencies nationwide

in seconds. NCIC maintains computer files on

wanted and missing persons and stolen property

(e.g., vehicles, boats), and handles about 1 million

inquiries a day nationwide. The NCIC telecommunication network permits remote access to the Interstate Identification Index (III) file maintained by the .

FBI’s Identification Division. The III includes the

names and identifiers (e.g., date of birth, race, sex)

of persons with arrest records. The computerized

criminal history records of persons listed in the III

can be accessed electronically, usually within about

15 seconds, from the States or the FBI. (During peak

periods, the sending or receiving of computerized

records on persons in the III can take up to 15

minutes-an infrequent occurrence. )57 Any manual

records on a person listed in the III could be accessed

in hours or even days—not minutes-because the

source State would have to search for and retrieve

the records by hand and then send them (by mail or

facsimile, unless keyboarded) to the requestor.

fis~ U.S. Department of Jmtice, lhsk Force on Felon Identification in Firearm Sales, Reporz to the Aztorney GeneraZ, op. Cit., footnote SO, fOr

discussion of a wide range of proposals.

STNotethatthe@ty of tie-history records transm“tted as aresuh of alll hit can only be as good as the record quality in the State (or Federal)

repositories from which the records are sent.

–19-
20 ● Automated Record Checks of Firearm Purchasers: Issues and Options

r

I
Automated Record Checks of Firearm Purchasers: Issues and Options . 21

States with computerized criminal history records

and so-called ‘‘hot files’ (e.g., wanted persons,

stolen vehicles) can also provide responses within

seconds. Virginia was the first State to implement

(on Nov. 1, 1989) a POS system for checking the

criminal records of firearm purchasers buying handguns with a barrel length under 5 inches (Virginia

will extend coverage to all firearm purchases from

licensed dealers starting July 1, 1991). The other

States with POS systems are Delaware (operational

since Jan. 14, 1991) and Florida (operational since

Feb. 1, 1991). Both are modeled after Virginia and

likewise apply to dealer sales only. Delaware record

checks apply to handgun and rifle purchases, but not

shotguns; Florida record checks apply to all firearm

purchases.

Licensed firearm dealers in Virginia call an 800

number at Virginia State Police headquarters in

Richmond to check the criminal records of handgun

purchasers (see figure 4). The dealer provides the

name and identification information of each purchaser to an operator, who keys the information into

a computer terminal connected to State and FBI

record systems. The Virginia State Police can check

both Virginia criminal history and wanted person

records and the NCIC hot files while connected on

the phone with the dealer (the III also will be

checked online, starting about July 1, 1991). The

State police can usually provide an initial response

within 90 seconds.

About 94 percent of the inquiries result in a “no

hit” (no records indicated), and the purchase is

approved.58 Six percent are ‘hits, ’ and the purchase

is temporarily disapproved. The State police staff

reviews each hit, obtains more detailed criminal

record information if necessary, and confirms every

disqualifying criminal record. About one-quarter of

the hits (1.5 percent of all inquiries) are confined

and the disapproval stands. Three-quarters of the

time hits are on a different person (e.g., with a

similar but different name and identifiers), or reveal

a felony arrest charge that did not lead to a

conviction or a conviction for a misdemeanor that is

not disqualifying. The State police contact the

dealers on false positives within hours, or at the

latest by the end of the next business day, to change

initial disapprovals to approvals.

The Virginia experience points up the strengths

and weaknesses of the 800 number approach to POS

record checks. The main advantage is that the initial

record check can be completed in a few seconds.

This is only possible, however, because Virginia has

a substantially computerized criminal history record

system. Several other States are also computerized,

but most States have either incomplete or no

computerized criminal history files. Even computerized States like Virginia still have some manual

records, usually for older, inactive offenders who are

least likely to be involved in current crimes.

The Problem of Record Quality

A State computerized criminal history (CCH) file

is needed to provide rapid response and, potentially,

a complete and accurate response. State CCH

records maintained by the FBI are missing some

arrests and many more dispositions. About half the

arrests in the FBI’s criminal history files are missing

dispositions.59 The FBI finds it difficult to get these

dispositions, and the FBI and the States are collaborating on a strategy to get the FBI out of the criminal

history recordkeeping business-except for Federal

offenders. The III would be used to access CCH

records in the State repositories. The operational

responsibility for record completeness and accuracy

would lie with the States. About 80 percent of all

offenders are single-State offenders (with a criminal

record in only one State);60 thus the vast majority of

CCH hits in any record check system (POS, waiting

period, or proapproval) will be on in-State records.

A computerized CCH does not guarantee high

record quality. Virginia happens to have a relatively

S8@ratio~ &~ on tie Vh@ ~S ~s~m wme provid~ by the Virginia State Police. For further details, see Virginia Sti@ Police, Virginia

Firearms Transaction Program: Procedures forDealers (Richmond, VA: Virginia State Police, Nov. 1, 1989), Virginia Firearms Transaction Program:

Reportfor the Oflce of the Governor (RichmonL VA: Virginia State Police, 1990).

s~e ~1 _enfly r~iv~ about 8,)00 disposition reports pm &y ~mp~ed to about 17,~ ~st reports. ‘l’his sugg~ts a disposition repotting

rate of 47 percen~ which is consistent with 1980 and 1986 FBI data indicating about 45 percent disposition reporting. The FBI notes that an unknown

number of arrest reports may contain disposition information that makes filing of a formal disposition report unnecessary. For further discussion, see

U.S. Congress, OffIce of lkchnology Assessmen4 An Assessment ofAlternativesfor a National Computerized Crinu”nal History System, OTA-CIT-161

(Spri.ngileld, VA: National ‘Ezhnieal Information Service, October 1982), pp. 89-%; and statement on “Criminal Justice Record Quality” by Fred B.

Wo@ OTA ProjeetDirector, before a July 16,1986, heazingof the House Committee on the Judiciwy, Subcommittee on Civil and Constitutional Rights.

@A of Jan. 1, 1991, tie FBI es~tes that single-State offenders accounted for 81 pereent of the records indexed by Sines p~cipating in tie

Interstate Identification Index. Earlier estimates (1979-81) suggested a single-State offender rate of about 70 percent.
Figure 4-Telephone “Instant” Check by Gun Dealers

Records checked

name index

If purchaseapproved

Computer Phonelink link firearm 

Virginia State Police Ireview record checkresults and approve I ‘ \If initial disap I& .. . .. proval reversed

SOURCE: Office of Technology Assessment, 1991; and Bureau of Justice Statistics, 1989. appeals
Automated Record Check of Firearm Purchasers: Issues and Options ● 23

high level of disposition reporting (roughly 85

percent for all arrests, 95 percent for recent arrests)

and is using computerized techniques to improve

record quality further. Some States have better

record quality than Virginia, but many States have

worse. Record quality is essential to all record check

systems but is critical to POS systems because there

is no time available for updating or verifying

information before making an initial response. The

initial firearm purchase approval or disapproval

must be made within seconds; any followup on

disapprovals must be made within hours (or within

2 to 3 working days at most, in current POS States).

The better the record quality, the fewer the missed

hits due to missing felony arrests and convictions

(false negatives) or false positive hits due to missing

felony acquittals.

The ideal is 100 percent arrest and disposition

reporting; but few States are perfect today-nor can

they expect to be for sometime. What level of record

quality is acceptable for POS firearm purchaser

checks? Most agree that the record quality of the

FBI’s criminal history file is unacceptable. With half

of the dispositions missing, a large percentage of

record hits would have to be checked (through

telephone calls to local courts, prosecutors, etc.), and

many would likely be found to be false positive hits.

Virginia’s 85 to 95 percent disposition reporting is

more acceptable. Most of the false positive hits on

the Virginia POS system are not due to State CCH

record quality problems, but to hits on similar but

different names in the FBI’s NCIC wanted person

file. (NCIC is programmed to pickup anyone with

similar names and dates of birth.)

The Problem of Positive Identification—

the Promise of Live Scans

A major weakness of 800 number POS systems is

the lack of positive identification. Identification of

firearm purchasers in the Virginia system was based

on the requirements of two forms of identification

(ID), including one with a photo. (A recent legislative action reduced the number of required IDs to

one, if it is a government-issued photo ID.) The

Virginia State Police report few problems with false

identification during the first year of operation.

Critics claim that purchasers using fake identification are likely to go undetected. The FBI believes

that about one in six persons with a criminal record

may be using alias names and identification. But

whether this ratio applies to firearm purchasers is

unknown.61

Currently, a set of fingerprints is the only form of

positive biometric identification (based on unique

human descriptors or measurements, i.e., biometrics) accepted by the criminal justice community.

Voiceprints, handprints, retina scans, and electronic

mug shots and signatures are used for some highsecurity purposes-primarily in the defense and

intelligence communities-but are still many years

away for widespread criminal justice use. Only the

electronic mug shot along with electronic fingerprints were included in the final version of a

long-range plan for the NCIC—known as NCIC

2000; identifiers like DNA profiles were judged

premature for widespread application.62

Fingerprint identification could be included in

POS systems by live scarming the purchaser’s

fingerprints and: 1) electronically transmitting the

prints for checking against State and, if necessary,

Federal automated fingerprint files; or 2) comparing

the live scanned prints against those stored digitally

on a smart card issued to the purchaser. In addition

to a live scan positive identification with prerecorded prints on a smart card, dealers must check

for criminal activity that had occurred since the

issuance of the card. This could be done using an 800

number, touchtone telephone, or computer terminal

connected to criminal record repositories. Criminal

justice agencies oppose direct access by gun dealers

(and other noncriminal justice users) to electronic

criminal record systems to protect security and

privacy in compliance with State and Federal

regulations. Live scan plus an 800 number connectGIThe Oregon State Police found that about 1 in 14 handgun purckrs with c~records used phony names and identi.tlcatio~ and very few of

these (1 of 70) had disqudifyhg miminal records.

G~m~erdisasionofbiome~c technolo@es, seeU.S. Congress, (lfilceof‘lkchnologyAssessmen~ D@endingSecrets, Sharing LMu:NewLocks

and Keys for Electronic Information, OTA-CIT-31O (Washington DC: U.S. Government Prindng Office, October 1987); Cn”ma”nal Justice: New

Technologies and the Consn”tution, OTA-CIT-366 (Washington DC: U.S. Government Printing Office, May 1988); and Genetic Witness: Forensa”c Uses

ofDNA Tests, OTA-BA-438 (Washington DC: U.S. Government Printing Ofllce, July 1990). Also see SEARCH Group, Inc., Biomem”cIdentzjication

Technologies, op. cit., footnote 50, especially chs. 2 and 3 and the appendix. For discussion of planned NCIC capabilities, see NCIC Advisory Policy

Board, Planning and Evaluation Subeommittee, NCIC staff paper, topic #2, “NCIC 2000 Phase II Implementation Schedule” (Sau Diego, CA Dec.

3-4, 1990), pp. 3-7.
24 . Automated Record Check of Firearm Purchasers: Issues and Options

ing dealers with officials who would access the

records may overcome the concerns of the criminal

justice agencies.63

Live scan technologies exist today; but their

further development to support POS firearm purchaser checks involves substantial costs and complexities. All licensed gun dealers must have a live

scan fingerprint machine; and all States and the FBI

must have an automated fingerprint matching capability for a POS system to work. The cost of live scan

fingerprint readers compatible with criminal justice

systems is about $40,000 to $50,000 at this time. The

low-cost POS scanners now available cannot perform full criminal fingerprint checks.64 Equipping

all gun dealers with suitable live scan readers at

today’s prices would be costly-about $10.8 billion

assuming 270,000 licensed dealers at about $40,000

per unit. Equipping just the storefront gun dealers

could cost about $600 million.65 The cost of live

scanners must drop below $1,000 per unit-the

range of credit card scanning devices-for widespread application. This could happen within 5 to 10

years, if the market for biometric technologies

develops rapidly. Fingerprint or other biometric

identification could also reduce fraud in credit card

transactions and eliminate use of phony identification for retail transactions-including firearm purchases.

In addition to affordable POS live scan devices,

State and Federal criminal fingerprint repositories

would need to be able to process a large number of

additional fingerprint checks likely to be generated

by firearm purchases. About 60 percent of the States

have or are implementing automated fingerprint

identification systems; most, if not all, States may

have such systems in 5 to 10 years. The FBI is

planning a major upgrade of its automated fingerprint system to be completed by 1995. These

systems could, in principle, handle fingerprint

checks of firearm purchasers, but it is improbable

whether they could do so at the POS because of the

need for a short response time. Even the FBI’s

planned state-of-the-art automated fingerprint identification system aims for a 2-hour response time for

criminal justice checks and 24 hours for noncriminal

justice checks.66 For POS purposes, 2 to 24 hours is

too slow. Automated POS fingerprint checks maybe

feasible in the future, but are not likely to be cost

effective on the scale required for firearm purchaser

checks until early in the 21st century. In the

meantime, there are two other options: a national

felon identification file; and smart cards.

National Felons File

A national felons file would include the names

and identifiers of all persons convicted of a felony

offense who are prohibited under Federal law from

purchasing a firearm. A convicted felon file would

be much smaller in size than the State and Federal

criminal files, which it would replace for firearm

purchaser checks. A felon file would exclude misdemeanors and felony arrests not resulting in a

conviction. This could alleviate the record quality

problem and reduce costs since firearm purchasers

need only be checked against the felon file.

