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UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

NORTHERN DISTRICT OF FLORIDA

PENSACOLA DIVISION

IN RE SKANSKA USA CIVIL §

SOUTHEAST INC. AND § ADMIRALTY RULE 9(H)

SKANSKA USA, INC. AS §

OWNERS OF THE BARGE KS § CIVIL ACTION NO.

5331, PRAYING FOR § 3:20-CV-05980 – RV/MJF

EXONERATION §

FROM OR LIMITATION § SENIOR DISTRICT JUDGE

OF LIABILITY § LACEY A. COLLIER

§

§ MAGISTRATE JUDGE

§ HOPE THAI CANNON

PETITIONERS’ MOTION FOR REINSTATEMENT 

AND CONTINUATION OF INJUNCTION PENDING 

APPEAL OR, ALTERNATIVELY, TEMPORARY STAY OF ORDER 

LIFTING INJUNCTION PENDING APPELLATE CONSIDERATION

Skanska USA Civil Southeast Inc. and Skanska USA, Inc. (collectively 

“Skanska”) moves this Court pursuant to Fed. R. Civ. P. 62(d) to reinstate and 

continue the injunction against prosecution of the state court lawsuits pending the 

outcome of Skanska’s appeal of this Court’s decision now pending in the United 

States Court of Appeals for the Eleventh Circuit (the “Eleventh Circuit”). 

Alternatively, should the Court deny reinstatement of the injunction, Skanska 

moves the Court pursuant to Fed. R. Civ. P. 65(a) to grant a temporary injunction 

against prosecution of state court lawsuits pending consideration of a motion for 

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stay to be filed in the Eleventh Circuit under Fed. R. App. P. 8(a). In support of its 

motion, Skanska states as follows:

I.

Background

1. Prior to and shortly after Skanska filed the initial suits for exoneration 

from or limitation of liability on December 9, 2020, approximately 100 state court 

actions were filed claiming damages resulting from the breakaway of Skanska’s 

barges during Hurricane Sally. Approximately 85 of those state court actions are 

for economic loss allegedly resulting from the damage to the Pensacola Bay 

Bridge. All but six of the plaintiffs in these 85 state court actions have filed claims 

in Cases Nos. 3:20-CV-5980, 3:20-CV-5981 3:20-CV-5982, and 3:20-CV-5983. 

In addition, claims for economic loss allegedly resulting from damage to the 

Pensacola Bay Bridge were filed in Case No. 3:21-CV-00056 and Case No. 3:21-

CV-00526.

2. Title 46 U.S.C. § 30511(c) provides that when an action for limitation 

is filed then “all claims and proceedings against the owner related to the matter in 

question shall cease.” 

3. Simultaneously with filing its complaints seeking exoneration or 

limitation, Skanska moved this court to enjoin the prosecution of claims in any 

other court. ECF No. 3. The motion for injunction was based on Supplemental 

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Rule F(3), Supplemental Rules for Admiralty or Maritime Claims, which provides 

in pertinent part: 

Upon compliance by the owner with the requirements of subdivision 

(1) of this rule all claims and proceedings against the owner or the 

owner’s property with respect to the matter in question shall cease. On 

application of the plaintiff the court shall enjoin the further 

prosecution of any action or proceeding against the plaintiff or the 

plaintiff’s property with respect to any claim subject to limitation in 

the action.

4. Skanska’s motion to enjoin prosecution of actions in other courts was 

granted. ECF No. 6 at 2. 

5. Following the liability trial in October, the Court ruled that Skanska 

was not entitled either to exoneration, ECF No. 1352 at 38, or limitation, ECF No. 

1352 at 40, dismissed Skanska’s Complaint for Exoneration from or Limitation of 

Liability, and dissolved the injunction. ECF No. 1352 at 40. 

6. Skanska has filed a Notice of Appeal of this Court’s decision. ECF 

No. 1357. 

