1 

China’s Logistics Capabilities for 

Expeditionary Operations 

The modular transfer system between a Type 054A frigate and a COSCO container ship during China’s first military-civil UNREP. 

Source: “重大突破!民船为海军水面舰艇实施干货补给 [Breakthrough! Civil Ships Implement Dry Cargo Supply for Naval Surface 

Ships],” Guancha, November 15, 2019 

Primary author: Chad Peltier 

Supporting analysts: Tate Nurkin and Sean O’Connor 

Disclaimer: This research report was prepared at the request of the U.S.-China Economic and Security 

Review Commission to support its deliberations. Posting of the report to the Commission's website is 

intended to promote greater public understanding of the issues addressed by the Commission in its 

ongoing assessment of U.S.-China economic relations and their implications for U.S. security, as 

mandated by Public Law 106-398 and Public Law 113-291. However, it does not necessarily imply an 

endorsement by the Commission or any individual Commissioner of the views or conclusions 

expressed in this commissioned research report. 
2 

Contents 

Abbreviations .......................................................................................................................................................... 3

Executive Summary ............................................................................................................................................... 4

Methodology, Scope, and Study Limitations ........................................................................................................ 6

1. China’s Expeditionary Operations Logistics System ...................................................................................... 8

China’s Logistics Reform Effort: Dimensions and Drivers .............................................................................. 8

Military and Geopolitical Drivers of PLA Logistic Reform ............................................................................... 8

Logistics Support Department and Joint Logistics Support Force ............................................................... 12

Continuing Development Priorities and Challenges ..................................................................................... 17

Integration and Bureaucratic Resistance ................................................................................................... 17

Enhancing Military-Civil Fusion ................................................................................................................... 17

Informatization of Logistics Systems .......................................................................................................... 18

Combat Readiness: Training, Talent Recruitment and Retention, and Exercises ................................ 19

Discipline and Corruption ............................................................................................................................ 21

2. Bases and Basing Objectives ......................................................................................................................... 22

PLA Basing Strategy 2020 – 2030 ................................................................................................................. 36

PLA Basing After 2030 .................................................................................................................................... 37

3. PLA Expeditionary Operations Capabilities and Sustainment ..................................................................... 39

PLAN Expeditionary Capabilities .................................................................................................................... 39

PLAN Future Force Requirements ............................................................................................................ 44

PLAN Marine Corps (PLANMC) deployment ................................................................................................ 46

PLAN Expeditionary Logistics Models ........................................................................................................... 48

PLAAF Expeditionary Capabilities .................................................................................................................. 52

4. Role of Civilian Organizations in Expeditionary Operations ......................................................................... 54

Civilian overseas port facilities ......................................................................................................................... 55

RO-Ros and Container ships .......................................................................................................................... 55

Tankers ............................................................................................................................................................. 57

Strategic airlift .................................................................................................................................................... 57

Recommendations for Congress ........................................................................................................................ 59

Appendix A: Gulf of Aden Task Forces .............................................................................................................. 62

Appendix B: Djibouti Base and Potential Base Locations ................................................................................ 63

Appendix C: Satellite Imagery of Potential Overseas Chinese Bases ............................................................ 84

Endnotes ............................................................................................................................................................. 103
3 

Abbreviations 

ASUW 

ASW 

BRI 

CCTV 

COSCO 

CMC 

DoD 

GLD 

HA/DR 

ISR 

JLSB 

JLSC 

JLSF 

LHD 

LPD 

LSD 

MEU 

MND 

NEO 

PLA 

PLAAF 

PLAN 

PLANMC 

UNREP 

XAC 

Anti-Surface Warfare 

Anti-Submarine Warfare 

Belt and Road Initiative 

China Central Television 

China Ocean Shipping Company 

China Central Military Commission 

Department of Defense (U.S.) 

General Logistics Department 

Humanitarian Assistance / Disaster Relief 

Intelligence, Surveillance, and Reconnaissance 

Joint Logistics Support Base 

Joint Logistics Support Center 

Joint Logistics Support Force 

Landing Helicopter Dock 

Landing Platform Dock 

Logistics Support Department / Landing Ship Dock 

Marine Expeditionary Unit 

Ministry of National Defense 

Noncombatant Evacuation Operation 

People’s Liberation Army 

People’s Liberation Army Air Force 

People’s Liberation Army Navy 

People’s Liberation Army Navy Marine Corps 

Underway Replenishment 

Xi’an Aircraft Company 

 
4 

Executive Summary 

China is prioritizing three military development goals through 2030: 

1. The ability to impose unacceptable costs on the access of, or freedom of maneuver within, China’s 

first and second island chains. This includes the South and East China Seas as well as the waters 

out to Guam. 

2. The ability to contribute to international commons operations, which China perceives as the 

responsibilities of a great power.1 This is seen through China’s involvement in the Gulf of Aden 

anti-piracy task force missions and participation in overseas humanitarian assistance and disaster 

relief (HA/DR) operations. 

3. Defending China’s overseas economic interests, particularly through the Belt and Road Initiative 

(BRI), including infrastructure and overseas Chinese nationals. The risk of terrorist activity targeting 

Chinese facilities and personnel is likely to be a major driver of People’s Liberation Army (PLA) 

expeditionary combat operations through 2030. 

In pursuit of these goals, China has pursued both organizational reforms as well as new military capabilities 

to aid in expeditionary operations. As part of broader organizational restructuring beginning in 2015, the 

PLA created the Logistic Support Department (LSD) and Joint Logistic Support Force (JLSF) to better 

support joint operations. The administrative separation of these two organizations divides responsibilities 

for force management and logistics implementation / operations support, countering corruption, enhancing 

joint logistics between the services, and better aligning the organizations with Central Military Commission 

(CMC) strategic planning. The JLSF manages the implementation of the joint logistics support system, 

coordinating logistics, personnel, and supplies to theater commands. Based at Wuhan Joint Logistics 

Support Base (JLSB), the JLSF directs five joint logistics support centers (JLSC) aligned with a specific 

theater command. The LSD provides PLA-wide strategic logistics planning, coordinates military-civil fusion, 

and determines strategic priorities. Together the two organizations are responsible for diverse logistics 

activities including inventory and warehousing, medical services, transport, force projection, oil pipelines, 

engineering and construction management, reserve assets management.

Additionally, both the People’s Liberation Army Navy (PLAN) and People’s Liberation Army Air Force 

(PLAAF) are rapidly expanding their offensive and logistical capabilities. These include the introduction of 

the PLAN’s Type 055 destroyers, Type 075 landing helicopter docks (LHD), Type 901 fast replenishment 

ships, and indigenously designed aircraft carriers (including the Type 002 and future Type 003), as well as 

the PLAAF’s Y-20 strategic transport aircraft, the Y-20 tanker variant, and the J-20 fifth-generation fighter. 

