Grassroots Development: The African

Development Foundation

June 1988

NTIS order #PB88-236252
Recommended Citation:

U.S. Congress, Office of Technology Assessment, Grassroots Development: The African Development Foundation, OTA-F-378 (Washington, DC: U.S. Government Printing Office, June 1988).

Library of Congress Catalog Card Number 88-60052 6

For sale by the Superintendent of Documents

U.S. Government Printing Office, Washington, DC 20402-9325

(order form can be found in the back of this report)
Foreword

Grassroots development, to some, is a contradiction in terms. They identify development with industrialization, with large-scale transportation systems and U.S.-style

agriculture with its expensive equipment. To others, grassroots development is a means

to achieve results, an approach that has been missing from too many foreign aid programs and partly to blame for their failures, For yet others, grassroots development is

an end in itself because it promotes people’s well-being and empowers self-help groups

to expand and make their own choices and bring about change.

Grassroots development may be a little of all these things to the members of Congress who established the African Development Foundation (ADF) in 1980. This report

is about the Foundation - the only program wholly funded by the U.S. Congress to support grassroots development in Africa. Our analysis of ADF’s experience is broadly drawn;

it will be of interest to anyone involved in self-help efforts of any kind. What works?

What doesn’t? And why?

This is OTA’S third report on U.S. foreign aid and African agriculture and the most

comprehensive look at a single program. It complements a larger, more general work

in press on enhancing agriculture in Africa and its already-published companion report

on the Sahel Development Program. The House Foreign Affairs Committee, its Subcommittee on Africa, and the House Select Committee on Hunger requested this study. The

Senate Foreign Relations Committee, Subcommittee on African Affairs, endorsed their

request.

OTA’S special thanks go to the Washington-based and African staff of the Foundation who openly discussed their philosophy, their work, and their plans at length and

who spent their holidays reviewing our draft. Also, we gratefully acknowledge the help

of the people who participate in the 12 ADF-funded projects that we visited in Africa.

They contributed their time, resources, knowledge, and enthusiasm to this assessment

and it could not have been done without their help. Many others shared their insights

with us, both in Africa and here in Washington. Members and leaders of the field teams,

workshop participants, reviewers, and members of OTA’S Low-Resource Agriculture

Advisory Panel all deserve, and have, our appreciation. As with all OTA studies, the

content of this report is solely OTA’S responsiblity.

. . .

Ill
OTA Project Staff -grassroots Development:

The African Development Foundation

Roger C. Herdman, Assistant Director, OTA

Health and Life Sciences Division

Walter E. Parham, Food and Renewable Resources, Program Manager

Phyllis N. Windle, Project

Analytical Staff

Director

Kathy Desmond, Contractor

George Scharffenberger, Contractor

Scott McCormick, Contractor

Allen Ruby, Research Analyst

J. Kathy Parker, Contractor

Valerie Brown, Research Assistant

Administrative Staff

Ellis Lewis, Administrative Assistant

Nellie Hammond, Secretary

Carolyn Swarm, Secretary
Contents

Page

Abbreviations and Acronyms . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . vi

Chapterl. Summary and Options . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 3

Chapter2. OTA’s Assessment Methods . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 23

Chapter 3. The African Development Foundation. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 35

Chapter4. OTA’S Findings About ADF-Funded Projects . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 53

Chapter 5. OTA’S Findings About ADF’s Funding Program . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 85

Chapter6. Lessons for Other Development Assistance Organizations . . . . ......115

Appendix A. ADF Projects Awarded From Fiscal Year 1984 Through

Fiscal Year 1987 . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .123

Appendix B. Summaries of 12 ADF-Funded Projects Visited by OTA . .....126

Appendix C, Desk Reviewers, Participants in the Methods Workshop,

and Members of OTA Field Assessment Teams . . . . . . . . , . . . , . . .146

Appendix D. Field Team Methods: The Assessment Materials . ..............148

Appendix E. Field Interviews , ..., . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . ..., . . . . . . . . . . ...,165

Appendix F. Reviewers of OTA’s Draft . . . . . . . . . . . . ................,.,..,.172

Appendix G, References . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .. ....174

Index . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .. ...179
ABBREVIATIONS

ADF

AFC

AID

AJAC

ALDEP

AMA

app.

ARAP

ATI

CEBEMO

CONGAD

CRF

Cus o

DHC

FAO

FONGS

FR

FSK

FTE

FY

GAO

—African Development Foundation

—Agricultural Finance Corporation

(Zimbabwe)

—U.S. Agency for International Development

—Association of Young Farmers of the

Casamance (Senegal; acronym for

French name)

—Arable Lands Development Program

(Botswana)

—Boiteko Agricultural Management

Association (Botswana)

—appendix

—Arable Rainfed Agricultural Program

(Botswana)

—Appropriate Technology International

—Dutch Catholic development assistance program (acronym for Dutch

name)

—Council of Nongovernmental Organizations Supporting Development

(Senegal; acronym for French name)

–Country Resource Facilitator (ADF)

—Canadian University Service Organization

–Dakoro Herders Cooperative (Niger)

—Food and Agriculture Organization

of the United Nations

—Federation of Nongovernmental Organizations of Senegal (acronym for

French name)

–Foundation Representative (ADF)

—Farming Systems Kenya

—Full-time equivalent

—Fiscal year

—General Accounting Office

AND ACRONYMS

IAF —Inter-American Foundation

IBM —International Business Machines, Inc.

ICIPE —International Centre of Insect Physiology and Ecology

IFAD —International Fund for Agricultural

Development

IUCN —International Union for the Conservation of Nature and Natural Resources

KFM —Kungal Fado Mango (Niger; acronym

for Fulani name)

MISEREOR—German Catholic bishops developNGK

NGO

NOVIB

OMB

OTA

PACT

PAM

Pm

PRC

P v o

RLO

SAED

UN

UNIFEM

WID

ment assistance program

–Njoguini, Gitero and Kabati Self-Help

project (Kenya)

—Non-governmental organization

—Dutch private development assistance

organization (acronym for Dutch

name)

–Office of Management and Budget

—Office of Technology Assessment

—Privrte Agencies Collaborating Together

—Project Assessment Memorandum

(ADF)

—Partnership for Productivity/Kenya

–Project Review Committee (ADF)

—Private voluntary organization

–Regional Liaison Officer (ADF)

—Government regional development

agency for the Senegal River Valley

(acronym for French name)

—United Nations

—United Nations Development Fund

for Women

—Women in development

vi
Chapter 1

Summnary and Options
CONTENTS

Summary . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 0 . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .

Scope and Methods. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .

ADF Yesterday and Today . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .

How Well Are ADF-Funded Projects Doing? . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .

ADF’s Program and Possible Improvements . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .

Lessons for other Organizations . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .

Congressional Options . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .

Reauthorization: Permanent v. 5-Year . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .

Appropriations. . . . . . . .

Congressional Oversight

Legislation. . . . . . . . . . . .

Box

1-1. ADF’s Legislation in Brief A

Figure

Box

Mandate for

Figure s

3

3

5

7

10

12

12

13

14

15

17

Page

Grassroots Development . . . 17

1-l. Countries With ADF-Funded Projects . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 4

l-2. Flow Chart of OTA’s Assessment Methods, . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 5

Tables

Table Page

l-1. The 12 ADF Projects Visited by OTA Teams . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 6

l-2. Rating the Critical Issues in 12 ADF-Funded Projects . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . , 7

1-3. Summary of Congressional options . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1 3
Chapter 1

Summary and Options

SUMMARY

The African Development Foundation (ADF)

is a small U.S. development assistance agency

faced with a large task: supporting grassroots

development in Africa. Congress created ADF

in 1980 to “enable the poor to participate in

the process of development. ” As of 1987, ADF

has given grants to organizations in 19 African countries and its FY 88 appropriations were

$7,0 million (figure l-l).

OTA’S assessment confirmed the validity of

the assumptions on which ADF was created

and found that most ADF-funded projects were

doing reasonably well. While a number of areas

for improvement were identified, OTA concluded that the Foundation’s reauthorization

is justified, ADF would need additional funding, however, if it is to implement recommended

improvements without reducing the funds available for new grants.

Scope and Methods

This report, done at the request of the House

Foreign Affairs Committee, its Subcommittee

on Africa, and the House Select Committee on

Hunger, is intended to assist Congress with decisions about the African Development Foundation’s role in U.S. foreign assistance. Consequently, this is not an evaluation of specific

ADF-funded projects. Most of the Foundation’s

projects are in early stages of implementation

and any final analysis must await their completion. Nor is this the final word on ADF. The

Foundation is young and evolving. It has had

some successes, and some problems. This report suggests some ways to overcome these

problems and thus enable the Foundation to

fulfill more effectively the unique role that Congress has designated for it.

This report examines ADF’s overall funding

program with a special focus on its agriculture

and renewable resources projects and the use

of technology. As Congress requested, it looks

at the broad impacts of ADF’s work: the results,

replicability, and sustainability of its projects;

and how it fosters the participation of Africans

in their own social and economic development

(figure 1-2).

The assessment began with an analysis of recent evaluations of similar organizations to

compare different evaluation methods and

identify common problems. In addition, experts

in project and program evaluation, grassroots

development, and field evaluation methods

were interviewed. Project files in ADF’s Washington office were carefully reviewed to provide an overview of the Foundation’s funding

program and highlight potential problem areas.

Field visits to 12 representative ADF-funded

projects (table 1-1) and interviews with African

and donor officials in Africa formed the foundation of the report’s findings, Three regional

field teams visited 6 countries, spending a total of 285 person-days gathering and analyzing

information and suggesting possible improvements that ADF could undertake.

The Foundation cooperated fully with all

parts of this work. For example, discussions

with ADF staff provided a broad picture of

ADF’s activities. Members of the Foundation’s

African staff accompanied the OTA field teams

on their site visits and assisted with local arrangements, Also, ADF provided substantial review comments while this report was in draft

form. At the same time, however, OTA sought

to ensure that its results were independent:

selection criteria stipulated that no field team

members had previous or current contractual

relationships with the Foundation; ADF field

staff did not participate in most interviews, including meetings with project managers; and

the Foundation did not have access to OTA’S

field assessment materials or the three teams’

reports.

3
4

Figurel.1 .—Countries With ADF.Funded Projects

SUDAN

\ \ / /

. [

LR

Map adapted from the African-American Institute, Inc., copyright @ 1984.
5

Figure 1 -2.— Flow Chart of OTA’S Assessment

Methods

CONGRESSIONAL REQUEST OTA experience

\ /

I

Identification of critical issues

1. Participation 3. Sustainability

2. Results 4. Replicability

Technology (in relation to the other four issues)

Assessment Methods WASHINGTON DESK REVIEWS ON

WorksHop 1. AGRICULTURAL TECHNOLOGY

2. RENEWABLE RESOURCE

\

TECHNOLOGY

3. PARTICIPATION

I Choice of indicators to I

Meeting FIELD ASSESSMENT WORK

SHEETS AND FORMS

r

I National-level interviews Project visits

I

I

Field Team Wrap-Up Meetings

I

I

INDIVIDUAL ASSESSMENTS OF

CONGRESSIONAL OPTIONS

DRAFT REPORT

FINAL REPORT

KEY: Items printed m capital letters are repcxts or wtten materials

Items printed In bold are meetmgs

SOURCE: Offtce of Technology Assessment, 19SS

ADF Yesterday and Today

The Foundation was established by Congress

in 1980 to complement official bilateral and

multilateral development assistance programs

such as those of the Agency for International

Development (AID) and the United Nations.

ADF’s legislation was modeled on the InterAmerican Foundation but its history is quite

different. ADF had a difficult start. First, the

Administration delayed appointment of ADF’s

Board of Directors until 1983. This stalled the

agency’s start-up because ADF’s legislation required that the U.S. President appoint a Board

to be responsible for the Foundation’s management and to select its president. Then, highlevel staff resigned in 1984 creating more uncertainty about ADF’s program. As a result,

Congress asked the General Accounting Office

(GAO) to assess ADF’s management capacity

to implement its mandate. Although GAO raised

some difficult issues, its qualified endorsement

of ADF’s capabilities led Congress to reauthorize ADF for five years beginning in 1985.

In 1984, under the leadership of a new president, the Foundation began to develop its funding program in earnest. Procedures were devised to identify potential grantees, approve

grants, and conduct project monitoring and

evaluation. Some processes, such as project approval, have changed little since 1984. Others,

such as research and evaluation procedures,

are being developed further now as the first

projects are reaching completion, Certain key

activities, such as the responsibilities for project

approval, are under continuing ADF review,

ADF’s Washington and Africa-based staff

grew to 52 full- and part-time employees, contractors, and interns by February 1988. Twentyfive staff members are full-time employees,

within the Office of Management and Budget’s

27 full-time employee limit. Virtually all funding decisions are made in Washington, e.g.,

screening, reviewing, and approving project

proposals. The addition of ADF’s African staff

(4 regional officers and 14 part-time country

resource facilitators) is recent, however, and

may alter this high degree of centralization.

ADF has awarded grants to 114 projects in

19 countries in Africa totaling $10.3 million in
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the past 4 fiscal years (1984-1987). Individual

grants range from $700 to $250,000; projects

average approximately $90,000, including grant

amendments. Most commitments are for 2 to

3 years. Two-thirds of the projects have agricultural activities as a major component; some

support other rural activities such as potable

water supply and still others provide aid to urban organizations (20 percent). The Foundation

awards grants to grassroots organizations and

to intermediary organizations that provide services to local groups, Funded groups use ADF

money to repair wells, build small-scale irrigation systems, improve animal health, plant

vegetable gardens and orchards, rent tractors,

raise chickens, obtain credit for fertilizer, form

cooperatives, and many other activities. ADF

grants enable intermediary organizations to

provide services such as credit, training and

technical assistance to grassroots groups.

How Well Are ADF-Funded

Projects Doing?

People’s participation in ADF-funded projects, the projects’ sustainability over time, and

their replicability from location to location are

fundamental aspects of ADF’s congressional

mandate. And appreciable positive results, leading to social and economic development, are

expected to be a major outcome of supporting

grassroots efforts. Therefore, these were the

four critical issues—participation, positive results, sustainability, and replicability—on

which the performance of the 12 visited projects

was assessed (table 1-2).

Table 1-2.—Rating the Critical Issues

in 12 ADF-Funded Projects

No. of projects rated

Critical issue High Moderate Low

Overall Degree of Participation . . . 6 2“ 4

Overall Results . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 4 6 2

OveraIl Sustainability (for next 3

to 5 years) . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 6 5 1

Overall Replicability in Region

or Country . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 3 7 2

.

Participation

Fostering the participation of Africans in

their own development is an important goal of

ADF. This assessment of 12 ADF-funded projects showed high overall participation in onehalf of the projects but low overall participation in one-third. These ratings were adjusted

for the local context and were based on elements such as people’s support for project design and its technologies; their access to the

project and benefits in light of their contributions; their role in project decisionmaking; and

how participatory the recipient organizations

are.

A number of issues remain for ADF to settle

and, if addressed, are likely to improve the

Foundation’s record on participation, For example, ADF must give increased attention to

the various elements that characterize participation, rather than allowing one, local control,

to supersede all others. A project may be controlled locally, yet people who contribute time

or other resources may not support the activities undertaken or take part in decisionmaking. Involvement in decisionmaking seems to

be key but ADF has little information on this

or other elements of participation.

In the 12 cases studied, either an African

grassroots group or intermediary organization

originated the project in every case. Of the

funded groups visited, four were grassroots

organizations and eight were intermediary

organizations. More intermediary organizations had low participation than grassroots

groups. Both types of organizations face difficult questions of access. For example, women

have a low degree of access to projects in onethird of the projects visited, and rarely participated in management.

Generally, participants were representative

of the community, agreed the project addressed

a need, and shared equitably in costs and benefits. On the other hand, usually participants

did not take part in evaluation and financial

decisionmaking. A third of the projects were

judged low on participants’ acceptance of the

proposed technologies, their share in project
8

management, and participatory provision of

technical assistance.

Results

One of ADF’s main purposes is to help bring

about social and economic development. A way

to assess whether ADF is achieving this purpose is to evaluate the results of ADF-funded

projects. OTA’S rating of results was based on

whether projects achieved their objectives and,

more importantly, whether positive economic

and social impacts had occurred, or were likely

to occur, without significant negative effects,

including those on the environment.

Because of the early stage of most of the projects visited, project results could only be estimated. Actual impacts were observable in only

half of the projects. Ten projects were judged

likely to have positive impacts on social and

economic development of poor people in the

locale but the levels of impact varied from significant to negligible. One project brought about

a 30 percent increase in income for women who

received small agricultural loans; an irrigation

project doubled land value in another. Two

other projects, however, were unlikely to benefit the poor even though they were likely to

reach some of their objectives.

To adequately assess the results, or outcomes,

of projects, the benefits must be considered in

relation to the costs. Thus, OTA considered the

contributions of ADF, the local communities,

and other donors.

Ž Grant size and numbers of participants varied widely. As a result, ADF’s grant size

per person ranged from $50 to $3,507, averaging $650.

● Just under one-half of the money ADF is

putting into the 12 visited projects is spent

for equipment. Another 18 percent goes

into revolving credit funds. About 10 percent is spent in each of three categories:

1) agricultural inputs, 2) salaries and office

expenses, and 3) ADF audits, evaluations,

and other expenses including contingency

funds. The remainder funds vehicles, transportation, training, and technical assistance.

●

●

Communities usually provide labor for

projects. In six projects, a majority of participants also provide some money and materials.

All 12 of the visited organizations were recipients of funds from other external

donors in addition to ADF. In four of these

cases, the specific project funded by ADF

was also funded by other donors. The other

donors include AID, the U.S. Ambassador’s Self-Help Fund, European religious

donors, European and U.S. private voluntary organizations (PVOS), private foundations, the World Bank, and the African Development Bank.

Sustainability

Sustainability generally means that project

activities or results will continue after the grant

period. OTA judged ADF-funded projects on

several levels: sustainability of the project, of

project-related activities, and of the local group

and/or intermediary organization. Also, sustainability includes economic, environmental,

technical, and social factors; each was assessed

independently but then combined in an overall rating.

Almost all ADF-funded activities were judged

to have a high or moderate potential to be sustainable over the next 3 to 5 years. Changes

were underway in a number of projects, though,

and their eventual form might differ considerably from that proposed in the original project

documentation. Community support and the

self-help nature of the projects were the strongest reasons for sustainability. But the lack of

careful economic and environmental planning

were common constraints threatening sustainability, especially in the longer term. The most

common constraint to economic sustainability in ADF-funded projects is lack of provision

for future ongoing, or recurrent, costs (affecting five projects). Three projects already show

negative environmental consequences—soil

erosion, soil compaction, and land clearing

without adequate reforestation.

The poorer performance of ADF-funded projects regarding longer term sustainability also
9

relates to the technologies being used. Almost

all of the projects were judged technologically

sustainable in the short term. Technologies

used in nine projects, however, were relatively

high risk; those in five were relatively complex;

and those in five were comparatively high cost.

RepIicability

Donors seek replicability to increase the impact of their funding program, Grantmakers,

such as ADF, that fund small-scale projects intend that their sponsored projects will benefit

local people, but they also intend them to have

wider impacts. Replicability refers to more than

the duplication of project activities, it includes

dissemination of technologies, organizational

methods, or skills beyond the funded group. In

judging replicability of projects, OTA considered 1) the potential for other groups in the region or country to use the technology or repeat

the project activity and 2) whether aspects of

the organization’s management structure or

style could be beneficial to other groups.

Ten of the ADF-funded projects visited showed

a moderate or high degree of replicability in

the region or country, and two a low degree.

Self-help processes, such as the ways groups

identified, planned, or managed their activities,

were judged more likely to be replicable than

the technologies used. The major constraint to

replicability was the high cost of the project

activities or technology. In seven projects, more

than one-half of those visited, project activities

were judged unlikely to be repeated for this reason. However, the majority of funded groups

made some effort to spread what they learned.

Most intermediary organizations planned to

replicate project activities with additional local groups. In three cases, non-participants

adopted technologies introduced by the ADFfunded projects.

Interestingly, three projects involving grassroots organizations have had an impact on national institutions. One was among the first village associations to obtain credit from the new

National Agricultural Credit Bank in Senegal.

Its successful irrigated rice project raised the

expectation that other local associations could

Photo credit: OTA/George Honadle

ADF funding allows groups to tap the wisdom and

experience of their local leaders. This man leads a

farmers’ cooperative that produces tea and coffee

in eastern Zimbabwe.

also handle credit. Another is seen by the Botswana Ministry of Agriculture as a successful

pilot project on vegetable and poultry/egg production, worthy to be tried elsewhere by the

Ministry. The third, a water supply and irrigation system built by residents of three communities, provides Kenyan officials with an example of lower cost local water projects.

How the Four Critical Issues Interact

Participation, positive results, short- and longterm sustainability, and replicability are all

desirable but not necessarily simultaneously

compatible. Generally, participation increases

results. And positive results can increase participation and be a condition for replicability.

On the other hand, over-emphasizing results

can lessen participation, especially in the short

term. And neither participation nor results are

necessarily compatible with long-term sustainability, especially with environmental sustainability if dangers are dimly perceived. Thus ADF

needs to balance the demands of these different aspects of its mandate in implementing its

funding program.
10

ADF's Program and Possible

improvements

Many of the ADF-funded projects that OTA

examined are performing reasonably well. Some,

however, have deficiencies regarding participation, sustainability, and replicability that are

troubling given ADF’s mandate. The Foundation inevitably made difficult choices as it translated its mandate into action. Together, those

explicit and implicit choices have shaped ADF’s

funding program and they are reflected in the

project findings discussed here.

The Foundation’s choices in several areas

have had clearly positive impacts. The Foundation has a highly committed staff with considerable African experience and it has contracted with qualified Africans to help carry

out its program. It supports the growth of grassroots leadership and organizational capacity

and its grant-making process is often flexible

and responsive. The focus on agricultural projects is appropriate, and ADF’s new evaluation

program is promising.

In other areas, however, ADF is doing less

than it could. Five major areas of improvement

exist:

1. ADF’s relationships with its applicants and

grantees are not as effective as they could be.

Decisions regarding ADF’s evolving role vis a

vis each funded group, such as the level of involvement, frequency of contact, and the balance between facilitation and evaluation, could

be improved. Often ADF is too passive but at

times it is too involved. In the former case, potential to assist the group’s development is neglected. In the latter, the self-help process may

be bypassed inappropriately.

2. Pre-funding analysis of project proposals

is often inadequate in one or more of several

critical areas: the sociallpolitical context and

organizational factors of the applicant group,

technological choices, environmental implications, and the economic constraints and opportunities of the projected activities.

● Although ADF encourages a high degree

of local control, other critical elements of

participation, such as participants’ involve-

●

●

ment in decisionmaking and access by

women, minority groups, and the poor, are

not sufficiently addressed. Thus, ADF is

not fully meeting its mandate to foster participation by the poor in their own development.

ADF’s analysis of the stage of development—the growth and track record—of applicant groups and their relationship to

government officials and other donors often

is weak. Similarly, analysis of intermediary organizations and their relationships

with grassroots groups has not been sufficient. As a result, ADF sometimes makes

inappropriate decisions as to who, when,

what or at what level to grant funding.

Inadequate analysis of technical, environmental, and economic factors sometimes

results in ADF funding projects with questionable technical soundness, economic

and financial viability, and environmental

sustainability. Also, ADF’s work has not

helped expand the choices of technologies

available.

3. The way that ADF monitors projects often

does not provide enough in-depth understanding and information to effectively facilitate implementation by project managers and participants. As a result, the Foundation misses

opportunities to assist grantees and increase

the likelihood of project success.

4. ADF African field staff are underused in

pre-funding analysis and project monitoring.

This slows decisionmaking, causes ADF to

make funding decisions without the helpful

analysis they could provide, and also means that

funded groups are not receiving the best possible assistance.

5. ADF does not communicate sufficiently

with other private and official development

groups in Africa, so its ability to learn from

others’ experience and to help groups benefit

from others’ resources is reduced. Also, ADF

does not prepare country-specific planning

strategies to guide its use of sparse resources

and place its work in context. This reduces its

impact and makes it difficult for ADF to identify its specific role in each country.
In addition, other significant but lower priority problems exist. For instance, an unnecessarily long time passes between ADF’s receipt

of project proposals and the disbursement of

project funds (12,5 months for the 12 visited

projects). ADF has not yet completed agreements or reached informal understandings with

the governments in 13 of the 19 countries in

which it funds projects.l ADF’s funding portfolio does not reflect the full range of possibilities granted in its legislation, The Foundation

has not paid sufficient attention to evaluating

its own funding program, Nor is its research

program yet addressing issues raised by the

organizations and activities it funds.

None of these problems is irremediable and

ADF has begun to take steps to correct some

already. For example, the Foundation is planning to expand the responsibilities of its African staff but has not yet clarified how to do

this, The following suggestions could help correct these problems and are OTA’S high priority changes for ADF:

revise and clarify the roles of staff in their

working relationships with applicants and

grantees,

increase and improve pre-grant analysis

and facilitate better planning by applicants

during the project approval process,

improve communication with the managers

of funded projects and more actively help

them identify problems and resources during project implementation,

enhance the responsibilities of the African

staff in project identification, approval, and

monitoring, and

increase communication with other development organizations, especially those that

assist similar recipient groups. Begin to

develop plans to guide its work in each

country.

Each of these suggestions requires ADF to

take a more active role as facilitator with its

grantees, with its staff, and within the devel1 In early 1988, ADF completed agreements with Sierra Leone

and Ghana, reducing the number of countries without agreements to 11 of 19.

opment assistance community. OTA finds that

such a role is consistent with the Foundation’s

mandate to support self-help efforts. This role,

if it is pursued carefully, can be consistent with

the Foundation’s desire to encourage local control of funded projects and to avoid making

funded groups dependent on the Foundation,

For example, plans to guide ADF’s work in each

country that identify funding program priorities can be drawn up with the participation of

grassroots and intermediary organizations,

Also, they can be applied flexibly to be consistent with ADF’s mandate to be responsive to local initiatives.

In implementing each of these suggestions,

the emphasis should be on simple, inexpensive,

and rapid methods. For example, existing appraisal methods could be used for collecting

information quickly to enable ADF to make better decisions. OTA is not recommending expensive, large-scale feasibility or environmental impact studies. In some cases, small planning

grants could enable ADF’s applicants to conduct much of the pre-grant analysis themselves

or to choose qualified consultants to do it for

them. ADF, however, needs to select appropriate ways to verify independently the soundness

of proposals and, when necessary, obtain outside expertise to appraise project plans. In most

of these cases, African contractors could provide such verification by making short visits.

In addition to selected use of outside experts,

ADF staff needs training (particularly in lowresource agricultural technology and economic

and environmental analysis) to conduct better

analysis of proposals and to assess the work

of consultants.

Also, ADF should give some attention to these

lower priority improvements:

●

●

●

Streamline the project approval process

and reduce unnecessary delays.

Conclude agreements with African governments where appropriate.

Evaluate and address issues regarding the

limited scope of its current portfolio, such

as ADF’s emphasis on funding incomegenerating activities and the large portion

of its grants for equipment.
12

A variety of private and official development

assistance programs have developed specific

programs and procedures that ADF could learn

from to address these various problem areas.

But ADF also has a unique role, different from

other official U.S. development assistance programs. ADF should develop additional creative

ways to meet the concerns discussed here.

Every suggestion carries a price tag. Improvements in efficiency of resource use would enable ADF to implement some suggestions without additional cost, but most of these changes

will increase operational costs. If ADF is to

maintain its current level of annual grants, it

is unlikely that it could make the changes suggested here for less than a $500,000 to $700,000

increase in its annual budget. The majority of

these funds should be used to increase the responsibilities of the African staff and provide

them with the resources to carry out new duties.

Some funds would be needed for additional

Washington staff and increased travel. The remaining funds could be divided among shortterm contracts, staff training, and ADF’s research program.

Lessons For Other Organizations

Congress, in directing the Foundation to

share the results of its work, expected that ADF

would learn from its successes and its disappointments and that other development assistance groups could benefit from ADF’s learning.

Indeed, ADF shares many of the deficiencies

highlighted here with other funders and it can

serve as a positive model in some areas.

The Foundation can successfully exemplify

certain aspects of funding program management, such as maximizing local control of externally-funded work, using Africans to provide

technical assistance and conduct evaluations,

and providing funding for planning grants.

Also, ADF has, by and large, established effective congressional relations that could be instructive for other government-funded agencies.

Finally, this assessment offers its own lessons

to other evaluators: program and project assessments create complementary pictures of an

organization’s status and external evaluations

are useful additions to ongoing internal ones.

The findings of ADF’s own internal project

evaluations are confirmed by this assessment

and they are parallel to those reached during

evaluations of similar development assistance

groups. This consistency indicates that the issues raised are of significance not only to ADF

but also more generally to all programs designed to support grassroots development.

CONGRESSIONAL OPTI0NS

Congress has several tools available for influencing ADF’s work–authorization, appropriations, and oversight. Each has been used

in the past. For example, Congress examines

ADF’s appropriation annually when the Foundation testifies before the appropriations committees and when the Foreign Affairs and Foreign Relations Committees set funding levels

during the authorization process. The Foundation’s staff have testified before other committees, and thorough congressional oversight has

been conducted by congressional research

agencies: 1) the General Accounting Office, in

its 1984-1985 study of ADF’s management capacity and, 2) the work reported here. Until this

time, Congress had not conducted a broad examination of ADF’s enabling legislation nor

made substantive changes in it.

This section addresses how Congress could

use these tools to improve ADF’s effectiveness

(table 1-3). The congressional options suggested

here fall into two categories, according to their

priority:

● High Priority Options

–Reauthorize ADF.

—Set overall levels of appropriations, e.g.,

increase appropriations by $500,000 to

$700,000 per year for two years to enable

ADF to make high priority changes in

conducting its funding program or hold
13

appropriations constant until such changes

are made.

—Withhold major oversight for an interim

period; then, examine the changes implemented and consider increasing the

annual appropriation for grants by $2 to

$3 million.

Ž Other Options

—Amend ADF’s authorizing legislation to:

a) remove the $250,000 limit on ADF

projects and b) require that ADF’s Board

of Directors be bipartisan.

—Amend ADF’s appropriations and/or authorizing legislation to a) arrange for

funds from terminated projects and loan

repayments to return to ADF’s account,

b) allow grantees to keep project funds

in interest-bearing accounts, and c) provide no-year funds.

—Conduct oversight regarding specific

items such as women’s participation in

ADF-funded activities, environmental

impacts, and funding delays.

Reauthorization:

Permanent v. 5-Year

The Foundation’s enabling legislation includes a provision for expiration of the Foundation’s authority in 5 years. In 1985, ADF was

reauthorized for its second 5-year period. Congress will face the issue of reauthorization once

again before 1990.

Although ADF can make a number of important improvements, its problems are not serious enough to question the Foundation’s authorization. Nor have the assumptions that

justified ADF’s creation been altered. To continue ADF, Congress could: 1) extend the Foundation’s authority for another 5 years, or 2)

delete the requirement for reauthorization, providing ADF with permanent authority. Both approaches have advantages and disadvantages.

A 5-year reauthorization provides ADF with an

impetus to make improvements because it will

be re-evaluated in 5 years. Thus, reauthorization gives Congress another 5 years to appraise

ADF’s work and maximizes Congress’ leverage

over the Foundation. This approach, however,

Table 1-3.—Summary of Congressional Options

Reauthorization

1. Regarding reauthorization of the agency:

Ž delete provision requiring periodic reauthorization of

ADF, or

● reauthorize ADF for another five-year period folIowing

its expiration in 1990.

Appropriations

1. Regarding overall levels of appropriations for a 2-year interim period:

● hold appropriations constant, pending high priority

programmatic changes, or

Ž increase appropriations $500,000 to $700,000 to fund

high priority program changes with or without earmarking, then conduct oversight on ADF’s improvements and

evaluate higher appropriations for grants.

2. Increase the annual appropriation for grants by $2-$3 million at the end of the interim period.

Oversight

1. Withhold major oversight for a 2-year interim implementation period.

2. After 2 years, conduct formal oversight on high-priority

topics such as ADF’s pre-funding analysis of projects; its

relationships with grantees; project monitoring and evaluation processes; use of African staff; and communication

with other funders.

3. Also, routinely discuss specific issues with ADF, such as

women’s participation in projects, environmental impacts,

and funding delays.

4. Evaluate the qualifications of nominees to the ADF Board

of Directors before Senate confirmation.

Other Legislative Options

1. Fine-tune authorizing legislation to make ADF more effective:

● eliminate the $250,000 project limit, and

● specify bipartisan composition of the Board of Directors.

2. Amend appropriations or authorizing legislation to:

. allow terminated grant funds and loan repayments to

return to ADF’s account,

● provide ADF with no-year funds, and

● allow guarantees to use interest-bearinag accounts.

must be balanced against some disadvantages:

temporary reauthorization may contribute to

uncertainty about the Foundation’s future and

work against ADF’s establishing the long term

programs encouraged by the congressional

mandate. Also, short term reauthorization increases pressures on the Foundation to fund

projects with quick results, an approach that

could jeopardize other important aspects of its

mandate such as participation and sustainability.

As an alternative, permanent authorization,

like that supporting the Inter-American Foundation, could be achieved by deleting the requirement for periodic reauthorization. This
14

could encourage ADF to take a longer term perspective. Congress could use other methods,

such as appropriations decisions or oversight

hearings, to provide ADF with incentives to

make improvements.

Appropriations

The Foundation has sought increases in its

appropriations every year since its inception;

its FY 1988 appropriations are $7.0 million. At

the time of its 1985 Five Year Plan, ADF anticipated a many-fold increase by 1.990, expecting to reach $30 million. While congressional

budget realities have dashed those expectations,

ADF still seeks to expand its program, convinced that it has the capability to accomplish

more in more places. Certainly as Congress experiences frustration with the poor development record of larger agencies, the temptation

is strong to channel additional money to groups

using alternative approaches.

ADF would have no shortage of activities to

fund if more money were available. The Foundation receives requests to develop programs

in countries not yet funded and to undertake

more work in those countries where it already

has programs. The Foundation estimates that

it has received approximately 1,335 project

proposals and 1,168 letter inquiries since commencing funding in fiscal year 1984. Although

OTA has not estimated how many of those proposals are appropriate for funding, it is clear

that the Foundation could expand its program

to additional countries with serious interest,

such as Burundi, Gabon, Madagascar, and

Swaziland.

The contractors involved in OTA’S assessment each evaluated ADF’s funding program

and level of funding. Virtually all raised serious concerns about certain aspects of ADF’s

funding program: particularly the need for ADF

to redefine its relationship with applicants and

grantees, to perform better pre-grant analysis,

to do more effective project monitoring, to increase reliance on its African staff, to improve

communication with others in Africa, and to

begin to prepare country plans.

None of OTA’S experts, however, judged that

ADF’s appropriations should be decreased.

Almost all thought that increases in ADF’s grant

program were warranted, especially if the

Foundation made the high priority changes discussed here. A few stressed the opinion that

funding should remain constant until the

changes were accomplished.

Should ADF’s Funding Be Increased?

Congress has several options to consider regarding future funding for ADF: hold total appropriations constant, pending high priority

programmatic changes; or increase appropriations for the types of changes suggested here,

giving either general direction or specific earmarking regarding the money’s use. Any increased funding for grants should be deferred

until ADF successfully makes the suggested improvements.

Of these funding options, holding ADF’s

funding steady while asking for important

changes is the least likely to be effective. OTA

estimates that the changes suggested here could

cost the Foundation $500,000 to $700,000 annually if undertaken all at once. The Foundation could not allocate this amount of money

to new tasks without diverting funds from

grants, thus reducing the amount available for

new projects. If Congress used this option,

ADF’s non-grant costs would increase and its

obligations for new grants would decline substantially.

Another option would be for Congress to increase ADF’s appropriations by an amount adequate to make these high priority improvements

for, perhaps, two years, then plan hearings to

evaluate ADF’s actions. This option could be

implemented by 1) earmarking funds for specific types of reforms, or 2) providing nonearmarked funds with general direction regarding their use and then using oversight to ensure implementation. The first option gives

Congress maximum control but cuts ADF’s flexibility. Generally, OTA finds that congressional

micro-management is inappropriate and that

it decreases programs’ effectiveness (46). In this

case, some general congressional direction, i.e.,
15

to improve ADF’s operation of its program

rather than increasing funding for grants,

seems warranted regarding the intended uses

of interim funding increases. Detailed earmarking is probably not necessary, however.

Many people find ADF’s mandate innovative

and judge its projects at least as successful as

those supported by other donors. OTA found

that ADF could make use of more funds if its

program were improved. Therefore increased

appropriations for grants, as distinct from other

administrative and program changes, could be

provided at the end of an interim period if ADF

demonstrated that improvements had been

made. With more solid analysis underway, with

increased responsibilities for African staff, and

with improved, streamlined procedures in

place, ADF probably could effectively absorb

a $2 to $3 million increase in project funding

by fiscal year 1991, bringing its total appropriations to $9.5 to $10.7 million (in 1988 dollars).

Options that designate new funds for making the changes suggested here will temporarily tip ADF’s budget toward a larger proportion of administrative and other non-grant costs

because the high priority changes are operational ones, such as expanding the use of African staff and providing additional staff training. Operational costs, in this report, refer to

the broad category of all non-grant expenses,

including administrative costs. Some people,

however, feel that ADF’s non-grant costs are

already too high, The Foundation calculates its

administrative costs at 38 percent for fiscal year

1986, 35 percent for fiscal year 1987, and 31

percent for fiscal year 1988 (using a method simADF’s approach is different from other donors.

Most ask the people to contribute to projects

the donors have selected. These projects may

meet a need, but are not a priority of the people. “please cooperate with us, ” they say.

ADF’s approach is “let the people decide. ”

Charles Keenja, Principal Secretary of the Ministry of

Local Government and Cooperative Development,

Dar es Salaam, Tanzania. OTA interview,

Sept. 1, 1987.

ilar to that used by the Inter-American Foundation). OTA calculates ADF’s operational

costs (comparing all non-grant expenses to the

total committed appropriations) to be 42 percent in fiscal year 1986 and 43 percent in fiscal year 1987.

If ADF received new appropriations of

$500,000 to $700,000 and used the money as

discussed here to improve its operations, its

non-grant costs could approximate 50 percent

of the total budget in fiscal years 1989 and 1990,

This shift to a higher percentage of non-grant

costs should be temporary, however, and viewed

as a short-term investment in ADF’s long-term

effectiveness. OTA expects that, over time, immediate, non-grant improvements would enable the Foundation to handle larger amounts

of grant-related funding, thereby reducing the

proportion of non-grant costs. Thus, discussions between Congress and ADF concerning

ADF’s operational costs should focus on the

best use of non-grant funds to support an improved grants program rather than only on the

proportion of non-grant costs. Temptations are

strong to make easy cuts or to increase average grant size when pressures exist to curb the

proportion of operational expenses. Many of

those cuts, for example, in staff travel and training, could hurt the Foundation’s grants program.

Congressional Oversigh*

The Foundation’s efforts for effective congressional liaison seem to be motivated by a

sincere desire to keep Congress well acquainted

with ADF’s work and to create and maintain

solid working relations. For example, the Foundation’s attitude was cooperative and open

throughout this assessment and it responded

rapidly to requests for information. Evidence

exists that ADF also is responsive to key congressional committees and that it has sought

to improve its performance as a result of outside suggestions. The Foundation is aware already of many of the concerns highlighted in

this report. It is tackling some of these problems now and, based on its record, is likely to

respond conscientiously to OTA’S findings.
16

A Short-Term Reprieve From

Major Oversight

No need exists for extensive congressional

oversight immediately. ADF has hosted two major external examinations of its work in the past

4 years. These reviews are likely to improve

ADF’s effectiveness but each has absorbed a

considerable amount of staff time and resources. Now that high priority areas for improvement have been identified, Congress

could reprieve ADF from further external investigation while it implements high priority

improvements.

High Priority Oversight Topics

At the end of a 2-year period, however, ADF

should be given the opportunity to demonstrate

what it has accomplished of the high priority

changes suggested in this report and how these

alterations are affecting its budget. Congress

could determine then whether further funding

increases are appropriate.

Congress could, for example, ask the Foundation how it is:

●

●

●

●

●

implementing more effective ways to relate to applicants and grantees that fulfill

various elements of its innovative mandate?

increasing the responsibilities of its African staff for pre-approval analysis and

monitoring, and concomitantly adjusting

the Washington staff’s responsibilities?

streamlining and improving its pre-grant

analysis of social, organizational, technical, environmental, and economic factors?

developing improved and more efficient

processes for project approval and monitoring?

consulting with other funders and coordinating work, when appropriate, and planning country programs?

Specific Areas for Congressional

Oversigh

Several areas exist that could require more

specific congressional oversight. These are

areas that Congress could ask ADF to address

in its annual report to Congress (the Congressional Presentation), in routine annual appropriations hearings, or in hearings conducted

by the authorizing committees. Three areas to

address include:

1. The participation of women, ethnic minorities, and the poor in ADF-funded projects is

difficult to determine and this ambiguity indicates that ADF should direct increased attention

to these issues. In general, women’s contributions of time, labor, and energy is disproportionate to their participation in project decisionmaking and management, even when the local

context is taken into account. Congress could

use oversight to ensure that ADF take appropriate steps to increase the participation of

women, ethnic minority groups, and the poor

in its funded projects while recognizing ADF’s

need to work within local cultures and to fund

viable projects.

2. ADF’s attention to environmental issues

also needs strengthening. In some cases, ADFfunded activities inadvertently contribute to

environmental degradation although alternative technologies exist that have fewer negative impacts or that could help restore the environment. This, as well as a lack of simple and

realistic economic and financial planning, constrains the projects’ sustainability.

3. Congress has 15 days to review and disapprove ADF-funded projects, as it has for all

Executive Branch expenditures not included

in the previous year’s Congressional Presentation. Notification is a way in which ADF informs Congress of new work. But the formal

notification period sometimes can stretch project approval by as much as a month if Congress

is in recess. Congress and ADF could work together to streamline this process. For example,

ADF could send project notices to Congress

during recesses, a practice that is not done now.

Congress and ADF could agree to types of projects that should not be transmitted to Congress

during recess (the first project in a given country, unusually large projects, etc.) and to a more

succinct notification format that would decrease ADF’s internal workload. Or, Congress

could drop notification for projects below a

specified amount of funds.
17

Senate Confirmation of

ABM Board of Directors

Congress considered the role of ADF’s Board

of Directors important enough to set out detailed stipulations in the Foundation’s enabling legislation. Therefore, Congress has an interest in the direction that the Board sets for

ADF and could use oversight for keeping abreast

of the Board’s thinking,

The U.S. Senate confirms members of ADF’s

Board of Directors. This provides an important

opportunity to oversee the Foundation’s direction.’ Up to now, Congress has rarely used

this tool to ensure that prospective members

have experience relevant to ADF’s mandate and

that they represent a range of views on African grassroots development. Members of Congress could inform the U.S. President of qualifications they consider essential for nominees

or they could be more active in formal confirmation hearings.

Legislation

No Major Overhaul Needed

No need exists for a major revamping of

ADF’s enabling legislation. This law is farsighted and based on a participatory approach

to grassroots social and economic development

that has proven successful. Also, it is a good

example of Congress providing general direction without undue restrictions or unreasonable demands. It provides ADF with appropriately wide latitude, and remains consistent, in

general terms, with what is known of effective

grassroots development assistance (box 1-1),

Fine-Tuning for Effectiveness

Certain provisions of this or other legislation

(such as appropriations laws) affecting ADF are

problematic, however, and likely to become

more so as ADF ages. Concerns exist in several areas:

~As of March, 1988, three vacancies of the five designated for

private sector representatives existed on the Board. ADF’s legislation specifies that five board members be from the private

sector and two represent U.S. government agencies concerned

with African affairs.

● the $250,000 cap on individual project

funding,

● the partisan nature of ADF’s Board of Directors,

Box 1-l.—ADF’s Legislation in Brief:

A Mandate for Grassroots Development

ADF was established by the International

Security and Development Cooperation Act

of 1980 (Public Law 96-533, Title V), and thus

is not authorized by the Foreign Assistance

Act. This has provided ADF with the flexibility to depart from types of work carried out

by other U.S. agencies.

According to its legislation, ADF’s purposes

are four-fold:

(1) “to strengthen the bonds of friendship

and understanding between the people

of Africa and the United States;

(2) to support self-help activities at the local

level designed to enlarge opportunities

for community development;

(3) to stimulate and assist effective and expanding participation of Africans in their

development process; and

(4) to encourage the establishment and growth

of development institutions which are indigenous to particular countries in Africa

and which can respond to the requirements of the poor. . . .“

Further, ADF is to carry out these activities

with indigenous groups representative of the

poor and to coordinate, to the extent possible,

its work with U.S. government and private,

regional, and international groups. Specifically, it may make grants, loans, and loan

guarantees to: a) foster local development institutions and efforts initiated by communities, b) develop self-evaluation methods to

transfer experience, c) develop research by

Africans and transfer information within

Africa, and d) procure technical or other assistance for its recipients. ADF is to give priority

to projects which community groups undertake themselves, where there is participation

by the poor.

SOURCE: U.S. Congress, Legislation on Foreign Relations

Through 1986, Volume 1 (Washington, DC: U.S. Government Printing Office, March 1987).
18

●

●

ADF’s inability to retain funds from terminated grants and loan repayments, and

grantees’ inability to keep project funds in

interest-bearing accounts.

ne $250,000 Cap on Projoct Funding

Some successful ADF-funded projects are

now being affected by the $250,000 per project

funding limit. Pressures on organizations to attempt ever-new activities to qualify for another

funded project can encourage them to attempt

activities for which they are not ready rather

than solidify positive results of earlier efforts.

This problem is likely to increase as more ADFfunded projects reach maximum funding levels.

The Foundation is better positioned to determine the appropriate limit to single-project

funding than Congress; this is a decision that

most grant-making organizations make for

themselves. For example, the Inter-American

Foundation operates without a legislated

project ceiling and has funded successful grassroots projects in excess of $1 million.

Congress could amend ADF’s authorizing legislation to eliminate the $250,000 ceiling per

project, However, this would not bean endorsement for ADF to increase the average size of

its grants, nor to undertake more complex

projects. Rather, this would enable ADF to better: sequence its support of various components

of some projects; adjust for unexpected increases in costs; or provide a transition for an

activity to become better established. The Foundation should approach the idea of funding

projects in excess of $250,000 cautiously. First,

it might develop guidelines for gradually providing sequenced grants to individual groups.

Congress can ensure by oversight that ADF

keeps average grant size low without retaining

the strict limit to project size.

The Partisan Nature of ADF's Board

The Foundation’s legislation details many

aspects of the structure of ADF’s Board of Directors. It does not, however, require that members represent both political parties. It is in

ADF’s best interest to have a Board that represents a wide range of views regarding grassroots development and that potential partisan

concerns not shape its work. Therefore, Congress could amend ADF’s enabling legislation

to ensure that Board members be drawn from

both political parties in approximately equal

numbers. Congress provided such protection

for the Peace Corps National Advisory Council. A similar structure has proven successful

for OTA’S Technology Assessment Board.

Inabillty To Retain Funds From

Terminated Projects and Loan

Repayments

All grant-making groups need to terminate

projects before completion when projects develop irresolvable problems. In fiscal year 1987,

the Foundation terminated six such projects.

These projects were funded in fiscal year 1985

when the Foundation had funds that could be

spent in any fiscal year (“no-year funds”).

Therefore, ADF will retain money deobligated

from these projects and be able to use the funds

for new work. Current single fiscal year funding requires that the money obligated, but not

spent for a project, be deobligated then returned

to the U.S. Treasury rather than ADF. Congress

could amend this process so that ADF would

be allowed to retain funds from terminated

projects for use in other grants. U.S. AID has

the power to retain deobligated money as long

as it is reobligated for a similar project in the

same geographic area (44). Congress could provide ADF with similar authority, allowing ADF

to reallocate funds to other projects without requiring that they be spent in the same region

or sectors.

Also, Congress could prevent this problem

by providing ADF with no-year funding. Additional benefits exist to no-year funding as

well. Fiscal year funding can constrain programs’ effectiveness and absorb resources that

could be better directed in longer-term efforts

(46). ADF, like many groups that have single

fiscal year funding, finds that project approval

tends to accumulate at the end of the fiscal year.

As a result, decisionmaking can become hasty.

No-year funds are no panacea, however. The

Sahel Development Program in AID, for example, was granted no-year funds, then hesitated
19

to use them for fear of congressional disapproval.

Some AID officials felt that money unspent in

one year would result in lowered congressional

appropriations the following year. Also, no-year

funds require oversight, since unobligated

funds accumulating over several years may indicate that an organization’s capacity to make

grants has been exceeded. While Congress

would need to monitor the situation if it provided ADF with no-year funds, accumulations

of funds are unlikely to occur due to ADF’s

backlog of unfunded proposals.

Similar to allowing the return of terminated

grant funds to ADF, Congress also could allow

repayments of ADF loans to return to ADF. Under current rules, the U.S. Treasury, not ADF,

would receive loan repayments if ADF established a loan program, So far, ADF does not

provide loans or loan guarantees despite congressional authority to do so. A number of significant problems hamper development of these

programs and OTA is not recommending that

ADF give high priority to creating one at this

time. However, Congress could legislate a provision that ADF receive loan repayments, expecting that ADF may appropriately begin loan

and loan guarantee programs sometime in the

future,

Grantees’ Inability To Keep Money in

lnterest-Bearing Accounts

In these two cases—loss of terminated grant

funds and of potential loan repay ments—ADF’s

appropriations are in effect decreased. Current

appropriations legislation also has the unanticipated effect of decreasing the worth of individual grants to organizations in Africa because

project managers cannot keep ADF-provided

funds in interest-bearing accounts (except for

income generated from project activities). Grant

size in real terms decreases then, especially in

countries where inflation is high or where currency is devalued. Congress could legislate a

provision for ADF whereby grantees could keep

project funds in interest-bearing accounts,

stipulating that all interest payments be used

for project-related costs or returned to ADF.

Congress provided the Inter-American Foundation with this authority in 1980,
OTA's Assessment

Chapter 2

Methods
—

Page

Summary

Why This Assessment Was Requested. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .

How OTA Conducted the Assessment. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .

Overview

Designing the Assessment Plan . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .

Developing Field Team Methods. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .

The Desk Reviews . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . + . . . . . . . . . . . .

Selection of Countries and Projects to Visit . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .

Field Team Work . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .0.......

Synthesis Meeting and Preparation of Report . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .

Box

2-1.

2-2.

GAO’s Look at

Recent Similar

Boxes

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29

31

Page

ADF Management. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 24

Assessments . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 27

Frigure

Page

2-1. Flowchart of OTA’s Assessment Methods . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 26
Chapter 2

OTA's Assessment Methodsl

●

●

SUMMARY

OTA undertook this assessment at the request of the House Foreign Affairs Committee and the House Select Committee on Hunger, with specific instructions to examine

people’s participation in projects funded by

the African Development Foundation (ADF)

and the projects’ results, sustainability, and ●

replicability, The committees also requested

an assessment of the Foundation’s overall

performance and how it could be improved.

The methods used to assess ADF activities

included extensive interviews with development experts in Washington and Africa, inIThis chapter and app. D provide detailed information for

readers with an interest in evaluation methods. In addition, apps.

C, E, and F list many of this assessment’s participants. The results of the assessment begin in the next chapter.

eluding ADF staff; reviews of Foundation

documents in Washington, D.C. related to

participation, agricultural technology, and

renewable resource management in ADFfunded projects; and workshops for OTA

staff and contractors.

Three five-member teams visited East, West,

and Southern Africa for 23 days in 1987, observing 12 ADF-funded projects in 6 countries. Each group spoke with project participants, Foundation staff, local and national

officials, U.S. ambassadors, AID mission directors, and representatives of other development and research organizations. The

teams assessed ADF-funded projects, reviewed the Foundation’s programs in each

country, and suggested congressional options and ways for ADF to improve its work.