A national felon file would be difficult to implement in the short-term for four reasons. First, a

national file could not be compiled until each of the

State criminal history files has identified in-State

felony convictions. Only a few States, including

Virginia, have done this to date. A flagged State

criminal history file is a prerequisite for any State

POS system to avoid picking up excessive false hits,

like firearm purchasers convicted of a misdemeanor

but not a felony. The new voluntary Federal standards

for felony reporting could improve felony flagging

GsFor Wr discussio~ see u.S. Department of Justice, Risk Force on Felon Identifhtion in Firearm Sales, Report to the Attorney Gewal, op.

cit., footnote 50.

~~sf@erpfit~.~~~~ contro~~ ~ssf~iliti~ w~s@k f@qMts Of p~~-messm c(mlpd -t a file Of

~-ts of PerSOm authoti access. When a person arrives at a door or gate, he or she punches in an identifying number that calls up a stored

f@m*t to be COIUPWd against his or her “live” scanned f~erprint. The Immigration and Naturalization Service is pilot testing the use of live

scanned f~erpri.nts to check detainees against a file of illegal alien miminal offenders; but the file size is much smaller than would be necessary for

State or national criminal identifk.ation checks.

fiFordiscussionof costes~~sforvfiousoptiom, see ibid., @T. OXW@ “fitkM=of S@rt-up ~-o~COStS of SYst~ for Iden_

Felons Who Attempt ‘lb Purchase Firearms,” contmctor paper prepared by FishcNlrsagh Associates, Inc., 221 Wnce Street, Chapel Hill, NC 27514,

for the U.S. Department of Justice, T&k Force on Felon Identification in Firearm Sales, June 1989.

66For di=Wsion of ~~1 i&n~l~tion au~tionp~ s= s~t~ents of ~B. w- Senior Associtie, Mice of khXlOIO~ AssCSSm@.,

and Stanley Kle@ Deputy Assistant Director, FBI Identification Divisio~ before a Mar. 13, 1991, hearing of the House Committee on the Judiciary,

Subcommi ttee on Civil and Constitutional Rights. Also see OT& The FBI Fingerprint I&ntification Automation Program, op. cit., footnote 14, in

preparation.
Automated Record Checks of Firearm Purchasers: Issues and Options . 25

of State and FBI criminal history files, but they will

take several years to implement.

Second, the definition of a felony offense varies

from State to State. Federal firearm laws honor State

law definitions of felony (or other) offenses that may

be disqualifying for firearm purchasers.67 The intent

in part was to recognize variations in State laws with

regard to expungement and restoration of rights

(including the right to purchase and possess firearms) for offenders who have served their time or

been pardoned. And some State laws disqualify

fireman purchasers for serious misdemeanor as well

as felony convictions. The result has been to

complicate the enforcement of Federal law, both by

gun dealers and law enforcement agencies. The

BATF is required to issue gun dealers an annual

compilation of State firearm laws and felony definitions, so that dealers can answer purchaser questions

about what is a disqualifying conviction.68 Dealers

are responsible for knowing the firearm laws of the

State and local jurisdiction where the guns are

delivered to the customer. This can be difficult.

BATF regulations, for example, permit licensed

dealers to sell or dispose of rifles and shotguns-but

not handguns-over-the-counter at in-State gun

shows to out-of-State residents if the sale is legal in

both States.69 BATF has fallen behind in issuing the

compilation of State firearm laws; the most recent

edition is dated July 1988.70

The compilation of a national felon file would

require screening of each State’s criminal history

records and its firearm laws. Law enforcement

officials and criminal record managers believe that

this task is best accomplished on a State-by-State

basis for the time being. A national felon file might

eventually be possible, but only after all State

records are flagged and screened.71

Third, a national convicted felon file would, by

definition, exclude persons convicted of certain

serious misdemeanors, under indictment for a felony

offense, or who are fugitives from justice. Persons in

these categores are also prohibited from purchasing

or receiving firearms by Federal law. Any person

convicted of a misdemeanor punishable by more

than 2 years imprisonment, or under indictment or

information72 in any court for a crime punishable by

more than 1 year imprisonment, is prohibited.73

‘‘Fugitives from justice’ are defined as any person

who has fled from a State to avoid prosecution for a

crime or to avoid giving testimony in any criminal

proceeding. 74 The State of Virginia interprets Federal law as justifying the checking of State and

national wanted person files in addition to State and

national criminal history files. In checking NCIC,

Virginia assumes that persons listed in NCIC are

wanted for a felony offense in another State and by

being in Virginia to purchase a firearm are fugitives

from justice. The FBI indicates that: 1) almost all

NCIC wanted persons are wanted for felony offenses, frequently serious felonies; and 2) arrest

warrants have been issued (usually by a judge or

magistrate) on almost all NCIC wanted persons .75

If the Virginia approach as used in its POS system

is accepted as sound, then the rationale for establishing a national felon file may not be justified for

purposes of firearm purchaser checks. A national file

limited to convicted felons would exclude persons

wanted or indicted for murder, armed robbery, rape,

and lesser felonies. If the goal is to check for persons

wanted or indicted as well as convicted of felony

cTSee u.S. Conmss, Semte, Committee on the Judici~, Federal Firearms Owners Protection Act, Senate report No. 98-583, 98~ Cong., 2d =S.

(WashingtorL DC: U.S. Government Printing Office, Aug. 8, 1984); Public Law 99-308, the “Federal Firearm Owners Protection Act,” 99th Cong.,

2d seas., May 19, 1986.

6SU.S0 Dep~ent of tie Tr~sury, Bureau of Alcohol, Tobacco, and Firearms, State Laws and Published Ordinances-Firearm.r, lg~ ~.

(Washingto~ DC: BATF, July 1988).

@See gmmwy U.S. Jlep~entOf the Treasury, Bureau of Alcohol, Tobacco, and Firearms, Federal Firearms Regulations, 1988-89 (wm~to~

DC: BATF, June 1988).

T%meau of Alcohol, Tobacco ~d Fir~, State Laws, op. cit., footnote 68. BATF could issue periodic legal updates on a regular basis (e.g., every

6 months) to meet the legislative intent, while publishing the full compilation less iiequently.

Tlseeu.s, Dep~entOf Justi~, Tmk Force on Felon Identifkation in Firearm Sales, Report to the Attorney General, op. Cit., footnote SO; statement

of P.J. Doyle, Florida Department of Law Enforcement and ChahmmL NCIC Advisory Policy Board, before a Mar. 13, 1991, hearing of the House

Committee on the Judiciwy, Subcommittee on Civil and Constitutional Rights.

Tz~ ~dic~ent is a formal ~cusation Of a crime presented by a grand jury; au information is a formal accusation made by a pmsmting attorney.

7318 U.S.C. 44, sees. 921(a) (20), 922(d)(1) and (2), Md 922(g)(l) ~d (2).

7418 U.S.C. 44, sec. 921(a) (15).

TS~e Florida Pos system alSO checks wanted person files. During the f~st 2 months of operatiou Florida identified 21 wanted persons attempting

to purchase firearms. See Florida Department of Law Enforcement, ‘‘Firearm Purchase Program, ’ op. cit., footnote 45.
26 ● Automated Record Checks of Firearm Purchasers: Issues and Options

offenses, a national felon file may not be adequate.

Many law enforcement and criminal records officials believe that improvement and automation of

the State and Federal criminal record systems is

better suited for effective firearm purchaser checks

than the development of a national felon fire. In their

view, automated, updated, and properly flagged

State and Federal criminal files should best meet the

need. Entries in the FBI’s Interstate Identification

Index could be flagged so that persons wanted,

indicted, or convicted of felony (or serious misdemeanor) offenses could be immediately disapproved

for firearm purchases, subject, of course, to followup

verification based on the complete criminal records.

This option would require that State criminal records

first be similarly flagged-a major challenge.76

Fourth, a national felon file, and other proposed

national computerized files, raise significant privacy

and security issues. Each proposal to add a new file

to the National Crime Information Center generates

debate and controversy. Privacy and civil liberty

advocates are concerned that a national felon file

might lead to uncontrolled, and inappropriate or

illegal, use of criminal record information for

noncriminal justice purposes. Some consider a

national felon file as another step toward a‘ ‘virtual’

national database of personal and private information. Critics are concerned that someday a felon file

might be matched or interconnected with computerized tax, education, health, social security, and

similarly sensitive databases. Criminal justice record managers are wary that a national felon file

might complicate system security and privacy,

especially if tens of thousands of gun dealers were

allowed direct electronic access to the NCIC computer network.77

Smart Cards78

Smart card technology offers advantages if linked

to an 800 number POS firearm purchaser check.

Smart cards are now used for: financial transactions;

distribution of government benefits and entitlements

(e.g., food stamps); health and emergency medical

information (e.g., blood type, medical history, allergic reactions); and security purposes (e.g., access to

restricted facilities, computer centers). Smart cards

look like ordinary plastic credit cards but include a

magnetic- or laser-readable strip or a computer chip

encoded and embedded within. Nearly any digital

information can be stored on smart cards, including

personal identifiers and criminal history information.

One option proposed would be to issue a smart

card to persons who desire to purchase a firearm. The

card could include fingerprint identification information that could be compared with the cardholder’s

live scan fingerprints taken at the POS for positive

identification. At the same time, the gun dealer could

call an 800 number to check for criminal activity

subsequent to the date the smart card was issued.

Another option would be to piggyback on smart

cards issued for other governmental purposes, such

as driver’s licenses. Some States like California are

now using smart cards for a variety of purposes. But

even the most advanced States would take several

years to convert to smart card driver’s licenses,79

many States much longer. Using a general purpose

ID card, like a driver’s license, for firearm purchaser

checks could minimize concerns about the State or

Federal Government compiling lists of law-abiding

gun owners. Including fingerprint information on

76~e~1 ~~ ~o~clud~ @ta ~epwatemtio~ felon file is notn~es~, ~d@tS~te ~d~~ords c~bcpIo@y@@ fOrfehXlycOnvictio~.

The IWIC wanted-persons file flags fugitives and can be checked simultaneously with III. Many State crhdMI history files do not however, maintain

information on felony indictments; thus flagging State and Federal files for indictments will be difllcult. Virginia again provides a model of how this

can be done. The Virginia CCH ffle includes police and prosecutor as well as court dispositions. A record is flagged for a felony arres~ but the flag is

removed in the event of a dismissal, none prosse, or acquittal.

77S= U.S. coges~, Offlce of ~~ology Assessment An A~ses~nt of Alter~tives for a Natio~l Computerized C??”minal History System, Op.

cit., footnote 59; U.S. Congress, Ofllce of lkchnology Assessment Federal Government Information Technology: Electronic Record Systems and

Zndividucd Privacy, OTA-CIT-296 (Springlleld, VA: National ‘Ikchnical Information Service, June 1986); U.S. Congress, Oftlce of ‘lkchnology

Assessment, “Issues Relevant to NCIC 2(K)0 Proposals,” OTA staff paper, Nov. 12, 1987; J.J. froming, P.G. Neumann, D.D. Redell, J. Goldmaq D.R.

Gordo~ M. Rotenberg, and L, Siegel, A Review of NCZC 2000: The Proposed Design for the National Crime Information Center (Washington DC:

Computer Professionals for Social Responsibility, February 1989); and July 26, 1989, comments of J. Gel@ American Civil Liberties UnioW on

the U.S. Department of Justice Draft Report on “Systems for Identifying Felons Who Attempt to Purchase Fizearms.”

TSThe tm “s~cmd” t~tic~ly refers to cards with built-in computer chips tbat can process, send, and receive as well as store iDfO~tiOn.

Common usage of ‘smart card” in the law enforcement community includes magnetic strip cards (that store information) and laser strip cards (that store

and update, i.e., read and write) as well as computer chip cards. See U.S. Congress, Ofllce of ‘lkchnology Assessmen4 Electronic Delivery of Public

Assistance Benejits: Technology Options and Policy Zssues, OTA-BP-CIT-47 (Washington, DC: U.S. Government Printing 0fi5ce, April 1988),

especially pp. 7-12.

Tg~es~bly as new licenses are issued and old licenses renewed.
Automated Record Checks of Firearm Purchasers: Issues and Options . 27

the card would reduce the potential for fraud, but

might cause concern about fingerprinting lawabiding license applicants and the creation of a

de facto national identification card.8o

Automated Record Checks and

Waiting Periods

How Waiting Periods Work

Some States have enacted waiting periods to

provide time for record checks of firearm purchasers, alone or as part of broader background checks.