Despite these advancements, the PLA is still in the early stages of developing its expeditionary military 

capabilities. As one defense analyst argued in the South China Morning Post, “bigger supply ships were no 

substitute for more overseas bases when it came to supporting the expanding mission of China’s naval 

fleets.”2 Many of the PLAN’s and PLAAF’s new capabilities help to address long-standing deficiencies in 

expeditionary capabilities – including in anti-submarine warfare, maritime air-defense, strategic airlift, and 

tanker aircraft – but China has not yet had the time to develop the doctrine or experience necessary to 

maximize their use of these new capabilities. 

The PLAN’s primary replenishment capabilities lie in the nine Type 903A ships and two newly introduced 

Type 901 fast support ships, which are designed to support carrier groups. Altogether, this auxiliary fleet is 

capable of supporting approximately 20-30 surface combat ships for 2-3 weeks without replenishment, with 

the Type 901s also supporting the PLAN’s two carriers. PLAN assets would need solid and liquid supplies 

from foreign civilian ports and/or domestic civilian container ships or tankers for operations exceeding that 

time period. The PLAN appears to be pursuing five basic expeditionary logistics models: accompanying 
5 

replenishment ships, civilian ports, logistics bases, replenishment relays, and civilian underway 

replenishment (UNREP). 

The PLAN and PLAN Marine Corps (PLANMC) may be developing the capability to conduct organic 

amphibious combat operations in the model of a U.S. Marine Corps Marine Expeditionary Unit (MEU). The 

PLANMC has expanded to over 30,000 personnel in the last few years because of transfers from the PLA 

Army. Without foreign air bases and with limited aircraft carriers, China has a limited capability to project 

airpower beyond limited amphibious operations using its Type 075 LHD. Type 075s, in conjunction with 

Type 071 landing platform docks (LPD) and other, smaller landing ships, may be able to conduct limited 

amphibious operations overseas, but a lack of rotary wing assets (due in part to competition for capabilities 

with the PLA ground forces) will severely limit PLANMC amphibious assault capabilities at least until 2030. 

Chinese analysts note that strategic airlift allows militaries to rapidly respond to emerging conflicts 

overseas, whereas naval power projection is significantly slower. The Y-20, China’s new strategic transport 

aircraft, will significantly expand PLAAF expeditionary capacity by providing a rapid-reaction transport lift 

capability, but the lack of overseas airbases means that China will need to rely on civilian airports at least 

through the short term. 

Chinese military analysts increasingly note the importance of military-civil fusion (军民融合) for 

expeditionary operations as well as China’s BRI interests. China released several technical standards and 

laws beginning in 2015 that are designed to further military-civil fusion, including capabilities such as rollon/roll-off and container ships. The PLAAF has also conducted exercises with civilian cargo aircraft 

companies so that these organizations can support expeditionary military operations if required. In fact, 

Chinese companies already have experience supporting some noncombatant evacuation and HA/DR 

operations. While these capabilities have important limitations, particularly in their utility during armed 

conflicts, coordination with the military command and control network, and in meeting military construction 

standards, they are nevertheless capable of supplementing PLA capabilities for operations short of armed 

conflict and fulfilling an emergency reserve function. 

Through 2030, China’s expeditionary capabilities appear primarily aimed at supporting the second and 

third goals above – the participation in international commons operations and the protection of overseas 

economic investments. Critically, although the PLA will likely be challenged to sustain overseas combat 

operations or operations in hostile countries through 2030, China is nevertheless rapidly developing 

capabilities necessary to disrupt U.S. interests in the Middle East, Africa, and throughout Asia. China’s 

existing overseas operations in the Red Sea provide it with valuable experience and opportunities to 

develop expeditionary concepts of operations (CONOPS). The United States should monitor signs that 

China’s overseas capabilities and/or goals have shifted, such as: 

 The deployment of the PLAN’s Type 901 fast replenishment ship, Type 075 LHD, or Type 055 

destroyer on overseas operations (particularly Gulf of Aden missions) 

 Pre-positioning of ordnance abroad, particularly at the Djibouti logistics support facility. 

 An increase in the Type 901 or Type 903A’s ability to transport solid cargo (for UNREP of 

ordnance) 

 An increase in the number of helicopters – for anti-submarine warfare, tactical transport, or attack – 

available to the PLAN and PLANMC 

 An expansion in the number of Type 901 fast replenishment ships 

 The establishment of a military logistics facility for aerial replenishment or the frequent use of a 

foreign airfield 
6 

The PLA’s actual fixed overseas footprint may continue to remain light until approximately 2030 because it 

can still rely on civilian infrastructure and platforms to support its expeditionary operations. However, after 

2030, the PLA will likely pursue more dedicated military bases beyond its existing Djibouti Logistics Support 

Base. The PLAN and PLAAF’s capabilities in 2035 would theoretically allow the PLA to perform higherlevel overseas combat operations, but operations in contested environments will almost assuredly require 

overseas military facilities or, at the least, preferred access to both ports and airfields in friendly countries. 

Further, the PLA will still likely have limited capability to conduct operations in hostile countries with 

integrated air defense systems without support from future PLAN aircraft carriers. This may be difficult for 

the PLA given slowing economic growth and defense budgets.3 

Methodology, Scope, and Study Limitations 

This study is intended to assess China’s military logistics capabilities, concepts of operation, and 

organizations to conduct expeditionary operations. It is divided into four sections. First, we assess the 

People’s Liberation Army (PLA) Joint Logistics Support Force (JLSF), including its structure, mission, and 

personnel, to understand its ability to support overseas missions. Second, we consider where China might 

seek to develop additional overseas military bases and its objectives in doing so. Third, we analyze the 

PLA’s expeditionary capabilities – with a focus on in-development capabilities (such as strategic airlift, naval 

replenishment ships, and amphibious warfare capabilities) to project and sustain forces abroad. Finally, 

Jane’s surveys the role of civilian organizations and capabilities to better understand how dual-use assets 

and military-civil fusion (军民融合) could assist in expeditionary logistics. 

Unless otherwise specified, the “short term” future refers to 2020-2025, “medium term” refers to 

approximately 2025-2030, and “long term” refers to after 2030. In the context of this report, “expeditionary” 

operations refer to the PLA’s overseas operations, generally beyond the South and East China Seas. 

