CAN EUROPE SURVIVE MAASTRICHT?

Douglas T. Stuart

February 4, 1994
ii

*******

The views expressed in this report are those of the author

and do not necessarily reflect the official policy or position of

the Department of the Army, the Department of Defense, or the

U.S. Government. This report is approved for public release;

distribution is unlimited.

*******

Comments pertaining to this report are invited and should be

forwarded to: Director, Strategic Studies Institute, U.S. Army

War College, Carlisle Barracks, PA 17013-5050. Comments also may

be conveyed to the Director of Research by calling commercial

(717) 245-4086 or DSN 242-4086.
iii

FOREWORD

We are very pleased to publish this excellent essay by

Professor Douglas Stuart. He has produced a timely and

informative report on a most important subject, the current

status of European integration, and how it may affect U.S.

interests.

With the signing of the Draft Treaty on European Union in

December 1991, a new term entered the European security lexicon:

Maastricht. The fuller implications of this term are still being

explored. Even the best informed observers of Western Europe

remain perplexed by the exact provisions of the Treaty,

particularly for security and defense issues. Equally important,

now that the European Union has supplanted the European

Community, are the ramifications for U.S. interests in Europe.

Professor Stuart, with the generous support of the Ford

Foundation, presents a much needed analysis of the Maastricht

Treaty and its effects on Europe. He maintains that the Western

European leaders have lost sight of the true meaning and

potential value of European integration in recent years. This, he

explains, accounts for the European Union's seeming inability to

respond effectively to international crises, such as the one in

former Yugoslavia. Professor Stuart concludes that unless the

European Union reassesses its priorities and policies, the

fundamental aspiration of maintaining European unity may be lost.

We offer this study to our readership confident that it will

fill a significant gap in existing European security and defense

literature.

JOHN W. MOUNTCASTLE

Colonel, U.S. Army

Director, Strategic Studies Institute
iv

BIOGRAPHICAL SKETCH OF THE AUTHOR

DOUGLAS T. STUART is the Robert Blaine Weaver Professor of

Political Science and Director of International Studies at

Dickinson College. He is the author or editor of 4 books and over

25 published articles dealing with international affairs. His

areas of research specialization include U.S.-European security

relations and Asian security and arms control. He is a member of

the editorial boards of Westview Press ("Dilemmas in World

Politics" series) and the Center for Defense Journalism (Boston

University) and a member of the International Institute for

Strategic Studies (London) and the Italian Institute for

International Affairs (Rome). He recently completed a 2-year

research project on the future of European security, sponsored by

the Ford Foundation. In 1992 Professor Stuart received

Dickinson's Ganoe Award for Inspirational Teaching.
v

SUMMARY

With the end of the cold war, virtually all of the

institutions and assumptions associated with that era have come

under scrutiny except the West European experiment in regional

integration. Left unanswered, or even seriously discussed, when

the Berlin Wall came down, were two questions raised by Alastair

Buchan in 1974: "If West European union was a product of the cold

war, will the one survive the demise of the other?" and "What

role should the European Community play on a wider stage. . .?"

The nations of Western Europe chose to disregard these

difficult questions because they had invested too much time and

too many resources in European Community (EC) integration to risk

derailing the whole experiment with an identity crisis. EC

"completion" would provide its own answers over time.

Furthermore, by 1990 it would have required considerable

statesmanship to stop the EC train which had acquired an

institutional life of its own (with over 19,000 EC employees).

There was, however, another reason why the nations of

Western Europe continued to focus their attention and their

energies on regional integration at the end of the cold war. It

made it easier for them to defer consideration of unpleasant and

controversial issues on the periphery of "little Europe." For the

end of the cold war had created more problems than it had solved

for the nations of Western Europe, and there was a natural enough

inclination to wish them away.

The Treaty on European Union, which was negotiated at an EC

summit in the southern Dutch city of Maastricht during the period

December 9-11, 1991, became the focal point of the post-cold war

campaign of EC completion. The Maastricht Treaty has been widely

heralded as the most important development in EC history since

the Treaty of Rome, even though few European citizens outside of

Brussels have even a vague sense of its contents. But if the

specifics of the Maastricht Treaty are obscure, its purpose, as

reflected in its priorities, is clear. Maastricht is first and

foremost an economic document, designed to consolidate and expand

upon the progress which had been made during the cold war toward

the creation of a fully integrated West European economic system.

This monograph argues that the post-cold war campaign for EC

completion has diverted Western attention from two more important

and immediate concerns: the eastward and southward extension of

the West European "zone of peace" and the articulation and

defense of common West European values and interests in the world

community. Specifically, it will be argued that the Maastricht

Treaty has actually made it harder for the nations of Western

Europe to develop programs of economic and cultural

reconciliation with the governments of Central Europe and the

southern Mediterranean at a strategic moment in European history.

This monograph will also argue that the "civilian" values which

have become an integral part of the EC's identify have undermined
vi

the efforts of West European governments to play a positive role

during the Persian Gulf conflict and the crisis in Yugoslavia.

The report will close with some recommendations for developing a

more cooperative relationship between Washington and the

governments of Western Europe, as a basis for both pan-European

and trans-Mediterranean security.
1

CAN EUROPE SURVIVE MAASTRICHT?

Introduction.

The present Community is but a fragment of Europe.

If we fail to bring the democratic countries of

Eastern and Central Europe into our Community, we

risk recreating division in Europe. . .1

John Major

British Prime Minister

On November 1, 1993, citizens of the 12 nations of the

European Community (EC) officially became citizens of the

European Union (EU). This was the day when the much-battered and

maligned Maastricht Treaty on European Union came into force.

Initial plans had called for a high visibility media event to

celebrate the occasion. But even the most ardent supporters of

the Maastricht experiment understood that celebrations would have

been ridiculous. Indeed, the best thing that the proponents of

"European construction" could say about the final ratification of

the Maastricht Treaty was that it put an end to a long and

enervating process which had diverted West European attention

from other pressing issues.

Or did it? Representatives of the European Union are already

hard at work laying the foundation for the 1996 Maastricht review

conference, renegotiating the so-called "Schengen Agreements" for

passport-free travel within the EU and pushing forward with plans

for salvaging some form of European Monetary Union (EMU). The

self-confidence and sense of identity of West European

governments and publics have been shaken to their core by the

events of the last three years, but the Eurocracy marches onward-

-toward what?

This monograph will consider some aspects of the Maastricht

experiment from the point of view of their effects upon the

current and future security of Europe. My arguments will be built

around a simple thesis: The Maastricht Treaty was a dangerously

misguided initiative at a critical moment in Europe's history. As

of this writing there is no way of knowing if the damage done by

the "Maastricht detour" is remediable. But it is clear that

strong and visionary leadership will be required if the nations

of Western Europe are to effect a change of course. It is also

clear that such a dramatic change of direction will require the

active and assertive participation of the United States.

An appropriate starting date for this study is 1985, the

year that Mikhail Gorbachev became the youngest Soviet leader

since Stalin, setting in motion the chain of events which were to

transform international relations. It is relevant to my argument

that according to the EC's own polls only 12 percent of the West

European public believed in 1985 that there was a likelihood of
2

war in the next 10 years, while 78 percent saw little or no

likelihood.2 Dispite the expressions of concern by West European

policymakers and intellectuals about Ronald Reagan's approach to

foreign policy, West Europeans were fundamentally satisfied with

their security situation in the mid-1980s.

Nor was security the only benefit that West Europeans

derived from the cold war. On the economic front as well, West

Europeans had never had it so good (problems of "Eurosclerosis"

notwithstanding). The constraints imposed by the U.S.-Soviet

competition had created an artificial hothouse environment in

Western Europe which had facilitated the growth of the separate

West European economies, despite the burdens imposed by their

ambitious social welfare systems. The special circumstances of

the cold war also encouraged progress toward economic integration

within the EC. It was always good domestic politics to rail

against American hegemony, of course, but such criticisms had

become ritualistic over time, and in any event most West

Europeans understood (even if they were not prepared to admit it)

that Washington was the most benign of hegemons. Indeed, the

trans-Atlantic relationship at times resembled nothing so much as

the "reverse tribute system" of the 15th century Ming empire,

which paid subordinate states more than it charged them in return

for their public expressions of allegiance.

Washington's allies also were able to pursue relatively

independent foreign policies, particularly after the late 1960s,

within limits imposed by such formidable barriers as the Berlin

Wall and Henry Kissinger. This was, in fact, a fairly wide field

of play, as illustrated by the dramatic initiatives of European

statesmen like Adenauer, de Gaulle and Brandt.3

By 1990, however, the conditions which had favored Western

Europe for over four decades had begun to disappear. The world

was going through one of those rare periods that Charles de

Gaulle once described as a "great reshuffling of the cards," and

West European governments understood that they needed to act

quickly and decisively in response to these dramatic changes.

They chose to concentrate their energies and attention on the

long-cherished goal of "completion" of the European Community.

The Treaty on European Union, which was negotiated at an EC

summit in the southern Dutch city of Maastricht during the period

December 9-11, 1991, became the focal point of this campaign.

The Maastricht Treaty has been widely heralded as the most

important development in EC history since the Treaty of Rome, but

few European citizens outside of Brussels have even a vague sense

of its contents. Stanley Hoffmann contends that this is not due

to the ignorance or apathy of the West European public:

One of the reasons why the majority of Danes and

almost half of the French said no to the Maastricht

treaty in 1992 was that the text was nearly

incomprehensible. Drafted after the heads of state
3

and government had left Maastricht, it was written

by and for lawyers and bureaucrats and required

legal experts to explain it.

The more clarification was provided, the more it

became apparent that with the extension of the

Community's competence came a vast tangle of

procedures--cases in which decisions can be taken by

a two-thirds majority, cases requiring unanimity,

cases in which a two-thirds majority can decide

because of a unanimous decision to allow it to do

so--creating an almost impenetrable maze.4

Although the specifics of the Maastricht Treaty are obscure,

its purpose, as reflected in its priorities, is clear. Maastricht

is first and foremost an economic document, designed to

consolidate and expand upon the progress which had been made

during the cold war toward the creation of a fully integrated

West European economic system. Much of the groundwork had already

been laid for the West European Single Market by the time that

the Maastricht Summit was convened. Between 1950 and 1991

intra-EC trade had grown from 32.9 to 59.6 percent of all trade

by EC countries and the Community was moving steadily forward

toward its goal of eliminating all barriers to the free movement

of goods, services, capital and people.5

 The treaty focused upon

the logical next step in this process--full economic and monetary

union, including agreements for a common EU currency and an EU

central bank. Full economic and monetary integration was

interpreted by most West European leaders as the overwhelming

priority for EU governments and the precondition for any

subsequent "widening" of the European Union to include any of the

newly independent states of East or Central Europe.6

Economic considerations were also at the core of the other

key elements of the Maastricht compromise; institutional,

political and social reforms designed to facilitate intra-EU

cooperation and standardize practices among EU countries.

Arguably the most controversial aspect of this package of reforms

was the "Protocol on Social Policy" (and its appended Agreement)

which builds upon earlier efforts to establish a comprehensive

set of workers' rights and protections. Specifically, the "Social

Protocol" commits signatories to "the promotion of employment,

improved living and working conditions, proper social protection,

dialogue between management and labor, the development of human

resources with a view toward lasting high employment and the

combatting of exclusion."7 Because of the open-ended and

intrusive nature of the Social Protocol, Great Britain chose to

"opt out" of this portion of the treaty, and is unlikely to

change its policy in the foreseeable future.

The treaty is much less ambitious in its plans for a Common

Foreign and Security Policy (CFSP) for the European Union. Once

again, the relevant sections of the treaty build upon earlier

initiatives, in particular the Single European Act of 1987, by
4

formally committing the EU "to assert its identity on the

international scene, in particular through the implementation of

a common foreign and security policy...". Henceforth, the

European Council will meet at least twice each year to formulate

general guidelines for joint action in the foreign and security

affairs of the member countries. These guidelines will then be

addressed by the EU Council of Ministers in their regular

meetings. For its part, the Council of Ministers is charged with

attempting to reach a common position "on any matters of foreign

and security policy of general interest. . ." It is important to

note, however, that foreign and security affairs are still

explicitly treated by the Maastricht Treaty as intergovernmental

issues. Decisions are still unequivocally in the hands of the

sovereign governments, and the whole process of CFSP is treated

by the Maastricht Treaty as a distinct "pillar" of European Union

which is still beyond the legal authority of both the EU

Commission and the European Parliament. The treaty does allow for

a system of qualified majority voting (QMV) on foreign and

security matters, but only if all governments have agreed by

consensus to permit it. Thus, for all intents and purposes the

principle of unanimity is unaffected by the treaty.