WHY THIS ASSESSMENT WAS REQUESTED

When the African Development Foundation

(ADF) was founded, Congress intended that its

grassroots approach complement other types

of aid already provided to Africa by the United

States. Now Congress is evaluating how well

U.S. development assistance to Africa is doing

and ADF, as one U.S.-funded development program, has come under scrutiny. This is part of

Congress’ continuing attempt to ensure that the

United States provides the most effective assistance possible via the Agency for International

Development (AID), the Peace Corps, multilateral institutions, private voluntary organizations, and other groups that receive U.S. funds

directly or indirectly. Although the focus here

is on ADF’s program, this study has broader

applicability. For example, the Foundation’s enabling legislation stresses the need for Africans

to participate in their own development and

ADF’s experience with participatory development is relevant to the pending reauthorization

of the Foreign Assistance Act of 1961.

The House Foreign Affairs Committee and

the House Select Committee on Hunger requested this comprehensive assessment of

ADF’s funding program.2 Their request noted

the context in which U.S. aid to Africa takes

place: “Strong humanitarian, political, and economic reasons exist for the U.S. to continue

to participate in assisting African countries in

their efforts to develop their human and physical resources. ” As the requesting committees

ZRepresentatives Dante Fascell, Chairman of the House Foreign Affairs Committee, and Howard Wolpe, Chairman of its

Subcommittee on Africa, and Mickey Leland, Chairman of the

House Select Committee on Hunger, requested the study. Senator Paul Simon, Chairman of the Subcommittee on African Affairs of the Senate Foreign Relations Committee, supported their

request.

23
24

said, ADF was established because “one reason given for the failure of many programs

funded by the major donors has been the lack

of involvement of the intended beneficiaries,

especially low-resource farmers, many of whom

are women.” Their question was whether ADF

had been any more successful in having an impact on development in Africa. The requesters

specifically asked OTA to examine:

●

●

●

●

the degree to which ADF’s activities fulfill the Foundation’s legislated mandate,

whether ADF is supporting sustainable and

replicable projects with positive impacts

beyond the project level,

the degree to which ADF is assisting the

poor majority, and

ways for ADF to improve its effectiveness.

In addition to these factors, OTA focused attention on the Foundation’s use of technology

and technical assistance and narrowed the

scope to include only those projects dealing

with agriculture and renewable resources. This

focus, which covered 67 percent (58 projects)

of ADF’s portfolio, made the assessment manageable and allowed OTA to use its previous

experience in these areas.

OTA’S involvement with U.S. assistance to

Africa began in 1984 when the House Select

Committee on Hunger requested an issues paper on technology, agriculture, and U.S. foreign aid to sub-Saharan Africa (Africa Tomorrow, 1984). Then Congress requested a more

detailed follow-up study examining agricultural

technologies for low-resource African agriculture (Enhancing Agriculture in Africa: A Role

for U.S. Development Assistance, in press,

1988). In 1986, OTA published an interim report based on that on-going assessment - Continuing the Commitment: Agricultural Development in the Sahel. This report included a

one-month field visit to U.S.-funded development work in West Africa. The final report on

low-resource agriculture in Africa provides a

general framework for a resource-enhancing

approach to African agriculture, discusses the

overall role of technology, and details the potential of a number of technologies such as

small-scale irrigation, agroforestry, and fertilizers.

This previous OTA work has emphasized the

need to support participation of poor farmers,

herders, fishers, and their organizations in the

programs designed to assist them. An assessBox 2-I.—GAO’s Look at ADF Management

In mid-1984 the Senate Appropriations

Committee’s Subcommittee on Foreign Operations requested that the U.S. General

Accounting Office (GAO) determine whether

ADF had the management capacity to carry

out its mandate and to handle larger appropriations efficiently. The study was requested because of the uncertainty which followed the

resignations of the first President and VicePresident in April and May 1984, barely 6

months after ADF had begun operations.

GAO’s analysis concluded that by late 1984

ADF had made progress in establishing its organizational structure. It had filled most of its

authorized staff positions, established internal administrative procedures, grant agreements, and a project review committee, and

was making plans for its accounting system.

GAO also concluded, however, that ADF

should not focus on expanding its program significantly to approach the $100 million it originally envisioned spending in 1990. (This number was revised to $30 million in ADF’s 5-Year

Plan published in May 1985.) GAO raised a

number of other concerns as well. Some, such

as the need for a 5-year plan, have been corrected. OTA considers other issues still relevant, For instance, GAO felt that ADF had not:

1. identified which countries would receive

priority funding,

2. determined to what extent ADF would

provide loans and loan guarantees,

3. settled the extent to which ADF would

emphasize private sector initiatives as encouraged by the Board of Directors,

4. established how ADF would coordinate

with other donors, and

5. decided how ADF would meet demands

for project monitoring and handle staffing for these tasks.

SOURCE: U.S. Congress, General Accounting Office, Issues Affecting Appropriations for the Afr]c8n Development Foundat~on, GAO/

N’SIAf)-85-62, May 7, 1985.
25

ment of ADF thus builds on OTA’S experience suited in the early stages of this work, tapping

by exploring, in depth, a program established GAO’s previous work and exploring the possito do just that. bility of a joint OTA/GAO effort. Finally, howOTA’S examination of ADF is the Founda- ever, the committees requested that OTA conduct this assessment independently because tion’s second congressional review. The Gen- OTA’S focus and experience better matched eral Accounting Office (GAO) evaluated ADF’s their need for an examination of the Founda- management capacity in 1985 (box 2-l). GAO,

OTA, and the congressional requesters con- tion’s impacts on development in Africa.

HOW OTA CONDUCTED THE ASSESSMENT

overview

This report presents findings about ADF’s

overall funding program in the area of agriculture and renewable resources, describes its

performance, suggests areas for improvement,

and notes opportunities for other development

assistance organizations to learn from the Foundation’s experience.

The work was conducted in several stages,

each building on the previous one (figure 2-1).

Field visits to 12 ADF-funded projects in Africa

provided crucial information regarding ADF’s

field operations. OTA was not charged to evaluate the funded groups, however. Instead, teams

visited projects to assess the overall ADF

program.

In doing this assessment, OTA used a variety of methods to gather information at the program and project level, both in the United States

and in Africa. In Washington, ADF staff and

other experts were interviewed. Project documents, ADF’s evaluations of 10 nearly completed projects, two country profiles, and additional information about its program were

reviewed. In Africa, project managers and participants as well as national and local officials

and other development funding groups were

interviewed. These interviews provided abroad

view of ADF’s philosophy and policies as well

as a measure of how well ADF implements its

mission.

This assessment included several major steps.

The assessment plan was developed in spring

1987; OTA organized the field teams and developed materials they would use that summer.

The reviews of ADF’s Washington project files

were conducted in August, the field teams went

to Africa in September, and the synthesis meeting was held when the team leaders returned

in October. This report represents only a snapshot in the life of the 12 ADF-funded projects

and in the evolution of the organization.

Changes in ADF’s policies or practices made

after the fall of 1987 are included in footnotes.

Designing the Assessment Plan

The congressional request identified critical

issues related to ADF’s mandate and suggested

that the assessment include field visits to ADFfunded projects in Africa. To plan its assessment, OTA began in Washington with intensive interviews with approximately 30 experts

in field evaluation methodologies and grassroots organizations. The most appropriate program evaluation methods were incorporated

into OTA’S approach (see box 2-2). Also, ADF’s

staff were interviewed about their roles and

work. An Advisory Panel established to guide

OTA’S assessment of low-resource agriculture

in Africa met in Washington at the end of April

and was used to review the plan and begin developing field indicators to help assess four critical issues: participation, results, sustainability, and replicability. This panel suggested that

the assessment teams lengthen their time in the

field, that African team members be named for

every country visited, and that data collected

be disaggregated by gender.

OTA next conducted an initial analysis of

ADF’s project portfolio based on abstracts provided by ADF for each funded project. From
26

Figure 2-1. - Flow Chart of OTA’S Assessment Methods

CONGRESSIONAL REQUEST OTA experience

Identification of critical issues

1. Participation 3. Sustainability

2. Results 4. Replicability

Technology (in relation to the other four issues)

/ \

Assessment Methods WASHINGTON DESK REVIEWS ON

Workshop 1. AGRICULTURAL TECHNOLOGY

2. RENEWABLE RESOURCE

\ TECHNOLOGY

Choice of indicators to

(

measure the critical issues

Field Team Orientation )

Meeting FIELD ASSESSMENT WORK

SHEETS AND FORMS

rI

National-level intewiews Project visits

I

I

INDIVIDUAL ASSESSMENTS OF

CONGRESSIONAL OPTIONS

I

Review process

FINAL REPORT

KEY: ~ems printed m capital letters are reports or written materials

Items printed m bold are meetmgs

SOURCE: Office of Technology Assessment, t988

this, OTA tabulated project information, including grant size, duration, maturity, geographic

scope, activities, goods or services funded by

the ADF grant, and intended outcomes. This

analysis provided information on the range of

project characteristics and average features so

the countries and projects selected for visits

would be representative of ADF’s portfolio. The

survey was limited to the 86 projects funded

by ADF through September 31, 1986. Twothirds of these, or 58, dealt substantively with

agriculture or renewable resources and were

considered within OTA’S scope of work.

This assessment of funded projects must be

qualified by the newness of ADF’s program. Its

first projects are just now nearing completion.

Thus, OTA’S major focus is on suggesting how

ADF’s overall funding program can be improved, not on providing a definitive statement

judging the results of ADF projects.

Developing Field Team Methods

To develop methods for the field teams’ use,

OTA held a workshop with two purposes:

1. to review current field evaluation methods,

and

2. to develop indicators to address the critical issues identified in Congress’ request

for this study.

The field research method used is a form of

“rapid rural appraisal. ” In rapid appraisal,

teams visit the field for a short time to obtain

selected information needed for policymakers.

This approach is quicker and more cost effective than some other research methods. It relies

on individual and group interviews, observation, and local documentation where available

(12,21).

In the methods workshop, OTA staff, team

leaders, and three consultants with extensive

evaluation experience (app. C) spent 2 days:

defining the critical issues—participation,

results, replicability, and sustainability;

converting these definitions into concrete

indicators that could be observed and

measured in the field; and

designing worksheets on which to collect

data for each of these issues.
27

Each critical issue had multiple dimensions tions (from project proposal evaluation and

and thus required several indicators to use in monitoring checklists), suggested modifications

the field. OTA used a variety of sources to help by the Low-Resource Agriculture Advisory

define each issue, including expressions of con- Panel, and relevant findings from OTA’S progressional interest, ADF’s operational defini- vious work on low-resource agriculture in

Box 2-2 .—Recent Similar Assessments

Four agencies, with programs in some respect similar to ADF’s, were evaluated recently. OTA

used these evaluations to suggest assessment methods for this effort, such as the need for desk reviews, the number of projects to visit, and the time required for field work. Also, these examinations

of grassroots funding organizations identified important common approaches and problems. Each

organization’s purpose and the intent and method of its evaluation are summarized here. The results

of OTA’S assessment of ADF are compared to the findings of these evaluations in chapter 6.

Appropriate Technology International (ATI). ATI’s mission is to develop innovative approaches

to technology, directly involving organizations and entrepreneurs in developing countries. The Agency

for International Development (AID) conducted an external, mid-term review to assess ATI’s performance under its cooperative agreement with AID, to identify lessons regarding technology transfer and promoting small-and medium-scale enterprises, and to assess ATI’s ability to replicate its

successful innovations. The evaluation included an assessment of 18 ATI projects in 10 countries

by a contractor-supplied team. Members used open-ended, improvised, interview questions in the

field, standardized among regions, The evaluation, including orientation sessions, field visits, and

a synthesis meeting, took place in a 6-month period (16).

Inter-American Foundation (IAF). IAF provides grants and loans directly to Latin American grassroots groups and is the model on which ADF was based. It operates outside of other official U.S.

development assistance channels, responding to initiatives of indigenous groups for social, institutional, and economic development. This internal evaluation reviewed the foundation’s goals, procedures, and policies; initiated a strategic planning effort; investigated IAF’s accomplishments, its role

in U.S. relations in Latin America, and its effectiveness as a pioneer. A team of 3 evaluators reviewed

extensive written materials, including IAF’s legislative history, and conducted interviews with at least

200 people. Individual members of the team visited between 1 and 3 countries each; the process took

3 months (50),

International Fund for Agricultural Development (IFAD). This multilateral agency works to increase food production in some of the poorest, food deficit countries and to improve the nutritional

level and living conditions of the poorest populations. AID conducted this external review, examining IFAD’s program relative to U.S. development assistance policy and providing a basis for decisions regarding U.S. participation in IFAD, The evaluation methods included desk reviews of written

materials, field visits to IFAD projects throughout the world, interviews with IFAD staff and representatives of other institutions, and a synthesis meeting. Teams used an open-ended protocol and

questionnaires in the field. In all, 9 AID staff members conducted the evaluation over a 4-month period,

spending 3 to 5 days at each of 19 project sites (39).

The United Nations Development Fund for Women (UNIFEM) provides funding and direct technical assistance for women-specific projects and serves as a catalyst to ensure women’s involvement

in mainstream development activities. The agency conducted this internal evaluation to assess the

extent to which it is carrying out its mandate, to show the impact of development assistance on women,

to document the fund’s activities relative to the U.N. Decade for Women, and to identify future priorities. This was the most extensive and field-oriented of the evaluations and the one from which OTA

borrowed the most methodology. UNIFEM included desk reviews, orientation sessions, field evacuations of projects, mailed questionnaires, and input from regional commissions in this project and

program assessment. Regional field teams visited 42 projects in 24 countries; members were drawn

from experts resident in the country or region. The work lasted approximately 1 year (38).

83-361 0 - 88 : ~1. 3 - z
28

Africa and other evaluations. OTA sought to

develop indicators that blended quantitative

and qualitative data.

The “participation” issue required the most

complex set of indicators concerning who participates, when, and how. The focus was on

equitable access to the project, the project participants’ roles in all phases of the project cycle, project control, and the recipient organization’s operational style. Indicators of

equitable access, for example, were the types

and levels of involvement of women and various ethnic, age, and income groups.

Assessing “results” included determining

whether or not the project achieved its objectives. However, results also were defined to include a measure of the project’s broader effects

on participants, the recipient organization, and

the community. Information on broad project

outcomes was used as well as data on specific

project outputs. OTA attempted to identify intended and unintended effects of several kinds:

economic, social, organizational, environmental, policy, and technological. These results

were examined in terms of the project’s specific objectives as well as in terms of the local

context and broader development goals.

“Sustainability” was considered the time related dimension of “results” while “replicability” was the spatially related dimension. Thus,

effects beyond the grant period are considered

under sustainability. Sustainability can be

measured on several levels including maintenance of a resource, continuation of a project

or activity, and persistence of an organization.

Field measures included indicators for several

levels, e.g., the institutional, social, economic,

environmental, and technological sustainability of the ADF-funded projects.

Effects beyond the project locale were considered part of “replicability.” Like sustainability, replicability is implied in ADF’s purpose

to achieve social and economic development

in Africa through support of local self-help efforts. Ideally, even small projects should have

an impact beyond their immediate location.

This can occur in several ways: by serving as

a model for other individuals or groups; by contributing to spontaneous adoption of new technologies by others; or by effecting policy change

on a regional or national level. Also, the learning process that occurs during project implementation itself can be replicated by a funded

group or others to plan additional activities.

Therefore, OTA assessed whether groups’ processes as well as their specific activities could

be repeated.

The choice of technology has a direct bearing on participation, results, sustainability, and

replicability in ADF-funded projects. Therefore,

assessing the use of technology was also a part

of OTA’S analysis of the four critical issues.

Much research and experience in Africa shows

that, in general, participation of poor farmers

in increasing their productivity and incomes

in a sustainable way is facilitated by technologies that are lower cost, use local resources,

are readily learned, and increase incomes without unacceptably increasing risk. Distinguishing among high-cost, high-technology, highinput, and high-risk methods is important, however. And, ultimately, the appropriate use of

technology must be judged by a careful analysis of a particular situation. Field teams were

instructed to assess the appropriateness of technology choices only after interviewing project

managers, researchers, and local officials in

Africa familiar with the use of a given technology in that locale.

OTA staff used the input from the Methods

Workshop to develop assessment materials for

the three-field teams to use in Africa (app. D):

●

●

●

Worksheets for teams to record data collected at project sites for each of the critical issues (Participation, Results, Sustainability, and Replicability);

Project Assessment Forms for the teams

to describe their analysis of project performance, based on information in the

worksheets;

Country Assessment Forms which teams

used to assess ADF’s overall performance

in the country based on project assessment

information as well as from additional interviews in Africa and information from

ADF; and
29

● Congressional Assessment Forms for team

members to provide suggestions regarding

levels of congressional appropriations for

ADF, ways to improve ADF’s work, and

lessons for other donors.

The Desk Reviews

A desk review is an analysis based on project

documents. The overview provided by a desk

review is usually complemented by field visits

to selected projects.

Three specialists with extensive African experience reviewed ADF’s files on the 58 projects

selected for this analysis (app. C). All three reviewed the same files, but each with a different focus. One examined participation, another

agricultural technologies, and the third examined renewable resources. Each person spent

about 2 weeks reviewing files, meeting with

ADF staff, and preparing reports. These

reviewers:

●

●

●

●

●

●

●

developed topologies of participatory methods, technologies, and funded organizations;

described characteristics of participation

and technologies and analyzed their

strengths and weaknesses;

determined how types of participation and

technical methods are chosen and by

whom;

discussed how technical assistance is provided, and by whom;

analyzed the possible implications of their

findings for participation, results, sustainability, and replicability;

identified concerns for the field teams to

examine more closely during their time in

Africa; and

provided suggestions for improving ADF’s

funding program.

Selection of Countries and

Projects to Visit

Twelve projects were selected for visits, two

in each of six countries. First, likely countries

to visit were identified based on those with at

least three ADF-funded projects within the

scope of work. Based on these considerations,

OTA formed an East Africa team to visit Tanzania and Kenya, a West Africa team to visit

Niger and Senegal, and a Southern Africa team

to visit Botswana and Zimbabwe.

Specific projects were chosen for visits based

on the analysis of ADF’s project portfolio. The

projects represented ADF’s portfolio in these

respects: grant size, duration, maturity, and

geographic scope. Also, attempts were made

to include projects illustrating the range of agricultural activities and organizations funded by

ADF. No information about project performance was available at the time of project selection. However, 2 of the 12 projects were among

10 undergoing simultaneous evaluation by ADF

teams (NGK and PfP in Kenya).

The final list of projects included two which

were not on OTA’S original list. The Dakoro

Herders’ Association project in Niger was substituted for the Iniminak Pastoralists Project

after ADF expressed concern that OTA could

learn little by visiting the latter project due to

its delayed start and strained relations with

local officials. The Development Fund of Silveira House in Zimbabwe replaced the National

Council of Disabled Persons project in Matabeleland, Zimbabwe, due to concerns for the

team’s safety and validity of data collected in

an area of dissident activity. Brief descriptions

of the selected projects and summary project

findings are included in appendix B.

Field Team Work

The three regional teams used the same methods so that their work could be compared across

projects and across regions. Their work began

in Washington with a 4-day Team Orientation

Workshop. At this workshop, the U.S.-based

field team members refined the methods and

materials developed by OTA (app. D), prepared

work plans, and met with ADF staff members.

Each team consisted of five members: three

based in the United States (including the team

leader) and an African member from each of

the two countries to be visited (app. C). The Afri-
30

Each team spent 23 days overseas, visiting

two countries. On the first 2 days in the capital

city of each country, they briefed the African

team member, met with host country officials,

and interviewed the U.S. ambassador, AID mission director, and representatives of other development agencies (listed in app. E). Approximately 2 days were spent at each project site

interviewing project managers and staff, members of committees and the Board of Directors,

and project participants (independently from

project staff). To encourage their participation,

groups of women were at times interviewed

separately from men. Small group interviews

were complemented with individual interviews

and, in several instances, with large group meetings. Between 1 and 20 project subgroups were

visited at various locations where the 12 projects were being carried out. Teams also met

with local non-participants and others in the

project area, such as:

● local officials to gather information, including average production, income levels, and

government policies regarding aspects of

the project;

● researchers to learn about how well certain technologies performed locally; and

● representatives of others with similar

projects (listed in app. E).

In all, approximately 800 persons were interviewed in project locales.

can members joined the group upon arrival in

each country. Members were chosen for their

expertise in several of the following areas:

evaluation methodology; technical expertise in

agriculture, natural resource management, economics, or social sciences; foreign language

skills, especially fluency in French for the West

Africa team; and experience working with

grassroots organizations in Africa. Most had

extensive experience in at least one of the countries visited, Emphasis also was placed on balancing the teams with women and men. There

were two women on the OTA teams in five of

the six countries. Members could not have previous or ongoing contractual relationship with

ADF.
.

31

ADF has African field staff in five of the six

countries visited. These ADF staff accompanied teams to the project sites and attended

selected meetings between teams and project

or national government personnel. OTA and

ADF agreed at the outset that ADF staff would

not be present at most meetings with project

managers and participants in order to facilitate open discussions.

OTA team members included persons fluent

in the languages used by local officials and

project managers, except in one case where a

secondary language understood by both the

project leader and OTA team interviewer was

used. In some instances, persons were hired

to help translate interviews with project participants. Key information obtained from all interviews was cross checked and verified by additional sources.

During their final 3 days together in Africa,

team members met to reach consensus on their

findings. Together, teams made judgments

concerning how well ADF projects were performing and how well the ADF program supports its projects. Finally, each member individually suggested ways ADF could improve

its work and how Congress could encourage

these improvements.

Synthesis Meeting and Preparation

of Report

Materials from the three teams were brought

together during a Synthesis Meeting which included OTA staff and the three team leaders,

Participants compared findings from the three

areas, established the reliability of data in different parts of the worksheets, began to develop

criteria for project rankings across regions,

formed general conclusions about ADF’s program, prepared congressional options, and

began the report-drafting process. This led

directly to the draft report and, after extensive

outside review (app. F), including by ADF, to

the final report.
Chapter 3

The African Development

Foundation

.
CONTENTS

Page

Summary . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 35

The Beginnings of the African Development Foundation . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 35

Origins . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 35

Getting Started: 1980 to 1984..... . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 35

Growth: From 1984 Through 1987 . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 37

ADF’s Processes to Fund Projects and Its Project Portfolio. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 4 0

Outreach . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 40

Process for Approving Grants . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 41

Process of Monitoring Grants . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 44

ADF Portfolio of Funded Projects: September 1984 Through

September 1986. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 45

Evaluation, Research, and Public Education: How ADF Is Sharing

What It Learns . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 48

Evaluations of lts Funded Projects by ADF . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 48

Self-Evaluations by Funded Groups . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 49

Research Grants . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 49

Public Education . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 49

6 0 X

Box Page

3-1. ADF’s Place in U.S. Foreign Assistance.. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 38

Figure s

Figure Page

3-1.ADF Project Approval Process . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 42

3-2. Sectors of ADF-Funded Agricultural Projects . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 46

3-3. Functions of ADF-Funded Agricultural Projects, . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 46

3-4. Technological Components of ADF-Funded Agricultural Projects. . . . . . 47

Tables

Table Page

3-l. ADF Appropriations and Obligations: Fiscal Years 1981-1988. . . . . . . . . 36

3-2. Number of Sectors of ADF-Funded Agricultural Projects . . . . . . . . . . . . . 47

3-3. Number of Functions of ADF-Funded Agricultural Projects. . . . . . . . . . . 47

3-4. Number of Components of ADF-Funded Agricultural Projects . . . . . . . . 48
Chapter 3

The African Development Foundation

The African Development Foundation (ADF] ●

had a difficult start, first with delayed appointment of the Board of Directors and then

with unexpected turnover of top staff result- .

ing in a General Accounting Office (GAO)

study of its management capacity.

After a new president was appointed, ADF

developed workable funding procedures that

consisted of outreach, grant approval, and

monitoring processes,

Between 1984 and 1987, ADF awarded grants

to 114 projects in 19 African countries, distributing a total of $10,3 million.

Now that its first grants are nearing completion, ADF has begun evaluating these

projects. ADF also awarded research grants

to Africans and published public education

materials.

Origins

Congress established the African Development Foundation (ADF) in 1980 in an attempt

to counter some of the limitations faced by official development assistance programs such as

those of the World Bank and the Agency for

International Development (AID). Inadequacies

or gaps in official U.S. development assistance

that Congress hoped ADF might overcome included: government-to-government programs

failed to reach the majority of Africa’s poor;

standard grants were typically too large to be

handled by grassroots organizations; funding

approval in established assistance agencies was

too slow, cumbersome, and cautious; and

Americans and Europeans played too great a

role in project design and implementation. Beginning in 1975, the planning unit of AID’s

Africa Bureau, the private Development Group

for Alternative Policies, and the Inter-American

Foundation (IAF) played important roles in

ADF’s establishment, as did legislators who proposed it in five bills between 1977 and 1980

(1,28). The Foundation’s legislation was

modeled on IAF’s, passed 11 years earlier. Both

foundations have similar purposes and are

based in congressional mandates “to enable the

poor to participate in the process of development” (ADF, Title V, Section 502). While some

people have advocated ADF as an alternative

to other U.S.-funded development programs,

the International Security and Development Cooperation Act of 1980 established ADF to “complement” them (43).

Getting Started: 1980 to 1984

President Carter signed the legislation establishing ADF into law in December 1980, but

this was followed by a long delay in appointing ADF’s Board of Directors. The legislation

specified that the seven-person Board, comprised of five persons from the private sector

and two from government agencies concerned

with African affairs, be appointed by the President with the consent of the Senate. The Reagan administration delayed naming this board

and did not include funds for ADF in the

budgets sent to Congress from 1981 through

1983. Congress, however, appropriated $2.o

million in fiscal year 1981, $2.0 million in fiscal year 1982, and $2.0 million in fiscal year

1983 (table 3-1). These funds were earmarked

in the Sahel Development Fund and were available to ADF regardless “of the year appropri35
—. .

36

Table 3-1.–ADF Appropriations and Obligations: Fiscal Years 1981-1988

(in millions of dollars)

1981 1982 1983 1984 1985 1986 1987 1988

Appropriations’ . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 0.50 0

2 2.000 2.000 3.000 1.000 3.706 6.614 7.000

Obligations . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1.713 4.493 5.995 6.5654

Grants 5 . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 0.838 2.617 3.442 3.902

Project Development and Evaluation6 

. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 0.000 0.585 1.080 1.259

Administration and Management . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 0.875 1.291 1.473 1.404

NOTES: 1 ADFdid not become operational until 1984. Funds appropriated from FY 1981 to 1983 were no-year funds and were carried over for use in future years.

2$2m~~on Wasappropriated but $l.5mittion was rescinded.

s This table includes actual obligations, so projections for fiscal year 1988 are not listed. OTA used figures in this table tO CdCUlate the PrOPOflhI of non-9rant

costs for fiscal years 1966 and 1987. ADF, however, now divides obligations into two, not three, categories and calculates its administrative costs based

on the two-part classification,

4 $4g 000 of the Fy 87 appropriations was not obligated and was returned to the U.S. Treasury.

5 A p~oject has all its funds placed in the obligation Iirte the fiscal year the grant agreement is signed (e g., the funding for a 5-Year ProJect signed in 19~

appears only under 1986). The grant line includes funding commitments for:

● projects (new commitments);

● amendments to previously committed projects: 12 totaling $364,449 in 1986 and 47 totaling $627,231 in 1987;

● research grants: five totaling $250,000 in 1986 and two totaling $58,939 in 1987; and

● cooperative agreements, which are principally for African Country Resource Facilitators, eight totaling $144,975 in 1987,

6 The project develo~ment and evaluation line includes costs for contractors, including African Regional Liaison Officers, providing technical assistance and

appraising, monitoring, and evaluating projects.

SOURCES’ African Development Foundation, 1988. Executive Office of the President, Off Ice of Management and Budget, Budget of the United States Goverrrmerrf FY

1986, 1987, 1988, Apperrdix (Washington, DC: U.S. Government Printing Office, 1985, 1986, 1987).

ated (“no year” funds). Congress rescinded $1.5

million of the fiscal year 1981 appropriation,

but retained $0,5 million in startup funds. Thus,

$4.5 million in ADF funds was carried over to

fiscal year 1984, by which time Congress had

pressured the administration to name ADF’s

Board of Directors and appropriated an additional $3 million for fiscal year 1984. The attendant political compromises set the stage for

the new organization’s difficult birth.

The Senate approved the administration’s

nominees for the ADF Board in October 1983.

All seven board members were Republicans.

The government officials named were the Undersecretary of State for African Affairs and

AID’s Assistant Administrator for Africa. Four

of the five representatives of the private sector

were businesspeople, and none had African experience. The Board appointed Constance Hilliard as president and Reginald Petty as vicepresident. Pressures from the Hill to begin funding projects in Africa grew quickly. Tensions

within the staff and between the staff and Board

led to the resignations of the president and vice

president in April and May 1984, which paralyzed the Foundation’s activities and generated

unfavorable press coverage about the delays in

awarding grants (34). As a result, in June 1984

the Foreign Operations Subcommittee of the

Senate Appropriations Committee requested a

General Accounting Office (GAO) study to determine if ADF had the management capacity

to carry out its mandate (ch. 2).

ADF’s Board appointed Leonard Robinson,

Jr., acting President starting June 1, 1984. As

Deputy Assistant Secretary of State for African Affairs, he had represented the State Department at two ADF Board meetings. Robinson was a former Peace Corps volunteer and

Associate Country Director in India. He appointed Percy Wilson vice-president. Wilson

had directed community-level domestic antipoverty programs and been Peace Corps Director in Sierra Leone. The organization was set

up quickly under pressure: staff was hired on

6-month contracts, funding criteria and procedures were developed, and work began on a

five-year plan while GAO auditors were in the

office.

An explicit directive from key congressional

members to fund projects before the end of the

fiscal year took overwhelming precedence. Six

consultants with experience in African development programs attended a week-long workshop in Washington in late July then went to

Africa to bring back project proposals. Most

of a variety of projects proposed by U.S. private voluntary organizations (PVOS) were rejected because they were not designed or con-
37

trolled by Africans. The consultants evaluated

other already-submitted proposals in the field

and relied on personal African contacts in those

countries where they had worked before to seek

additional fundable projects. They returned in

6 weeks with 86 proposals; 36 were presented

to the newly formed staff Project Review Committee. In September 1984, just prior to the informal congressional deadline, the Board

awarded grants to 11 projects totaling $838,000:

five from Lesotho, two from Botswana, and one

each from Mali, Niger, Liberia, and Zambia.

By the end of September 1984, 11 permanent

staff members had been hired, 6 others had been

selected, and Robinson had been appointed

president. The GAO report concluded that ADF

was “putting into place the staff and administrative capacity to manage a grant program”

(41). But GAO questioned aspects of ADF’s

operations, especially the fact that they projected their annual budget to rise to $96 million by 1990. (This initial projection was later

revised to $30 million in ADF’s Five Year Plan.)

Subsequently, Congress reauthorized ADF

through 1990.

Growth: From 1984 Through 1987

Expansion to 19 Countries

The Foundation was able to expand considerably from 1985 through 1987 due to the accumulation of “no year” funds and new appropriations. After publicizing the availability of funds

for grassroots organizations, ADF received

hundreds of proposals and in fiscal year 1985

awarded grants to 42 projects in 13 countries

worth $2.6 million. In fiscal year 1986 ADF

awarded about $2.8 million in grants to 33 more

projects, expanding to 19 countries. The Foundation consolidated its program in fiscal year

1987, funding 28 new projects in the same countries for $3.1 million, In addition, the Foundation awarded nearly $1.0 million in 59 amendments to previous grants in 1986 and 1987 (table

3-1). In its first 4 years, then, the Foundation

awarded $10,3 million to 114 projects in 19

countries.

Which countries received funding depended

in large part on the personal contacts of ADF

staff because the Foundation did not have criteria to select new countries. Also, selection

depended on the Board’s decision that ADF

would fund projects only in countries maintaining diplomatic relations with the United States

(see box 3-1).

The expansion of ADF’s program in Africa

required ADF to develop relationships with

African governments. ADF only funds legally

recognized organizations in Africa and it informs the appropriate African governments,

through their embassies in Washington, of each

grant. Although the Foundation does not allow

African governments to decide who receives

ADF funds, applicants often must obtain host

country permission to receive outside funding.

In most countries, ADF representatives made

initial contacts with African officials to inform

them of ADF’s program, but they did not attempt to reach a formal agreement specifying

how ADF will operate in each country until

later. Since mid-1986 ADF has given priority

to negotiating accords with the governments

of those countries where ADF has active programs. At that time ADF decided not to begin

funding in any country until an accord is negotiated. By the end of 1987, accords or written understandings have been reached with

nine governments (none in Southern or East

Africa),’ The terms of the accords include a

limited role for the national government in

project implementation and exemptions from

certain African customs payments by grant recipients. These are similar to the agreements

most U.S. PVOS negotiate with African governments before beginning work there. The Foundation reached informal understandings with

Benin and Congo/Brazzaville through an exchange of letters in lieu of a formal accord.

The Foundation’s recognition of the need for

a more systematic approach is reflected in its

recent plan to collect and analyze information

to design a funding strategy for each country.

A manual on how to prepare Country Assessment Profiles was developed in 1986 and Profiles have been completed for Tanzania, Sene-

‘Of these, 6 were in countries where ADF funded projects and

ADF signed accords with Sierra Leone and Ghana in January

and February 1988, respectively.
38

Box 3-1.—ADF’s Place in U.S. Foreign Assistance

Congress established ADF as a public corporation, independent of other U.S. foreign assistance

agencies and operating outside the constraints of short-term U.S. foreign policy considerations (13),

One rationale for ADF’s independence is that ADF primarily funds non-governmental, grassroots

organizations, unlike most official U.S. programs which provide resources to foreign governments.

Also, Congress anticipated that independence would:

● give the Foundation broader access to local groups,

● decrease the likelihood that political pressures from the United States or from host governments would override other considerations in making funding decisions, and

● build confidence in ADF as a reliable partner in long-term development.

The Foundation, with the support of its Board, has demonstrated its independence by funding

projects in several countries with which the U.S. government disagrees. For example, ADF continues

to fund grassroots groups in Zimbabwe even though AID froze funding there in 1986, and ADF still

accepts proposals from Benin, where AID programs are ending also. The Foundation began funding

projects in Tanzania in 1986, before AID’s program was resumed in 1987 (aid, except for food aid,

had been cut off in 1984 under the Brooke Amendment because Tanzania had fallen more than a

year into default in repayment of loans to the United States). The Foundation has understandable

reasons, such as the personal safety of its staff, for not funding projects in some African countries

with which the U.S. government has had major disagreements, such as Angola and Mozambique.

Congress also intended ADF to be a complementary participant in U.S. development assistance.

As such, ADF does not act inconsistently with long-term foreign policy considerations. It is wholly

funded by Congress, two administration officials sit on its Board of Directors, and it funds projects

only in countries which have diplomatic relations with the United States. In addition, most of the

19 countries within which ADF operates also participate in other U.S.-funded development assistance:

• 19 have AID programs,

● 15 have Peace Corps volunteers, and

• 19 have received Public Law 480 food commodities in the past 2 years.

ADF operates more like U.S. and European PVOS and private foundations than official assistance

programs such as AID and the World Bank in project scale, grant size, and operating style. Many

U.S. PVOS take part in official U.S. foreign assistance because they receive U.S. funds; a minority

of U.S. PVOS, however, currently fund self-help programs of African organizations in a similar way

to ADF. This dichotomy—ADF’s being an official program but acting in some ways more like a private one—sometimes confuses representatives of official and private programs in the United States

and in Africa. This distinction also provides the Foundation with an advantage in developing a special niche in U.S. foreign aid,

gal, Cameroons, Sao Tome, Congo, and Cape

Verde. (ADF has funded projects only in the

first three countries.) First, consultants in the

United States prepare a report on the geography, history, population, government, and

economy of the particular African country. A

team of senior ADF staff is briefed on this material, then travels to Africa to interview officials in the ministry responsible for foreign

affairs, other African officials, and representatives of PVOS, training and research institutions, and other development assistance organizations. The ADF team identifies funding

gaps, obtains other information relevant to

ADF’s funding program, and verifies information already received. Another part of the profile deals with the “viability and safety of operating” in the country. Ideally, profiles would

be prepared before ADF begins funding in a

country, but they were not done before ADF

entered the first 19 countries.
39

Increasing ADF Staff in

Washington and Africa

To expand ADF’s funding program to 19

countries, the president enlarged the Foundation’s staff to 27 full-time employees, 6 contractors, 1 intern, and 4 work study students in

Washington and 15 full- and part-time staff in

Africa by the end of fiscal year 1987. Now, four

main functional offices are based in Washington, D. C,:

●

●

●

●

Office of the President, which includes a

president, vice president, general counsel,

congressional liaison, and assistants;

Office of Administration and Finance,

which includes a director, budget and fiscal officer, personnel officer, and assistants;

Office of Program and Field Operations,

which includes a director, five regional

Foundation Representatives, a grants coordinator, and three program assistants; and

Office of Research and Evaluation, which

includes a director, research associates,

and an information officer.

The Foundation’s 1985 Five Year Plan envisioned establishing five regional field offices

in Africa to assist in monitoring projects. In

1986, ADF implemented that plan when it

selected the first African Regional Liaison

Officers (RLOS). According to their job descriptions, Regional Liaison Officers will help monitor projects; verify grantees’ compliance with

grants’ conditions and reporting requirements;

work with auditors, technical assistance

providers, evaluators, and African officials;

conduct outreach to potential applicants; and

carry out administrative functions such as

logistical support for ADF Washington staff

visits. The Regional Liaison Officers perform

these duties as assistants to the Washingtonbased Foundation Representatives. Currently,

ADF has contracted four full-time Regional

Liaison Officers based in Nairobi, Kenya;

Dakar, Senegal; Harare, Zimbabwe; and

Yaounde, Cameroon. Each has a small office

and travel budget.

The Foundation began to select African personnel to serve as Country Resource FacilitaPhoto credit” ADF/Kerry Hanrahan

Africans help implement ADF’s funding program in

Africa. Besa Amenuvor (ADF’s Country Resource Facilitator (CRF) for Ghana), Leonard Floyd (ADF’s

Washington-based Foundation Representative), and

Koffi Adaba (CRF for Togo) were among those attending a 1988 conference in Togo for ADF’s regional staff.

tors (CRFS) in 1987 on a part-time basis due to

the difficulty and expense of travel within

Africa and the wide distances between grantees. By November 1987, ADF had signed cooperative agreements with 11 Country Resource Facilitators.* The Country Resource

Facilitators’ primary responsibility is to facilitate the provision of technical assistance to

funded groups. In reality, the Country Resource

Facilitators also function as assistants to the

ADF’s Washington-based Foundation Representatives. The addition of Country Resource

Facilitators was not envisioned in ADF’s Five

Year Plan. Therefore, the Foundation has reevaluated the roles of the Regional Liaison

Officers and plans to merge the regional and

country positions by 1990.

ADF complements its full-time staff by hiring African and American consultants on a contract basis. For example, 72 contracts were

awarded in fiscal year 1987 for project evaluations, and monitoring, translation, technical

assistance, research, and administrative

functions.

ZBY F~b~u~ry 1988, ADF had signed cooperative wreernents

with 14 Country Resource Facilitators.
.

40

This growth in the Foundation’s staff has

been slower than was projected in the Five Year

Plan and than was suggested in its enabling legislation, in part because appropriations have

been lower than anticipated. The 1980 law set

generous staff limits: 25 during the first year,

50 during the second, and 75 thereafter. The

Office of Management and Budget, with authority to approve new staff positions, subsequently

set ADF’s limit at 27 full-time positions (FTEs).3

Although the size of the Foundation’s staff

has grown more slowly than expected, its increase has been larger than the relative increase

in the number of grants and amount awarded.

Consequently, ADF has been criticized for its

staff size, relatively high salary levels, and substantial travel costs. Congressional staff and

others have expressed concern regarding the

high ratio of administrative and other operational costs in relation to grant commitments,

estimated by OTA to be 42 percent in fiscal year

1986 and 43 percent in fiscal year 1987.4

3ADF has not exceeded this level. By February 1988, its staff

consisted of 25 FTE employees, 7 contractors, and 2 student interns in Washington and 4 Regional Liaison Officers and 14 Country Resource Facilitators in Africa for a total of 52. The Country

Resource Facilitators, interns and one contractor are part-time.

4

0TA included in its grants category all project grants,

amendments to grants, and research grants. Then OTA compared all non-grant costs to the total amount of money obligated

in a given year. ADF, like the Inter-American Foundation, categorizes its costs differently. Beginning in fiscal year 1988 ADF’s

Congress has exerted pressure on ADF to reduce its administrative costs. The Foundation

responds that its high non-grant costs are justifiable, given expenses needed to establish a new

agency, monitor grants in 19 countries and

other factors. Also, ADF President Leonard

Robinson, Jr., testified that he was attempting

to reduce administrative costs to 31 percent for

fiscal year 1988 (42).

Setting Up An Advisory Council

The Foundation’s authorizing legislation required that ADF set up an Advisory Council

of persons knowledgeable about development

activities in Africa and that the Board consult

with it at least once a year to discuss ADF objectives and activities. The 27-person Council

met in March, June, November 1985, and November 1986, and 4 task forces made suggestions regarding 1) concepts of development, 2)

ways to educate the public about ADF’s work,

3) methods to work with Congress and other

U.S. government groups, and 4) means to supplement the Foundation’s appropriations with

outside resources.

categories are I) Program Support, or administrative costs and

2) Program Development, which includes grants, African staff,

publication expenses, and work by contractors to appraise, monitor, evaluate and provide technical assistance to grantees. The

Foundation retroactively estimated its administrative costs at

38 percent in fiscal year 1986 and 35 percent in fiscal year 1987.

ADF’S PROCESSES TO FUND PROJECT% AND ITS PROJECT PORTFOLIO

Outreach formation on how to apply for grants in EngThe Foundation spreads information about lish, French, and Portuguese. Other organizations, including Africare and the World Council its program by several methods: of Credit Unions, have publicized information

● publications, about ADF’s program in Africa.

● ‘meetings in Africa, and

● personal contacts. Also, ADF staff publicizes its program

through meetings with government officials,

ADF’s brochure and newsletter, Beyond Re- PVOS, and the media during initial trips to Afrilief’, are especially important information tools. can countries where ADF intends to begin fundThe brochure contains funding criteria and in- ing. For example, the local press has carried
41

articles about ADF and African radio and television stations have featured interviews with

ADF staff. Following this type of publicity, ADF

receives many requests, a large part of which

are ineligible, such as requests for individual

assistance and scholarships.

In the early days, ADF’s most important

method of informing African organizations of

the availability of funds was via the personal

contacts of ADF staff. ADF staff called on people and groups recommended by colleagues,

who also helped spread the word about the

Foundation. This method of communication remains important, although outreach is becoming more systematic. For example, dissemination of information about ADF’s funding

program is one purpose of the Foundation Representatives’ trips to Africa. The African Regional Liaison Officers, who sometimes visit

a neighboring country between Foundation

Representative visits, and country representatives also explain ADF’s program and procedures.

Once ADF funds several organizations in a

country, word often spreads through networks

of similar groups. This informal method of outreach becomes more important as additional

projects are funded in a country.

Recently, ADF traced how its funded projects

originally made contact with the Foundation.

Of 102 projects, the greatest number, 35, resulted from Foundation Representative contacts. Another 23 proposals were submitted

directly from Africa to Washington. Many

projects were referred by others: 19 were referred by U.S. PVOS, 10 by African nonWe had to leave and go to Nigeria because

of the drought. We were not happy there. [The

ADF Representative] said she would help us

and now we are back. . . . No one else would

help.

Macao bii Gao, Dakoro Herders’ Cooperative,

Bundu Eggo, Niger.

Translated and paraphrased from an OTA interview,

.Sept, .22, 1987,

governmental organizations (NGOS), five by

African governments, three by African universities, three from U.S. government programs

(AID, Ambassadors Self-Help Fund, Peace

Corps), two from Regional Liaison Officers, one

each from an international NGO and ADF initiative (6).

The OTA field teams found that an American

or European resident in Africa was responsible for linking grassroots organizations with

ADF in a quarter of the ADF projects they

visited. These “brokers” were a Peace Corps

Volunteer, a European volunteer, and an American photographer/writer.

Process for Approving Grants

The Foundation’s process for approving

grants has been modified only slightly since

1984, although the way the system functions

in practice has evolved with the growth of the

staff and portfolio (figure 3-1) (2,26). The Foundation Representatives are notified of the

amount of funds available for grants in their

region at the beginning of each fiscal year. Each

is allocated the same amount, about $700,000

during the past 2 years. They generally prefer

to respond to individual proposals without concern about the number of grants to countries

within the region. In at least one case, however,

the Representative attempted to plan distribution by country within the region. Unallocated

funds may be awarded to projects in any region during the final quarter of the fiscal year.

The initial contact between an applicant and

the Washington office varies from submission

of a sophisticated proposal to sending a simple letter requesting funds. Even with the addition of ADF’s African staff, most request letters and applications come directly to

Washington, although in a few cases the Regional Liaison Officer has seen the request or

spoken with the potential applicant first,

Screening Proposals

The program assistant, under supervision of

the Foundation Representative, first screens

proposals and determines whether or not the

request meets basic eligibility standards. These
42

Figure 3-1. -ADF Project Approval Process

I No I

8

Program

●

review comm. (PRC

Grant

YES

6

notice

NO[

11

Budget office

8

SOURCE: Teixeira Nash and Curtis Boykin, ‘The ADF Funding Prmess or How the Izuni Coop got an ADF Grantl ” Bepnd Fte/k#, VOI 1, No 3, November 1985, pp 1-4

eligibility criteria, with the exception of the

legislated limit of $250,000, reflect the ADF

Board’s evolving policies and interpretation of

ADF’s mandate: the applicant must be a nongovernmental entity (while public entities are

specifically allowed in the legislation, ADF

Board policy is more restrictive); the beneficiary must consist of two or more individuals or

families; large capital projects and scholarships

are not eligible. An estimated 85 percent of applicants are screened out at this stage. Since

ADF has not systematically recorded the numbers of applicants and reasons for their rejection, it is not known if this percentage has

changed over time.5

The program assistant informs rejected applicants of the reasons why their proposals were

rejected. Then ADF asks remaining applicants

to complete ADF’s grant application if they

have not already done so. Applicants are asked

to submit four to five pages of information an5ADF is setting up a system to track numbers of applicants

and reasons for rejection beginning in early 1988. A computerized management information system (PROMIS) will track information on applicants and funded projects.

swering questions about their organization and

proposed project. Most organizations funded

by ADF submit proposals longer than requested

but ADF has funded a few short, handwritten

proposals. Proposals are usually submitted in

English or French but proposals in other languages are eligible for consideration.

Review

The next step is a review of the proposal by

the Foundation Representative, who generally

asks applicants for additional information. Usually site visits occur during this stage. Although

visits are commonly conducted by the Representative, sometimes a consultant visits the applicant. After reviewing all information, the

Foundation Representative decides whether or

not to recommend the proposal for funding.

Representatives’ reasons for rejection usually

relate to the project’s feasibility and ability of

the applicant organization to carry it out. However, ADF has not documented the number of

rejections at this stage and reasons for them.

The Representative then prepares a Project

Assessment Memorandum (PAM) recommend-
43

ing the project. The format for this 10 to 15 page

memo includes a brief summary of the proposal, the reasons for the recommendation, and

brief sections designated for discussing sustainability, replicability, and environmental

concerns. The Representative’s concerns may

be found in a section on conditions to be placed

on the grant. In practice, the purpose of the

memo is to convince the staff Project Review

Committee to approve the proposal for funding.

After clearance by the director of the Office

of Field Operations, the PAM and proposal are

sent to the staff Project Review Committee, the

next step in approval. The committee is headed

by the vice president and consists of the president, directors of the three ADF offices, the general counsel, and one Foundation Representative other than the ones presenting proposals

for approval at the weekly meeting. Prior to the

meeting, members review the proposals and

PAMs. During the meeting the Foundation Representative makes a brief presentation and committee members then question the Representative. The Representative defends the proposal

and acts as an advocate for it. At the end of

the discussion, committee members (but not the

Foundation Representative) complete a Project

Rating Sheet. An average of 70 points of a possible 100 is required for approval. These rating sheets are kept by the vice president rather

than in the project file; however, the representative receives a copy of the meeting minutes.

Proposals may be approved, approved with conditions, sent back for further information, or

rejected, But the rejection may not be final as

the representative can present the same project

later if it scores between 65 and 69, either modified, with more information, or with more persuasive arguments. According to the vice president, the Project Review Committee rejects

proposals for two major reasons: 1) they seem

to be a violation of ADF policy or mandate, or

2) they are not conceptually sound or feasible.

Over the past 4 years, the committee has rejected approximately 1 of every 10 projects.

Board Approval

The next step in the process is approval by

a majority of the three members of a separate

Project Review Committee at the Board of Directors level, which meets at least monthly. The

members of the Board selected for this committee live in Washington, saving travel expenses. One is the U.S. Department of State

member, who is usually represented by a

delegated foreign service officer. In all but four

cases, the Board review committee approved

proposals sent to it by the staff review committee. The views of the Board committee, however, have shaped the types of activities and

organizations funded beyond this intervention

in project approval, For example, their views

put forward in formal and informal policies and

conversations have affected project proposals

before they are submitted to the Board committee.

Early on, the Board rejected the suggestion

that it only approve grants greater than $75,000.

The Board committee has approved all grants

and amendments to grants for most of ADF’s

history. However, the Board agreed in early

1987 that grant amendments less than $10,000

could be approved by the Director of Program

and Field Operations, and those between

$10,000 and $25,000 could be approved by the

vice president with concurrence by the

president.’

Congressional Notification

Next, the project approval process requires

congressional notification, as mandated by appropriations laws. The Foundation sends brief

summaries of each project to the Senate and

House Appropriations Committees and their

Subcommittees on Foreign Operations. If ADF

hears nothing from the committees within 15

days, the grant can be obligated. No proposal

has been rejected at this stage, but delays occur because ADF holds notifications whenever

Congress is recessed.

‘In mid-December, the Board approved a small project furlding procedure for similarly funding grants of these sizes. Neither require staff Project Review Committee approval. In addition, the Board agreed to delegate to the president authority for

approving projects of less than $125,000, but limited this authority

by requiring a 15 day notification period during which a majority

of members of the Board Project Review Committee could disapprove funding.
44

Signing the Grant Agreement

After the two week wait, ADF’s president

sends the applicant a letter informing them of

the approval and two copies of the Grant Agreement for their signature. The agreement includes the approved proposal and budget and

may include conditions which must be met before ADF will award the grant. Announcements

of the grant are sent to the ambassador in the

United States of the nation concerned, to the

U.S. ambassador, and, since 1986, to the AID

director.

The average time elapsed between the first

submission of the applicant’s proposal and final approval (the signing of the Grant Agreement) is 9 months, a period longer than for other

organizations that fund projects of comparable size, such as Ford Foundation and IAF

(29,32). This period includes an average 3

months between ADF staff approval in the

project review committee and the signing of

the Grant Agreement. Some of this time may

be required for the recipient to consider and

comply with conditions on the grant. But this

period is followed by another period of several

months before the first check is disbursed from

ADF. And transfer of funds can take several

months to reach Africa because of long delays

in disbursal of funds from Washington through

the U.S. government budget and fiscal officer

based in Paris. In 1987, ADF began to send

funds through commercial banks to speed up

transmission to Africa.

Process of Monitoring Grants

Monitoring includes program and financial

oversight and facilitation of the grantees’ efforts by the funder. According to ADF’s president, “an appropriate monitoring strategy does

not burden or intimidate grantees (but) encourages self-evaluation” (7). While many

groups share this attitude, ADF’s monitoring

approach is unusual in that it gives its grantees much greater control of funds than government funding programs and most U.S.