These operations require replenishment and/or basing overseas. Following this definition, this report does 

not examine PLA activities in Central Asia.4

Jane’s gathered a variety of sources during our analysis. Jane’s focused on primary Chinese sources, 

including Chinese news organizations and official PLA websites. Critically, we also searched through 

Chinese forums, which were a particularly valuable source of data and imagery of in-development military 

capabilities. Through our partnerships with Maxar Technologies and Airbus Defense and Space, Jane’s 

was able to leverage up-to-date, high resolution satellite imagery to better understand the suitability of 

specific sites as potential PLA overseas bases. Finally, we created or used a number of quantitative 

databases to analyze and visualize various aspects of PLA expeditionary capabilities. For example, Jane’s 

created a dataset of the PLA’s Gulf of Aden deployments and used the American Enterprise Institute and 

Heritage Foundation’s China Global Investment Tracker. We also made extensive use of Jane’s internal 

defense and military data, including procurement information in Jane’s Defense Procurement, satellite 

imagery analysis from Jane’s Satellite Imagery Analysis, equipment specification data from Jane’s All the 

World’s Aircraft and Jane’s Fighting Ships, and order of battle information from Jane’s Military and Security 

Assessments. 

There are nevertheless some limitations to our analysis. There are countless civilian organizations that 

may be able to contribute capabilities – roll-on / roll-off vessels, container ships, and civilian aircraft – 

towards expeditionary operations if required. A completely comprehensive survey of available and future 

assets would be a valuable addition to U.S. understanding of China’s dual-use capabilities, but Jane’s 

attempted to focus on the most representative and potentially impactful capabilities. Second, additional 

research into Chinese language academic writings – particularly those from PLA military colleges and think 
7 

tanks – would be very valuable. While Jane’s incorporated those sources into this report, there are 

additional resources for future studies to consider. 
8 

1. China’s Expeditionary Operations Logistics System 

This section will assess the organizational reforms that the PLA has undertaken to improve joint logistics 

support, including the creation of the Logistics Support Department (LSD) and the Joint Logistics Support 

Force (JLSF). 

China’s Logistics Reform Effort: Dimensions and Drivers 

China has undertaken expansive reform of its military logistics system as part of broader People’s 

Liberation Army (PLA) organizational restructuring begun in late 2015. At an institutional level, these 

reforms consolidated command authority in the Central Military Commission (CMC) and improved the 

PLA’s ability to conduct joint operations. According to the 2019 State Council Defense White Paper 

“China’s National Defense in the New Era”, the objective of the reforms was to advance the establishment 

of a “modern and specialized military capable of fighting and winning wars in the information age” and to 

“improve the operational effectiveness and development of efficiency of the military.”5

The development of a joint logistics system is critical to improving the operational effectiveness and 

development of efficiency of the PLA. Indeed, the PLA defines joint logistics largely in terms of efficiency, 

referring to a system that “unifies the organization of the services to implement basic logistics work; avoids 

duplicate staffing, organizations, and facilities; and rationally distributes workforce, material, and financial 

resources to support joint operations and joint activities.”6 

The reforms also cleared the way for the establishment of two new organizations that now anchor the PLA 

efforts to develop and deploy a joint logistics support system with these characteristics, both in supporting 

local and expeditionary operations and contingencies: the Logistic Support Department (LSD) and Joint 

Logistic Support Force (JLSF). The combined efforts of these organizations have created a logistics 

system more capable of supporting joint operations, especially along internal lines of communication. 

These organizations also have featured in the refinement of processes, practices, and relationships that will 

support China’s “going out” effort and need to protect its expanding global interests. 

However, both the LSD and JLSF are at a relatively early stage in their development and judgments of 

their success are premature. They continue to adapt and adjust their priorities to address a range of 

persistent gaps in capabilities, integration inefficiencies, and organizational and technological constraints. 

Military and Geopolitical Drivers of PLA Logistic Reform 

The main military driver7 for these PLA reforms and for on-going refinement of China’s logistics support 

system is the urgent need for the PLA to deepen its understanding of and capacity for jointness in an 

informatized environment. These reforms seek to integrate the activities of multiple components of the PLA 

in a coordinated effort, under a single command authority. 

Joint operations have become a fundamental part of modern warfare8 and are critical to meeting the 

increasingly dynamic, crowded, and uncertain operational environments in which conflict is taking place 

simultaneously across multiple domain areas. Competition in the traditional military domains of land, air, 

surface of the sea, and undersea have been augmented over the past decade by activity in the cyber 

domain, electromagnetic spectrum, and space. The need to coordinate activities across all these domain 

areas and adapt to frequently fluid conditions places a premium on jointness, especially joint command and 

control, logistics, and training, especially in a “highly-informatized” environment. Chinese military writings 

have frequently used the term “informatized” to capture the prominence of information collection, 

processing, and dissemination as well as the requirement to better exploit information and integrate 

information technologies in modern military activities. 
9 

The PLA since the first Gulf War has recognized a significant vulnerability related to its capacity to organize, 

train for, and conduct joint operations. As experiments in joint operations have progressed, the PLA has 

concentrated efforts on breaking service silos, ensuring joint logistics support, and addressing a lack of 

combat experience, especially among operational commanders.9 As a result, joint training, including 

logistics training, has become a critical priority. China’s 2019 defense white paper noted that China’s 

increased defense spending since 2012 has emphasized, “supporting training in real combat conditions, 

enhancing strategic-level training, joint training at the [theater command] level and training of services and 

arms, and improving the conditions for simulated, networked and force-on-force training.” The paper also 

listed “establishing and improving the joint operations command system” as one component of reforming 

the PLA’s leadership and command system.10 

An efficient joint logistics system capable of delivering precision logistics—providing the right support at the 

right place in the required amount11—is also essential to building these sought-after joint operations 

capabilities.12 While the main focus of the reforms has been on supporting joint operations and “winning 

modern regional wars”13, PLA logistics reform will also provide resources and mechanisms to support 

China’s efforts to protect its growing overseas interests. 

Zhou Bo, the director of the Center for Security Cooperation in the Ministry of National Defense’s (MND) 

Office for International Military Cooperation effectively summarized the scale of these interests in an August 

2019 article in Foreign Policy magazine: “As the world’s largest trading nation and exporter, [China’s] 

overseas interests include, among other things, the safety and security of more than 1 million Chinese 

nationals working overseas, 140 million Chinese travelling abroad every year, some 40,000 Chinese 

enterprises around the globe, and overseas property and investment of $7 trillion.” According to Zhou, the 

PLA cannot be the only means of protecting these expansive interests, but “a forward presence is 

useful.”14

Indeed, the 2019 defense white paper “ explicitly states “overseas interests are a crucial part of China’s 

national interests” and “one of the missions of China’s armed forces is to effectively protect the security and 

legitimate rights and interests of overseas Chinese people, organizations and institutions.”15 Prominent 

PLA activities and investments in the broad areas listed below have reinforced the emerging importance of 

this mission. 