The form and content of CFSP is also far from clear, as

explained in an analysis of the treaty prepared for the UK House

of Commons:

Due to the need to reach consensus, the CFSP treaty

articles are extremely flexible and open to varying

interpretations. Thus, for example, the notion that

the EC has a common defense identity and could even

have a common defence policy has been stated, but no

timetable has been set for their implementation.8

The sections of the Maastricht Treaty which deal with

defense matters are, in fact, among the most ambivalent and

conditional portions of the document. Several commentators have

stressed the significance of Article J.4 (2) of the treaty, which

establishes the Western European Union (WEU) as the future

defense arm of the EU. It is not clear at this point, however,

that the formal association of the WEU with the process of CFSP

will make much of a difference in the campaign for the creation

of a true European defense identity. Indeed, Jacques Delors,

President of the EU Commission and a fervent supporter of a more

independent foreign and security identity for Europe, expressed

concern during the talks leading up to Maastricht that this

approach diverted attention from the substance of CFSP and toward

institutional matters.9 Furthermore, the future of the WEU is

unclear due to its legal association with both the EU and NATO,

as reflected in the wording of the treaty which describes it as

both ". . .the defense component of the European Union and the

means to strengthen the European pillar of the Atlantic

Alliance." As I will have occasion to discuss further on, the

WEU, NATO and the EU are currently engaged in a difficult process

of making operational sense out of this unwieldy institutional
5

arrangement.

The Maastricht Treaty thus satisfies only the second of

Napoleon's two requirements for a good constitution ("short and

vague"). But the complex and open-ended nature of the document is

not as much of a problem for Europe as the implicit message that

it has sent to West European publics. Neither the treaty itself,

nor the politics which have surrounded it, have ever made clear

what this new stage in European integration was supposed to

accomplish, other than economies of scale in production and

increased trade between EU countries. What, in the world, was the

new European Union for?

Confusion about ends and means notwithstanding, the campaign

for EU completion has remained the centerpiece of West European

politics since the collapse of the Berlin Wall and in November

1993 the campaign achieved one of its interim goals with the

ratification of the Maastricht Treaty. This preoccupation--

indeed, obsession--with building the European Union is

understandable in light of the history of the European

integration movement since World War II. This campaign reflects a

confusion of West European priorities and a misreading of the

realities of the post-cold war situation on the Continent. West

European fascination with the EU experiment has diverted

attention from two more important and immediate concerns:

eastward and southward extension of the West European "zone of

peace" and the articulation and defense of common West European

values and interests in the world community.

Defenders of the EU experiment will be quick to observe that

both of these goals are incorporated in the long-term plans for

European Union as articulated in the Maastricht Treaty. There are

five responses to this argument. First and foremost, the treaty

does not accord a high enough priority to the aforementioned

issues of outreach and comprehensive security. Second, events

have been moving too quickly, and the Continent simply cannot

afford the expenditure of time and energy which West Europeans

have invested in Maastricht. The dramas associated with

Maastricht ratification have already diverted too much attention

away from the rapidly disintegrating situations just beyond the

EU's borders. Third, in a few cases, the exclusionary politics of

EU construction have actually exacerbated these dangerous

situations. The tense relationship between the EU and Turkey is

one important example. Fourth, ratification of Maastricht

notwithstanding, the new circumstances of the post-cold war era

make it virtually impossible for the nations of Western Europe to

ever achieve the level of integration which would be required to

speak with one voice on issues of foreign and defense affairs.

And as the ongoing Bosnian crisis illustrates, anything less than

full European Union consensus means paralysis. Fifth, conditions

were already in place at the time of the Maastricht summit which

permitted EU governments to consult and, where possible,

coordinate their actions in support of shared liberal values and

common interests. But the priority accorded to EU construction
6

has undermined the process of flexible and ad hoc security

cooperation in Western Europe.

To put the matter bluntly, the governments of Western Europe

have been fiddling with the EU while the Eurasian Continent is

beginning to burn. They are doing so partly out of inertia--

because the process of EU construction was already far along by

the time the cold war ended. But preoccupation with the EU is

also attributable to self-delusion and abdication of

responsibility, reflecting a struthious West European desire to

remain isolated from the problems of the world.

For the foreseeable future, the construction of a reliable

and effective Continental order must take precedence over the

further consolidation of the European Union. This order must be

based upon the preservation and advancement of six liberal

values: the sponsorship of democracy, the growth of free markets,

civilian control of the military, protection of individual and

minority rights, peaceful resolution of disputes where possible

and effective security cooperation where necessary. The nations

of Western Europe are uniquely qualified to take the lead in this

campaign for the construction of a new "Liberal Union" on the

Eurasian continent.10 They are also indispensable for its

success. As a first step in the reorientation of their foreign

policies, West European governments will have to follow Prime

Minister John Major's advice to "raise their eyes" beyond the

European Union.

What Is Europe? Where Is Europe?

In the last article written before his death in 1984, Hugh

Seton Watson posed a deceptively simple question: "What is

Europe, Where is Europe?"12 Most of the Intra-European debate

until now has been guided by an unrealistically narrow and

exclusive answer to this question. For the collapse of the Berlin

Wall did more than reconstruct Mitteleuropa. It did away with the

artificial distinction between the northern and southern

littorals of the Mediterranean. It recreated the Eurasian context

of European politics. And it shattered the cultural and political

moat between a Christian Europe and the nation of Islam.

Fortunately, as the nations of Europe begin to develop

foreign and security policies for this much larger geographic

region, they can be confident of the support of the United States

and Canada. For the brief period since the collapse of the Berlin

Wall has demonstrated that there is much more to the

trans-Atlantic bargain than anti-Sovietism. Western policymakers

have continued to meet in such forums as the Group of 7 summits,

the NATO Council of Ministers, and the Conference on Security and

Cooperation in Europe (CSCE). And the beginnings of a new

trans-Atlantic relationship can be seen in the ways in which the

nations of the Atlantic Alliance have met the challenge of

adapting NATO to the new circumstances of the post-cold war era.

The core of this new trans-Atlantic relationship is the mutual
7

commitment to the liberal values mentioned above.

A new trans-Atlantic relationship will be impossible,

however, until the nations of the European Union stop behaving in

ways which Hedley Bull characterized during the early 1980s as

"civilian power Europe"--a tendency to finesse, defer or

disregard uncomfortable issues of national and regional

security.13 Unfortunately, the preoccupation with EU construction

has actually made this more difficult to achieve, by distracting

West European governments from the unpleasant realities of the

post-cold war era and encouraging them to focus instead upon the

simpler problems of Maastricht. The extent to which West European

governments rise to the challenges of the post-cold war world,

and the role played by the United States and Canada in

facilitating the process of foreign policy reorientation in

Western Europe, will help to determine not only Europe's place in

the world, but also Europe's location between what Stanley

Hoffmann has referred to as the "Hobbesian floor" of perpetual

warfare and the "Kantian ceiling" of perpetual peace.14

The Maastricht Detour.

Dramatic structural change was never a realistic possibility

for the nations of Western Europe during the cold war era. Nor

was it easy to imagine a resolution to the East-West struggle

which did not involve catastrophic war or the surrender of

fundamental Western values. For these reasons, most experts

shared Anton DePorte's 1979 opinion that "The European state

system developed by the cold war and completed by the arming of

Germany in 1955. . . .has a strong lease on the future."15 Small

wonder, then, that West European governments saw the collapse of

the Berlin Wall as an historic opportunity for architectural

change.

Lurking just behind the rhetoric of optimism and

opportunity, however, was a pervasive concern about two questions

which Alastair Buchan had raised as early as 1974. First, "If

West European union was a product of the cold war, will the one

survive the demise of the other?" Second, "What role should the

European Community play on a wider stage. . .?"16 West European

governments responded to the first question by accelerating their

campaign for EU "completion." Since they had no answer to the

second question, they opted for Scarlett O'Hara's dictum--"I'll

think about it tomorrow." But this strategy failed to take

account of the fact that the two questions are interdependent,

and that the world would not remain in the waiting room until a

unified Western Europe was prepared to receive it.

The Politics of Completion.

It is worth mentioning at the outset that the vision of EU

completion reflected in the Maastricht Treaty bears only a

passing resemblance to the Europe of Jean Monnet and other
8

leaders of the post-World War II European integration movement.In

the final paragraph of his Memoirs, Monnet attempted to place his

vision of Europe in its proper historical and global context:

Have I said clearly enough that the Community we

have created is not an end in itself? It is a

process of change, continuing the same process which

in an earlier period of history produced our

national forms of life. Like our provinces in the

past, our nations today must learn to live together

under common rules and institution freely arrived

at. The sovereign nations of the past can no longer

solve the problems of the present: they cannot

ensure their own progress or control their future.

And the Community itself is only a stage on the way

to the organized world of tomorrow.17

Monnet's concluding remarks demonstrate his appreciation of

two points which are fundamental to my argument: that the

construction of a European Union must be guided by the goal of

establishing an enduring European order, and that a peaceful and

prosperous Europe must serve as the cornerstone of an "organized

world." Both of these themes had been articles of faith for the

early proponents of European union, many of whom had formulated

their ideas as members of the resistance movement in World War

II. These individuals had seen firsthand how nationalism could

metastasize into Nazism and "ethnic cleansing," and they were

committed to nothing less than the transformation of world

politics.18

By the mid 1950s, however, these postwar visionaries had

either been marginalized or forced to pursue much more mundane

goals. Monnet, whose greatest strengths were in administration,

proved to be particularly effective at building European

cooperation slowly and incrementally. Over the next two decades

he concentrated his efforts on the "functional linkage" of

specific economic activities. As a result, by the time that

Monnet disbanded his Action Committee for a United States of

Europe in 1975, the Community had nine members and was well on

its way to the achievement of a full common market.19 Monnet

emphasized economic cooperation because of his own background and

training in international finance and because he saw this realm

of activity as having the greatest potential for progress. He

never lost sight, however, of the need for Europe to become

something more. Indeed, his commitment to broader western values

and interests made him vulnerable to de Gaulle's well-known

criticism that he was a "very good American."

For its part, the United States encouraged the channeling of

European energies into the campaign for economic unification

during the first half of the cold war era. Economics was viewed

by Washington as the least problematic area for European

cooperation, since it did not directly challenge America's status

as leader of the anti-Soviet alliance.20 The construction of an
9

efficient economic community was also associated with the

long-term American goal of getting the West Europeans to carry

more of the financial burden of the common security effort.

Consequently, Washington managed its financial and diplomatic

relations with Western Europe in such a way as to encourage

economic union.21

As the process of economic integration moved forward--from

free trade to customs union to common market--discussions of

political and defense unification were towed along in the

Community's wake. There were some notable attempts at real

progress in the field of "high politics" of course, including the

1976 Tindemans Report (which called for enhanced foreign policy

coordination), the 1984 reactivation of the Western European

Union (which has become the focal point of the debate about the

EU's defense identity), the 1987 Single European Act (which

brought European Political Cooperation--EPC--within the

Community's institutional and legal purview) and those portions

of the Maastricht Treaty which committed the EU to a Common

Foreign and Security Policy.22 These positive developments have

nonetheless been eclipsed by the campaign for EU economic

integration.23 The preoccupation with the economic aspects of

West European cooperation is a perverse expression of the theory

that "the business of government is business." To the extent that

it has become institutionalized in Brussels and established as

the overwhelming priority in the calculations of West European

governments, it has encouraged the politics of self-delusion and

irresponsibility within the EU.

The steady growth of the EU's economic institutions and the

preoccupation with the economic aspects of public life have also

taken their toll on the relationship between West European

governments and publics. Since the early 1970s one of the most

enduring themes among European commentators has been the mass

public's loss of a sense of mission and excitement regarding the

future of Europe. Why is it so hard for these commentators to

recognize the roots of this problem in the replacement of the

postwar vision of Europe as a source of world order with a vision

of Europe as a "supermarket"? At present, the effects of this

loss of direction can be seen in public opinion polls (only 40

percent of EU citizens expressed support for the Maastricht

Treaty in a spring 1993 Eurobarometer poll) and in the tepid and

conditional support that the EU received in those countries which

undertook referendums on the treaty.24 A sense of loss of

direction has also contributed to the recent trend towards

regionalization and the decline of executive authority within

many of the member countries of the European Union.25 These

problems are exacerbated by the situation of economic stagnation

which has spread throughout Western Europe over the last 2 years.

The Illusion of Privacy.