PVOS. Once the ADF Grant Agreement is

signed and the first check sent, the recipient

group has control of implementation, includPhoto credit: ADF/Christine Fowles

Most AD F-funded agricultural projects involve production of crops primarily for sale. The Agricultural Finance

Corporation in Zimbabwe received ADF funds to provide loans to small farmers growing coffee.

ing purchasing equipment and hiring technical assistance. Unlike recipients of other U. S.-

funded programs, ADF grantees are not required to purchase American-made equipment

and materials. This flexibility allows them to

purchase equipment that may be less expensive, more readily available, more appropriate,

or easier to maintain because of availability of

spare parts. For example, ADF has, on behalf

of the grantee, disbursed funds directly to a

company in a country other than the recipients’

in order to purchase imported equipment more

quickly.
45

The ADF monitoring process, however, is

similar to most other funders’ in that quarterly

reports and site visits are required, In the quarterly progress report, the project manager is

asked to list project accomplishments and

whether or not the activities occurred on time,

and to identify any problems, plans to solve

them, and those who participated in internal

evaluation during the quarter. The quarterly financial report is based on a cash accounting

method; recipients must list their expenditures

and cash balances at the beginning and end of

the quarter. To facilitate recordkeeping, ADF

requires project managers to keep ADF funds

in a separate bank account. Also, grantees are

required to keep ADF funds in non-interest

bearing accounts like other recipients of U.S.

funds (program income generated from the

grant, however, is excused from this requirement), This regulation lowers the value of grant

funds, especially when inflation and currency

devaluations occur,

Project managers send these reports to Washington, but not to ADF’s African staff. Nor do

they necessarily keep a copy for themselves.

Often these reports are late and important information reaches Washington slowly. The

Foundation now asks project managers to request checks 6 weeks before they need them.

Thus, in a few cases, a grant’s second check

may be processed before ADF receives the first

quarterly report, reducing ADF’s leverage over

the projects.

However, ADF exercises some control over

grant funds through its monitoring and disbursal practices. Funds are disbursed during the

grant period according to a schedule determined by project funding needs. The fact that

many projects have high equipment budgets

spent in the beginning of the grant period reduces ADF leverage over grant implementation,

however. The Foundation uses African

accounting firms to conduct reviews and audits at the end of major projects, and mid-term

for certain projects. In some cases, ADF asks

these firms to check on the accounting methods and capacities of grantees before disbursal of ADF funds. To date, 24 audits have been

completed. The Foundation may also provide

grant funds for training and assistance in bookkeeping or financial and general management.

Once the quarterly reports arrive in Washington, they are handled by a number of persons. The Foundation Representative and the

budget and fiscal officer each review the quarterly report; the Representative will discuss

problems with the budget officer and the director of the Office of Field Operations. The

grants coordinator and program assistants are

also involved. The Foundation Representative

may communicate back with project managers

by letter or telex; they also talk by phone with

the Regional Liaison Officer about once a week.

ADF policy is that their staff visit each funded

group in the first quarter of the grant year (in

part to make sure that the grantee understands

ADF monitoring forms and procedures) and

once toward the end of the first grant year. The

schedule of visits to Africa sometimes has not

permitted this policy to be implemented, however. With the addition of African staff, ADF

expects that projects will be visited more frequently.

ADF has been flexible in permitting revision

of the activities, schedules, and budgets specified in the Grant Agreement. A number of

projects have been extended and/or received

additional funds with grant amendments. A few

organizations were initially awarded a planning

grant and subsequently a larger project grant,

Funds for end-of-project evaluations are provided in the original grant budgets. ADF earmarks 2 percent of the total grant for an external, end-of-project evaluation and another 2

percent for an audit of project funds, although

it only requires audits of certain grantees, In

addition, ADF includes the expenses of monitoring by its African staff as part of its overall

grant commitments (table 3-I),

ADF Portfolio of Funded Projects:

September 1984 Through

September 1986

At the beginning of this assessment, OTA requested information from ADF on the 86 grants

committed through the end of September 1986
46

(listed in the ADF Congressional Presentation

FY 1988, app. A). The total committed to these

projects in 19 countries by spring 1987 was

slightly more than $7 million, with the average

awarded to each project $81,500.7 Six of these

were terminated by ADF by August 1987 for

a variety of reasons including substantial problems with project start-up or performance.

Others received grant amendments increasing

the amount of ADF funds. Zimbabwe and

Kenya had the largest number of funded

projects: 13 each.

Grants ranged in size from $7OO to a

pastoralist in the Sahel for a small trading center to the legal maximum of $250,000 for a water

supply for three communities in Kenya.

Twenty-four percent (21 projects) were less than

$25,000; and 38 percent (33 projects) were at

least $100,000. Ten projects were at or near the

$250,000 ADF maximum limit.

Two-thirds of these projects deal with agriculture in a significant way. Of these, most aim

to increase food production for sale and domestic consumption (figure 3-2). A large number

(70 percent) involve production of cash crops

primarily for marketing, such as vegetables,

fruit, peanuts, coffee, tea, and rice. One-third

involve livestock production and 13 percent involve poultry. Although 89 percent of agricultural projects are production-based, marketing

is an important function in at least one-half (figure 3-3). Processing and storage are involved

in 28 percent and 22 percent of projects, respectively, while resource conservation activities are only present in 10 percent. The technology profile of ADF’s agricultural projects

is equally diverse. Perhaps not surprising given

the critical shortage of water and irrigation in

much of Africa, 78 percent of the projects dealing with crop production include small-scale

irrigation systems (figure 3-4). Many include

the use of improved seeds (36 percent) or fertilizer (32 percent). More unexpectedly given

the resources required to make tractor use sustainable, 36 percent of the agricultural projects

‘By the end of fiscal year 1987, the average total amount

awarded to each project, including grant amendments, had increased to $90,755.

Figure 3-2. -Sectors of ADF-Funded

Agricultural Projects

70 —

60 —

50 —

40 —

30 —

20 —

10 —

o —

70%

5296

33%

Livecrop stock

sectors

13%

acrops grown primarily for sale including vegetables, fruit, peanuts, soybeans,

sunflowers, coffee, and tea.

SOURCE: Peter MatIon, “Consultant’s Report to OTA,” contractor report prepared

for the Office of Technology Assessment, August 1987

90 —

00 —

70 —

60 —

50 —

40 —

30 —

20 —

10 —

o —

52%

Production Marketing cessing -

vation

Functions

SOURCE: Peter MatIon, “Consultant’s Report to OTA,” contractor report prepared

for the Office of Technology Assessment, August 1987
47

Figure 34.-Technological Components of

ADF-Funded Agricultural Projects ●

100,

90

t

Irrigation Seed Tractors Fertilizer Animal

Traction

Technological Components

aT~ble refers Only to projects lnvolvlng crop ProductIon

SOURCE Peter MatIon, “Consultant’s Report to OTA, ” contractor report prepared

for the Off Ice of Technology Assessment, August 1987

involve the use of tractors, while only 12 percent make use of animal traction.

A majority of the agricultural projects have

multiple sectors, functions, and technological

components. Nearly two-thirds involve more

than one agricultural sector (table 3-2) and function (table 3-3) and 55 percent have more than

one technological component (table 3-4). Looking at the sectors in another way, half of the

ADF-funded agricultural projects deal with single or various combinations of crops only, 22

percent with animals only, and 27 percent with

mixed crop and animal activity.

Forty-four percent of ADF’s agricultural

projects work with communally-owned farms

only; 22 percent only with private farms; and

35 percent with a combination of communal

and private farms (25). Several projects support

agricultural-related enterprises, e.g., two assist

fishers’ cooperatives by repairing boat motors.

Generally, credit programs use revolving loan

funds to support numerous sub-projects, some

Table 3.2.—Number of Sectors of ADF-Funded

Agricultural Projects

Sector(s) Percent of projects

One-sector projects

Two-sector projects

Three-sector projects

Four-sector projects

Cash Crop 11

Livestock 9

Fish 9

Food Crops 7

Cash/Food Crop 32

Cash Crop/Livestock 7

Cash Crop/Poultry 5

Livestock/Poultry 2

Poultry/Fish 2

Cash/Food Crop/Livestock 11

Cash Crop/Livestock/Poultry 2

Cash Crop/Food Crop/

Livestock/Poultry 2

99a

36

48

13

—2

99

aTotal less than 100 percent due to rounding.

SOURCE: Peter MatIon, “Consultant’s Report to OTA, ” contractor report prepared

for the Off Ice of Technology Assessment, August 1987

Table 3-3.—Number of Functions of ADF-Funded

Agricultural Projects

Function(s) Percent of projects

One-function projects

Two-function projects

Three-function projects

Four-function projects

Production

Conservation

Processing

Production/Marketing

Production/Processing

Marketing/Storage

Production/Marketing/

Storage

Production/Marketing/

Processing

Production/Processing/

Storage

Production/Marketing/

Processing/Storage -

Production/Marketing/

Storage/Conservation

Production/Marketing/

Processing/Conservation

29

6

4

24

8

2

10

6

2

6

2

2

101a

39

34

18

10

101

aTotal greater than 100 percent due to rounding.

SOURCE: Peter MatIon, “Consultant’s Report to OTA,” contractor report prepared

for the Office of Technology Assessment, August 1987

of which involve agricultural production, and

others involve non-agricultural small-scale rural enterprises. The one-third of the ADF grants

not classified as agricultural have gone to support non-agricultural activities in rural areas,

such as potable water supply projects, or to fund
48

Table 3-4.—Number of Technological Components of

ADF-Funded Agricultural Projectsa

Technologies Percent of projects

One-component projects

Two-component projects

Three-component projects

Four-component projects

Five-component projects

Irrigation

Tractors

42

4 1

46

Irrigation/Tractors 8

Irrigation/Seeds 8

Seeds/Fertilizer 8

I

32

Tractors/Animal

Traction 8

Irrigation/Seeds/

Fertilizer 8

Irrigation/Tractors/

Fertilizer 4

1

16

Seed/Tractors/Fertilizer 4

Irrigation/Seed/

Tractors/Fertilizer 4 4

Irrigation/Seed/

Tractors/Fertilizer/

Animal Traction 4 4

102b 102

alnCIU&S Only projects involving crop production.

bTotal greater than IO() percent due tO rounding

SOURCE: Peter MatIon, “Consultant<s Report to OTA,” contractor report prepared

for the Office of Technology Assessment, August 1987.

organizations in major cities and regional

towns. ADF estimates that about 20 percent of

its projects through fiscal year 1987 provide

funding to urban organizations.

ADF has awarded two-thirds of its grants for

periods of two or three years. Of the 86 grants:

● 15 (1 7°/0) were for 1 year,

● 31 (36°/0) for 2 years,

● 28 (32°/0) for 3 years,

● 7 ( 8%) for 4 years, and

● 5 ( 6°/0) for 5 years.

Projects differ in their geographic scope.

Two-thirds (56 projects) were classified as local, encompassing a village or a number of communities in a given area. Twenty-two percent

(19 projects) were regional projects covering

a large area within a country; and 13 percent

(11 projects) were national in scope.

EVALUATION, RESEARCH, AND PUBLIC EDUCATI0N:

HOW ADF IS SHARING WHAT IT LEARNS

The Foundation’s legislated purposes include

the development of self-evaluation techniques,

support for relevant development-related research by Africans and sharing lessons learned

with others in Africa and the United States.

Over the past 2 years, ADF has initiated various activities to carry out these functions.

Evaluations of Its Funded Projects

by ADF

The Foundation’s Office of Research and

Evaluation was established in 1986, as envisioned in ADF’s Five Year Plan. At the same

time, ADF asked three American journalists familiar with African development issues to visit

ADF-funded projects in six African countries.

Each spent several weeks interviewing project

participants and others in two countries; together they visited 18 ADF-funded projects.

Their report, Fulfilling the Mandate: An Assessment Report by Three Development Journalists,

described the concerns, activities, and results

of the projects visited (3). Their conclusions

point to the strength of grassroots movements

in Africa and the positive potential of ADF’s

support for them.

A number of ADF’s first projects were nearing completion by 1987, thus more formal

project evaluations could be carried out. ADF

hired a consultant to design a methodology and

identified five projects in West Africa and four

in Kenya for this evaluation (however, 67 percent or less of the total grant had been disbursed

to four of them). The Foundation selected 2

teams of African consultants, several based in

the United States, to each spend 3 weeks visiting the projects between April and June of 1987.

Earlier, ADF agreed to co-sponsor an evaluation with the Ford Foundation of a fifth Kenyan ADF-funded project, Partnership for

Productivity (PFP), because it had received Ford

Foundation funding also (31). These evaluations

were conducted by and for ADF and in this

sense are internal ADF evaluations even though

they were external to the projects.
49

Soif-Evaluations by Funded Groups

One of ADF’s first efforts to stimulate selfevaluation by project participants was to host

an evaluation conference for some 50 representatives of ADF-funded community groups

in East and Southern Africa. Participants

shared insights and experiences during a 3-day

conference in Nairobi in January 1987. They

explored problems and potential solutions;

made recommendations to ADF about its funding program and procedures; and discussed

their ideas about planning development activities, seeking financial and technical assistance,

and planning for self-sufficiency to avoid dependence on donors (5,19). A similar conference is planned for representatives of West and

Central African ADF-funded projects in early

1988.

The Foundation also is planning to train

managers of ADF-funded projects to carry out

participatory evaluation within their own organizations. A workshop on this topic was held

during the fall 1987 meeting of the Foundation’s

African Regional Liaison Officers in Washington; follow-up technical assistance with representatives of funded groups is being planned.

ADF has provided funds so that leaders of

ADF-funded projects could visit and provide

assistance to more recently funded projects. For

example, the director of a project that provided

technical assistance and credit to small farmers

in Kenya was sent to review a similar project

starting up in Tanzania and make recommendations to increase its effectiveness. One grant

in Botswana includes funds for a visit to a similar ADF-funded project elsewhere.

Research Grants

In 1986, ADF implemented a program to fund

research by Africans on development issues related to the ADF mandate.’ The Senior Fellowship program has supported 5 Africans to

carry out 18-month research projects in Africa

(obligating $250,000 for these research grants

in 1986). Their research topics included rural

non-formal education in Uganda, health care

in Nigeria, international PVOS in Somalia, food

self-sufficiency in Malawi, and a community

development program in Cape Verde. Of these

five countries, ADF has a grant program only

in Somalia. Research funding was suspended

in 1987 pending Board approval of a policy paper clarifying funding objectives, criteria, and

procedures. An additional $250,000 is projected

for 1988. The Foundation’s Office of Research

and Evaluation intends to support research on

broad issues of relevance to efforts of funded

groups.

ADF began a Doctoral Fellowship program

in 1987 to support research in Africa by Africans studying for their PhDs in U.S. universities. So far, 2 African graduate students have

been funded for 12 months. Their work is examining ujamaa policy in Tanzania and refugee

policy in Somalia. Three additional fellows are

projected for 1988, with a total of $78,500 for

the five, pending approval of the Foundation’s

research position paper. Proposals for fellowships are screened by an external Research

Advisory Review Panel consisting of five experts on Africa (three Africans, two Americans)

based at universities in Washington, D,C. before being submitted to ADF’s staff Project Review Committee.

Public Education

ADF has made a number of efforts to educate Americans and others about its work in

Africa. In addition to its publications, the Foundation’s staff have participated in conferences

in the United States, Europe, and Africa. ADF

has hosted educational visits to its funded

projects in Africa by ADF Board members, con-

‘ADF’s research programs differ from those of the Fellowship

Program of the Inter-American Foundation in several ways. While

the majority of IAF awards fund field work in Latin America

by American graduate and postdoctoral researchers, ADF restricts its program to Africans. In 1982 IAF began granting fellowships to Latin American junior researchers and development

professionals to obtain advanced training in U.S. universities;

on the other hand, ADF research grant recipients are not necessarily affiliated with an American university. Unlike ADF, IAF

has funded projects of overseas research organizations in its regular grants program. Also, IAF has contracted with developing

country research organizations and universities to provide technical assistance and conduct feasibility and evaluation studies

of their funded projects to a greater extent than ADF.
50

gressional staff, and others. In several instances, it has supported visits by its African

staff and project leaders to the United States,

primarily for their own learning but also to

share their experiences with Americans. Also,

ADF has provided funds for its project leaders

to attend meetings about grassroots development in Africa.

The information officer is responsible for

ADF publications: a 12 page newsletter, Beyond

Relief; a professional journal dealing with issues of grassroots development in Africa, Advance; and 1986 and 1987 ADF-Funded Projects

booklets. Three issues of Beyond Relief were

published in 1985, one in 1986, and one in 1987.

An average of 6,000 copies were distributed in

English; one issue, featuring ADF’s funding

process, was published in French (3,500 copies).

The newsletter features articles about ADFfunded projects, ADF programs, and development topics written by Africans, staff, and

Board members. The newsletter is distributed

free to a diverse readership including development organizations, PVOS, interested members

of Congress, the media, Federal agencies, African embassies in Washington, and individuals

and academic institutions with an interest in

Africa.

The first issue of Advance, published by the

Government Printing Office in June 1987, contained articles by several ADF-funded project

managers, the head of the African Development

Bank, a professor at American University, and

ADF’s director of research and evaluation. The

5,000 copies were distributed to U.S. PVOS, officials in development assistance agencies, African government officials and private organizations, and individuals. Several members of

the ADF Advisory Council and the State Department representative on the Board are on

the Advance Editorial Board. Advance will be

published with French summaries to facilitate

its wider dissemination in Africa. The booklets with short descriptions of ADF-funded

projects are available in English and French.

The Foundation also is exploring new ways

to inform people about its activities. In two

cases visited by OTA, ADF demonstrated its

interest in the audio-visual documentation of

its projects. Twenty-three percent of the budget for its Dakoro project in Niger is slated for

a documentary film. Also, ADF has contracted

a Kenyan film company to record the story of

an ADF-funded community water supply

project.
Chapter 4

OTA's Findings About
CONTENTS

Page

Introduction, . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 53

Beneficiary and Participant . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 55

project and Organization . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 55

Grassroots and Intermediary Organizations . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 55

What Is Participation and How Can It Remeasured?. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 55

Assessing Participation in 12ADF-Funded Projects . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 58

Factors Fostering and Constraining Participation . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 64

What Are Results and How Can They Be Measured? . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 65

Assessing Results in 12ADF-Funded Projects . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 65

Sustainability . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . ~ . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 70

What Is Sustainability and How Can It Be Measured? . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 70

Assessing Sustainability in 12 ADF-Funded Projects . . . . . . . . . . .. 72

Factors Fostering and Constraining Sustainability . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 75

Replicability . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .. 75

What Is Replicability and How Can It Be Measured? . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 75

Assessing Replicability in 12ADF-Funded Projects . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 76

Factors Fostering and Constraining Replicability . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 78

Relationships Among Participation, Results, Sustainability,

and Replicability . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 79

Trade-offs . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 79

Project Findings, Program Choices, and ADF’s Mandate. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 81

Boxes

Box Page

4-1. A Look at ADF’s Files: Participation . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 56

4-2. A Look at ADF’s Files: ADF’s Use of Renewable Resource

Technologies . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . + . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 71

Tables

Table Page

4-1. Rating the Critical Issues in 12ADF Projects . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 53

4-2. The12ADF Projects Visited by OTA Teams . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 54

4-3. Rating Participation in 12 ADF Projects . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 57

4-4. Rating Results of 12 ADF Projects . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 66

4-5. Rating Sustainability of 12 ADF Projects . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 72

4-6. Rating Replicability of 12 ADF Projects . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 76
Chapter 4

OTA's Findings About

ADF-Funded Projects

●

●

SUMMARY

The four critical issues addressed here are

participation, results, sustainability, and

replicability (table 4-1), These issues were

chosen because of their importance to ADF’s

mandate and the interests of the congressional committees that requested this work.

One-half of the 12 African groups visited by

OTA teams were judged to have a high degree of overall participation in the ADFfunded project activity; one-third, however,

were rated low on participation. In a majority

of projects, participants did not share in

evaluation and financial decisionmaking and

women rarely participated in project management.

Table 4-1 .—Rating the Critical Issues

in 12 ADF Projects

No. of projects rated

Critical issue High Moderate Low

Overall degree of participation . . . . 6 2 4

Overall results . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 4 6 2

Overall sustainability (for next

3 to 5 years) . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 6 5 1

Overall replicability in region or

country . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 3 7 2

●

●

●

Most of the projects visited were in early

stages of implementation so OTA’S teams

estimated future results when possible; actual impacts could be observed in only half

of the projects. Ten projects were judged

likely to have a positive impact on the sociaI

and economic development of the poor in

the locale. But the level of expected impact

ranged from significant to negligible.

Eleven ADF-funded activities had a high or

moderate potential to be sustained over the

next 3 to 5 years, although not necessarily

in the same form as in the approved proposal.

Community support and the self-help nature

of the projects were the strongest reasons for

sustainability. But the lack of careful economic and environmental planning were

common constraints threatening sustainability, especially in the longer term.

Ten of the projects had a moderate or high

degree of replicability in the region or country but two were rated low. Self-help processes were judged more replicable than many

of the technologies used. The relatively high

cost of the technologies involved was a major constraint to replicability of project

activities.

INTRODUCTION

This chapter examines the results of site visits siders links between these issues and their

to 12 ADF-funded projects (table 4-2). It is orga- relationship to ADF’s funding program. Denized around the four critical issues that Con- tailed descriptions of these projects are in apgress asked OTA to investigate: participation, pendix B. Since these projects were selected

project results, sustainability, and replicabil- to be representative, chapter 5 discusses the imity. In each case, ADF’s approach to the issue placations for ADF’s program and gives sugintroduces the discussion. Then OTA’S opera- gestions about how ADF can improve the eftional definitions follow, along with the over- fectiveness of its funding program.

all and detailed findings. The final section con53
54

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55

Throughout this work, OTA makes important

distinctions between: a) beneficiary and participant, b) project and organization, c) grassroots and intermediary organizations.

Beneficiary and Participant

Project “beneficiary” and project “participant” are often used interchangeably and

vaguely, A beneficiary gains from the project

activity; the benefit may be direct or indirect,

and intended or unintended (10). Participants

take part in or contribute to project activities

but they do not necessarily benefit. For example, in one credit project more women have

taken part by contributing to local savings clubs

than have received loans from them. In other

cases, people benefit from projects without participating, such as receiving irrigation water

from systems which they did not help build.

Participation in project activities and directly

benefiting from them are included here in measures of “participation,” but the two are considered separately,

Proiect and Organization

The term “project” refers to the activity or

activities supported by the ADF grant (as described in the approved proposal). The group

sponsoring the activity andlor receiving the

grant funds is the recipient “organization.” This

distinction is especially important when considering sustainability and replicability. Sometimes organizations are sustainable but specific

activities are not. Organizational processes may

be replicable but certain activities too sitespecific for repetition. OTA’S assessment of

these two critical issues included project and

organizational elements.

Grassroots and Intermediary

Organizations

Grassroots organizations (sometimes called

primary or base groups) are defined as “small

aggregations of individuals or households who

regularly engage in some joint development

activity as an expression of collective interest”

(11). Most are community-level associations, although they may include members from several communities. Intermediary organizations,

or grassroots support organizations, provide

services to grassroots groups. One type has

professionals in leadership positions; another

type consists of higher level membership organizations, such as confederations of cooperatives or associations of community organizations (11). In this assessment, intermediary

organizations may refer to national, regional,

or local private voluntary organizations (PVOS),

church-based groups, associations of cooperatives, or parastatal organizations. OTA visited

four grassroots organizations and eight intermediary organizations. The intermediary organizations consisted of three regional PVOS, two

associations of village cooperatives, two

church-related groups, and one parastatal.

Grassroots groups and intermediary organizations are distinguished throughout this

assessment.

PARTICIPATI0N

What is Participation and How Can direction into operational criteria. Some of

It Be Measured? these criteria deal primarily with the timing of

participation in the project cycle, others with

The Foundation’s legislation specifically em- modes of participation. ADF examines the folphasizes participation, directing ADF to give lowing components of participation in its

priority to projects in which community groups

foster their own development and which have

project approval and monitoring checklist:

“the maximum feasible participation of the ● participation of beneficiaries in project depoor in project initiation, design, implementa- sign, implementation, management, and

tion, and evaluation. ” ADF has translated this evaluation;
56

community members contribute to the a lack of specific ADF data on participation,

project and share in benefits; and especially gender-disaggregated data; raised isachievement of project objectives enhances sues about participation in intermediary orgacontinued participation. nizations; and highlighted decisionmaking as

a probable critical element of participation (box

However, ADF recently stated it gives priority 4-I). The specific data that field teams collected

to self-determination and local control, allow- to evaluate project participation are included

ing recipient organizations to select their own in appendix D, “Field Team Methods: The

modes of participation (8). Assessment Materials.”

The elements of participation ADF uses in Participation in ADF-funded projects was

its appraisal checklist were considered appro- assessed on the basis of multiple factors. The

priate but OTA found that some additional ele- following were most useful in comparing

ments were needed for its field assessment. A projects in different regions and in reaching

careful review of ADF’s project files identified

—

overall project ratings:

Box 4-1.—A Look at ADF’s Files: Participation

OTA examined ADF’s files of projects related to agriculture and renewable resources to gather

information on the way ADF is implementing its congressional mandate for participation. Overall,

it appears that ADF has pursued the spirit of its mandate. For example, ADF has hired Africans to

represent the Foundation in Africa, Africans provide most of its technical assistance, and African

contractors perform its evaluations. Unfortunately, however, ADF does not document how it is increasing the participation of people as decisionmakers in the projects it funds. Existing files lack

the data necessary to say if projects are as participatory as Congress intended.

OTA’S review of ADF’s files identified these major findings:

1. ADF has little specific documentation to support the Foundation’s claims of participation by

African community members in project decisionmaking. For example, questions regarding key

aspects of participation in ADF’s grant application form are vague and seldom answered by

applicants. ADF staff say they evaluate participation during the project approval process but

do not document it. As a result, ADF has little documentation of the amount and type of participation that occurs.

2. ADF does not make an organized attempt to gather gender-disaggregated data. Therefore, ADF

does not know whether women participate fully in project activities.

3. Methods of participation in ADF-funded projects differ according to the type of organization

receiving the grant. Grassroots groups, which provide benefits directly to their members, tended

to have strong participation by their membership or the members’ representatives, sometimes

with a special place for community elite. Intermediary organizations, which provide benefits

to grassroots groups that pass benefits along to members, seemed to have less participation

by potential beneficiaries and more by the groups’ Boards of Directors, management, and staff.

These differences have as-yet unexamined implications for how ADF assesses participation.

Since a significant portion of ADF grants goes to intermediary groups, these implications are

significant.

4, Effective participation means participation as a decisionmaker, not only as a beneficiary. For

example, women were beneficiaries but not decisionmakers in the Kenya Beekeepers Organization; their needs were ignored, and the project was failing as a result. Women’s role as

decisionmakers can be problematic because OTA’S data suggest that women tend not to be

decisionmakers in projects in which both men and women participate. Again, this is something

that ADF needs to address in its work.

SOURCE: Virginia DeLancey, “Aspects of Participation in Projects Funded by the African Development Foundation,” contractor report prepared for the Office of Technology Assessment, August 1987.
57

1.

2.

3<

4.

Participation in project identification and

design: who originated the project, identified the need, proposed the activity, designed the project, and made technology

choices? Were participants consulted, and

do they agree to the activity and with the

project design?

How participatory is the organization receiving the grant: What is the structure of

local groups? How do members share in decisionmaking? Do they agree with leaders’

decisions, and do members’ suggestions result in changes? How, and how often, do

intermediary organizations relate to local

groups? How are group leaders selected?

who has access to the project: Do participants represent the community? Do women

take part? Is any group (ethnic, age, etc.) excluded and why? Who are selected to be participants and how? Do the poorest one-third

in the locale and country participate?

Participation in decisionmaking, paying

costs, and sharing in benefits: What do participants contribute and gain? How do participants share in decisionmaking and management of the project?

5. Participation in technical assistance: Who

makes initial and ongoing technology

choices? Who provides technical expertise

and how? Is the process based on two-way

communication; is the advice imposed?

6. Participation in project evaluations: Who

takes part in evaluation? When and how?

Each project was rated using several

aspects of the factors listed above (table 4-

3). Then, a rating for overall participation

was given to each project. The following factors were given greater weight than others:

participant input into decisionmaking; their

understanding and support for the project

activity; and, in the case of intermediary

organizations, the quality of the relationship

between the intermediary organization and

community groups. The ratings took into account the local context, since the 12 projects

took place in varying settings with a variety

Table 4.3.—Rating Participation in 12 ADF Projects

No. of projects rated

Elements of participation High Moderate Low

Overall degree of participation . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 6 2 4

1. Participation in project identification and design

Input into origin of project . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 6 2 4

participants identified/agreed to need . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 7 3 2

participants proposed/agreed to activity . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 6 2 4

Input into design of project . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 3 4 5

participants agreed with design . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 3 6 3

participants made/accepted technology choices . . . . . . . . . . . . 5 3 4

Participants understand and agree with project. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 6 5 1

2. How participatory is organization receiving the grant?

local organization. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 6 4 2

intermediary organization . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 2 2 4

3. Who has access to the project?

Participants are representative of community . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 5 6 1

Women have equitable access to project . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 4 4 4

4. Participation in decisionmaking, costs and benefits

Participants share in project management . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 5 3 4

Members have access to fiscal decisions and records. . . . . . . . . 3 2 7

Women share in project management . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1 5 6

Members share equitably in costs and benefitsb. . . . . . . . . . . . . . 6 4 0

Women bear equitable share of project costsc . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 3 7 1

Women have equitable share of project benefitsc . . . . . . . . . . . . . 4 7 0

5. Participation in provision of technical assistance . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 6 2 4

6. Participation in project evaluation. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 0 1 4

NOTES

aElght grant ~eciplerlts visited were i ntermedlary organizations

bThls refers t. ~qultable share within male or female subgroups lt Was too soofl to evaluate distribution Of prOJeCt benefits

in one case, In another case, insufficient data was available to judge.

clt was too soon to judge In one case

din the other seven ~ro,ects, part[clpants did not share irl project evaluation
58

of modes of participation, all far from the

American cultural context,

Assessing Participation in

12 ADF-Funded Projects

Finding: One-half of the ADF-funded projects

visited were judged to have a high overall degree of participation, but one-third were rated

low overall.

Six of the twelve groups had a high degree

of participation in the ADF-funded project

activity (table 4-3). The six represented a wide

spectrum of modes of participation. For example, projects rating high in overall participation included a herder group with a traditional

hierarchical system of decisionmaking (Dakoro

in Niger) and an intermediary organization with

several thousand members in nearly a hundred

local groups (Partnership for Productivity/

Kenya, PfP). Another strong example is the

poultry and vegetable growing project by the

Boiteko Agricultural Management Association

in Botswana, notable because of its open management style. The 10 women members share

in all project decisionmaking, the financial report is presented on the blackboard at monthly

meetings, and leadership rotates. While technical assistance is provided by a man (the

project manager of the ADF grant) and one

woman is acknowledged to be “the mother”

of the group, training has been provided for all

members so they are able to share fully in decisionmaking regarding project activities,

The fact that a third of the projects rated low

overall on participation is a serious concern

given the importance assigned to participation

in the legislation establishing ADF. Two of the

low-rated projects appeared to have considerable problems related to participation (Kikatiti

in Tanzania, and Union Kaoural in Senegal);

interviews at the other two low-ranking projects

(Dagnare in Niger, and Tutume in Botswana)

raised even more fundamental concerns about

their appropriateness for ADF funding explained below. The Dagnare project was rejected twice by ADF’s Project Review Committee before it was approved,

Another reason for concern is the trend over

time. Of the 12 projects visited, 5 were awarded

grants in 1986, 6 in 1985, and 1 in 1984. Yet

of the most recent grants, those awarded in

1986, only one of the six projects rated high

on participation overall and three rated low,

Finding: The ADF projects visited generally

rated well on some aspects of participation,

such as meeting recognized needs and encouraging contributions of labor, but poorly

on other aspects. In a majority of projects,

participants did not share in financial decisionmaking or evaluation, and women rarely

participated in management.

1. Participation in Projoct

Indentification and Design

To assess the elements regarding project identification and design included in table 4-3, OTA

began by asking who originated the project. In

every case either a local group leader or an indigenous intermediary organization originated

the project, in this sense, fulfilling the legislative intent that projects be designed by Africans. Typically a local leader worked with a

regional PVO to propose the project; in several

cases, the local leader was a member of the

larger organization. Sometimes outsiders provided help at early stages. For example, a Peace

Corps volunteer linked a tri-community water

committee with ADF and with the Kenyan

water officials who designed the technical

aspects of the project. But the NGK committee

originally had the idea to obtain water from the

slopes of Mt. Kenya. Additional groups, such

as Boiteko, conceptualized their project, but

sought technical help from outside to design

the project and select specific technologies.

ADF funded a grant for technical assistance

in Dakoro, Niger, and the provider designed

the project. Usually African professionals provided external technical assistance.

Identifying the need for the project is another

important element in project origination. Participants took part in this step or agreed that

the project addressed a real need to a high degree in seven cases, a low degree in two. If the

project addressed a strongly felt need, such as
59

Photo credit: ADF/Wendy Wilson

Successful participation takes many forms.

ADF-funded activities build on traditional systems of

community decisionmaking in the Dakoro Herders

Cooperative in Niger.

for water or increasing food production, the

beneficiaries generally supported it.

In the cases studied, the participants usually

agreed with the project activity and design.

However, one-third of the projects received a

fairly low degree of support for the activities

proposed and technologies selected; one-fourth

of the projects faced a low acceptance of the

project design. For example, the farmers agreed

with the concept of a credit program in the Zimbabwe Coffee and Tea project but not with the

repayment schedule or pesticides proposed by

the Agricultural Finance Corporation (AFC).

Sometimes participants supported one activity over others: Kikatiti members were much

more interested in obtaining water from a restored borehole than in the reforestation part

of the project strongly supported by the intermediary organization. In the Dakoro project,

herders were dissatisfied with changes imposed

by local government officials. In these two

cases, where participants supported only some

project objectives, those objectives were judged

to be the ones most likely to be achieved.

Lack of participant involvement in project

design was a major problem in some cases. For

example, two cases where participation was

judged unacceptably low, the Tutume and Dagnare projects, were designed with minimal involvement of the intended beneficiaries, who

had virtually no idea of what was to come, In

the Union Kaoural project, the intermediary

group designed the project and decided which

villages would participate and how.

In other cases, however, the lack of active

involvement by the beneficiaries in the early

stages of project design was not a problem. Involving everyone in detailed project design generally is infeasible. Participants in these instances agreed with technology choices even

if few were involved in actually designing the

project. Decisions usually were made either by

a small group of leaders with external technical assistance available locally or by the intermediary organization staff, In several cases,

ADF personnel decisively shaped the project

proposal,

A key consideration was the quality of the

relationship between the initiators, designers,

and participants. Positive participation ratings

in project identification and design were most

often related to participants’ support of choices

made by their leaders or by the African intermediary organizations,

2. How Participatory Is the Organization

Receiving the ADF Grant?

Overall participation generally was rated high

in organizations judged to have the support of

their members, whether the recipient organization was a grassroots organization or an intermediary group. OTA visited four grassroots

organizations; two were rated highly participatory organizations and two were rated moderately participatory. Three of these four projects

had high ratings on overall participation, suggesting that grassroots groups may have an

advantage in achieving participation. The management structure of these highly-rated groups

ranged from elected representatives (from three

communities to a central management committee in NGK), to traditional leadership (Dakoro),

to open meetings of all participants (Boiteko).

Leadership style varied from a small group of

tightly disciplined elected leaders who made

83-361 0 - 88 : QL 3 - 3
60

decisions (Ross Bethio in Senegal) to consensusbuilding approaches.

Participation in the eight intermediary organizations was more problematic, confirming

the findings of the review of ADF’s files. All

four projects with low ratings for overall participation were intermediary organizations.

However, three of the eight intermediary organizations did receive high overall ratings in participation; two were the church-related intermediary organizations (Silveira House in Zimbabwe and Morogoro Diocese in Tanzania),

the third (PfP) was begun and led by Kenyans,

most of whom are Quakers. The three highlyrated intermediary organizations have a long

history of sponsoring development projects and

providing training to local groups and have an

explicit philosophy to foster participation.

High overall participation was strongly correlated with the quality of the relationship between intermediary organizations and local

groups. In the two projects with the poorest

overall participation ratings, the intermediary

groups were not actually working with local

groups. In the Dagnare project in Niger, a group

of retired civil servants nominally agreed to

share the benefits of the ADF grant with two

other communities, thus making themselves

technically an intermediary organization and

more likely to receive ADF funding. The project

primarily will benefit the retired civil servants.

In Tutume, Botswana, a private organization

sponsored a tractor hire and demonstration plot

to serve individuals they selected, but these

farmers had no role in project design, nor do

they have a role in implementation, decisionmaking, or evaluation. They are not members

of the organization receiving the ADF grant,

nor, after several years of receiving the service, have they joined any group. While the project may be considered self-help in the sense that

it is run by Botswana, it is not self-help in the

sense that beneficiaries have a role in its management or decisionmaking.

Different types and levels of participation are

appropriate for intermediary organizations and

local groups, as well as for different stages in

the development of the intermediary organization, the local groups, and the project activity.

However, problems in the relationship between

the intermediary organization and local groups

can arise from many sources:

●

●

●

●

●

the two may have different objectives and

perspectives about the project;

too much financial and technical control

may be given to the intermediary organization;

intermediary organizations may make decisions without the input and acceptance

of local groups;

intermediary organizations may not understand the need for participatory development; or

intermediary organizations mav not have

the experience and capability fieeded to

work with local groups.

The assessment teams looked at different

aspects of the relationship between the intermediary organizations and local groups and

they judged how each functioned. They found

that the local groups had little input in the intermediary organization’s decisionmaking in

seven of eight projects. Only in Morogoro, Tanzania, had the intermediary organization established a working structure for the local group

to share decisionmaking regarding the project.

There, village-level congregations elect a “contact” committee for development projects;

officers of several committees comprise a parish committee, whose officers sit, in turn, on

higher-level committees. This interlocking committee structure, developed over a number of

years and recently applied to the tractor hire

and maize production project funded by ADF,

builds on a democratic church structure and

allows for two-way information flow.

In determining the level of participation in

projects involving intermediary organizations,

learning how decisionmaking occurs can be

more critical than knowing management structures. Intermediary groups without formal

structures for direct local input into project design were able to compensate for these structural deficiencies if they had good relationships

with local groups. For example, the PfP project

in Kenya received good ratings for being a par-
61

ticipatory intermediary organization even

though it had no formal structure for local input. This organization has a large number of

extension agents who are in close contact with

the local groups and have generally good relationships with them. This provides an informal mechanism for participants’ suggestions

to influence decisions made by the intermediary organization. The Silveira House project

in Zimbabwe similarly maintains extensive extension and training programs; while Kenya’s

PfP works with pre-existing groups, Silveira

House programs encourage local participation

among previously unorganized groups. In the

case of the Union Kaoural in Senegal, however,

the existence of formal structures for representation was not sufficient to provide for adequate

participant input into decisionmaking. These

structures tended to be used for one-way, topdown communication.

Some intermediary groups do not seem to

know how to relate to local organizations. For

example, farmer groups taking part in the AFC

project have little influence on AFC policy despite a directive from the Zimbabwe government that AFC work with communal farmers.

The AFC is attempting to shift its emphasis

from large-scale commercial farmers to those

of the communal areas, but it has not yet developed an organizational response to this

directive, although it has established a working relationship with local cooperatives. In this

case, the local groups themselves are strong and

participatory, but the intermediary organization’s relationships with the local groups are

not,

3. Who Has Access to the ADF-Funded

Project?

Access to ADF-funded projects is open in

most cases, but women have a low degree of

access in one-third of the projects visited. Otherwise, participants generally represent the community in all but one case (Dagnare, Niger).

In some cases, a certain amount of exclusion

may be justified, even necessary, for group cohesion and identity. For example, donor efforts

to include persons other than the group proposing the activity (which occurred in the Dakoro

project) can weaken participation and negatively affect results. But sometimes exclusion

is not justified, and often it is implicit or hidden. The most common problems related to access include: lack of access by the poorest third

of the population and women, land tenure issues, religious affiliation of participants, and

the criteria for selecting participants, especially

those used by intermediary groups.

The Poorest One-Third of the Population. One

ADF goal is to reach poor people in Africa. In

this review, the poorest one-third of the people in the area seemed able to participate in

ADF-funded projects, although no reliable

socioeconomic data have been collected by

funded groups or ADF to prove this. The one

clear exception is Dagnare, Niger, where participation in the core project was limited to relatively better-off civil servants and their families.

Trade-offs sometimes exist between access

of the poor and other important aspects such

as projects’ economic viability. For example,

the entry fee for a piggery subproject of Silveira

House in Zimbabwe restricts participation to

the affluent because each entrant is required

to purchase a costly pig. Similarly, conditions

for receiving AFC loans exclude some poor people, such as Mozambican refugees because they
62

lack long-term access to land. Exclusion from

the piggery subproject may not have been justified because it could have been designed so that

participants contributed labor or other resources, or purchased their pigs over time. However, ADF was justified in supporting the AFC

project because the participants are poor and

representative of small farmers in the area.

The answer to a related question—do the

project participants represent the poorest onethird of the people in the country or region?—

is more difficult to determine. In only a third

of the cases could the assessment teams respond with a firm “yes,” based on interviews

with local officials and others outside the

project. The other cases involved better-off participants, either because the project was situated in a part of the country with higher rainfall and/or better infrastructure, or it was

sponsored by a relatively affluent group (for example, owners of farm plots in a Kenyan land

resettlement area in the NGK project).

Land Tenure and Displacement. Schemes to

expand cultivation or provide irrigation also

can be ways to secure rights to lands that customarily were under the use of others. Research

on development projects in Africa has shown

that pastoralists are especially vulnerable to loss

of grazing rights and access to land caused by

development schemes. Women’s plots can be

lost when cultivation is expanded for crops that

bring cash to men. Irrigation projects may disrupt downstream crop production or grazing

lands. Projects that increase the land’s value

(e.g., irrigation) in areas where sales of land occur can increase the chance that more marginal

farmers will lose land to the more politically

and economically powerful.

Development projects can exacerbate these

problems if the funder does not have a detailed

understanding of local patterns of landholding

and use. In certain cases, ADF does not seem

to have sought this information. Rights to use

of the land put into crop production by the

Youth Association of Ross Bethio in Senegal,

for example, were previously held by a minority group of Fulani herders. The youth group

legally acquired those rights. The herders, provided with alternate but poorer grazing land,

tried to block installation of the group’s irrigation system. Eventually, local authorities with

armed guards dislodged the herders. In the

Morogoro project, block farms will be cultivated by tractors on land that is traditional grazing land of the Maasai in Tanzania. In both

cases, herders are a different ethnic group from

the farmers and most project participants.

Women’s Access to Projects. Women constituted at least 90 percent of the participants

in 2 of the 12 projects visited, Boiteko and PfP.

The sample of projects visited is representative

of ADF’s portfolio in this respect. Grants to

women’s projects or organizations also represent 17 percent of total ADF-funded grants

through fiscal year 1987.

Women had a high degree of access to the

project relative to local norms in 2 other projects

visited, a moderate degree in 4, and a low degree of access in 4 of the 12. Access was judged

by whether or not women were or could become eligible to participate in project activities and to receive project benefits at least in

the same proportion as their involvement in the

activity in the locale.

In some cases, women were able to participate in activities from which they usually were

excluded and which often result in their displacement from land. In Ross Bethio, for example, Senegalese women were given access

to irrigated land. In AFC, a few women were

given credit for coffee and tea production in

eastern Zimbabwe. Women are a majority of

participants in Ross Bethio, and although they

receive far lower benefits than the men, their

inclusion in the project was judged an advance

in the local context. But in Zimbabwe, where

women commonly are eligible for rural credit

programs, the small number included in the

AFC project was not sufficient to be considered an advance, and women were judged to

have a low degree of access to the project.

In the four projects where women’s access

was rated low, the fact that the projects address

work done by women could negatively affect

achievement of project objectives. Women in

Kikatiti, Tanzania, for example, are excluded

from the committees directing a village project
63

that focuses on water and fuelwood, areas of

their responsibility.

Issues of access for minority ethnic or religious groups can be similar to those involving

women,

Lack of Clear Criteria for Project Access, The

lack of clear criteria for selecting participants

was identified as a problem for ADF-funded

intermediary organizations in particular (e.g.,

Tutume; AFC). When the service provided is

one that many individuals or groups want, organizations need clear criteria and a fair process

for selecting who will and will not participate.

Some groups required participants to register,

others included only dues-paying members, and

others considered anyone who contributed labor to be project members. OTA’S assessment

teams noted that ADF often did not verify

whether project participants were representative of the local community, nor identify

whether selection criteria and processes were

perceived as fair.

The two religious-based intermediary organizations visited by the teams were rated highly

participatory and appropriate for ADF funding because participants were representative

of the general community. Nevertheless, funding such groups raises additional questions regarding access. In these cases, access to project

benefits was open to eligible participants without regard to religious affiliation. While most

participants in the tractor hire project in

Morogoro are Anglicans (because church committees register members and the demand for

services is far greater than the supply), a significant portion of small farmers in the area

were Anglican and management and resource

constraints justified the focus. With the exception of the piggery sub-project of the revolving

fund of Silveira House whose high entry fee

restricted access to the affluent, participants

of both projects were representative of the community and poor.

4. Contributing to Costs, Sharing in

Benefits, and Participating in

Decisionmaking

Costs and benefits were equitably shared

among participants to a high or moderate degree in every case studied. Distinguishing between project participants and beneficiaries,

however, shows that in some projects the two

groups are different people. For example, fewer

people helped build the water systems in East

African projects than will receive water; in PfP,

more women contributed to the savings clubs

than have been able to receive loans.

Also, OTA specifically examined how women

participants shared in project costs and benefits (table 4-3). This was judged to be equitable

in most cases, even when women did not receive precisely equal benefits. For example,

women participants in Ross Bethio did not consider their lesser share of project benefits unfair. The one low rating was given to the Tutume project in Botswana because female,

single heads of households in practice had to

contribute more labor to receive the same benefit as male-headed households.

However, equitable sharing in costs and benefits alone, without sharing in project management and decisionmaking, constitutes a low

level of participation. OTA judged the former

a necessary but not sufficient condition for

meeting the ADF participation mandate.

A low degree of sharing in decisionmaking

during project implementation existed in onethird of the projects (table 4-3). This rating was

highly correlated with the rating for overall participation. A special problem for intermediary

organizations and grassroots groups was the

lack of participation in financial decisions

found in more than half the cases. Often the

local group had accurate records of time and

funds contributed by its own members, but little access to the financial records of the intermediary organization or the technical assistance provider who controlled funds provided

by outside donors.

Women’s participation in management and

decisionmaking rated low in half the projects,

including PfP, which provides credit to 3,000

women. One reason for this is because all members of the PfP board of directors and the

majority of the staff are men, Thus, funding a

women’s project or women’s organization does

not guarantee that women participate appropriately in management. In only one case, the
64

Photo credit: ADF/Christine Fowles

Women participate in many ADF-funded projects, such

as this successful one in Botswana (Boiteko).

other predominantly women’s project of the 12,

Boiteko, was women’s participation in management rated high. An ADF-sponsored evaluation

of five Kenyan projects concluded that the lack

of women’s participation in management

harmed project results, especially those with

a majority of women participants (22).

S. Participation in Providing

Technical Assistance

All 12 ADF-funded projects received some

technical assistance during their design and implementation stages. ADF policy encourages

recipients to select their own technical assistance and pay the provider with ADF grant

funds. This policy is unique and consistent with

the Foundation’s mandate. So is their attempt

to have technical assistance provided by Africans where possible. Africans provided technical assistance in 10 of the 12 cases. Often an

intermediary group will provide technical assistance to its local groups. But the roles of the

technical assistance providers and their relationship with the local group and participants

differed among the projects studied.

OTA found that technical assistance was provided in a non-participatory way in one-third

of the projects (table 4-3). Project managers or

participants had little two-way interaction with

technical assistance providers, they were not

given an opportunity to provide input to technology choices, or they were dissatisfied with

providers’ methods. Providers were representatives of intermediary organizations in two of

the cases ranked low, a Dutch volunteer in one

and local government officials in one. Three

of the projects with non-participatory technical assistance also had a low rating on overall

participation.

6. Participation in Project Evaluations

One consistent problem noted was the lack

of participation in internal project evaluations.

Until recently, ADF did not encourage or help

funded groups participate in evaluations. Only

PfP had even a moderate level of member participation in its evaluation process. Although

only half of the projects studied were fully operational, their grants had been committed for

at least 12 months. Preliminary evaluations,

based on early project activities, would have

been appropriate by this point.

Factors Affecting Participation

Finally, OTA teams assessed factors fostering and limiting participation in each project.

Sometimes external circumstances helped participation, such as good markets, rainfall, and

roads. Others, such as illiteracy, hindered. Commonly cited positive factors include:

● effective and trusted leadership,

● group cohesion,

● building on existing traditions of communal effort,
65

●

●

●

●

project activity matching needs of com- ●

munity,

using familiar technologies, ●

regular meetings, and ●

clear project scope.

Factors constraining participation in the 12

●

●

projects included: ●

● unclear membership criteria,

exclusion of women from project management committees,

overly complex organizational structure,

production system requiring centralized

decisionmaking,

inadequate information sharing,

too prominent a role for outsiders, and

centralized decisionmaking in intermediary organization.

RESULTS

What Are Results and How Can

They Be Measured?

A main purpose of ADF is social and economic development. The Foundation weighs

the social and economic impacts of its projects

in terms of:

● achieving project objectives,

● attaining community needs,

● effects on the environment and health, and

● benefits to participants and others.

Like most donors, however, ADF directs most

of its post-approval efforts toward tracking its

own project inputs (e. g., monitoring expenditures of grant funds for purchases of materials

and technical assistance) and the project

outputs—the goods and services that the ADF

grant was expected to produce (a working irrigation system, credit provided to small farmers,

or tractor-hire services, etc.). Little systematic

attention is given by ADF or its project

managers to project outcomes, i.e., what the

beneficiaries actually do with the service and

how it changes their lives and the life of the

community and of the organizations to which

they belong. Tracking outcomes is an important way to determine a project’s progress, identify gaps where other resources are needed, and

involve participants in evaluating project activities. It also is a way to determine whether the

project is attaining the broader development

goals of the grantee and funder.

Project outputs and outcomes both were included in OTA’S assessment of project results

and data on a wide variety of relevant indicators were collected (app. D). The following criteria were used to assess results:

1.

2.

3.

4.

Degree to which the project is meeting its

objectives: how well is the ADF-funded

project doing relative to similar projects

supported by other funders; what fosters

and what hampers achieving objectives?

Actual or likely economic impacts on participants: how many beneficiaries are

there; what are the amount and the value

of benefits and contributions per person?

Actual or likely social impacts on community and organizational impacts on the local groups and intermediary organizations.

Actual or likely environmental impacts

during the grant period.

OTA attempted to quantify intended and

unintended results and their economic, social,

organizational, and environmental impacts on

participants and the community. Data were disaggregate by gender. If an activity was meeting its objectives and had, on balance, positive

economic, social, and organizational effects for

poor people and no serious negative environmental impacts, OTA rated its overall results

positively in terms of achieving social and economic development.

Assessing Results in 12 ADF-Funded

Projects

Finding: OTA judged that 10 projects were likely

to have a positive impact on the social and

economic development of the poor people in
66

the locale. However, the level of impact

ranged from significant to negligible.

Because of the early stage of implementation

of the projects visited, OTA teams were required to estimate likely results. Some actual

results could be seen in only one-half of the

projects. However, 10 were judged likely to

have a moderate to high positive impact on the

social and economic development of poor people (table 4-4). Overall ratings were similar for

projects with some actual results compared

with those starting up; however, grants committed in 1985 were rated somewhat higher (3

high, 2 moderate, 1 low) than those committed

in 1986(1 high, 3 moderate, 1 low). In addition,

grassroots groups rated significantly better than

intermediary organizations (3 high and 1 moderate vs. 1 high, 5 moderate, and 2 low).