7. Skanska seeks to maintain the status quo as to the state law actions by 

continuation of the injunction entered by this Court until the conclusion of the 

appellate proceedings now pending in the Eleventh Circuit. The order that 

Skanska seeks would continue the scope and effect of the injunction, previously in 

place as set forth in ECF No. 6, supra, until the conclusion of those appellate 

proceedings.

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II.

Standard for Restoring or Granting an Injunction Pending Appeal

8. The relief sought by Skanska, to restore or grant an injunction pending 

appeal, is authorized by Fed. R. Civ. P. 62(d), which provides in part: 

(d) Injunction Pending an Appeal. While an appeal is pending from 

an interlocutory order or final judgment that grants, continues, 

modifies, refuses, dissolves, or refuses to dissolve or modify an 

injunction, the court may suspend, modify, restore, or grant an 

injunction on terms for bond or other terms that secure the opposing 

party's rights. . . .

(Emphasis added).

9. In Hilton v. Braunskill, 481 U.S. 770, 776, the Supreme Court stated 

the four generic requirements for granting a stay pending appeal:

(1) whether the stay applicant has made a strong showing that he is 

likely to succeed on the merits; 

(2) whether the applicant will be irreparably injured absent a stay; 

(3) whether issuance of the stay will substantially injure the other 

parties interested in the proceeding; and 

(4) where the public interest lies. 

“The first two factors are the ‘most critical.’” Hand v. Scott, 888 F.3d 1206, 1207 

(11th Cir. 2018) (quoting Nken v. Holder, 556 U.S. 418, 434 (2009)).

10. “Where the ‘balance of the equities weighs heavily in favor of 

granting the [injunction],’ the movant need only show a ‘substantial case on the 

merits.’” Garcia–Mir v. Meese, 781 F.2d 1450, 1453 (11th Cir. 1986). 

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III.

Likelihood of Success on the Merits

A. It is essentially certain that Skanska will prevail on the merits with 

respect to the economic loss claims. 

11. Skanska’s appeal of this Court’s order finding Skanska liable to the 

economic loss claimants does not merely have a substantial likelihood of success 

on the merits, but is essentially certain to succeed. 

12. This Court denied Claimants’ Motion to Dismiss for lack of subject 

matter jurisdiction, holding that it had admiralty jurisdiction. “With admiralty 

jurisdiction comes the application of substantive admiralty law.” Misener Marine 

Constr., Inc. v. Norfolk Dredging Co., 594 F.3d 832, 837-838 (11th Cir. ), cert. 

den., 130 S.Ct. 3503 (2010) (quoting East River S.S. Co. v. TransAmerica DeLeval, 

Inc., 476 U.S. 858, 864) (1986). As will be discussed below, there is a long line of

maritime cases applying substantive maritime law to determine the question of 

whether an alleged tortfeasor who damages property owes a duty to persons who 

claim economic loss but do not have a proprietary interest in the damaged 

property. Accordingly, federal admiralty law governs whether the economic loss 

claimants have a viable claim.

13. Under Robins Dry Dock v. Flint, 275 U.S. 303 (1927), only persons 

who have a proprietary interest in property that has been damaged can recover 

economic loss resulting from the damage to that property. Robins Dry Dock has 

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been consistently followed by the Eleventh Circuit. Kingston Shipping Co. v. 

Roberts, 667 F.2d 34 (11th Cir. 1982); In re Hercules Carriers, Inc., 720 F.2d 1201 

(11th Cir. 1983). The Eleventh Circuit panel that hears this case will be bound by 

the prior decisions of the Eleventh Circuit. Accordingly, Skanska’s chances of 

success on the merits of the economic loss claims are essentially certain. 

B. Skanska has a substantial likelihood that it will prevail on the merits with 

respect to this Court’s order prohibiting Skanska from conducting 

discovery with regard to how other sophisticated entities evaluated the 

likely impact of Sally. 

13. Skanska also has a strong case that it will succeed on the merits with 

regard to this Court’s orders prohibiting Skanska from obtaining discovery with 

respect to how other sophisticated entities evaluated the likely impact of what 

eventually became Hurricane Sally. If Skanska succeeds on appeal on this 

argument, it will be entitled to a new trial on the entire case, including the property 

damage claims.