Specific procedures vary widely. Waiting periods

range from 2 days to several weeks (see table 1). The

extent of records checked ranges from criminal

history records only, to criminal history and wanted

person files, to criminal and other records-such as

commitments to mental health institutions. In most

States that have record checks (e.g., California

Illinois, Oregon, Virginia) the record checks are

mandatory before a firearm purchase can be approved. In a few States (e.g., Michigan, Pennsylvania. South Carolina) the record checks are conducted

after the purchaser has taken possession of the

firearm, because police are unable to complete the

record check before the end of the waiting period or

because there is no waiting period. Some State

waiting periods apply to specific handguns only,

others to all handguns and some other firearms (e.g.,

semiautomatic firearms), and others to all firearms

(handguns, rifles, and shotguns) .81

Waiting periods can be combined with both POS

and proapproval systems. Virginia allows until the

close of the next business day to confirm POS

disapprovals. This amounts to a 24- to 48-hour

waiting period for some persons (but not counted as

a formal waiting period), depending on the time of

day the record check is made. There is no waiting

period for Virginia purchasers whose POS record

checks clear. Florida combines a POS record check

with a 3-working-day waiting period for “cooling

off’ purposes (as of Oct. 1, 1991). Illinois combines

a required firearm owner identification card, which

includes a record check, with a 72-hour waiting

Table l—Maximum Time Periods Required for Initial

Firearm Purchase by State Residenta

Handgun

--- . . . . . . 180 days

60 days

40 days

30 days

15 days

14 days

9 days

7 days

5 days

3 days

2 days

New York

Washington, DC

Indiana

Massachusetts

Illinois

New Jersey

North Carolina

California

Hawaii

Oregon

Tennessee

Connecticut

Missouri

Maryland

Minnesota

Rhode Island

Washington

Delawareb

Florida C

Iowa

South Dakota

Alabama

Pennsylvania

Virginiad

Wisconsin

Long gun

60 days

40 days

30 days

15 days

14 days

7 days

3 days

3 days

2 days

Washington, DC*

Massachusetts**

Illinois**

New Jersey*

California***

Hawaii**

Connecticut***

Maryland**

Rhode Island”

Delaware”””

Floridac*

Virginiad*

a

lncludes waiting time for both documentation (i.e., processing of a firearm

purchase application, where and when required) and for taking possession of the firearm. The waiting time listed is for the first purchase. In some

states the documentation is good for subsequent purchases in a given

time period; in other states the documentation must be processed for each

purchase. In most States with waiting periods, the time required for

documentation and taking possession is the same. In a few States, the

waiting time for taking possession is shorter: Washington, DC (2 days for

preregistered handguns-the only handguns allowed in D.C.); Illinois (3

days for handguns, 1 day for long guns); and Indiana (7 days for

handguns).

bDelaware can take up to 3 working days to verify initial point-of-sale (POS)

disapprovals.

CFIon& ~n t~e Up to 3 working days to verify initial POS disapprovals; a

3+vorkingday waiting period for all handgun purchases goes into effect

Oct. 1, 1991.

%giniacantake until thecloseof thenextworkingday toverifyinitial POS

disapprovals; POS checks apply to all firearm purchases as of July 1,

1991.

● All long guns.

**Shotguns and assault rifles only.

● ** RifIes only.

SOURCE: U.S. Department of Justice, Bureau of Justice Statistics and

U.S. Department of the Treasury, Bureau of Alcohol, Tobacco,

and Firearms; updated by OTA, 1991.

period for handgun purchases and 24 hours for long

gun puchases. California has a 15-day waiting

period that applies to all firearm sales in California,

whether handguns or long guns, and covers sales

%id.; also see statement of W.J. Henderso~ L. Guttentag, and J. Gel- American Civil Liberties Unioq on “Voluntary Work Authorization

Cards” before a Nov. 9, 1989, hearing of the House Committee on the Judiciary, Subcommittee on hnmigratio~ Refugees, and International Law. For

a general discussion of smart card options, see U.S. Department of Justice, Task Force on Felon Identification in Firearm Sales, Reporr to the Attorney

General, op. cit., footnote 50.

slFor de~ on State waiting periods, see U.S. Department of the Treasury, BATF, State Luws and Ordinances-Firearms, Op. cit., footnote 6% Us.

Department of Justice, Bureau of Justice Statistics,‘‘State Requirements and Systems Controlling Firearms Sales,” Apr. 4, 1989, prepared for the ‘lksk

Force on Felon Identification in Firearms sales.
28 ● Automated Record Checks of Firearm Purchasers: Issues and Options

from a licensed dealer and an individual. Oregon has

a 15-day wait combined with a fingerprint and

record check on handgun purchasers. Oregon gun

dealers ink the purchaser’s fingerprints (thumbs

only) on the store premises and mail the prints to the

Oregon State Police for processing (the completed

purchase forms are sent to both local and State

police). Oregon is one of a handful of States known

to actually run fingerprint checks on purchasers;

most States with record checks use names and

identifiers, not fingerprints.

The impact of automated record checks on

waiting periods or proapproval periods differs depending on the original purpose of the waiting

period. If the wait was intended to allow time for

criminal record checks, then automating the process

could reduce the waiting period for issuing a firearm

owner identification card. With enough time and

resources, most States should be able to implement

a POS system. However, waiting or proapproval

periods would not necessarily be reduced. States

may want to keep them for cooling off purposes, to

provide time for background checks beyond criminal records, or to conduct fingerprint checks that

would not be possible at the POS.-

State Computerized Criminal History

Files—A Key Prerequisite

(CCH)

The key prerequisite for automated firearm purchaser record checks is State computerized criminal

history (CCH) files. State CCH files must meet

several conditions to reduce the time for record

checks and move toward POS checks. These requirements include the following:

1. complete and fully automated master name

index to criminal offenders;

2. complete CCH file, at least for recent felony

offenders;

3. an acceptable level of final dispositions in th

CCH file; and

4. substantially complete flagging of felony con

victions in the CCH file.

Most States meet some of these requirements today;

few meet all.

In 1989, 44 States had all in-State offenders in a

master name index, and three other States had over

85 percent of the offenders included.82 Of those

States, 39 have fully automated name indexes.

Illinois and Ohio are the only States with large

populations that do not have automated name

indexes. Most States, however, have only partially

automated criminal history files. Ten States have

fully automated files with computerized records for

all offenders.83 Eight States have manual files. Most

States fall somewhere between (see figure 5).84 The

percentages may be somewhat better for purposes of

firearm purchaser checks, since many partially

automated States give priority to computerizing

records of recent, felony offenders. Nationwide,

about 60 to 70 percent of State criminal history

records are automated.85

Most States have only partially complete disposition reports.86 Just one State-Massachusetts—

indicates 100 percent reporting. Thirteen States

include 10 to 50 percent of the final dispositions for

arrests in the criminal history file. The remaining

States include between 60 and 95 percent of the final

dispositions (see figure 6).87 Nationwide, about 65 to

70 percent of State criminal history records include

final dispositions.88

The level of ‘acceptable’ disposition reporting is

debatable. The goal for most States is 100 percent;

many are taking steps to improve reporting. Only a

few States can match the disposition reporting levels

of Virginia, which are 86 percent of all arrests and 95

percent of arrests occurring within the last 5 years.

Szsee SEARm &oup, kc., Sumey of Cn”nu-nal History lnfonnucion Systems, NCJ-125620 (Wr@ingtOq DC: U.S. Rpment of Jwtiw, BW~U

of Justice Statistics, March 1991), which is the primmy data source for the following discussion of State miminal record system capabilities. The survey

results should be interpreted as an approximate snapshot or profile of State criminal record systems, rather than a pnxise accounting. Many States do

not have reliable, complete statistics on their record systems and therefore responded to the survey with best estimates.

83Colomdo, &or~ Hawaii, Idaho, Michigaq Menu Nevada, Oregoq Rhode Island, and W-ton.

8413 Stites ~th 1 t. so ~ment of remrds automt~; 7 Stites ~th51 to 75 pmcent auto~t~ ~d 13 Stites with 76 to 99 percent automated.

85The BJS/SE~~ tioup, Inc. survey found that about 60 Prcd of ~ s~te c~ history records were automated as of 1989. See SEARCH

Group, Inc., Survey of CriminuZ History lnformution Systems, op. cit., footnote 82. The percentage likely has increased somewhat since 1989.

MSEARCH @OUp, r.nc., Survey of Crim”nd History Znformution Systems, op. cit., footnote 82.

8714 Stites with 60 to 75 Wnnt disposition reporting; and 12 States with 76 to 95 percent disposition reporting.

88~e BJS/SU~ G_Oup, rnc. survey found that about 63 Wrcent of ~ Stite~history records included fti dispositions (for completed

arrest cycles) as of 1989. See ibid. The percentage likely has increased somewhat since 1989.
Automated Record Checks of Firearm Purchasers: Issues and Options ● 29

Figure 5-Automation of State Criminal History

Records, 1989

A I

15

12 II I

o % 1 51-75 76-99 1 00%

Automated records as a percent of total records

SOURCE: Bureau of Justice Statistics/SEARCH Group, Inc., 1991.

If the Virginia level of disposition reporting was

accepted as a standard, the States meeting this

criterion in 1989 would include: Connecticut, Maine,

New Jersey, and North Carolina, in addition to

Virginia. 89

Other States could meet lower standards. At

80-percent current disposition reporting, for example, California, Iowa, Minnesota, Montana, New

Jersey, and North Dakota would also “qualify.”9

°

At each increment of lower disposition reporting, the

percentage of false positive hits and the time and

effort needed to verify these hits would likely

increase. Waiting periods and proapproval periods

are used in part to compensate for incomplete

disposition reporting. Crimin al records personnel

use waiting time to check all questionable hits and

to identify false positive hits. Under the Virginia and

similar POS systems, all purchases resulting in hits

are initially disapproved, since there is no time

allowed to check incomplete records before responding to the dealer. In Virginia, California,

Illinois, Oregon, and other States with statistics, the

great majority of initial hits are false positives.91

For purposes of firearm purchaser checks, State

criminal history files should be flagged to identify

Figure 6—Final Dispositions in State Criminal

History Files, 1989

1O-5O% 60-75°A

/“

100%

Final dispositions as a percent of total arrests

within past 5 years

SOURCE: Bureau of Justice Statistics/SEARCH Group, Inc., 1991

persons with felony convictions. Flagging means

entering a code designation into the database that

indicates a felony conviction, so that a search of the

fide will indicate whether a person has a felony

conviction without having to review the entire

criminal history record. Persons formally charged

(e.g., indicted) for felony offenses, which also

disqualifies persons to purchase firearms under

Federal law, could be flagged as well. Only six

States have flagged all persons with felony convictions: Idaho, Illinois, New York, South Dakota,

Virginia, and Wisconsin. A few States have flagged

some felony convictions; the majority of States have

flagged none. Most of the States claim to have the

necessary information in their criminal history

systems; but it will take time and resources to flag

convictions (23 States could flag all felony convictions, and 18 States could flag some convictions) .92

And States can only flag convictions that have been

reported to the State criminal history repository;

when final dispositions are missing, convictions

cannot be flagged.

Wide Variability in State CCH Systems

States vary widely in the ability to conduct

criminal record checks of firearm purchasers. The

 initial bits) reported to OTA by State officials are, by State: Virginia to 

California Oregon (17: 18); Delaware (7: 10); and Florida 

 of History Information Systems, op. cit., 82.
30 ● Automated Record Checks of Firearm Purchasers: Issues and Options

1989 SEARCH Group survey of the States (sponsored by the Bureau of Justice Statistics (BJS))

compiled information on the key components of

each State’s criminal record check capabilities.93

This information should be analyzed by BJS to rank

the States in order of: length of time to conduct

criminal record checks, and reduction in time for

checks at l-year intervals in the future based on

different assumptions. Ability of a State to reduce

record check time depends on it’s current status of

name index and criminal history automation and

disposition reporting. Well-automated States with

complete reporting can reduce the record check

response times easier than those with incomplete

records.

California is positioned to reduce record checking

time because it has the following:

1.

2.

3.

4.

a fully automated, complete name index of

criminal offenders;

a substantially automated criminal history file

(67 percent of all offenders, all recent or active

offenders);

75-percent disposition reporting (85 percent

for arrests within 5 years); and

some felony conviction flags in place with

information available to flag all felony convictions.

California’s waiting period for handgun purchases

was once 5 days. But that was too short to complete

record checks, so the waiting period was extended to

15 days.

California Department of Justice officials estimate that improvements in the automated record

system, cost recovery user fees (raised from $7.50 to

about $15.00 per transaction), and possibly smart id

cards could halve the processing time. Then, the

15-day waiting period could be reduced. Some

California officials and gun dealers opt for a

POS/smart card system with a 3- to 7-day waiting

period for cooling off. Minnesota, Montana, New

Jersey, New York, North Carolina, and South

Carolina are also well positioned to improve their

record checks.

Many States have serious deficiencies in their

CCH systems that make it more difficult to improve

record check accuracy and response time. Arkansas,

for example, has a manual criminal history file, low

disposition reporting rate (20 to 30 percent), and no

current capability to flag convicted felons. Colorado

has a fully automated name index and criminal

history file, but low disposition reporting (10

percent) and no felony conviction flags. Other States

have the following serious CCH deficiencies: no

CCH file (Maine, Mississippi, New Mexico, Tennessee, Vermont, West Virginia, and the District of

Columbia, along with Arkansas); limited CCH file,

with automated records on 40 percent or fewer

offenders (Arizona, Indiana, Kansas, Louisiana,

Massachusetts, Nebraska, North Dakota, Ohio, Oklahoma, and Pennsylvania); low disposition reporting,

with 40 percent or fewer dispositions reported for

arrests within the past 5 years (Alabama, Alaska,

Delaware, Georgia,94 Idaho, New Mexico, Arkansas, and Colorado); and no current capability to flag

convicted felons (Colorado, Connecticut, District of

Columbia, Georgia, Idaho, Illinois, Iowa, Nebraska,

Ohio, Oklahoma, West Virginia, and Arkansas).95

Problem of Funding

Record check improvements will take significant

time and increased funding. How fast improvements

can be made depends on the volume of firearm

purchaser record checks (a function of population),

the commitment of State legislatures and the Congress to improving record checks of firearm purchasers (enabling the reduction of waiting or proapproval

periods and movement toward POS checks), and the

financial resources available.