Participants from several projects told OTA

teams about dramatically increased production

and incomes, e.g., a 30 percent increase in income for women who received PfP’s farm input loans. In addition to a significant impact

on individuals in this project, a large number

of people in other communities in western

Kenya were affected positively. Similarly, most

family incomes increased considerably following the completion of the water and irrigation

system in the NGK project in Kenya, the one

project visited which had completed its ADF

grant period. Additional specific information

on project results is included in the project

descriptions (app. B).

Benefits to poor people in two cases, however, were judged likely to be low. Dagnare and

Tutume were judged likely to achieve some of

their objectives, but not benefit the poor segment of the population very much. The Tutume

project in Botswana provided free tractor plowing. However, no longer-term benefits to the

sponsoring organization were evident, agricultural production had not increased, and soil erosion threatened to lower future production. In

addition, participants were relatively affluent

in both projects.

1. Degree to Which ADF-Ftmded

Projects Are Meeting Their

Objectives

Despite the preliminary stage of one-half the

projects visited, 11 were judged to be meeting

or likely to meet their objectives to a high or

moderate degree. However, a project can meet

its objectives, in the sense of providing the

planned service or outputs, but have little impact on improving peoples’ lives or achieving

Table 4-4.—Rating Results of 12 ADF Projects

No. of projects rated

Elements of results High Moderate Low

Overall results

Actual or likely positive impact on social and economic

development of the poor in locale . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 4 6 2

1. Degree to which project is meeting or is likely to meet its

objectives. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 5 6 1

No. of projects rated

Positive No Change Negative

2. Actual or likely economic impacts on participants . . . . . . 10 2 0

3. Actual or likely social and organizational impacts

Actual or likely social impacts . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 9 2 1

Actual or likely organizational impacts overalla . . . . . . . 9 1 1

Impacts on local groups . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 10 1 1

Impacts on intermediary organizations . . . . . . . . . . . 4 3 1

4. Actual or likely environmental impacts during grant

period . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1 8 3

NOTES:

aln one case, impacts Were rated positive on local groups but negative on the intermediary organization SO nO Overall ranking

was given

bEight grant recipients visited were intermedia~ 0r9aniZatiOnS.
67

other development goals, as seen above

(Tutume).

Conversely, a project can be behind schedule in meeting objectives, or only partially meet

them, and still have important impact, For example, the one project with a low rating on

meeting its objectives (Morogoro, Tanzania)

had notable impact on many participants during the first agricultural season. participants

who received the entire range of project services (tractor plowing, improved seeds, fertilizers, pesticides, and extension advice) increased their maize production significantly in

a year of lower-than-average rainfall. But projected numbers of participants were overambitious and one tractor arrived rather than

three, and that one late. Only 150 acres were

plowed, less than one-tenth of what was

planned for the first year. Overall, however, the

OTA team assessed this project’s likely future

impact favorably. Thus, the types and values

of actual benefits and the number of beneficiaries are more important than rigidly meeting

project objectives. To measure impact accurately, baseline data and data on specific effects on beneficiaries must be collected, but in

only one case had any attempt been made to

collect this information (PfP).

OTA teams assessed what factors helped and

hindered projects in achieving their objectives

and goals. Common positive factors were good

leadership, organizational strength, a ready

market for production, simple available technology, and either government support or complementarily with government policies. Commonly cited factors constraining results were

lack of markets, poor production plans, and the

lack of provision for maintenance and repairs.

Feasible strategies to meet recurrent costs and

replacement reserves did not exist in most

projects. In a number of instances, organizational and management weaknesses were also

cited. Finally, delays in project startup and in

disbursal of funds affected five of the agricultural projects visited.

Team members also attempted to evaluate

whether ADF’s projects achieved, or were likely

to achieve, their objectives more often than similar projects funded by others. Based on interviews with outside researchers, donors, and

government officials, this was judged true in

two-thirds of the projects, but not in the other

one-third. The comparison, generally, was to

past bilateral or multilateral governmental programs rather than to programs supported by

PVOS or other private funders because few examples of the latter were available. This finding needs to be placed in a broader context,

however: many of these types of projects (irrigation, tractor-hire, rural water supply, and rural credit) have a poor track record in Africa.

2. Actual or Likely Economic Benefits

Ten projects had, or were likely to have, positive economic outcomes for the participants
—

68

and no change was probable in two (table 4-4).

The specific benefits, the number of people receiving them, and their value are described in

the project summaries (app. B). These values

were estimated based on interviews with participants because the projects had neither collected baseline data nor data about increased

production and income resulting from project

activities.

A project’s economic effect in most cases was

greater beneficiary income due to increased

production of crops or livestock. In 7 of the 12

projects, an important component of the increased production was (or will be) provision

of water; in 4, provision of credit; in another

4, provision of agricultural inputs with extension advice.

Other economic benefits include increases

in the value of land or in saving time collecting firewood, carrying water, or plowing. For

example, the value of land in one community

in Kenya rose from $625 per acre to $1,250 an

acre as a result of construction of the NGK

water supply. But the distribution of the economic benefits ranged widely.

Beneficiaries totaled fewer than 100 persons

in 4 of the projects; in 2, more than 2,000 (table

4-2). The value of the increased yearly production caused by the ADF-funded activities

ranged from $540 per year per person in the

Boiteko project to $14 in the Morogoro project.

But the $14 represented a 10 percent increase

in annual income for the participating farmers

in Gairo, Tanzania. Usually other members of

households benefited indirectly in some way.

Finally, OTA calculated the cost to ADF per

participant by dividing the grant amount by

number of participants. The cost to ADF per

participant averaged $650—Morogoro’s was

$624 in the first year–and ranged from $50

(Union Kaoural) to $3,507 (Boiteko). After these

projects have completed several years, it will

be possible to calculate the ratios of ADF-costsper-participant to benefits-per-participant to

provide a measure of the economic efficiency

of ADF’s funding. The Foundation as yet has

not used simple cost/benefit analysis as an element in making funding decisions.

3. Actual or Likely Social and

Organizational Impacts

Three-fourths of the projects that OTA visited

were judged to have, or be likely to have, positive social and organizational impacts. The

positive social impacts on the community principally flowed from the concrete benefits the

project brought or would bring. Less tangible

effects identified by project leaders andlor participants and communicated to OTA teams

were a sense of pride in themselves and their

community, the skills learned while implementing the project, and the sense of power that accompanied the knowledge that the group could

successfully carry out development activities.

Negative social effects included actual or potential conflicts with those who lost control of

assets or were left out such as herders in Ross

Bethio and Morogoro and farmers downstream

from NGK’s water project. But because of other

effects in these cases, the net social benefits to

the local community were still rated positively.

Likewise, projects had positive effects on

funded organizations related to the experience

of planning and implementing their projects

and from the organization’s ability to deliver

goods or services to members. The ADF projects were judged to have positive effects on all

four grassroots groups, but only one-half of the

intermediary organization seemed likely to benefit. In one case, the project activity strengthened participating local groups but contributed

to divisiveness between some groups and the

intermediary organization (Union Kaoural). In

others, benefits principally flowed to the local

group with little organizational effect on the

intermediary organization.

4. Acutual or Likely Environmental

Impacts During Grant Period

The findings on environmental impacts were

less positive than on economic and organizational effects (table 4-4). Only one project (AFC)

was judged to have a positive environmental

impact because planting tea on mountain slopes

in Zimbabwe can help prevent erosion. Simultaneously, however, coffee planting is increasing due to declining tea prices and the erosion
69

potential of coffee can be high. Negative environmental impacts could already be seen in

three projects. In installing its 100 hectare irrigation system near the Senegal River, the RossBethio Association bulldozed a considerable

number of trees and shrubs and destroyed some

grassland. This degradation was poorly balanced with only modest reforestation efforts.

Removing tree stumps and plowing during low

rainfall years has led to soil erosion in Tutume,

Botswana. Compaction is beginning to affect

soil structure in the Boiteko project in Botswana. Eight projects were judged likely to have

no significant negative environmental impact

during the rest of the grant period. However,

negative impacts may appear in the mid- t o

long-term.

What Do ADF and the Community Put

Into ADF-Funded Projects?

Since project results should be considered in

relation to their costs, or inputs, OTA also

sought to identify the resources contributed by

ADF, the community, and other donors.

The Foundation’s grant funds were allocated

to the 12 projects for the following uses:

●

●

●

●

●

●

●

46 percent for equipment: construction, infrastructure costs for wells and/or irrigation systems in 7 projects, tractors in 2;

5 percent for vehicles/transportation:

trucks or motorcycles were purchased in

5 projects, rented in 1;

18 percent for revolving credit funds, a

component of 4 projects;

10 percent for agricultural inputs: seeds,

fertilizer, implements for individual

farmers in 4 projects;

9 percent for salaries and office expenses:

while 9 projects had staff, ADF funds paid

staff salaries in only 5 cases;

4 percent for training and technical assistance obtained outside the project; and

9 percent for other expenses: ADF audits

and evaluations, contingency funds, and

an ADF documentary film.1

‘Total greater than 100 percent because of rounding,

Typically, ADF provides money for materials and the community provides labor. Often

the community also provides funds, through

individual fees, community fundraising efforts

and materials. The community contributions

to the ADF projects are measures of their support of the project. Contributions include:

●

●

●

labor: in nine projects most participants

contributed labor; in two others, one-half

did. For example, in the NGK water project

participants contributed an average of 115

days’ labor digging trenches in a year and

one-half. At Boiteko, the women continue

to contribute substantial labor in vegetable production and raising chickens. But

in Dagnare, members hired laborers to

work for them.

money: in one-half the projects most participants contributed some money in support of project activities. Usually this was

a small amount in relation to total project

Cost.

material: in one-half the Proiects more than

half of the participant; contributed material.

Tbe Role of Other Donors in

ADF-Funded Projects

All 12 organizations visited had external

funding sources in addition to ADF, and 4 used

those funds for the ADF-funded project. In 9

of the 12, more than one outside donor supported the organization and/or ADF-funded

project. The outside donors included U.S. AID

(PfP; Ross Bethio), the World Bank and African Development Bank (AFC), other bilateral

donors (Dakoro; Union Kaoural; PfP), European

religious donors (Morogoro; Silveira House),

European PVOS (Ross Bethio; Union Kaoural),

U.S. PVOS (PfP; Malihai), private foundations

(Dakoro; PfP), and the U.S. Ambassador’s SelfHelp Fund (NGK; Ross Bethio),

OTA teams found that in four cases some

alternative funding was available for the project

had ADF funds not been provided. Alternative

funding was less certain in six cases; in two

cases, no viable alternative funding was available for the project.
70

Therefore, the Foundation is not the only fun- few cases, ADF-funded activities also obtained

der of its grantee groups nor, in many cases, some African government funding (Tutume) or

of their projects, Often its money is being used government-supplied technical assistance. For

with that of other donors to provide larger example, district water officials in Kenya deamounts of funding than would be available signed the NGK water system and supervised

from a single source or to provide for continu- technical aspects of its construction.

ity of projects from one grant to another. In a

SUSTAINABILITY

What is Sustainability and How Can

It Be Measured?

Sustainability is generally understood to

mean that the project activity and/or its positive results will continue after the grant period

ends. It can be judged on several levels: sustainability of the resource, of certain activities,

of the project, of the local group and/or the intermediary organization. Also, sustainability

has economic, environmental, technical, and

social elements, and policy factors can intervene. Therefore, sustainability depends on

many dimensions of an activity and failure in

one area can jeopardize sustainability overall.

The Foundation includes most of these elements in its project appraisal checklist:

●

●

●

●

financial sustainability;

project self-sufficiency, generating enough

income to cover costs;

probability that the funded organization

will pursue other projects after the funded

one; and

effects on the environment.

These criteria were expanded for this assessment. For example, expecting that environmental sustainability might be a problem for

ADF as it has been for other donors, OTA based

its considerations of environmental sustainability, in part, on questions that emerged from

the reviews of ADF’s project files regarding

renewable resource technologies (box 4-2).

Teams sought a range of specific data during

site visits and other interviews in Africa (app,

D).

Key elements of sustainability for rating the

12 projects were:

●

●

●

●

economic aspects, including market for the

product, provision for recurrent costs,

preparation of business plans, and financial management capabilities;

organizational/social aspects, including

quality of leadership, track record of the

organization, participation of members in

decisionmaking, access of the organization

to financial resources, and whether or not

current activities would continue and other

activities were planned, how the funded

activities contributed to growth of the

group;

environmental aspects over the next 3 to

5 years and longer, including positive and

negative impacts on renewable resources

and identification of any measures to mitigate negative impacts;

technological aspects, including site specificity (whether or not the technology was

sustainable in the locale), access to training and technical assistance, and conformity to national development plans and

policies regarding the technology.

Ultimately, sustainability can be judged only

after a grant is completed. Just 1 of the 12

projects visited (NGK) had completed the ADF

grant period, and that only recently. But planning and decisionmaking for sustainability

should occur throughout the project cycle,

Therefore, the presence or absence of these elements often are indicators of what will happen

in the future. These rankings define the near

future as 3 to 5 years.
Box 4-2.—A Look at ADF’s Files: ADF’s Use of Renewable Resource Technologies

OTA examined ADF’s files of projects relating to agriculture and renewable resources, identifying the types of technologies used and attempting to determine how ADF accounts for environmental

sustainability.

ADF’s grassroots mandate appears to have high potential. ADF is well placed to become the primary assistance agency that blends ecological concerns with the urgency for Africans to raise adequate food and to provide adequate water. The Foundation is positioned to help Africans “break the

infernal cycle of people being forced to misuse their natural resource base, ” as one African forester

describes it. Even without such an ambitious goal, however, ADF could make improvements in its

work to avoid environmental problems.

This review’s most important finding is that ADF project documents contain little information

on field-tested and accepted technologies that could:

● mitigate additional stress on existing resources, and

● help increase farm yields and incomes on a sustainable basis via proven methods such as water

conservation, windbreaks, terracing, native trees, sand stabilization, and agroforestry plantations.

Files tend to yield incomplete and insufficient information to determine what resource-related

activities are underway and to identify the environmental impacts of agricultural projects. Evidence

is strong, however, that ADF-funded organizations could use resource-related technologies much more

often as primary and adjunct project activities.

Yet the Foundation is not ignoring the need for environmental protection and the use of resourcerelated methods. For example, ADF has funded several activities that integrate resource concerns

into predominantly agricultural projects. Of 56 projects examined, 3 dealt significantly with resourcerelated activities and 9 projects had resource activities as accompanying measures. The Foundation

could do more, however, to account for such concerns on a more sophisticated level, more thoroughly,

and more systematically. Agricultural projects that involve mechanical soil preparation, land clearing, or water development efforts where yields are large should raise flags in the minds of ADF staff.

The Foundation’s position is difficult because it responds to local initiatives and many Africans,

like many other agriculturalists and donors, presently do not give environmental protection high priority. Yet, according to the OTA desk reviewer:

“Any organization dispensing development funds, regardless whether local people, at present, place

any emphasis on the ecological sustainability of their resource base or not, needs some sort of “ecologic

malpractice protection”. . . , If this is not done, those who authorized funding. . . may be responsible (after

.5, 10, or 20 years) for having contributed to making matters worse instead of better; good intentions and

focusing on other, important criteria notwithstanding.”

The key is providing new information so that local people are more completely informed about

alternatives that might better serve them. The Foundation’s expanding outreach and training activities could help fill this need,

SOURCE: Fred R, Weber, “Desk and Office Review of ADF Activities: Renewable Resource Technologies, ” contractor report prepared for the

Office of Technology Assessment, August 1987.
72

Assessing Sustainability in

12 ADF-Funded Projects

Finding: One-half the ADF-funded projects were

judged to have a high potential to be sustained

over the next 3 to 5 years; another 5 were

judged to have a moderate chance to be sustained over the same period, although not necessarily in the same form as proposed.

Longer-term sustainability was not ascertain.

Finding: Strong community support for the

activity and the local organization was identified as an important factor fostering sustainability of the projects visited, while the

lack of careful economic and environmental

planning were common constraints to sustainability.

Six ADF-funded projects were judged to have

a high potential for sustainability over the next

3 to 5 years (table 4-5). Sustainability means the

project activity was judged likely to continue

for this period. Overall, projects sponsored by

grassroots organizations were rated more sustainable than those of intermediary organizations, and projects awarded grants in 1985 rated

slightly better than those funded in 1986.

These six projects are more likely to reach

a greater number of people and/or have an expanded impact on those involved. An excellent

example is the recently completed water and

irrigation system in Kenya (NGK). Vegetable

and milk production has significantly increased

as a result of the water supply to each farm.

The management committee is discussing plans

for vegetable marketing and milk processing.

They have hopes of purchasing a truck and

building a storage cooler for produce. Only one

project was judged to have a low chance of being sustained: the team identified economic,

organizational, technical, and environmental

factors that jeopardized sustainability of the Tutume tractor-hire scheme in Botswana. The

other five projects may be continued but with

their effects decreasing over time.

In some cases, a particular activity within the

project is more likely to be sustained than

another, however, suggesting that projects often

will change with time. For example, OTA teams

felt that the activities most strongly supported

by participants would have a better chance to

continue: herd reconstitution rather than literacy in Dakoro, Niger; water supply rather than

reforestation in Kikatiti, Tanzania. Flexibility

in adapting to new circumstances was assumed

to be an important component of sustainability.

1. Economic Sustainability of

ADF-Funuded Activities

Three-quarters of the ADF-funded projects

were judged to have a moderate to high chance

of being sustained economically, but onequarter faced a low chance (table 4-5). For example, OTA found a good to very good market

for the products of four projects, an adequate

market in four, and a poor market in two. But

when OTA teams asked whether or not formal

or informal, simple market analyses and business plans had been prepared for the activities,

Table 4=5.—Rating Sustainability of 12 ADF Projects

No. of projects rated

Elements of sustainability High Moderate Low

Overall sustainability for next 3 to 5 years . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 6 5 1

1. Economic sustainability of activity. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 5 4 3

2. Organizational/social sustainability

Local group/s . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 6 4 2

Intermediary organization . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . ., . . . . . . . . . . . 5 2 1

3. Environmental sustainability

For next 3 to 5 years . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 8 3 1

After 5 years . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 2 9 1

4. Technological sustainability. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 7 4 1

NOTES:

aE1ght grant recipients visited were intermediary ovlanizations
73

they found that only three had market analyses and only one a business plan (AFC).

A greater problem was lack of provision for

recurrent costs of the activity after ADF funding ended: five projects rated low, three average, and four high. While six projects had formal or informal strategies to cover costs, too

often it was not based on careful or accurate

economic analysis. Recurrent costs of the activity were expected to be covered by income

produced by the project activity, income from

a related activity (e.g., rental of the truck in two

projects was not only paying for itself, but

would provide income for the project), outside

donors (PfP), African government subsidies

(Tutume), or community fundraising efforts.

While criticizing the lack of financial planning to cover future costs of maintaining project

activities, OTA teams still judged several

projects to have a moderate chance of being

sustained because of the level of support of the

community and their past record in raising

funds internally and externally (e.g., the Kikatiti

water system). Traditional community fundraising efforts can best meet sporadic needs,

such as the breakdown of a pump, but not regular expenses such as paying the monthly electric bill and the system’s guard. But the local

groups’ affiliation with an intermediary organization, in this example the National Malihai

Club, could assist them obtain additional outside resources.

Financial management was rated high in four

projects (all southern Africa projects), moderate in six, and low in two. In both the low cases,

problems centered around accountability between the intermediary organization and local

groups regarding use and control of ADF funds.

For example, intermediary organizations did

not communicate openly and share decisionmaking with local groups regarding ADF funds.

Eight groups had received some financial technical assistance or training, and three had plans

to receive financial training.

2. Organizational and Social

Sustainability

Sustainability of the project activity often is

closely linked to the future of the group funded.

OTA’S assessment teams considered a number

of factors related to the organizational sustainability of grassroots groups, intermediary organizations and their local sub-groups. The organizational sustainability of 1ocal groups was

similar to that of the intermediary organizations

(table 4-5). But the two had different strengths.

For example, seven of eight intermediary organizations were rated high on leadership; six

were low on members’ decisionmaking; seven

had high or moderate access to financial resources. Local groups, on the other hand, rated

better on members’ decisionmaking (10 of 12

projects were high or moderate) but lower on

leadership (one-half were high) and access to

financial resources (4 were low and 6 moderate). Intermediary groups have certain advantages for sustainability, such as access to outPhoto credit: ADF/Christine Fowles

Sustainability is implicit in ADF’s mandate: future

generations should benefit from current development

projects.
74

side resources; however, they also have special

problems. PfP, for example, maybe unable to

continue successful work because external

funds are shrinking.

Artificial organizations established with little rationale other than obtaining an ADF grant

(e.g., Dagnare) had a poor chance of being sustainable. Other groups’ continuation may be

more certain than that of their project activities, especially if such activities are new to them

(Malihai, AFC). Long-established groups (Silveira House) were judged to have a better

chance of survival than a project sub-group primarily organized to carry out one activity with

resources from the intermediary organization.

Management training can help promote organizational sustainability and innovation.

Eight projects had received such assistance and

another three had plans to obtain it. For example, one of NGK’s project leaders received community development training from a Kenyan

training institute and his skill was an important reason for the success of the water project.

3. Envirnmental Sustainability of

ADF-Funded Activites

Environmental sustainability was assessed in

the short- and medium-term and a number of

concerns were identified. Two-thirds of ADFfunded projects were judged to have a high potential for short-term environmental sustainability (table 4-5). Far greater uncertainty exists

about their long-term environmental sustainability.

The kinds of agricultural projects that ADF

funds are known to have a variety of negative

environmental impacts. Government officials,

outside experts, and project managers varied

in their awareness of this. The Foundation and

project managers often made no clear assessment of potential problems. A few organizations, however, had carried out some activities

which increased awareness or helped improve

conditions. For example, one project helped

participants practice intercropping (PfP) and

two conducted some conservation education

(Kikatiti, PfP). Several ADF-funded organizations mentioned plans to plant trees or shelterbelts (Kikatiti, Morogoro, Ross Bethio) or use

integrated pest management methods (Boiteko)

to minimize negative environmental effects in

the future. But implementation of these plans

was disappointing.

A number of specific concerns warrant

greater consideration by ADF and project

managers:

for tractor hire projects: the danger of increased soil erosion and weeds and concomitant risk to farmers’ future production; destruction of grasslands and trees;

for irrigation projects: the danger of waterlogging, salinization, soil erosion and compaction; destruction of trees, grasslands;

and potential health problems;

dangers to health and soil fertility with increased pesticide use;

dangers of monocropping to soil fertility,

pest resistance and diversified diets and

income; and

the potential of increased water supplies

to cause overstocking and overgrazing by

livestock.

The differing judgments between short- and

longer-term environmental sustainability were

closely related to an assessment of the appropriateness of the technologies chosen by

projects.

4. Technological Sustainability of

ADF-Funded Activites

The Foundation’s funded activities were technologically sustainable for 11 of 12 cases (table 4-5). Teams judged that 5 of the 12 projects

entailed relatively high-technology approaches,

another 5 used relatively high-cost technologies,

and 9 included relatively high-risk technologies.

The latter, especially, seemed to call long-term

sustainability into question. But based on interviews with local researchers, other experts,

and government officials, the teams considered

that technology choices were probably appropriate in every case but one, and that they were

not too high-risk to the participants involved

given the context.

Team members in one case were convinced

by local experts that a technology known to
75

have detrimental effects elsewhere was sustainable in their locale. Researchers at Sokoine

University in Tanzania felt that tractor-hire

schemes could be an appropriate way to increase sustainable agriculture in parts of the

Morogoro region because of rainfall, population density, compensating practices to conserve the land, government policy, and other

factors, But questions about long-term environmental impacts remain, and a need exists to

1) document effects on soil and grasslands of

the tractor plowing schemes being implemented now by the government and others, 2)

design and carry out mitigating measures, and

3) do comparative studies with ox-plow use to

determine in which areas, and with which

farmers, animal traction is more advantageous,

While this tractor-hire program was judged

appropriate, the other one visited in Botswana

was not. Tutume was the one project where the

technology did not seem sustainable for environmental and economic reasons, even though

it was government-subsidized.

In judging sustainability of the technologies,

OTA teams also considered whether the specific activity was in conformity with national

development plans because a favorable policy

environment and supportive public services

can complement an activity. For example, Tanzanians interviewed argued the tractor schemes

of the 1980s would be more successful than the

failed ones of the 1960s and 1970s in part because spare parts and petroleum were available

from government programs favoring mechanization. Technologies were in conformity with

government priorities in all cases but one (PfP).

In that case the activity had the strong support

of local Kenyan officials interviewed precisely

because it was meeting a recognized gap in pub1ic programs by providing rural credit for

women.

Factors Fostering and Constraining

Sustainability

OTA teams identified the following factors

that contribute to the sustainability of a number of ADF-funded projects:

●

●

●

●

●

●

●

●

availability of technical assistance and

training,

strong intermediary organization with

good track record,

good local leadership,

environmentally sound activities,

adequate financial management and

planning,

good markets,

low-risk technologies for participants, and

complementary government policy.

The following were identified as constraints

to sustainability:

●

●

●

lack of or poor financial or environmental

planning,

intermediary organization deficiencies in

target group identification and monitoring,

and

women not involved in management of

projects relating to their work.

REPLICABILITY

What Is Replicability and How Can Replicability usually refers to extending the

It Be Measured? impact of the funded activity, or its benefits,

beyond the group originally included in the proReplicability is often desired by donors be- posal. Some experts consider replicabiIity as

the “multiplier effect.” Often, replicability cause it can increase the impact of their project

funding, Groups such as ADF that fund small- refers to adoption of an activity or technology

by non-participants or by those in other geo- scale projects intend not only that the projects

will benefit local people, but also that they will graphic areas without additional funding from

have larger impacts on social and economic de- the donor.

velopment. The assumption is that the activity Replicability rarely means an exact duplicais beneficial and should be replicated. tion of projects using a “cookie cutter” model
76

or “blueprint” approach. Such attempts have

failed in the past because of ecological, social,

cultural, economic, and other differences between regions and groups.

ADF is concerned that its projects be replicable; its criteria for replicability include:

● results are likely to be disseminated, and

● the project is likely to be repeated.

OTA expanded ADF’s criteria and collected

information on several elements of replicability for the 12 projects visited (app. D). Replicability of project activities, technologies, and organizational processes were each considered

separately because the same or other groups

might replicate the problem-solving or planning

process used for a project, but not the project

activity itself. And the process of taking best

advantage of a situation and recognizing the

unusual conditions necessary for an activity to

succeed can be replicable even though unique

social, cultural, physical and other aspects of

each particular situation might make project

activities non-repeatable. The following measures were incorporated into the final assessment of replicability:

technological replicability: the degree to

which other groups have financial and

physical resources (including infrastructure) to use the technology; whether technologies can be readily learned;

organizational replicability: which management structures, processes, and styles

could be used by others;

level of dissemination: efforts by funded

organizations to spread what they learned;

adoption of technologies by non-participants.

Evidence of project impacts on national policies and institutions was also sought.

Assessing Replicability in

12 ADF-Funded Projects

Finding: Ten of the ADF-funded projects were

rated to have a moderate or high degree of

replicability, and two a low chance of being

replicated. Self-help processes were judged

more replicable than the technologies supported. The relatively high cost of the technologies and high equipment expenses were

major constraints to replicability of project

activities.

Replicability of technologies and of organizational processes was weighed in overall ratings

for each project (table 4-6). These overall ratings were similar for grassroots groups and intermediary organizations. Projects awarded

grants in 1984 and 1985 rated higher in replicability than those committed in 1986. For example, PfP’s project was judged highly replicable.

Since 1980, PfP in Kenya had tested methods

to work with and train local women’s groups,

to help them establish savings clubs and loan

committees, and to administer revolving loan

funds. Many staff had worked with PfP for at

least a decade. PfP recently had applied this

methodology to credit for agricultural inputs

and its methodology was applicable to other

groups.

Table 4-6.—Rating Replicability of 12 ADF Projects

No. of projects rated

Elements of replicability High Moderate Low

Overall replicability in region/country. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 3 7 2

1. Technological replicability . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 5 5 2

other groups have access to financial resources. . . . . . . . . . . . . . 2 3 7

other groups have needed physical resource base . . . . . . . . . . . . 3 7 2

technologies readily learnable. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 8 3 1

2. Organizational replicability. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 7 3

3. Level of dissemination . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 2 2 2

NOTES:

aDue t. the ~reliminay stage of two projects, it was impossible to judge dissemination of Project results.
77

Replicability is not the only measure of

project impact, however. One successful project

(NGK) was rated low on replicability. Another

project, the Tutume project in Botswana, was

being replicated by the sponsoring intermediary organization using government subsidies.

But the OTA team found that the flaws of the

project were serious enough to question

whether replication was desirable.

1. TechnoIogical RepIicability

Almost all of the technologies used by ADFfunded projects can be replicated (table 4-6).

The greatest constraint, however, is that many

could not be repeated without a large grant from

ADF or another external funder. There was a

low chance in seven cases that other groups

could implement the activity since they did not

have access to funds. Thus, for those who consider repetition of the technology or the specific sector activity by another group as the core

of replicability, more than half of ADF projects

were not replicable.

The lack of other suitable physical settings

or infrastructures generally was not a serious

constraint to technology transfer, nor were the

technologies too difficult for other local people to learn. In one case, lack of capability to

control access to the benefits of the activity was

identified as a constraint to replicability. While

NGK successfully completed its water and irrigation system, OTA’S assessment team gave

it a low rating on overall replicability because

self-help construction of gravity-fed water systems is possible in only a few regions in Kenya.

More important, none of these regions are in

.,. - ,..

. . .

● * -

~.

.

. . . 

Not all projects should be replicated

Photo credit: OTA/Scott McCormick

Unacceptable levels of soil erosion may result because the tractor-hire project

in Tutume, Botswana, plowed this land.

.
— — —

78

newly resettled areas where local groups can

control access to the water. Also, the water system was expensive and few funders, including

the Kenyan government, provide such large

amounts of funding to small communities.

Thus, the circumstances critical for success

limited the project’s ability to be replicated

elsewhere.

2. Organizational Replicability

Aspects of the sponsoring group’s management structure, function, or style could be beneficial to other groups in three-quarters of the

projects (table 4-6). Examples of promising organizational elements included the open management style of Boiteko, the interlocking

church committee structure of Morogoro, the

tri-village management committee of NGK, and

national union membership to share information illustrated in Ross Bethio. Generally, OTA

found that the processes, like project activities,

cannot be rigidly repeated. For example, one

weakness of the Union Kaoural project in Senegal was that the intermediary organization’s

leaders imposed an inflexible project model on

all participating villages.

Few, if any, project activities or technologies

funded by ADF were innovative in themselves.

Using the technologies was often an innovative experience for the project participants or

an innovative activity for the locale, however.

The uniqueness of each group and its setting

means that each group must develop its own

activity, assess its own resources and needs,

and make decisions about the best way to reach

its goals. These activities are at the core of the

development process. Enabling other groups

to engage in these activities may be the most

replicable work ADF funds.

3. Level of Dissemination

A majority of the funded groups made some

effort to spread what they learned (table 4-6).

Most intermediary organizations, for example,

intend to implement the ADF-funded activity

in a number of locations, then to expand further. PfP, for example, expected to train 30

women’s groups in managing small revolving

loan funds during the 2-year grant period. Instead, it provided training and loans to 92

groups and cannot meet further demand. Grassroots organizations can disseminate results

through active membership in larger organizations. For example, Ross Bethio is sharing

what it learned about the organization of irrigated rice production through its membership

in FONGS, a national association of village

groups in Senegal.

However, in only three cases (PfP, Morogoro,

and Ross-Bethio), was there evidence that nonparticipants had adopted the technologies introduced by ADF-funded projects. Demonstrated yield increases in these examples led

outsiders to begin to copy some of their neighbors’ successful activities.

Finding: Three of the projects had some positive impact on national-level institutions.

Three projects had an impact on national institutions; all were successful projects run by

small grassroots organizations. Ross Bethio in

Senegal was among the first village associations

to obtain credit from a new National Agricultural Credit Bank; its success has led to the expectation that others can follow. In Botswana,

Boiteko’s success with its vegetable garden and

poultrylegg production has influenced thinking in the Ministry of Agriculture where it is

seen as a successful pilot project. Leaders have

provided technical assistance to a similar horticultural project funded by ADF in Botswana.

Water and agriculture officials from other districts in Kenya are looking at NGK with interest. Government water/irrigation projects often

are not completed and are more costly than

NGK’s project.

Factors Fostering and Constraining

Replicability

In addition to the constraints listed previously, another problem is that organizations

rarely documented concrete results that project

activities brought to the participants, limiting

their ability to publicize results to other communities and outsiders, including government

officials and outside donors. ADF promoted
shared learning in several cases by funding

travel costs for exchange visits between projects

and for managers to attend meetings. Good

communication of project leaders with local

officials enables the officials to bring the project

to the attention of others.

RELATIONSHIPS AMONG

SUSTAINABILITY,

An analysis of the interconnections between

participation, results, sustainability, and

replicability has implications about what ADF

funding can accomplish. It also can improve

ADF’s ability to select and monitor projects.

Although this sample is too small to provide

a rigorous test of correlation, some interesting

patterns emerge from this review of 12 projects.

Complementarities, or positive correlations

among the four critical issues, suggest that more

than one desirable outcome can be achieved

simultaneously and that proposal analysis and

project monitoring must be done holistically.

Trade-offs, or negative correlations, identify

dilemmas for the Foundation and other development organizations because they may suggest that achieving certain results can have undesirable costs in other areas.

Complementarities

ADF’s legislation is based on the assumption

that increased participation improves results.

Generally, this report confirms that assumption.

For example, projects that rated high on participation also rated high or moderate in results,

while projects that rated low on participation

also rated low or moderate in results. NGK’s

successful completion of the water system was

due, in large part, to the labor and other contributions of the residents. High levels of participation allowed local groups to overcome

deficiencies in other areas in all cases, but especially in Dakoro and NGK. In these cases, a

sense of “ownership” by the local group increased the potential for the continuation of

activities. Since the activities meet real needs,

people work to maintain them, even if the initial external investment was beyond their

79

Replicability often depends on conditions

outside of a group’s control, such as market

prices. For example, late government payments

for maize were limiting PfP’s ability to assist

new groups in Kenya.

PARTICIPATION, RESULTS,

AND REPLICABILITY

means. Nevertheless, participation alone is not

always enough to ensure the success of an

activity.

Success in bringing benefits to participants

helped sponsoring organizations gain support

and widen participation in the activity and

group. Examples include the large numbers of

local women’s groups who want to join PfP’s

credit program and farmers who want to register for Morogoro’s tractor-hire/input program

and AFC’S credit program. The positive effect

of results on participation is consistent with

development literature and the experience of

schools that provide training and technical

assistance to community organizations in the

United States (e.g., the Industrial Areas Foundation in New York City, New York). According to this view, organizations develop by identifying realistic actions that bring participants

concrete benefits due to their collective effort.

Thus, OTA’S team members were concerned

that some ADF staff believe that ADF-funded

groups grow as much through failure as success and attributed some problems in ADF’s

grant monitoring to this attitude.

Success in bringing concrete improvements

to participants was found to be a condition of

replicability. For example, the financial success

of the Boiteko group is the reason other groups

want to start similar projects in Botswana. But

not every successful project is considered

highly replicable.

Trade-offs also exist, however, between participation and results. If board members or

other decisionmakers are chosen from elite
80

groups, such as more highly-educated persons

and government officials, they often can help

local groups gain access to financial and technical resources, but they also tend to dominate

groups. This was seen in the Kikatiti, Tutume,

and Union Kaoural projects. The same tendency is true for technical assistance providers,

although OTA also saw exceptions to both, for

example, in the Boiteko project.

Placing too great an emphasis on achieving

ambitious project results in too short a time

period can restrict participation, just as too

much emphasis on participation can lessen results, at least in the short-term. Slowing down

the pace of change and gradually increasing

participation can help bring about longerlasting results. Since cultural norms, such as

women’s low participation in decisionmaking,

do not change quickly, ADF should be expected

to fund groups in which women’s participation

may not be equal but which are at least moving in the direction of becoming more participatory within the local context. The perceived

conflict between participation and results may

be, in fact, only a problem in the short-term.

Another apparent conflict, between replicability and participation, was seen in attempts

to impose external models, which hampered

achieving results in one project, Union Kaoural,

precisely because the desires of the local groups

were not taken into account. This inflexible approach to replicability was a problem for some

intermediary organizations as they attempted

to expand their programs to new sub-groups,

and for some persons selected to provide technical assistance to grassroots groups. Flexibility in adapting to new circumstances, by project

managers and funders, was identified as important in achieving results, sustainability, and

replicability.

Funding intermediary versus grassroots

groups also involves trade-offs. Projects of intermediary organizations may have the potential for broader results, greater sustainability,

and better replicability than those of grassroots

groups but these advantages are not automatic

and often occur at the cost of less participation of beneficiaries in project design and implementation. But possible advantages of grassroots groups in participation may correspond

with lesser results. In certain instances, their

impact, while affecting fewer people directly,

may be deeper. Given the proper context and

careful effort, successful grassroots projects can

be models for others and even affect national

policy. Alternatively, changing the ways intermediary organizations do business may have

a profound impact on the national setting and

alter the structures that constrain or enhance

local efforts. Understanding these potential

differences is important for tapping the actual

strengths of each.

Also trade-offs exist between participation

and sustainability, particularly environmental

sustainability. Often the environmental problems presented by new technologies are dimly

perceived and take a back seat to the immediate, pressing need for increased water or agricultural production. For example, the people

in Tutume, Botswana, wanted tractor plowing

but the OTA team concluded that the long-term

results of plowing are likely to be disadvantageous. While this is a problem for all donors,

it poses an especially difficult challenge for

ADF because of its mandate to support self-help

efforts.

A related trade-off is evidenced in the likelihood that the success of some project activities can cause environmental problems, e.g.,

Ross Bethio’s irrigation of 100 acres and the

acreage plowed by the Tutume and Morogoro

projects. Typically project beneficiaries will not

experience the negative economic impact of

environmental damage for some time, even

though in Tutume the harm is sufficient to

threaten short-term economic benefits. The

donor’s role is to help project managers see the

potential dangers and plan ways to minimize

them.
81

PROJECT FINDINGS, PR0GRAM CHOICES, AND ADF’S MANDATE

OTA’S assessment of 12 ADF-funded projects

identified many areas where the projects’ performance is good. But in several key areas, ADF

is falling short of its mandate, This is especially

true for important aspects of participation, sustainability, and replicability. One-third of the

visited projects had low overall levels of participation, even considering the local context;

ADF’s decision to fund two of them was questionable. Although ADF-funded projects visited

were judged likely to attain short-term objectives and benefit some people, a number raised

questions regarding the overall impact and

aspects of longer-term sustainability. Of special concern to OTA was the portion of agricultural projects using relatively high-risk technologies and the lack of consideration of

environmental impacts. Only two projects rated

low in overall replicability, using a generous

measure that includes replicability of management processes. By a more conventional definition, over half of the projects would be difficult to replicate.

Participation, sustainability, and replicability are fundamental to ADF’s mandate, making weaknesses in these areas a particular concern. The need for participatory development

permeated congressional testimony and debate

during the long process of the Foundation’s inception and is a recurring theme throughout

the authorizing legislation. Sustainability and

replicability were implicit in the discussions

preceding ADF’s establishment. Appreciable

positive impacts over time and across locations

were expected to be a major outcome of supporting grassroots development. Congress codified these expectations by specifying that ADF’s

funded efforts contribute to “social and economic development. ”

The findings regarding the 12 ADF-funded

projects discussed here appear to be applicable to the Foundation’s larger portfolio. First,

OTA’S review of ADF’s files in Washington,

which looked at 58 projects, pointed to a similar lack of attention to participation and concerns regarding financial or economic viability, technical soundness, and environmental

sustainability, Second, interviews with U.S. ambassadors, AID mission staff, representatives

from other public and private development

agencies, and ADF’s in-country staff led to the

conclusion that the projects visited were typical of the country programs in at least five of

the six countries visited. In the sixth country,

Kenya, the 2 projects visited seemed to be performing better than all but 1 of the 13 other

ADF-funded projects, based on information including ADF’s own evaluations of its projects

in Kenya. Third, OTA’S findings parallel and

confirm many conclusions reached by the

authors of ADF’s 1987 evaluations of 10

projects,

The Foundation has had just 4 years to turn

its legislative mandate into an operational program. ADF faced difficult choices along the

way, given the complexity of its mandate and

the challenges of African grassroots development. It has had to balance the distinct and,

at times, apparently contradictory aspects of

the mandate in allocating resources (time,

money, and staff) and setting priorities. The

Foundation’s choices sometimes were influenced by external factors such as congressional

pressure to quickly obligate funds following its

own false start, staff and budget limitations, and

the varied circumstances it faced in each African country. These combined choices are

reflected in the project results discussed here,

The next chapter presents OTA’S findings on

how ADF’s choices have produced both positive and negative results for its funding program. Also, chapter 5 suggests how different

choices may improve ADF’s performance in

relation to its mandate.
Chapter 5

OTA's Findings About

ADF's Funding Program
CONENTS

Page

Summary . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 85

Introduction 85

What’s Working Well . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 86

Areas for Improvement . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 87

High Priority Improvements 88

I. ADF’s Relationship With Applicants and Grantees . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 88

Z. Improved Analysis Before Funding Grants . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 90

3. Project Monitoring . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 99

4. Use of African Staff. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .........101

5. Plans, Communication, and Coordination at the Country Level. .. ...103

Lower Priority Improvements . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .

l. Timeliness of ADF’s Practices

2. Agreements With African Governments . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .

3. Program Evaluation

The Cost of Implementing

Box

5-1.

5-2.

5-3.

and Research. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .

OTA’s Suggestions. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .

Boxe s

A Look at the Files: ADF’s Use of Agricultural Technologies

Factors in Assessing Agricultural Technology . . . . .

A Renewable Resource Decision Tree . . . . . . . . . . . .

Table

5-1. Desk Reviewer’s Assessment

Table

of Agricultural

.,0...6 ●

.*****. .

Page

Soundness . . . . . . . 94
Chapter s

OTA's Findings About

ADF's Funding Program

SUMMARY

● ADF has a committed staff with considerable African experience and has contracted

with qualified Africans to help carry out its

program. It has supported the growth of

grassroots leadership and organizational capacity and the majority of the projects it has

funded are agricultural projects.

● A number of high priority changes would improve ADF’s ability to meet its mandate:

—revise and clarify the roles of staff in their

working relationships with applicants and

grantees;

—improve ADF’s social, organizational, technical, environmental, and economic analysis and facilitate better planning by

applicants during the project approval

process;

—improve communication with project managers and be a more active facilitator to

assist them identify problems and resources during project implementation;

—progressively enhance the responsibilities

of ADF’s African staff in project identification, approval, and monitoring; and

—increase communication with other development organizations, especially those that

assist similar recipients, in the countries

where ADF has programs. The Foundation

should begin to develop country strategies,

identifying its niche in each country.

● A number of lower priority but important

changes also would contribute to ADF’s effectiveness:

—streamline the project approval process

and reduce unnecessary delays,

—conclude agreements with African governments where appropriate, and

—address issues regarding the scope of

ADF’s current portfolio of funded projects,

e.g., consider funding a more balanced mix

of social and economic development activities and projects, and linking research and

funding programs more closely.

INTRODUCTION

The project findings presented in chapter 4 Although one function of OTA’S assessment

are an important starting point for looking at was to provide a snaphot of ADF’s current proADF’s program in detail. This chapter inte- gram, a more important goal was to identify

grates that information on ADF-funded projects ways that ADF could improve its program. The

with information gained from interviews with emphasis of this chapter, then, is on areas

ADF staff in Washington and Africa, the re- where ADF could enhance its ability to meet

view of ADF’s Washington files, recent ADF its congressional mandate. However, a discusevaluations of 10 projects, and meetings with sion of possible improvements in ADF’s fundother donors and technical assistance pro- ing program is best placed in the context of

viders, researchers, and African officials. what the Foundation is doing well.

85
WHAT’S WORKIN6 WELL

ADF has a strongly committed staff with considerable African experience. Most of the

Washington-based staff have lived and worked

in Africa, typically as Peace Corps Volunteers

or staff and, thus, know something of the local

cultures and languages in at least one African

country. In addition, ADF is selecting qualified

Africans to be Regional Liaison Officers (RLO),

Country Resource Facilitators (CRF), and technical consultants to support its program.

Most significantly, relative to its mandate,

ADF-funded projects have enhanced grassroots

leadership and the capacity of funded organizations to manage their own activities. The

Foundation makes a laudable effort to allow

control of the project to remain in the hands

of funded groups. For example, ADF disburses

money directly to African organizations, which

manage their own funds. In most cases, ADF

allows the groups to choose their own technical assistance for project design and during implementation. Three groups have used ADFfunded planning grants to design their projects.

Generally, project leaders interviewed by OTA

said they had cordial relations with ADF.

The Foundation provided helpful support and

suggestions while some of the 12 visited groups

were developing their proposals: ADF awarded

a planning grant to the Dakoro project in Niger, suggested that participants provide labor

at NGK in Kenya, and wrote or helped write

proposals based on suggestions of the group

in the projects from southern Africa. Also, ADF

asked the director of a successful agricultural

project, Farming Systems Kenya, to advise

another project being developed in Morogoro,

Tanzania.

Usually, the Foundation has been flexible and

responsive to changes suggested by project

leaders during project design and implementation. In Ross Bethio in Senegal, for example,

ADF allowed project managers to switch to new

providers of technical assistance and to different models for pumps and the project vehicle

after signing the Grant Agreement. ADF’s flexibility in allowing grant amendments, increasPhoto credit: ADF/Tom Katus

Paul Maina, shown examining seedlings with farmers,

directs the Farming Systems Kenya (FSK) project but

he has shared FSK’S experience with additional

ADF-funded organizations.

ing funding for revised activities or costs and

extending the grant period, assisted several

projects. In at least one case, ADF used its simplified procedures for approving amendments

under $25,000.

OTA found some additional examples of helpful actions by ADF while monitoring grants.

Concerns about financial accountability and

reporting, including sending outside consultants to check on use of ADF funds, resulted

in improved recordkeeping and bookkeeping

in several projects. ADF follow-up on the role

of technical assistance helped a male advisor

provide more participatory help to a group of

female participants at the Boiteko project in

Botswana. Visits by the ADF African Country

Resource Facilitator helped improve relations

with local officials in the Dakoro project in

Niger.

The high proportion of agricultural projects

in ADF’s portfolio is appropriate given the per-
87

centage of the African population engaged in

agriculture. The focus on increasing food production and rural incomes is consistent with

the goals of many African national development

plans and other U.S. development assistance

programs. Using the simple yardstick of meeting stated objectives, OTA’S team members felt

that the performance of ADF-funded projects

is at least equal to that of most funding programs in Africa.

The Foundation has begun a promising evaluation process by contracting African professionals to conduct evaluations of 10 projects

and by sponsoring the first evaluation conference of project managers. Its funding of research by African development professionals

is different from and more flexible than most

other research funding programs; the recipients need not be affiliated with an African government agency or university or, during their

research, with an American university.

In addition, ADF has made an effort to spread

its work through publications such as Advance,

Beyond Relief and the Assessment by Development Journalists. It has taken the need for

good congressional relations seriously. ADF

has established and maintained good relations

with many African government officials, on national and local levels, and with African ambassadors in Washington.

AREAS FOR IMPROVEMENT

This assessment also identified significant

areas for improvement. Overall, OTA determined that ADF could be making better decisions about what projects to fund, and that ADF

staff often has ineffective contact and communication with applicants and grantees and could

better support their self-help efforts. Recurring

problems are identified in the findings that follow, but each is not applicable to all projects,

or to the same degree, or equally relevant to

all countries where the Foundation has programs. Of necessity, the findings and the suggestions for dealing with them often overlap.

The areas identified for improvement are

listed in two groups: the first five are of highest priority and reflect a broad consensus

among the OTA assessment’s participants. Staff

roles in relation to applicants and grantees,

project approval and monitoring practices, and

reponsibilities of African staff were most commonly cited as areas needing improvement.

Considerations about country-level communication and planning, also included in the first

group, can help improve project selection and

follow-up. The second group includes lower priority issues, such as the need to reduce the average time taken for project approval and start

up, reach agreements with African governments where appropriate, and increase ADF’s

own internal assessments of its funding program and portfolio.

Each of the following sections identifies actions ADF should take and suggests ways that

they can be accomplished. Also, a variety of

additional ideas are provided to supplement the

initial suggestions. The suggestions are drawn

from the experiences of a variety of private and

official development assistance programs.

Much of this experience is relevant to ADF but

the Foundation has a unique mandate that

differs from other official U.S. development

assistance organizations. Fulfilling its mandate

should include learning lessons from others and

applying them creatively. Also, ADF should be

able to suggest additional ways to meet the concerns discussed.

The analysis in this chapter is based largely

on a late 1987 “snapshot” image of ADF’s program, which continues to evolve. ADF has indicated it is aware of and in the process of addressing many of these issues.

Every suggestion carries a price tag in time

or money. In some cases, suggestions would

add to ADF’s non-grant costs and to the already

long grant approval process. In other cases,

these suggestions could make better and more

timely use of existing resources. Such considerations are noted below.
88

High Priority Improvements

1. ADF's Relationship With Applicants and

Granteess

Finding: Too often ADF has had an ineffective

relationship with applicants and grantees.

Often ADF is too passive, but at times it is

too involved. In the former case, potential to

assist the group’s development is neglected.

In the latter, the self-help process may be

bypassed inappropriately. The resulting

inadequate information, insufficient analysis, and inappropriate follow-up action has

limited the degree to which the Foundation’s

funded projects are meeting ADF’s mandate.

Discussion.— ADF often takes a passive,

hands-off approach to its applicants and grantees. As a result, the Foundation’s working relationships are often less effective than they could

be. This approach is in part the outgrowth of

a valid rejection of other approaches which

deny participants control; it is also due to an

implicit and debatable assumption that the lack

of capital is the only constraint to rural development. And it is the outcome of logistical limitations imposed by distance. One major concern is ADF’s handling of the approval process.

Often ADF is too accepting of proposals, in part

because it too strictly interprets its mandate to

support self-help projects designed by African

groups. ADF assigns priority to local control,

assuming that local participation accompanies

it. This focus on local control also leads them

to doubt the need for technical expertise on staff

(8). However, this lack of balance in ADF’s approach works against its fulfillment of its mandate to foster participation and support self-help

efforts.

In other cases, ADF has not hesitated to suggest and require changes in project design. This

inconsistency causes some confusion among

ADF staff and its grantees about ADF’s role in

relation to project design and implementation,

Although some efforts have been taken to clarify and explain ADF’s expectations, more needs

to be done.1 OTA teams found instances where

ADF provided helpful advice, but they also

‘Workshops held in Togo and Zimbabwe in early 1988, with

sessions for applicants on how to prepare a proposal for ADF

and for grantees on ADF’s monitoring procedures, are a step

in this direction.

found as many cases of inappropriate interventions with negative consequences and poor

follow-up on good recommendations.

ADF made major changes in project design

in several cases without significant input from

participants. In each of these cases, ADF had

some basis for making the changes and the

project leaders formally accepted the changes

by signing the grant agreement. But the alterations hurt the project’s ability to meet ADF’s

goals to foster local participation in self-help

efforts.

For example, in a project in Senegal, ADF

removed the participants’ highest priority—

cereal banks—from Union Kaoural’s original

proposal and dropped another element—pharmacies—in one-half of the villages. Union

leaders continue to disagree with the consultant’s findings that these two priorities would

duplicate existing services. ADF’s decision was

cited by the Union’s leadership as one factor

that increased tensions among its members;

ultimately a majority of the member groups left

the association.

In another case, ADF compromised with local government officials who insisted on substantial changes to the project proposed by a

herders group in Niger. Placed in an awkward

position by mistakenly bypassing these officials

earlier, ADF agreed to several unnecessary

project modifications and to placing an inappropriate degree of control in the hands of these

officials. ADF accepted a budget for technical

assistance prepared by the officials which included payments for services that already were

included in their government job descriptions.