 Platforms: China’s massive naval ship-building campaign has an increasing focus on developing 

capabilities to project power and protect China’s overseas interests. The commissioning in 

December 2019 of the Shandong, China’s second aircraft carrier and first indigenously designed 

and built aircraft carrier is a strong indicator of intent, especially when seen in conjunction with the 

development of new destroyers and support ships. 

 Personnel: In 2017, the PLA announced the expansion of the PLANMC from approximately 

10,000 personnel to about 30,000 troops by 2020. The scope of PLANMC missions has also 

expanded to expeditionary operations as well. According to Alan Burns at CNA, “over several 

years, the PLANMC has been developing into a rapid response force that could be tasked with 

conducting a variety of expeditionary missions to defend China’s overseas interests.”16

 Basing: The establishment in 2017 of China’s first overseas base in Djibouti was an important 

development in China’s power projection and overseas operations efforts. According to the 

Chinese MND, the base was “built to better fulfill the international obligations such as such as 

escort missions in the Gulf of Aden and waters off the Somali coast, as well as to provide 

humanitarian relief.”17 In addition, the base provides a useful position from which to carry out noncombatant evacuations of Chinese citizens living in the region as well as counter-terrorism and 

other military missions. The base’s location at the junction of the Red Sea and Gulf of Aden also 
10 

provides China broader strategic value in protecting and expanding its interests in Africa and the 

Middle East and reinforcing China’s energy security. The base sits along the Bab el-Mandeb strait, 

a critical sea lane through which approximately 6.2 million barrels a day—about 9% of total 

seaborne trade in oil—transited in 2018, moving to and from the Suez Canal. About 2.6 million 

barrels a day were being shipped to Asian markets including China.18

 Operations: Since December 2008, the PLAN has participated in anti-piracy missions in the Gulf 

of Aden, and reportedly escorted over 6,600 civilian ships, more than half of which were foreign.19

According to Xinhua, by the end of 2018, China’s navy had “sent out 26,000 officers and soldiers” 

since 2008 as part of this Gulf of Aden mission.20 While specific numbers of ships escorted at any 

time varies, there are quantitative indications of the operational tempo of China’s counter-piracy 

mission. According to reporting in China Military Online, the 30th PLA escort task force escorted 59 

vessels in 31 “batches” over its nearly four months deployment from September 1, 2018 to 

December 24, 2018.21 The counter-piracy mission has also afforded China the opportunity to 

increase the deployment of PLA Navy submarines in the Indian Ocean purportedly in support of 

the transit of task forces to the Gulf of Aden. The “growing footprint” of the PLAN has raised 

concerns in the United States, India, and other countries like Japan that rely on secure shipping 

lanes through the Indian Ocean. According to the 2018 U.S. Department of Defense report to 

Congress on China’s military activities, “these submarine patrols demonstrate the PLAN’s 

emerging capability both to interdict sea lines of communication (SLOC) and to increase China’s 

power projection into the Indian Ocean.”22 In addition, Chinese forces have deployed abroad to 

support the evacuations of Chinese citizens from both Libya and Yemen. The PLAN is also 

increasing its deployments and independent operations in the Atlantic Ocean along the western 

coast of Africa to support the growing scale of Chinese investment there as well as Chinese 

citizens living in West Africa.23

Jane’s research also suggests that the development of a more centralized, high-profile, empowered, and 

effective logistics operation brings additional strategic importance, especially in the development or 

furtherance of valuable geopolitical relationships. 

The nature of logistics operations offers an opening for the LSD to provide material support for the 

expansion of soft power to strategically important states that might otherwise be resistant to directly 

engaging with the PLA. It is far more palatable for countries to deepen PLA direct military-to-military contact 

on natural disaster relief or medical exercises than combat-focused exchanges. 

One notable example of how China is using its joint logistics organizations to deepen strategically important 

geopolitical relationships is seen in recent developments in Djibouti. In January 2020, 10 PLA medical 

personnel stationed at the PLA support base in Djibouti received the Djibouti Independence Day medal. Lt. 

General Zakaria Sheikh Ibrahim, the Chief of General Staff of the Djibouti Armed Forces, awarded the 

medal – “the highest medal awarded to Djibouti’s citizens and friends” – for “humanitarian relief operations 

including public welfare in assisting impoverished students, medical assistance, as well as rescue and 

disaster relief, bringing about genuine help to the Djiboutian people.” The JLSF is also currently engaged in 

a special medical service operation in Djibouti known as “Operation Bright Eyes” to treat over 100 cataracts 

patients since December 2019.24 

PLA medical and humanitarian activities in Djibouti are notable because the United States also maintains a 

strategically important base in Djibouti only six miles from China’s, creating a unique and uncomfortable 

situation for the United States. As Kate Almquist Knopf, the director of the U.S. Department of Defense’s 

Africa Center for Strategic Studies noted,“there is nowhere else in the world where the U.S. military is 
11 

essentially co-located in close proximity to a country it considers a strategic competitor. This is not 

something the Pentagon is used to.”25 

This discomfort is partly rooted in the potential for disruption and observation of U.S. military operations and 

personnel in Djibouti. For example, in May 2018, the U.S. Department of Defense released a Notice to 

Airmen warning of numerous incidents “involving a high-power laser” being used to blind pilots 

approximately 750 meters from China’s Djibouti base. At least two U.S. airmen were injured as a result. 

There is also a persistent potential for a “quiet contest” between the United States and China to 

surreptitiously collect information about the other’s capabilities, operations, and personnel.26

Moreover, China’s military presence in Djibouti, and its continued medical operations there, creates a more 

strategic challenge for soft power influence with the Djibouti government that could harm U.S. interests in 

the Middle East and North Africa over time. The medal ceremony and “Operation Bright Eyes” will not in 

and of themselves give Djibouti cause to expel the United States, but when viewed through the prism of 

great-power competition they do contribute to broader Chinese efforts to gain leverage and influence over 

the Djibouti government. In conjunction with Belt and Road Initiative (BRI) investments, such goodwill 

missions deepen could alter Djibouti’s decision-making on important strategic issues such as, for example, 

future PLA efforts to expand its base or potential petitions to limit U.S. in-country activity. 