In an article entitled "Goodbye to a United Europe?,"
10

Stanley Hoffmann surveyed many of the problems listed above. He

noted that there was a "democratic deficit" within the EU as a

result of "the Byzantine complexity of the whole structure," and

its inability to instill a sense of loyalty or even

identification among West European publics. Hoffmann nonetheless

concluded that "This does not mean. . .that the policy of

European integration will be abandoned: there is no turning

back."26 According to this line of argument, which reflects the

dominant thinking among EU governments and policy analysts, the

only solution to Western Europe's problems is to persevere in,

and where possible accelerate, the process of EU consolidation,

particularly in the economic sphere. For this to be accomplished,

however, West Europeans cannot allow themselves to be

"distracted" by complex and threatening issues beyond the EU's

borders.

The problem is not a new one. As Andrew Shonfield noted in

his 1973 Reith Lecture, "In the early days of the European Common

Market, the Six managed to achieve a kind of illusion of privacy

within the international system. . .; as though they were living

inside a charmed circle bounded entirely by their own problems

and preoccupations. . ."27 In fact, this "charmed circle" became

even smaller and stronger in the minds of many EC policymakers as

the process of postwar decolonization forced key West European

governments to concentrate their interests and efforts at home.

As West European governments adapted to the dual pressures of

decolonization and superpower hegemony, the European Community

became the central focus of West European politics. None of this

would have been possible if it had not been for the artificially

protected environment of the cold war. Indeed, the Community was

at least as much a creature of the special circumstances of the

cold war as was the North Atlantic Alliance. Ironically, the end

of the cold war was interpreted by most commentators as the

moment of opportunity for the EC, and the death knell for NATO.

Both predictions were anchored in incorrect assumptions about the

ability of these institutions to function on a larger

international stage. I will discuss NATO's post-cold war record

further on, and focus here upon the EU. The EU members' desire to

preserve the "charmed circle" after the cold war is illustrated

by its handling of three issues: the EU's place in the world

economy, Western Europe's quest for a distinct cultural identity,

and the challenge of contributing to a viable system of regional

and global order.

The Politics of Economic Exclusion.

Immediately following World War II the United States engaged

key wartime allies in discussions aimed at the creation of a

globalized system of nondiscriminatory trade, which culminated in

the signing of the General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade (GATT)

in October 1947. The United States had to settle for a

less-than-total commitment to worldwide free trade in the final

GATT agreement, however, so that key European powers (Britain in
11

particular) could preserve their special trade relationships with

former colonies. It was nonetheless understood (at least by

Washington) that such arrangements would be phased out over time.

The establishment of the European Coal and Steel Community (1952)

as a first step toward the creation of a European Economic

Community presented a more fundamental challenge to the GATT

system. The United States nonetheless acquiesced to European

requests for an exemption from the constraints of GATT, because

it envisioned a strong and unified European Economic Community as

an effective bulwark against Soviet aggression and subversion.

Washington's decision to support the EC's request for an

exemption from the rules of nondiscriminatory world trade was

motivated primarily by political and strategic considerations.

Over time, however, a rich theoretical literature developed which

supported the proposition that preferential arrangements were not

necessarily in conflict with the long-term goals of globalized

free trade, and that under certain circumstances regional customs

unions and free trade arrangements might even advance the cause

of a liberal world economy.28

But as the number of preferential systems has grown over the

last four decades, this theoretical literature has become less

and less relevant to the policy debate about the place of such

arrangements in the GATT system, largely because each case is sui

generis. According to the GATT Secretariat, over 80 preferential

systems currently claim exemption from the nondiscrimination

rules of the GATT. These arrangements run the gamut from sectoral

free trade agreements to comprehensive customs unions, and they

are in various stages of completion. This has made it very

difficult for scholars to monitor or compare preferential systems

in order to make judgments about their effects on the global

liberal trade regime. It is generally conceded that many of these

arrangements do not comply with the specific requirements of the

GATT exemption guidelines (Article XXIV of the GATT). To date,

however, no request for an exemption has been refused, since the

GATT has neither the institutional mechanisms nor the clout to

take such action.29 The situation has reached the point where the

"tail" of preferential arrangements is now wagging the "dog" of

GATT, to the detriment of global economic welfare.

Professor John Jackson of the University of Michigan blames

the precedents set by the European Community for GATT's inability

to control the spread of preferential schemes. In particular, he

cites the international community's acquiescence to the EC's

creation of a multilayered system of trade preferences for former

colonies as a key factor in the progressive degradation of the

GATT's legal discipline.30 Other commentators (mostly Americans)

see the EU as a major factor in the spread of protectionist

sentiments among Organization for Economic Cooperation and

Development (OECD) governments. According to Joan Edelman Spero,

for example:

In building this (EC) trading system, the Community

has weakened the principle of nondiscrimination
12

basic to the GATT and has thus posed challenges to

liberalization of the larger international system.

In addition, its preoccupation with building a

common market and its continuing political

fragmentation weakened the EC's ability to play a

central management role in the multilateral

system.31

Robert Gilpin, meanwhile, finds the roots of EC

protectionism in Europe's traditions of state intervention in the

market:

Having pioneered in the first and second phases of

the Industrial revolution, Europeans became

poignantly aware of the fact that the global locus

of technological innovation now lay outside of

Europe. In these circumstances extensive trade

liberalization was increasingly regarded as

incompatible with the preservation of the welfare

state, the survival of European industry, and the

EEC itself. . . .Therefore, a powerful tendency to

retreat behind the protective walls of the European

Common Market and, in some cases, national trade

barriers has developed in response to what the

Europeans call 'the new international division of

labor.'32

To the extent that we can speak of a basis for consensus on

the question of regionalism versus globalism, it has been

provided by Jagdish Bhagwati, an adviser to the GATT talks and

one of the world's foremost authorities on commercial policy.

Bhagwati calls for tighter GATT standards for granting Article

XXIV exemptions ". . .so that these arrangements more readily

serve as building blocks of, rather than stumbling blocks to,

GATT-wide free trade." In particular, Bhagwati recommends that

exemptions be granted on the condition that preference groupings

"look favorably at accepting new members into a union . . ."33

This is the point at which we would seem to be on firm ground in

criticizing the ongoing European Union experiment.

As discussed earlier in this study, Jean Monnet never

envisioned Europe as a goal in itself, but rather as an essential

component in a global system of order and prosperity. This should

still be the standard against which all EU initiatives are

judged. Unfortunately, however, the politics of "completion"

associated with Maastricht have encouraged West European

governments to accord such a high priority to intraregional

issues that the longer term vision of the EU as a pan-European

and global actor has been severely attenuated and obscured. This

is particularly true in the economic realm, where Maastricht has

permitted West European governments to make a virtue out of

exclusion.

Concern about EU self-absorption is most often heard among
13

the governments of the Visegrad group (Hungary, Poland, the Czech

Republic and Slovakia).34 This is not surprising, since these

countries have such long traditions of economic involvement with

Western Europe. When viewed from Warsaw or Prague, the EU

experiment looks like an attempt artificially to disrupt the

historic patterns of trade and investment which characterized

Mitteleuropa. Defenders of the EU will reject this

characterization of the European Union's relationship with the

Visegrad states, citing the European Association Agreements,

which provide the context for trade liberalization with the

Central European governments, and the PHARE program (Poland,

Hungary Assistance for Reconstruction of the Economy) which

funnels aid to the EU's neighbors to the East. On closer

inspection, however, neither the terms of the Association

Agreements nor the size of the PHARE aid package are reasons for

rejoicing among the nations of Eastern and Central Europe.35 The

Association Agreements have come in for special criticism among

the Visegrad states, on the grounds that they unfairly favor key

EU economic sectors, including food, textiles and steel.36 The

time frame of 5-10 years for the gradual lifting of trade

barriers is also a source of frustration for the Visegrad

governments.37 As Prime Minister John Major recently admitted in

a speech to the European Bank of Reconstruction and Development

(EBRD):

We all have problems in opening up our markets in

certain sensitive areas. But I believe the Community

should practice what it preaches. Trade liberalization is the most effective and permanent means we

have to help consolidate political stability and

economic growth [in Central Europe]. . .We cannot

expect them (Visegrad states) to liberalize, moving

towards market economies, if we do not lead by

example.38

Polish government representatives have attempted to attach

some numbers to the disadvantageous terms of the Association

Agreements. According to one study by the Polish Foreign

Ministry, EU exports to the Visegrad states grew by 31 percent in

1992, while EU imports from these same states increased by only

10 percent.39 A group of Polish economists has calculated that by

the end of the 10-year period of the agreements, every dollar of

increased industrial output in Poland will be more than matched

by $2.26 in extra imports from the EU. As a result, the Polish

trade deficit with the EU will have worsened by $322 million per

year if existing quotas and tariffs are maintained.40

Disagreements about how much is enough are inevitable in

this type of situation, of course. But there is a more

fundamental concern that the nations of Eastern and Central

Europe harbor regarding the EU. Many representatives of Eastern

and Central European governments have become convinced,

reassuring EU rhetoric notwithstanding, that the West Europeans

will never actually extend full membership to them. EU
14

governments have encouraged this suspicion by the priority that

they have accorded to the Maastricht agenda for the construction

of EU monetary union. Indeed, the EU Commission stated during the

negotiations for the Association Agreements (1991) that the issue

of EU membership "would not be affected by the conclusion of

association agreements."41 Nor have the governments of the former

Warsaw Pact been reassured by more recent EU pronouncements, such

as the official statement issued at the close of the December

1992 Edinburgh Summit, which formally commits the EU to expansion

into Central Europe but provides no timetable for accession.42

As the aforementioned statement by Prime Minister Major

makes clear, EU governments are under pressure from domestic

constituencies to resist the requests of the Visegrad states for

a timetable for affiliation. But the logic of EU completion which

is enshrined in the Maastricht Treaty reinforces this sense of

exclusion. By committing the West European governments to such

goals as a common currency, a common central bank and open

borders, Maastricht makes the issue of new membership vastly more

complex and difficult. As long as West European governments

continue to accord priority to the achievement of these long-term

goals, it will be hard for the Visegrad states to obtain full

membership in the EU.

When West European governments look for examples of

non-exclusionary regional economic cooperation, they might

consider the recent record of the North American Free Trade

Agreement (NAFTA). While the initial agreement involves only

Canada, Mexico and the United States, it has been interpreted by

all three governments as the first step in a campaign of

hemispheric cooperation. Furthermore, NAFTA's economic agreements

have been presented as part of a larger process of regional

reconciliation on such issues as environmental protection, human

rights and democratization. As such, NAFTA fulfills not only

Bhagwati's standard for consistency with the principles of GATT,

but also some of the requirements for north-south cooperation in

a post-cold war era.43

The NAFTA analogy is very popular among the nations of North

Africa and the Middle East, who are even more worried than the

EU's Eastern neighbors about being progressively isolated from

Western Europe.44 The most serious problems facing the nations

which inhabit the southern and southeastern littorals of the

Mediterranean are the threat of Islamic fundamentalism,

environmental pollution and overpopulation. All three problems

are related to economic underdevelopment. West European

governments, separately and collectively, have taken some useful

initiatives to assist North African and Middle Eastern states to

cope with these challenges. For instance, negotiations are

underway to establish guidelines for the creation of a free trade

relationship between Morocco and the EU, an arrangement that

other North African governments hope can be expanded over time to

include the other members of the Arab Maghreb Union (Algeria,

Tunisia, Libya and Mauritania). The EU has also committed $625
15

million for environmental cleanup in the southern Mediterranean

over the next 5 years.45 Europe's southern neighbors see these

actions as useful first steps, but they warn that much more will

have to be done by the EU to address the root problems of poverty

and overpopulation in the region. In the absence of a major

campaign of economic assistance to the southern region, Europe

must be prepared for a succession of crises in the Middle East

and North Africa, which will inevitably spill across the

Mediterranean.

The Politics of Cultural Exclusion.

Any attempt to formulate a long-term EU policy of economic

cooperation with the nations of North Africa and the Middle East

must necessarily confront the emotional issue of culture. Samuel

Huntington has argued that the end of the cold war has set the

stage for a worldwide clash of cultures.46 Unfortunately, the

politics of EU consolidation exacerbates the risks associated

with this trend, and invites ugly speculation about the creation

of a new Christian union to confront the forces of Islam.

As previously mentioned, the original leaders of the

European integration movement were guided by a highly idealistic

vision of Europe and its proper role in the world. It was a

vision anchored in three liberal values: democracy, free markets,

and opposition to malignant and aggressive forms of nationalism.

It drew both its intellectual and its emotional strength from the

anti-fascist crusade of World War II, and its normative

references were transatlantic rather than European. This helps to

explain why it was so easy for Washington to accept the European

integration movement, and why the politics of European union were

entirely compatible with the politics of anti-Communist

containment during the cold war. As Hugh Seton-Watson observed in

1985, "The division that matters today is not between Europe and

the rest of the world, but between socialism and capitalism."47

When the cold war came to an end there was a predictable

scramble for new normative symbols to guide the campaign for

European Union. European leaders were acutely aware of the risk

that, absent the Soviet threat, Europe would become associated

with nothing more than the stultifying bureaucracy of the EC

Commission and the Baroque politics of exchange rate adjustment.