The U.S. Department of Justice has not yet

performed a detailed State-by-State analysis of the

money and time required to implement various

firearm purchaser check options. The BJS and FBI,

and various States, have conducted or sponsored

several preliminary, partial studies of selected op93rbid.

94@@~~dicate= tit over70 Pacent Of dispositions were qofied wi~ me p~t 5 ye~; he problem is tit IIMUIy of these dispositions were not

recorded in the State criminal history records, due to a large processing backlog that is now being reduced. For purposes of automated f~eaxm purchaser

checks, however, a disposition reported but not recorded is just as inaccessible as a disposition not reported.

gsrbid.
Automated Record Checks of Firearm Purchasers: Issues and Options ● 31

tions or components thereof.96 The composite results provide the following order-of-magnitude estimates of nationwide start-up costs and time:

A purchaser POS “instant” telephone check

“hot line” in each State (based on name and

identifier checks, not fingerprint checks) would

cost roughly $25 million, exclusive of the costs

of needed criminal record system improvements. 97

A purchaser POS “instant” check option

(whether with a national or individual State

telephone “hot lines”) would require roughly

$260 million over the next 3 to 5 years to

provide a substantially automated, complete,

and up-to-date criminal history records infrastructure .98

A purchaser fingerprint check option (not at the

POS) would require roughly an additional $200

million ($40 million Federal, $160 million

State)99 and 5 plus years to provide the necessary automated fingerprint identification capability.

A POS purchaser fingerprint check option

would cost an additional $600 million to $11

billion, lOO depending on whether only storefront or all gun dealers are equipped with the

●

necessary equipment, if implemented over the

next 5 to 10 years (the cost might drop

significantly in 10 plus years).

A purchaser smart card option with POS check

(’but no fingerprints) would roughly cost an

additional $410 million for magnetic strip cards

($270 million for dealer equipment, $140

million for issuing cards)lO1 up to $890 million

for computer chip cards102 over the next 3 to 5

years.

The State CCH and AFIS criminal record funds

would be required in any event for general improvements in criminal record and identification systems.

Smart cards would add another few hundred million

dollars, and POS fingerprint checks a few hundred

million to several billion dollars.

Funds for upgrading record check capabilities and

for operating costs could come from the following

sources: 1) State and local government general

revenues, 2) Federal block or discretionary grants, 3)

licensing fees (from gun dealers), and 4) user fees

(from firearm purchasers). All States provide general revenue funding for State and local criminal

record systems development and operation. The

amounts provided vary widely by State and over

MSee gener~y U.S. Dep~ent of Justice, Report to the Attorney General, op. cit., footnote 50 T. Omagh, “Estimates of Start-up and Operational

Costs,” op. cit., footnote 65; U.S. Department of Justice, Bureau of Justice Statistics, “Summary of Criminal History Record Improvement Grantees,”

Mar. 13, 1991. Also see cost analyses of numerous individual States planning or implementing computerized criminal history and automated fingerprint

identification systems.

~Ass~es the Vir@a POS “instant” check start-up cost (about $250,000 for checks on handguns with barrel length ~der 5 inches) can *

extrapolated to all States checking all firearm purchases from dealers. The BJS contractor arrived at a similar estimate in 1989; see U.S. Department

of Justice, Report to the Attorney General, op. cit., footnote SO, and T Orsa~ ‘‘Estimates of Start-up and OperationaJ Costs, ’ op. cit., footnote 65.

OT4 did not estimate operating costs. The BJS contractor estimated State “hot line” operating costs at about $40 to $50 million per year; the

Congressional Budget Office estimated the cost of an FBI “hot line” at $5 to $10 million per year, although the comparability of these estimates is

unknown. Both estimates exclude the cost of record system improvements.

WCost depends on the level of automation and rewrd qdity, and alSO on the size of the State and the baseline condition of record systems. Achieving

90 to 95 percent automation and 90 to 95 percent disposition reporting in all States is estimated to cost two to three hundred million dollars over the

next 3 to 5 years. This assumes an average automation cost of roughly $132 million ($5 millioq $2 rnillio~ and $1 million per State for the 21, 7, and

13 States with O to 50 percent, 51 to 75 percen~ and 76 to 99 percent automation respectively, as of 1989) and an average disposition reporting cost of

roughly $134 million ($6 rnillio~ $3 rnillio~ and $2 million per State for the 13, 14, and 12 States with 10 to 50 percen~ 60 to 75 percent, and 76 to

95 percent reporting respectively, as of 1989). This cost estimate alSO assumes that records of many older, inactive criminals (e.g., no activity for 25

to 30 years) might never be fully autqnated, but would be listed in automated, flagged name indexes. Time is also widely variable. Implementation of

major State CCH or AFIS systems takes, on the average, 2 to 4 years from initial planning to full operatio~ upgrades typically take 1 to 2 years. Major

improvements inrecordquality likewise usually take years. See SEARCH Group, Inc., Survey of Cn”mind History Informan”on Systems, op. cit., footnote

82, for State-by-State data on rates of improvement in automation and record quality during 1983-1989. The Congressional Budget OffIce estimated

the infrastructure improvement cost to support automated firearm purchaser checks at ‘ ‘hundreds of millions over several years.’ See letter fkom Robert

D. Reischauer, CBO Director, to Rep. Charles E. Schumer, May 3, 1991.

%%e Federal cost is based on preliminary estimates of the FBI’s fingerprint identification automation program (excluding building and site

acquisition), and assumes that the incremental cost of supporting fuearrn purchaser checks would be about $40 million (or 10 to 15 percent of the total

FBI AFIS cost). The State cost assumes AFIS upgrades for 30 States at $2 million each to handle the additional workload from firearms purchaser checks,

and new AFIS systems for 20 smaller States at $5 million each (assumes that the larger States have already invested in AFIS at costs of, typically, $10

to $25 million each). For further discussio~ see OTA, The FBI Fingerprint Identification Automation Program, op. cit., footnote 14.

l~Ass~es 15,000 to 270,000 dealer terminals at $@,ooo each.

IOIAssMes 270,000 dealer t~s at $1,000 each plus 70 million magnetic or laser strip cards at $2 each.

lozAssumes 270,000 dealer terminals at $2,000 each plus 70 rnllion computer chip cards at $5 each.
32 ● Automated Record Checks of Firearm Purchasers: Issues and Options

time. This reflects differences in economic conditions and political commitment to criminal justice

improvements. Funding is influenced by the vagaries of the regional and national economies. Most

State and local government budgets are strained, and

many of the States with the most serious record

system deficiencies are strapped for funds. This

makes Federal funding even more important.

Federal finds for State and local record system

improvements are available from the Bureau of

Justice Assistance (BJA). BJA, with the assistance

of BJS, administers the $9 million per year (for 3

years, starting in FY91) discretionary criminal

record quality improvement program and the roughly

$20 million per year (starting in FY92) 5-percent

set-aside Anti-Drug Abuse block grant program for

record system improvements.103 The block grant

set-aside program is still being defined. Only States

that can demonstrate complete and accurate criminal

record systems will be eligible to waive the 5-

percent requirement. The discretionary program is

already operational. These funds can be used for any

component necessary to implement automated fire-

●

●

●

●

●

●

purchaser checks, such as:

flagging of felony convictions in criminal

history records, with emphasis on arrests and

convictions within the last 5 years;

implementing the FBI’s voluntary reporting

standards for convicted felons, including the

use of fingerprint identification;

improving the reporting of arrests, dispositions,

and other criminal history information to central State repositories;

auditing the record quality of criminal history

record systems;

implementing or enhancing automated name

indexes and computerized criminal history

record systems; and

improving the capability to participate in the

Interstate Identification Index (III) system for

the interstate exchange of criminal history

information. l04

As of March 13, 1991, BJA and BJS had awarded

$8.7 million to 26 States, with $1.3 million intended

for 3 States in process. Projects range from eliminating backlogs of unfiled arrests and dispositions, to

designing a CCH (for States with a manual system),

to automating the information exchange among

judicial and law enforcement record systems, to

conducting record quality audits.105

Full implementation of the BJA and BJS grant

programs will speed up the improvement of State

and local criminal record systems and improve the

ability of those systems to support automated record

checks of firearm purchasers. BJA and BJS have not

yet conducted a State-by-State examination of:

needed criminal record system improvements; the

cost of needed improvements; and how quickly (and

by how much) these improvements might reduce

record check response time, and upgrade completeness and accuracy. Such an examination might be

included in the program evaluation that BJA and

BJS are planning for FY 1992,106 and could cover

both State and local criminal record system improvements and full implementation of the FBI’s

separate but related Interstate Identification Index

(III) and National Fingerprint File (NFF).107

Licensing and user fees are other sources of

revenue for automated firearm purchaser checks.

The current Federal firearm dealer license fee is $10

per year, renewable every 3 years.108 This fee could

be increased to raise additional funds for implementating automated firearm purchaser checks and to

cover the cost of more extensive criminal record

checks on license applications. A licensing fee of

$100 every 3 years, for example, would raise about

$7 million per year (assuming 70,000 new or

renewal licenses per year). About $2 million could

be used to fund complete criminal record and

fingerprint checks on license applicants and renewlossee U.S. )lep~ent of JUStiCZ, C)fflce of Justice Programs, Attorney General’s Program, op. cit., footnote 32.

l~u<s. DW~ent of Justim, O&Ice of Justice fio~~, BU~u of Justice Assis~~ ~d B~au of J~tice Statistics, “hnprovement of tid

Histo~ Record Information and Identifkation of Convicted Felons,” Federal Register, vol. 56, pp. 11275-11278, Mm. 15, 1991.

105u.s. Dep~entof Justice, Bureau of Justice Statistics, ‘‘SummZUY of C-History Record Improvement Grantees,’ Mar. 13, 1991, submitted

for the record of a Mar. 13, 1991, hearing of the House Committee on the Judiciary, Subcommittee on Civil and Constitutional Rights.

106SeeU.S. Dep~entofJustim, ()&lce ~fJustice ~o=s, Bmeauof Justice Assis~ce,EdwardByme Me~~”alStateand~ca~ ~wEnforcemnt

Assistance Program: Discretionary Program Application Kit (Washington, DC: BJA, Feb. 20, 1991), especially p. 38, “Criminal History Information

System Evaluation.”

IOTSCe OTA, FBI Automated Finge@nt Identification program, op. cit., footnote 14, in preparation.

IOgIt costs $25 per year for pawnbrokers; $50 per year for f~earms ~d ammunition manufacturers or importers. See 18 U.S.C. 44, sec. 923(a).
Automated Record Checks of Firearm Purchasers: Issues and Options ● 33

als. The remaining $5 million could be transferred to

the BJA and BJS grant program to augment funds for

record system improvements necessary to support

automated firearm purchaser checks.

User fees vary by State and range from no charge

to $29 per firearm purchaser.109 Fees for criminal

record checks based on name and personal identifiers range from about $2 to $10 per purchaser, when

fees are charged.l10 Fees for full record checks

including fingerprints range from about $12 to $29.

Some States (e.g., Oregon) do not charge even for

fingerprint checks, with funding provided from

general revenues. 111 A user fee surcharge could raise

significant additional funds to offset costs. A $2

Federal surcharge could generate roughly another

$5 million per year, assuming, conservatively, 2.5

million firearm purchases per year at licensed

dealers (multiple purchases in the same transaction

would still be assessed at $2). These funds could go

directly to each State, or be transferred to BJA and

BJS for redistribution to the States as part of the

criminal record grant programs. States could, alternatively, add a $2 surcharge themselves and deposit

revenues in an account reserved for State and local

record system improvements. 112 some gun owne r

groups view user fees and possible surcharges as, in

effect, a tax on the exercise of their constitutional

right to keep and bear arms. Some law enforcement

agencies view such revenue sources as a legitimate

way to cover the costs of conducting record checks

and to make the improvements needed to help ensure

these checks are as complete and timely as possible.

Challenge of Improving Record Quality

Additional resources will be needed, whether

from Federal grants, increased licensing or user fees,

or elsewhere, if complete and accurate firearm

purchaser record checks are to be provided. Problems with record quality are compounded by delays

and omissions in the information submitted by

courts and law enforcement agencies to State

repositories and delays in entering information once

submitted into State criminal record systems.113

Many States, but not all, require criminal justice

agencies to provide arrest cycle information to the

State record repositories, that is, information on

what happens to each offender after the initial arrest

(see figure 7).

This means that arrests can be legally carried in

the criminal history records with no indication if the

charges were dropped (one-third of the States) and

with no indication of final felony dispositions

(one-fifth of the States). Even when prosecutor and

court disposition reporting is required, reporting

levels vary widely. Some States with mandatory

prosecutor reporting estimate that half or more of

prosecutor declinations are never submitted to the

State repository. 114 Some States with mandatory

felony court disposition reporting likewise estimate

that half or more of final dispositions are never

submitted. 115 Even when dispositions are submitted,

the timeliness varies widely (see table 2).

It is apparent that State disposition reporting rates

vary from very low to very high. Many court

dispositions are never filed with the State criminal

record repository or filed late. When filed, many

State repositories take weeks to months to enter the

dispositions into the criminal history records. Even

States with high overall disposition reporting (e.g.,

95 percent in Virginia) and rapid entry of dispositions once received (5 days in Virginia) still

experience significant delays. An initial hit with the

Virginia POS firearm purchaser record check, for

Kwsee SE~CH ~oup, ~c., Sumey ofcrimina[ History Information Systems, OP. cit., foo~ote 82.

llov~~a c~ges $2 per record check but es~ates that &e full cost is about $10 per check. The difference is provided from gener~ revenues. See

Virginia State Police, Virginia Firearms Transaction Program: Report for the Ofi”ce of the Governor, op. cit., footnote 82.