China’s recent military engagement with Germany is another example of China’s use of its joint logistics 

organizations as tools in a broader strategy of military engagement with U.S. allies and partners. In July 

2019, China and Germany held a joint logistics exercise known as “Combined Aid-2019” that included 91 

Chinese military personnel and more than 80 observers from the United States, Japan, Austria, and 

France. The exercise was built on a scenario of a health crisis at a fictitious refugee camp and designed to 

test Chinese and German capacity to respond to “non-conventional security challenges.”27 It was the 

second China-Germany joint logistics-focused exercise. The first was held in Chongqing in 2016 and 

revolved around response to a “fictious earthquake scenario.”28 This exercise was explicitly mentioned in 

the 2019 defense white paper as an example of the “sound progress” China was making in “actively 

developing its military relations with European countries.”29

As with the PLA’s medical support in Djibouti, these exercises do not signal an imminent fracture in USGerman relations. However, they should be seen as important components of China’s broader efforts to 

strengthen ties with Germany, Europe’s largest economy, during a time of relative friction with the United 

States on defense and security issues. According to Wang Yiwei, an expert in European studies at Renmin 

University of China, “as the leader of the EU, Germany has said that Europe should take charge of its own 

security. It is also a brand-new world security situation now, as both China and Europe would want to 

hedge their risks in dealing with the US.”30

Combined Aid-2019 also helps normalize perceptions of China’s military and expansion of its activities 

outside of the Indo-Pacific as being benign and consistent with global norms, international institutions, and 

humanitarian objectives. Retired PLA colonel Yue Gang observed that the strategic value of the exercise 

surpassed its operational value, assessing that “given that NATO has been suspicious and wary of China’s 

military development, and this is a member of NATO this breakthrough underscores the considerable trustbuilding taking place between Germany and China, and it may even set an example for others to follow.”31

Significantly, German military statements on the exercise focused on the potential for combined ChinaGermany medical operations as part of “a UN scenario.”32 This theme was central to reporting from 

German news outlet Deutsche Welle, which noted that “even these tentative first steps help these UN 

peacekeeping partners gain a better understanding of each other.”33 
12 

In addition to these two examples, since its founding the LSD has also held joint logistics exercises with 

Laos, Vietnam, and Russia, among others, while LSD leadership have had high-level meetings with 

logistics leaders from the militaries of Israel34, the United Kingdom35, several Latin American countries36, 

and New Zealand.37 The LSD also has held high-level meetings with South Africa38, a country that 

continues to play a conspicuously important role in supporting the PLAN’s growing Atlantic Ocean 

operations.39

Logistics Support Department and Joint Logistics Support Force 

China’s logistics reforms must be seen in the context of the sweeping CMC-led reforms begun in late 2015 

that codified PLA emphasis on joint operations rather than services-based operations and guaranteed “the 

Party’s absolute leadership of the military and the CMC’s centralized leadership.” 40

Crucial reform components included the February 2016 announcement of the replacement of the PLA’s 

seven military districts with five theater commands subordinate to the CMC (see figure 1). Theater 

commands are largely responsible for combat operations and control the services components within their 

respective district. The creation of this three-layered CMC-Theater-Services construct is based on the 

principle that "CMC takes charge of the overall administration of China's armed forces, Theater 

Commands focus on combat, and different military services pursue their own construction”41 and was an 

essential step in moving toward unified joint operations. 

Figure 1: Map from Wikipedia, edited by Jane's.

Shenyang JLSC 

Xining JLSC 

Zhengzhou JLSC

Wuhan Joint Logistic Support Base 

Gullin JLSC

Wuxi JLSC 
13 

A second piece of joint logistics reform occurred in March 2016 when the CMC replaced the four 

headquarters / departments of the CMC – the General Logistic Department (GLD), the General Staff 

Department, General Political Department, and General Armaments Department – with 15 “functional 

segments, including seven departments, three commissions and five directly affiliated bodies.”42

Among the 15 new organizations created was the Logistic Support Department (LSD). Elimination of the 

GLD and creation of the LSD was more than just a rebranding exercise. The LSD retained the GLD’s 

responsibility for “planning the logistics support for the whole military, policy study, standards setting, 

inspection and supervision”43 as well as materiel management, facilities management, and procurement. 

However, the LSD did not retain responsibility for the implementation of this strategic planning that 

previously was owned by GLD direct subordinate units. In addition, the GLD, in particular, had “developed 

into a sprawling, semi-independent fiefdom (s) with limited external oversite”, inviting rampant corruption.44 

Ultimately, LSD activities are aligned with the broader CMC mandate of macro-management and strategic 

planning and include determining policy and priorities, commissioning research projects, and establishing 

standards. For example, in December 2019 the LSD announced that the PLA will increase use of modular 

buildings and prefabricated structures in the construction of military facilities. The decision was intended to 

increase efficiency by shortening construction time, reducing resource consumption and environmental 

pollution, and increasing standardization. The LSD also arranged for the commission of pilot projects to 

“promote prefabricated buildings in the military and then conduct synchronous research on the results of 

those pilot projects so as to formulate the construction standards that meet the requirements of actual 

combat as soon as possible.” The initiative is expected to reduce consumption of resources and 

environmental strain associated with current practice of “using reinforced concrete and heavy masonry” 

and also to increase the flexibility of PLA forces to deploy to locations characterized by ”harsh natural 

condition, short construction period and insufficient raw material supply.”45 

The third main reform that has shaped China’s current joint logistics system was the establishment of the 

Joint Logistic Support Force under the Joint Staff Department in September 2016. The JLSF was 

established to manage the implementation of a joint logistics support system, working closely with the 

theater commands to provide the appropriate general logistics support as required. 

The JLSF is based at Wuhan Joint Logistics Support Base (JLSB) and directs five joint logistics support 

centers (JLSC), which are aligned to a specific theater command. These JLSCs are subordinate to the 

Wuhan JLSB but provide direct support to the theater commands in which they reside. The U.S. DoD in 

2019 noted that the JLSF has assigned a representative to each of the theater joint command centers, 

thereby allowing support forces to operate in the same command network as combat forces during an 

exercise, which results in better coordination of various support missions.46 The leadership of the JLSF and 

JLSCs are somewhat unclear, though announcements of the JLSF establishment indicate that the 

commander (司令员) of the Wuhan JLSB is Li Shisheng (李士生, image bottom right) and the Wuhan 

JLSB political commissar (政治委员) is Yin Zhihong (殷志红).