14. Under the rule of The Louisiana, 70 U.S. (3 Wall.) 164 (1865), when a 

vessel breaks her moorings and strikes a fixed object or stationary vessel, the 

moving vessel is presumed to be at fault. The moving vessel can overcome this 

presumption by proving either that “[1] that the allision was the fault of the 

stationary object[;] [2] that the moving vessel acted with reasonable care[;] or [3] 

that the allision was an unavoidable accident.” Bunge Corp. v. Freeport Marine 

Repair, Inc., 240 F.3d 919, 923 (11th Cir. 2001).

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15. The test for whether the moving vessel acted with reasonable care is 

accurately set forth in the 1970 case of Petition of the United States of America, 

425 F.2d. 991 (5th Cir. 1970):

The test for determining whether [Skanska] is free from fault is 

whether [it] took reasonable precautions under the circumstances as 

known or reasonably anticipated. If those responsible for 

[Skanska’s] barges were reasonable in their anticipation of the 

severity of the impending storm and undertook reasonable 

preparations in light of such anticipation, then they are relieved of 

liability. The standard of reasonableness is that of a prudent man 

familiar with the ways and vagaries of the sea. 

Id. at 995. (Emphasis added). Accordingly, this defense has two components: (1) 

Was Skanska “reasonable in [its] anticipation of the severity of the impending 

storm”? and (2) did Skanska undertake reasonable precautions in light of the 

reasonably anticipated conditions? 

16. In analyzing whether a vessel owner has acted reasonably, the courts 

have consistently considered evidence of how similarly situated entities have acted.

In The T.J. Hooper, 60 F.2d 737 (2d Cir. 1932), defendant’s tugs lost two barges 

en route from Norfolk to New York City when caught in a gale. Another tow 

proceeding on the same route put into a port of refuge before the storm struck, and 

three other tows followed suit. In determining whether the defendant had acted 

negligently in continuing with the voyage, the court, speaking through Judge 

Learned Hand, stated “Courts have not often such evidence of the opinion of 

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impartial experts, formed in the very circumstances and confirmed by their own 

conduct at the time.” Id. at 739. 

17. Similarly, in Buntin v. Fletchas, 257 F.2d 512 (5th Cir. 1958), the 

court looked to actions of third parties to determine whether the defendant had 

acted reasonably, stating that “The houseboat was secured in the same manner as 

other boats that survived the hurricane at the shipyard.” Id. at 514. See also Hatt 

65, LLC v. Kreitzberg, 2009 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 95332 at *7, Case No. 3:06cv332-

MCR/EMT (N.D. Fla., Sept. 30, 2009), affirmed, 658 F.3d 1243 (11th Cir. 2011)

(“[M]ost, if not all, persons in the area were still expecting the storm to make 

landfall near Mobile Bay to the west in accordance with the NHC’s 4:00 

forecast.”).

18. Skanska had indications from newspaper reports that the United States 

Navy and Escambia County, both sophisticated entities with a duty to the public to 

monitor Sally, had similarly concluded that Sally was unlikely to have a significant 

impact on Pensacola. See Exhibits A and B. 

19. Accordingly, Skanska propounded the following interrogatories to the 

United States:

INTERROGATORY NO. 15: DIRECTED TO THE UNITED STATES OF 

AMERICA

Please identify each and every log, record, report, planning 

document, after-action reporting document, or data compilation of 

any kind, including text messages, Naval messages, or emails, kept 

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or maintained by NASP, other Independent Commands, SubRegional Command Centers, and Regional Commanders for 

September 10-30, 2020, whether handwritten or recorded by 

electronic or mechanical equipment, and which relates to the 

preparations for and responses to Hurricane Sally.

INTERROGATORY NO. 16: DIRECTED TO THE UNITED 

STATES OF AMERICA

Describe in detail and particularity the meteorological data and 

interpretation of the same that NASP, other Independent 

Commands, Sub-Regional Command Centers, and Regional 

Commanders utilized and relied on in order to make decisions to 

protect property and personnel from the impacts of Hurricane Sally.