Unfortunately, as they rummaged through history for a more

ennobling vision of Europe, the cupboard was sparse, if not

entirely bare. Some of the most explicit attempts to articulate a

unique vision of Europe--Napoleon's Franco-centric idea, for

example, and Joseph Goebbels' racist notion--were nothing more

than self-serving propaganda, and altogether unacceptable. Other

contributions to the debate--by scholars such as Erasmus and

rulers such as Alexander I--were too vague and general.

Charlemagne provided some useful geographic and ideational

referents. His Frankish empire, which reached its peak around 800
16

A.D., covered much of what would later become the original

six-member European Community. It was characterized by a

rudimentary common culture, based on educational reform, a code

of moral conduct and imperial patronage of the arts. But the

Carolingian empire was too closely tied to the Christian Church,

and too explicitly anti-Muslim, to be an ideal model for Europe's

future.48 Indeed, Charlemagne's empire obtained its general

boundaries, its geographic cohesion and its sense of mission from

the fact that the expansion of Islam in the early 8th century had

pushed Christianity back across the Mediterranean.

Unfortunately, in the absence of a more inspiring vision,

many people inside and outside of Europe have come to associate

the EU with this Carolingian (read, exclusively Christian)

conception of Europe, if only by default. This interpretation of

Europe is especially prevalent within the Arab world, where there

is a growing suspicion that the EU is developing its post-cold

war identity in contradistinction to Islam. Muslims are acutely

sensitive to reports of anti-Turkish crimes in Germany and to the

growth of right-wing, nativist movements in various EU countries

including France (the Front National) and Italy (the Movimento

Sociale Italiano), and they associate these developments with

what they see as a callous disregard on the part of West European

governments for the fate of the Bosnian Muslims. The EU has

attempted to build new bridges to the Arab world, by means of aid

programs and bilateral economic and cultural initiatives. They

have also made efforts to suppress racist and nativist trends

within their respective countries. But the priority that they

accord to "deepening" EU cooperation has made it difficult for

these governments to rebuff claims that the nations of Western

Europe are developing an "us-them" attitude toward the outside

world in general and the Islamic world in particular.

From the point of view of the nations of North Africa,

especially, the consolidation of the EU represents a rejection of

centuries of European history. According to this argument, Europe

has forgotten its Mediterranean roots, with the result that it

has discounted both the risks and the opportunities that are

present in the South and Southeast. West European governments

argue that they can best contribute to positive change in the

South and Southeast by first fulfilling their vocation for

European Unity. But can Europe's Arab and Turkish neighbors wait

that long? And will the campaign for EU consolidation only serve

further to isolate the nations of Western Europe from their

Mediterranean neighbors?

It is, in fact, somewhat misleading to speak of creating new

bridges between the EU and Islam, since a substantial Muslim

presence is already well established within Western Europe. It

has been estimated that there are 1.5 million Muslims in Britain,

3 million in France, 1.9 million in Germany and 1.7 million in

Italy. And as Anthony Hartley has observed, "The complexities of

the Islamic settlement in Europe are, after all, not going to go

away. Indeed, it is likely that the numbers of Muslim immigrants
17

will increase as instability in the Middle East and poverty in

Africa drive migrants across the Mediterranean."49 The challenge

for European governments will be to adapt their cultural agendas

to this reality, particularly in the realm of education, without

according Muslim immigrants "special status [and] privileges

additional to the ordinary rights of European citizens."50

Unfortunately, as I will discuss further on, the EU's

handling of the Iraqi invasion of Kuwait and the implosion of the

former Yugoslavia have combined to reinforce suspicions within

the Islamic world, and among many Muslims living in Western

Europe, that were recently articulated by Salah Hannachi,

Tunisia's Secretary of State for International Cooperation: "In

Europe, the advancing sentiment is that. . .we are back in the

era of war between the cross and the crescent."51 And until

Western European governments are willing and able to pursue a

much more inclusive economic, political and social agenda, they

will have great difficulty in refuting such accusations.

Even with the best of intentions, however, this will not be

easy. The most ambitious attempt to bridge the cultural divide

which separates the northern and southern littorals of the

Mediterranean was the series of preliminary discussions between

France, Italy, Spain and Portugal and the nations of the Maghreb

aimed at establishing a Conference on Security and Cooperation in

the Mediterranean (CSCM) modeled on the CSCE. Under the

leadership of former Italian Foreign Minister Gianni De Michelis,

these talks began in 1990. Three "baskets" of issues were

discussed, in accordance with the CSCE model: politics and

security, economic cooperation, and human rights. To date,

however, there has been very little progress due to the

disruptive effects of both the Gulf War and the ongoing

Arab-Israeli peace process. And even if the CSCM talks are

restarted, they are not likely to result in an ambitious document

comparable to the Helsinki Final Act, for three important

reasons. First, the situation is no longer characterized by the

dual hegemony of the cold war. Consequently, specific

disagreements between European and Maghrebi participants cannot

be resolved by superpower intervention. Second, the clear

priority on the part of the southern Mediterranean participants

is closer economic ties to, and more aid from, the EU. But as we

have already had occasion to discuss, there are strict limits to

what North African and Middle Eastern states can expect from an

EU that is overwhelmingly preoccupied with its own economic

agenda. Third, preliminary discussions relating to Basket III of

CSCM have demonstrated that there is a chasm between the northern

and southern participants on fundamental issues of human rights.

Indeed, negotiators came away from these discussions speaking not

of a long-term goal of formulating a common body of human rights

but rather of developing guidelines for "tolerance" of distinct

traditions of human rights.52

Turkey: A Test Case For the European Union.
18

Turkey presents the EU with a unique test of its commitment

to both economic and cultural inclusion in a post-cold war

setting. Ankara is presently at a turning point in its

decades-long quest for acceptance as a European nation, and its

prospects will be largely determined by the European Union. If

managed properly, the EU should be able to exploit its

relationship with Ankara to enhance its leverage with the nations

of the Middle East and Central Asia. More importantly, close

cooperation with Turkey will help the EU to directly confront the

issues of economic and cultural exclusion which currently

undermine its ability to play a positive and proactive role in

world affairs.

To date, Turkey has experienced considerable frustration in

its efforts to establish an advantageous relationship with the

nations of Western Europe. Throughout the cold war era, Ankara's

efforts to integrate itself into the political, economic and

cultural life of Europe were consistently rebuffed by the EC,

despite of the fact that Turkey worked closely with these nations

under the NATO umbrella.53 And now that the cold war has ended

Ankara finds itself in the frustrating position of having to once

again establish its bona fides with the West in order to assure

itself of a place at the European table.

During fall 1990, then-President Turgut Ozal embarked upon a

dramatic, and risky, campaign to resolve this situation.

President Ozal's decision to place Turkey in the forefront of the

allied coalition against Saddam Hussein jeopardized his country's

physical security, at a time when allied intelligence services

were warning of a massive Iraqi missile threat coupled with the

possibility of chemical and biological warheads. Ankara could

take some reassurance from the public expressions of support by

NATO governments, and from the deployment of the air component of

the Allied Mobile Force (AMF/AIR) to Southeast Turkey. But Ozal

was also aware of the domestic debates within key allied

countries (Germany in particular) about whether they would be

obliged to intervene in the event of an Iraqi attack against

Turkey, in retaliation for U.S. air strikes from Turkish air

bases.54 Ankara nonetheless maintained its commitment to the

anti-Iraq coalition, and played a key role in the conflict by

providing bases and by deploying of over 180,000 troops along the

Turkey-Iraq border.55

Ozal's contribution to the Gulf War represented a modified

version of Turkey's traditional cold war strategy of contributing

to Western security in the hopes of obtaining economic and

political rewards. The results, thus far, have been mixed. On the

positive side of the ledger, Turkey began the post-cold war era

on the right side of the victorious anti-Iraq coalition. As

President Ozal stated in March 1991, "For the first time in 200

years, Turkey has allied itself with the winners of a war. Siding

with the winners is always advantageous."56 Being on the winning

side has given Ankara more than bragging rights. It has
19

established Ankara's right to participate in post-war

decisionmaking about the future of Iraq and the future of any

collective security arrangement for the Persian Gulf region.

Being on the winning side also meant that Turkey was able to seek

compensation for at least a portion of the estimated $9 billion

that it lost during the Gulf crisis, and Turkish corporations are

participating in the reconstruction of Kuwait. Finally, Ankara's

participation in the war significantly increased Turkey's stock

in Washington for a period of time. U.S. policymakers

demonstrated their appreciation for Turkey's role in the Gulf War

by providing emergency economic and military aid to Ankara during

the conflict. The Bush administration also pressed for a foreign

aid authorization for Turkey which was not constrained by the

7:10 military aid formula, vis-a-vis Greece, which has been a

source of Turkish frustration for many years.57 Washington also

made it clear that it was prepared to be more accommodating on

the issue of U.S.-Turkish trade, by permitting an overall 100

percent increase in Turkish textile exports to the United States.

By the end of President Bush's term, however, Ankara was once

again beginning to feel unappreciated by the United States as

other issues and actors occupied Washington's attention. Turkey

has found even less reason to celebrate the results of its

collaboration with West European governments during the Gulf War.

From Ankara's point of view, the litmus test of Europe's

friendship is EU membership, which Turkey has been waiting for

since 1964, when it was granted an associate status by the

Community. Thus, the EU's decision to delay indefinitely the

decision on full Turkish membership and its subsequent decision

to establish association agreements with the EFTA countries as a

first step toward their ultimate accession into the EU were

viewed as gratuitously insulting by Ankara.58

There are two related reasons for the EU's lack of

appreciation for Turkey's role in the confrontation with Saddam.

First, EU officials continue to compartmentalize security,

politics and economics, in spite of the Maastricht commitment to

give the EU responsibility in all three issue areas. Second, the

nations of Western Europe are still guided by the logic of

"civilian power Europe" which encourages EU governments to accord

a much higher priority to issues of economic self-interest than

to issues of regional security. As a consequence of these two

factors, Turkey's contribution to Gulf security was duly noted by

its European neighbors, and promptly forgotten.

One aspect of the Maastricht Treaty was especially

disturbing for Turkey. To the extent that it helped to revitalize

the WEU and encourage a new round of debate about the future of a

European defense identity, Maastricht's plans for a CFSP

threatened to transform the persistent Greek-Turkish dispute from

an "in-house" struggle between Athens and Ankara into an

"us-them" conflict between Turkey and Western Europe. The WEU

attempted to finesse this issue by offering full membership to

Greece (decision taken at Rome, November 20, 1992) while inviting

Turkey to become an associate member on the day that the Hellenic
20

Republic officially joins the organization. The compromise is

less than satisfactory from Ankara's point of view.59

In a 1992 article, Professor Duygu Sezer reflected the

frustration of most of his countrymen relating to all of these

post-cold war developments:

Turkey has failed the test in the eyes of Western

Europe. But in a very important sense, Europe has

also failed the test--the test of a broader vision.

The undeniable political and cultural affinity and

rapport that had grown out of four decades of

ideological bonding and security cooperation was

discarded as soon as the enemy disappeared, paving

the way for Europe to recover its sense of security

and unity. Turkey was largely pushed aside by the

dominant political forces in Europe, particularly

the EC.60

In fact, concern for Turkish sensitivities has not been very

important in the ongoing intra-European debate about the future

of Turkey's economic relationship with the EU. To date, the

nations of Western Europe have not been convinced that the

economic and political benefits of Turkish membership in the EU

outweigh the perceived costs. They have agreed, however, to enter

into a customs union arrangement with Ankara by 1995.61

Hopefully, this arrangement will lead to closer collaboration

between Ankara and the nations of Western Europe and make it

easier for Turkey to demonstrate its potential value to the EU as

a bridge, not only to Europe's southern and southeastern

neighbors, but to the newly established governments of Central

Asia as well.

The EU's Contribution To Regional and Global Order.

Policies of economic and cultural exclusion would be

defensible if the European Union was at least making a

contribution to pan-European security. Unfortunately, this has

not been the case. As mentioned previously, the most visible

initiative taken by West European governments so far is the

formal integration of the WEU into the European Union. To date,

however, the WEU is still attempting to establish a distinct

diplomatic and military identity for itself, and the EU remains

light years away from the goal of a common foreign and security

policy articulated in the Maastricht Treaty. Two post-cold war

crises--in Kuwait and in the former Yugoslavia--illustrate the

problems that the EU faces as it pursues this goal.