11 l~e ~egons~tepolicee~~ate ~ ~ppro~te to~l direct cost of $11 per check, $6 for tie figerpfit checkby state police ad $5 for OthtX record

checks by local law enfomement. The indirect capital cost of additional automated fingerprint identitlcation capability could add as much as another

$10 per check. See Oregon State Police, 1990 Study of Retail Firearm Sales, op. cit., footnote 45.

112~ofi& ~~ges $loper record check w~chgenerated $367,000 during the first 2 months of operation. T’heSe funds cover bo~ opera~g costs ~d

related record system improvements. Virginia charges $2 per record check and recovers only a part of the operating costs. Virginia estimates the full

cost (operating and related infrastructure) at $10 per check.

113 SeeoTA,Assessment ofA[terWtivesfor aNational Computen”zed Criminal Histo~System, op. cit., foo~ote 59; U.S. Congress, SeIMte, cOU3111itki5

on the Judiciary, Subcommittee on Patents, Copyrights, and Trademarks, Computen”zed Cn”minal History Records, hearing, 98th Cong., Ist sess.

(Washingto~ DC: U.S. Government Printing Office, May 12, 1983); U.S. Department of Justice, Task Force on Felon Identification in Firearm Sales,

Report to the Attorney General, op. cit., footnote 50; and SEARCH Group, Inc., Survey of Criminal History Information Systems, op. cit., footnote 82.

lld~ab~,Dis~ct of Columbia, Illinois, Indiana, Kansas, Maine, Mississippi, South Dako@ Utah, md Wasmgton.

llSDi~~ct of ColMbia, ~ofi&, I~inois, ~uisi~, Mississippi, Nebras~, New Mexico, lknnessee, ad Washington.
34 ● Automated Record Checks of Firearm Purchasers: Issues and Options

Figure 7—Types of Criminal History Information Submitted to State Repositories, 1989

Charges dropped

Felony court dispositions

State prison admissions/

releases of felons

Probation information

Parole information

v I

o 10 20 30 4 0 50

Number of States

SOURCE: Bureau of Justice Statistics/SEARCH Group, Inc., 1991.

Table 2—Average Time Required To Receive and

Enter Final Dispositions Into State Criminal

History Records, 1989

Table 3-Average Time Required To Receive and

Enter Arrest information-into State Criminal

History Records, 1989

Average number of days between

Court disposition Receipt of disposition

and submission to and entry into State

StateaState repository criminal history records

Arizona . . . . . . . . . .

California. . . . . . . .

Florida . . . . . . . . . . .

Idaho . . . . . . . . . . . .

Maine . . . . . . . . . . .

Nebraska . . . . . . . .

New Jersey . . . . . .

Pennsylvania . . . .

Tennessee . . . . . .

Utah . . . . . . . . . . . . .

Virginia . . . . . . . . . .

Washington . . . . . .

Wisconsin . . . . . . .

Wyoming . . . . . . . .

57 days

30

180

35

14

365

7

180

28-42

180

90-120

60

14

7

45 days

40

180b

730b

1

60-90b

2

2

14

5

28

60-90b

3

 States with mandatory final disposition reporting.

 entering into criminal history database.

SOURCE: Group, 1991.

example, could turn out to be false, since a court

acquittal could take 3 to 4 months to be reported and

entered into the Virginia State CCH file.

The situation is further complicated because

Virginia is one of the majority of States whose State

laws provide for expungement of felony convictions, pardon of felons, or restoration of felons’ civil

rights. These actions typically must be noted on the

criminal history records. In some States, the record

itself must be destroyed, sealed, or returned to the

Average number of days between

Arrest event Receipt of arrest data

and submission to and entry into State

StateaState repository criminal history records

Alabama . . . . . . . . .

California . . . . . . . .

Colorado . . . . . . . .

Georgia . . . . . . . . .

Illinois . . . . . . . . . . .

Louisiana . . . . . . . .

Massachusetts . . .

Michigan . . . . . . . .

New Jersey . . . . . .

New York . . . . . . . .

South Carolina . . .

Virginia . . . . . . . . . .

7 days

21

2

3-4

1-5

7

28

7

7-14

7

5

3-5

3 days

15-20

2

252b

365b

3oob

5

1

1-14

10

5

 of entering data into criminal history database.

SOURCE: Group, Inc., 1991.

court or originating agency. All of these actions

could affect the right of a convicted felon to purchase

or possess firearms.

The reporting of arrests to State repositories also

varies, although not as much as for disposition

reporting (see table 3). Arrests typically are reported

to the State repository within a week or two and

entered into the criminal history records within a few

days to a week of receipt. Some States have

problems obtaining timely submissions from arresting agencies or in eliminating filing backlogs, which
Automated Record Checks of Firearm Purchasers: Issues and Options ● 35

delay the entry of arrest information into criminal

history databases. Just as missing dispositions can

lead to erroneous firearm purchaser record checks,

so can missing arrests-if the arrestee was formally

charged with a felony offense. An arrestee out on

bond or personal recognizance, for example, could

get a clean POS record check at a gun dealer and

walk out with a firearm if the arrest had not yet been

entered into the State criminal history file. (Missing

arrests present similar problems for record checks

conducted during waiting or proapproval periods.)

Achieving even reasonably complete and accurate

criminal history records on a nationwide basis will

require substantial procedural and automation improvements by police, prosecutors, courts, and

criminal record repositories.

116 These improvements

will take considerable time and resources, even if

assigned a high priority-thus the need to consider

sources of additional funds.

11%x OTA, ASSeSSrnent OfAlter~riVeSfOr aNationa[ Computerized Criminal History System, op. cit., footnote S9; SEARCH Group, rnc., Snategies

for Improving Data Quality, NCJ 115-339 (Washington DC: U.S. Department of Justice, Bureau of Justice Statistics, April 1989) and Data Quality

of Crin”nal History Records, NCJ-98079 (Washington DC: U.S. Department of Justice, Bureau of Justice Statistics, October 1985); U.S. Department

of Justice, Task Force on Felon Identflcation in Firearm Sales, Report to the Attorney General, op. cit., footnote 50.
Crosscutting Issues

Value of Criminal Record Checks

Assigning an overall value to criminal record

checks of firearm purchasers is difficult since it

involves the weighing of both quantitative and

qualitative benefits and costs. Record checks can

help implement Federal and State laws that prohibit

convicted felons from purchasing or possessing

firearms. States with record checks have found, on

the average, that about 1 to 2 percent of purchasers

from licensed dealers are convicted felons or are

otherwise disqualified. Reliable data are lacking on

States without record checks. (NIJ, BJS, or BATF

could commission survey research on a statistically

valid sample of firearm purchasers from dealers in

States without record checks to fill this knowledge

gap.) The limited research on how criminals obtain

firearms (based on surveys of convicted and incarcerated felons) suggests that purchases from licensed gun shops are the source in about one in six

cases. More often, criminals obtain firearms from

friends, the black market, and less formal sales or

exchange outlets such as gun shows. 117 Thousand s

of gun shows are held each year. Criminal record

checks are rarely required at gun shows, even though

gun show transactions are subject to Federal law.

Nor is there any available research on the criminal

backgrounds of gun show purchasers. (NIJ, BJS, or

BATF could sponsor research on a sample of firearm

purchasers from gun shows. 118 )

The possible extension of record checks to all gun

shows raises several questions. First, would gun

shows or other traditionally cash-and-carry ad hoc

sales outlets be possible with record checks? Some

gun owner groups are concerned that record checks

involving a waiting period would so discourage gun

show sales that many of the shows would fold.

Virginia requires POS record checks of gun show

purchases from dealers (but not private party transactions). This approach seems to be working with a

minimum of hassles for gun show vendors and

purchasers, and could be extended to all gun show

transactions. Federal law prohibits all convicted

felons, fugitives from justice, and other disqualified

persons from purchasing or receiving firearms,

regardless of location. California, on the other hand,

recently (in January 1991) extended record checks

and a 15-day waiting period to long gun sales and

gun shows; the effects on gun shows are not yet

known. Gun owner groups believe that waiting

periods threaten the viability and, indeed, the very

existence of gun shows.

We cannot precisely estimate the total number of

firearms reaching the criminal community either

directly or indirectly (e.g., via stooge purchases)

from gun dealers, gun shows, and other outlets that

could reasonably be covered by mandatory record

checks. The number of firearms potentially affected,

however, is likely to be in the range of tens to

hundreds of thousands per year. Direct criminal

purchases from gun dealers alone could account for,

conservatively, about 50,000 firearms per year,

assuming that 2 percent of purchasers are criminals

and 2.5 million dealer sales per year (out of 7.5

million total firearm sales by dealers per year).119

Adding gun show transactions could increase the

number of firearms affected.

Better estimates will require new and innovative

research on the flow of firearms to the criminal

community. NIJ or BJS could, as a frost step, sponsor

a research methodology conference to: first, discuss

conceptual strategies for more comprehensively

researching the sources of criminal firearms (including gun shows, flea markets, pawn shops, small

dealers, and interstate transfers as well as purchases

from storefront dealers and chain stores); and

second, review survey, sampling, and interviewing

methodologies that can produce the most statistically valid results. NIJ and BJS might fund several

l17h fisc~ yea 1990, BATF did recommend 280 cases to U.S. Attorneys for c~prosecution of persons illegally selling or receiving fiiearms

at gun shows or flea markets. Wrious BATF regional and district offices report illegal gun show transactions. The nature and extent of such transactions

are unknown.

118BA~ is ~omidering ~ explomtow @u@ t. ~~er ~de~~d the extent ad regio~ distribution of ~ shows, and the nature and extent Of any

illegal fiiearms transactions at gun shows.

1 l~A~ es~testo~ -u~ U.S. ~s~es by dealers to & about 7.5 millioq based on the rou@y 4 dfion fiiearrns manufactured domestically

and 1 million firearms imported per year (as reported to BATF) and assuming that used firearm sales equal 50 percent of new firearmsales. The estimate

of 50,000 additional firearms per year that could be affected by record checks assumes: 2.5 million dealer sales of firearms are not currently covered

by firearm purchaser record checks; and 2 percent of firearm purchasers in those States/jurisdictions without record checks have disqualifying criminal

records.

-37-
38 ● Automated~ecord Checks of Firearm Purchasers: Issues and Options

Figure 8—interstate Movement of Firearms: The Case of Boston, MA,

October 1989 to June 1990

All other

New Hampshire

New York

Pennsylvania 5

Florida

Virginia

Massachusetts

Georgia

Number of firearms traced to specific States

SOURCE: Bureau of Alcohol, Tobacco, and Firearms and Boston Police Department, 1990.

alternative approaches, in order to provide a more

robust basis for interpreting the research. A wellbalanced research advisory panel seems especially

appropriate and necessary, given the sensitivity of

this line of inquiry. The panel could provide

feedback on the methodology and help assure the

validity, objectivity, and credibility of the results. 120

criminal record checks should make it tougher for

criminals to get firearms from gun dealers, gun

shows, and other organized, public outlets. Some

criminals may be deterred from getting guns altogether; others may simply rely more on theft and the

black market. This underscores the importance of

measures to deter firearm theft (e.g., physical security

at stores and homes) and to investigate, prosecute,

and punish those who obtain or trade in firearms

through illegal channels (e.g., theft, illegal interstate

transportation of firearms, guns for drugs deals).

The effectiveness of criminal record checks will

depend in part on their coverage. Federal law

prohibits the sale, transfer, or interstate transport of

any firearm (and ammunition) by or to anyone who

has been formally charged or convicted of a felony

offense or who is a fugitive from justice. 121 The

absence of a Federal record check requirement

combined with the patchwork quilt of State record

checks means that criminals intent on obtaining

firearms may be able to avoid a record check

altogether. About half of the States have laws that

authorize or require a firearm purchaser record check

of some sort.122 The majority of these State laws

extend checks to both dealer and private transactions. 123 About two-fifths of these State laws cover

some or all long gun purchases as well as handguns.l24

BATF gun traces have documented significant

interstate movement of firearms used in criminal

activity. A 1989 trace of firearms used by Boston,

MA Criminals, for example, found that the majority

of firearms (57 percent) came from out-of-State (see

figure 8). The largest out-of-State source was

Georgia, which accounted for 14 percent of the

firearms traced and does not require a firearm

purchaser record check. Altogether, about one-third

of the traced firearms (60 percent of the out-of-State

firearms) came from States without any record check

requirements, and another 5 percent from States that

 of project advisory panels and workshops could serve a prototype.

 44, Sec. 922(d), (g), (n).

 States 

 Washington 

 States 
Automated Record Check of Firearm Purchasers: Issues and Options ● 39

checked in-State but not FBI record systems.125

BATF gun traces suggest that the majority of

out-of-State firearms used in crime come from States

without criminal record checks or waiting periods

prior to purchase (see figure 9).126 The methodology

and statistical significance of these gun traces has

not been rigorously reviewed. The degree to which

the guns traced are representative of all crime guns

is unknown. (NIJ/BJS could commission a review of

gun trace methodology and validity.)