Interrogatory No. 16 inquired directly into the U.S. government’s interpretation of 

meteorological data, and thus was likely to elicit information relevant to whether 

Skanska’s interpretation of that data was reasonable. Interrogatory No. 15 inquired 

into communications about hurricane preparations, which would likely include 

communications relating to the expected weather conditions. 

20. In Discovery Order No. 2, ECF No. 1192, Magistrate Judge Cannon 

held that what the Navy had done to prepare for Sally was irrelevant, in that the 

Navy did not have any barges. 

21. Skanska filed an objection to Magistrate Judge Cannon’s ruling, 

pointing out that while what the Navy did to physically prepare for Sally might not 

be relevant with regard to the manner in which Skanska had secured its barges, 

evidence of what sources the Navy relied upon to evaluate the potential impact of 

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Sally and how it had evaluated that information was relevant to whether Skanska 

was reasonable in relying on the sources it relied upon, and whether Skanska’s 

evaluation of the information obtained from those sources was reasonable. ECF 

No. 1201. This Court denied the objection. ECF No. 1205. Magistrate Judge 

Cannon then also granted the United States a protective order prohibiting Skanska 

from taking depositions of Navy personnel. ECF No. 1226.

22. A denial of discovery is based on an abuse of discretion standard, but 

“[a] district court by definition abuses its discretion when it makes an error of 

law.” Arthur v. Allen, 452 F.3d 1234, 1243, modified on rehearing on other 

grounds, 459 F.3d 1310 (11th Cir. 2006), cert. den. 127 S. Ct. 2003 (2007) 

(quoting Koon v. United States, 518 U.S. 81, 100 (1996). The Court’s ruling that 

evidence of how sophisticated entities evaluated the potential impact of Sally was 

irrelevant is in conflict with the cases cited above, including Buntin v. Fletchas, 

257 F.2d 512 (5th Cir. 1958), an “old Fifth Circuit” case binding in the Eleventh 

Circuit. Accordingly, denial of discovery was an error of law and an abuse of 

discretion.

23. “Erroneous denial of discovery is ordinarily prejudicial in the absence 

of circumstances showing that it is harmless.” Weahkee v. Norton, 621 F.2d 1080, 

1083 (10th Cir. 1980); Shaklee Corp. v. Gunnell, 748 F.2d 548, 550 (10th Cir. 

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1984). Accordingly, Skanska has a substantial likelihood that the Eleventh Circuit 

will reverse and remand for a new trial.

IV.

Irreparable Injury to Skanska

24. Skanska will suffer irreparable injury if the relief is not granted. “An

injury is irreparable ‘if it cannot be undone through monetary remedies.’” Scott v. 

Roberts, 612 F.3d 1279, 1295 (11th Cir. 2010) (quoting Cunningham v. Adams,

808 F.2d 815, 821 (11th Cir. 1987). If the injunction is not reinstated, Skanska will 

incur significant expenses that as a matter of law “cannot be undone through 

monetary remedies.”

25. If the injunction is not restored, Skanska will be forced to defend the 

separate lawsuits now pending, and many more lawsuits will probably be filed by 

claimants who had not filed state court lawsuits prior to the Court’s issuance of an 

injunction. Even if the economic damage lawsuits are consolidated for the purpose 

of deciding the question of liability, Skanska will spend at least hundreds of 

thousands dollars defending these claims. Moreover, each of the property damage 

claims will have to be tried separately, since the issues of whether a Skanska barge 

damaged a particular piece of property and the amount of damages are unique to 

each case. Defending the approximately 15 property damage claims will probably 

cost Skanska millions of dollars.

26. “The prevailing party in an admiralty case is not entitled to recover its 

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attorneys’ fees as a matter of course.” Misener Marine Constr., Inc. v. Norfolk 

Dredging Co., 594 F.3d 832, 838 (11th Cir.), cert. den., 130 S.Ct. 3503 (2010). 