On August 2, 1990, Iraq accomplished its historic aim of

annexing Kuwait, by means of a brutally efficient Blitzkrieg. The

invasion elicited almost universal condemnation, for three

reasons. First, it was such a flagrant challenge to the

principles of sovereignty and nonaggression upon which the entire
21

body of international law is based. Second, when viewed against

the background of Iraq's recent victory in the Iran-Iraq War and

Baghdad's development of a massive military arsenal, the invasion

of Kuwait appeared to be the first step in a campaign of military

domination of the Persian Gulf region. Third, the international

community faced the prospect of Iraqi control of a substantial

portion of the world's oil supply--particularly if the invasion

of Kuwait was followed by the conquest of Saudi Arabia. Thus,

when a condemnatory U.N. Security Council resolution (number 660)

was introduced immediately after the invasion, it obtained the

unanimous support of all current members, including Cuba.

As the strongest nation in the international community, the

United States felt a special responsibility to respond to Saddam

Hussein's aggression. But Washington also understood that it was

essential that the situation not devolve into a bilateral

confrontation between America and Iraq. The United States moved

quickly, therefore, to help raise the issue of the invasion of

Kuwait in the U.N. and within the Atlantic Community. Washington

was gratified by the speed and ease with which an international

coalition was formed against Saddam. This was because Washington

and London made it clear to the international community from the

first days of the crisis that they were prepared to bear the

brunt of the political and military risks of punishing Iraq.

During the next several months, however, the United States and

Britain came to appreciate the wisdom of Napoleon's observation

that "If I must fight, let it be against a coalition." As the

deadline for military confrontation approached, Saddam used

various strategies to disrupt the coalition and, in particular,

to drive a wedge between Washington and the nations of the

European Community.

One potentially disruptive issue was the fate of U.S. and

West European hostages in Iraq. EU governments had agreed not to

act independently to obtain the release of their respective

citizens held hostage in Baghdad. Saddam nonetheless engaged in

what Lawrence Freedman and Efraim Karsh call a "hostage lottery"

to break down the resolve of selected Community members. In the

end, the EU succeeded in preserving a common front on the hostage

question, although the policy was severely frayed around the

edges by the time that Operation DESERT SHIELD became Operation

DESERT STORM.62

If the EU's common front on the hostage question was a

source of satisfaction to Washington, the United States was less

impressed by the Europeans' willingness to offer military

commitments as the deadline for confrontation approached.

Then-Congressman Les Aspin summarized the American mood in late

November: "Europe has not fully measured up to expectations. .

.The bulk of European allies have given solid (if painless)

political support, passable economic support, and mere token

military support."63 Key European Community members also began to

express disagreements with the United States over the question of

how much diplomacy was required before the international
22

community opted for military action against Saddam. France was

particularly anxious to achieve a diplomatic breakthrough, both

for its own sake and as a way of bolstering its position as a

European and world leader. But the quest for a distinct European

diplomatic option in the Gulf crisis foundered on the formidable

opposition of Margaret Thatcher (and subsequently, John Major).

Lawrence Freedman and Efraim Karsh summarized the EC's dilemma as

follows: "The problem with a separate and ostentatious diplomatic

effort was that it must either convey the agreed coalition

message, which would be pointless, or convey a different message,

which risked a split in the coalition."64 As the deadline for

confrontation approached, the French government thought that it

had found a way to distinguish the European position from the

policies of the coalition leader. French President Mitterrand

began to speak about the possibility of encouraging greater

negotiating flexibility from Baghdad by offering to link the

resolution of the Iraq-Kuwait dispute to the larger issue of the

Arab-Israeli dispute. With the support of Holland, however, the

United Kingdom rebuffed this attempt to establish a separate EU

foreign policy at Israel's expense, on the grounds that it would

be detrimental to the efforts of the international coalition.

U.S.-EU relations during the lead-up to Operation DESERT

STORM were a model of conflict avoidance in a situation in which

all parties recognized that nothing would be gained by a public

shouting match. Since the United States and Great Britain were

prepared to act in tandem, and the world community was prepared

to support, or at least defer to, U.S.-UK action, the European

Union's options were limited, and its direct costs manageable.

Key EU governments nonetheless scrambled for a way to avoid even

the indirect costs of open war between Iraq and the coalition.

Ultimately, these governments failed to identify a third way

between war and acquiescence to aggression. Bruce Watson has

observed that "The Gulf War revealed vividly the cracks in

European unity, and the European reaction was complete with

indecision, name-calling, attacks on fellow nations--a genuinely

mediocre performance."65 This is too harsh a judgment. For the

process of European Political Consultation facilitated

intergovernmental discussions, the formulation of common embargo

positions, and the articulation of national differences. But the

fact that the EU was able to achieve even this level of internal

consensus is attributable to the preemptive leadership of the

United States and the United Kingdom. It cannot be interpreted as

a sign of progress toward the goal of a common EU foreign and

defense identity.

If the differences which surfaced within the EU during the

Gulf crisis were muted by the fact that Washington and London had

essentially preempted the policy debate, no such preemptive

influence has existed during the ongoing crisis in the former

Yugoslavia. Indeed, the most important difference between the two

crises (and there are more differences than similarities) is the

conspicuous absence of American leadership in the Balkan

situation. At least initially, this appears to have been the
23

result of a clear decision by Washington to use the Yugoslavian

case as a means of raising the consciousness of West European

governments regarding their security responsibilities in the

post-cold war era. Judging from the EU's handling of the

Yugoslavian catastrophe, Washington's strategy failed.

This is neither the time nor the place for an in-depth

analysis of the convolutions of the Yugoslavian crisis. Only when

the reconfiguration of the former Yugoslavia is complete will

scholars be in a position to analyze this event. It is, however,

possible at this time to offer a few summary observations

regarding the EU's participation to date in the breakup of

Yugoslavia. First, it is worth responding to the frequently-heard

claim that the timing of the implosion of Yugoslavia was

unfortunate, because the process of EU construction was not yet

far enough along to cope with this crisis. On the contrary, it

can be argued that if Western Europe had by some miracle been

spared serious security challenges for another two or three years

it would have made it even harder for the EU to cope with threats

when they finally surfaced. This is because West European

governments would in all likelihood have used that breathing

space to consolidate those "civilian" habits of thought and

behavior which had been developed among Washington's allies since

the mid 1960s and enshrined in the Maastricht process at the end

of the cold war. This approach to world politics guided most of

the governments of Western Europe as they strove to articulate

their separate national interests in the Balkans, and it

effectively paralyzed their efforts to take the kinds of actions

that were necessary.

During the spring and summer of 1991, as West European

governments were preparing for Maastricht and adjusting their

policies to the reality of a unified Germany, Yugoslavia was

treated as an annoyance and an inconvenience rather than an

immediate regional security crisis. EU governments were content

to support the position taken by the United States during this

time, which was based on a commitment to the preservation of the

Yugoslavian state and a desire for the peaceful resolution of

disputes and the protection of minority rights between and within

the separate Yugoslav republics. As the conflict intensified,

however, the risks of spillover into the Balkans and Central

Europe became more apparent and the possibility that Washington

would take the lead in responding to events in Yugoslavia became

more remote. Under these circumstances, the EU began to involve

itself more directly in the Yugoslavian situation, sponsoring 14

negotiated cease-fires and a major peace conference during the

second half of the year. Many critics of these early attempts at

conflict resolution complained that the Community was mismanaging

this or that specific aspect of the situation. But John Zametica

has correctly observed that ". . .this was a case of impotence

being confused with incompetence."66 The impotence was more

psychological than physical or organizational, but paralyzing

nonetheless. As the Serbs brushed aside one cease-fire after the

next, EU representatives became increasingly bewildered by
24

actions that were not in accord with their own assumptions about

the fundamentally benign and rationalistic nature of

international relations.

In the face of such bewilderment, any strongly held and

coherent opinion can take on special force. By the end of the

year, two such opinions had come to the fore within Western

Europe: a widely held judgment that the EU must resist the

temptation to be drawn into the Yugoslavian crisis by some

open-ended military action and a growing conviction that the

breakup of Yugoslavia was inevitable. But West European

governments also suspected that the collapse of the Yugoslavian

state would ignite a chaotic multifront war. Not surprisingly,

public speculations along these lines became increasingly

unwelcome throughout Western Europe as the EU edged closer to a

policy of public support for regional self-determination.

Many experts were surprised, and more than a few were

alarmed, by the assertive role which Germany played in moving the

Community toward this fundamental policy shift. For its part, the

German government has since argued that it came to this decision

grudgingly, in response to the repeated acts of aggression by the

Serbian government during the summer and fall of 1991. Indeed,

Bonn has since claimed that "Germany always supported former

Yugoslavia and had nothing to gain from its collapse."67 Nor is

there reason to question Germany's assertion that "The attempt by

the Serbian leadership to act as the champion of supposedly

pan-Yugoslavian interests was merely intended to disguise its

real objective: the unification of all Serbs within one state."68

Unfortunately, however, neither Germany nor the other

members of the EU were prepared to draw the obvious conclusions

from Belgrade's campaign of aggression in the face of repeated

West European efforts at mediation--that something more than

rhetoric and economic carrots and sticks was required, and wholly

justified, to avoid disaster. Under these circumstances, regional

self-determination evolved, with Bonn's sponsorship, as the

Community's political solution to a situation which had already

proven to be beyond the scope of political solution.69 As the end

of the year approached, regional self-determination became the

EU's preferred coercive instrument for encouraging Serbian

reasonableness, despite the facts that the preservation of the

Yugoslavian state was still widely perceived by the outside world

as the best outcome and that virtually everyone inside and

outside of Yugoslavia agreed that its breakup would not occur

peacefully.

This, then, is the major indictment against West European

handling of the Yugoslavian crisis: that the EU took public

responsibility for the Yugoslavian situation but was unprepared

to accept the implications of that responsibility. By summer 1991

many EU spokesmen were treating the Yugoslavian crisis as the

opportunity to establish the Community as an important actor in

world affairs (recall EU negotiator Jacques Poos' now-infamous
25

statement that "This is the hour of Europe"). Despite the fact

that West European governments did not have a plan to guide their

foreign policy at this time, there was a widespread sense of

optimism about the EU's diplomatic role in the crisis. Guided by

the logic of "civilian power," however, the EU rejected the

option of punitive military action if cease-fires, arbitration

and mediation proved unsuccessful.

The possibility of punitive military action against Serbia

was discussed within the EU from time to time as the crisis

unfolded. France took the lead in most of these discussions,

favoring the creation of an "interposition" force under the

auspices of the WEU. Throughout fall 1991, as successive

EU-brokered ceasefires collapsed, France obtained the support of

Germany, Italy and the Netherlands for the principle of military

intervention. There was no shortage of potential problems with

this policy (not the least being that neither Germany nor Italy

were prepared to contribute troops to any EU interventionary

force). But the principal barrier proved to be the unwavering

opposition of Great Britain, for two reasons. First, London was

concerned about setting a precedent that might tip the scales in

favor of an EU/WEU military "pillar" at a time when the future of

NATO was uncertain. Second, based upon its own experience in

Northern Ireland, Britain was especially chary of any West

European military involvement in the Balkans that might prove

harder to end than to begin.70 These and other concerns were

valid, or at least debatable, during fall 1991. But the EU's

subsequent decision to support regional self-determination

altered the circumstances and changed the role of the EU in the

Yugoslavian crisis. It imposed new moral responsibilities on the

governments of West Europe and should not have been undertaken

without some public commitments to protect individuals or

communities that became victims as a result of the breakup of the

Yugoslavian state. Instead, the EU chose this moment to pass the

baton to the United Nations, and to call for international

peacekeeping, despite the fact that the EU's own experience over

the previous six months had demonstrated that peacekeeping, in

and of itself, was dangerously inadequate.

In a situation in which the overriding sentiment within the

EU opposed military involvement, the option of regional selfdetermination was as close as the EU was prepared to come to a

strategy of coercive diplomacy. The people of Bosnia- Herzegovina

have paid the highest price for this policy-by-default. The

Bosnian government had special reason to fear the breakup of the

Yugoslavian state, because of the region's ethnic makeup and

geographic location. In the center of Yugoslavia, bordered by

both Croatia and Serbia, and composed of a population that was 44

percent Muslim, 31 percent Serbian and 17 percent Croatian,

Bosnia-Herzegovina was a prime candidate for violent

dismemberment once the federal status quo collapsed. The EU's

decision in favor of self-determination posed a particular

problem for the Muslim (and largely urban) plurality in

Bosnia-Herzegovina, which stood to lose the most from the
26

collapse of their republic. And because of this, the EU bears a

special moral responsibility for what has transpired since that

time.