Project leaders and participants were unaware

of these provisions and expressed disagreement

after details of the technical assistance budget

(which represented at least 20 percent of the

total project budget) were described.’

2ADF had a different understanding than local officials in

Dakoro regarding payments to the government technicians.

ADF’s understanding was that the technician would be removed

from the government payroll during project implementation.

Since the departure of the OTA team the government technician has been transferred and ADF reports that a private technician has been identified to fill that position.

OTA’S concerns regarding government involvement during

the purchase and distribution of livestock to participants have

been lessened with more active involvement of ADF’s Niger staff

member during those operations.
89

Inappropriate design changes were made in

other cases in response to justifiable ADF concerns. For example, in the Dagnare project in

Niger, an artificial organization was established

of groups with little previous organizational

connection but including poorer farmers to

overcome ADF’s reservations about the income

level of the original applicants.

Sometimes good recommendations to deal

with valid ADF concerns were not followed

through effectively. The Kikatiti project in Tanzania offers several examples: ADF put conditions on the grant requiring that a maintenance

plan for the water system be developed and that

a Tanzanian firm audit the village treasurer’s

books before funds were disbursed. ADF also

recommended that the group receive training

and technical assistance from two related Kenyan projects. But a year later the maintenance

plan bore little relationship to the actual costs

of maintaining the system, parts of it were not

feasible, and the proposed users’ fee was not

accepted by the beneficiaries. ADF disbursed

grant funds to the Malihai Arusha organization

based on an audit showing village books in arrears for 13 months, but did not require a timetable for turning over the management of project

funds to the community which would have to

maintain the system. Project leaders did not attend the planned training at the Greenbelt

Movement headquarters in Nairobi nor was

some recommended technical assistance

provided.

Suggestions for Improvement.—Because of

these problems, ADF should reconsider the implications of the various aspects of its mandate

concerning its relationships with applicants and

grantees. In particular, ADF should better balance the various parts of its mandate. For example, elements of participation (in addition

to local control) and contributions to social and

economic development should be addressed

more effectively in those relationships. To do

this the Foundation will need to revise the

responsibilities of its staff in project approval

and monitoring.

Although specific relationships should accommodate each situation, one staff role during approval would be that of facilitator. This

would entail informed, active, and sensitive dialog with applicants, helping ensure that various options have been considered. It assumes

that leaders of local organizations are capable

of analyzing their needs and selecting among

options if provided with adequate information.

Another staff responsibility would be to evaluate critically the appropriateness of ADF’s funding of the project relative to the various aspects

of its mandate and the Foundation’s accountability as a publicly-funded institution. This entails obtaining independent verification of the

information received from project leaders,

ADF should also revise its approach to project

monitoring. The Foundation should develop a

clearer policy regarding staff responsibilities,

including guidelines about when and how to become involved that are consistent with the entirety of its mandate and its responsibility as

a funder.

In this process, the Foundation should review

and revise job descriptions for the Foundation

Representatives, the Regional Liaison Officers,

and the Country Resource Facilitators to reflect

more conscious roles as facilitators and evaluators. Also, ADF should determine and discuss

with potential grantees the nature of their relationship early on, for example, agreeing how

actively ADF will be involved during the approval and implementation periods. This relationship should be flexible and renegotiable

based on periodic review.

Other ways that ADF could examine the implications of all aspects of its mandate for staff

responsibilities include:

●

●

●

hold a staff retreat to discuss the relationship between the various components of

ADF’s mandate and revised staff roles in

relation to applicants and grantees,

examine how other organizations with similar funding programs work out the potential conflicts between responsibility as a

funder for ensuring that money is well

spent and responsibility to grantees to support their control of their own projects, and

invite organizations, such as the Council

on Foundations or the Ford Foundation,

to provide staff training on reviewing and

monitoring grants, emphasizing methods

appropriate to the evolving relationships

between ADF and its grantees.
90

2. Improved Analysis Before Funding

Grants

Finding: ADF’s pre-funding analysis of project

proposals is often inadequate in one or more

of several critical areas: the social-political

context, organizational factors, technological choices, environmental implications, and

economic constraints and opportunities.

Discussion. —ADF has neglected some important elements in pre-funding analysis, in part

because of a lack of financial and staff resources. Also, its reluctance to engage applicants in dialog and one-sided emphasis on local centrol often have discouraged mor e

effective pre-approval analysis. The resulting

lack of information and adequate analysis has

led to funding at least some projects whose ability to meet their own objectives and ADF’s goals

is problematic.

Every ADF-funded project does not have aII

of the weaknesses discussed here, nor do they

exist in the same degree in every instance.

Therefore, the suggestions should be applied

on a case-by-case basis. The ability to select

appropriate approaches for each funded project

is one that every successful funder needs and

ADF needs to strengthen its skills in this area.

Suggestions for Improvement.—ADF should

improve pre-funding analysis, stressing simple

and inexpensive methods of gathering and analyzing data. This analysis then needs to be better incorporated into funding decisions.

To accomplish this better pre-approval analysis, the Foundation should make better use of

its existing Project Approval Guidelines, Rating Sheet, and the Project Assessment Memo

(See ch. 3). For example, the Foundation Representatives and field staff should provide better supporting documentation for major or

problematic aspects of a project. Also, staff

should spend more time (e.g., 3 days) in the field

prior to presenting a proposal to ADF’s Project

Review Committee, meeting with prospective

project leaders and participants separately and

verifying the information received from applicants with independent experts. In addition,

staff should receive training in analytical methods such as rapid rural appraisal so that they

can quickly obtain the most needed information.

Also, ADF could:

●

●

●

use planning grants more extensively to enable funded groups to take part in pre-grant

analysis and improve preparation of their

projects,

review the adequacy of the Grant Application Form, Project Approval Checklist,

Rating Sheet, and the Project Assessment

Memo, and

study and adapt the pre-funding analysis

methods used by other funders with similar mandates.

Finding: Critical elements of participation, such

as participants’ involvement in decisionmaking and their support for project activities,

as well as access to projects by women, minority groups, and poor people often are not

sufficiently addressed in ADF’s pre-funding

analysis. OTA’S review of ADF’s funding program indicates that it is only partially fulfilling its congressional mandate to foster the

participation of poor people in their own development.

Discussion.— ADF’s emphasis on local control has not been supplemented with sufficient

analysis of these and other issues relating to

participation. Key data are not collected and,

therefore, cannot be included in ADF’s ongoing evaluation of its work. For example, ADF

has made little attempt to disaggregate data collection to reflect the participation of significant

subgroups, particularly women, in its projects.

Suggestions for Improvement.—The Foundation should more carefully analyze participants’

support for, access to, and decisionmaking in

the proposed activities and in organizations

seeking funding. Also, ADF should encourage

improved participation in all projects based on

this analysis.

To make these changes, ADF should disaggregate its data collection regarding project participants, decisionmakers, and beneficiaries by

gender, ethnic group, and economic status.’

Also, ADF should establish standards for re3ADF plans to collect this data in its computerized information system beginning in 1988.
—

91

jecting proposals on the basis of a lack of participation; its standards should be linked to

community norms. ADF should also track

changes in participation during its monitoring

process,

The Foundation could use these methods to

implement this suggestion:

● revise the grant application form so that

applicants themselves provide disaggregated information about project leaders,

participants, and the community, and

● hold workshops for project leaders to develop ways to encourage participation.

Finding: ADF’s pre-approval analysis of applicant organizations is often weak, especially

regarding their social-political context, stage

of development and, in the case of intermediary organizations, their relationship with local groups. As a result, ADF sometimes

makes inappropriate funding decisions.

Discussion. —ADF needs better information

regarding organizational history, strengths,

weaknesses, and local context of applicant organizations. Lack of knowledge of local realities

in some cases led ADF to accept problematic

aspects of proposals without question. For example, in the Ross Bethio project in Senegal

ADF accepted farmers’ assertions of their land

claims and was unaware of the existence or vehemence of the rival claim. Had it been better

informed, ADF could have encouraged mediation or, like the Ford Foundation, decided not

to fund the group at that time.

While establishing a working relationship

with local government officials is the responsibility of the applicant, ADF can play a broker

role and verify that an acceptable relationship

has been established prior to project approval.

This can bring increased access to resources

needed by the project. For example, local water

officials designed and supervised the construction of the NGK water system in Kenya. But

in Kikatiti, Tanzania, because such a relationship could not be worked out, ADF justifiably

funded a private contractor, leaving local officials without an investment in maintaining the

system. Poor relationships with local officials

were also a problem in two other projects

(Dakoro, Niger; Union Kaoural, Senegal). ADF

did not seem to identify the extent of the problem or incorporate it in funding decisions.

The lack of in-depth knowledge about the

funded groups could be a factor in the high

proportion of intermediary group projects in

which participation is low. For example, several of the intermediary organizations visited

had difficulty working with subgroups (AFC,

Malihai); had this been identified as a problem

early on, some provision could have been

agreed on to assist the intermediary organization, Knowledge about the larger organizations’

track record, stage of development, experience

with the proposed activity and local groups, and

other sources of funding are critical in making

appropriate decisions regarding the timing and

level of funding. Without such knowledge, determining the best level of interaction with a

grantee during project planning and implementation is difficult.

Finally, since each of the 12 organizations

visited had received outside funds, more consideration of the relationship of the ADF grant

to the work supported by other funders and the

rate of growth of the organization would have

been important. ADF grants need to be considered in relation to each other as well, For

example, in Senegal ADF gave one small community (5 kilometers from Union Kaoural’s

headquarters) a grant of $80,000 at the same

time it awarded Union Kaoural a $106,000 grant

for similar activities in 25 communities in the

area. Tension among villages increased as a result. Funding an activity without considering

its impact on other development efforts in the

locale may inadvertently undermine wider

efforts.

Suggestions for Improvement.—The Foundation should improve its analysis of organizations’ strengths and weaknesses and the likely

impact of the funded activity on them before

approving grants. This involves analyzing the

social and political setting in which the organization works, including its relationship with

local officials, funders, other development efforts, and local groups. Also, ADF should in83-361 0 - 88 : QL 3 - 4
92

volve prospective grantee organizations in prefunding analysis, which would help build institutions, an important aspect of ADF’s

mandate.

To better understand organizations’ strengths

and weaknesses, the Foundation should

differentiate between intermediary organizations and grassroots groups in its pre-funding

analysis, modify its current forms to reflect this

distinction, and obtain information about their

stage of development and future plans. Also,

ADF should contact other funders of prospective grantees more consistently to assess the

group’s track record, its access to other resources, and the relationship of the new grant

to ones already funded or proposed.

In addition, ADF could:

●

●

●

●

use planning grants to build institutional

capacity, especially to increase grantees’

management and technical skills and the

ability of intermediary organizations to

work with local community groups,

provide ADF’s African staff with small

budgets to assist applicants with training

(e.g., for bookkeeping, management) as

needs become apparent,

consider disbursing funding to train project managers prior to funding other aspects

of project activities, such as providing

equipment and materials, and

consider increasing funding for training

components of grants where appropriate.

To foster institutional capacity, ADF could

support steady growth of an organization as

opposed to supporting overly ambitious shortterm plans. In some of the projects reviewed

by OTA, the ADF grant more than doubled the

organization’s budget. The Foundation could

consider the applicant’s experience managing

increasing amounts of funds, and not award

large grants to organizations without adequate

experience. It could use a series of increasing

grants to help build capacity gradually. Also,

ADF could review the impacts of its current

practice of disbursing the majority of its funds

early in the grant period.

Finding: Pre-funding analysis of technical and

environmental factors by ADF and applicant

organizations often is inadequate, resulting

in decisions to fund some projects with questionable technical soundness and, often,

problematic environmental sustainability.

Also, ADF’s approach has not worked to expand the choices of technologies available to

potential grantees.

Discussion.—ADF’s project approval process

inadequately provides for verifying the technical soundness of proposals (box 5-I; table 5-

1). Potential problems and negative evidence

are rarely identified in appraisal documents.

Foundation staff currently lack sufficient technical skills for some of this analysis. Generally,

ADF has not facilitated the use of alternative

technologies nor has its funding program advanced the development of improved indigenous technologies. While several ADF-funded

groups gained improved access to technical information as a result of ADF’s approval process, such cases are in the minority. Some examples of the consequences of insufficient

technical analysis include: unrealistic wellrepair plans (Dakoro, Niger), overly optimistic

production projections (Union Kaoural, Senegal), overlooked environmental degradation

(Tutume, Botswana), and unknown capacity of

water source (NGK, Kenya).

Many agricultural technologies that ADF

funds are those with a poor track record in

Africa, e.g., irrigation, rural water supply, rural credit, and tractor-hire programs. This provides ADF an opportunity to demonstrate the

effectiveness of the self-help approach where

others have failed but it also adds to the burden of verifying feasibility. Nine of the projects

visited used relatively high-risk technologies.

Much current research questions the sustainability of higher-risk technologies. OTA teams,

after conducting interviews with local researchers and other experts, judged that technology

choices were probably appropriate in 11 of the

12 projects, but were concerned that in most

cases ADF apparently had not attempted to confirm whether or not they were appropriate.

More appropriate technologies might have been

available but ADF had not asked project managers if they considered other options, nor provided information on low-cost technologies
——

93

Box 5-1.—A Look at the Files: ADF’s Use of Agricultural Technologies

OTA examined 27 ADF project files in depth and an additional 30 less intensively to evaluate

the types of technologies used in ADF-funded projects and to determine the technical and economic

soundness of these projects. Certain findings Were positive: project documentation shows consistent

improvement over time, the Foundation uses an excellent checklist for approving projects, and ADF’s

senior management recognizes and is willing to correct Weaknesses in technical staffing. Other, serious concerns remain.

No rigorous analytical framework is applied consistently to assess a project’s technical coherence and feasibility and economic soundness, sustainability, and replicability (table 5-I). The qualitative application of the approval checklist allows criteria to be met Without providing supporting data

or analysis. The generally poor performance of ADF-funded irrigation projects in Kenya and Mali,

documented in ADF evaluations, demonstrates ADF’s lack of understanding of technical factors that

can make or break a project. Apparently, ADF has not fully learned the lessons of these early problems

and the Foundation continues to give too little priority to ensuring technical soundness. The files,

for example, do not address explicitly the complex factors that determine whether tractors make technical sense. Yet one-third of ADF’s agricultural projects include support for tractors. Also:

● Many ADF-funded projects include multiple-sectors but the combinations sometimes are not

the most advantageous. For example, irrigation projects also could introduce fertilizer and improved seeds, but most apparently do not. ADF could support more integrated cropllivestock

systems, a particularly appropriate type of multiple-sector activity. But since this work is very

demanding of technical and managerial resources, it is often advisable to pursue single sector

projects or sequence sectors over time.

• Technical assistance is used infrequently during project preparation, although it is more common during implementation.

• Production and marketing activities dominate ADF’s portfolio. Natural resource-related activities

play a relatively minor role in ADF’s portfolio (only 10 percent of projects) relative to the magnitude of environmental problems in Africa where agricultural intensification is increasing

pressures on the resource base.

Some of these problems can be attributed to the ADF staff’s lack of training and experience in

the key technical areas of a majority of ADF agricultural projects: agronomy, crop and livestock science,

agricultural engineering, and hydrology. Senior management notes that budget limitations prevent

hiring additional technical staff, The Foundation chooses to hire generalists with community development and cross-cultural experience for the Representative positions and has recently hired part-time

in-country staff with technical skills. OTA’S examination of ADF’s files shows clearly that ADF does

not adequately increase grantees’ access to improved technical advice.

SOURCE: Peter J. MatIon, “Consultant’s Report to OTA,” contractor report prepared for the Office of Technology Assessment, August 1987.

blending indigenous and outside approaches Some ADF staff resist improving in-house

in new ways.

Other evaluators looking at different ADF

projects came to the same or even stronger conclusions. The ADF team evaluating five West

Africa projects recommended that “no project

should be financed” until the applicant conducts a feasibility study, addresses the problems identified, and has the revised plan approved by an ADF expert consultant.’

—.. —

4Abdoulaye Djegal, “A Report on the Evaluation of Five ADF

Projects in West Africa,” ADF, July 1987, p. 26 (Dalakana Project),

and pp. 27-28 (Narena Project).

technical capacity. They are mistakenly concerned:

. ,, that emphasis in key design and implementation issues would shift away from local

“responsibilization’ and capacity building—

to which they give highest priority among

project objectives—toward technical feasibility

which they appear to associate with a top-down

imposition of foreign expertise and loss of local control. . . . this is a false dichotomy which

can be solved through more imaginative approaches. , . . if done properly, solid technical

input to assess project feasibility and to refine
94

Table 5-1 .—Desk Reviewer’s Assessment of Agricultural Projecta Soundness

Percent of Projects

Uncertain/

Adequate/ Inadequate/ Not lack

feasible infeasible done information

A. 12 projects with major irrigation component

1. Quality of technical assessment . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . — 58

2. Use of technical assistance in

—

performing assessment . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . — 25 42

3. Desk reviewer’s assessment of

technical feasibility. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 25 —

4. Economic cost/benefit analysis done . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . —

—

8 92

5. Economic sustainability . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 25 17

6. Environmental sustainability . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .

—

42 — —

B. 5 projects with major tractor component

1. Quality of technical assessment . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . — 60

2. Use of technical assistance in performing assessment . . —

—

20

3. Desk reviewer’s assessment of

—

technical feasibility. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 20 —

4. Economic cost/benefit analysis done . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . —

—

20 80

5. Economic sustainability . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 20 40

6. Environmental sustainability . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . —

—

— —

C. 8 projects with major seed/fertilizer component

1. Quality of technical assessment . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . — 50

2. Use of technical assistance in

—

performing assessment . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . — 13 25

3. Desk reviewer’s assessment of

technical feasibility. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 25 13

4. Economic cost/benefit analysis done . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . —

—

12 88

5. Economic sustainability . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 25 38 —

6. Environmental sustainability . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 50 — —

aBaSed On 25 projects reviewed in depth

SOURCE” Peter J. MatIon, “Consultant’s Report to OTA,” contractor report prepared for the Office of Technology Assessment, August 1987

elements in design do not contradict the fostering of local competence and confidence. Rather

it can contribute directly to it.5

As another team of ADF’s evaluators of a failing project in Kenya said:

Projects should have feasibility studies carried out before they are funded to determine

their viability. Unsuccessful projects tend to

discourage people, lower their morale, and kill

their initiative. They also lose confidence in the

management and the sponsor and it becomes

difficult to motivate them again for similar

activities.G

The Foundation’s lack of attention to issues

of environmental sustainability and risk are

SPeter J. Matlon, “Consultant’s Report to OTA,” contractor

report prepared for the Office of Technology Assessment, August 1987, pp. 18-19, and 23.

‘Hilda Kohnhiriwa, et al. “KWAHO/Taita Integrated Rural

Community Water Project (TIRCOWAP), Project Evaluation Report,” ADF, July 1987, p. 25.

42

33

75

—

58

58

40

80

80

—

40

100

50

62

62

—

38

50

striking in a continent where the limits of production systems make such concerns of critical importance. Potential negative impacts on

the environment, and measures to mitigate

them, have not been identified early enough in

a number of ADF projects. For example, ADF’s

end-of-project evaluation of NGK in Kenya

noted that irrigation could lead to soil erosion.

The suggested mitigating measures would have

been easier to implement if this study had been

conducted before the construction of the water

system began. Projects including tractor-hire

and irrigation schemes raise red flags for those

with experience in conservation of renewable

resources. Too often, ADF has failed to recognize such flags.

Suggestions for Improvement.—ADF should

perform sufficient technical analysis to be reasonably certain that proposed technologies are

workable and sustainable. Also, ADF should encourage applicants to consider a range of tech-
95

Photo credit: OTA/George Scharffenberger

Improved pre-funding analysis would have identified

technical problems in the plans to repair this well at

Bundu Eggo, Niger.

nologies and suggest alternatives where appropriate. In this process, ADF should identify the

potential environmental effects of project activities and encourage applicants to minimize negative effects and build on positive changes. ADF

should devise various ways to ensure that sufficient analysis is done by applicants themselves.

ADF should develop a variety of ways to verify technical soundness and decide which

would be appropriate for each project. For example, ADF could ask applicants to obtain written verification from local researchers or experts testifying to project soundness and

detailing what additional planning may be

needed. ADF staff should itself obtain such verification during the pre-approval process. Or

ADF could hire in-country consultants to check

on project plans, spending a day or two on site.

OTA is not recommending expensive AID-type

feasibility studies, but brief, independent verification by a qualified professional, usually

available in-country. Outside verification is

needed even if the applicant organization has

some technical expertise. If an applicant shows

sufficient promise, but insufficient planning,

a small planning grant would enable them to

obtain technical or other help needed to plan

their project adequately or test various approaches on a small scale. The plan would then

be reviewed by ADF or a local contractor with

relevant expertise.

The Foundation can improve its technical

analysis of project proposals by increasing the

staff’s capability for making technically sound

funding decisions, especially Foundation Representatives. ADF should initiate a training program to familiarize the Representatives and the

Africa-based staff with a broader range of technologies, including “low-resource” and other

methods that build from local resources and

skills.

ADF staff needs additional skills in issues related to technical and economic feasibility and

training in sharpening community development skills. The addition of African Country

Resource Facilitators to provide technical assistance is a step in the right direction, although

the experience and skills of the people selected

should reflect the types of projects funded if

they are to best fulfill their responsibilities.

Additional training could be offered to existing staff in a number of substantive areas,

depending on the priority needs of the individual. ADF could invite technical experts to provide workshops to its staff, or ADF could send

staff members elsewhere for training. The

Foundation could identify institutions in Africa

which provide training in rural organizing or

community development and attend the training alongside community leaders, or they might

benefit from attending intensive 7 to 10 day

trainings at one of the community organizing

schools in the United States, for example.

ADF staff may lack qualifications necessary

to appraise the work of technical consultants

for some projects, even with additional train-
ing. Some of OTA’S contractors felt this could

be corrected with contracts for activity-specific

technical skills. Others felt that ADF needs

more staff with technical backgrounds to define and assess the work of technical contractors and who could be trained in participatory

community development if needed.

At the same time, ADF should emphasize to

its technical consultants and providers of technical assistance that, although local decisionmaking is to be respected, they have the responsibility to suggest options to grantees and

provide ADF with a critical analysis of the

project plans. Revised work statements and orientation sessions could accomplish this. ADF

could develop guidelines for what should b e

included in these analyses (box 5-2) and for the

qualifications of persons conducting them. The

analysis suggested is to verify that applicants’

plans are adequate and sound, and identify

where improvements are needed. It is not a substitute for the applicants’ own planning. The

approach should stress dialog among equals

Box 5-Z.—Factors in Assessing Agricultural Technology

A complex set of factors determine the success of agricultural projects. Irrigation, tractor, and seed/fertilizer projects are unlikely to have their intended results if these factors are neglected. ADF and its

funded groups need to take them into account for their activities to be sustainable. Expensive or elaborate

studies are not needed. Instead, ADF and applicants should seek a brief independent review, i.e.,

external professional verification that the proposed project plans adequately account for the following factors. ADF might award a planning grant if further analysis is warranted, While problems in

some areas could be resolved at once, others might require monitoring and project changes throughout the grant period.

(1) Irrigation project components:

● hydrological parameters,

● crop mix and extent of complementary input use,

• expected input levels and yield response,

● rules for water access and water management procedures,

● water quality, drainage, and possibility of long-term salt build-up,

● labor conflicts with rainfed activities,

• farmers’ familiarity with irrigated agriculture, and

● market depth, factor and output prices, and price impacts of the project.

(2) Tractor project components:

● initial capital costs without subsidies (non-replicable attribute),

● access to fuel, spare parts, maintenance,

● field size distributions, fragmentation, and dispersion,

● soil types and crop mix (yield response),

● rules determining access to tractor services,

● density and quality of secondary roads,

● slope and topography, and

● soil erodibility and rainfall intensity.

(3) Seed/fertilizer project components:

● availability of improved cultivars—their input, response and yield stability (source of performance information: research station results or on-farm tests?),

● types and amounts of fertilizers,

● crop/fertilizer price ratios, and

● long-term effects of fertilizer use,

SOURCE: Peter j. MatIon, “Consultant’s Report to OTA, ” contractor report prepared for the Office of Technology Assessment, August 1987,
97

and two-way communication between ADF’s

contractors and project managers. The scope

of work could include recommendations to improve the project activity and an assessment

of the degree to which these recommendations

are acceptable to participants. ADF could also

provide training in community development

methods for these experts, stressing the need

● identify several in-country technical experts to review project proposals in their

individual areas of expertise, e.g., irrigation, agronomy, animal science,

● identify several U. S,-based technical experts who could provide a technical review

of proposals, and

to include the group in all stages of their work. ● require that the Project Assessment Memo

ADF could use additional means to improve include information on technical analysis,

technical analysis, such as: whether or not the applicant has explored

other technology options, tried a small pi-

. implement streamlined ways of making de- lot project, knows of others who have concision regarding environmental impact, ducted similar activities; and whether or

e.g., Webter’s decision tree (box 5-3), not a small planning grant is preferable.

Box 5-3.—A Renewable Resource Decision Tree

Avoiding resource degradation requires that project-related decisions be made knowledgeably

and consciously. A decision tree such as the one below could help ADF and its funded groups ensure

that this is the case.

1. Does the proposed activity alter renewable resources?

la. If no, resource sustainability is not an issue; make a statement to that effect in project documents, No further action is required on the subject.

lb. If yes, go to #2.

2. Determine the extent of planned or expected environmental consequences. Whether changes are

“small” or not, depends on the eco- or agro-climatic zone the project site is in. Develop and use

simple field guidelines with illustrative criteria such as:

● Normally, total land-clearing less than 1 hectare (2.5 acres) is not severe, provided slopes are

gentle (under 10 percent).

● Normally, irrigation schemes less than 5 hectares (12.5 acres) do not have significant adverse

consequences, especially if trees and shrubs are planted along drainage canals, roads, etc.

● Water development schemes delivering less than 5 cubic meters of total, additional water per

day are sufficiently small not to cause additional stress on other resources.

Do these guidelines indicate that the effects of the project are minor?

2a. If yes, ascertain that basic mitigation techniques have been added (if they are not incorporated

into the program already).

2b. If no, or if, based on experience with similar projects, other reasons exist to suspect potentially

adverse impacts on natural resources, go to #3.

3. Undertake an expanded resource analysis. Elaborate the magnitude of adverse consequences and

recommend specific, practical ways to avoid or mitigate problems. For example, suggest that where

tractors are introduced, all ground preparation be done along contours (instead of in the fall-line

of slopes). Or introduce trees and shrubs along drain ditches and access roads and provide each

farm unit with a corner for fruit and food trees in irrigation schemes. Where land clearing is involved, leave strips of natural vegetation: 10 meters wide every 50 or 100 meters of cleared land;

if slopes are cleared, these strips should be placed parallel to the contour lines, etc.

SOIJR(; E Fred R Weber, “Desk and Offlc.e Re\iew of ADF Actlv!tles Renewable Resnurce Technologies, ” contractor report prepared for the Office of Tef hnolu~y

Assessment, August 1987
98

Finding: Pm-approval economic analysis by applicants and ADF has been lacking or poor

for many ADF-funded projects. Therefore,

ADF has funded a number of projects with

questionable economic and financial viability.

Discussion.— Income-generating projects

need simple market analyses and business

plans. All projects need plans to cover maintenance and repair, especially of vehicles and

waterlirrigation systems, and other recurrent

costs. Such plans do not exist for a number of

ADF funded projects. Where done, they are

often inadequate and ADF had not verified their

accuracy.

Project documents show little attention to

analysis of whether or not project benefits will

be sufficient to ensure participants’ continued

involvement. ADF does not verify assumptions

regarding availability of inputs, estimates of

recurrent costs and potential market demand,

and production and selling price. Considering

the 12 projects visited by OTA, simple economic analysis of key proposal components

would have raised questions about the Dakoro

project’s cooperative store (such stores have a

poor track record in the Sahel and previous

stores run by the same managers failed);

Morogoro’s plan to purchase maize produced

by project participants (dropped by project

managers as unrealistic by the time of the OTA

visit); and the plans to maintain the NGK and

Kikatiti water systems (fundraising plans approved by project leaders would not meet projected costs of maintaining the systems). The

need to include economic and financial analysis in proposals was also noted in ADF’s internal evaluations of projects in West Africa and

Kenya. Finally, in making choices among prospective grantees, the Foundation has not included calculations of benefits and costs per

participant or overall economic return.

Suggestions for Improvement.—The Foundation should do more to encourage and help applicants do better pm-grant economic planning.

Simultaneously, ADF should do better economic

analysis of project proposals. The methods used

should be simple, straightforward, and inexpensive.

Photo credit: ADF/Tom Katus

The products of many ADF-funded projects are sold in markets such as this one in Morogoro, Tanzania. Ensuring that

applicants have adequate marketing plans should be a crucial part of ADF’s project approval process.
99

ADF should require applicants to use simple

financial and economic planning appropriate

to the project proposal, i.e., simple market analysis, production plans, and plans for obtaining inputs, maintaining and replacing equipment, and providing for recurrent costs. ADF

could require applicants to submit these plans

with their application. The Foundation should

independently verify the economic sustainability of projects by its own analyses, either by

ADF staff or consultants, or others outside of

the project. ADF’s evaluation of project financial planning should be documented in the

Project Assessment Memorandum. Also, ADF

should explore realistic ways to integrate rough

estimates of costs and benefits per participant

and overall economic return into the Foundation’s funding decisions.

Also, the Foundation could consider:

●

●

●

providing training and technical assistance

to project managers to assist them in developing their economic plans,

providing planning grants or written materials, such as how-to guidelines of what

economic plans to include in project

proposals, and

training ADF staff in simple economic

.

analyses,

3. Project Monitoring

Finding: The way that ADF monitors projects

does not provide enough information for ADF

to be an effective facilitator during project

implementation. Therefore, ADF misses

timely opportunities to assist grantees and

increase the likelihood of project success.

Discussion.—All funders find that grant

modifications must be made as projects are implemented, especially if pre-planning has been

less than ideal. ADF has shown a high degree

of flexibility y in some cases in the face of changing project circumstances and this should be

continued. However, in other cases, ADF’s lack

of information and passivity at critical junctures let opportunities slip away to assist grantees in addressing problems and to reinforce

their success.

Omissions during monitoring can affect the

ability of the group to carry out its planned

project. For example, lack of close monitoring

and dialog with project managers led to confusion over the role of the intermediary organization in Kikatiti, Tanzania. The Foundation’s distance was also at least partially responsible for

lack of follow-upon developing realistic plans

to finance repair and maintenance for Kikatiti’s water system. More seriously, ADF was unaware of major differences developing between

the proposal and actual project activities in several cases. The most dramatic instance was

Ross Bethio, Senegal, where ADF was unaware

of the conflict over land rights and the fact that

its funds were used to remove Fulani herders

from the lands they traditionally used for grazing. In the Union Kaoural project, two-thirds

of the recipient groups were changed without

ADF’s awareness.

Generally, systematic follow-up was lacking

regarding participation in decisionmaking, economic and financial planning, technical assistance needs, negative environmental impacts,

and self-evaluation. Many problems and suggestions identified by ADF evaluators who reviewed 10 projects in West Africa and Kenya

could have been identified and dealt with earlier

if ADF’s monitoring was stronger,

parallel to pre-funding analysis, confusion

about ADF’s monitoring role is due in part to

a “hands off” approach, an outcome of ADF’s

perception of its mandate to maintain local control. Determined not to diminish local control

or foster dependency, ADF has often shunned

the more active role of a facilitator during

project implementation, opting instead for the

more cautious role of observor. Although ADF

has developed a good monitoring checklist, it

is not completed by ADF staff after reading

progress reports or making site visits. Nor are

staff required to document information on this

checklist.

Lack of funds for staff travel to project sites

in Africa at times contributes to inadequate

monitoring. While most projects are visited

once a year, often it is a quick visit. ADF staff

accompany project managers, especially of the
100

intermediary organizations, and have little time

to talk privately with participants or outside

experts.

Quarterly progress reports could be an important monitoring tool but the instructions of

what project managers should include in these

reports are sketchy and they usually do not contain critical information. Project information

flows to Washington too often without the

Foundation providing constructive feedback to

grantees. Many project managers, and at least

one African staff member, complained of the

lack of feedback on these reports. The Foundation’s own evaluation of East African projects

found the same need for improved monitoring

and increased feedback.

The Foundation is aware that monitoring cannot be done from afar and decided to contract

with staff who are closer to the funded groups.

However, ADF has not optimized their role in

project monitoring. For example, Country Resource Facilitators have been instructed not to

become involved in issues related to project

management and they do not regularly receive

copies of quarterly reports.7 Nor do they have

sufficient funds for transportation to visit

projects regularly.

Suggestions for Improvement.—The Foundation should increase and improve its project

monitoring. At a minimum, this means that

ADF should spend more time with grantees,

especially with project participants other than

leaders and with non-participants. Also, ADF

should make better use of its monitoring checklist (for example, to review quarterly reports,

document findings of field visits, and suggest

follow-up actions) and increase timely feedback

to project managers. ADF should evaluate the

effectiveness of the technical assistance provided with grant funds.

7ADF reports that their African staff now receive copies of

project quarterly reports. ADF staff, at a conference in October

1987, made a number of additional suggestions about the monitoring system including improving information received in the

quarterly reports, use of the computerized management information system to improve follow up, and more frequent visits

by the Country Resource Facilitators. ADF plans to implement

these suggestions in 1988.

In general, ADF should give higher priority

to monitoring by spending additional time and

resources in the field. ADF projects could be

visited at least twice a year (at least once by

the Foundation Representative). Sufficient time

should be allowed for dialog with project

managers, local project committees, and participants as well as for meetings with persons

outside of the project to obtain independent

views. The degree and kind of monitoring depends on the needs of each project. For example, when serious problems arise, more frequent

meetings could be planned between ADF staff

and project managers.

Also, ADF should continue to develop and

implement its plans for internal and external

evaluation of funded projects, recognizing the

different purposes and timing of each. Internal evaluation and monitoring procedures are

primarily designed to help the funded group

learn and to assist in its planning. Thus, such

evaluation should be conducted by the group

throughout the project cycle. External evaluations are primarily for accountability and learning about project impacts by the donor and

others. They are normally conducted at the end

of projects or midstream in longer projects.

Both can be done in participatory ways and require collection of baseline data so that progress

can be checked against the situation before

project activities began.

The Foundation could also address concerns

regarding monitoring by:

●

●

revising its quarterly progress report form

to clarify what information is needed and

reducing the processing time (and steps)

in Washington,

organizing workshops for project managers that address common issues such as

project management and participatory

evaluation. a

For example, a workshop

could help grantees develop ways to collect information on socio-economic characteristics of the people served and on

‘ADF’s workshops for project managers, held in Togo and Zimbabwe in early 1988, helped explain ADF’s monitoring procedures.
101

project impacts on yields, the environment,

and participants (30,9), and

● studying monitoring systems of other funders

of community organizations, such as the

workshops that the Kellogg Foundation

sponsors for its overseas grantees, and exploring ways to reduce reporting requirements when there are several funders of

one project.

4. Use of African Staff

Finding: ADF African field staff are underused

in pre-funding analysis of projects and in

project monitoring. As a result, ADF’s

decisionmaking procedures are slowed, the

Foundation misses helpful analysis regarding applicants and grantees, and the projects

miss the benefits of closer facilitation. Also,

ADF is losing important opportunities to

strengthen Africans’ capabilities, another

aspect of its mandate.

Discussion.—An improved project appraisal

and monitoring process would be difficult to

implement without having ADF staff incountry. African staff now play primarily an

administrative role with little analytical or decisionmaking responsibility for project approval

and monitoring. The terms of the new cooperative agreements with the Country Resource

Facilitators address only some of these issues.

For example, the current agreements with both

Regional Liaison Officers and Country Resource Facilitators emphasize monitoring

responsibilities, but do not mention a role in

analysis during the approval process. In fact,

one African staff person understood his responsibility was to pass proposals to Washington

without comment on their merits. ADF staff

Photo credit: ADF/Joe Kuria

The Foundation could tap the expertise of its African staff by assigning them greater responsibility. Here, Gilbert Maeda

(Country Resource Facilitator for Tanzania) and Tom Katus (Foundation Representative) discuss the Albalbal Water Development Project in northern Tanzania with Maasai project participants.
102

has discussed expansion of the roles of the Regional Liaison Officers and Country Resource

Facilitators, but current emphasis is placed on

familiarizing new staff with ADF.

African field staff could play a key role in

working with applicants during development

of their projects and/or in helping ADF weigh

project proposals. This will require carefully

balancing responsibilities to two clients: the applicants, to whom the field staff could provide

assistance directly or indirectly, and ADF, to

whom the field staff would provide critical

evaluations of proposals’ merits. Like staff of

any funding organization, they would be expected to disclose previous associations with

applicants, and in case of conflict of interest,

decline to take part in decisions regarding

funding.

African and American staff would need additional resources for training and transportation to assume these increased responsibilities.

Training in working with community groups,

techniques for rapid rural appraisal, and specific technical training would be particularly

helpful. Giving increased responsibility to its

field staff would make ADF a more participatory organization and add another dimension

to ADF’s role of building African institutions.

Suggestions for Improvement.—The Foundation should progressively increase its African

staff’s responsibilities for outreach, project

identification, assistance to applicants, prefunding analysis, monitoring, and evaluation.

In the process, ADF should restructure other

staff responsibilities, especially those of the

Foundation Representatives, to reflect the increased responsibilities of African staff. Also,

ADF should explore giving its African staff increased responsibilities for project approval, for

example, for projects below a specified funding level.

This will require that ADF revise job descriptions for staff to reflect new responsibilities and

make other institutional adjustments. For example, upgrading the Country Resource Facilitator job description could eliminate the need

for Regional Liaison Officers, since one field

staff person per country is sufficient given the

size of ADF’s program. ADF is already moving to merge the two positions. Also, ADF

would need to increase contract time and supply African staff with budgets adequate to carry

out their greater responsibilities.

Careful recruitment, selection, and training

of African staff to fill the new country coordinator positions would be an opportunity to improve ADF’s analytical abilities. For example,

the new ADF country coordinators could further develop a roster or talent bank of technical consultants and research groups in the

country to help ADF review proposals, help

applicants develop proposals, and provide ongoing technical support, monitoring, and evaluation. Each could identify an expert agronomist, livestock scientist, and irrigation specialist

to provide an in-country review of relevant

proposals. While ADF could request these experts to providepv bono services, they should

be prepared to pay professional rates. Also,

Country Resource Facilitators could help broker other support services, including those of

local governments, PVOS, and other funders.

The new country coordinators could be given

discretion over a small fund to provide training or technical assistance to groups, or to assist ADF in project appraisal. For example, field

staff could use these funds for exchange visits

of project managers or to allow recipients to

attend conferences. They could also identify

information relating to technologies used by

grantees or their other needs and resource

centers where this information is available.

ADF could also explore giving the African staff

a greater role in project approval beyond proposal analysis.

As the responsibility of African staff increases, the responsibilities of the Washingtonbased Foundation Representatives would need

to be adjusted accordingly. They could, for example, supervise and train field staff, develop

regional funding and training strategies, and

coordinate the development of country plans.

The Representatives could provide general

direction and oversight but leave increased

decisionmaking to the country coordinators,

for example for small grants.
103

A related issue involves decentralization of

funding decisions. Eventually ADF might consider establishing formal regional offices in

Africa. One option would be to move the Foundation Representatives from Washington to the

field to head up such offices.’ However, such

a major change in ADF’s structure is unwarranted at this time because it would be prohibitively expensive in relation to the size of ADF’s

project portfolio. A sufficient number of skilled

Africans exist to make Africa-based Americans

unnecessary at the country level.

Another option would be to allow regional

staff (Foundation Representatives and country

coordinators) to assume larger roles in grantmaking decisions while the Washington review

committee’s power was reduced, The Ford

Foundation, for example, allows regional

offices in Africa to make funding decisions below $50,000. All applications are received and

acted on at the regional office. Proposals over

this amount require approval in New York, but

monitoring is done by the regional office.

S. Plans, Communication, and

Coordination at We Country Level

Finding: ADF’s inadequate communication and

lack of coordination with other private and

official development groups limit its ability

to learn from their experience and help ADFfunded projects obtain additional resources.

Discussion.—The Foundation has been lax in

contacting other donors about prospective

projects. There has been insufficient communication in Africa between ADF and private

funders, including U.S. and European PVOS,

and between ADF and official U.S. development efforts such as the Agency for International Development (AID). Often there is little

or no interaction even when ADF is funding

the same African organization or project. As

a result, critical information has been over-

‘ADF, like the Inter-American Foundation (IAF), has decided

not to establish full regional offices. But IAF Foundation Representatives are responsible for one country (and a number of countries have more than one IAF representative). ADF Foundation

Representatives have responsibilities for three to four countries

with active programs (i.e., where ADF has awarded grants).

looked and opportunities for greater impact

have been lost.

While it is common for a new organization

to stress its uniqueness and difference from

other programs, this “go it alone” approach has

prevented ADF from taking advantage of experiential learning of others committed to

similar goals. It has resulted in missed opportunities for the Foundation to improve its performance and for ADF to share valuable insights with others.

Insufficient communication exists between

ADF and the U.S. embassy and AID in most

countries. In certain circumstances, such as

when a dispute exists between the African and

U.S. governments, it is advantageous for ADF

to maintain distance from other official U.S.

programs. But adopting an arm’s length approach for all countries is not always advantageous. Several ambassadors and AID directors

feel that ADF’s grant size, falling between the

small grants of the Ambassador’s Self-Help

Fund and large AID grants, gives ADF a natural niche in U.S. development assistance. AID

officials, likewise, consistently mentioned the

lack of communication with ADF, even when

ADF funded a group AID had previously

worked with or was currently funding. AID

staff felt that its experience and technical expertise could be useful to ADF. At least one mission director felt that they would have much

to learn from the Foundation,

Better communication does not mean, however, a loss of independence. ADF’s legislated

mandate and its status as an independent

agency not tied to short-term U.S. foreign policy objectives make it inappropriate for AID

officials to expect ADF funding to conform to

AID development assistance strategies, such

as those enunciated in the Country Development Strategy Statements, Nor should AID or

the U.S. Embassy have a role in project approval

(13).

Communication with the Peace Corps i s

somewhat better and has been helped because

many ADF staff formerly worked for the Peace

Corps, including two of the Regional Liaison

Officers and at Ieast one Country Resource
104

Facilitator, and many staff maintain professional ties with their former colleagues. In one

case visited, a Peace Corps Volunteer was the

contact who informed the community about

ADF (the NGK project in Kenya).

Suggestions for Improvement.—ADF should

increase communication with other development agencies. At a minimum, the Foundation

should meet with those groups that share funding of projects and organizations to discuss

plans regarding funding and to determine if collaboration is appropriate.

ADF was established as an independent but

complementary organization which should coordinate with other U.S. development assistance activities “to the extent possible” (Section 504b) and share its learning with others.

Photo credit: OTA/George Honadle

Efforts to promote tractor use have a mixed record in

Africa and ADF should learn from other donors’ successes and failures with tractor projects.

Some experts feel ADF could best fill gaps in

U.S. development assistance by emphasizing

its complementarities with rather than differences from other groups. For example, cooperating with some private agencies could enable ADF to take advantage of its special

arrangement with U.S. government and African officials; cooperating with official programs could allow ADF to take advantage of

its greater flexibility to be an innovator.

Improved communication might become collaboration in some cases. Who to collaborate

with and how would differ from country to

country, based on each project’s particular

needs and the resources of ADF and the other

donors.

For example, ADF could meet with the administrator of the Ambassador’s Self-Help Fund

(or representatives of the small grants programs

of the Canadian government and the European

Economic Community) to review portfolios.

This might help ADF locate local organizations

that have successfully planned and carried out

a project with a small amount of outside funds

and that are ready for a larger grant that ADF

could provide. Or ADF could consider tapping

the technical expertise of AID or other private

or official donors familiar with similar activities or organizations in the locale of a ADF applicant to verify the potential sustainability of

activities proposed by the applicant. ADF could

benefit from checking with other donors familiar with the ADF applicant or its proposed activity in the locale to obtain additional sources of

information on the project. However, U.S. agencies or other donors should not have any approval authority.

AID and ADF might consider cofunding

projects at the same time, or AID might fund

a project after ADF funding has been completed. This, however, could entail some loss

of local control by the funded group. The same

constraint might apply even if AID funding

were provided indirectly through a PVO. But

the problem of donors exercising too much control over a project is not restricted to official

programs and ultimately the African organization must choose which constraints are accept-
105

able. In the case of the women’s credit program

of PfP/Kenya, AID’s Women in Development

office funded it directly before ADF and AID

is continuing to fund it after ADF through

another organization, World Education’s Rural Enterprise Program, with good chances of

PfP’s maintaining local control,

Also, ADF could consider other ways of increasing coordination:

●

●

●

compile information on other funders’ programs to refer applicants not eligible or less

suitable for ADF funding to others,

explore opportunities to share office space

and technical resources, including technical libraries and resource data bases, with

organizations such as the Peace Corps, international research programs, and PVOS,

and

study the funding processes of other

donors, especially-those funding similar

kinds of organizations and activities.

Finding: ADF does not prepare country-specific

planning strategies to guide its use of resources and relate its work to the context of

other local development efforts. Therefore,

the Foundation’s impact is lessened and it has

yet to find its niche in each country.

Discussion.—Little evidence exists, despite

claims, that the Foundation is seeking and finding funding opportunities untapped by other

donors, ADF’s funding portfolios do not appear

to be tailored to each country’s needs and, in

some cases, seem to be overly influenced by

staff preferences. Outreach and project identification are haphazard and not well linked to

long-range planning.

The Foundation Representatives prepare regional strategy memos that vary in format and

depth. These internal memos are more like

work plans containing information on the status of ADF’s funding program, on particular

grants, travel plans, budget, and selection of

African staff, In only a few instances do they

identify funding program priorities.

Annual country plans are best placed in the

context of long-range planning. The Foundation’s Country Profiles come closest to being

country-specific long-range plans. However,

ADF has not prepared Country Profiles for 16

of the 19 countries where it has funded projects,

The profiles for Senegal and Tanzania contain

basic information available elsewhere and some

insightful interpretation (e.g., references to

what certain official policies have meant for

poor people), but give a fairly superficial analysis of the context of grassroots development

efforts. Both profiles were based on interviews

with African, American, and European representatives of non-governmental organizations

(NGOS), grassroots organizations (not in Senegal), research and training organizations, and

donors. Although both profiles made some important program recommendations (e.g., identified opportunities for ADF involvement), neither included preliminary funding priorities

nor proposed an outreach strategy for ADF in

that country. Nor has there been follow up to

fill in the gaps. ADF makes little attempt to relate each country’s funding program to its

profile.

Suggestions for Improvement.—The Foundation should develop brief (10-20 page) annual

country plans and use them to guide its funding program in each country. These papers

should present a profile of the Foundation’s

funding program that year and project its direction for the next year, e.g., identify priority program areas and perhaps geographic areas and

types of groups for funding. Also, ADF should

attempt to develop a clear niche in each country.

ADF staff should more carefully identify its

niche in each country and how it can effectively

fill it. That niche will be different for each country, since it should be tailored to the needs, opportunities, and government situation of each,

and it should be developed in concert with

others concerned with grassroots development.

The rationale for the suggested program focus

for the year could include discussion of how

ADF’s funding strategy complements those of

other donors in the country. These can only

emerge after much communication with others

in each country. The program areas identified

in the country plan then become the basis for
106

Photo credit: OTA/George Honadle

A country strategy should identify a few high priority funding areas to best use scarce resources. In Zimbabwe, for example, ADF funds are helping the national Agricultural Finance Corporation carry out its strategic plan to help small

farmers’ groups such as this one in the Pungwe Valley.

designing an outreach program and/or selecting among a large number of applicant

proposals.

The country plans would sharpen and update

the general funding goals identified in the Country Profiles, where these exist. The country

plans or strategies could also build on the Country Profiles by specifying the best overall approach or mix of approaches to support local

development. Of critical importance are decisions about ADF’s levels of operation (i.e., funding community groups, intermediary organizations, parastatals, individual enterprises, and

even the possibility of collaborating with government programs).

The profiles and plans should identify funding gaps without narrowing the focus to a single sector or issue, which would be inconsistent with ADF’s purpose to support local

initiatives. Nor should they be inflexibly applied

and prevent ADF from responding to new opportunities.

Plans for outreach to specific kinds of grassroots groups in specific areas of the country

for certain kinds of activities could be part of

the country strategy, as could be plans for coordination with other donors and government

officials. The Foundation could provide its staff

with a budget (in addition to the allocation for

project-related expenses) to carry out activities

to support the development of the country plan,

such as funds to attend workshops, interview

researchers, and visit projects funded by others.

ADF’s African field staff could have major

responsibility in developing country plans.

The revised profiles also could identify any

unique social-political characteristics of the

country that might affect ADF’s work. For example, the OTA team that visited Southern

Africa concluded the present approach of ADF

to official U.S. programs characterized by lack

of contact was appropriate in Zimbabwe, where

the U.S. political presence is not entirely welcome, but inappropriate in Botswana, where

this constraint does not exist. The country profiles and plans could include a discussion of

how ADF can cooperate most advantageously

with local authorities, which must be based on

an understanding of the government’s development plans. For example, Kenya’s “District

Focus on Rural Development” presents an opportunity for ADF to support activities of grassroots groups for which complementary services and resources are available at the local

level. If ADF decides to continue actively involving senior staff in the preparation of the

revised profiles, it could prepare only one or

two a year. ADF could delegate the preparation of the new profiles to Foundation Representatives and African staff. Also, the Foundation could benefit from:

● studying the planning processes used by

others. The Ford Foundation’s regional
107

●

strategies and IAF’s biannual country “reviewlpreview” processes might suggest

ideas, ’[) and

preparing streamlined profiles, identifying

its particular niche and funding priorities

in each country (focusing on the types of

information now included in Volume 11 of

the Country Assessment Profiles), with

help from ADF’s African field staff.

Lower Priority Improvements

In addition to the high priority suggestions

for improving ADF’s operations, several other

areas were identified. These include shortening the time taken for project approval and startup, completing operating agreements with African governments of countries where ADF has

funded projects, and directing more attention

to evaluating ADF’s own funding portfolio and

funding program.

1. Timeliness of ADF's Pratices

Finding: An unnecessarily long time passes

between ADF’s receipt of project proposals

and first allocation of funds to successful

applicants. As a result, some project results

are jeopardized and ADF’s credibility is decreased.

Discussion.—ADF’s approval process is unduly long compared to other funders which

fund grants of comparable size (e.g., private

foundations, IAF, PVOS). For the 12 visited

projects, an average of 12.5 months elapsed between the date the proposal was first submitted

to ADF and the date the first check was disbursed (table 4-I), Within this period, an average of 5.5 months elapsed between submission

and approval by the Project Review Committee (PRC) and seven months between such approval and the date the first check was sent.

Following approval by the PRC, approval is required by the Board of Directors, followed by

congressional notification, and then the Grant

Agreement is sent to Africa for signature. FurIoFor an example of applying an IAF country strategy and rationale for program priorities, see Bradford Smith, “Why Fund

a Day Care Center in Sao Paulo?” Grassroots Development.’ Journal of the Inter-American Foundation, vol. 11, No. 2, 1987.

ther internal processing and preparation for

startup took an average 3.5 months between

ADF signing the Agreement and disbursal of

the first check.

The long time required for project approval,

start up, and actual transmission of funds negatively affected projects in nearly half of the

cases visited; two projects lost a year’s production (Dagnare in Niger, Morogoro in Tanzania).