47 The deputy political commissar is Chen 

Jian.48 The JLSF commander is Li Yong (李勇, image top right), also the Lieutenant General of the 

PLAAF, his deputy is Bai Zhongbin, and the JLSF political commissar is Xu Zhongo (徐忠波).49 
14 

Figure 2: The Joint Logistics Support Base and Joint Logistics Support Center structure. Source: McCauley, “Modernization of PLA 

Logistics: Joint Logistic Support Force”, Testimony before the U.S.-China Economic and Security Review Commission: China’s 

Military Reforms and Modernization: Implications for the United States, 

A series of events in 2018 and 2019 reflect the strong CMC support for the JLSF and the broader logistics 

systems reform effort. In July 2019, JLSF member Wu Yong became the first JLSF soldier to be awarded 

the title of “most admirable serviceman in the new era” by the Publicity Department of the Chinese 

Communist Party for his support to the maintenance of oil pipelines.50 More than 300 JLSF personnel 

marched during the October 1, 2019 military parade marking the 70th anniversary of the founding of the 

People’s Republic of China. Reporting from China’s MND noted that “compared with previous parades, 

Tuesday’s event highlighted the armed forces’ enhanced capabilities in carrying out joint combat and 

logistical support operations.”51 Later in the month, General Secretary Xi met with delegates at the first 

Party Congress of the JLSF in Wuhan on October 18, 2019, encouraging the JLSF to “faithfully perform 

their duties, push for new progress and contribute to fulfilling the dream of a strong military.”52 

Together the LSD and JLSF are charged with leading the development, implementation, and refinement of 

a joint logistics force responsible for implementing integrated joint operations, supporting joint training, and 

providing strategic and campaign joint logistics. Specifically, the two organizations are responsible for 

inventory and warehousing, medical services, transport, force projection, oil pipelines, engineering and 

construction management, reserve assets management, and procurement in line with the below four 

principles:53 

 Combat effectiveness through the establishment of an effective joint logistics organization and 

system

 Maintaining a strong focus on joint combat, training, and support in peacetime and wartime 

 Commitment to the concept of "integrating those can be integrated and differentiating those have 

to be differentiated." This guidance applies both to resource allocation and separation of 

responsibilities between the JLSF (which is responsible for general-purpose materials and 

equipment)-and the services (which are responsible for special-purpose materials and equipment). 

Li Yong: JLSF 

Commander 

Li Shisheng: Commander 

of Wuhan JLSB 
15 

 Persistent emphasis on military-civil fusion and engagement of non-military resources such as 

Chinese commercial shipping companies to improve the overall efficiency of joint logistic support. 

Within this system, three important distinctions between the organizational responsibilities of the LSD, 

JLSF, theater commands, and military services are worth exploring. First, it is important to understand the 

different roles of the LSD and JLSF. Critically, the separation of the LSD – a department within the CMC – 

and the JLSF, which is administratively under the CMC Joint Staff Department, separates force 

management from logistics implementation and operations support, as reflected in the table of reported 

responsibilities of each organization below.54

Second, there is also a distinction between peacetime and wartime command and control. During 

peacetime, the JLSF through the JLSCs is largely responsible for the provision of logistics support to the 

theater commands and operates separately from the theater commands. However, during wartime, the 

theater commands assume control of the JLSCs located within their geographic area. The JLSF can also 

form contingency logistics support brigades – “modular ad-hoc units to provide rapid comprehensive 

logistics support in a main operational direction” – and reserve logistics support brigades are available for 

mobilization.55 

Reserve logistics support brigades are an important part of the joint logistics system56 and of China’s 

national defense efforts to deal with both “emergencies and wars.” The International Institute of Strategic 

Studies “Military Balance” estimates that China’s reserve forces in 2018 totaled 510,000 troops.57

According to China’s MND, these reserve forces are separated by service and consist of the “Army 

Reserve, Navy Reserve, Air Force Reserve and the Second Artillery Force Reserve.” The chart below lists 

the various components of each service’s reserve force58: 

Service Components 

Army Reserve  Infantry, artillery, antiaircraft artillery, antitank artillery, tank, engineering, chemical 

defense, signals, coastal defense, and other specialized forces 

Navy Reserve  Reconnaissance, mine-sweeping and mine-laying, radar observation and 

communications, and other specialized forces 

Air Force Reserve  Ground-to-air-missile, radar, and other specialized forces 

Second Artillery Force 

Reserve 

 Specialized missile support force and special equipment and maintenance force 

Logistic Support Department: Force Management and 

Strategic Planning 

Joint Logistic Support Force: Implementation and 

Operations Support 

PLA-wide strategic logistics planning Coordination of logistics support to theater commands

Materials management and procurement and facilities 

management

Managing the storage and distribution of material, fuel, ordnance 

International military engagement Directing transportation, field medical, and subsistence support to 

PLA units assigned to theater operations 

Overall administrative of PLA hospitals and medical 

programs

Coordination of military-civil integration strategy 

Science and technology priority determination and 

development

Integration of land, air, rail, and maritime transportation 

integration of military requirements

Improving logistics reserve forces 

Standardizing information technology standards 
16 

Reserve units are organized mainly on a regional basis. The MND explains that “divisions are set up in 

provinces and brigades in prefectures. A division can be set up in a region covering more than one 

prefecture, and a regiment in a region covering more than one county.”59

In 2017, the PLA reduced Army reserve forces while increasing the size of the reserves of other services. 

The move was made as part of other significant changes – including an overall reduction in PLA size of 

300,000 troops by the end of 2017—designed to better align PLA structure and personnel skills with the 

changing nature of conflict and PLA missions.60 

The lack of specific mention of logistics reserves does not mean that services reserve forces are not 

focused on logistics issues. PLA reporting from 2017 on the annual training of the Chongqing Army 

Reserve Logistics Support Brigade reflects the nature of the specialized support specified by the MND. 

According to the description of the exercise: “100 cubic tactical oil depots were opened in 10 minutes, and 

tankers from PetroChina’s Chongqing branch quickly entered the area to complete the task of receiving, 

storing, distributing oil and refueling vehicles.” The exercise also included ambulances, tents hidden in 

camouflage, and different rooms for triage, serious injury, X-ray, and surgery.61

The effectiveness of China’s reserves is unclear due to several structural challenges, most notably around 

a lack of sufficient and standardized training. For example, in a February 2019 article in The National 

Interest, Lyle Goldstein, a research professor at the US Naval War College’s China Maritime Studies 

Institute, profiles an article on PLA military logistics written by two professors from China’s National Defense 

University. One of the author’s recommendations to improve PLA joint logistics is to increase Chinese 

exercises of reserve forces in respect to “missions”, “time”, “content”, and “quality.””62 

The need for improved training has secondary effects that could create dilemmas for both the PLA and for 

the commercial enterprises from which reserve personnel are taken. According to veteran Asia analyst and 

USCC Commissioner Larry Wortzel, training reserve units for modern warfare is “far more complex than in 

the past, involving skills such as network services, computer defense, missile repair, and aircraft 

maintenance.” Standardized training solutions will take longer, potentially leading to complaints from 

“provinces, counties and enterprises” over “lost time, wages, and material.”63

The third important distinction is between generalized and specified logistics support. The JLSF and JLSCs 

are responsible for the provision of generalized joint logistics support; that is, support that is applicable 

across the joint force. However, there remains a role for the services, providing specialized and service – 

specific logistics support to the theater command operations. As the MND explained, the joint logistics 

system has the JLSF “as the backbone, military services as the complement, integration of centralized and 

decentralized logistic support, and two support lines including generalization and specialization.”64 

The JLSF is the primary focus of the state media reporting on PLA logistics activities. For example, PLA 

media coverage of the on-going coronavirus crisis has placed the JLSF at the center of the response and 

largely praised the efficiency and effectiveness with which it has moved since late January to help stem the 

crisis,65 the epicenter of which is ironically in Wuhan. 