Accordingly, Skanska will be unable to recover its attorney’s fees incurred in 

defending these cases, and will thus suffer an injury that “cannot be undone 

through monetary remedies.” 

27. Skanska’s irreparable injury is exacerbated by the fact that a class 

action lawsuit on behalf of the economic loss claimants has been filed.1 See Gionis 

v. Javitch, Block & Rathbone, 405 F. Supp. 2d 856, 873 (S.D. Ohio 2005) 

(granting stay pending appeal where defendant would incur substantial costs in 

litigating class certification issues).

V.

Lack of Substantial Harm to Economic Loss Claimants

A. The economic loss claimants will suffer no harm, since their claims will be 

dismissed if they go forward in state court.

28. No substantial harm will result to the economic loss claimants if the 

injunction is restored. “[B]ecause this is a maritime case, this Court and the 

Florida district courts of appeal must adhere to the federal principles of harmony 

and uniformity when applying federal maritime law.” Carnival Corp. v. Carlisle, 

953 So.2d 461, 470 (Fla. 2007). Robins Dry Dock has been followed by every 

federal appellate court that has considered the issue. Kingston Shipping Co. v. 

 

1 A true and accurate copy of the class action complaint is attached as Exhibit C.

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Roberts, 667 F.2d 34 (11th Cir. 1982); In re Hercules Carriers, Inc., 720 F.2d 1201 

(11th Cir. 1983); Louisiana ex rel. Guste v. M/V TESTBANK, 752 F.2d 1019 (5th

Cir. 1985) (en banc); Barber Lines A/S v. M/V DONAU MARU, 764 F.2d 50 (1st

Cir. 1985); American Petroleum & Transport, Inc. v. City of New York, 737 F.3d 

185 (2d Cir. 2013); Channel Star Excursions v. Southern Pacific Transportation 

Co., 77 F.3d 1135 (9th Cir. 1996); Getty Refining & Marketing Co. v. MT FADI B, 

766 F.2d 829 (3d Cir. 1985). Accordingly, there is a well-settled uniform rule of 

federal maritime law that the Florida state courts would be obligated to follow.

29. If the economic loss claims are allowed to go forward in state court, 

the state court will be obliged to apply federal maritime law and dismiss these 

claims under Robins Dry Dock and the result in state court will ultimately be the 

same as in the Eleventh Circuit. However, Skanska will be forced to incur at least 

hundreds of thousands of dollars of additional expense that will not be incurred if 

prosecution of the state court cases is enjoined until the Eleventh Circuit rules.

B. None of the claimants will suffer substantial harm, because any successful 

claimants will be entitled to pre-judgment interest.

30. The only conceivable prejudice to the Claimants asserting claims for 

property damage would be a delay, and given the backlog of cases due to the 

Covid-19 pandemic, the appeal in the Eleventh Circuit will almost certainly be 

resolved long before any case in state court could get to trial. Moreover, under 

maritime law, as a general rule, a successful claimant in a maritime case is entitled 

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to pre-judgment interest. City of Milwaukee v. Cement Div., National Gypsum Co., 

515 U.S. 189, 195 (1995); Assurance General de France v. Cathcart, 756 So.2d 

1055, 1058 (Fla. App.—4th Cir. 2000) (applying rule that prejudgment interest is 

to be awarded in admiralty cases in Saving to Suitors clause case filed in state 

court). Accordingly, any successful Claimant will probably suffer no economic 

harm, whereas Skanska will suffer irreparable economic harm by incurring 

substantial defense costs that it will not be able to recover as a matter of law.

VI.

Public Interest

31. The fourth consideration is “where the public interest lies.” Hilton v. 

Braunskill, 481 U.S. at 776. The reinstatement of the injunction under Rule 62(d) 

will advance the public interest, in that it will serve the purpose of judicial 

economy, which is a matter obviously in the public’s interest. If the injunction is 

not reinstated, what will ultimately be hundreds of cases filed in the state court will 

be unleashed on the state court system. If the injunction is reinstated, on the other 

hand, the issue of whether Skanska owed a duty to the economic loss claimants can 

be resolved easily and expeditiously by the Eleventh Circuit, a court that is 

intimately familiar with the issue involved, having previously addressed it on at 

least two prior occasions. 