Delays also discouraged participants and undermined support for project leadership in the

Dakoro project in Niger; led to a hastily constructed irrigation system in Ross Bethio, Senegal, which may result in technical flaws; and

generally contributed to internal tensions

within groups. Delays in disbursing ADF funds

also were identified as a serious problem by

the ADF team evaluating Kenyan projects,

These delays were costly because of currency

devaluations in Botswana and Tanzania and

inflation in Zimbabwe and other countries. As

a result, project costs to the applicants were

increased and funding was effectively lowered,

In at least one case (Boiteko), ADF did not adjust the grant following a currency devaluation

and thereby the group suffered a loss in the

grant’s value.

Some delays are outside of ADF’s control. But

other delays are caused by the inefficient execution of and/or the many steps in the ADF approval process in Washington and faulty communication with project managers in Africa.

Some delays could be avoided by working more

closely with promising applicants,

Suggestions for Improvement.—The Foundation should streamline its project application,

review, and approval processes. At a minimum,

ADF should publicize what it does not fund as

a way to decrease the number of ineligible applications received. Then it should improve the

application screening process to eliminate the

applications with the least promise for meeting ADF’s mandate early so staff will have more

time to spend working with the more promising candidates. The key is for ADF to develop

ways to streamline this process while at the

same time improving its approval and monitoring practices. Also, the Foundation should con-
108

tinue to identify ways to speed transmission of

funds to grantees.

Better initial data collection and increased

involvement of African field staff could speed

the consideration of proposals. For example,

spending more time up-front in site visits, requiring better planning by applicants before

they submit proposals, and clearly identifying

and dealing with problems early in the process can save time in the long run.

The Foundation should be more selective at

each stage of the approval process, starting with

project identification. A more systematic approach to outreach and initial screening would

enable ADF to reduce the amount of time spent

on inappropriate funding requests. For example, ADF could study the large number of request letters and initial applications that have

not been funded and publish lists of what it generally does not fund in the ADF brochure, flyer,

and newsletter.

Also, ADF could work more with others to

identify groups that best meet ADF criteria,

especially after identifying country program

priorities. A good example is ADF’s identification of the Morogoro Diocese project. An

ADF team interviewed staff of the Development

Services Department of the Christian Council

of Tanzania, who provide technical services to

grassroots development projects, while developing the Tanzania Country Profile. ADF’s Representative reviewed a number of proposals

from the Council’s member organizations, identified one as a likely candidate for funding, and

then met with the Development Department of

the Morogoro Diocese to discuss project

funding.

Also, ADF could streamline its processes in

these ways:

●

●

examine other funders’ pre-application

processes for ways to design its own. Develop pre-application forms used to make

the first screening decisions before prospective grantees submit complete proposals,

send project notifications to Congress even

during recesses and work with the Ap-

●

●

propriations Committees to simplify notification procedures further,

monitor how recent changes in the Board

of Directors’ approval of projects affect the

time involved and whether sending money

through the commercial bank selected by

ADF speeds the transmission of funds from

ADF to projects in every country, and

identify the reasons causing the average

3.5 month delay between ADF’s signing the

Grant Agreement and actual disbursal of

the first check to develop ways to speed

the process.

2. Agreements With Afician Governments

Finding: ADF has not yet completed accords or

reached informal understandings with 13 of

the 19 countries in which it funds projects.11

This can lead to confusion regarding African

governments’ roles in ADF-funded projects,

delay project implementation, and may

hamper the Foundation’s ability to resolve

conflicts with local officials.

Discussion.—For most official and major

PVO funding programs, agreements spelling

out the purposes of funding and the roles of

donors, recipient organizations, and government officials are generally reached before

funding begins. These agreements could help

clarify the roles of local officials in relation to

ADF projects. ADF has suspended new funding

in Kenya since early 1987 due to the lack of an

official accord. In certain cases, an African government may prefer an informal written

understanding, eliminating the need for a

formal agreement.

Suggestions for Improvement.–ADF should

complete formal and informal agreements

expeditiously, continuing to communicate with

and use the assistance of the American embassy

in negotiating the accord.

llIn early 1988, ADF signed agreements with Sierra Leone and

Ghana, reducing the number of countries without agreements

to 11 of 19.
109

3. Program Evaluation and Research

Finding: ADF’s funding portfolio does not reflect the full range of possibilities granted in

its legislation. While some of these limitations

may be justified, the Foundation may be

narrowing its impact unnecessarily.

Discussion.—The vast majority of ADF’s

project portfolio emphasize economic development, while its legislative mandate also includes

social development. Nearly 75 percent of 86

project abstracts reviewed had a small-enterprise component and 25 percent a revolving

credit component. Many ADF-funded economic projects contain social development

components, such as training, but these areas

usually receive a small percentage of the ADF

grant funds. A high proportion of funds go to

construction, equipment, and vehicles (5 I percent in the 12 projects visited) versus skill development (4 percent for training and technical assistance).

ADF’s decision to emphasize income-generating activities over social development projects

has major implications for the way it is implementing its mandate. While income-generating

projects certainly can be consistent with the

mandate, the Foundation’s expectation that

income-generating projects become completely

self-supporting within a 2 to 3 year average

grant period seems unrealistic. Evaluations of

other funding programs show how difficult it

is for economic development projects to become self-sustaining. Grants and loans to economic projects of low-income groups have a

relatively high failure rate (24,33,36).

Applying the same standards to social development efforts is even more unreasonable.

Most successful social programs in the United

States could not have fulfilled a similar criterion. The Foundation has not funded social

development projects because of concerns that

they are not sustainable without continued dependency on donors or governments. This is

not always true, however. Some social development projects may be short-term, e.g., a

leadership training course. For others the real

question might be less that of self-sufficiency

and more of developing realistic plans detailing how project expenses will be raised after

the grant period ends from a variety of sources

including program income, grassroots fundraising, support from other donors, government

programs, and membership dues.

The Foundation has made no loans or loan

guarantees, although both are allowed by its

legislation.]’ While the Board of Directors has

supported making loans, budget and OMBdetermined staff ceilings prevented ADF from

hiring personnel with the expertise to analyze

loan applications. In addition, ADF is discouraged by the fact that loan repayments

would go to the U.S. Treasury. Thus, ADF has

decided to award grants to African intermediary organizations for revolving loan funds instead of making loans or loan guarantees (23).

Current ADF practice is to fund only private

non-profit groups. ADF policy now disallows

the funding of parastatals” (although ADF

funded two parastatals in Zimbabwe in 1985).

The legislation, however, also allows funding

for public and for-profit groups. The Board of

Directors’ decision has constrained ADF funding to some intermediary organizations, especially in countries with socialist governments,

and has exacerbated tensions among intermediary organizations, local groups, local officials,

and ADF. For example, the major reason for

the delay in start-up of the Kikatiti grant in Tanzania was the 9 months it took the organization to obtain its non-profit status so it could

meet ADF criteria. Such projects managed by

village officials may be de facto projects of local governments. Designating such groups as

PVOS may obscure important issues relating

to local participation.

Suggestions for Improvement.—The Foundation should periodically evaluate the sectors it

funds, the types of projects it funds, and the uses

to which its funds are put. For example, ADF

should examine the balance between projects

that have economic versus social development

goals and between expenditures on capital goods

IZIAF a]50 has not made any loans or loan guarantees.

13A Parastata] organization has a mixture of public and Private ownership or management, usually with public control.
110

(such as equipment) versus those that build people’s skills and the capacity of their organizations. Also, ADF could consider eventually developing loan and loan guarantee programs. The

Foundation could develop guidelines for funding public entities and private for-profit groups

when local realities make that desirable.

Social development projects include community organizing projects, programs of networks

or coalitions, leadership training programs, legal assistance/advocacy programs, self-help cultural and educational projects, and alternative

health education projects. They also include

training in management, organizational development, human resource development, membership development, fundraising, and financial planning—activities designed to strengthen

a group’s capacity to carry out its purposes.

ADF’s Board of Directors and staff could discuss the mixture of social and economic development activities in ADF’s portfolio and consider a wider range of perspectives on

grassroots development. The Foundation could

tap the experience of its Advisory Council to

develop criteria for funding social development

projects. ADF staff could visit organizations

providing training to grassroots groups and

PVO coalitions while developing its country

profiles and strategies.

In the future, ADF could consider making

loan guarantees to encourage African banks or

other institutions to provide credit to small

farmers or community groups which the institutions might otherwise be reluctant to make.

This would reduce ADF’s responsibility for itself managing a loan portfolio as well as use

ADF funds to leverage additional resources for

grassroots groups. For example, the Ford Foundation is developing a loan guarantee program

to encourage Senegal’s National Agricultural

Credit Bank to increase loans to members of

a national federation of village and regional

PVOS. Later, ADF might consider making loans

on a pilot basis to grantees that have already

successfully implemented activities. Or ADF

could combine grants and loans to groups with

a solid track record. A change in ADF’s legislation would allow loan repayments to return

to ADF and thus facilitate ADF’s initiation of

loan guarantees and/or loans. However, ADF

should first implement priority improvements

in its grants program, making it inadvisable to

begin a loan program in the immediate future.

ADF’s Board of Directors and staff also could

develop guidelines for funding organizations

which are public in some respect. This would

prevent confusion and misunderstanding between ADF and the applicants who now must

present themselves as totally private entities.

The guidelines, especially those related to participation of beneficiaries in decisionmaking,

need not be substantially different from those

for private, non-profit entities. Guidelines might

have to be country-specific, however, since

each country differs in designating public and

private status. Similarly, guidelines could be

developed for funding private for-profit entities where appropriate.

Finding: The Foundation has not paid sufficient

attention to evaluating its own funding program (as opposed to evaluating its funded

projects). Nor is its research program responding to the issues raised by its funding

program. As a result, ADF is losing opportunities to make the most effective use of its

own experience and to share that knowledge

with others.

Discussion.— ADF has not yet examined the

strategic choices about development implied

in its funding portfolio, such as its emphasis

on economic over social development activities and the technology choices it is supporting, particularly within agricultural projects.

The Foundation has yet to tailor its research

funding programs to its regular funding program. Research grants have had little relevance

to the issues of participation, sustainability, and

technology choices of the groups ADF is funding. Nor has the Foundation critically analyzed

its expansion into new countries, the distribution of funds among regions, and among countries within regions. Despite, or perhaps because of, the criticism it has received about its

administrative costs, ADF has not done its own

analysis of the optimal balance between grant

and non-grant costs.

Suggestions for Improvement.–ADF should

periodically review its portfolio and address
111

some of the major policy issues identified here

such as the technologies it supports, the allocation of funds among and within regions, and

the balance between grant and non-grant expenses. ADF should postpone expansion into

new countries until it has made high priority

improvements, then received a significant increase in congressional appropriations. The

ADF research program should be redirected to

respond to the needs of the funding program.

Reviewing its portfolio and redirecting its research program are both issues for strategic

planning and may be appropriate issues for

ADF to address as it prepares its next Five Year

Plan,

ADF’s research program has an important

role to play as ADF faces these and other policy issues, ADF could:

● do brief (5-10 page) biennial assessments

of its country programs and use them to

provide guidance for the research program,

●

●

●

broaden its portfolio by using the research

program to support research related to

technologies appropriate for grassroots development. Previous OTA reports have

identified the need to bridge the technology gap for PVOS and grassroots groups,

establish information banks on lowresource technologies, and collect and

store traditional knowledge before it is lost.

For example, few donors are supporting

local resource management, such as indigenous grazing and irrigation efforts,

ADF could study its funded projects for lessons in these areas that might be applicable to other projects,

develop a rationale to guide regional and

country-by-country distribution of ADF

funds, and

prepare criteria

new countries.

to guide expansion into
112

THE COST OF IMPLEMENTIN6 OTA’S SUGGESTIONS

This chapter has identified priority areas

where changes would improve ADF’s ability

to more fully implement its mandate. Within

each section, “shoulds” (general approaches

and measures that are likely to be necessary

for ADF to better meet its mandate) are distinguished from “coulds” (other complementary

ways to address the same issues). Also, the discussions covered how time can be saved, while

accomplishing more, especially during project

appraisal and planning.

Implementing these suggestions, however,

will be costly. Using existing resources more

efficiently would enable ADF to implement

some of these suggestions at minimal cost.

Nevertheless, added resources are needed to

support the suggested changes to enable ADF

to do improved pre-funding analysis and to take

a more active facilitator role with promising

applicants and grantees. The major recommendations cited here could be implemented for

an additional $500,000 to $700,000 a year,

according to OTA’S review of ADF’s estimates

for salaries, workshops, travel, and contracts.

An apportionment reflecting the priorities set

out in this report would result in a majority of

the increase going to ADF’s African staff, approximately 25 percent for additional Washington staff and their travel, and the remainder

for short-term contracts for technical analysis,

training for staff and consultants, and the research program.

The additional funds going to Africa would

increase African staff time and the resources

they would need to take on the suggested new

responsibilities (funds for salaries, office space,

travel, and a small amount for project support).

Additional Washington staff could include

more program assistants, a Foundation Representative, and/or technical expertise. Some

funds could be used for short-term contracts,

principally in Africa, for appraising proposals

for ADF and providing more extensive assistance to applicants and grantees. Some funds

would cover increased travel to Africa, especially by Foundation Representatives.

Using funds for these purposes will temporarily increase the proportion of costs that ADF

spends for non-grant purposes, yet some people maintain that these costs are already too

high. While a thorough review of ADF’s expenditures for overhead and grant-making was

beyond the scope of this study, OTA found that

concerns regarding ADF’s proportion of nongrant costs may be overstated. Two organizations provide guidelines on appropriate levels

of overhead costs for philanthropic organizations, which ADF resembles in some ways. The

Council of Better Business Bureaus advocates

that at least 50 percent of all income be spent

on programs and activities directly related to

the organization’s purposes (14). The National

Charities Information Bureau expects management and fundraising costs to be less than 40

percent and program expenses at least 60 percent (27). ADF’s non-grant costs (43 percent in

fiscal year 1987) are not unreasonable by these

measures.

Often ADF’s non-grant costs are compared

inappropriately to PVO levels. The Foundation

does not stretch its staff with volunteers and,

as a U.S. government agency, pays salaries

mandated by the U.S. Civil Service. ADF uses

federally-controlled regulations for travel,

which is inherently expensive because of the

distances involved. Monitoring more than 100

small-scale, grassroots efforts in 19 countries

is staff- and travel-intensive by nature. Also,

the Foundation’s congressionally-mandated efforts to disseminate its results are costly. In.

addition, start-up periods, which often stretch

for several years, are administratively expensive for any new organization.
—- —-

Chapter 6

Lessons for Other Development

Assistance Organizations
CONTENTS

Page

Summary . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .......................115

Introduction. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . ......................115

Lessons About Participation . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .........116

Lessons About the Role of African Staff and African Organizations . ......117

A Lesson About Relationships with Capitol I-Ml . .......................119

Lessons About Boards of Directors and Advisory Groups .. .. .. ... ... ...119

Lessons for Others Conducting Assessments . ..................,.......119

Box

Box Page

6-1. The Common Problems of Groups Similar to ADF. . ................116
Chapter 6

Lessons for Other Development

Assistance Organizations

●

●

✎

OTA’S findings regarding the African Development Foundation’s (ADF) funding program are similar to those of the Foundation’s

1987 internal evaluations of 10 projects as

well as recent evaluations of Appropriate

Technology International, the InterAmerican Foundation, the International

Fund for Agricultural Development, the U.N.

Development Fund for Women, and U.S. private voluntary organizations.

ADF can serve as a model for other groups

in certain aspects of its funding program, for

example, maximizing local control of externally funded activities, using Africans to provide technical assistance and to conduct

evaluations, and awarding grants for planning to local groups. Also, the Foundation’s

work with African intermediary organizations provides an example for other organi-

●

●

●

zations wishing to contribute to grassroots

development.

The Foundation has established effective

working relations with Congress, characterized by direct communication, that are instructive for other official or publicly funded

groups.

Many organizations face similar issues regarding the composition and roles of their

Boards of Directors.

This report contains lessons that could help.

others ‘who seek to evaluate development

assistance programs. For instance, conducting both program and project assessments

creates complementary pictures of an organization’s status while external evaluations

are useful additions to internal ones.

In many ways, ADF and its funded projects

share the problems faced by others; in some

ways ADF can be an example for other development assistance organizations. The strengths

and weaknesses of ADF-funded activities, analyzed in chapter 4, are common to similar efforts funded by others. Chapter 5 highlighted

what OTA learned about ADF’s funding program and suggested possible improvements regarding the role of African staff, pre-grant social, economic, technical, and environmental

analysis, project monitoring, and other issues.

The Foundation’s deficiencies in these areas,

too, are shared with other development assistance organizations and recent evaluations of

similar organizations raise many of the same

concerns (box 6-l).

Private voluntary organizations also often

share common problems: limited replicability,

lack of sustainability, isolated programming

context, insufficient planning and management, and weak databases and evaluation (40).

Because ADF in some ways resembles a private funder more than governmental development agencies such as AID (e.g., projects and

grants are generally small and its operating style

is flexible and participatory) it is not surprising that ADF shares some of the problems identified as common among PVOS, especially those

that fund community groups in Africa. Governmental funders, PVOS, and others have

much to learn from each other in tackling these

shared problems and ADF can contribute to,

as well as learn from, such a discussion.

115
— —

116

Box 6-1.—The Common Problems of Groups Similar to ADF

Chapter 2 notes four agencies that have programs in some respect similar to ADF’s. Recent evaluations show that the groups share many common problems such as the need to work out relationships

with other funders and the need to address project impact and replicability. These evaluations raised

the following concerns:

Appropriate Technology International’s (ATI) evaluation was conducted by AID. It noted ATI’s

need to: improve its technical and commercial appraisals of projects; give higher priority to “soft”

technologies such as market analysis; improve the management of field operations, monitoring, and

evaluation; strengthen attempts to replicate its work; increase efforts to disseminate lessons learned;

consider making mid-course adjustments more often; and find ways to maximize its impact (16).

Inter-American Foundation. This internal evaluation highlighted concerns regarding: the lack

of clear articulation of funding priorities within Latin American countries, economic sectors, and

development objectives; ad hoc project selection; and the relationship of the Foundation to other organizations (50).

International Fund for Agricultural Development (IFAD). This evaluation, conducted by AID,

raised concerns about: IFAD’s relationships with other donors (e.g., finding its own niche and providing co-financing); the sustainability of its efforts; how well it is reaching women; problems with monitoring and evaluation; dissemination of its knowledge; and sponsoring a program potentially with

too broad a focus (39).

The United Nations Development Fund for Women (UNIFEM). Important program issues arising from this internal evaluation include: links between UNIFEM’S activities and those of other development groups; fuller involvement of local experts and leaders; improved delivery systems; concentration on projects with the greatest potential impact; support for a variety of multi-faceted projects.

Project-related concerns also were raised, including:

• the impacts of external factors on project success or failure,

Ž monitoring local and national activities,

● accounting for divisions of family labor in project design,

● assessing and building institutional viability, and

● providing technical training for extension workers (38).

.

Grassroots development efforts in Africa have ample by relying on Africans to provide techhad some success i-reproving food production nical assistance and conduct evaluations, by

and conserving natural resources (20,37,48) and providing planning grants to local groups, and

the Foundation is among the funders support- by leaving control in the hands of funded orgaing creative approaches and achieving positive nizations. These are the kinds of lessons that

results. In particular, ADF is setting a good ex- ADF can share with other organizations.

LESSONS ABOUT PARTICIPATION

Many development assistance groups claim of ownership in the work. Larger donors, such

to support grassroots development, which en- as U.S. AID, differ from ADF in important

tails the effective participation of beneficiaries ways—size of funded activities, pressure from

in development. However, ADF often succeeds various interest groups, government-toin maximizing the control of local groups and government funding, legal framework, and

organizations over their projects, which en- other factors. Thus they cannot duplicate ADF’s

hances the results because people feel a sense approach entirely. However, they could adapt
117

certain of ADF’s methods, such as favoring

African initiatives and ensuring that important

project-related decisions are made by African

participants. Other ADF approaches to local

control—such as encouraging funded groups

to select their own technical assistance—are

more directly transferable to private grantmakers, including some PVOS and others working at the local level.

The Foundation’s experience shows that supporting participatory development requires

careful analysis of who participates, when and

the various ways that people participate. Avoiding approaches that place expatriates in de facto

charge of African projects is an important first

step. Although giving funds directly to African

organizations can reduce the problem of external control, participation by beneficiaries can

still be lacking and additional efforts may be

appropriate to foster broad participation. Participation in decisionmaking is key to effective

overall participation but funders often fail to

assess roles of all the people involved in enough

detail to determine whether the beneficiaries

really take part in this process. It is also important to measure progress in enhancing participation in terms of the local context. This requires understanding the local context and

sound baseline data on factors such as income,

gender, social relations, ethnic groups, and the

local political context, as well as information

on project activities. Although ADF has much

to improve in addressing these more difficult

aspects of participation, its experience trying

to balance different aspects of its mandate—

supporting local control and stimulating expanding participation of the poor—will be relevant to other organizations.

Like participation, other key concepts in development assistance require redefinition and

more effective implementation in the face of

a history fraught with less-than-expected results. The Foundation and OTA agree that

replicability, for example, depends less on

replicating actual project activities than on the

replicability of the processes that the projects

had engendered. The Foundation, with its explicit mandate to learn from and share its experiences, its access to U.S. Government

resources, and its opportunity to forge connections with private groups, is well-placed to take

part in defining and implementing approaches

with impacts beyond the projects themselves.

LESSONS ABOUT THE ROLE OF AFRICAN STAFF AND

AFRICAN ORGANIZATIONS

Encouraging Africans to take positions as

staff members or consultants in development

assistance groups has real benefits. Africans

know the local situation, especially its cultural,

political, and macroeconomic contexts; their

support is more cost-effective because housing,

overseas travel, and per diem costs are often

less (not because they are paid less for their

professional services but because other expenses can be less); and impacts beyond the

immediate project results snowball as evergreater numbers of Africans are given opportunities to use and enhance their skills and

spread their knowledge. The Foundation has

demonstrated that it is possible to find a wide

variety of African experts for tasks many other

funders assign to expatriates and that clear

statements of their work increase the likelihood

that expectations will be met. ADF’s ability to

identify and contract with Africans deserves

recognition; other groups could follow its

example.

Many African non-governmental groups are

attempting to forge new relationships with their

American counterparts. African organizations

seek to use their growing expertise to help

American and European organizations plan,

manage, and evaluate externally funded activities. Often, this requires that U.S. PVOS and

private donors reconsider how they work in

Africa: how should they shift more responsibility to African staff; how should they support

African groups rather than or in addition to

their own activities?
Simultaneously, additional U.S. development

assistance money is being used to help develop

public and private African institutions. For example, larger amounts of official development

assistance are being channeled via U.S. PVOS

to assist in strengthening local organizations.

Thus, questions like these will need to be answered within the official U.S. and private development assistance community. ADF has

been in the vanguard of American funders

which support private African organizations.

Thus, ADF’s experience is likely to become increasingly important to others given this ongoing evolution of African/U.S. PVO relationships.

The Foundation’s experience can highlight

specific areas to address as these new relationships form. For example, ADF has an opportunity to further learn about, then share, the

results of its work with private African intermediary organizations. This assessment of

ADF’s work shows that projects of intermediary organizations require different approaches

to pre-funding analysis and monitoring than

those for local organizations, especially when

participation is a goal of the donor. Moreover,

intermediary organizations commonly have

special technical assistance needs as they begin to work with local groups or poor farmers.

Also, intermediary groups, American and

African staff of U.S. groups, and providers of

technical assistance all need clear guidance regarding ways to relate to local groups that foster self-reliance. This has been a focus of the
119

ADF funding program from the beginning. to help bring about that awareness. Also, ADF

Long-term institutional change can be facili- may be able to share its positive experiences

tated as African government officials become working with African governments with outaware of the successes of grassroots develop- side development assistance organizations that

ment efforts. ADF can use its special status as have been cautious about entering into closer

a U.S. Government-funded organization and relationships with local officials.

good relations with many African governments

The Foundation has nurtured its relationship

with Members of Congress and staff on Capitol Hill. ADF’s senior staff have a good working relationship with high-level officials both

in Congress and the Administration and have

an admirable and unusual directness in providing information. As a result, ADF has a reputation for cooperation and responsiveness similar to some PVOS that receive government

funds. The Foundation’s small size and its history of congressional support may contribute

to this situation, factors that larger organizations such as U.S. AID do not share. Whatever

the reasons, however, ADF’s work is not hampered by the quasi-adversarial attitude that

sometimes shapes AID’s congressional relations (46).

LESSONS ABOUT BOARDS OF DIRECTORS AND

ADVISORY GROUPS

Many organizations are reconsidering the

roles played by their boards of directors and

advisory groups. In some cases, they are finding that advisory functions can be filled more

cost-effectively without official groups (e. g., by

bringing in individuals to conduct seminars on

state-of-the-art topics). In other cases, members’

unavailability for frequent meetings may suggest giving more responsibility to staff. Staff

planning retreats, for example, can sometimes

substitute for the strategic planning that aboard”

or advisory committee might provide.

The Foundation’s experience with a new

board and one shaped to a large degree by partisan considerations suggests some important

lessons. A politically balanced board, for

example, can be an asset to publicly funded

organizations and can help avoid program disruptions during changes of administrations,

Appointing board members with an understanding of a group’s mandate can reduce the

time it takes to educate new board members,

In addition, defining clear roles for the board

that focus on policy oversight is a way to tap

the strengths of members and help prevent inappropriate micromanagement.

This assessment has shown how important broader program, many things were learned

it is to conduct program assessments in con- that might not have been evident by studying

junction with project evaluations. The results the project level alone. At the same time, the

of each highlight different aspects of an orga- findings about the functioning of the funding

nization’s work and suggest different ways to program were obtained by a careful examinaimprove its effectiveness. By examining ADF’s tion of specific projects.
—

120

Unfortunately, the costs of combined program and project assessments are high and

grassroots groups and private funders often

lack the resources to undertake such a comprehensive assessment. Therefore, every effort

should be made to draw on previous work and

to communicate with others before undertaking new assessments. Defining critical issues

and selecting minimum data sets can be done

on the basis of past and similar assessments

at little expense.

Also, this effort illustrates ways for internally

conducted assessments to complement those

done by external groups. For instance, some

issues identified by OTA’S work were raised

in ADF’s first project evaluations, thus providing partial confirmation of the Foundation’s internal evaluations. Although internal efforts are

always important, occasional external examinations can provide information that only outsiders, with fresh viewpoints, are likely to

provide.

Certain of OTA’S methods, such as conducting a single brief visit to each project, are

appropriate only for comparable outside evaluators. Alternately, self-evaluations conducted

throughout an individual project’s lifetime

could be more participatory and provide more

specific, helpful, and timely feedback to project

managers, for example, and be a significant

aspect of project management. Methodological lessons from this work that are applicable

to most outside assessments include the need

for: placing Africans and women on every field

team to increase understanding of the local setting and to ensure access to the greatest number of project participants; allowing enough

time to visit each project to accommodate the

professional and social needs of the evaluators

and the people being visited; interviewing participants, managers, and others independently

of each other to get beyond the “official” view

of project activities; and providing for review

and feedback by the staff of the organization

under examination.
Appendixes
Appendix A

ADF Projects

1984

Awarded From Fiscal Year

Through Fiscal Year 1987

ADF Projects Obligated Through Fiscal Year 1986

Country Project Name *Type/Sector Grant

Benin

Benin

Botswana

Botswana

Botswana

Botswana

Cameroon

Cameroon

Cameroon

Egypt

Ghana

Ghana

Ghana

Guinea

Guinea

Kenya

Kenya

Kenya

Kenya

Kenya

Kenya

Kenya

Kenya

Kenya

Kenya

Kenya

Kenya

Kenya

Lesotho

Lesotho

Lesotho

Lesotho

Lesotho

Lesotho

Lesotho

Liberia

Liberia

Mali

Mali

Mali

Mali

Mali

Mali

Mali

Niger

Niger

L’Amicale des Ressortissants de Houndjohoundji . . . . . . . . . . . . . A: 10

Songhai Project . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . A: 4,9

Tutume . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . A: 4

Boiteko Agricultural Management Association. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . A: 4

Tswelelopele Production Project . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . A: 4,9

Blockmaking Production Project . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . A: 7,9

Binshua Water Project . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . A: 10

CEDAC . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . A:4,7

NDU Water Supply . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . A: 10

Integrated Rural Technology Center (IRTECTAP) . . . . . . . . . . . . . /1:2,3

Osu Canoe Fishing Shop . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . A: 4,9

LMK Labadi Community Bank . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . A: 7,9

Rural Small Scale Dev. Scheme and Swine Project . . . . . . . . . . . . C: 4,9

Kaback Village Fishing Project . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . A: 4,9

Kindia Pineapple Producers . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . A: 4,9

ATAC Appropriate Technology Advisory Comm. . . . . . . . . . . . . . A: 2,7

Kenya Beekeeper’s Association (KBA)/Kibwezi. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . A: 2,7,9

KWAHO/TIROCOWAP Taita** . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . A: 2,5,10

Farming Systems Kenya, Ltd.** . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . A C: 2,4

Mwenda Women’s Group . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . A C: 4,9

Kenya Dental Association . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . A: 7,5

Human Care Alliance . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . A: 5,6

Kenya Women Financial Trust** . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . AC: 2,7

Njoguini, Gitero, and Kabati** . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . A: 3,10

Partnership For Productivity** . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . AC: 2,7

Ushindi Youth Project . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . A: 7,9

Songa Development Committee Projects . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . A: 3,10

GBM Green Belt Movement . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . A: 2

LDTC Research on Group Training . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . AC: 2

Levi’s Nek Training Program . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . A: 2,9

Morija Vocational School . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . AB: 2

Moteng Women in Self-Help . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . A: 2,9

Ramosebo Village Development . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . AC: 2,7,9

Ha Sematle Village Development . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . A C: 9

Lesotho Handspun Mohair . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . A: 7,9

Agro-Industrial Company . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . A: 4,9

Boys Town** . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . A: 4,10

L’Association Malienne d’Assistance Technique Villageoise . . . . A: 4

COPCC Sewing and Training School** . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . A: 2

Narena Village Dev, Project** . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . A:4,1o

UNFM Segou/Soke Cooperative** . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . A: 4

GTB Women’s Dye Craft Cooperative . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . A: 9

Private Agricultural Coed Training Center . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . A: 2

Dalakana Integrated Village Development . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . A: 4,5,10

Dagnare Agricultural Society . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . AC: 4,10

Iniminak** . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . A: 4

$ 26,613

150,872

40,144

27,288

3,400

37,523

123,457

250,000

48,826

119,545

32,025

62,400

39,637

189,388

225,687

83,040

75,871

108,773

111,245

3,428

40,115

25,794

152,625

247,313

198,478

34,500

11,585

58,745

100,719

21,777

42,804

15,022

25,347

17,584

105,415

17,784

141,931

34,152

50,774

242,703

109,687

14,500

74,830

250,000

89,619

13,463

123

83-361 0 - 88 : QL 3 - 5
124

ADF Projects Obligated Through Fiscal Year 1986

Country Project Name *Type/Sector Grant

Niger

Niger

Niger

Niger

Rwanda

Rwanda

Rwanda

Senegal

Senegal

Senegal

Senegal

Senegal

Sierra Leone

Sierra Leone

Sierra Leone

Somalia

Somalia

Tanzania

Tanzania

Tanzania

Tanzania

Togo

Zambia

Zambia

Zambia

Zambia

Zambia

Zimbabwe

Zimbabwe

Zimbabwe

Zimbabwe

Zimbabwe

Zimbabwe

Zimbabwe

Zimbabwe

Zimbabwe

Zimbabwe

Zimbabwe

Zimbabwe

Zimbabwe

Association of Nigerian Women . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . A: 2,4,10

Dakoro Herders’ Cooperative (DHC) Planning . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . A: 2,4

Small Trader Project . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . A: 9

EPAP . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . A:9,1O

IWACU -Training and Credit Extension Coop . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . C: 4

EPR Small Animal and Seed Distribution . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . C: 4

APESA School Farm . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . A: 2,4

Dialambere Community Development Project. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . A: 4,5,10

Diego Peasant Farm Association . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . A: 4,7,10

Horndolde. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . A:4,1O

Ross Bethio. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . A: 4,10

Union Kaoural . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . A: 4,7,10

Eastern Clinic . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . A: 4,5,9

Cheshire Self-Help. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . A:4,2

Yendeh Village Development Association . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . A: 4,9

Haqabtir . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . AC: 4,2

Weaving, Marketing, and Revolving Fund Supply . . . . . . . . . . . . . A: 7,9

Malihai Club . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . A: 10,4

Mufundi Educational Trust . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . A: 2,4

Presidential Trust (PNFT) . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . A:9

Morogoro . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . A: 4,7

FUCEC . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . C:8

Desai Revolving Fund. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . AC: 2,9

VIS Scotch Cart Project . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . AC: 2,9

AME Mechanical Training Center . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . AC: 2,9

ZFDS Water Project . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . A: 10,5

ZCSDSelf-Help Fund . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . ABC:4

ORAP Technologies** . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . AC:4

NCDPZ Self-Help Projects . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . A: 4

Honda Valley Fish Project . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . A: 4,9

Environment, Development, Activities . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . B: 7

Oneness Youth Promotions . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . A: 9

Silveira House Dev. Fund** . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . A: 8

Tabudiria Training Center . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . A: 2

Beatrice Dairy . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . A: 4

Zimbabwe Coffee and Tea . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . AC: 4

Tariro Poultry Project . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . A: 2,4

Talent Consortium. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . A: 1,2

Art Roots Cooperative . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . A: 7,9

ChiPinRe Water District and Sanitation Project . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . A: 2,10,5

249,200

7,255

700

40,115

233,000

102,747

39,749

77,739

119,011

51,163

162,095

104,770

247,684

3,774

19,371

55,989

76,284

65,616

104,752

10,900

236,998

112,874

14,025

66,357

20,686

20,795

81,198

114,498

12,803

67,183

2,115

59,984

3,298

122,027

24,392

101,537

10,848

112,700

14,238

138,934

*Type: A=Development Assistance, B=Research Assistance and C=Third Party Revolving Loans

Sector:l = Communication 4 = Agriculture/Crops/Animals 7 = Management/Capacity Building

2 = Education 5 = Health Care 8 = Multi-Sector

3 = Energy 6 = Housing 9 = Small Business

10 = Water Resources

**Grant amendment providing additional fundsto FY 1984 and/or FY 1985 projects.

SOURCE: African Development Foundation, Congressiona lPresentation: F’iscal Year 1988 (Washington, DC: February 1987)
.

125

ADF Projects Obligated in Fiscal Year 1987

Country Project Name Grant $

Benin

Botswana

Botswana

Botswana

Cameroon

Ghana

Lesotho

Liberia

Liberia

Mali

Niger

Senegal

Senegal

Sierra Leone

Sierra Leone

Somalia

Somalia

Tanzania

Tanzania

Tanzania

Togo

Togo

Togo

Togo

Togo

Togo

Zimbabwe

Zimbabwe

Agricultural Community Development Project . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1,5 00

Backyard Gardening Project . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 48,152

Micro-Enterprise Credit Project. ..,...,. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 133,488

Nthoo Typing School Project . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 11,999

CEDAC Food Production and Marketing Project . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 250,000

Peki-Dzogbati Oil Palm Nursery Project. ......,. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 182,133

Village Workshop and Revolving Fund Project . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 116,143

Self-Help School, Health and Agricultural Project . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 93,365

United Liberia Inland Church Academy Project. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 24,694

Agro-Nord Project . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 97,488

Dakoro Herders’ Cooperative Project II . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 107,922

Post-Symposium: Development Alternatives Project. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 19,387

Revolving Loan Fund for Grassroots Initiatives Project . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 215,301

YEA Agricultural and Food Production Project . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 250,000

Yele Rural Electrification Project . . ., . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 250,000

Daryeel Planning Study Project . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 7,864

Gum Resin Development Project . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 159,947

Feasibility Study for the Albalbal Water Project . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 3,822

Albalbal Water Development Project . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 233,077

Marangu Schoolmarm Project . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 40,588

Agoto-Godo Agricultural/Livestock Infrastructural Project . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 71,740

FUCECs Baseline Study . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 23,672

Novissi Onion Production Project .,....... . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 8,395

Produce Storage Project . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 11,006

UNICOOPEMA Pilot Credit Program . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 250,000

Watsidome Gardening/Small Animal Husbandry Project . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 22,087

Furniture Manufacturing project . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 220,624

Matsvaire Village Development Project . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 103,270

SOURCE: African Development Foundation, January 1988.
Appendix B

Summaries of 12 ADF-Funded Projects

Visited by OTA1

Farm Rehabilitation for the

Agricultual Society of Dagnare

Organization: Dagnare Agricultural Society

Site: Three sites in western Niger (Dagnare, Lamorde, and Ganky-Bassarou)

Activities: Rehabilitate irrigated fields (pumps,

pipes, canals, control gates, wells)

and provide tools and technical

assistance.

Grant Size: $88,817

The Setting.—The fields of the Dagnare Agricultural Society (a form of village-level cooperative

known as a mutuel in French) are the first that will

be rehabilitated under this project; they are located

across the Niger River from Niger’s capital, Niamey.

The lands to be irrigated for the Lamorde Agricultural Society are located several kilometers upstream,

on the outskirts of Niamey. Those of Ganky-Bassarou

are approximately 45 miles south.

The OTA team visited two of the three sites. The

contrast between the membership of the two groups

is striking. In Dagnare, the participants are relatively well-off civil servants (mostly retired) or other

salaried workers; poor farmers predominate in

Ganky, although a definitive profile is impossible

since eventual participation in the project for the

Ganky Mutuel is still undetermined. Dagnare members describe the participants in the Lamorde

Mutuel as falling somewhere between the other two

in terms of socio-economic profile.

The mutuel form of agricultural organization is

encouraged by the Niger government as the most

appropriate ownership/management formula to implement its strategy of small-scale production

projects. The Dagnare MutueZ is one of the oldest

mutueh in Niger. It began in 1965 with a government grant of land and credit to its original

founders—a small group of 13 influential civil servants. The breakdown of its pump in the mid-1970s

and a decline in political favor following the fall

of former President Diori disrupted the irrigation

IThese 12 summaries provide an overview of the 12 ADF projects in

Africa that were visited by OTA’S field assessment teams. Each contains

details about the project, its setting, the sponsoring organization, and

the findings of the OTA team.

Photo credit: OTA/George Scharffenberger

Leaders of the project at Dagnare.

scheme. Despite the fact that little production has

taken place over the decade, the group remains wellorganized, cohesive, and participatory due largely

to dynamic leadership, the educational level of its

members, and the improved prospects provided by

ADF funding. The group has regained much of its

lost influence and includes members of several of

the capitol’s most powerful families. Six of the fourteen members are women, most widows of original members. Several are active in group management and decisionmaking.

By contrast, the Ganky MutueZ is new and poorly

organized, and has uncertain objectives. The village received brief fame 2 years ago when the Niger government held up the community’s initiative

in dry-season manioc production as a model for the

rest of Niger. In fact, however, production and marketing was largely on an individual basis rather than

through the mutuel.

Interviews with community members show that

they have poor information about the proposed

ADF-sponsored activity (especially women), a low

level of participation in project design and a concentration of control in decisionmaking in one family (the family of the president of the Dagnare

group). A mutuel does exist in Ganky but written

records were inaccessible or non-existent and its

officers were uncertain as to who was or was not

126
127

a member or how membership was determined.

Group leaders estimated the members at 300. Community members made little distinction between the

local cooperative (a larger unit grouping several villages) and the village-level Ganky Mutuel, The question of access to the irrigation scheme was equally

unclear.

Increased variability in the timing and quantity

of rainfall across Niger has exaggerated the vulnerability of its rainfed cropping systems. For the individual farm household, this has translated into

erratic and generally lower income and food supplies, Although Niger has performed better than

many Sahelian nations facing similar conditions

and its exports of uranium did provide some respite, the decline in agricultural production has

meant increased fiscal and trade deficits. Tapping

the irrigation potential of the Niger River is seen

by both farmers and the government as one means

of breaking this decline. As a host of problems have

surfaced to dampen the high level of expectations

associated with large irrigation schemes, Niger has

begun to encourage small-scale irrigation as a viable alternative.

The Project.—The Dagnare project began as a proposal from the Dagnare group to finance the rehabilitation of their existing irrigation scheme—

principally by providing new electric pumps and

repairing canals, gates, and other facilities. The

group attempted to get commercial credit since

1976 but was unsuccessful. A number of private

voluntary organizations (PVOS) were also contacted

but the proposal was rejected because of the group’s

relative wealth. Encouraged by the ADF Foundation Representative, Ganky and Lamorde were included in the proposal after ADF had rejected it

twice because of inappropriate economic level of

the Dagnare participants. A new organization was

proposed which would link the three agricultural

societies. Dagnare is to play a leading role and provide technical assistance and support to the other

two areas.

The details of the Dagnare efforts are the best documented in the proposal but many aspects remain

to be worked out by the Dagnare group with the

help of ADF-funded technical assistance. Details of

the other groups’ plans have been left to a later date.

A key element of the proposal is that each group

will pay back 20 percent of its grant into a revolving fund that would be used to support future credit

needs for the three groups or others,

As of the OTA visit, little had been accomplished.

Although the Dagnare group had received funds after considerable delays (caused by problems with

the group’s legal status and ADF’s fund transfer

mechanism), the funds remained untouched in the

group’s account for 2 months. The Dagnare president felt they had not received clear instructions

from ADF that they could begin. The group had held

planning meetings and made contacts with the

equipment suppliers and technical services they

would need to implement their scheme. In Ganky,

four meetings on the ADF project had been held

but the level of understanding and preparation for

the project is low among the members of the community. One reason for the delay is that the family

head on whose land the project is to be installed

is ill. Related to this, the OTA team raised questions

about the security of land rights for the project, since

everyone in the community referred to the area as

“the old man’s land.” The land is currently being

farmed during the dry season by women who use

it to grow vegetables. When asked, village leaders

informed the team that only family heads (i.e., men)

would be given plots in the new irrigation scheme,

Women, they said, would be given other land to

grow their vegetables.

Conclusion.— OTA’S assessment team was unanimous in its conclusion that the Dagnare project

should not have been funded in its present form.

Although the logic of ADF’s argument in funding

a relatively better off group of people who would

use their higher level of education and organization to assist poorer farmer groups is persuasive,

the team felt that such an outcome was unlikely in

this case. The Dagnare group has not proven themselves to be effective farmers, they view the irrigation scheme only as a supplement to their income

rather than a principal economic activity, the economic viability of their own scheme is questionable, and the group members expressed serious reservations about their role as advisors to other

groups. Finally, the Dagnare members were largely

unaware of and opposed to the idea of reimbursing

20 percent of the grant sum for loans to other

groups. Since there is little likelihood that Dagnare

will be an effective catalyst to help poorer farmers

develop their productive potential, there is little

justification for supporting them under ADF’s

mandate.

One alternative ADF could have used would have

been to fund the other groups directly without going through Dagnare. Providing those groups with

a technical assistance fund to pay for the services

that the Dagnare group is supposed to provide could

have been as effective and certainly less expensive

if the main objective of the project were to help these

poorer groups. This solution would have been
128

equally problematic, however, because the Ganky

group clearly lacks organizational strengths, it has

shown a low level of participation in program design, and questions exist about that scheme’s technical and economic feasibility.

The OTA team’s prognosis for the future of the

Dagnare project is not enthusiastic. The dynamism

and know-how of the Dagnare core group will probably lead them to reach their own objectives in the

short to medium term, but these objectives are much

less grandiose and altruistic than those in the project

documentation. Ganky’s and Lamorde’s fate are less

certain and much more problematic. z

Dakoro HordersF Cooperative

Organization:

Site:

Activities:

Grant Size:

Dakoro Herders’ Cooperative

Bundu Eggo, Niger

Reconstitute livestock herd, repair

well, establish cooperative store, provide literacy training, and improve

animal and human health.

$7,255 (planning grant); $108,275

The Setting.–Bundu Eggo (literally Eggo’s well)

is a nomad camp consisting of a 74-family community founded by the ancestor of the current population who dug the well and gave it his name. The

well is also used by other communities living in the

surrounding valley. During the rainy season, Bundu

Eggo is home to only a few members of the community who live in its four mud and thatch huts.

During the dry season, depending on that year’s

grazing and watering strategies, other members of

the community come to stay, building temporary

structures from poles, hides, canvas, and cloth. The

camp is 60 kilometers north of the local administrative town, Dakoro, which in turn is a l0-hour

drive, mostly on good paved road, east of Niger’s

capital, Niamey. Bundu Eggo is connected with

Dakoro by a dirt track in generally poor condition.

Just outside Dakoro, rainfed cultivation ceases because rainfall is too scarce and uncertain. It is an

area of wide undulating plains punctuated by

widely dispersed sand dunes—the border zone between the true desert to the north and the arable

savannah.

The vast majority of the participants involved in

the Dakoro Herders’ Cooperative project (50 of the

74 families) are from the Bundu Eggo camp and are

nomadic herders of the Kasasawa group of woodabe—

a sub-family of the Fulani ethnic group. The other

2ADF reports that subsequent to the OTA team visit, the Lamorde

Agriculture Society has been dropped from the Dagnare project.

participants (10 from the Farfarou sub-family of the

Fulani and 14 of the Touareg ethnic group) are from

other camps in the same valley. All participants are

men selected for participation by the traditional

hierarchies of the individual groups. For the

Kasasawa, need as well as willingness to maintain

livestock were major factors in selection for participation, according to the project’s leader. A disadvantaged minority in a very poor country, the nomadic herders who will participate in the project

are easily among the poorest one-third of the total

population.

The project idea originated with the Kasasawa

who, in response to the loss of large proportions

of their herds in the early 1980s, had formed “Kungal Fado Mango” or KFM—literally, “the organization born of large strides.” KFM built on and

strengthened traditional family and community

bonds to seek common solutions to their threatened

way of life. The other groups were added as beneficiaries of what came to be called the Dakoro

Herders’ Cooperative project at the insistence of the

administrative authorities in Dakoro, who feared

potential difficulties in favoring one ethnic group

over the others. Although the other groups were accepted by the Kasasawa as beneficiaries of new livestock, the Kasasawa did not plan to include them

in other components or in decisionmaking. No

meetings uniting all participants or beneficiaries

had taken place other than those organized by ADF

or its contractors.

As stated above, the project is primarily in response to a major loss of livestock experienced in

the drought years of 1983 and 1984. An ADF-funded

technician calculated this drought killed nearly 40

percent of all livestock. Its other components address additional concerns which support a strategy

of increased sedentarization. The negative experience of having to flee with their herds into Nigeria

several years earlier had motivated several of the

group’s leaders to seek external support to lower

their vulnerability during drought years and permit the Kasasawa to stay in their own grazing areas.

The Bundu Eggo group has a longstanding relationship with an American photographer, Carol Beckwith, whose book and articles have provided them

with special access to the outside world. It was Ms.

Beckwith who introduced the group to the future

ADF Foundation Representative, who was then in

Niger working for a different organization. These

contacts provided the avenue that led to ADF

support.

The Project.–The Dakoro project represents two

ADF grants. In late 1985, ADF approved a $7,255

planning grant to provide technical assistance to
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the cooperative to formulate a specific proposal.

Financing delays, problems in finding appropriate

technical assistance, and the logistical challenges

of working with a distant nomadic group meant that

a proposal was not completed until 1 year later. At

that point, local government officials who had been

bypassed in the project design process objected and

threatened to block the project. At their insistence

changes were made which substantially altered the

shape of the project. In addition to the inclusion

of the other ethnic groups mentioned above, the officials insisted that the dry season agriculture component be dropped, and that purchases of goats and

sheep be substituted for cattle. A local government

technical service agent was designated as the technical coordinator of the project and counterpart to

the cooperative’s leader, Project participants agreed

to these changes when informed by ADF that they

had little choice. Due to overestimates in the original planning grant budget, only half of that first

grant was actually disbursed.

The second Grant Agreement for approximately

$85,000 to implement the new plan was signed just

prior to the OTA team visit in September 1987. No

funds from the second grant had been received. The

project budget, developed by the Dakoro local government officials, contains five main components:

$35,ooo for the purchase of sheep, goats, camels,

and donkeys to replace approximately 10 percent

of the herd lost in the recent drought; $8,250 to build

and stock a cooperative store that would provide

basic necessities for the community; $6,750 for a

literacy program; $8,550 for repairs to the community well; $1000 for basic medicines for both livestock and people; and $17,500 for the technical

assistance to support the project (approximately

one-half for local government technical service

agents). Over $26,000 (nearly 30 percent of the total grant amount) is earmarked for ADF’s documentation of the project.

Interviews with the project participants indicated

that the replacement of livestock was their highest

priority and there was considerable disappointment

that the cattle had been replaced by sheep and goats.

Milk from cows is the main element in the Woodabe diet. The repair of Eggo’s ancient well was

their second priority. Few community members

were aware of the project’s other components and

many expressed opposition to the idea of literacy

training, which they saw as an imposition on their

way of life. There was an equal degree of confusion and disagreement regarding the role of the local government technical agent in the project although some felt that the government presence

would assure a fairer distribution of livestock. The

distribution plan, according to the cooperative

leader, had only been discussed with those who

would receive livestock and not with the entire

group. Local experts interviewed by the OTA team

felt that this type of indirect decisionmaking, involving considerable one-on-one interactions rather

than large public meetings, was consistent with

traditional norms.

Conclusion. —The OTA team found numerous

flaws in the Dakoro project design but were unanimous in their high rating of the project as consistent with ADF’s mandate. ADF is one of only a few

organizations in Niger which support initiatives of

semi-nomadic herders to modestly adapt their

threatened lifestyles and systems of production.

Herder groups such as the Kasasawa are clearly

among the poorest of the poor throughout the Sahel and have been bypassed by most government

and foreign donor development programs, ADF is

notable in its attempts to maintain a modicum of

control in the hands of the herders themselves, the

compromise with local officials notwithstanding,

It was readily apparent to the OTA team that the

herders of Bundu Eggo feel deep appreciation and

respect for ADF and its Representative.

The largest concern raised by the OTA team with

respect to the Dakoro project was that of the role

given local government authorities. The opposition

engendered by ADF’s lack of contact with local officials and ADF’s determination to do something for

the Bundu Eggo group left ADF in a poor bargaining position. It is ironic that the conflicts engendered by ADF’s approach in Niger have led to more

government control in several ADF projects than

in those of PVOS which have been willing to “play

the game” by involving officials in their programming activities from the beginning.

Specifically, the OTA team had concerns that unless closely supervised by ADF’s local Country Resource Facilitator, the purchase and distribution of

livestock could result in an undue portion of the

benefits accruing to merchants and officials rather

than participants.3 The OTA team found the salary

and benefits expected by government officials to

do what is already their job as inappropriate. 4

Other problematic aspects included: the technical

3ADF has subsequently reported that ADF’s Country Resource Facilitator in Niger did indeed actively participate in the purchase and distribution of livestock and that the concerns expressed by the OTA team

were not realized.

~ADF had a different understanding than the local officials in Dakoro

regarding payments to the government technicians, ADF’s understanding was that the technician would be removed from the government payroll during project implementation. Since the departure of the OTA team

the government technician has been transferred and ADF reports that

a private technician has been identified to fill that position.
130

feasibility of the proposed well repair (dangerous

at best and likely to be impossible given the state

of the existing well); the financial viability of the

cooperative store, given limited management/commercial experience and the negative experiences

of previous, much smaller stores run by the same

individuals; and the disagreement regarding the

need for literacy. A more gradual approach, with

more training at its earlier stages would have had

fewer financial and management risks. Experts consulted in Niger could not reach consensus regarding a final concern, the problem of the long-term

environmental impact of the grazing systems being perpetuated by this project. Nor was there agreement on the significance of the change from cattle

to sheep—a point felt by some to be immaterial since

the Kasasawa were likely to sell a portion of the

small ruminents received from ADF to buy cattle

anyway.

These concerns notwithstanding the team felt that

the most important component of the project, the

purchase of livestock, would meet its objective.

Once received, the herders were likely to manage

them successfully according to traditional systems

with or without the advice of the government technician. The other components are more problematic

but also of less significance to the beneficiaries. The

“bottom line” for the Dakoro project is whether or

not the project will provide or at least move toward

a long-term solution to the vulnerability of the

herders’ current existence. It is too early to tell the

outcome, but the fact that the project has given the

community a temporary respite, experience in problem solving, and most of all, hope, is more than

enough justification.