The European Union has taken only one substantive decision

since the Yugoslavian crisis began, and it was the wrong

decision. Support for republican self-determination, without a

firm commitment by the EU to protect minorities and punish acts

of aggression against newly constituted nation-states, was an

irresponsible act.Virtually all of the EU's policies since that

time have been designed to make the subsequent catastrophe as

painless as possible for the victims and as costly as possible

for the aggressors, within the very strict limits imposed by the

West European commitment to a "civilian power" role. In practical

terms, this has meant an ambitious humanitarian effort in support

of besieged civilians and economic and political sanctions

against Serbia and Montenegro, which have been identified as the

principal villains in the Yugoslavian crisis.71 EU apologists

have tended to depict this story as a tragedy--by definition an

unfortunate but unavoidable event. But Michael Brenner is closer

to the truth:

It was not preordained that EC countries be so

shortsighted about the dangers of Yugoslavia's

dismantlement and the ethnic passions it liberated;

nor that they act fitfully and, too often, too late

in trying to bring their influence to bear; nor that

they cast the die for Bosnia through the illconsidered, premature recognition of Slovenia and

Croatia; nor that they respond to the Bosnia

catastrophe with hollow threats whose unfulfillment

gave courage to the intransigent; . . . nor that

their stern demands for the closing of detention

camps and cessation of the shelling of cities be

left as paper declarations while the Twelve

exhausted their time and energy on the Maastricht

ratification crisis.72

To the extent that the international community can take any

reassurance for the situation in Bosnia it comes from the fact

that the Serbs and Croats have accomplished most of what they had

hoped for and that some form of diplomatic agreement is likely in

the near future, based upon a military fait accompli. Whether

this diplomatic agreement actually protects the rump Bosnian

Muslim community remains to be seen. It is entirely possible,

however, that the artificial enclaves carved out for the Bosnian

Muslims will not protect them for long. In which case, the world

will have achieved a "solution" of sorts to the Bosnian crisis.

It will be a solution of the type discussed by Russian historian

Frederick Starr during a recent speech at Dickinson College. When

asked to comment on the prospects for the ethnic minorities in

the former USSR, Starr observed that from the view of an

historian the situation of minorities was pretty straightforward.

One looked at a particular minority problem at one point, and
27

then, when one returned to this situation at some later point,

the problem was no longer there.

Conclusion: From Exclusive European Union<R>To Inclusive

Transatlantic Community.

In a recent report for the North Atlantic Assembly, Thijs

van Vlijmen observed:

. . . even if all can agree that future historians

will rub their eyes in disbelief when they come to

examine how civilized Europe could allow such

atrocities to be perpetrated (in former Yugoslavia)

for so long on this continent, we must also

acknowledge that there are powerful political

realities at work here which militate against

effective action to stop the carnage.73

But Western European governments created many of these

"political realities" by their quest for an artificially safe and

affluent European Union. These governments were constrained in

their handling of the Yugoslavian crisis by "powerful" forces of

self-delusion and irresponsibility. At a minimum, any new

approach to pan-European order must be built upon a more

realistic appreciation by EU governments of their responsibility

for regional security and a more collaborative relationship with

Washington. Stanley Sloan has described this relationship as "a

new transatlantic bargain" in defense of pan-European order.74

The measure of any such bargain must be some standard of

efficacy, that is, the degree to which nations responsible for

preserving order are capable of agreeing on the need for action

and are then capable of achieving whatever policy they commit

themselves to.

The first step in establishing a new transatlantic bargain

is for the nations on both sides of the now-defunct Berlin Wall

to accept the current and future indispensability of NATO as the

cornerstone of pan-European security. As a practical matter, this

question no longer seems to be in dispute. Even France, which has

been in the forefront of the campaign to establish a distinct

European defense identity as an alternative to NATO, has quietly

adjusted its position as a result of the harrowing experiences

associated with the collapse of Yugoslavia. Dominique Moisi of

the French Institute for International Relations put the matter

bluntly in a recent interview with The New York Times:

I'd say we are looking for impetus and reassurance

from the United States. Impetus because we realized

sadly that, without the United States to kick us, we

don't move. Reassurance because Europe is again

becoming a dangerous place. And we don't feel at

ease alone with ourselves.75
28

The widespread acceptance of NATO's indispensability for

pan-European security is illustrated by the cordial and

collaborative atmosphere which surrounded the January 1994

Alliance summit in Brussels. According to the opening statement

of the summit:

NATO has moved to the center stage again. Gone is

the headline "Why NATO." . . . NATO owes its

attractiveness to the security which it alone can

guarantee to its member nations. . . . But this is

not the only reason. . . . It is the key element of

stability in a world more and more shaken by

instability, crises and conflicts. No new security

order in Europe is conceivable without it.76

The Alliance summit contributed to the process of

Franco-American reconciliation on the future of European

security. It also consolidated and expanded upon some of the very

positive changes which have been underway within NATO since 1990.

Three changes deserve brief mention.

First, NATO has been adjusting its strategy to the demands

of the post-cold war situation. NATO governments established the

guidelines for the new allied strategy during the London

Conference of July 1990 and formalized them as the Alliance's

"New Strategic Concept" (NSC) at the Rome Conference of November

1991. The NSC commits NATO to scrap the relatively static and

heavy concentration of forces around the Central Region which

characterized the cold war, in favor of a more complex and

multidirectional defense posture which places a premium on

flexibility and mobility. In accordance with this new defense

posture, NATO is developing both Immediate Reaction Forces

(capable of full deployment in 2 to 10 days) and more substantial

Rapid Reaction Forces (fully deployable in 10 to 30 days). These

forces will be backed by NATO's Main Defence Forces, which will

constitute 65 percent of the total force. A headquarters has

already been established for the ACE Rapid Reaction Corps, and

the Corps itself should become operational in 1995.77 The

Alliance has also accorded a high priority to the development of

multinational units, and arrangements have been worked out for

the subordination of the Franco-German "Eurocorps" to the Supreme

Allied Commander Europe (SACEUR) in times of crisis.78

Building upon these initiatives, the participants in the

recent NATO summit agreed to begin work on the establishment of

Combined Joint Task Forces (CJTF) to respond to future

contingencies. NATO governments have introduced the formula of

"separable but not separate" forces to describe the CJTF

concept.79 As currently envisioned, CJTF units will be capable of

ad hoc and flexible configuration in response to European crises.

U.S. forces may or may not be part of CJTF operations, or

American units may be used solely for logistical, intelligence or

air support roles. One of the purposes of the CJTF concept is to

make it easier to conceive of circumstances under which the WEU
29

could take on an operational role, with NATO's backing and

support. Plans also allow for the participation of East and

Central European troops in CJTF operations.

The second and related area of ongoing NATO reform involves

new procedures to facilitate political cooperation with other

security-related institutions. NATO's evolving relationship with

the WEU illustrates this latter trend. Cooperation between these

two institutions has been hard to achieve over the last 3 years,

but progress has been made by both sides.80 This has made it

easier for European governments to pursue a common defense

identity without doing violence to the missions or purposes of

NATO. The recent move of the WEU Council and Secretariat to

Brussels was of more than symbolic value in this regard.81

NATO has also adjusted to the new circumstances of the

post-cold war era by establishing guidelines for cooperation with

the United Nations and the CSCE in support of pan-European

peacekeeping, peacemaking and peace enforcement operations.82 At

the time that the Berlin Wall came down, many commentators

expressed the hope that the U.N. and the CSCE would be able to

work with the EC to resolve Europe's future security problems by

recourse to "civilian power" alone. Before long, however,

representatives of these larger institutions had come to realize

that NATO, with its unique combination of political and military

resources, was still necessary for the preservation of order on

the Continent. NATO governments have responded positively, and

are currently working with both the U.N. and the CSCE to clarify

issues of command and to establish procedures for notification

and consultation.

The third, and arguably the most important, change that NATO

has undergone since the collapse of the Berlin Wall is its

outreach to the nations of the former Warsaw Pact. In an

editorial which was published in 1990, American historian John

Lewis Gaddis recommended that both NATO and the Warsaw Pact

should be preserved in post-cold war Europe, and that the two

alliances should be merged into a pan-European security

organization.83 This was a fundamentally bad idea. It nonetheless

reflected a very valid concern about the dangers that the

international community would face if the nations of the former

Soviet Bloc were left without any institutionalized fora for

security cooperation and mutual reassurance.

NATO's initial response to this problem was the creation of

the North Atlantic Cooperation Council (NACC) in 1991. The

purpose of NACC is to enhance stability throughout the European

region by providing the nations of the former Warsaw Pact with a

forum for dialogue, consultation and the development of joint

projects. In the relatively short time since its first meeting

the organization has grown in membership (38 countries), in

geographic scope ("from Vancouver to Vladivostok" including the

Central Asian nations which were formerly part of the Soviet

Union), and in responsibilities. The NACC has become a venue for
30

pan-European discussions relating to arms control, defense

cooperation, crisis management and peacekeeping. Meetings between

foreign and defense ministers of the NACC governments have helped

to maintain the momentum for approval and compliance with the

treaty on Conventional Forces in Europe (CFE Treaty) and other

arms control agreements. They have also provided an indispensable

forum for consultation and policy coordination relating to

ongoing crises in the former Yugoslavia and in portions of the

former Soviet Union. Furthermore, NACC has followed NATO's lead

by making itself available to the U.N. and the CSCE for

pan-European peacekeeping, peacemaking and peace enforcement

activities.

As of this writing, however, the NACC is still an

under-utilized institution with a very marginal political status.

This will probably change as a result of the "Partnership for

Peace" program which was the centerpiece of the recent NATO

summit in Brussels. This program elevates East-West security

cooperation to the level of a top priority for the NATO Alliance,

and insures that international attention will continue to be

focused on this issue. The Partnership is essentially an open

invitation to the 22 nations of the NACC which are not already

members of NATO, and to any other European nations "on which the

NATO allies agree" to participate in a "framework for detailed,

operational military cooperation for multinational security

efforts that has NATO at its core." Among the military activities

that Partnership nations are invited to participate in are joint

military planning, training and exercises. According to Secretary

of Defense Les Aspin, "They could even include operations such as

search and rescue missions, disaster relief, peacekeeping and

crisis management." According to the terms of the recent NATO

Summit communique, Partnership nations will be invited to send

permanent representatives to both NATO Headquarters and to a

newly created Partnership Coordinating Cell at SACEUR

Headquarters in Mons, Belgium.84 This would give Partnership

representatives an opportunity to participate on a day-to-day

basis in both political discussions and military planning

activities.

At the core of the new Partnership arrangement is a NATO

offer of security consultation "whenever the territorial

integrity, political independence or security of a partner state

is threatened."85 Students of NATO politics will be quick to

recognize these words as Article 4 of the NATO treaty. Students

of NATO politics will also be quick to note that Article 4 is a

much weaker commitment than Article 5 of the NATO treaty, which

commits all signatories to treat ". . .an attack on one or more

of the Parties. . .(as) an attack against them all. . ." NATO

governments have been clear in their message to the nations which

are candidates for Partnership--this is neither an iron-clad

security guarantee nor a promise of eventual NATO membership.

While it is true that some East and Central European governments

would have preferred direct membership in NATO to affiliation

through the NACC and the new Partnership arrangement, no one who
31

monitors recent developments can fail to be impressed with the

progress that NATO has made in institutionalizing pan-European

security cooperation in such a brief period of time.

In all likelihood, the status and influence of the NACC will

be significantly increased over the next couple of years, since

it is the appropriate forum for transforming the East-West

Partnership into an operational reality. NACC's institutional

assets will also have to be improved. William Johnsen and

Thomas-Durell Young are among the experts who have recommended

steps to make NACC "more substance-oriented."86 Institutionalized

procedures for NACC consultation and policy coordination need to

be enhanced.87 One possible improvement would be for the creation

of a new Deputy Secretary-General position responsible for

coordinating NACC affairs. There is also a need for more staffing

within the NATO Secretariat but dedicated to NACC, to facilitate

planning, conflict monitoring and consultation within the NACC

framework.

Hopefully, progress in the institutionalization of NACC will

help to alleviate the concerns of those nations of the former

Warsaw Pact that are pressing for full NATO membership.88 This

does not mean that NATO governments should use NACC permanently

to foreclose the option of NATO membership for the nations of

Eastern and Central Europe. But much more can be done to make

NACC a respected and effective entity in its own right while the

more difficult issue of expanding NATO membership is sorted out

among the current 16 Alliance members.