32. The public interest will also be served with respect to the property 

damage claimants, since if the entire case is reversed because of the denial of 

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discovery, the state courts will not have to deal with these claims if Skanska is 

exonerated after remand. 

VII.

The balance of factors weighs in favor of reinstating the injunction.

33. As noted above, the Supreme Court has held that the first two factors, 

the likelihood of success on the merits and the prejudice to the appellant if the 

injunction is not granted, are the most important. With respect to the economic 

loss claims, these two factors could scarcely be stronger: Skanska is virtually 

certain to prevail on the merits, and will suffer at least hundreds of thousands of 

dollars of unrecoverable defense costs if the injunction is not granted.

34 With respect to the property damage claims, the likelihood of success 

on the merits, while strong, is admittedly not certain, but “[w]here the ‘balance of 

the equities weighs heavily in favor of granting the [injunction],’ the movant need 

only show a ‘substantial case on the merits.’” Garcia–Mir v. Meese, 781 F.2d 

1450, 1453 (11th Cir.1986). As discussed above, the prejudice to Skanska is even 

greater with respect to the property damage claims, since none of these claims has 

anything in common with any other property damage claim with respect to 

causation or damages, so these cases are not susceptible of being consolidated. 

Accordingly, Skanska will incur millions of dollars of unrecoverable defense costs 

defending these cases. Skanska’s argument that evidence of how other 

sophisticated entities evaluated the impact of Sally is relevant is supported by the 

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way similar evidence has been treated by other courts, and Skanska clearly has a 

“substantial case on the merits.” 

35. Moreover, both of the other two factors, the absence of any prejudice 

to the property damage Claimants and the public interest in not burdening the state 

courts with cases when there is a substantial likelihood that this Court’s ruling on 

liability will be reversed and remanded for a new trial, weigh in favor of reinstating 

the injunction.

36. Finally, the injunction with respect to the economic loss claims will 

almost certainly be reinstated by the Eleventh Circuit if this Court does not 

reinstate it. Accordingly, interests of judicial economy support reinstating the 

injunction in all the cases. 

VIII.

Alternatively, the Court should enjoin state court proceedings pending ruling 

by the Eleventh Circuit on a Motion to Stay pursuant to Fed. R. App. P. 8

37. Should the Court deny reinstatement of the injunction under Rule 

62(d), Skanska alternatively seeks an injunction pursuant to Fed. R. Civ. P. Rule 

65(d) enjoining the economic loss Claimants and any other persons claiming 

economic loss allegedly resulting from damage to the Pensacola Bay Bridge from 

proceeding in any other forum until the Eleventh Circuit has ruled on Skanska’s 

motion for stay pursuant to Fed. R. App. P. 8. 

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38. Fed. R. App. P. 8(a) provides that a party must ordinarily move first in 

the district court for an order restoring an injunction while an appeal is pending, 

but once this is done, can move for relief in the Court of Appeals if the motion is 

denied by the district court. Should this Court deny Skanska’s motion to restore 

the injunction, Skanska will immediately file a motion in the Eleventh Circuit 

seeking this relief. 

39. Rule 65 requires every order of injunction to state the reason the 

injunction is being issued. Here that reason is to preserve the status quo as to state 

court actions to allow the Eleventh Circuit to determine whether a stay pending 

appeal is warranted. 

40. Pursuant to Rule 65(d), every order of injunction must state the 

specific terms of the injunction and the specific actions subject to the injunction. 

Here, the terms of the injunction, and the actions enjoined are an extension of the 

injunction established by this Court at the outset of this case, i.e., “The filing or 

prosecution of any and all claims and proceedings asserting claims that could have 

been asserted in these consolidated proceedings, other than in this Court, is hereby 

enjoined.” (ECF No. 6, p. 2.) 