Equipment So Strengthen the

Agricultural Activities of the Youth

Association of Ross Bethio

Organization: Youth Association of Ross Bethio

Site: Ross Bethio, Senegal

Activities: Irrigated agriculture—rice, tomato

and vegetable production.

Grant Size: $158,639

The Setting.—Ross Bethio is located on the Senegal River in the north of the country, four hours

drive on paved roads from the capital, Dakar. It is

located in an area where rainfed agriculture has

been particularly hard hit by the downward trend

in rainfall and where irrigated agriculture has taken

on growing importance. As a center for a stateowned agricultural development organization

(SAED), many Ross Bethio farmers have had access

to irrigated lands for two generations. Although

SAED’S strategies have often resulted in high debt

for many farmers, access to irrigated land and the

possibilities of salaried positions with sugar and

tomato canning operations nearby and in the regional capital of St. Louis, translate into higher average income levels in Ross Bethio than many other

areas of the country. All people have not, however,

benefitted equally. Access to irrigation and to employment is restricted and is becoming more critical with population growth and general economic

decline. Local herders have been particularly hard

hit by recurrent drought and have had generally less

access to irrigation or employment alternatives.

The Youth Association of Ross Bethio is among

the more dynamic of many similar organizations

of young adults throughout the country. The vast

majority of its 265 members (100 men and 165

women) are between the ages of 15 and 35. About

35 percent (mostly men) have attended primary

school and 20 participants have gone on to secondary school.

The problem of access to irrigated land is particularly acute for this age group. Although many of

them come from families with access to irrigation,

those plots are still in the hands of their elders or

risk being divided into uneconomically small plots

when passed on to this generation. For many people, the solution has been to seek local salaried employment or emigrate to the urban centers of St.

Louis or Dakar—strategies that are proving to be

increasingly unsuccessful. Meanwhile, the current

development of water and salinity control along the

Senegal River and the government’s land policies

regarding the development of irrigation have raised

fears that outsiders, either Senegalese or foreign,

will be given rights to land around Ross Bethio.

The Youth Association of Ross Bethio was formed

in 1974 in response to the challenges posed by

drought. Its well-organized structure, active membership, group discipline, and capable leadership

have led to a series of successful activities in smallscale irrigation, reforestation, livestock, and the improvement of community infrastructure (roads,

mosque, village pharmacy, women’s center, etc.).

Its activities have attracted attention and financial

support from a number of external donors. The

Association’s success with its first 40 hectare irrigation system (financed by the Dutch organization

NOVIB) led them to seek funding for expansion. The

ambitiousness of their plan caused them to be

turned down by several donors before coming to

ADF,
131

— .

The Project.—The AD F-funded project has added

over 100 hectares of irrigated land to the Association’s fields, thus providing a major increase in the

land available to its members. ADF’s grant has paid

for two irrigation pumps to draw water from a large

irrigation canal; the clearing and preparation of the

new irrigated fields, including the construction of

canals and dikes; and a small pick-up truck to transport supplies, produce, and participants.

Rice production began in September 1987 despite

major delays in the transmission of funds from ADF

to the Association, low levels of water in the source

canal, and a land dispute involving the local herders

who had traditional grazing rights to the area developed under the project. The Association followed

due process to gain title to the land and an eventual

“amicable settlement” was reached, but the dispute

required the intervention of armed police to remove

the herders from the land—an operation partially

financed by ADF-supplied funds according to an

Association official. On the more positive side, the

Association’s determination to succeed is shown

in their tremendous efforts to begin production, despite limited water in the source canal, by moving

tons of mud by hand to dig channels to feed their

irrigation system.

Production is impressively organized, Male members of the Association run the irrigation system,

supply 200 hours of work per season in collective

teams. Land access rights for men and women as

well as the distribution of benefits to each are organized differently. Men are given individual fields

averaging 3/4 hectare. Production is on an individual basis, although operations where timing is critical such as planting are performed by the collective work groups. Allocation is on a year-to-year

basis and considers the number of mouths to feed

and the level of effort contributed to collective work

teams. The 165 women involved have been allocated

only 20 hectares to be worked collectively in teams.

Although production, cost, and total benefits are

still uncertain, project staff estimate benefits on the

order of $90 for men and between $50 and $115

for women. Division of benefits on the women’s

fields will be made on the basis of the number of

days worked and the amount of effort contributed.

Cost and production estimates used by the Association to arrive at these figures were judged realistic by local experts, although the fuel costs of the

pumps chosen by the group were not known since

the model of pump is new to the area.

All inputs (diesel fuel, seed, fertilizer, etc.) are being provided by the Association through its own

budget (bolstered by funds from the Dutch organization NOVIB) and through credit arranged through

Senegal’s new National Agricultural Credit Bank.

The Association is one of the first to receive production credit from the bank.

Although women expressed the hope of having

access to more land in the future, they favored the

collective formula for working their land and did

not complain about the disparity of access and benefits between men and women. In fact, for many

this was their first access to irrigated lands of their

own,

Conclusion. —The Youth Association of Ross

Bethio fits well into the ADF mandate. While perhaps not among the poorest of Senegal’s poor, the

group’s identification of access to irrigation as a

major determinant of future well-being is correct

and farsighted. The project already has begun to

achieve one of its principal goals—the return of village youth from the urban centers. Apart from the

regrettable incident of forcing the herders off the

land to make way for the irrigation project and the

unresolved long-term impacts of irrigation on land

and water resources, the project gives evidence of

attaining the kind of sustainable results and expansion of opportunity called for in ADF’s mandate.

The Association’s operations are based on a high

degree of centralized decisionmaking and discipline, but it is an effective and probably unavoidable management method given the high degree of

coordination and timing inherent in a 100+ hectare irrigation scheme. Participants expressed high

levels of confidence in the group’s leaders and there

was evidence that leadership was responsive to and

held accountable by the members.

Organization issues are likely to become acute in

the short to medium term, especially the on-going

allocation of land within the irrigated area. Will the

leadership’s method for allocation according to

need and effort continue to go unchallenged? How

will new members be accommodated? What will

happen as the “youths” grow older? The Association’s proposed solution (further expansion of the

irrigated area) may be unrealistic because few outside organizations are willing to commit the level

of funding provided by ADF. Also, several experts

believe that at 150 hectares the scale of operations

is already beyond the maximum point of efficient

production,

A further challenge will be to maintain access to

short-term credit to finance the high costs of inputs.

The credit from the National Agricultural Bank this

year cannot be assumed to be on-going and, according to Association officials, was far less than

needed. The unproven cost and maintenance rec-
—

132

ord of the Association’s choice of pumps is an additional cause for concern. The OTA team’s feeling is, however, that the group’s performance in the

past, the resourcefulness and dynamism of its

leadership, and the dedication of its members will

find solutions to these problems. The prognosis for

the long-term future is clouded only by the economic and ecological uncertainties facing irrigated

rice and tomato production along the Senegal River.

Organization:

Site:

Activities:

Grant Size:

Union Kaoural

Kaoural Federation of Cooperatives

Twenty-five village associations in

the Kolda region of Senegal

Collective orchards and gardens;

dairy cattle feeding centers and village pharmacies.

$103,832

The Setting.—The Union Kaoural is an association of village youth groups based in the village of

Media Koundie (30 kilometers to the east of Kolda).

The Kolda Region, although connected by good

roads to the rest of Senegal, is among the country’s

most isolated and disadvantaged areas in terms of

social and productive infrastructure. This is partly

explained by the distance to Dakar (8 hours by road),

and partly due to the fact that, for political and economic reasons, it had been relatively neglected by

government development programs. Outside attention to agricultural development in the zone has also

been lacking despite the fact that the region is less

constrained by rainfall patterns, depleted soils, and

population densities than much of arable land in

Senegal. It is a zone where a sedentary branch of

the Fulani ethnic group is traditionally dominant.

The Union Kaoural is estimated by its leaders to

include over 3,000 members in 79 village groups.

Observations and interviews by OTA team members indicate that a considerably lower number are

actually active in the group’s activities. Approximately 45 percent of the members are women, and

75 percent are between the ages of 15 and 30. In

the Medina Koundie village group, fewer than 10

percent have gone to school. All but a few village

groups are predominantly Fulani. Members broadly

reflect the income level of their communities but

the leadership comes from relatively more affluent

and powerful families.

Low income and underemployment, particularly

during the dry season, are major facts of life in the

Kolda region, even more than in other areas of Senegal. The lack of alternative employment and government assistance to farmers through extension

services and input support has left people with few

options beyond moving to other regional capitals

or Dakar.

Village-level youth associations are traditional in

Senegal. In recent years, many of these groups have

been energized anew and have formed regional and

national level associations. The Association of

Young Farmers of the Casamance (AJAC in French)

has been one of the more dynamic regional associations. It in turn has encouraged the formation

of sub-regional unions of village groups such as the

Union Kaoural, which began in 1982. The Union

Kaoural is highly structured with a Board of Directors and a constituent assembly with representatives

of its member groups. The reality, however, is less

participatory or cohesive with a high degree of centralized control resting in a few individuals and considerable instability of membership.

Thirty-nine village groups were in the Union

when ADF negotiated its grant. Since then, 63 new

groups have joined but 27 have withdrawn (the

majority leaving with some rancor and despite the

fact that they were slated to receive benefits from

the ADF project). Two additional segments of the

Union are in the process of being spun off more

amicably. The village-level associations visited by

the OTA team expressed confidence in the Union

leadership (OTA did not visit any groups that had

withdrawn) and showed evidence of being participatory and enthusiastic about the proposed

activities. The dedication and hard work of several

of the Union’s leaders was evident. The Union has

received operational and project funding from a

range of NGO donors, mostly through the aegis of

AJAC.

The Project.—The Union Kaoural project being

funded by ADF is designed to provide collective opportunities for income generation. The project is

a scaled down version of the original proposal presented to ADF. The Union’s first priority (a cereal

bank) was dropped from the proposal at the suggestion of an ADF consultant and a second component, village pharmacies, was reduced by one-half.

The remaining project includes four principal activities that have been allocated among the 25 villages

chosen by the Union’s leadership to benefit from

the program.

ADF funding will provide materials for 10 collective orchards, 10 collective gardens, 2 dairy cattle feeding centers, and 5 village pharmacies, Both

dairy centers (15 percent of the project budget) are

being built in Medina Koundie—one for an association of herders who are not members of the

Union. The other components are identical “cookiecutter” activities where the Union provides mate-
133

rial inputs and the local village association provides

labor. All purchasing of materials and their distribution is being handled by the Union, including the

contracting and payment of salaries for the well diggers and masons. The Union has used ADF funds

to provide bookkeeping training to the treasurers

of the local groups. Its leaders also talked of providing some technical assistance and further training in vegetable gardening and fruit tree production directly or in conjunction with AJAC.

As of the OTA visit, wells and basins had been

completed and tools and fencing delivered to 8 of

the 10 villages that are slated to receive gardens.

Wells had been started in two others. The buildings

for the two dairy centers also were complete, but

in the opinion of the OTA team one of the buildings and both of the wells shown were built prior

to ADF funding. Purchase of the cattle was partially

completed. The team was told that materials for the

orchards were ordered and would be soon delivered.

Overall, the project is behind schedule. Part of

the delay was reported to come from slowness in

communciations and especially in the transfer of

funds from ADF to the Union. Opposition from local government officials, particularly over the village

pharmacies, was another problem which, although

not altogether resolved, gave indications of being

addressed. A further problem has been the tight control exercised by the Union’s manager (animateur

in French). His illness and lack of a deputy at one

point in the negotiations caused significant delay.

Poor planning was a final problem. Adequate allowance was not made for the costs of transporting the materials from the purchase point to Medina Koundie and then out to the remote village

members.

Financial records on the use of ADF funds were

non-existent or “not available. ” Those records that

did exist, combined with interviews with project

staff and participants, as well as observation, all indicate the possibility that substantially less materials and money were being used in construction and

equipment than was planned for in the project

proposal,

Conclusion. —The individual village-level organizations and their members seem to fit the ADF mandate, but OTA team’s visit raised questions regarding significant aspects of the project’s design. The

Union Kaoural appears to be going through a period

of instability where the exigencies of a project of

this magnitude give evidence of having a negative

influence. The centralization of its de facto structure, internal management and organizational deficiencies, the lack of basic financial records, and the

logistical difficulties in implementing a project in

25 villages spread across an area of hundreds of

kilometers with only one good road and one small

vehicle raise tremendous questions as to ultimate

outcomes. The fact that some progress can be seen

is to their credit.

The lack of effective individual input into project

planning and implementation is equally disturbing.

Each component was designed by the core group

in Medina Koundie, which also decided which village should get what activity. Each is being implemented according to an identical plan with the

Union controlling all the funds, hiring all the skilled

labor, and supervising all the work. Not only is this

method likely to cause difficulties given the difference between the membership, environments, and

organizations of the individual village groups but

it also precludes the development opportunity that

could have been provided by giving the local groups

a greater role in project design and implementation.

Although village participants seemed generally

knowledgeable about the project, they were unaware of its financial aspects and several were unclear about what was expected from them. There

were several instances where the village groups

failed to take important action while they awaited

instructions from the Union.

The lack of basic feasibility studies raises additional questions, No evidence exists to show that

thought had been given either at the village or Union

level to eventually marketing what will be produced,

Poor transportation infrastructure and the lack of

local markets could cause disappointing returns.

Records from the vegetable production activities of

the Medina Koundie village group showed net

losses for the past two years despite their location

on a paved road and in closer proximity to the larger

market town of Kolda than many of the other participating villages. The distribution of any proceeds

generated is a further unresolved and potentially

thorny issue. Most groups talked of all proceeds remaining in the group for investment in community

infrastructure or to be used for social obligations

of the members (a common practice in small income

generating activities of village youth groups, but

more problematic with larger projects). This form

of distribution might be inconsistent with the objective of increasing income possibilities and stemming rural to urban migration, The proposed plan

of the Union’s leaders to “tax” village groups 40

percent of their profits to establish a revolving fund

that could be used to do similar projects in other

member villages was not known by many groups

and not popular with those that were informed. Two

added cautions: the success of village pharmacies
—

134

and cattle feeding centers has been extremely low

elsewhere in Senegal.

Given these uncertainties, the future prognosis

is less than bright for the type of profitable collective group enterprises envisioned in the project proposal. A number of the groups however, showed

determination and creativity. The high quality of

the wells being built, and the benefits of good fencing and quality tools will undoubtedly benefit at

least some of the participants. The opportunity to

undertake the individual micro-projects (the heavy

handed control of the Union notwithstanding) is

also likely to benefit many of the individual village

groups, giving them experience in management,

new production techniques, marketing, and organization. A more thoughtful, realistic, and gradual

approach to assisting the Union Kaoural would have

enhanced these benefits.

Integrated Food Dovelopment

Program

Organization: Diocese of Morogoro, Development

Department

Site: Morogoro, Tanzania

Activities: Tractor hire; credit for inputs for

maize production.

Grant Size: $248,378

The Setting.—The Anglican Diocese of Morogoro

encompasses nearly 400 villages in 3 districts in central Tanzania, a region including productive areas

with sufficient rainfall for farming and drier areas

severely impacted by drought. The area where the

ADF project was first implemented in 1986 and

1987 lies at the edge of the vast rolling plains of the

Maasai Steppe. The town of Gairo is halfway between Morogoro and the new capital Dodoma. Most

of the people farm plots averaging several acres and

graze small herds of cattle on communal lands.

A charismatic minister, Reverend Chitemo, is a

main force behind local development efforts. He became bishop when the new Anglican diocese was

formed shortly after Independence in 1964. Anglicans are the predominant Christian religion in the

area. The Development Committee of the diocese

has sponsored a variety of agricultural projects

since 1970 to improve the nutrition and standard

of living of the Uluglu people. Rabbit, poultry, citrus tree, and beekeeping projects are on-going.

More recently, the diocese began a dairy and goat

project. Missionaries working in the diocese obtained support for these activities from English and

Australian religious funders such as Christian Aid.

Early failures taught the Bishop important lessons—the need for technical expertise and training,

and especially, the active participation of the people in development efforts. As a result, a participatory church structure was developed to encourage

a two-way information flow between the diocese

and the local villages. Each congregation, which include several villages, elects a contact committee;

three leaders of several congregation committees

form a parish committee; representatives of several

parishes form a deanery-level committee; the several deanery committees feed into the diocesan

Planning and Development Committee. Farmers,

women’s groups, youth groups, and pastors from

each parish are involved in planning and carrying

out projects.

The Project.—The project the Development Committee submitted to ADF, which it met through the

Christian Council of Tanzania (a coalition of protestant churches], is its most ambitious yet. It aims

to introduce modern farm inputs—mainly improved

seeds, fertilizer, and pesticide—and tractor hire

services together with extension advice and credit

to farmers to increase production of their major

crop, maize. The Development Committee initially

planned to purchase, store, and market the maize

produced. The goal is to increase productivity per

acre and acreage under cultivation.

ADF funds would buy 3 tractors to plow group

farms for congregations (3 acres each), women’s

groups (2 acres), youth groups (1 acre), and individual farms (1 acre each). The first year, each tractor was to plow 10 to 20 acres per day, for a total

of 1,080 to 1,800 acres; a specific package of seed,

fertilizers, and insecticides was to be applied by registered farmers who would get one acre plowed at

a charge of about $10. Maize yields were projected

to increase from an average of 1.5 bags per acre to

10 bags. ADF funds would build storage depots and

buy a truck. Shortly after awarding the grant ADF

sent a representative of another ADF-funded project, Paul Maina, director of Farming Systems

Kenya, to review plans and make recommendations

to the Development Committee. Since the Food and

Agriculture Organization (FAO) was sending several hundred Fiat tractors to the Morogoro region,

the diocese decided to purchase Fiat tractors, to take

advantage of the supplies of spare parts in garages

set up to service the FAO tractors.

The project was late getting started: a director and

agronomist were not recruited until February 1987;

only one tractor arrived and that in the middle of

the planting season; the fertilizer also arrived late,

Thus, only 156 acres were plowed, an average of
3.5 per day due to breakdowns and the fact that the

sites were scattered. Some farmers had more than

one acre plowed; some who were not registered in

the program hired the tractor or purchased inputs.

Not all farmers accepted the whole package, given

their aversion to the risk of adopting radically new

farming practices. Maize yields of project participants averaged 5 bags per acre, which were higher

than past yields but lower than planned, mainly because of lower than usual rainfall in the area. Household incomes thus increased $14 (less than the $44

planned), roughly equivalent to a 10 percent increase.

The OTA team arrived before the second planting season and found participants enthusiastic

about the results and many more wanting to participate than could. The management had learned

valuable lessons: more careful planning and record

keeping; better training of the contact committees

who selected participants; better effort to recruit

women farmers (nearly one-third of the individual

farmers registered for the second year), some of

whom would obtain inputs on credit; farmers would

sell maize through regular marketing channels

rather than to the diocese committee and repay their

loans to the committee; if the two tractors did not

arrive on time, project managers would consider

renting them. They would plow at least one “block

farm” on uncultivated land, which they told the

OTA team would not disturb the persons who

grazed their cattle herds since there was plenty of

open land. (Most Maasai, among the herders using

the area proposed for the block farm, are not Anglican.)

Conclusion.—The OTA team was especially impressed with the mechanism for two way communication and input from participants as well as the

increased yields of the first year participants. Although most beneficiaries were Anglicans, they

were a representative group of the area and included poor people. In general, the team felt the

project had been overambitious in its proposal, but

the new managers were making corrections based

on the first year. OTA concerns about participation

were the lack of clarity on how to register and careful supervision of plowing. The interlocking committee structure would help replicate the project

within the diocese, extending its impact. In some

instances, neighbors already imitated farming practices that participants learned from the project extension agents.

The church’s long experience with development

projects should help ensure sustainability after the

Bishop retires in late 1987. The team’s main con135

cerns related to sustainability were economic and

environmental. Careful financial planning about

how to continue the project has not been done. For

example, a market analysis would determine

whether the plan to purchase and market farmers’

produce is realistic or would lead to major losses

for the Committee. Estimating the costs of maintaining, and eventually replacing, the tractors would

help determine if the current rate charged to plow

each acre, somewhat less than the market rate, is

feasible,

Nor has the Development Committee clearly identified potential negative environmental impacts, although the project managers’ plan to plant citrus

trees on the block farms to improve the people’s diet

could also help prevent erosion. OTA members

asked if they considered ox plows for some areas,

and expressed concern about monocropping (which

could eventually reduce soil fertility, decrease production of pulses which provide protein, and increase risk if the price of maize was to decline].

Some danger exists of losing sight of the value of

the integrated food program envisioned by the Bishop

and overlooking the other agricultural projects in

the enthusiasm for maize and tractors.

Conservation Education Project

Organization: Kikatiti Village Malihai Club

Site: Kikatiti and Arusha, Tanzania

Activities: Water supply and reforestation

Grant Size: $66,168

The Setting.—Kikatiti, situated at the base of the

mountains between Mount Meru and Mount

Kilimanjaro about 22 kilometers from Arusha, has

a growing population estimated at 1,300 families.

Because of its higher elevation and rainfall, the area

near Arusha was favored by the white settlers and

remains an area of high agricultural potential in

Tanzania. Most of the Chaga people in the community are small farmers, with about 2 to 5 acres of

land, and in conformity with government regulations to reduce pressure of cattle herds on the land,

admit to raising one cow per acre. Water is a pressing problem. Women wait in long lines at the well.

Sometimes they must draw water for household use

from the nearby spring-fed pond used by cattle, with

negative consequences for health of their far-dies.

The women also walk long distances in search of

fuelwood.

In nearby Arusha, a group of environmentalists

established the Malihai (“living wealth”) Club of
136

Tanzania to educate Tanzanians, especially through

boys clubs in secondary schools, to appreciate the

wildlife in Tanzania’s national parks and help preserve them. Originally within the National Parks

(headquartered in Arusha), the Malihai Club of Tanzania was established in 1983 and obtained funding from the African Wildlife Foundation and

World Wildlife Fund/IUCN. The staff still is on the

payroll of the Ministry of Lands and Natural Resources. Awareness of the need to deal with the development problems of people living adjacent to the

parks, to prevent their poaching of wildlife, wood,

and water from the parks, led to the concept of helping communities in “buffer zones” near the parks.

Malihai Arusha picked Kikatiti as their first village

project for several reasons, including that they

thought it was an area where wood was being

poached from Arusha National Park. And a former

principal, whose school had sponsored a Malihai

Club, moved to Kikatiti and came to the national

organization of Malihai for assistance.

Malihai Arusha showed audiovisual materials

about the need to preserve the parks and plant trees

during town meetings. In 1985, Kikatiti set up their

own club, consisting of all members of the village

and headed by the elected leaders of the village, to

be in charge of environmental issues. While women

could be dues-paying members, they were excluded

from management committees,

The Project.—The director of the Malihai Club of

Tanzania first wrote ADF seeking funding for the

national organization. Later, after ADF explained

that Malihai’s proposed work with villages was

more appropriate for funding, he submitted a proposal for an improved water supply and reforestation project in Kikatiti. The water project had several components: a borehole previously dug with

AID funds, 4 kilometers away, would be linked to

the village, with separate waterpoints for domestic

use and for livestock. The people would dig the

trenches; ADF funds would provide pipe, electric

pump, technical assistance, a motorcycle, and repair and spare parts for a van for Malihai Arusha,

The forestry component was a small part of the

grant. Since the Tanzanian Forest Department provides seedlings, ADF funds would help build a village nursery.

ADF awarded the grant to Kikatiti Malihai Club

with a condition that they develop a maintenance

plan. But following a review by ADF’s auditors,

Coopers and Lybrand Tanzania, which showed village books were 13 months in arrears, ADF decided

to disburse funds to Malihai Arusha. (While technically ADF funds were in a joint account, actual

control of these funds was given to the national

organization.) Since the district government water

engineer would not provide services without pay,

Malihai Arusha eventually contracted a private firm

for an engineer, who added a 20,000 gallon water

storage tank to the plans. Thus, much of the control of the project rested in Malihai Arusha, even

though ADF continued to address its communication to the Kikatiti Chairman. For example, Malihai Arusha prepares all quarterly reports. The new

ADF Country Resource Facilitator lives nearby and

has visited the project often, but his role is limited

to technical matters; he was instructed not to get

involved in problems related to project management.

The delays in project start-up were in part due

to problems in obtaining engineering services and

the needed equipment (pipes, pump) from Nairobi,

Kenya, since the supplies were not available in Tanzania. The main problem, however, was the long

time it took for the Kikatiti Club to obtain tax exempt status needed to import materials tax free. At

the time of the OTA visit, the trenches had been

dug by most of the men in the village on several

Saturdays of collective action, and the pipes had

just arrived from Nairobi. The pump had not yet

arrived, and the storage tank and water points were

not built. Still, public support for the water system

was high.

However, less support was evident for the forestry

component. The nursery near the pond was in poor

condition, the fence broken by cattle, with few small

trees. Community leaders agreed the nursery was

not working as planned; but might do better when

the water supply was completed. ($4,000 in ADF

funds are for a future nursery, perhaps on the same

site.) OTA team members noted that planting trees

around the pond, while it could help protect the

pond, would not affect the watershed. Kikatiti

leaders said most seedlings were planted on individual plots and denied that women obtained fuelwood from the national park since it was some distance away.

Kikatiti leaders had no idea how much it would

cost to maintain the water system (e.g., pay the

monthly electric bill, hire someone to oversee the

system, and set up a fund for eventual replacement

of the pump) and noted that during a town meeting

members had not accepted the monthly fee (about

$1.00) proposed by the committee and substituted

a $1.25 annual fee per household. Nor did they plan

to charge fees from users from outside the village.

OTA team members were unable to meet with the

Kikatiti treasurer. Despite repeated requests, OTA

team members were also not able to speak to women

in Kikatiti.
137

Conclusion.—Kikatiti was recognized as a local

government when it registered under the Tanzania

government-sponsored ujamaa program. Since the

community had successfully completed a number

of on-going projects (e.g., grain mill, cattle dip, and

store) and would have to maintain the water supply, OTA team concluded that (1) a planned disengagement of Malihai Arusha from management and

financial control of the project would have helped;

(2) the water should not be connected until Kikatiti

develops an economically feasible plan to sustain

the system. Despite the lack of financial planning,

the fact that the community successfully managed

other projects and that water was such a critical

need led the OTA team to conclude that the water

project would probably be sustained by the people.

It was unlikely that the district water officials would

provide much support. However, the nursery did

not seem to have strong support, even though many

recognized the need for more trees. Involvement

of women in the committees could have helped.

Within the district, few communities have built

their own water supply. Since the government of

Tanzania does not have the resources to provide

water to many rural communities, self-help water

projects definitely meet a need. However, replicability of this system is limited because few villages

have access to the relatively large amount of outside funds needed for construction, or reliable

sources of electricity. Better relations with the district water officials might help others reduce costs

of technical assistance and maintain the system.

The Malihai Club of Tanzania’s plan to help people who live in buffer areas near the national parks

meet their needs is innovative. But to work more

effectively with other village development projects,

they need to improve their community development

skills, learn to work in concert with local leaders,

and establish a relationship of trust with them.

Njoguini, Giteroo, and Kabat i

Self-Help Water Project

Organization: NGK Self-Help Water Project Committee

Site: Njoguini, Gitero and Kabati, Kenya

Activities: Water supply for domestic use and

irrigated plots.

Grant Size: $250,000

The Setting.—The village of Njoguini is located

below the forest in the foothills of Mount Kenya,

snowcapped year round. The villages of Gitero and

Kabati are down in the dry plains which were once

vast wheat farms held by British settlers. Following independence in 1963, this area of the highlands

was part of the Million Acre Resettlement scheme

intended to compensate white settlers and redistribute their land to African farmers. But public funds

and donor contributions fell short and so private

land buying companies were formed to combine individuals’ savings, purchase large farms, and subdivide them among the new owners. Gitero was the

first of the three communities to begin resettlement

in the late 1970s. By the early 1980s, 250 families

had settled on the 350 plots in 3 new communities.

Shares were for 1 acre in Njoguini, 2 in Kabati, 3

in Gitero; but half the families obtained 3 to 5 acres

and a few up to 20, Most of the new settlers were

Kikuyu, but about half in Njoguini were Meru.

The Gitero Self-Help Committee was formed in

1982 to obtain water needed by the new residents.

Before he left, the white settler who had owned the

large estate sold the windmill that had been the

principal source of power for the old borehole, the

only water source. The community raised funds to

repair the well and diesel pump. A Peace Corps

Volunteer assigned to the adjoining district’s water

office put the committee in touch with the U.S. Ambassadors Self-Help Fund, which provided $10,000

to replace the windmill in 1983. But the drought

of 1984 was devastating. Crops failed, three-fourths

of the communities’ cattle died, and the people were

forced to depend on food aid for survival.

The Project.—To better ensure water supplies, the

people decided to pipe water from a river fed by

glaciers on Mount Kenya so that each household

could have enough water for domestic use, for their

livestock, and to irrigate I acre of land. The management committee expanded to include seven

elected representatives of each of the three communities, Njoguini, Gitero and Kabati (NGK). The loPhoto credit” ADF/Michael Maren

NGK’s first water tank nearing completion in 1986.
138

cal chief and community development assistant

were added as the government’s representatives.

Each committee coordinated fundraising and work

for its village and elected representatives to the central committee. The central committee approached

the Provincial Water Engineer who began to conduct a survey and design a gravity-fed water system and asked the Peace Corp volunteer to prepare

a proposal to ADF and be the project manager.

ADF’s representative suggested that the labor be

contributed by the residents, rather than paid by

the grant, The residents began to clear the course

and dug 3 kilometers of trenches by the end of 1984,

In spring 1985, ADF awarded $149,000 for the

project’s first phase and later another $98,000 for

the second two phases. The objectives were to dig

a 13 kilometer trench for the main trunk line down

the mountain and 18 kilometers of distribution lines;

to build two 50,000-gallon storage tanks and an intake. The design allowed each household to have

an individual tap and for 200 acres to be irrigated.

ADF funds paid the salaries of the manager and a

counterpart who would be trained to manage the

system, pipes, and materials for the storage tanks.

Each community worked one day a week and all

three worked on Saturdays, when large meetings

were held; committee records show each person

worked an average of 115 days. The community

raised money for the intake high in the rainforest

(which had to be protected from roving elephants)

though harambee fundraisers and a $31 subscription fee. Large boulders were cracked by warming

them with fire and then throwing cold water over

them. They received permission for the pipeline to

cross the Kenyan Vice President’s very large farm

and for the second storage tank to be located on it.

District water officials who designed the system supervised its construction,

By the time of the OTA visit, the main distribution lines, intake, and two storage tanks were complete, and many residents had completed water installation (but not hooked up household water taps)

to their farms at their own expense. The trained

counterpart was supervising the system. About 100

to 130 acres were being irrigated. It was unknown

if the approximately 100 absentee landowners could

afford the hookup fee ($425) to pay for the 115 days

of labor and the additional costs of bringing the line

to their farms. While the system was designed for

200 irrigated acres, some people were irrigating 2

or 3 acres, and there are 350 farms. Local extension agents had provided training in irrigated production prior to arrival of the water, and lush vegetable gardens were in evidence on the irrigated plots.

Women were growing cabbage, pepper, carrots, and

tomatoes in the dry season. Cattle were producing

more milk.

There were benefits in addition to increased income from the sale of vegetables. Women no longer

spend long hours carrying water, and they complain

of fewer backaches; children have improved hygiene, diets, and time to attend school. In addition,

land values doubled as a result of the water supply:

rising from $625 to $1250 an acre in Gitero (current land values in Kabati were cited as $750 to $950

an acre; in Ngoguini, $1818 an acre).

Bouyed by success, the central management committee plans to build a storage shed to market

vegetables in nearby cities, form a dairy cooperative with a milk processing plant, and bring electricity to the area.

Conclusion. —The OTA team was impressed both

with the participation of the people and the results

of their effort. The tri-village management structure,

providing a voice for people of different ethnic

groups and geographic areas, could be replicated

in other areas. Other factors fostering participation

were the fact that it is a new settlement without entrenched social or political factions, a clearly defined area, the leaders are perceived to be honest,

and the chief had community development training.

The team had some concerns about sustainability of the project, although the track record of the

group indicates they will probably meet future challenges. The proposed maintenance charge bears no

relation to the costs of repair, replacement, and payment of supervisors of the system. A careful analysis of these costs has not yet been done. Nor has

a market analysis been done of the impact of the

increased vegetable production that could result in

lower prices. Not much consideration has been

given to mitigating negative environmental impacts

of irrigation on soil fertility, such as waterlogging

and erosion. Nor has a soil analysis been done to

determine which areas are more suitable for irrigation. Terracing and agroforestry could be considered.

The management committee also needs to plan

for competing claims on the system in the future.

Residents across the road have complained to local officials they do not have access to water for

irrigation; others have complained of the diversion

of their potential water source. Also, households

currently irrigating will be reluctant to cut back

their irrigated acreage once new households come

on line.

According to research by government water officials, only 1 in 15 self-help water projects in Kenya
139

is completed. But few have direct access to the outside resources that NGK received from ADF. While

a gravity-fed system is relatively simple, there are

limited sites available for gravity systems in Kenya.

Areas for new settlement of entities with the ability to control access to the water and manage its

use are equally scarce. Still, water and agriculture

officials have looked with interest at NGK, recognizing the contribution of the residents was onethird the cost of the project. At least one other community in the district has begun its own water

project.

Kenya Small Enterprise and

Credit Training Project

Organization:

Site:

Activities:

Grant Size:

Partnership for Productivity (PfP)/

Kenya

Nairobi and Kakamega, Kenya

Provide women’s groups with training and credit for small-scale enterprises and agricultural inputs,

$228,800

The Setting.—Partnership for Productivity

(PfP)/Kenya is a private voluntary organization

which was started by some American Friends

(Quakers) in the Western Province of Kenya in 1969.

Since 1975, it has been autonomous with a Kenyan

Board of Directors and staff, many of whom are

Quakers. Yet PfP/Kenya continued to receive training and other support from the U.S.-based PfP

through 1986. Its purpose is “to promote both socioeconomic development and human potential development in rural Kenya by focusing on incomegenerating” projects.

Most activities have been centered in three western provinces, densely populated areas with high

rainfall and high potential for rainfed agriculture,

Cash crops such as sugar, tea, and coffee are replacing production of food crops, especially near Lake

Victoria.

PfP’s early efforts were to provide management

assistance to individual small-scale business operators. In 1974, PfP began a rural extension service

to help small entrepreneurs with legal assistance,

training in business management and financial

planning, as well as some specialized assistance in

agriculture and energy conserving technologies,

Credit was provided to complement the training and

technical assistance. By 1980, PfP decided to work

with groups so it could reach more people.

In 1981, PfP initiated a successful pilot project,

funded by AID’s Women in Development program

and the Ford Foundation, to help rural women become more self-sufficient. Since credit and commercial institutions in Kenya require land title deeds,

traditionally in the name of the husband, as collateral for loans, rural women are unable to obtain

credit. PfP provided women with business management training and access to credit. During the pilot project 18 women’s groups received loans, with

a loan recovery rate of 90 percent, and 54 groups

received farm inputs on credit. PfP demonstrated

that it had developed a methodology that helped improve the incomes of rural women.

The Project.—ADF awarded a 2-year grant to

PfP/Kenya in 1985, which was later increased to

$229,000, to provide: 1) training in credit and business management to 30 women’s groups in three

districts and 2) credit to these groups for incomegenerating projects and agricultural inputs. Initial

ADF grant funds were to provide for staff salaries,

including eight new extension agents, and the credit

fund. Since PfP’s Board of Directors consists of 8

men and its 5 field supervisors are men, it recruited

women extension agents for this program (by 1987,

8 of 20 extension agents were women). The ADF

grant was amended to allow the purchase of four

motorcycles so the agents can visit the women’s

groups more frequently,

At the time of the OTA visit near the end of the

ADF grant period, about 4,000 women were active

in credit groups in western Kenya. PfP had provided

training and credit to 92 groups, more than three

times the number projected. Three officers from

each of the groups had attended special business

training workshops sponsored by PfP. The local

groups vary in size from 20 to 45 members and include landless women, heads of households, and

non-literate persons. Although group leaders appear

to be more affluent than members, the team did not

see this as a problem, Each group has a constitution and is registered with the Ministry of Social

Services. Building on traditional savings clubs and

the harambee tradition, the groups demonstrated

cohesion and the ability to handle complex financial transactions and loan repayments. Most of the

women understand simple cash flow analysis and

non-literate women have mastered a red-bag/greenbag system of money management, in which their

working capital is kept in red bags and the surplus

in green bags, The records of the 15 groups visited

by OTA team members were clear, up to date and

open to all.

PfP capitalized 50 revolving loan funds with $625

each. Since the individual loan size allocated is $62,

only 10 women in each group could get loans at first.
140

Each group was expected to show savings of 15 percent (about $100) before PfP capitalized the fund.

With repayments, monthly savings contributions,

and group fundraising, new loans are made as funds

are available. Each group sets its own interest rate,

some charging as much as 120 percent interest, so

the loan fund will appreciate more quickly. PfP

charges the market rate, increasing its charge on

the initial loan to the groups to 14 percent. An internal evaluation by PfP in 1986 indicated that recipients of these loans have increased their income

by 30 percent.

The OTA team was particularly interested in the

loans for agricultural inputs made to 62 groups

which received the inputs on credit. Interviews confirmed the finding of the internal evaluation that

these loans led to an increase in productivity.

• pre-loan: average yield per acre was 3 to 5 bags

of maize ($45).

Ž post-loan: average yield per acre was 18 bags

of maize ($205).

OTA team members were impressed with the extension advice that combined conservation techniques,

such as multicropping, rotation, planting trees,

using oxen and contour plowing, with improved

inputs.

OTA found that most of ADF’s $80,000 in the

credit fund had been disbursed and repaid principal

and interest had begun to be given out as new credit.

If the past track record is any indication, a threefold multiplier can be expected. However, loan

repayment of the local groups to PfP is currently

low, especially when compared to past PfP programs. Some 63 percent of the groups were late

payers, though only 3 of every 10 members were

late. The primary reason for the lateness, according to PfP staff, was that the government national

maize buying board had not paid farmers for their

last season’s crops 6 months after the harvest.

Conclusion.—Informed sources confirmed that

few, if any, other organizations currently operating in Kenya provide rural credit as well as PfP.

OTA team members concluded that project outcomes could be enhanced in two ways. First, PfP

could develop a more coherent strategy for taking

its advanced members into higher incomegenerating activities, either in the formal or informal sector. Second, PfP needs a donor who can assist it over an extended period of time in developing ways to be more self-supporting. Currently PfP

is in desperate need of outside financing; 94 percent of its budget comes from outside donors and

those who funded PfP (e.g., PACT, IBM, Ford, FAO)

did not continue their grants ending in 1986-87,

Since early 1987, budget reductions had forced ADF

to lay off half of its staff, some of whom had been

with the organization for years. The only new funder

at the time of OTA’s visit was Kenya’s Rural Enterprise program which channeled AID funds to PfP

for an agricultural service center designed to provide income to PfP.5

The mechanism by which women can get loans

without collateral depends on their participation

in a group. This model, developed in Latin America and tested elsewhere, has proven replicable.

This is its first use in East Africa, and it is likely

to work elsewhere in Kenya. But whether the funds,

and local groups, can maintain themselves without

PfP oversight is not known.

Poultry-Market Gardon Project

Organization: Boiteko Agricultural Management

Association

Site: Serowe, Botswana

Activities: Vegetable, poultry, and egg production.

Grant Size: $35,072

The Setting.–The Boiteko Agricultural Management Association (AMA) conducts a horticultural

and poultry project in the village of Serowe, in eastern Botswana, approximately 300 kilometers north

of the capitol of Gaborone. Nine women and one

man from the village comprise the AMA group that

runs the project, with assistance from a technical

manager and a financial consultant.

The area surrounding Serowe, known as the hardveld, is semi-arid. Arable agriculture normally is

constrained by inadequate and variable precipitation during most rainfall seasons. In a good year,

the area can expect to receive between 400 and 450

millimeters of rain. Reliable supplies of water cannot be depended on for any production activity,

especially horticulture, and the situation has been

exacerbated by a six year drought that has decimated the country’s cereal production,

During the last 3 years, the Ministry of Agriculture has strongly encouraged the development of

horticulture projects as a means of increasing rural employment while decreasing dependence on

South Africa for the importation of most of the country’s vegetables. The Ministry supports small scale

producers by limiting the importation of vegetables

51n January 1988, ADF’s Project Review Committee approved a new

Institutional Revolving Credit grant of $248,000 to PfP which addresses

both OTA points.
141

that are grown domestically and by providing technical assistance.

The Project.—The Boiteko project attempts to provide a reliable income source and employment for

rural people while providing a reliable source of

vegetables and eggs for the local market within

Serowe.

The Boiteko group has a long history of project

experience, The present AMA represents the remaining core of a group started in the early 1970s

as a production unit of the Serowe Brigades, a private vocational training/income generating movement started by a teacher from South Africa, Patrick

Van Rensburg. The original Boiteko group was involved in weaving and vegetable gardening and had

over 100 members, However, with the decline of

the Serowe Brigades throughout the late 1970s and

early 1980s, and some inappropriate technical assistance, the Boiteko group disintegrated.

During 1984, the Southern Region Field Representative for ADF heard from Van Rensburg, then

the head of a non-governmental organization, that

the remaining members of the Boiteko group had

hired a technical advisor and wished to continue

their horticultural scheme and add an egg laying

operation. The objectives of the group were to provide members with a consistent supply of income

and provide the village and the group with

vegetables,

The group so far has accomplished a great deal.

With the original ADF grant, the group has been able

to purchase wire fencing to enclose a 1 hectare plot

for the vegetable and egg production operations as

well as build a chicken house. Other grants from

an AID-sponsored appropriate technology project

and from the Canadian University Service Organization provided a windmill for the irrigation borehole, a mechanical tiller, and netting for the vegetable nursery. From the proceeds of the project, the

group pays its members approximately $45 per

month and the members have expanded their operations to include a citrus orchard. The vegetable

operation grosses between $120 and $240 per month

and the egg laying operation between $420 and $540

per month.

One recurring problem has been a reliable source

of water. The windmill, purchased with a grant to

the group, is a prototype for Botswana and has frequently broken down. Recently, the group asked for

and received from ADF an amendment to their

original grant for a diesel engine pump and irrigation piping, which will alleviate their immediate

water supply problems.

The group feels they have accomplished their objectives, but have hope further that the operation

will eventually increase their present incomes, They

also hope to become self-sufficient in technical and

financial management of the project.

Conclusion.—The group and the project both face

a potentially very productive future because of the

strength of the group’s organizational and participatory structure. Their open style of management and

sharing of responsibilities have become models for

group development in Botswana. The project faces

some obstacles because of environmental concerns

over the resistance of pests to insecticides and the

compaction of the soil. In addition, the group faces

somewhat severe undercapitalization which forces

lag periods in production while waiting to replace

inputs.

The most encouraging sign for sustaining the

project is the support the group gets from other

donors and the Ministry of Agriculture. Boiteko has

become a symbol of success for horticultural projects and there appears to be a committed effort to

ensure its longevity. The ministry hopes that

projects similar to Boiteko can be replicated, and

it appears that other non-governmental groups in

the country are following the model. Other horticultural groups have formed in the villages of

Ramotswa and Kanye. However, the one powerful

force of the Boiteko group is its solidarity. Many

people have commented on the uniqueness of the

group and it maybe that because of the conditions

under which it formed and sustained itself, the success of this project may be difficult to replicate.

Tutume Tractor Hire Project

Organization: Tutume McConnell Community

Trust

Site: Francistown, Botswana

Activities: Rent tractors for plowing and

hauling.

Grant Size: $40,604

The Setting.—The Tutume McConnell Community Trust is an enterprise of the brigade located

in Tutume, a village 110 kilometers northeast of

Francistown, in northeast Botswana. The brigades

are private training programs for school leavers

which also provide some employment opportunities and sponsor some businesses to cover their

costs. The brigade’s mandate is to provide vocational training within profit-making productio n

units.

Arable agriculture in Botswana is rarely a full time

occupation. Most households follow a very diverse

strategy of income generation, relying on forma l

and informal employment opportunities and live -
142

stock production supplemented by food production.

Households face significant constraints because of

the paucity and variance of rainfall and the lack of

draught power for plowing. The draught power constraint severely affects female-headed households

as they are generally the last to be able to borrow

or hire oxen for plowing. Since plowing must be

timed to coincide with unpredictable rainfall patterns, those who plow last suffer diminished or insignificant harvests.

The government of Botswana has initiated several programs in attempts to become more selfsufficent in food production. Both of the principle

programs, the Arable Lands Development Program

(ALDEP) and the Arable Rainfed Agricultural Program (ARAP), provide grants and subsidies for

draught power. ALDEP is an on-going program and

ARAP is a drought relief program intended to encourage farmers to plow during the drought.

The Project.—In April 1984, the Tutume McConnell Trust Brigade proposed a tractor hire scheme

as a solution to the draught power constraints of

farmers in the Tutume area, The objectives of the

project were to alleviate the shortage of draught

power, to increase food production in the area, to

haul manure during the season, and haul bricks and

sand for the brigades during the off-season. The

project was intended to improve the agricultural

incomes of the area’s farmers and the operating income of the brigade. An amendment to the original

grant provided for a 10 hectare demonstration plot

for the brigade.

The project has provided plowing for approximately 60 farmers during the initial season of operation. On average, each woman has had approximately 1.8 hectares ploughed and each man 2.4

hectares, However, the results of the project must

be viewed in the light of some of the complicating

factors, First, the success of the project depends on

the affordability of the tractor service. Presently,

ARAP provides any farmer a subsidy of $30 per hectare for hiring draught power, The subsidy means

that during the drought, the Tutume area farmers

receive the tractor service at no monetary cost. The

project is therefore demand driven based on the subsidy offered by the government. In addition, even

the first farmers who received the service did not

get their lands plowed until late December, far into

the agricultural season and decreasing their chances

of realizing a productive harvest.

The project has operated for one agricultural season, The objectives of the brigade have only been

partially fulfilled: tractor plowing has been provided

to several farmers in the area and the brigade has

been able to use the tractor to haul materials during the off-season. However, there is no evidence

that food production has, or will be, increased because of the project for several reasons. First, the

brigade intends to use the tractor to plow its own

demonstration plot before proceeding to plow

farmers’ fields. Because agricultural production is

so dependent on the timing of plowing coincident

with the start of the rains, it is questionable that

this pattern will allow any increase in local production. Second, the brigade has had a serious problem matching the technology to the soil conditions

of the area. A moldboard plow could not be used

successfully because of the predominance of treestumps in most of the fields. In switching to a disc

plow to offset the problem, the upper horizons of

the soil structure of the plowed fields has been

damaged leaving them susceptible to wind and

water erosion.

Conclusion. —The project appears to be economically sustainable only as long as the subsidy makes

the project affordable to the farmers, Several planners at the district and the national level have commented that the subsidy is intended as drought relief and will be discontinued in the near future.

There is also the question of who will be able to afford the plowing services after the removal of the

subsidy. Definitely, the poorer farm households

were not able to afford such a service before the

drought and it is unlikely that they will be able to

afford it in the future.

Environmentally, the project faces an even

bleaker future. Even though the technical problems

leading to increased soil erosion maybe worked out,

it is still questionable whether increased farmland

should be opened up to monocropping in a fragile

semi-arid ecological zone, The removal of trees and

the plowing of large areas of land may have already

made the area more susceptible to environmental

damage.

Organizationally, the project is not sustainable,

The farmers receiving the services of the brigade

have no say in the decisionmaking of the project

or in the demonstration plot research being conducted by the agricultural unit of the brigade. This

top-down form of consultation does not allow input from the farmers and makes later field trials irrelevant with respect to meeting the needs of

farmers. There is no learning or process of group

empowerment, as no primary groups exist.

Finally, the project has passed on the large risk

of farming in a semi-arid environment to the

farmers, Any increase in soil erosion, or financial

risk due to planting increased hectarage, is passed

on through ADF and the brigades to the rural households. Past demonstration tractor hire schemes in
143

Botswana have not increased agricultural production sufficiently to cover the costs of production.

At present the project appears to be replicable because the brigades and other NGOS have embraced

the idea and are promoting it. At least two other

brigades in Botswana have expressed interest in a

tractor hire scheme in their area. As long as the subsidy remains, such a project has the potential for

tremendous popularity. However, the question here

is not “Can the project be replicated?” but “Should

the project be replicated?” From available evidence

and past experience in Botswana, the answer appears to be negative.

Zimbabwe Coffee and Tea Project

Organization:

Site:

Activities:

Grant Size:

Agricultural Finance Corporation

Honde and Pungwe Valleys,

Zimbabwe

Revolving credit fund for coffee and

tea production.

$101,537

The Setting.—After independence in 1980, the

government of Zimbabwe faced the difficult task

of restructuring the rural economy of the country

to provide services to the African smallholders previously excluded from participating in economic

development. Agricultural production in preindependent Zimbabwe favored the large-scale commercial sector and institutionally the delivery of inputs and services was directed toward the larger

farmers, The present objective is to provide access

to inputs and services for the smallholding lowresource farmers of the country.

The Agricultural Finance Corporation (AFC) of

Zimbabwe is a parastatal credit institution that was

founded to provide loans for agricultural activities.

Previously, its experience was mostly with the

larger commercial agricultural sector. For the last

seven years, the AFC has been redirecting its attention to provide loans to smallholders for both

marketable food and cash crop production. They

make loans available for the short-, medium-, and

long-term for crop production expenses including

land preparation, the purchase of fertilizers and

chemicals, harvesting, transportation and marketing.

The Project.—The ADF funds for the Zimbabwe

Tea and Coffee Project allowed the group to establish a revolving credit fund for the production o f

tea and coffee by smallholders in the Honde and

Pungwe Valleys of eastern Zimbabwe, The Honde

and Pungwe Valleys stretch from the Nyanga -

Mutare road northeast to the Mozambique border.

The area provides a favorable region for the production of tea and coffee in addition to several

different food crops.

The AFC has two important credit schemes in the

valleys, one of which is funded with European Economic Community funds and the other financed by

ADF. The ADF project provided medium- to longterm loans for the purchase of tea and coffee seedlings, and expenses related to land preparation and

fertilizers and chemicals. Initially, approximately

144 farmers received loans of approximately $600

spread out over 3 years. The interest rate charged

is 13 percent per year. The projected numbers of

farmers to receive loans under the revolving credit

fund are 214 in 1986-87 and 383 in 1987-88. In total, there are 500 farm households in the area.

Because both tea and coffee take a number of

years to mature, no returns to the farmers have been

measured. Estimates made by the AFC and AGRITEX, the government agricultural research and extension agency, anticipate returns per farmer of approximately $700 to $1,000 per heciare per year for

tea and a higher return for coffee. With the average

size of a combined tea/coffee plot being one hectare per household, the expectations are that each

household will be able to repay the loan starting in

year 3 or 4 and have a reasonable profit.

The project has not been able to yet recover the

value of the loans because they are not yet due for

repayment. However, it is anticipated that there will

be a high repayment rate because of the favorable

conditions under which the farmers operate, because of the potentially high returns for coffee, and

because the AFC will be repaid directly by the marketing societies before the farmers receive any

returns from the sale of crops.

Conclusion. —The possibility of sustainability for

this project is relatively high. Economically, the

funds are being used to support fairly high-value

cash crops. As long as coffee prices paid to the

farmers offset the depressed price of tea, the

prospects for increased income and for the continuance of the revolving credit scheme are high. However, it is not clear if the economic feasibility plans

of the project accurately reflect the changing conditions for the marketing of these cash crops. In the

area, several farmers who have long-term experience with the production of tea have had to sell food

crops to repay AFC loans.

The project has increased the potential of organizational sustainability at the primary cooperative level and for the AFC. The cooperatives associated with the project appear very democratic and

participatory, except possibly with respect to

women’s access to the project. As institutions, they
144

have experienced substantial empowerment because of their involvement in the production of tea

and coffee.