Another important step which should be taken in the very

near future to reassure the nations of the former Warsaw Pact and

bolster the security of the post-cold war order in Europe is the

convening of a pan-European summit for the purpose of signing a

"European Stability Pact." Many experts have argued that Europe

does not need a major international conference along the lines of

Vienna and Versailles to codify the results of the collapse of

the Soviet empire. Professor Kalevi Holsti, for example, has

argued that the pervasiveness of liberal values among the key

actors in the new European system obviates the need for a

pan-European treaty.89 But the events which have taken place in

Europe since 1992 give us reason to be more pessimistic. As

discussed earlier in this monograph, the form of liberalism which

has developed in Western Europe has both positive and negative

elements. The well-known positive elements include behavioral

predispositions to rationalism and moderation as well as concern

for human rights and democracy. The less-appreciated negative

elements include parochialism, self-delusion and ambivalence.

Under these circumstances, West European liberalism per se is not

a reliable guarantor of pan-European order. The positive elements

of West European liberalism need to be reinforced, codified and

extended eastward by the signing of a regional stability pact.

In a 1993 draft interim report entitled "Engaging the New

Democracies," the North Atlantic Assembly (NAA) discussed the
32

three essential components of such a comprehensive security pact:

rules regarding the inviolability of borders, treatment of

minorities, and peaceful settlement of disputes.90 French Prime

Minister Edouard Baladur has argued that the EU should play the

leading role in sponsoring a conference to negotiate such a

treaty, and NATO governments have now endorsed the European

Union's call for such a stability pact.91 A strong and assertive

role for the EU is essential for the success of such a

pan-European treaty for several reasons, not the least being that

the European Union can offer recalcitrant Eastern and Central

European governments economic incentives--including the

possibility of EU membership--to move the process forward. But

this will require West European governments to confront directly

some of the issues which they have been able to disregard during

the debate over Maastricht. The need for such a fundamental

reassessment of the EU's proper role on the Continent was

articulated by Prime Minister John Major in what may be the most

important public statement of his Premiership:

A powerful view--still dangerously fashionable among

some continental politicians--is that the fault of

Maastricht lay in not going far enough . . . I

believe profoundly that this view is wrong. . . .

Unless the Community is seen to be tackling the

problems which affect them (the people) now, it will

lose its credibility. . . . So let us have a very

serious debate based, not on wishful thinking, but

on the real situation in Europe and the World.92

The "real situation in Europe" requires a high-profile

meeting of the heads of state from "Vancouver to Vladivostok" to

recommit themselves to the rules of behavior articulated in the

Helsinki Final Act (1975) and the Charter of Paris (1990)

relating to the status of disputed borders, procedures for

international dispute resolution, and the treatment of citizens

and minorities. To insure that the final document which is

produced by this meeting is more than a list of platitudes, the

G-7 governments and the nations of the EU and NATO should commit

themselves to using the document as a point of reference for

making future decisions about aid, trade, diplomatic support and

institutional membership. Signatory governments should also agree

to use the document as a basis for making decisions and taking

actions in response to crises within and between European

countries. The final document should be in the form of a treaty,

to further enhance its international importance.

Back To the Future: NATO In a Three-Tier Security System.

A high-profile European Stability Pact would go a long way

toward shoring up the forces of liberalism on the Continent.93

But if the crisis in Yugoslavia has taught us anything, it is

that diplomatic initiatives can be either irrelevant or actually

harmful if they are not backed by useable and effective power.
33

For the foreseeable future the locus of such power can only be

NATO. And it is somewhat ironic that the evolving NATO-based

security system in Europe resembles the vision of European

security articulated by George Kennan in 1948. During the

Washington Preparatory Talks for the NATO treaty, Kennan floated

the idea of a three-tier security system. At its core would be

the five nations of the 1948 Brussels treaty (France, Britain,

the Benelux States) plus the United States, Canada, Norway and

Denmark. He envisioned a second ring of "associate members,"

comprised of certain governments (Kennan specifically mentioned

Portugal and Sweden) which would be accorded security guarantees

in exchange for basing privileges. A third "affiliate" category

would be established for various nations and territories which

the Western governments considered to be of special strategic

importance.94

At present, the NATO system seems to be moving toward a

different form of three-tier system with a European core

comprised of the WEU/EU nexus, a second ring of states which is

made up of the 16 members of the Atlantic Alliance and a third

ring which is composed of the 38 nations of NACC. The essential

difference between Kennan's vision and the evolving NATO system

is that Kennan's system was based upon differentiated membership-

- what U.S. Undersecretary of State Robert Lovett referred to as

"resident members, non-resident members and summer privileges."

By contrast, in the evolving European order the Atlantic Alliance

is inextricably engaged in all three circles--providing the

context for the development of the WEU/EU system and the bedrock

for the development of the NACC. This makes the current system

much less vulnerable than Kennan's system would have been to

recriminatory disputes about first, second and third class

citizenship. But it does not solve the problem altogether.

Indeed, the greatest challenge that NATO governments will face in

the next few years will be the need to preserve a sense of

cohesion and common purpose in the face of new responsibilities

for European security and new opportunities for cooperation with

other institutions involved in the maintenance of European order.

The impressive record of intra-Alliance cooperation since the

collapse of the Berlin Wall nonetheless encourages optimism about

NATO's ability to find imaginative solutions to such challenges.

In the conclusion to his aforementioned editorial, John

Gaddis observes that "It is a principal of enlightened

conservatism that one ought to retain what history shows to have

worked, even as one accommodates to the changes history is

bringing." We can be grateful to Professor Gaddis for reminding

us of this principle, even if he drew the wrong conclusions.

Fortunately, NATO governments have not drawn the wrong

conclusions. They have preserved what worked and moved quickly to

make some very constructive changes.

For NATO to develop into the central pillar of pan-European

security, however, key West European governments will have to

reconcile themselves to the fact that the politics of EU
34

construction have been more of a problem than a solution for

Europe as a whole. They have perpetuated a cramped and selfish

approach to world politics among the nations of Western Europe.

It is not too late for the governments of Western Europe to break

out of the psychological prison of Maastricht, however. A first

step in this process of strategic reassessment is for EU

governments to confront directly the question that was raised in

the introduction to this study: What, in the world, is Europe

for? I have argued that the correct answer is that Western Europe

must play a leading role in the construction of a new

transatlantic liberal union based upon support for the related

values of democracy and free markets. These are the only values

that can provide the industrial democracies of North America and

Western Europe with a vision that will energize their respective

publics and a coherent purpose for their policies in the larger

pan-European and trans- Mediterranean region. And unless the

members of the new liberal union are prepared to work together to

advance and defend these values, neither the EU nor the Atlantic

Community has a future.

ENDNOTES

1. John Major, "Raise Your Eyes, There is a Land Beyond,"

The Economist, September 25, 1993, p. 29.

2. Euro-Barometer: Public Opinion in the European Community-

-1985, reprinted in E. Hastings and P. Hastings, eds., Index To

International Public Opinion, 1985-86, New York: Greenwood Press,

1987, p. 575.

3. Three excellent sources for students interested in the

policies and priorities of these men are: Wolfram Hanrieder,

Germany, America, Europe, New Haven: Yale University Press, 1989;

Bernard Ledwidge, de Gaulle et les Americains, France:

Flammarion, 1984; and Timothy Garton Ash, In Europe's Name, New

York: Random House, 1993.

4. Stanley Hoffmann, "Goodbye to a United Europe?," The New

York Review of Books, May 27, 1993, p. 29.

5. See the analysis by James B. Steinberg, "An Ever Closer

Union," RAND Document R-4177-A, Santa Monica, CA: 1993, in

particular pp. 68-74.

6. It is true, of course, that since July 1990, negotiations

had been underway with the nations of the European Free Trade

Association (EFTA) to form a "European Economic Area" as a

possible step toward full integration of EFTA members (Austria,

Finland, Iceland, Norway, Sweden, Switzerland and Liechtenstein)

into the European Community. But negotiations with these

economically and politically secure governments do little to

advance the cause of economic modernization and democratization

in Eastern and Central Europe, and may even undermine the

prospects for EU accession by the former Warsaw Pact states if
35

negotiations with the EFTA governments are used by West European

governments as a way forestalling talks with Eastern and Central

Europe.

7. Quoted in "The Maastricht Debate: Social Charter, Chapter

or Protocol?," United Kingdom House of Commons Library, Research

Paper 93/28, March 9, 1993, p. 4.

8. See the analysis of CFSP in "The Maastricht Debate: The

Common Foreign and Security Policy," United Kingdom House of

Commons Library, Research Paper #93/27, March 9, 1993.

9. Cited in James B. Steinberg, "An Ever Closer Union," Rand

Research Monograph #R-4177-A, Santa Monica, CA, 1993, p. 52.

10. The concept of a liberal union in Western Europe is

discussed by Kalevi Holsti in "The Post-Cold War Settlement in

Comparative Perspective," in D. Stuart and S. Szabo, eds.,

Discord and Collaboration In a New Europe: Essays in Honor of

Arnold Wolfers, Washington: Johns Hopkins Foreign Policy

Institute, 1994, forthcoming.

11. See, John Major, "Raise Your Eyes, There is a Land

Beyond," pp. 27-29.

12. Hugh Seton Watson, "What is Europe, Where is Europe?,"

Encounter, Vol. LXV, No. 2, July/August 1985, pp. 9-17.

13. Hedley Bull, "Civilian Power Europe: A Contradiction In

Terms?," Journal of Common Market Studies, Vol. 21,

September-December 1982, pp. 149-170.

14. Stanley Hoffmann, Duties Beyond Borders: On the Limits

and Possibilities of Ethical International Politics, Syracuse:

Syracuse University Press, 1981, p. 17.

15. Anton DePorte, Europe Between the Superpowers: The

Enduring Balance, New Haven: Yale University Press, 1979, pp.

243-244.

16. Alastair Buchan, The End of the Postwar Era, New York:

Dutton, 1974, p. 206.

17. Jean Monnet, Memoirs, Garden City, NJ: Doubleday, 1978,

p. 524.

18. See Walter Lipgens, "European Federation in the

Political Thought of Resistance Movements During World War II,"

in F. Roy Willis, ed., European Integration, New York: New

Viewpoints, 1975, pp. 1-18.

19. According to John Pinder, by 1975 "The European

Community has virtually completed its customs union and has gone

far towards the removal of non-tariff discrimination too, and
36

hence towards the establishment of the Common Market." "Positive

Integration and Negative Integration: Some Problems of Economic

Union in the EEC," in European Integration, p. 80.

20. A notable exception was Washington's support for the

stillborn European Defense Community in the early 1950s.

21. For example, in his discussion of the formative period

of the cold war, David Calleo notes that "While American

leadership was certainly not absent from the Marshall Plan, the

United States self-consciously attempted to hand over its

planning initiatives to the Europeans themselves, on the

condition that they strive to create a closely integrated

European economy." Beyond American Hegemony: The Future of the

Western Alliance, New York: Basic Books, 1987, p. 30.

22. For the influential distinction between high and low

politics, see Stanley Hoffmann, "Discord in Community: The North

Atlantic Area as a Partial International System," International

Organization, Vol. 17, No. 2, Spring 1963, p. 529.

23. This fact is best illustrated by the way in which the EU

invests its resources and institutional energies. For example,

only a handful of the 19,000 "Eurocrats" employed by the EU deal

with foreign and defense affairs. Most of the progress that is

being made in the realm of defense cooperation is under the

auspices of the WEU which is discussed later in this report.

Regarding the efforts by Jacques Delors to establish a more

ambitious foreign and defense role for the EU Commission, see

"Uncivil War in the European Community," The Economist, January

30, 1993, p. 49.

24. Data reprinted in The Economist, "A Survey of the

European Community," July 3, 1993, p. 6.

25. For an interesting survey of the risks and opportunities

inherent in this trend, see Alberta M. Sbragia, "Maastricht,

Enlargement, and the Future of Institutional Change," Ridgway

Viewpoints, Pittsburgh: University of Pittsburgh, Graduate School

of Public and International Affairs, No. 93-3.

26. Stanley Hoffmann, "Goodbye To a United Europe?," The New

York Review of Books, May 27, 1993, pp. 27-31.

27. Cited in Alastair Buchan, The End of the Postwar Era, New York: Dutton, 1974, pp. 207-208.

28. Jagdish Bhagwati provides an authoritative survey of

both the theoretical debates and the historical record of

preferential systems and their effects on liberal trade. See The

World Trading System At Risk, Princeton, NJ: Princeton University

Press, 1991, pp. 58-79.

29. See John Jackson, "Regional Trade Blocs and the GATT,"
37

The World Economy, Vol. 16, No. 2, March 1993, pp. 121-131.

30. John Jackson, The World Trading System, Cambridge, MA:

MIT Press, 1989, cited in Bhagwati, The World Trading System at

Risk, p. 67.