Nonetheless, Chinese authors have consistently highlighted the challenges and persistent tensions 

associated with the transition to a joint logistics system with the JLSF rather than the former military regions 

and supporting services at the center. A 2017 article on PLA medical services notes that the 2015 and 

2016 reforms have “presented new challenges to the organization and implementation of medical services. 

Now the military medical service belongs to the command of joint security forces which is an independent 

arm instead of being led by the military region.”66 
17 

A January 2019 article by Major General Huang Tainxin, the political commissar of the joint logistics center 

in Shenyang, assesses that the reformed logistics system shows characteristics of a fragmented 

organizational structure. It argues that a modern joint logistics system requires further work to take 

advantages of the efficiencies of the new flat structure, including a focus on strengthened centralized and 

unified leadership and political training.67 

Continuing Development Priorities and Challenges 

The result of China’s joint logistics reform has been an increasingly competent joint logistics force that is 

capable of delivering joint logistics support to the five theater commands in both peacetime and in combat 

and is beginning to leverage the processes and mechanisms created by these reforms to sustain 

operations to protect China’s global interests. But the development of China’s joint logistics system is at a 

relatively early stage and is still evolving to respond to changes in the operational environment and 

technological development as well as adapting lessons learned from ongoing reform efforts. 

A review of Chinese sources and U.S. observers of China’s military reform and modernization identifies 

five prioritized development areas or continued challenges slowing the full realization of organizational 

reform, in some cases both. Significantly, many of these priorities and challenges are not unique to the joint 

logistics support system and are consistent with identified challenges facing the PLA’s broader shift to joint 

operations. 

Integration and Bureaucratic Resistance

A common theme across most analyses of China’s logistics systems reforms is the persistent need for 

comprehensive transition to a joint approach and more complete integration of the legacy logistics systems 

of the individual services. In other words, there is growing urgency and importance to replacing the old 

concept of “single service victory” [danyi junzhong zhisheng, 单一军种制胜] with winning as a joint force.68

And as noted above, the engagement between JLSF and the services in the theater commands appears 

to still suffer from the persistence of this instinct. 

The 2018 DoD report to Congress highlights this organizational challenge, noting that China’s successful 

transition to a joint force “depends greatly on strong centralized leadership and direction that can dispel 

inter-service rivalries.”69 U.S. National Defense University’s 2019 book “Chairman Xi Remakes the PLA” 

frequently touches on the theme of organizational resistance to PLA reforms, emphasizing at a broad level 

that “inter-service rivalry and competition for resources and missions remain powerful obstacles to 

jointness.”70 More specifically, it asserts that PLA logistics organizations have “resisted numerous previous 

efforts to reform the system to more effectively support joint logistics.”71

Institutional rivalry and resistance are felt in and across China’s joint logistics systems as are inefficiencies 

stemming from a lack of integration of related functions within the joint logistics systems. In an October 

2018 article, Zhang Aimin, a professor at the Equipment Support Department of the Army Military 

Transportation University in Tianjin, stresses the need for unified command, close coordination, and clear 

delineation and delegation of responsibilities. However, it also recommends the integration of planning, 

training, standards, and operations of sub-sets of the logistics and equipment support system, such as 

combat readiness, emergency response, post command, emergency mobilization, and equipment 

support.72 

Enhancing Military-Civil Fusion 

Military-civil fusion is one of the four guiding principles articulated by the CMC (listed on page 7 above) for 

the operation of the JLSF and is a prominent area of continued focus and improvement. 
18 

The PLA calls upon civilian transportation, logistics assets, and infrastructure as part of its support to 

operations, deployments, and exercises along its internal supply lines and in the five theater commands. A 

profile of the Wuxi Joint Logistic Support Base published four months after the establishment of the JLSF 

offers insight into the ways in which the new joint logistics system calls on support of “deep military-civil 

integration.” Examples include using local air, land, and maritime transportation to support medical 

evacuations and deployments and even the use of local subways to bypass rush hour traffic in transporting 

troops across the city.73 

Enhanced military-civil fusion is also a key component of China’s logistics support to the PLA’s growing 

overseas deployments and activities. The National Defense Transportation Law, passed in September 

2016, the same month as the establishment of the JLSF, improved the PLA’s ability to leverage civilian 

carriers to support expeditionary operations and power projection by “placing obligations on Chinese 

transportation enterprises located abroad or engaged in international shipping overseas.” The law also 

requires large and medium-sized Chinese companies to provide “rapid, long-distance, and large-scale 

national defense transportation support.”74 

And there is some evidence of progress in the increased coordination and use of civilian transportation 

assets and infrastructure capable of filling gaps in China’s current long-range strategic logistics support. In 

late 2019, the PLAN conducted a test to establish a modular underway replenishment system (UNREP) on 

a civilian ship, “successfully providing logistics support to naval ships at sea.” According to the MND, the 

test involved the commercial ship transferring supplies to the frigate Linyi across a wire rope between the 

two ships, a process that took approximately 30 minutes. The MND claims that “using civilian ships to carry 

out UNREP for naval ships is a new attempt in the field of naval logistics support” and that “the 

breakthrough provides a strong logistics support for the Chinese navy to go to the high seas.”75 

Some observers, both in China and outside, view integration of military and civilian logistics planning and 

operations as a potential strategic vulnerability. Especially concerning is a gap in standards as well as 

training between the military and its civilian / commercial partners. Large numbers of ships, for example, 

were built before the 2015 release of the Technical Standards for New Civilian Ships to Implement National 

Defense Requirements, meaning that most of these ships will require “significant modification.” A 

December 2019 report on “Civil Transport in PLA Power Projection” by Conor Kennedy of the Naval War 

College cites a 2017 assessment from the deputy commander of the Northern Theater Command Army 

that out of 200,000 transport vessels in China at the time, fewer than 2,000 were suited for “direct 

mobilization.”76

Some efforts are being made to bridge this gap, especially in training, through increasing interactions and 

exercises between military and civilian stakeholders. For example, the JIDI BAOZHANG exercise took 

place in the Tibet Military District in June 2018. The exercise stressed military-civil fusion and included LSD 

components working closely with local civilian entities to construct temporary bridges, transport fuel, and 

deliver food to troops in the field.77 

Informatization of Logistics Systems 

The PLA drive for precision joint logistics in a highly-informatized operational environment requires 

integration of innovative and advanced information technologies into logistics equipment and support 

processes. Integrating military support and command systems and those of civilian partners is critical to 

avoiding gaps in information and strategic or operational situational awareness. 