About three-fifths of the States with record checks

have limited checks to handgun purchases. Crime

statistics indicate that handguns account for about 80

percent of firearm-related crime, long guns about 20

percent (see figure 10).127 Handguns represent, in

comparison, about 40 to 45 percent of total firearm

sales, long guns the remaining 55 to 60 percent.128

The presumption is that record checks on handgun

purchasers are likely to identify a much higher

percentage of ineligible persons than checks on long

gun purchasers. Whether this is the case could be

another subject of NIJ, BJS, or BATF sponsored

research. 129 The fact remains, however, that long

guns are estimated to be used in about one-fifth of

firearm-related crime. To the extent c riminals obtain

long guns from dealers or other sources where record

checks could be applied, limiting record checks to

handguns allows a significant exception.

Benefits of firearm purchaser record checks must

be weighed against costs. These include both the

 of the Treasury, Bureau of Alcohol, Tobacco, and Firearms, and Boston Police Trace Study: City op. cit.,

footnote 28. A 1976 trace of handguns used in MA crime found that 65 percent came from out-of-State. See U.S. Department of the

Treasury, Bureau of Alcohol, Tobacco, and Firearms, Project Identification: A Study of Handguns Used in Crime (Washington, DC: U.S. Department

of the Treasury, February 1976). concluded that, in general, percentage of crime handguns purchased interstate was directly

proportional to the degree of local handgun control.’ For example, 96 percent and 92 percent of crime handguns in New York City and MI (both

requiring record checks and permits prior to purchase), respectively, came from out-of-State sources. Primary source States included Ohio, Kentucky,

Virginia, South Carolina, Florida, and Mississippi (none of which at the time had criminal record checks or waiting periods prior to handgun

purchase). The pattern was not entirely consistent. The majority of crime handguns in Oakland and Los Angeles, CA, 74 percent and 82 percent

respectively, came from California sources, although most of the out-of-State handguns came from States without record checks or periods. A

1991 trace of firearms used in New York City crimes from 1987 to 1990 found that, similar to the 1976 study, 94 percent came from out-of-State

sources. Six States accounted collectively for two-thirds of the fiiearms Texas, Florida, Georgia, South Carolina, Ohio).

 Trace project, 

 Justice, Federal Bureau of Investigation

Uniform Crime Reports 1989: Crime in the United States (Washington, DC: U.S. Government Printing 1990), and FBI update for 1990.

 but not about intended

for domestic sale (total production less exports); about 45 percent were handguns (pistols and revolvers) and 55 percent long guns (rifles, shotguns,

combination guns).

 for percent of long gun purchasers were to of 

purchasers. See Oregon State Police, 1990 Study of Retail Firearm Sales, op. cit., footnote 45.
40 ● Automated Record Checks of Firearm Purchasers: Issues and Options

Figure 10—Homicides by Type of Firearm, 1989

/’------------

Unknown ‘ \

7 %

Rifle

76%

10%

Shotgun

Handgun

SOURCE: Federal Bureau of Investigation, 1991.

financial costs of implementing record check options, and the intangible costs of the possible

compromise of individual rights to the extent such

record checks are not accurate and timely. The

monetary costs of near-term options for actually

conducting automated record checks (not for the

infrastructure) are likely modest and could be

recovered through user fees in the $5 to $15 range,

if general government revenues are not available or

insufficient. The longer term options involving

smart cards and POS fingerprint (or other biometric)

identification could entail substantially higher costs.

The largest costs, however, are probably not for

record checks per se but for record quality improvement s needed to ensure that record checks are

reasonably accurate and timely. Erroneous checks

can cause additional delays for prospective firearm

purchasers and waste the time and effort of criminal

justice officials (and perhaps the purchasers) to

correct the records. Errors can also result in authorizing purchases for persons who should be disqualified. Either way, the less complete and more

inaccurate the criminal records, the greater the costs

to firearm purchasers, criminal justice agencies, and,

ultimately, societal goals such as reduction of

crime-and especially violent crime.

From the perspective of some gun owner groups,

the risk or cost of record checks goes up if such

checks lead to the creation of lists or indices of gun

owners, or otherwise have a ‘‘chilling’ effect on the

right to keep and bear arms. Some gun groups are

concerned that police or other government officials

could sometime use such lists to confiscate firearms

or intimidate firearm owners. The Virginia POS

system, for example, addresses this problem by

retaining detailed information only on disqualified

purchasers. The names and personal identifiers of

law abiding purchasers are not retained more than 30

days by the Virginia State Police, only a log sheet

that lists the time, date, gun dealer identification

number, and a confirmation number assigned to each

record check.130 This information permits the State

police to verify that a check was conducted, should

any questions arise, and to collect any applicable

fees from gun dealers, but prevents the police from

maintaining a list of law-abiding gun buyers and

their firearms.

The fact remains that computerized criminal

record systems maintain, as standard operating

procedure, transaction logs to document who is

using the system, when, for what purposes. Transaction logs are needed to help assure system accountability and security. The Virginia transaction log

does not include the names of firearm purchasers,

but the potential exists regardless of legal prohibitions. State statutes generally do not impose penalties for failure of criminal justice personnel to

comply with privacy, security, and related criminal

record requirements. Penalties when prescribed are

typically misdemeanors, and violations are rarely

prosecuted. 131

Audits of State police records personnel and

recordkeeping practices should help ensure compliance with firearm purchaser check requirements and

record quality standards. Audits could be conducted

on both a periodic and random basis for maximum

impact. Firearm purchasers need simple and speedy

appeal procedures to resolve questionable record

check results.132 Some combination of administrative, civil, and criminal penalties also could encourage compliance and provide further assurance to

 dealers do in their files copies of the Federal transaction form that includes details on the purchasers and purchased.

 SEARCH History Records, op. cit., footnote 116; Advisory g and Evaluation Committee, staff paper, topic #’7, to Misuse of ” San Diego, CA, Dec. 3-4, 1990, pp. 19-25.

 2 Florida’s record check program, about 0.3 percent of record checks to Of disapprovals) were

appealed by purchasers. About 60 percent of the appeals resulted in a reversal from disapproval to approval of the firearm purchase. See Florida

Department of Law Enforcement “Firearm Purchaser Program, ” op. cit., footnote 45.
Automated Record Checks of Firearm Purchasers: Issues and Options . 41

firearm purchasers that automated (or other) record

checks will not be abused.133

Some gun owner groups remain skeptical that the

benefits of record checks—automated or not—are

worth the costs and risks. They question whether

such checks will effectively deter a significant

number of criminals from obtaining firearms, or are

more likely to delay law-abiding citizens from

purchasing firearms and compromise their right to

keep and bear arms, with very few active criminals

actually detected or deterred. Law enforcement

officials counter with statistics on the numbers of

convicted felons identified trying to purchase firearms in those States with record checks. BJA/BJS

could periodically compile statistics (and issue

reports) on the results of automated (or all) firearm

purchaser checks, including the number of: purchases screened, initial disapprovals, confined

disapprovals, appeals of disapprovals (with results

of appeals), and prosecutions of illegal purchasers

(and resulting convictions).

Value of Waiting Periods for

Record Checks

The value of waiting periods for criminal record

checks is, as a general rule, inversely related to the

ability of a jurisdiction to conduct complete and

timely checks of relevant criminal (and other) record

systems. The value of waiting periods is also

inversely related to the ability to accurately identify

the firearm purchaser. The more automated and

complete a State’s criminal records, and the lower

the incidence of false identification, the less the need

and value of waiting periods to check the records of

firearm purchasers. States like Virginia are able to

do an initial check of State criminal history and State

and Federal wanted person systems in a matter of

seconds, with relatively low known false positive (or

false negative) rates. About 4 out of 100 Virginia

handgun purchasers are initially disapproved based

on false positive record hits; these false positives are

usually corrected within several hours (2 out of 100

are confined hits). If this level of false positives is

judged acceptable, then the value of a waiting period

for the purpose of criminal record checks is relatively low. Some support a waiting period in

Virginia for cooling off purposes, to make positive

fingerprint identification of firearm purchasers, or

both. The number of purchasers successfully using

phony identification is unknown.

In California, by comparison, the firearm purchaser record checks take 4 to 7 days on the average,

not counting mail delays. This is part of the

justification for California’s current 15-day waiting

period. California takes longer than Virginia for

several reasons:

●

●

●

much larger volume of firearm purchaser record

checks (about 330,000 in 1990 compared to

70,000 in Virginia);

somewhat lower level of disposition reporting

for recent arrests (85 percent compared to

Virginia’s 95 percent); and

the necessity to check noncriminal justice

records (e.g.; mental health commitments) for

other firearm purchase disqualifications.

California experiences a high initial false positive

rate-so high that a POS system might be unacceptable even if technically feasible. About 28 out of

every 100 California firearm purchasers are initially

identified as potentially disqualified, based on the

record checks. Only 1 out of 28 is actually confirmed

as disqualified. Because of the waiting period, the 27

false positive hits are corrected before responses are

sent back to the gun dealers. The gun dealers and

purchasers know only that 1 out of 100 purchasers

are disapproved and that the other 99 are approved.

But in a POS system, an initial response would have

to be provided to the dealers and purchasers before

the hits could be checked out.

States could be ranked according to the ability to

conduct automated POS criminal record checks of

firearm purchasers. States with an automated name

index and criminal history file, relatively high

disposition reporting, and some ability to flag felony

convictions-e. g., New Jersey, Oregon, and South

Carolina-are in the best position to implement POS

systems, should they decide or be required to do so.

These States would need relatively little time and

resources for POS development, and a relatively

shorter waiting period to conduct record checks in

the interim. States with a manual criminal history

file or low disposition reporting-such as Arkansas,

Mississippi, and New Mexico-are in the weakest

lqsGun mms of ~erica r~ommends that: 1) the compilation of law-abiding f~earm owner lists be legally prohibited; 2) felony Petities be

established for criminal justice employees who create such lists; and 3) a right of civil action against the government be provided to any citizen who

believes such lists may exist, with legal fees to be paid by the government if the allegations prove correct.
42 ● Automated Record Checks of Firearm Purchasers: Issues and Options

position. They would need more time and resources

to implement a POS system, and would need a

relatively longer waiting period to conduct criminal

record checks until a POS system was operational.

Most States fall somewhere between, with differing

combinations of strengths and weaknesses.

The rate of criminal record quality improvement

will be the major pacing factor in implementing POS

systems for many States. Telecommunication and

computing technologies might be acquired or upgraded relatively quickly, given the necessary (and,

for some States, substantial) funding. Assuring

reasonably complete and timely arrest and disposition information frequently requires procedural and

legal as well as technical improvements. Several

major components of the criminal justice community must cooperate to achieve high record quality,

especially the police, prosecutors, and courts.134

Forcing POS systems prematurely on States that do

not have the necessary criminal record infrastructure

could result in: 1) large numbers of false positive

hits, frustrated criminal records officials, and unhappy gun purchasers; and 2) an unknown number

of felons and fugitives who are erroneously authorized to, in effect, illegally purchase firearms (false

negatives). To avoid these consequences, proposals

for automated record checks must be geared to the

actual and projected capabilities of State (and

Federal) criminal record systems.

A complete ranking requires further BJS and

SEARCH Group, Inc. examination of State-by-State

capabilities starting with the results of the 1989

survey summarized in figures 11 and 12. In any

given year for the next few years, each added day of

waiting period would permit additional States to

complete criminal record checks of firearm purchasers within the time allowed. The marginal utility of

each additional day could be estimated by BJA/BJS,

based on a State-by-State followup analysis of the

1989 survey results. The average time needed for

record checks should decline in the future, assuming

that checks are required and that Federal and State

resources continue to be available for improving the

automation and completeness of criminal record

systems. Over time, more States can be expected to

develop the capabilities needed to expedite criminal

record checks and ultimately to conduct POS

checks. Some States probably could develop POS

systems within months; most will need years. The

average waiting time needed to conduct criminal

record checks should correspondingly shorten, assuming States did not retain waiting periods for

other purposes (e.g., cooling off, checks of noncriminal justice records).

Difficult as criminal record checks may be, the

challenges posed by checking other types of records

are even greater. Federal law prohibits other categories of persons (in addition to felons and fugitives)

from purchasing or possessing firearms, including:

unlawful users of controlled substances, persons

adjudicated as mental defective or committed to

mental institutions, illegal aliens, persons dishonorably discharged from military service, and renunciates of U.S. citizenship. As many as 20 million

persons may fall in one or more of these categories,

but records do not even exist on perhaps four-fifths

of these people. Half the records that do exist are not

automated, and many of the records are subject to

complicated, conflicting laws, rules, and traditions

on disclosure of personal information.135

The National Institute of Drug Abuse, for example, estimates that about 14.5 million persons are

unlawful users or addicted to controlled substances

(e.g., cocaine, heroine). Only about 3 percent are

included in some kind of record system (not

counting the unknown number that are also felons or

fugitives). A BJS contractor estimates the number of

illegal aliens to be 2.7 million, based on Immigration

and Naturalization Service and Census Bureau

figures, but only about one-fourth are listed in a

record system.136

The “mental defective” category poses other

problems. 137 Federal law covers persons adjudicated

as a mental defective or committed to a mental

institution. The law does not specify whether

commitment can be voluntary or need be involuntary. BATF has adopted the narrower definition—

only persons adjudicated or committed by a court,

134See SEARCH Group, Inc., Strategies for Improving Data Quality, Op. cit., footnote 116.

135see J*M. TieL ~ofi Cow., Idennfiing per~on~, Other Than Felons, Ineligible TO purchase Fireams: A Feasibility st@y, Op. Cit., fOOEIOte 50,

which is the primary data source for the following discussion.