41. This alternative relief procedure is common. See, e.g., In re 

Albicocco, No. 06–CV–3409 (JFB), 2006 WL 2620464, at *5 (E.D.N.Y. Sept. 13, 

2006) (denying a stay pending appeal under Rule 62, but granting a temporary stay 

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so that a party could apply to the Court of Appeals for a stay); Motorola Credit 

Corp. v. Uzan, 275 F.Supp.2d 519, 525 (S.D.N.Y.2003) (same); Paris v. (1) Dep't 

of Nat'l Store Branch 1 (Vietnam), No. 99–CV–8607 (NRB), 2000 WL 777904, at 

*5 (S.D.N.Y. June 15, 2000) (same); Centauri Shipping Ltd. v. W. Bulk Carriers 

KS, 528 F. Supp. 2d 186, 196 (S.D.N.Y. 2007) (denying injunctive relief, but 

granting “temporary stay [to] remain in effect until the stay motion before the 

Second Circuit is decided.”).

WHEREFORE, PREMISES CONSIDERED, Skanska respectfully moves 

this Court, pursuant to Rule 62(d) to restore or grant a continuing injunction 

enjoining all Claimants in these consolidated cases and all other persons from 

instituting or prosecuting any claims in any other forum pending the conclusion of 

the appeal of this matter. Alternatively, Skanska respectfully moves this Court to 

issue a temporary injunction pursuant to Rule 65(a) enjoining all Claimants in 

these consolidated cases and all other persons from instituting or prosecuting any 

claims in any other forum until the United States Court of Appeals for the Eleventh 

Circuit has ruled on Skanska’s motion for a stay pursuant to Fed. R. App. P. 8. 

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Respectfully submitted, 

/s/ Harold K. Watson

DEREK A. WALKER SCOTT A. REMINGTON

Admitted Pro Hac Vice Florida Bar No. 122483

KENNETH H. TRIBUCH JEREMY C. BRANNING

Florida Bar No. 986887 Florida Bar No. 507016

Harold K. Watson, Esq. ANDREW M. SPENCER

Derek A. Walker, Esq. Florida Bar No. 0119966

Charles P. Blanchard, Esq. CLARK PARTINGTON

Jon W. Wise, Esq. P.O. Box 13010

CHAFFE MCCALL, LLP Pensacola, FL 32591-3010 

801 Travis, Suite 1910 Telephone: (850) 434-92000

Houston, Texas 77002 Facsimile: 9850) 432-7340

Telephone: (713) 546-9800

Facsimile: (713) 546-9806

ANTHONY J. RUSSO, ESQ.

Florida Bar No.: 508608

arusso@butler.legal

MIHAELA CABULEA, ESQ.

Florida Bar No.: 71586

mcabulea@butler.legal

rburnison@butler.legal

BUTLER WEIHMULLER 

KATZ CRAIG LLP

400 N. Ashley Drive, Suite 2300

Tampa, Florida 33602

Telephone: (713) 546-9800

Facsimile: (713) 546-9806

Attorneys for Skanska USA Civil Southeast, Inc. 

and Skanska USA, Inc. 

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CERTIFICATE OF COMPLIANCE AS TO WORD COUNT

I hereby certify that, as required by Local Rule 7.1(F), this Motion contains 

4,104 words, counted as provided in Local Rule 7.1(F).

/s/ Andrew M. Spencer

ANDREW M. SPENCER

CERTIFICATE OF COUNSEL CONFERENCE

I hereby certify that in a good faith effort to resolve the issues raised in this 

Motion as required by N.D. Fla. Loc. R. 7.1(B), undersigned counsel for Skanska 

conferred with counsel for Claimants by telephone and email. Counsel for 

Claimants represented to undersigned counsel that Claimants object to the relief 

requested in this Motion.

/s/ Jeremy C. Branning

JEREMY C. BRANNIN

CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE

I HEREBY CERTIFY that a copy of the foregoing has been filed with the 

Clerk of Court and furnished to all counsel of record through the Court’s CM/ECF 

electronic filing system on this 18th day of January, 2022:

/s/ Andrew M. Spencer

ANDREW M. SPENCER

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