31. Joan Edelman Spero, The Politics of International

Economic Relations, New York: St. Martin's Press, 1990, pp.

77-78.

32. Robert Gilpin, The Political Economy of International

Relations, Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press, 1987, pp.

374 and 376.

33. Bhagwati, The World Trading System At Risk, p. 77.

34. Since the breakup of Czechoslovakia in January 1993, EC

spokesmen have been distinguishing between the Czech Republic and

Slovakia when they discuss the prospects for EC membership.

Bratislava has been gradually and quietly demoted, while Prague

continues to be thought of as a full member of the Visegrad

three.

35. EC-Visegrad trade has increased by 18 percent overall

since the Association Agreements were signed, and 1993

allocations for the PHARE program total approximately one billion

dollars.

36. See the recent report by the North Atlantic Assembly,

based upon meetings with governmental spokesmen in Eastern and

Central Europe; "Engaging the New Democracies," NAA Political

Committee Report AK 77, May 1993, Martin Blin, Rapporteur, pp.

1-2.

37. EU-Visegrad negotiations are discussed by James

Steinberg, "An Ever Closer Union," pp. 115-116.

38. Speech by John Major to the EBRD, April 26, 1993.

Transcript provided by the British Information Services, New

York: PS48/93, April 26, 1993, p. 3.

39. Jane Perlez, "East Europe Waits for the West's Welcome

Wagon," The New York Times, International Section, August 29,

1993, p. 6.

40. Reported in "2001 Is Too Late," The Economist, March 13,

1993, p. 20.

41. Quoted in John Pinder, The European Community and

Eastern Europe, New York: Council on Foreign Relations, second

edition, 1992, p. 60.

42. Nor were the Visegrad governments reassured by the fact

that the EC members agreed at Edinburgh to begin accession
38

agreements with three EFTA applicants, Austria, Sweden and

Finland, during 1993. All three states have relatively strong

economies and are already well integrated into the Western

European community. EC governments did agree at Edinburgh,

however, to further reduce existing quotas against Visegrad

imports.

43. For a positive assessment of NAFTA's future,

particularly as it relates to environmental, political and human

rights issues, see Robert Pastor, "NAFTA as the Center of an

Integration Process: The Nontrade Issues," The Brookings Review,

Winter 1993, pp. 40-47.

44. "Mediterranean Security," Wilton Park Papers, No. 48,

December 1991, Richard Latter, Rapporteur. Based upon a

conference held at Wilton Park, under the auspices of the UK

Foreign and Commonwealth Office, October 21-25, 1991.

45. Data and analysis is provided in "The Western

Mediterranean: Europe's Rio Grande," The Christian Science

Monitor, January 27, 1993, pp. 9-14.

46. Samuel Huntington, "The Clash of Civilizations?,"

Foreign Affairs, Vol. 72, No. 3, Summer 1993, pp. 22-49.

47. Hugh Seton-Watson, "What is Europe, Where is Europe?,"

p. 12.

48. For an illuminating discussion of the precursors to the

European Community, see Jean-Baptiste Duroselle, Europe: A

History of Its Peoples, New York: Viking, 1990.

49. Anthony Hartley, "Europe's Muslims," The National

Interest, Winter 1990-91, pp. 66.

50. Hartley, pp. 65.

51. Cited in The Christian Science Monitor, "Forging New

Ties Across the Mediterranean," text by Howard LaFranchi, January

27, 1993, p. 4.

52. Stuart interviews with southern European governmental

representatives, Wilton Park, UK, October 21-25, 1991. This

pessimistic assessment is confirmed by the disappointing results

of the June 1993, U.N.-sponsored conference on human rights in

Vienna. The final document is virtually silent on the issue of

civil and juridical rights and the references to torture have

been described by Amnesty International as "a slap in the face of

humanity." The document focuses instead on issues such as debt

reservicing as a fundamental human right. See "Human Rights:

Never Heard of Them," The Economist, June 12, 1993, pp. 48 and

53.

53. The history of Turkish security relations with NATO are
39

summarized by D. Stuart and W. Tow, The Limits of Alliance: NATO

Out-Of-Area Disputes Since 1949, Baltimore: Johns Hopkins

University Press, 1990, pp. 288-298.

54. On January 23, 1991, Iraq formally advised Turkey that

provision of facilities in support of U.S. air strikes against

Iraq constituted an act of "unjustified aggression." But the

much-discussed Iraqi attack on Turkey never came. The Social

Democratic Party in Germany reacted to these threats by

questioning whether Article 4 of the NATO treaty would actually

apply in the event of an Iraqi attack.

55. For an analysis of the Turkish contribution to the war

effort, and a general discussion of the contemporary situation in

Turkey, see James Brown, "Turkey and the Persian Gulf Crisis,"

Mediterranean Quarterly, Vol. 2, No. 2, Spring 1991, pp. 46-54.

56. Clyde Haberman, "Turks Claim Some of Victor's Spoils,"

The New York Times, March 13, 1991, p. A14.

57. For background on the issue of the 7:10 ratio, see the

chapters by T. Veremis and A. Karaosmanoglu in D. Stuart, ed.,

Politics and Security in the Southern Region of the Atlantic

Alliance, London: Macmillan, 1988, pp. 137-180.

58. Greece has been in the forefront of the campaign to

block Turkish accession to the EU. Turkey has attempted to

retaliate by complicating NATO efforts to develop headquarters

for the 7th Allied Tactical Air Force, ATAF, and the Allied Land

Forces South-Central Europe, LANDSOUTHCENT, in Greece. For an

analysis of these and other NATO command and control issues, see

William T. Johnsen and Thomas-Durell Young, Preparing for the

NATO Summit: What Are the Pivotal Issues?, Carlisle Barracks, PA:

U.S. Army War College, Strategic Studies Institute, October 8,

1993.

59. See "Information Report" by the Committee for

Parliamentary and Public Relations, Western European Union,

October 18, 1993, NATODATA/INTERNET, Part II, p. 10.

60. Duygu Bazoglu Sezer, "Turkey's Grand Strategy Facing a

Dilemma," The International Spectator, Vol. XXVII, No. 1, January

1992, pp. 24-25.

61. Eric Rouleau provides an update on Turkey's situation as

well as some data to explain why the EC cannot afford to move too

quickly to bring Turkey into the Economic Community in "The

Challenges To Turkey," Foreign Affairs, Vol. 72, No. 5,

November-December 1993, pp. 110-126.

62. For an analysis of the "hostage lottery," see Lawrence

Freedman and Efraim Karsh, The Gulf Conflict: 1990-1991, Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1993, pp. 172-175.
40

63. Michael Gordon, "U.S. Asks Allies to Help Move Troops to

Gulf," The New York Times, November 24, 1990, p. 4. This does not

address the equally serious issue of West European military

capabilities. Thomas-Durell Young notes that Washington's allies

could not have provided the coalition with much more than they

did in any event, private conversations with the author.

64. Freedman and Karsh, The Gulf Conflict, p. 261.

65. Bruce Watson, "The Significance of the Gulf War to

Europe," in Bruce George, ed., Jane's NATO Handbook: 1991-92,

London: Jane's Information Group, 1992, p. 205.

66. John Zametica, "The Yugoslav Conflict," Adelphi Paper,

No. 270, Summer 1992, London: IISS, 1992, p. 59.

67. "Recognition of the Yugoslav Successor States," Position

Paper of the German Foreign Ministry, Bonn, March 10, 1993,

German Information Center, Vol. XVI, No. 10, p. 1.

68. Ibid.

69. See the text of the Haarzuilen statement of the EC

Foreign Ministers, October 6, 1991.

70. See John Zametica, The Yugoslav Conflict, pp. 65-68.

71. This judgment is not meant to exonerate Croatia, which

has all too often played the role of hyena to the Serbian lion.

72. Michael Brenner, "EC: Confidence Lost," Foreign Policy, Vol. 91, Summer 1993, p. 31.

73. Thijs van Vlijmen, Rapporteur, North Atlantic Assembly

report on "Alliance Security," Document AK 75, DSC (93) 2,

Brussels, May 1993, p. 2.

74. See Stanley Sloan, NATO's Future: Toward a New

Transatlantic Bargain, Washington: NDU Press, 1985.

75. Quoted by Alan Riding, "Clinton's Attention Heartens

Europe, Even the French," The New York Times, January 9, 1994, p.

E5.

76. "Opening Statement, Special Meeting of the Council with

Participation of Heads of State and or Government, Monday,

10th-Tuesday, 11th January, 1994." NATODATA/INTERNET p. 1.

77. "Military Trends Within the Atlantic Alliance," Draft

Final Report of the Defence and Security Subcommittee, North

Atlantic Assembly, Rafael Estrella, Rapporteur (AK 229, DSC/AF,

93) 2, May 1993, Brussels, Belgium.

78. For an analysis, with recommendations, of force
41

structure planning in support of the "New Strategic Concept," see

Johnsen and Young, Preparing for the NATO Summit: What Are the

Pivotal Issues?.

79. See the "Declaration of the Heads of State and

Government Participating in the Meeting of the North Atlantic

Council Held At NATO Headquarters, Brussels, on 10-11 January,

1994," NATO Press Communique M-1, 94, 3, NATODATA/INTERNET,

January 11, 1994, p. 3.

80. According to a report prepared for the U.S. House of

Commons,

Efforts to achieve better co-ordination resulted in

the adoption of a (classified) Document on Cooperation in November 1992. This sets out mechanisms for

representation of one body at meetings of the other,

guidelines for co-operation in planning and designs

for improved co-ordination of ministerial meetings.

Future division of labor in peacekeeping operations

has also been discussed.

"The Maastricht Debate: The Common Foreign and Security Policy,"

p. 14.

81. See the recent "Information Report" by the WEU,

Committee for Parliamentary and Public Information, October 18,

1993, NATODATA/ INTERNET, for information on the principles and

policies which guide its relation with the Alliance.

82. It is important to make clear definitional distinctions

between peacekeeping, peacemaking and peace enforcement. As the

international community has recently discovered in places like

Somalia and Bosnia-Hercegovina, however, it is not always easy to

maintain these distinctions in practice. For an interesting

attempt at differentiation, see Donald Snow, Peacekeeping,

Peacemaking and Peace-Enforcement: The U.S. Role in the New

International Order, Carlisle Barracks, PA: U.S. Army War

College, Strategic Studies Institute, February 1993.

83. John Lewis Gaddis, "One Germany--in Both Alliances," The

New York Times, March 21, 1990, p. 27.

84. "Declaration of the Heads of State..." p. 5.

85. See "Partnership for Peace," Secretary of Defense Les

Aspin's remarks to the Atlantic Council of the United States,

Washington, DC, December 3, 1993, p. 2.

86. Johnsen and Young, Preparing for the NATO Summit. . .,"

p. 6.

87. See the comments by U.S. Secretary of State Warren

Christopher, "Towards a NATO Summit," NATO Review, Vol. 41, No.
42

4, August 1993, pp. 3-6.

88. See, for example, Vaclav Havel, "New Democracies for Old

Europe," The New York Times, October 17, 1993, p. E17.

89. Kalevi Holsti, "The Post-Cold War 'Settlement' in

Comparative Perspective," in D. Stuart and S. Szabo, eds.,

Discord and Collaboration in a New Europe: Essays in Honor of

Arnold Wolfers, Washington, DC: Johns Hopkins Foreign Policy

Institute, forthcoming.

90. North Atlantic Assembly, Political Committee, Draft

Interim Report, "Engaging the New Democracies," Maurice Blin,

Rapporteur, AK 245 245, PC\EE, 93, 5, October 1993, Annex, pp.

20-24, NATODATA/INTERNET.

91. "Declaration of the Heads of State..." p. 4.

92. John Major, "Raise Your Eyes..." pp. 27-29.

93. For earlier arguments about the need to bolster the

forces of liberalism, see Thomas Risse-Kappan, "Predicting the

New Europe," The Bulletin of the Atomic Scientists, October 1990,

pp. 25-29; and Stephen Van Evera, "Primed for Peace: Europe After

the Cold War," International Security, Vol. 15, No. 3, Winter

1990-91, pp. 7-57.

94. This argument is developed in a recent article by the

author, entitled "NATO's Future As A Pan-European Security

Institution," NATO Review, Vol. 41, No. 4, August 1993, pp.

15-18.
43

U.S. ARMY WAR COLLEGE

Major General William A. Stofft

Commandant

*****

STRATEGIC STUDIES INSTITUTE

Director

Colonel John W. Mountcastle

Director of Research

Dr. Earl H. Tilford, Jr.

Author

Dr. Douglas T. Stuart

Editor

Mrs. Marianne P. Cowling

Secretary

Ms. Rita A. Rummel

*****

Composition

Mrs. Mary Jane Semple