136rbid.

lsTMenW health professimals object to the use of the term ‘‘mental defective’ as degrading, and would prefer that this terminology not be included

in statute (as in 18 U.S.C. 44) or otherwise.
Automated Record Checks of Firearm Purchasers: Issues and Options ● 43

Figure 11-State-by-State Capabilities To Support Automated Firearm Purchaser Checks:

Automated Records and Final Dispositions, 1989

Percent of records that are automated

I

I

I

I

Alabama

Alaska

Arizona

Arkansas

California

Colorado

Connecticut

Delaware

Florida

Georgia

Hawaii

Idaho

Illinois

Indiana

Iowa

Kansas

Kentucky

Louisiana

Maine

Maryland

Massachusetts

Michigan

Minnesota

Mississippi

Missouri

Montana

Nebraska

Nevada

New Hampshire

New Jersey

New Mexico

New York

North Carolina

North Dakota

Ohio

Oklahoma

Oregon

Pennsylvania

Rhode Island

South Carolina

South Dakota

Tennessee

Texas

Utah

Vermont

Virginia

Washington

Percent of final dispositions recorded

1

1

1

1

1

1

1

1

1

na

na

1

Washington, DC

West Virginia

Wisconsin

Wyoming

100 80 6 0 4 0 2 0 0 0 20 40 60 80 100

I

na Data not available NOTE : The percentages shown were estimated

by State criminal record officials in 1989 and have

not been independently verified or updated.

SOURCE: Office of Technology Assessment, based on Bureau of Justice Statistics/SEARCH Group, Inc., 1991.
44 ● Automated Record Checks of Firearm Purchasers: Issues and Options

Figure 12—State-by-State Capabilities To Support Automated Firearm Purchaser Checks:

Automated Name Index and Felony Flags, 1989

Yes No Some

Fully automated master name index

I System currently flags convicted felons I ■ I DID I

System has information to flag felons ● I I I

NOTE: The data shown were provided by State criminal record officials in

1989 and have not been independently verified or updated.

SOURCE: Office of Technology Assessment, based on Bureau of Justice Statistics/SEARCH Group, Inc., 1991.

authority, commission, or board are ineligible to

purchase or possess firearms. BATF has indicated

that commitments by family members, friends,

family doctor, and oneself (self-commits or voluntary admissions) are not covered. According to the

National Institute of Mental Health, about threefourths of all mental institution commitments are

voluntary; the rest are involuntary-mostly civil and

a very small percentage (about 2 percent) criminal.

Criminal commitments include persons found incompetent to stand trial,

insanity, and guilty but mentally ill.138

not guilty by reason of

A BJS contractor estimated that 2.7 million

persons are mentally defective, counting just involuntary commitments, and that almost all have a

record somewhere because they are in some kind of

mental institution. Many (perhaps two-thirds) of

these persons are in databases maintained by State

mental health departments. The completeness and

accuracy of these records are largely unknown; most
Automated Record Checks of Firearm Purchasers: Issues and Options ● 45

of these records are not automated. California is one

of those States currently attempting to check mental

health records as part of broader firearm purchaser

checks. Expanding these checks to voluntary and

private mental hospital commitments raises major

procedural, legal, and privacy questions.139

Records for the dishonorable dischargers and

denunciates are in comparatively good shape. The

Defense Manpower Data Center maintains an automated database with an estimated 90 percent of all

persons dishonorably discharged since 1971 (only

about a third of all dishonorable discharges still

living). The U.S. State Department Passport Office

has an automated database of all persons who have

renounced U.S. citizenship since 1941. These two

categories of disqualified persons account, however,

for an insignificant percentage (0.15 percent) of the

total. 140

The outlook is not good for including all disqualifying categories in routine firearm purchaser record

checks. Illegal drug users and illegal aliens pose

perhaps insurmountable problems, because most are

not included in any record system. Involuntarily

committed mental defective might eventually be

checked on a systematic basis; but substantial record

automation and quality improvements would be

needed in most States.141 Voluntary commitments

account for the vast majority of mental cases, and

would be much more difficult (and controversial) to

check.

In sum, nationwide POS checks of noncriminal

justice record systems are not likely to be feasible for

many years, with the possible exception of dishonorably discharged, denunciates, and persons involuntarily committed to mental institutions. To the extent

checks for all disqualifying categories are conducted, a lengthy waiting period may be necessary

to locate and search whatever records exist. Law

enforcement officials might in most cases have to

simply do the best they can in whatever time is

available, knowing that the desired information may

not exist or be accessible.

Value of Fingerprint Identification

All currently operational POS record check systems are based on the name and personal identifiers

(e.g., address, date of birth, social security number,

photo) of the firearm purchaser, not on fingerprint or

other positive biometric identification. The use of

phony identification cards is prevalent in U.S.

society. Driver’s licenses, credit cards, and social

security cards are all relatively easy to fake or alter.

Some law enforcement officials are concerned that

a significant percentage of firearm purchasers with

criminal records or other disqualifications might use

phony identification in order to escape detection.

The risk would appear to be higher with POS record

checks because: decisions to approve or disapprove

a purchaser must be made quickly; and criminal

records officials do not have firsthand access to the

identification cards being presented (information is

phoned in by the gun dealer). The Virginia State

Police has experienced few known problems with

phony identification during the first 20 months of

firearm purchaser POS record checks. Other criminal justice officials remain skeptical, however. The

FBI’s analysis of criminal record checks of employment or licensing applicants (not firearm purchasers)

found that, on the average, each 100 checks result in

5 record hits based on name and identifiers and one

hit based on fingerprints (that would have otherwise

been missed).142 BJS could conduct or sponsor a

survey of those States with any kind of firearm

purchaser record checks to determine the extent of

known use of phony IDs. BATF could followup gun

traces that identify Virginia (and perhaps Florida)

sources to attempt to determine how the firearms

were initially purchased or obtained, and whether

phony identification was used.

One option is to fingerprint firearm purchasers

either at the POS or as part of an application for a

firearm owners identification card or permit to

purchase card. Indiana, New Jersey, New York,

North Carolina, Oregon, Washington, and the District of Columbia require fingerprints of some or all

firearm purchasers.

143 Fingerprints are obtained at

ls~id.

I@Ibid.

IAII~~i~ is one of me few s~te~ tit ~ste~ti~y checks f~e~ purc~sers (in MS s~te, fmem identification card appliC~tS) tif@lSt

computerized records of persons committed to mental health hospitals.

IAzDa~ provided by Virgil Young, FBI Identification Divisiou Apr. *2, 1991.

143SE~CH -up, ~c., Sumey of Crimiml HiSIOq znfor~tion systems, op. cit., footnote 82.
46 ● Automated Record Checks of Firearm Purchasers: Issues and Options

the POS in Oregon. Here, the gun dealer takes the

inked thumbprints of handgun purchasers and mails

the prints (and other purchaser information) to the

Oregon State Police for checking against State and

regional automated fingerprint files (purchaser information is also sent to the local law enforcement

agency that conducts local record checks). These

checks are conducted during the 15-day waiting

period for handgun purchases (neither the fingerprint check or waiting period are required for long

gun purchases). State police indicate that, because of

mail delays, it would be difficult to complete the

fingerprint checks in less than 10 days. About 1

percent of purchasers are disqualified overall (0.7

percent for handguns based on a name and fingerprint check, 1.5 percent for long guns based on a

retroactive name check). The overall percentage is in

the same range as California and Virginia.

Oregon is currently evaluating the fingerprint

checks to determine if the benefits are worth the

costs. The number of handgun purchasers using

phony IDs was very small, but this may have been

in part because of the deterrent effect of fingerprinting purchasers at the POS. Oregon processed 30,323

total handgun sales in 1990. About 15 percent of the

handgun purchasers had a prior criminal record, and

about 0.6 percent had disqualifying criminal records.

But only 337 purchasers with a criminal record

(about 1 percent of all purchasers) were identified

through use of fingerprints. Most of these purchasers

were women who had changed names due to

marriage or were persons of foreign extraction who

used multiple surnames with variable spelling. Only

5 purchasers (0.02 percent of all handgun purchasers, 0.1 percent of those with a criminal record) were

actually disqualified based on a fingerprint check

that uncovered use of a false name and identification. The Oregon State Police recommend that

purchasers be required to provide all prior names or

aliases and prints of all 10 fingersl44 in order to

reduce the cost of name and fingerprint checks.145

The more information provided, the better the

chances of making a name “hit” without the

necessity of a more expensive fingerprint check.

And when needed, fingerprint checks run on 8 or 10

finger prints are less expensive than checks based on

2 fingers.

The process could be speeded up if gun dealers

faxed rather than mailed fingerprints to the State

police (assuming facsimile copies are suitable for

automated processing), and if the State police faxed

rather than mailed the results back to the local law

enforcement agency. This might cut the total response time to the 4- to 7-day range of those States

that have automated fingerprint systems, as does

Oregon. About three-fifths of the States have or are

planning automated fingerprint identification systems (known as AFIS); it is possible that all States

will have access to some AFIS capability by as early

as 1995 and quite likely by 2000. This does not

guarantee, however, that these systems will be able

to handle a large volume of firearm purchaser

checks. Oregon participates in a regional AFIS

(known as the Western Identification Network, Inc.),

which had to be upgraded to handle Oregon’s

firearm purchaser fingerprint checks.

Whether or not firearm purchasers are routinely

fingerprinted, fingerprint identification is central to

almost all State criminal history record systems and

is a primary basis on which any disputes over

mistaken identity or erroneous records would be

resolved. Most States, and all populous States except

Massachusetts, back up virtually all of their criminal

history records with fingerprints (see figure 13).l46

The criminal justice community has long concluded that fingerprints are essential to the identification and tracking of criminal offenders. No other

positive identifier is likely to be available for

widespread use for many years.147 The majority of

criminals are repeat offenders, and many are highly

motivated to escape detection and identification. In

sharp contrast, the vast majority of firearm purchasers have no criminal record at all, and have no

obvious reason to falsify their identify. This is why

the benefits of fingerprinting all firearm purchasers

compared with the costs and time delays are matters

of continuing debate. Some gun owner groups also

are concerned about the stigma and possible abuse of

fingerprinting, for what they consider to be the

l~Rolled tlwnbpri.nts plus plain (flat) pMts of the Other 8 fingers.

ldssee Oregon State Poliw, 1990 Study of Retail Firearm Sales, op. Cit., fOOmOte 45.

146--ei@t States maintain fingerprints for 100 pereent of arrests; 9 States for 75 to 99 percent of arrests; and only 1 State does not maintain

fingerprints at all.

ldTSee U.S. Dep~ent of Justice, Task For~ on Felon Identification in Firearm Sales, Report to the Attorney General, Op. cit., fOOtIlOte 50; SEARCH

Group, Inc., Biometric Iden@i-cation Technologies, op. cit., footnote 50.
Automated Record Checks of Firearm Purchasers: Issues and Options ● 47

Figure 13—Arrests Supported by Fingerprints in

State Criminal History Files, 1989

25-40% 75-99% 1 00%

Percent of arrests with fingerprints

SOURCE: Bureau of Justice Statistics/SEARCH Group, Inc., 1991.

exercise of their constitutional right to keep and bear

arms. The benefits, costs, and concerns may change

sometime in the future when, and if: 1) fingerprints

(or some other positive biometric data) become part

of standard identification information required for

issuance of driver’s licenses, credit cards, or other

widely used IDs; and 2) POS fingerprint scanning

and checking systems become cost-effective for

widespread use.

Another option would be to include fingerprint

checks as part of the Federal firearm dealer licensing

process. Dealers are subject to the same legal

prohibitions as purchasers. BATF does run an FBI

name check on all dealer applicants, but not a

fingerprint check. This is because of the cost and

delay associated with FBI fingerprint checks, and

because BATF lacks fingerprinting capability. Applicant fees could be increased by about $20 to $40

to cover the cost. The FBI claims that fingerprint

checks can be completed in about 20 days, not

counting mail delays. Allowing 10 days for mailing

to and from BATF, the total time for fingerprint

checks should be about 30 days—still within the

45-day limit on applicant processing. If FBI checks

are not timely, for whatever reasons, BATF could at

least ask the applicant’s State of residence to run a

fingerprint check against State criminal record files.

BATF could seek the cooperation of local law

enforcement agencies in taking the applicant fingerprints and forwarding the prints to State or FBI

criminal record repositories. BATF also could run

periodic name checks on licensees, perhaps once a

year or on a random basis, rather than only at the

time of initial application or renewal.l48 As it stands

now, BATF must depend largely on voluntary dealer

reporting of felony convictions or other disqualifying activities.

The point is that firearm dealers (and manufacturers and importers) have direct and unimpeded access

to firearms, to a far greater extent than most firearm

purchasers. Running fingerprint checks on the perhaps 70,000 license applications and renewals per

year would be much less costly and time consuming

than running such checks on millions of firearm

purchasers. The percentage of dealers engaged in

criminal activity is unknown; BATF name checks on

firearm license applicants suggest that about 2

percent have a disqualifying criminal record.149 The

percentage of dealers who are actually selling

firearms is also unknown. The Oregon State Police

found that, of 4,837 federally licensed firearm

dealers in Oregon, only about one-third reported

sales of handguns in 1990. preliminary followup

suggests that significant numbers of dealers:

● were out of business;

. could not be located or contacted;

● were in business but did not sell a firearm in

1990;

. obtained a license solely to purchase firearms

for their own use and collections; and

● sold firearms but did not report due to lack of

awareness of State reporting requirements.150

During fiscal year 1990, BATF conducted 8,471

dealer inspections-directed primarily at the larger

storefront dealers-for compliance with Federal

law, and identified 7,477 violations.151 The nature

 of The test found 110 

record information on the 2,118 renewals checked.