The AFC has also benefited from the shift in emphasis from the large-scale commercial to the smallholder sector. The ADF funds contributed to sustaining this shift, but did not produce the major

incentive for it.

Environmentally, the replacement of food crops

grown on steep slopes by the more soil-protecting

tea crop benefits soil conservation. However, it is

not clear how the continuing shift from tea to coffee will affect the degree of groundcover in the area.

Alternatively, little or no research has been done

on the possibility of intercropping the tree crops

with food crops for soil conservation. There has also

been no analysis of the potential for surface and

ground water contamination (or the potential for increased incidence of health problems) caused by

the increased use of pesticides in the area.

The last issue of sustainability involves the lack

of monitoring being done by the AFC, ADF, or the

primary organizations. The AFC is attempting to

increase their computer capability to track loans

and recipients, but they must also ensure that data

is collected on who is being served and the impacts

on the target group.

The AFC revolving credit scheme for tea and coffee production has little potential for replicability

in the rest of Zimbabwe because of the specific ecological conditions necessary for the production of

these crops. However, the lessons learned by the

AFC with regard to repayment procedures and the

success of the primary groups could be adapted for

other crops and situations within Zimbabwe. This

project has the potential for a significant impact on

the income levels of low-resource farmers and for

the growth of indigenous institutions involved in

improving access to previously excluded portions

of the farming sector, but efforts must be made to

build in monitoring procedures that allow organizations to determine the populations actually being served and the benefits to them.

Silveira House Development Fund

Organization: Silveira House

Site: Nine communities, Zimbabwe

Activities: Dressmaking cooperative; animal

and storage facilities; store; farm inputs and equipment.

Grant Size: $20,808

The Setting.—Zimbabwe contains a plethora of

non-governmental organizations (NGOS) involved

Women learn dressmaking as part of the

Silveira House Project

in rural development. Some are non-denominational, while others are religiously based. One of

the more respected religious-based institutions is

Silveira House. It began as an institution in 1964

with the major objective being to provide a place

where people could gather to discuss political issues. In 1970, Silveira House started an agricultural

program centered around groups using the traditional nimbe cooperative labor group for organizing purposes. Within several years their activities

expanded to cover over 500 groups within their

diocese.

Silveira House derives most of its present budget

from lay contributions solicited by institutions representative of the German Catholic Bishops (MISEREOR) and from funds awarded by a Dutch Catholic development organization (C EBEMO). Its total

budget is approximately $500,000 per year. Their

agricultural program is one of the most expensive,

approximately $120,000 per year.

The Project.—In 1983, the director of Silveira

House felt that a discretionary fund would be a useful method of providing loans and grants to communities for small-scale projects. This fund would

allow rapid responses to groups’ and communities’

needs. ADF approached Silveira House at the suggestion of an Oxfam staff member familiar with the

idea, and in March 1985, ADF gave a grant for

$15,510. Subsequent grant amendments brought the

total up to $20,808.

With the ADF money, Silveira House has provided funds for dressmaking cooperatives, livestock

dip tanks, piggery construction, the stocking of a

community store, building sheds for the storage of

farm inputs, and purchase of farm inputs and processing equipment, In all, groups from 10 communities are scheduled to be assisted with ADF funds.
The results so far have been concentrated in nine

of the communities and interest-free loans have

been made totaling approximately $8,000. The remaining monies of the discretionary fund will be

dispersed when the groups’ projects are ready for

funding. An additional $3,298 is budgeted for the

purchase of a motorcycle for the agricultural field

staff; however, some problems with the transfer of

funds between the ADF and Silveira House have

delayed its purchase.

ConcIusion.— Silveira House remains one of the

most stable and respected NGOS in Zimbabwe, thus

ensuring the sustainability of the group beyond the

end of the project. It is also likely that because of

the training and organizing skills transferred from

Silveira House to local communities that the recipient groups will continue to prosper after the ADF

funds have been used. Finally, the activity of a

revolving credit scheme being funded by ADF encourages the sustainability of the project’s activities.

Several pros and cons of this use of ADF funds

are apparent. The advantages are those of sustainability listed above, plus the probability that the funds

are being used by an institution with a mandate sim145

ilar to ADF’s. Silveira House has a strong training

program and works closely with government group

development programs and the groups themselves

to strengthen local institutions. However, little data

exist to suggest that the target groups reached by

Silveira House represent the poorer segments of the

communities. Of the several activities visited by the

OTA teams, for example, the piggery project at

Mwanza and the cattle dip in Chishawasha, principally benefited the more affluent small farmers,

those who could afford the entry fee for the piggery

project and those who owned cattle. Another concern is that some of the projects encourage women

to learn traditional skills such as dressmaking which

are less remunerative than agricultural activities.

On the positive side, Silveira House has a fairly

large and consistent budget commitment of which

the ADF grant is a very small portion, Were the ADF

funds not available, Silveira House most likely

would have been able to secure funds for the discretionary credit scheme from other sources, When

the ADF grant is disbursed, Silveira House will

likely be able to use its contacts with other donors

to raise additional funds.
Appendix C

Desk Reviewers, Participants in the

Methods Workshop, and Members of

OTA Field Assessment Teams

Desk Reviewers

“Aspects of Participation in Projects Funded by the

African Development Foundation” by

Dr. Virginia DeLancey

Associate Professor

Institute of International Studies

University of South Carolina

Fort Jackson, SC

“Consultant’s Report to OTA” by

Dr. Peter J. MatIon

Principal Economist

International Crops Research Institute for the

Semi-Arid Tropics (ICRISAT)

I-Iyderabad, India

“Desk and Office Review of ADF Activities:

Renewable Resource Technologies” by

Dr. Fred R. Weber

Owner and Manager

International Resources Development and

Conservation Services

Boise, ID

Participants in the Methods Workshop

Ms. OluBanke Akerele

Deputy Director

U.N. Development Fund for Women (UNIFEM)

New York, NY

Dr. George Honadle

Consultant

Rockville, MD

Ms. Caroline Pezzullo

president

Caroline Pezzullo Associates

New York, NY

Members of Field Assessment Teams

West Africa Team: Niger and Senegal

Team Leader:

Mr. George Scharffenberger

Consultant

Washington, DC

Team Members:

Dr. Judith A. Carney

Consultant

Berkeley, CA

Ms. Marthe Doka Diarra

Chief

Department of Sociology

Institute for Research in the Human Sciences

(IRSH)

Niamey, Niger

Ms. Anne Mendy-Correa

Consultant

Dakar, Senegal

Mr. James W. Rugh

Consultant

Sevierville, TN

East Africa Team: Tanzania and Kenya

Team Leader:

Ms. Kathy Desmond

Consultant

Arlington, VA

Team Members:

Dr. Haidari Amani

Senior Lecturer

Department of Economics

University of Dar es Salaam

Dar es Salaam, Tanzania

Dr. Shirley Buzzard

Consultant

Takoma Park, MD

146
147

Dr. Gideon-Cyrus Mutiso

Mutiso Consultants, Ltd. (Development Management)

Nairobi, Kenya

Mr. Emery Roe

Assistant to the Director

Survey Research Center

University of California

Berkeley, CA

Southern Africa Team Botswana and

Zimbabwe

Team Leader:

Dr. Scott McCormick

Environmental Analyst

Associates in Rural Development

Burlington, VT

Team Members:

Dr. George Honadle

Consultant

Rockville, MD

Ms. Yvonne Merafe

Senior Rural Sociologist

Ministry of Agriculture

Gaborone, Botswana

Dr. Anita Spring

Associate Dean

College of Liberal Arts and Sciences

University of Florida

Gainesville, FL

Mr. Lovegot Tendengu

Principal

Chibero Agricultural College

Norton, Zimbabwe
Field Team

The Assessment

Appendix D

Methods:

Materials

Appendix D contains the forms used by the OTA field teams in their assessments of participation,

results, sustainability, and replicability in 12 ADF projects; for their assessment of ADF’s country programs; and for their assessment of ADF concerning congressional options.

148
149

PROJECT COVER SHEET

(To be filled out from information supplied in interviews with projec t

managers, cross-checked with information from others.)

1. Project Nam e start date :

Organization Nam e start date :

2 . Amount of money received to date from ADF: US $

Other funding sources of project/amount/purpose :

Other funding sources of organization/amount/purpose :

Percent of organization’s budget received from ADF:

3. Number and characteristics of persons involve d

Total Nos. Average income level/occupatio n

male femal e male femal e

Board of Director s

Staff (of project )

Staff (of organization )

Members of organization

Project participant s

Beneficiarie s

Community

Comments:

4. Who makes major decisions?

Board of Directors Officer s othe r (specify )

● how selected? : electe d ' appointe d , assumed

• frequency of meetings:

• minutes of meetings: y e s no

5. Staff view of project objectives (in priority order )

a .

b .
150

c .

Do participants’ view of objectives differ from staff’s? ye s no I f

SO, how ?

6. List records kept (eg., meeting minutes, financial records) and rat e

quality (excellent, adequate, poor). Explain rating .

7 . List previous evaluations (of project and organization), by whom and whe n

8. List any differences from data on chart (ADF Funded Projects: Septembe r

1984 thru September 31, 1986 )

9. Relationship with ADF

● When and how did the organization come in contact with ADF?

● number of ADF visits in last yea r

● visits by whom ?

● What do recipients find helpful about the relationship with ADF?

• What do recipients think could be improved?

10. Notes re: information sources and reliability of data on this form .
151

WORKSHEET 1 -– MINIMUM DATA SET: PARTICIPATION

Name of project:

1. Who is defined as a participant ? Who is defined a project beneficiar y

(if different from participants) ?

2 . Number of responses (under each category) of project management to th e

following questions:

How many project participants, ,.. .

a) most, b) half, c) very few, d) non e

( a ) ( b ) ( c ) ( d )

●

●

●

●

●

●

●

●

●

●

identified the nee d

proposed the activitie s

understand the projec t

contribute labo r

contribute materia l

contribute mone y

receive benefit s

share in decision s

share in evaluatio n

are on project committee s

3 . Number of responses (yes and no) of project participants to the followin g

questions on the checklist for participants:

Yes No

●

●

●

●

●

●

●

●

●

participated in desig n

participated in evaluatio n

have access to project record s

could be an officeholde r

have elections for officers

new people get electe d

efforts to get new people involve d

usually agree with leaders’ decision s

some groups have more influenc e

If yes, who and why?

Comments on data:
152

4. Who originated the project ?

local leader (type : )

local indigenous PVO

intermediary organizatio n

churc h indigenous PVO ( regional, national )

parastata l for profit

ADF

other (specify )

5. Evidence of changes in project direction due to participant/beneficiar y

input: y e s n o . If yes, give example s

6. Specific benefits to participants (e.g. , cash, in kind) as a result o f

activit y

Benefit No. o f participants Average value/amt

(men) (women) (men) (women)

a .

b .

c*

7 . Specific contributions of participants (e.g., cash, labor) materials) to

activitie s

Contributio n No. contributin g Average value/amt

(men) (women) (men) (women)

a .

b .

8. Number of responses of non-participants to questions on checklist:

Yes No

● familiar with projec t

● were invited to be in projec t

● benefit from the projec t

● could join the project no w

● feel benefits distributed fairl y

Summary of reasons person s are not participants and/or why they thin k

project is unfair .
—

153

9. Meetings/activities in past year (name of group, committe, etc.)

Date Type of meeting No. attending No.possible Minutes/decision s

(M) (F) (M) (F) reflect input (Y,N )

Number at meeting with OTA team: men , women

percent speaking : men , women

10. Perceptions regarding role of outsiders (interview project staff/leaders)

Rating : 1) helpful; 2) ineffective 3) harmfu l

a . Technical assistance providers

Type Organizatio n Comments on TA relationship Average ratin g

effectivenes s

1)

2 )

3)

b. Other outsiders

Comments

11. For projects of intermediary organization s

a . No. of subgroups receiving assistance as result of projec t

b . How are they selected?

c . Subgroups’ relation to intermediaryo organization :

● represented on board of intermediary (yes) (no )

● frequency of contact: times pe r Who made

contact ?

● change adopted in intermediary group program due to input from

subgroups: (yes) (no ) e.g .

Comments

12. Other observations regarding participation :
154

ASSESSMENT OF PROJECT PARTICIPATION

Name of projec t

1. In what ways and to what extent have intended beneficiaries participate d

in this project ? Assess factors fostering and limiting tha t

participation .

2 . Are the poorest one-third able to participate in the program? Have any

groups been excluded from the project ? If so, why and how?

3* How equitably have benefits and costs been distributed ?

4. What specific measures or actions would enhance participation of projec t

participants/beneficiaries ? How can the impact of these measures on

participation be monitored and measured ?

5* Has the level of participation affected project impact (results,

sustainability and replicability) ? Describe .
155

WORKSHEET 2-–MINIMUM DATA SET: RESULTS

Name of project:

10. Principle goods and services delivered by project operations to date :

outpu t Amount/Value Intende d Data Sourc e

(yes/no )

a .

b .

co

d .

2. What intended ouputs have not been achieved ?

a m

b .

3. Is there any evidence that participants are better off than non -

participants as a result of this project ? If SO, give details. Are

certain groups of participants (e.g., elites) benefiting more tha n

others ?

4. Summary of perceptions of increased welfare among participants and non -

participant beneficiaries (if applicable) interviewed. (Give numbers) .

Participants Non-participant beneficiarie s

Men Women Men Women

Feel project will mak e

them much better off

Feel project will mak e

them a little better of f

Feel project won’t hel p

them or will make wors e

How were data obtained (e.g., group or individual interviews).

83-361 0 - 88 : QL 3 - 6
5. How has the project documented results ? How complete is the information?

*

6 . Change in number of organization’s members (and/or project participants)

since project began . Give numbers of new participants and dropouts.

Provide data source .

7* List specific evidence of outcomes (impacts, responses, what people ar e

doing differently ) that can be related to project implementation o r

outputs.

Outcome Intende d Data Sourc e

(Y) (N)

a . Economic

b . Organizationa l

c* Socia l

d. Environmenta l

e . Local or national polic y

f* Technica l

8. Other observations regarding results:
757

ASSESSMENT OF PROJECT RESULTS

Name of projec t

1 . To what degree (high or low) is the project accomplishing its state d

objectives ? Why?

2 . How does project performance compare to that of similar projects by othe r

groups?

3. What might have happened had there not been ADF support?

4 . What are the key factors responsible for project outcomes or effects ?

a .

b .

c .

d .

e .

f .

economic

organizationa l

socia l

environmenta l

local/national polic y

technica l

5. How could project outcomes be enhanced?
158

WORKSHEET 3 -- MINIMUM DATA SET: SUSTAINABILITY

Name of project:

1.

2*

30

a .

b .

c .

d .

e .

f .

g .

h .

Was there project activity before the ADF grant ? Yes No

If so, what ?

Is the ADF funded activity intended to continue after grant ?

Project and group (if applicable) has:

Projec t Group Comments

(y) (N) (Y , N , N A)

Strategy to maintain leader -

ship, member participation ,

group cohesio n

Strategy to cope with nega -

tive environmental impacts

Strategy to cope with nega -

tive social impacts

Plan to maintain activit y

financially/economically afte r

ADF grant (eg, recurrent costs)

If small-scale enterpris e

--market analysis

--business pla n

Training program

--management

--technica l

--financia l

Strategy to gain access to

technical assistance/know-how

Plan to do other activitie s

i . Strategy to deal with potentia l

opposition to project/grou p
159

j. Strategy to mobilize and generat e

complementary resource s

4 . Evidence of adaptation in project design/group organization (objectives,

activities , organization , etc.) in response to changing circumstance s

What Why

b .

c .

5 . Resources critical to continuation of project/effort and source (local,

national, external )

6 . Prospects for continued support of project activity . Or, if project i s

not intended to continue, prospects for other activities by the group .

7 . Other observations regarding sustainability :
160

ASSESSMENT OF PROJECT SUSTAINABILITY

Name of project

1. What specific factors indicate the likelihood that project outcome s

(economic/financial, organizational/ social, environmental,

technological, policy outcomes) will be sustained over time ? What ar e

constraints to sustainability ?

2 . What specific changes would increase the likelihood of sustainabl e

outcomes? How can they be monitored by ADF?

3. To what extent has the project changed local technologies and management,

and what influence does that have on project/group continuation ?
161

Name of projec t

WORKSHEET 4 -- MINIMUM DATA SET: REPLICABILITY

1. promising project elements (technologies, organizations, process, etc.) :

Element Innovativ e Conditions required for wider us e

( y ) (N)

a .

b.

c .

Comments:

2 . Incidence of adoption of specific project methods or technologies amon g

non-participants

What Who Where

3 . Efforts made by the group or ADF to spread knowledge gained (e.g., radio ,

newspaper, conferences, exchange visits)

a . by projec t

b . by ADF

c* by others

4 . Other observations regarding replicability :
162

ASSESSMENT OF PROJECT REPLICABILITY

Name of projec t

1. What promising project elements (e.g., process, organization mode ,

technologies) are particularly applicable to other groups and/or t o

further activities by this group? Why ?

2 . Which of these elements are innovative compared to those used in othe r

projects addressing similar issues or situations ?

3 . What effects (if any) have there been (or are there likely to be) outsid e

the locale of the ADF-funded project ? How can these effects be enhanced?

4 . What lessons have been learned (by ADF, project managers, participants,

and others) from this project ?
163

COUNTRY PROGRAM ASSESSMENT

(Team responses based on all project data, observations and interview s

relevant to ADF program in this country).

Name

1.

2 .

3 .

4 .

5*

6 .

of Country :

What is your overall assessment of ADF in

? What impact

is it having on social and economic development and how could it be

enhanced?

Is there evidence that the projects you visited are/are not typical o f

other ADF projects in the country ? Explain .

What is ADF’s track record in comparison with other donors ?

What alternative project(s) might the same funds have supported whic h

could have resulted in greater impacts along the lines of ADF’s mandate ?

Does ADF appear to respond to real needs ?

Is there anything unique or different about ADF? Comment on the

effectiveness and appropriateness of that contribution .
—

164

CONGRESSIONAL ASSESMENT

Name of team member:

1. On the basis of all you have learned, would you recommend that ADF’s

funding level be increased, decreased or remain the same? Why ?

2 . What are your specific recommendations for improving ADF’s performance ?

( YOU may include changes in ADF implementation and interpretation of th e

legislation as well as changes in the Legislation.) List as many as yo u

wish, and indicate your priorities.

3 . What lessons came out of the ADF assessment that are relevant to othe r

agencies (AID, U.S. PVOS, others) working in African development ?
Appendix E

Field Interviews

The OTA field teams interviewed ADF staff in Africa and spoke with nearly 800 people associated

with the 12 projects visited. Project managers, participants, staff and board members of funded organizations provided OTA with a great deal of information about their activities. While too numerous to list,

they all have our appreciation. The directors of the 12 projects are listed here.

WEST AFRICA

Mr. Macao bii Gao

Chief

Dakoro Herders Cooperative

Dakoro, Niger

Mr. Diallo Moctar

President

Agricultural Society of Dagnare

Niamey, Niger

Mr. Samba Der Gaye

Coordinator

youth Association of Ross Bethio

Ross Bethio, Senegal

Mr. Demba Dia

Animator

Union Kaoural

Medina Koundie, Senegal

EAST AFRICA

Mr. Phares Makau

Programme Coordinator

Planning and Development Committee

Diocese of Morogoro

Morogoro, Tanzania

Mr. Andrew Peppetta

General Manager

Partnership for Productivity/Kenya

Nairobi, Kenya

Mr. Lawrence Murage

Chairman

NGK Water Project Committee

Naro Moru, Kenya

SOUTHERN AFRICA

Mr. Ditshwanelo Makwati

Project Manager

Boiteko Agricultural Marketing Association

Serowe, Botswana

Mr. Bigboy Chavaphi

Brigade Coordinator

Tutume McConnell Development Trust

Francistown, Botswana

Mr. Clem Machingaifa

Provincial Manager

Agricultural Finance Corporation

Mutare, Zimbabwe

Mr. A.K. Ayo Fr. Harold Barry, S.J.

chairman Executive Director

Kikatiti Village Council Silveira House

Kikatiti. Tanzania Harare, Zimbabwe

165
166

The field teams also met with others in Africa who are not associated with ADF or the 12 ADF-funded

projects visited. These included officials of the host governments, U.S. and other development assistance

agencies as well as representatives of private organizations. This group of interviewees is listed here.

WEST AFRICA

NIGER

Mr. Boubakar Ali

Deputy Prefect

Dakoro, Niger

Mr. Mahamadou Issaka

Chief of Livestock Service

Mr. Idi Gonhah

Dakoro Co-operatives Officer

Mr. Salisou Illiassou

Dakoro Representative

Ministry of Planning

Dakoro, Niger

Mr. Amadou Seini Maga

Prefect

Maradi, Niger

Mr. Sani Bako

Minister of Foreign Affairs

Mr. Abdoulaye Moumouni Djermakoye

Director of International Organizations and

Conferences

Ministry of Foreign Affairs and Cooperation

Niamey, Niger

Mr. A. El Hadji Habibou

Minister of Agriculture

Mr. Dourahamane

Secretary General

Ministry of Agriculture

Niamey, Niger

Mr. Hamid Algabit

Prime Minister

Niamey, Niger

Mr. Hama Abadou

Director of Office of Head of State

Niamey, Niger

Mr. Almoustapha Soumala

Minister

Mr. Tankari Abdou

Deputy Director, Regional Development and

Small Projects

Mr. Abdou Galadima

Small Projects Division

Ministry of Planning

Niamey, Niger

Ms. Cathy Tilford

Regional Technical Advisor

Mr. Doug Steinburg

Forestry Program

CARE

Niamey, Niger

Mr. Richard W. Bogosian

U.S. Ambassador

Mr. Joseph Saloom

Deputy Chief of Mission

Ms. Cynthia Aknetteh

Economic Officer

U.S. Embassy

Niamey, Niger

Ms. Lynne Gray

Director

Mr. Mamadou Issa

Deputy Director

Mr. David Blain

Associate Director

Peace Corps

Niamey, Niger

Ms. Carol Beckwith

Anthropologist/Photographer

Niamey, Niger

Mr. Dayton Maxwell

Acting AID Director

Mr. John Heermans

Forestry Consultant, Forestry Land Use and

Planning Project

Mr. Frank Casey

Ms. Cynthia Moore

Dr. Fred Sauer

AID Technicians

Dr. Rinus ven den Ende

Mr. Mark Matlin

Integrated Livestock Project

U.S. Agency for International Development

Niamey, Niger

Ms. Gretta Shultz

AFRICARE

Niamey, Niger

Ms. Amy O’Neill

Mr. Didier Alley

Lutheran World Relief

Niamey, Niger
167

Mr. Abara Djika

Deputy Prefect

Say, Niger

SENEGAL

Mr. Walter Williams, Jr.

Director

AFRICARE

Dakar, Senegal

Mr. George Carrier

Deputy Mission Director

Mr. Khoi Nguyen Le

U.S. Agency for International Development

Dakar, Senegal

Mr. Lanon Walker

U.S. Ambassador

Mr. Michael Sykes

Economic and Commercial Affairs Officer

U.S. Embassy

Dakar, Senegal

Mr. Richard Horowitz

Regional Representative

Ford Foundation

Dakar, Senegal

Mr. Frank Conlon

Lutheran World Relief

Dakar, Senegal

Mr. Ibrahima Sy

Director

Mr. Pascal N’Dong

Chief of Multilateral Division, Department

of Economic and Technical Affairs

Ministry of Foreign Affairs

Dakar, Senegal

Mr. Gary Engleberg

Ms. Lillian Baer

Africa Consultants, Inc.

Dakar-Farm, Senegal

Mr. Cherno Kane

President

CONGAD

Dakar, Senegal

Mr. Khasoum Wone

Deputy Prefect

Arrondissement of Ross-Bethio

Department of Dagana

Ross-Bethio, Senegal

Mr. Abdoulaye Diop

president

Walo youth Association

Ross-Bethio, Senegal

Mr. Aly wade Gueye

President de la Communaute Rurale

Arrondissement of Ross-Bethio

Department of Dagana

Ross-Bethio, Senegal

Mr. Khayar Ka

Prefect

Department of Kolda

Kolda, Senegal

Mr. Sami Daniff

Head of Centers for Regional Expansion

Department of Kolda

Kolda, Senegal

Mr. Adama Faye

Mr. Cheikh Boy

Mr. Abdou Fall

Mr. Baba Koita

Coordinator of ADF-funded Dialambere

Project

Senegalese Government Agricultural

Research Institute (lSRA)

Kolda, Senegal

Mr. Thiousso Diallo

Agricultural Engineer

Government Regional Development Agency for

the Senegal River Valley (SAED)

St. Louis, Senegal

Mr. Martin Fanghaenel

Mr. Amadou wade

Foster Parents Plan International

St. Louis, Senegal

Dr. Jean-Francois Tourrand

Dr. Moussa Sow

Dr. Papa Fall

Senegalese Government Agricultural Research

Institute (lSRA)

St. Louis, Senegal

Mr. Famara Diedhiou

President

FONGS

Thies, Senegal
168

Mr. Ali Boly

Peace Corps Training Consultant (former

ADF Consultant)

Peace Corps

Thies, Senegal

EAST AFRICA

TANZANIA

Mr. Makara

Project Water

PLANCONSULT

Arusha, Tanzania

Mr. David Babu

Director

Tanzania National

Arusha, Tanzania

Ms. Joyce Hamisi

1Engineer Consultant

Parks

Executive Secretary

Presidential National Trust Fund (ADF-funded

Project)

Dar es Salaam, Tanzania

Mr. L.C.M. Mususa

Partner

Coopers and Lybrand

Dar es Salaam, Tanzania

Mr. Donald Petterson

Ambassador

Mr. Joseph Seagars

Deputy Chief of Mission

Mr. John Kauffman

Program Officer, U.S. Ambassador’s SelfHelp Fund

U.S. Embassy

Dar es Salaam, Tanzania

Mr. Joseph Stepanik

Director

U.S. Agency for International Development

Dar es Salaam, Tanzania

Professor R. Mabele

Senior Research Fellow

Economic Research Bureau

University of Dar es Salaam

Dar es Salaam, Tanzania

Mr. F. Kihunwra

Secretary, Chief Manager, Planning and

Research

Mr. H.I-I. Akile

Mechanization Officer

Cooperative and Rural Development Bank

Dar es Salaam, Tanzania

Mr. Yves Morneau

Second Secretary

Canadian International Development Agency

Dar es Salaam, Tanzania

Mr. Charles N. Keenja

Principal Secretary

Ministry of Local Government and Cooperative

Development

Dodoma, Tanzania

Dr. M.E. Mlambiti

Head of Department of Rural Economy

Mr. S.C. Lugeye

Acting Director of Institute for Continuing

Education

Mr. I.J. Lupanga

Head of Department of Agricultural

Education and Extension

Dr. Aku O’Ktingati

Senior Lecturer, Forest Economics

Sokoine University of Agriculture

Morogoro, Tanzania

Mr. O.M. Ishumi

Regional Agricultural Development Officer

Ministry of Agricuhure and Livestock

Development

Morogoro, Tanzania

Mr. R, Mwsambashi

Headmaster

Reverend Raymond Austin

Reverend Herb Hafermann

Lutheran Junior Seminary

Morogoro, Tanzania

Mr. Joseph J. Mungai

Project Director

Mufindi Educational Trust (ADF-funded Project)

Mafinga, Mufindi District

Tanzania

KENYA

Mr. N.K. Mberia

District Commissioner, Kakamega

Office of the President

Kakamega, Kenya

Ms. Catherine Wituka

Mr. Francis Kima

Mr. Oscar Oyalo

Ms. Mary Kekorle

Extensionists

Kenya Woodfuel Development Programme

Kakamega, Kenya
169

Mr. George Griffin

Deputy Chief of Mission

Mr. Daniel Waterman

Counselor for Economic Affairs

Mr. J. Anthony Holmes

Second Secretary for Economic Affairs

U.S. Embassy

Nairobi, Kenya

Mr. Steven Sinding

Director

Mr. Derek Singer

Chief, Human Resources Development

Mr. M. Peter Leifert

Program Officer

Mr. K. Toh

Senior Economist

Dr. Maria Mulei

WID Program Officer

U.S. Agency for International Development

Nairobi, Kenya

Mr. Fred O’Regan

Managing Director

world Education Rural Enterprise Project

Nairobi, Kenya

Mr. S,0. Makondiege

Deputy Chief Engineer

Operations and Maintenance

Ministry of Water Development

Nairobi, Kenya

Mr. John Cohen

Senior Planning

Ministry of National Planning and Development

Nairobi, Kenya

Mr. Michael Westlack

Program Specialist

Commodity Analysis and Policy Planning

Ministry of Agriculture

Nairobi, Kenya

Mr. S,K. Marisin

Executive Director

Kenya National Council of Social Services

Nairobi, Kenya

Mr. William Saint

Representative

Ms. Jennifer Sebstad

Program Officer

The Ford Foundation

Nairobi, Kenya

Mr. David Kniffen

Trainer

Peace Corps Training Center at Naivasha

Nairobi, Kenya

Mr. C.O. Amonde

District Officer

Mr. Paul Gathogo

Chief

Mr. G, Wambugu

Extension Officer

Mr. J.K. Mbogo

Irrigation Officer

Mrs. F.W. Wango

Home Economist and Horticulturalist

District Department/Naro-Moru Division

Naro Moru, Kenya

Mr. M.M. Naivasha

District Water Engineer

Ministry of Water Development

Nyeri, Kenya

SOUTHERN AFRICA

BOTSWANA

Mr. Natale Bellochi

U.S. Ambassador

Mr. Johnie Carson

Deputy Chief of Mission

U.S. Embassy

Gaborone, Botswana

Mrs. Motsumi

Chairperson

Mrs. Rossina Mannotoko

Secretary General

Botswana Council of Women

Gaborone, Botswana

Mr. John Hummond

Director

Mr. John Roberts

Deputy Director

Mr. Paul Daley

Agricultural Officer

Dr. David Norman

Chief of Party, Agricultural Technology

Improvement Project (ATIP)

U.S. Agency for International Development

Gaborone, Botswana
. .

170

Ms. Ruth Motsete

Social Concerns Officer

Botswana Christian Council

Gaborone, Botswana

Mr. Rob Van den Boom

Deputy Representative

SNV-Netherlands Development Organization

Gaborone, Botswana

Mr. Kim Ward

Program and Training Officer/Acting

Director

Ms. Binkie Ramologa

APCD, Agriculture and Women’s

Development

Mr. Steve Gibson

Training Officer

U.S. Peace Corps

Gaborone, Botswana

Mr. Israel Matenge

Commissioner of Agricultural Management

Associations

Mr. J, Larsen

Senior Agricultural Economist

Ms. Elizabeth Muggeridge

Agricultural Economist

Mr. Gulubane

Head of the Small Dam Unit

Mr. Jetten

Technical Advisor

Mr. Howard Sekwele

Agricultural Economist

Mr. G.D. Horspool

Agricultural Engineer

Mr. K.K. Mmopi

ALDEP Coordinator

Ministry of Agriculture

Gaborone, Botswana

Mr. Sekate

Mr. Anderson

Representatives

Foundation for Education for Progress/CORDE

Gaborone, Botswana

Ms. T.C. Moremi

Coordinator of Rural Development

Rural Development Unit

Ministry of Finance and Development Planning

Gaborone, Botswana

Mr. K. V. Morei

General Manager

Mr. Percy Maribe

Chief Extension Officer

Rural Industries Innovation Centre

Kanye, Botswana

Mr. 1. Malobi

District Agricultural Officer

Mr. G.L. Mogetsho

Incoming District Agricultural Officer

Mr. Letina

District Poultry Officer

Mr. Tabina

District Horticultural Officer

Ministry of Agriculture, Central District

Serowe, Botswana

Captain Kgositau

General Manager

Serowe Brigades

Serowe, Botswana

Mr. F.J. Sigwele

District Agricultural Officer

Ministry of Agriculture

Tutume, Botswana

Mr. C.C. Molomo

Commercial Tractor Owner

Tutume, Botswana

ZIMBABWE

Mr. Nyamayaro

Chair

Mwanza Development Authority

East Harare, Zimbabwe

Dr. Brian Marshall

Lecturer

Department of Biological Sciences

University of Zimbabwe

Harare, Zimbabwe

Mr. Peter Johnson

Chief of Crop Production

Mr. Tekie

Chief Horticuhuralist Extension Officer

AGRITEX

Harare, Zimbabwe
171

Mr. Ed Fugit

Deputy Chief of Mission

U.S. Embassy

Harare, Zimbabwe

Mr. Eric Witt

Agricultural Officer and Acting AID

Director

U.S. Agency for International Development

Harare, Zimbabwe

Mr. Chris Kanyuchi

Director of PVOINGO Coordination

Ministry of Finance

Harare, Zimbabwe

Dr. Liberty Mhlanga

General Manager

Agricultural and Rural Development

Authority (ARDA)

Harare, Zimbabwe

Ms. Lucy Thomas

Resident Representative

Mr. McDonald Homer

Program Manager, Southern Africa

AFRICARE

Harare, Zimbabwe

Mr. L. N. Mbigi

Personnel Manager

Eastern Highlands Tea Estate

Juliasdale, Zimbabwe

Mr. L. Muchatuta

Agritex Officer

Mr. D. Chikande

Coffee Extension Worker

Mr. M, Chigwande

Coffee Extension Worker

AGRITEX

Juliasdale, Zimbabwe

Mr. S. Dube

Chair

Chikomba II Coop

Chikomba School

Mutare, Zimbabwe

Mr. Marcus Hakutangwi

Assistant Provincial Agricultural and

Extension Officer

AGRITEX

Mutare, Zimbabwe

Mr. L. Matikinyidze

Cooperative Assistant

Ministry of Cooperative Development

Nyanga, Zimbabwe
Appendix F

Reviewers of OTA's Draft

In addition to the 15 members of the OTA field teams, the following staff members of ADF, outside

reviewers, and members of OTA’S Advisory Panel on Low-Resource Agriculture in Africa reviewed the

draft report.

The African Dovelopment Foundation

Mr. Leonard Robinson, Jr.

President

Mr. Percy Wilson

Vice President

Mr. Paul Magid

General Counsel

Ms. Lynn Herbon-Gwinn

Congressional Liaison

Ms. Jennifer Douglas

Policy Planning Officer

Mr. Tom Wilson

Director, Administration

Ms. Constance Jenkins

Personnel Officer

Mr. Scott Boudreau

Financial Specialist

and Finance

Dr. Paula Donnelly Roark

Director, Research and Evaluation

Mr. Francis Kornegay,

Research Specialist

Ms. Teixeira Nash

Information Officer

Ms. Cheryl Jones

Evaluation Consultant

Ms. Sandra Robinson

Jr.

Director, Program and Field Operations

Mr. Leonard Floyd

Foundation Representative,

Ms. Christine Fowles

Foundation Representative,

Mr. Thomas Katus

Foundation Representative,

Mr. Leslie Pean

Foundation Representative,

Dr. Wendy Wilson

Foundation Representative,

172

Central Africa

Southern Africa

East Africa

West Africa

Sahel/North Africa

Ms. Jeanette Whitfield

Grants Coordinator

Mr. Curtis Boykin

Program Assistant

Ms. Kerry Hanrahan

Program Assistant

Ms. Lori Pearson

Program Assistant

Ms. Sithabile Ndiweni

Regional Liaison Officer for Southern Africa

Harare, Zimbabwe

Mr. Ibrahima Niang

Regional Liaison Officer for the Sahel

Dakar, Senegal

Mr. Joe Kuria

Regional Liaison Officer for East Africa

Nairobi, Kenya

Mr. N’Gade Amadou

Country Resource Facilitator

Niamey, Niger

Mr. Gilbert Maeda

Country Resource Facilitator

Arusha -

, Tanzania

Outside Reviewers

Dr. Gerald Cashion

Social Science Advisor

Office of Development Planning

Bureau for Africa

U.S. Agency for International Development

Washington, DC

Mr. Jim Cotter

Adjunct Professor

International Development Program

School of International Service

American University

Washington, DC
173

Dr. Paula Goddard

Deputy Director

Center for Development Information and

Evaluation,

Bureau for Program and Policy Coordination

U.S. Agency for International Development

Washington, DC

Mr. Doug Hellinger

Co-Director

The Development Group for Alternative Policies

Washington, DC

Dr. J. Kathy Parker

Consultant--Social Ecologist

Newtown Square, PA

Ms. Caroline Pezzullo

President

Caroline Pezzullo Associates

New York, NY

Dr. Charles Reilly

Vice-President for Learning and Dissemination

Inter-American Foundation

Rosslyn, VA

Dr. ]ohn Sutter

Publisher

Osprey Graphics/Yankee Trader

Port Jefferson Station, NY

Advisory Panel Reviewers

Dr. Eugene Adams

Vice President for International Programs

Tuskegee University

Tuskegee, AL

Dr. Haidari Amani

Senior Lecturer

Department of Economics

University of Dar es Salaam

Dar es Salaam, Tanzania

Dr. Leonard Berry

Vice President of Academic Affairs

Florida Atlantic University

Boca Raton, FL

Dr. Cornelia Flora

Department of Sociology, Anthropology and

Social Work

Kansas State University

Manhattan, KS

Dr. Jake Halliday

Senior Program Manager for Industrial and

International Business Development

Battelle-Kettering Laboratory

Columbus, OH

Dr. Goran Hyden

Professor

Department of Political Science

University of Florida

Gainesville, FL

Dr. Joseph Kennedy

Director, International Programs

AFRICARE

Washington, DC

Dr. David Leonard

Associate Professor

Department of Political Science

University of California

Berkeley, CA

Mr. Robert Rodale

Chairman of Board

Rodale Press, Inc.

Emmaus, PA

Dr. John Scheuring

Seeds Department

Ciba Geigy Ltd.

Basel, Switzerland

Dr. Anita Spring

Associate Dean

College of Liberal Arts and Sciences

University of Florida

Gainesville, FL

Ms. Helen Vukasin

Environment and Development Program

CODEL, Inc. (Coordination in Development)

New York, NY

Mr. Marcus Winter

Assistant Director for Natural Resources

Office of Technical Resources

Bureau for Africa

U.S. Agency for International Development

Washington, DC
Appendix 6

References

1.

2.

3,

4.

5.

6.

7.

J3,

9,

10,

11.

12.

174

African Development Foundation, Blueprint for

Action, The Five-Year Plan, 1986-1990 (Washington, DC: May 1985).

African Development Foundation, “ADF

Manual—Proposal Review and Project Management procedures Handbook, ” Revised May 5,

1986,

African Development Foundation, Fulfilling the

Mandate, An Assessment Report by Three Development Journalists (Washington, DC: September 1986).

African Development Foundation, Congressional Presentation Fiscal Year 2988 (Washington, DC: February 1987).

African Development Foundation, “The ICIPEADF Evaluation Conference on Grassroots Development, Nairobi, Kenya, January 1987” (Washington, DC: 1987).

African Development Foundation, “ADF Project

Origins,” undated memo, 1987.

African Development Foundation, Statement of

Leonard H. Robinson, Jr., President, African Development Foundation, Before the Subcommittee on Foreign Operations, Committee on Appropriations, U.S. House of Representatives,

Washington, DC, Mar. 23, 1987.

African Development Foundation, “Operationalizing the ADF Mandate, ” Appendix I of A13F

response to OTA draft report (Washington, DC:

December 1987).

Buzzard, Shirley and Edgcomb, Elaine (eds.),

Monitoring and Evaluating Small Business

Projects: A Step by Step Guide for Private Development organizations (New York, NY: Private Agencies Collaborating Together (PACT),

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Carloni, Alice S., Women in Development:

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Djegal, Abdoulaye, “A Report on the Evaluation

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Magid, Paul, ADF General Counsel, memo to

Leonard H. Robinson, ADF President, regarding Responses to OTA Inquiries, Nov. 9, 1987.

Markham, Jaimie, consultant, former director

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Index
Index

NOTE: Page numbers in italics refer to figures and tables.

Access. See Participation

Accords, ADF country, 37, 108

Administrative costs, ADF. See Costs, operational

Advance, 50, 87

Advisory Council, ADF, 40

African Development Bank, project funding by, 8, 69

Africare, 40

Agency for International Development, U.S. (AID), 5,

8, 18-19, 35, 38, 69

Agricultural Finance Corporation Project (AFC), 54,

59, 61-62, 63, 68-69, 74, 79, 91, 143-144

Agricultural Mutuel of Dagnare Project, 54, 58, 60,

61, 66, 69, 74, 89, 107, 126-128

Agriculture

inputs for, 8, 46-47, 74

proportion of ADF grants supporting, 7, 10, 46-47,

86-87

Ambassadors Self-Help Fund, U.S, 8, 41, 69, 103, 104

Appraisal, rapid rural, 11, 26

Appropriate Technology International (AT1), 27, 115,

116

Appropriations, ADF. See Legislation; No-year funds

Assessment

flow chart for OTA, 5, 2 6

forms used by field teams for OTA, 148-164

OTA methods for report’s, 3, 23-31

projects visited by OTA during, 6, 2 9

Beyond Re]ief, 40, 50, 87

Board of Directors, ADF

initial delay in appointing, 5, 35, 36

lessons for other development foundations concerning, 119

partisan nature of, 18, 36

project approval by, 42, 43

resignation of, 5, 36

Senate confirmation of, 17, 36

Boiteko Agricultural Management Association, 58,

59, 78, 79

Boiteko Agricultural Management Association

project, 54, 62, 64, 68, 69, 74, 78, 80, 86,

140-141

Botswana, 9, 29, 58, 60, 63, 66, 69, 72, 75, 77, 78, 79,

80, 86, 92, 107

Brooke Amendment, 38

Carter, ]immy, 35

Congress, U.S.

ADF authorization by, 3, 5, 35

ADF improvement policy options for, 12-19

ADF lessons concerning relations with, 119

notification of project approval of, 43

oversight of ADF by, 15-17

costs

ADF projected budget, 37

of implementing OTA suggestions, 12, 87, 112

operational, 12, 40

recurrent, of projects, 8, 73, 98-99

Council on Foundations, 89

Country Assessment Profiles, 37-38, 105-106

Country Resource Facilitators (CRFS), 39, 89

Credit

programs, 8, 9, 47, 62, 63, 75, 78, 79, 105

see also Loan program

Dagnare. See Agricultural Mutuel of Dagnare Project

Dakoro Herders’ Cooperative Project (DHC), 29, 54,

58, 59, 61, 69, 72, 79, 86, 91, 92, 107, 128-130

Data, disaggregation of, 25, 56, 90

Decisionmaking. See Participation

Delancey, Virginia, 56

Desk reviews, 27, 29, 94

Development Group for Alternative Policies, 35

Environment, See Sustainability

Erosion, soil, 8, 66, 68-69, 74

Evaluation, program

by ADF, 10-11, 48, 87, 109-110

costs of, 8

externa], 7-10, 23-31, 86-87

improvements suggested from OTA, 10-12, 87-111

internal, 49, 64

lessons for other development foundations concerning assessments and, 119-120

list of representative projects chosen for OTA, 6, 54

methods, 25-31

Farming Systems Kenya, 86

Five Year Plan (ADF’s 1985), 37, 39, 48

FONGS, 78

Ford Foundation, 8, 44, 48, 89, 91, 106, 110

Foreign Assistance Act—1961, 23

Foundation Representatives

grant information by, 41, 42-43

monitoring involvement by, 45

training for, 95

Funding

alternative, in ADF projects, 69-70

approval, 11, 42, 43

cap on project, 18

congressional policy options involving, 14-15

costlbenefit analysis as element in decisions for, 68

independence in, decisions, 5, 37, 38

project portfolio (ADF’s), 11, 37, 45-48

proposals for ADF, 36-37, 88-89, 90-99

General Accounting Office (GAO), ADF study and report by, 5, 24, 25, 36, 37

Grants

ADF research, 5, 11, 12, 49, 110-111

agreement for, 44, 86

approval process, 41-43, 90-99, 107-108

budget for, 46

179
180

information tools for publicizing availability of,

40-41, 49-50

monitoring, 5, 44-45

Grassroots organization

project benefits on, 68

project participation and, 7, 59-60, 63

project sustainability of, 72, 73

technology dissemination by, 78

trade-offs involving, 80

Greenbelt Movement, 89

Guidelines

for funding organizations, 110

grant provision, 18, 90

Hilliard, Constance, 36

Industrial Areas Foundation (New York), 79

Iniminak Pastoralists Project, 29

Inputs, agricultural. See Agriculture

Integrated Food Development Program Project, 54,

60, 62, 63, 67, 68, 69, 74, 75, 78, 79, 80, 86, 98,

107, 108, 134-135

Integrated pest management (1PM), 74

Inter-American Foundation (IAF), 5, 18, 19, 27, 35,

44, 115, 116

Interest bearing accounts, 19, 45

Intermediary organizations

project benefits on, 68

project origination by, 7, 58

project participation and, 60, 63, 64

project sustainability of, 72, 73-74

technology dissemination by, 78

trade-offs involving, 80

International Fund for Agricultural Development

(IFAD), 27, 107, 115, 116

International Security and Development Cooperation

Act–1980, 35

Irrigation. See Agriculture; Water supply; individual

projects using

Kellogg Foundation, 101

Kenya, 9, 29, 58, 60-61, 62, 64, 66, 68, 70, 72, 74, 75,

76, 77-78, 79, 86, 91, 92, 93, 94, 98, 99, 104,

105, 106, 108

Kikatili Village Malihai Club Project, 54, 58, 59, 62,

69, 72, 73, 74, 80, 89, 91, 98, 99, 135-137

Land

tenure, 62

value, 62, 68

Legislation

ADF’s 1980 authorizing, 3, 5, 35, 40

appropriations authorization (ADF), 3, 5, 35-36

congressional policy options involving authorization and appropriations, 17-lg

five-year reauthorization, 5, 13-14, 37

see also Congress, U. S., individual statutes

Loan programs, 47, 75, 78, 79

developing ADF, 109-11o

funds lost through, 18-19

Malihai Arusha organization, 89

Mandate, ADF’s legislative, 3, 5, 7, 10, 11, 17, 35, 38,

48, 64, 71, 81, 88, 89

Matabeleland Council of Disabled Persons, 29

MatIon, Peter J., 93, 94, 96

Media

grant publicizing by, 40-41, 50

unfavorable coverage on ADF by, 36

Monitoring

by ADF, 65, 99-101

approach differences by ADF, 44

checklist for program, 56, 90, 99-100

methods of ADF project by OTA, 10, 23-31

quarterly report’s requirement for, 45, 100-101

Morogoro. See Integrated Food Development Program Project

National Agricultural Credit Bank (Senegal), 9, 78,

110

National Malihai Club, 73

NGK Self-Help Water Project, 54, 58, 62, 66, 68, 69,

70, 74, 77, 78, 79, 86, 91, 92, 94, 98, 104,

137-139

Niger, 29, 58, 61, 72, 86, 88, 89, 92, 107

Nongovernment organizations (NGOS)

project funding by, 8, 69

project referrals from, 41

see also Grassroots organizations; Intermediary

organizations; individual donors

No-year funds, 18-19, 35-36, 37

Office of Management and Budget (OMB), 5, 40

Oversight, congressional

high priority topics for ADF, 16

policy options involving, 15-17

Participation, 7-8, 9, 10, 28, 55-58, 65-67

access to projects’, 61-63

ADF lessons for other development assistance organizations, 116-117

assessment forms used by OTA field teams,

151-154, 155-156

benefits from, 63-64, 67-68, 79

contributions to, 58-60, 63, 69

in decisionmaking, 63-64

by ethnic minorities, 61-62

factors affecting, 64-65

local control of, 58-60, 79-80

women’s, 58, 62-63, 64

Partnership for Productivity/Kenya Project (PFP), 48,

54, 58, 60-61, 62-63, 64, 66, 67, 69, 73, 74, 76,

79, 104, 139-140

Peace Corps, 18, 41, 58, 103-104

Petty, Reginald, 36

Planning-grants. See Grants

Plans, country ADF’s 37-38, 105-107

Policy

ADF technical assistance, 64

options for Congress, 12-19

Portfolio, ADF’s, 11, 37, 45-48
181

Poverty, projects’ impact on, 8, 61-62

private voluntary organizations (PVOS), 8, 37

ADF’s resemblance of, 38

coordination with, 103

problems common to ADF of, 115, 116

programs funded by, 67, 69

projects proposed by, 36-37, 41, 58

see also NGOS; individual organizations

Project Assessment Memorandum (PAM), 42-43, 90,

97-99

Project Review Committee (PRC), ADF, 37, 43, 49, 90

Quarterly reports, See Monitoring

Reagan, Ronald, 35

Reauthorization

congressional options involving, 13-14

see also Legislation

Reforestation, 59, 69, 74

Regional Liaison Officers (RLOS), 39

grant information dissemination by, 41

improvements concerning, 89

monitoring involvement by, 45

Replicability

assessment forms used by OTA field teams, 161-162

of projects, 9, 28, 75-79, 80

Results

assessment forms used by OTA field teams, 155-157

of projects, 8, 28, 65-70, 79-80

Robinson, Leonard, Jr., 36, 37, 40

Ross Bethio. See Youth Association of Ross Bethio

Project

Sahel Development Fund, 35

Senegal, 9, 29, 58, 60, 61, 62, 78, 86, 88, 91, 92, 99,

107

Senegal River, 69

Silveira House Development Fund Project, 29, 54, 60,

61, 63, 69, 74, 144-145

Sokoine University (Tanzania), 75

Staff

ADF lessons concerning role of African, 117-119

African-based, 5, 11, 12, 39, 45, 92, 101-103

consultant’s use to complement, 10, 11, 39, 102

formation of management, 5, 36, 37

growth in, 5, 39-4o

limit on size of, 5, 40

personal contracts of, 37, 40, 41

training, 11, 12, 95, 102

Standards. See Guidelines

Strategies, country, 37-38, 105-107

Sustainability, 8-9, 10, 28, 67-69, 70-72

assessment forms used by OTA field teams, 157,

158-160

economic, 67-68, 72-73, 98-99

environmental, 68-69, 74, 94-97

factors affecting, 75

organizational, 68, 73-74, 88-89

technical, 74-75

Tanzania, 29, 58, 60, 62-63, 67, 68, 72, 75, 86, 89, 91,

99, 107, 108, 109

Technology

agricultural, 46-47, 48, 93, 96

choices of, 10, 28, 58, 74-75, 78, 92-94

constraints on transfer of, 7-8, 9, 77-78

dissemination of project, 9, 28, 76-77, 78

renewable resource, 71, 97

Technical assistance

provision of, 8-9, 58, 64, 70

training, 73

Technology transfer. See Technology, dissemination

of project

Tractors

use of, in funded projects, 47, 63, 66

see also individual projects using

Trade-offs, 61, 79-80

Training

costs of, 8, 45

evaluation, 49

financial, 45, 73

grant funds used for financial management, 45

management, 45, 74

technical assistance, 73

Tutume Tractor Hire Project, 54, 58, 60, 63, 66, 67,

69, 70, 72, 73, 75, 77, 80, 92, 141-143

UNIFEM. See U.N. Development Fund for Women

Union Kaoural Project, 54, 58, 59, 61, 68, 69, 78, 80,

88, 91, 92, 99, 132-134

United Nations Decade for Women, 27

United Nations Development Fund for Women

(UNIFEM), 27, 115, 116

Water supply

projects funding improved, 46, 47

see also individual

Weber, Fred R., 71, 97

Wilson, Percy, 36

Women

participation in projects by, 7, 8, 10, 58, 62-63, 64

project access by, 62-63

rural credit for, 75, 78, 79

World Bank, 8, 35, 38, 69

World Council of Credit Unions, 40

Youth Association of Ross Bethio Project, 54, 60, 62,

63, 68, 69, 74, 78, 86, 91, 99, 107, 130-132

Zimbabwe, 29, 60, 61, 62, 68-69, 107, 109

Zimbabwe Coffee and Tea Project. See Agricultural

Finance Corporation Project