 19901,408 application abandoned or 75 9 revoked, breed on

criminal record checks. This would be about 2 percent of all applicants, g 70,000 license applications or renewals per year.

 1990 Study on Retail Firearm Sales, op. 45.

 conducted 7,142 dealer compliance inspections, 4,731 
48 ● Automated Record Checks of Firearm Purchasers: Issues and Options

and severity of these violations have not been

analyzed. 152 Only about one-half of Virginia’s and

Florida’s licensed dealers are participating in the

respective State POS record check programs. The

status of the nonparticipating dealers is unknown.

Value of the National Fingerprint File/

Interstate Identification Index

About one in five criminals commit crimes in

more than one State; about one in three Federal

offenders have multi-State records. The illegal

interstate transportation of firearms is a major focus

of BATF investigations. Any system to check the

criminal records of firearm purchasers on a national

basis depends on the timely interstate exchange of

criminal justice information. The National Crime

Information Center (NCIC) serves this need for

wanted persons and fugitives from justice; the

Interstate Identification Index (III) provides a listing

of persons with a criminal record and the State(s) of

record. The FBI operates both NCIC and III in

cooperation with State and local law enforcement

and criminal justice agencies.

A few States already query III, and some NCIC,

as part of firearm purchaser checks. Virginia and

Oregon, for example, check both. III and NCIC

could, in principle, be used by all States as part of

firearm purchaser checks. The computer capacity of

III may need expansion to accommodate the additional traffic (10,000 more inquiries per day would

be about a 15-percent increase in III volume). The

telecommunication capacity of NCIC should be

adequate (10,000 more inquiries would be only a

l-percent increase in total NCIC daily volume). If

high record quality is required, with a minimum of

false hits, then the completeness and automation of

Federal and State criminal history records must be

improved.

If a national fingerprint check is included as part

of firearm purchaser checks, then full implementation of State and FBI automated fingerprint identification systems is essential. Current FBI fingerprint

checks take far too long (20 to 30 days, including

mailing time) to meet the record check requirements

of most States, even States with long waiting

periods. The only exceptions are States that require

preapproved firearm owner identification or permit

to purchase cards. The FBI is planning a major

fingerprint identification automation program built

around the National Fingerprint File (NFF) concept.

The NFF would greatly reduce the number of

duplicate criminal fingerprint cards received and

maintained by the FBI. In combination with the III

and state-of-the-art AFIS technology, the NFF is

expected to reduce the time for FBI fingerprint

checks from weeks to hours or days. Under the

NFF/III concept, the FBI would retain: 1) one

fingerprint card per criminal offender per State (the

NFF); 2) no criminal history information on nonFederal offenders (except for name and basic identifiers such as date of birth and race); and 3) an index

(the ID) to offenders with records in one or more

States (but not the records themselves).153

Full NFF/III implementation will take 4 to 5 more

years

154 and could easily stretch to 2000 or beyond

if not accorded continuing high priority. Implementation will depend on:

1.

2.

3.

4.

funds available (several hundred million dollar

range at the Federal and State levels);

automated Federal and State fingerprint identification and criminal history record systems;

improvement in Federal and State criminal

record quality; and

an interstate agreement on rules and responsibilities for the interstate exchange of criminal

justice information.

An interstate compactor Federal legislation maybe

needed to reconcile the differences in Federal and

lszln fisc~ year 1990, BATF r~ommended 167 cases to U.S. Attorneys for prosecution of dealers suspected of c riminal activity. A 1989-90 BATF

gun trace in DetroiL MI identified 13 licensed dealers supplying firearms to the criminal community. See BATF, Detroit Trace Project, op. cit., footnote

126.

153For ~ Oveniew of tie ~~ histow, s=, for ex~ple, OTA, Assessment Of Alter~tiveSfOr a NutiO~l CornpUten”zed Cn”?nirtul History System,

op. cit., footnote 59; U.S. Department of Justice, Federal Bureau of Investigation, Interstate Identification Index Phase Three Test Findings June-July,

1987 (Washington+ DC: FBI, Nov. 30, 1987), Interstate [den(ification Index Program: National Fingerprint File Operational P!an (Washingto% DC:

FBI, July 10, 1990), Automation Programforidentifi”cation Division Revitalization (Washington DC: FBI, Aug. 30, 1990); National (lime Information

Center Advisory Policy Board, III Ad hoc Subcommittee, Identification Services Task Group, Identification Division Revitalization, August 1989,

available from the FBI.

15d~I es~te, assuming full funding. For further discussion of the FBI identification automation prograq see OTA, FBI Automated Fingerprint

Identification Program, op. cit., footnote 14 in preparation.
Automated Record Checks of Firearm Purchasers: Issues and Options . 49

Figure 14-Firearm Death Rates per 100,000

Population, Males 15 to 19 Years Old, 1979-88

 White males

— Black males

60-

4 0

2 0

0

79 80 81 82 83 84 85 86 87 88

Year

SOURCE: U.S. Department of Health and Human Services/National

Center for Health Statistics, 1991.

State laws, especially regarding noncrimin al justice

use of criminal records.155

Today, most firearm purchaser checks are considered criminal justice inquiries, and therefore are

authorized uses of III. In principle, firearm purchaser

checks are no different than checks of applicants for

government employment or licenses, teachers, child

care providers, and others whose criminal record is

a factor in selection or approval decisions. Even if

fully implemented, however, the NFF/III would not

support POS fingerprint record checks of firearm

purchasers in seconds or minutes. The checks

probably could be conducted in several hours if

given a high priority and using electronic fingerprint

transmission. Several days seem more likely, since

fingerprint checks of persons wanted, arrested, or

prosecuted for specific crimes presumably would

receive higher priority.

Value of a Firearm Safety and

Security Education Program

Firearm purchaser record checks should be

viewed as only one of many actions needed to help

reduce firearm-related crime. Other actions might

include stiffer, mandatory sentences for repeat

firearm offenders, intensified investigation and prosecution of illegal gun trafficking, and firearm safety

and security courses.

Citizens of all ages would benefit from firearm

safety and security programs. Firearm dealers and

owners could learn the latest security techniques for

preventing firearm theft. Firearm users could review

and update their knowledge of the rules of safe sports

and target shooting. Even young children, all too

frequently involved in gun accidents, could learn

something about the hazards of firearms in the hands

of untrained, inexperienced persons. Older children

and adults of all ages could learn more about Federal

and State firearm laws. These kinds of programs

could be sponsored and funded by Federal, State,

and local education departments and boards, working in cooperation both with gun owner

with school safety, law enforcement,

prevention organizations.

Such courses could be particularly

groups and

and crime

helpful in

addressing the problem of guns and youth. Recent

surveys indicate that youths under the age of 19 are

increasingly perpetrators and victims of firearmrelated violence (see figure 14). In 1988, nearly

4,000 youths ages 1 to 19 died from the use of

firearms; about 2,000 were homicide victims, 1,400

suicide victims, and 600 accident (unintentional

shooting) victims. For white males 15 to 19 years of

age, in 1988 the firearm death rate exceeded the

death rate from natural causes for the first time (by

about 11 percent). The comparable firearm death

rate for black teenage males (15 to 19 years old) was

2.6 times the natural death rate. Firearm deaths

accounted for about 20 percent of all teenage (15 to

19) deaths. The firearm homicide rate for black

teenage males was about 11 times the rate for white

teenage males. The firearm suicide rate for white

male teenagers was double that of black male

teenagers. Unintentional firearm deaths account for

40 percent of all firearm deaths of younger children

(aged 1 to 14), but only 10 percent of teenager

 compact proposals, see SEARCH Group, “Interstate and Federal-State Compact on the Exchange of Criminal History

Records,” July 20, 1989; U.S. Department of Justice, Federal Bureau of Investigating “Interstate Compact on the Exchange of Criminal History

Records,” working Aug. 4, 1989; and NCIC Advisory Policy Board, Interstate Identification Index Subcommittee, “Interstate and Federal-State

Compact on the Exchange of History Records for Justice Purposes,” final Nov. 16, 1989, and revised Dec. 4,

1990.
50 ● Automated Record Checks of Firearm Purchasers: Issues and Options

firearm deaths.156 Between 1979 and 1988, the total

firearm death rate for teenagers age 10 to 19

increased while the rate for persons 20 to 29 was

stable or actually declined (although still 20 to 30

percent higher than for teenagers).157

Federal law prohibits licensed firearm dealers

(and manufacturers, importers, and collectors) from

selling or delivering: handguns (and handgun ammunition) to anyone under 21 years of age, and rifles

and shotguns (and related ammunition) to anyone

under 18 years of age. 158 Note that the Federal

prohibition does not apply to transfers between

individuals. Firearm purchaser record checks, even

if 100 percent effective in screening out underage

purchasers, are unlikely to have much direct impact

on teenager access to firearms. Teenagers and

children apparently obtain most firearms from their

own homes, secondarily from friends, and infrequently by theft.159 One-third to one-half of adolescent boys, and one-fifth to one-quarter of adolescent

girls, believe that they could get a handgun if they

wanted one.l60 (The source and use of firearms by

juveniles are subjects of an ongoing NIJ-sponsored

study.)

The National School Safety Center and other

groups concerned with the health and safety of

school-age children have concluded that a multifaceted program is needed to deal with youth and

guns.

161 One priority might be to educate gun

owners on how to secure their firearms from

intentional or accidental use by children. Another

priority might be to encourage or require firearm

safety courses for all firearm owners and their

families who have children under age 18. Firearm

safety courses also could be offered as part of school

health and safety programs. Many of these programs

already cover other causes of school age injury and

death, such as drugs, alcohol, and driving.l62 For

schools with students bringing firearms on campus,

tough rules and penalties may be needed as well as

firearm education. Parental and community involvement seems essential in these areas. Some schools

are resorting to the use of metal detectors, restricted

entry, and gun-free zones and signs (similar to

drug-free zones already set up around many

schools). Another possibility is to enact or strengthen

laws holding parents liable for damages or injuries

resulting from firearm use by their children, if the

gun belongs to a parent.l63

These kinds of educational and awareness programs could bean important complement to firearm

purchaser record checks and other, related actions

collectively intended to reduce the rates of firearms

related death, injury, and criminal activity in the

United States.

156 LA. F@phut et rd., ‘‘Firearm Mortality Among childre~ You@ and Young Adults 1-34 Years of Age, Trends and Current Status: United States,

1979 -88,” Monthly Vital Statistics Report, vol. 39, No. 11, Mar. 14, 1991, available from U.S. Department of Health and Human Services, National

Center for Health Care Statistics; U.S. Congress, Office of T&chnology Assessmen~ Adolescent Health-Volume I: Summary and Policy Options

(Washington DC: U.S. Government Printing Office, April 1991), and Adolescent Healt&-Vohme H: Background and the Effectiveness of Selected

Prevention and Treatment Services (Washington, DC: U.S. Government Printing office, September 1991),

]sT~id.

15818 U.S.C. 44, Sf3C. 922(b)(1) and (2).

lsqsee Natio~ School Safew Center, Weapons in schools, NSSC Resource Paper (Malibu, CA: NSSC, Pepperdine University, Jwe 1990, sponsor~

by the U.S. Department of Justice, Oftlce of Juvenile Justice and Delinquency Prevention U.S. Department of EducatioU and Pepperdine University;

and surveys conducted by the Florida School Board Association (FSBA) and Center to Prevent Handgun Violence, The FSBA survey (for the 1986-88

school years) found that students obtained weapons (including firearms): primarily from their own home (87 percent of the time); secondarily the home

of a friend or relative (6 percent); and infrequently by theft (1 percent). AU other sources totaled 6 percent. The CPHV survey of 532 child shootings

(from 1986-88) found that the firearms involved were owned: primarily by the victim’s or friend’s parents (75 percent of the time); secondarily by another

relative (13 percent) or the victim’s or parent’s friend (13 percent); and rarely by the victim Mm/herself (2 percent) or a relative’s employer (1 percent).

l@Ameficm School Health Associatio~ Assmiation for the Advancement of Health Educatiou and Society for Public Health Edu~tiOU ~c.,The

National Adolescent Sttient Health Survey:A Report on the Health ofAmerica’s Youth (Oakland, CA: Third Party Publishing, 1989), based on a sample

of 12,067 8th and loth grade students and sponsored by the U.S. Department of Health and Human Services, Public Health Service, Office of Disease

Prevention and Health promotio~ Centers for Disease Control, and National Institute on Drug Abuse.

161see Natio~ school s~e~ Centa, weapons in schools, op. cit., foo~ote 159; also see discussion in C)TA, Adolescent Health, ibid.

162Ffi~ could be included in programs like ‘‘Just Say No’ and DARE (Drug Abuse Resistance Program) that emphasize partnerships between

schools, students, parents, the community, and law enforcement. The intent is to strengthen each student’s character, self-esteem, decisionmaking skills,

and sense of personal responsibility.

lcq~id.; alSO see Natiod School Safev Center, School Crisis Prevention and Response, NSSC Resource Paper (Malibu, CA: NSSC, pePP~@e

University, March 1990) and Student and Staff Victi~”zation, IWSC Resource Paper (Malibu, CA: NSSC, Pepperd.ine University, June 1989); and OTA,

Adolescent Health, op. cit., footnote 160.