Enhancing automation of the joint logistics process and integrating advanced information technologies has 

been an important priority for PLA logistics reform since the establishment of the JLSF in 2016. In fact, the 
19 

2017 profile of the Wuxi JLSC that appeared in China Youth Daily prominently mentions the efficiencies 

gained through automation and the use of advanced information technologies, including recounting an 

anecdote of how within half-an-hour of the click of a mouse, four oil tankers carrying 80 tons of fuel were 

rushed to a PLA Rocket Force base.78 

But clear technology and integration gaps remain. Leigh Ann Luce, an independent analyst, and Erin 

Richter, a senior intelligence officer at the U.S. Defense Intelligence Agency, identified initial technology 

requirements to further information technology and integration: 

 Unified military logistics standards—a requirement also prominently referenced in evaluations of 

organizational integration 

 Military logistics sensing and collecting capabilities, to include “Internet of Things sensing and 

identification technology that allows for real-time, dynamic visualization and control 

 Construction of a ubiquitous information transmission network 

 A robust information management platform to enable data storage, efficient processing, rapid 

retrieval 

 Development of comprehensive enterprise applications79

The LSD has taken the lead in meeting these requirements. In June 2017, the organization released calls 

for research on “logistical cloud data center transformation and design and implementation”, which “marked 

a groundbreaking step in the military’s logistics science and technology field.”80 Another indicative LSD – 

led research effort – “Key Technologies in a Planning, Command, and Simulation Platform for Transport 

and Projection in Joint Operations” – is designed to “integrate data from a vast network of sources to 

provide solutions in route planning, plan dissemination, in-transit visibility, simulated exercises, simulation 

evaluation, operations feedback, and a host of other functions that will directly support PLA-wide 

transportation capabilities.”81

Combat Readiness: Training, Talent Recruitment and Retention, and Exercises 

Developing and maintaining joint combat readiness is a force-wide PLA priority – as identified in the 2019 

defense white paper– and efforts to achieve this heightened level of readiness have consistently focused 

on talent recruitment and retention, training, especially in “real combat conditions,” exercises, and 

inspections.82 

A 2017 article in the Journal of Military Logistics University prominently references the need for more 

focused, standardized, and consistent professional training for operations in peacetime and combat, 

especially in the specialized areas that comprise LSD focus areas and JLFS operations, such as 

transportation, supply management, and medicine.83 

The PLA also sees talent recruitment and retention as important priorities for further development of an 

efficient and effective Chinese joint logistics system, including developing systems for selection and 

promotion of highly skilled and motivated science and technology personnel. 

Exercises have been one prominent means through which the LSD and JLSF personnel have gained 

experience and developed skills to support more efficient precision logistics and support. According to the 

2019 white paper, “logistics units have been incorporated into [theater command]-level joint training, transtheater training by services and arms.”84 And there is evidence that these exercises – both for the joint 

logistics community and broader joint PLA forces – have “grown in scale, complexity, and number 

reflecting the priority the PLA has assigned to developing joint operations capability in a number of potential 

scenarios.”85 In total, over the first three-plus years of their existence, logistics support forces have 
20 

conducted more than 50 drills with various theater commands and branches of military.86 Reporting on 

these exercises frequently references both the complexity and realism of the scenarios explored. 

Among the most prominently cited logistics exercises is the Joint Logistics Mission 2018, referred to by the 

U.S. Department of Defense as “the first comprehensive, logistics support exercise since the establishment 

of the JLSF.” The exercise involved a joint logistics support force unit, service-level logistics units, as well as 

PLA Army, Air Force, and civilian national defense mobilization forces from the Western Theater and 

featured tasks such as delivering blood-bags using drones to wounded soldiers at the “front line” and 

setting up refueling depots via helicopters and vehicles at remote terrains.87 

JLSF forces are also being folded into large multi-dimensional joint exercises. For example, more than 360 

JLSF troops participated in an expansive nation-wide January 2018 exercise involving 4,000 troops from all 

branches of the PLA.88 As noted above, China’s JLSF and LSD are both actively engaging with foreign 

partners both through high-level meetings and joint exercises in order to “strengthen the integrated training 

of logistical and operational forces”. Recent indicative exercises include: 

 “Combined Aid-2019”: The July 2019 China-Germany joint logistics exercise simulated an 

international humanitarian medical rescue mission where casualties are scattered in a location 

ravaged by infectious diseases like cholera. It focused on developing new concepts and best 

practices for joint command and control, treatment and evacuation of casualties, epidemic 

prevention and control, and rescue missions. Chinese representatives arrived with new medical 

equipment for the drill, including its latest field tent hospital system, armored ambulances, and 

epidemic prevention vehicles, in order to exhibit advances in Chinese medical technology.89 

 “Peace Train 2019”: On August 16, 2019 China and Laos kicked-off the “Peace Train 2019” 

humanitarian and medical joint rescue exercise in Vientiane, Laos. The exercise focused on joint 

response to and medical rescue in mudslide disasters and involved approximately 500 individuals. 

Key components included mass treatment of wounded, transportation and evacuation of critically 

wounded by road, waterway and air; and epidemic prevention and pathogen monitoring.90 Peace 

Train was also held in July and August 2018 and reportedly focused on flood disaster relief. The 

event was most notable largely because of the intrusion of a real- world disaster outside of the 

context of the exercise. On 23 July, the Sepien-Senamnoi Hydropower Dam in Attapeu Province, 

Laos actually collapsed, leading to extensive flooding and leaving hundreds missing, many dead, 

and thousands displaced.91 The visiting Chinese medical team sent 32 members of its exercise 

contingent to support relief efforts on July 25.92 

 China-Vietnam Joint Exercise: From August 22 – 29, 2018, China and Vietnam held a joint 

seven-day exercise in which military medical teams from both countries provided free medical 

services to residents of Hoa Thuan township of Vietnam’s northern border of Cao Bang and 

Longzhou County in southwestern China’s Guangxi Zhuang Autonomous Region. More than 

4,100 individuals were treated.93

In addition to these humanitarian exercises, Chinese forces also have participated in combat-focused 

exercises with partner states that have included prominent logistics components. From September 16 – 

21, 2019, Chinese troops supported the Russian “Center 2019” exercise held in Russia’s central military 

district. A total of 1,600 Chinese troops participated along with an undisclosed number of Type 96A main 

battle tanks, H-6K strategic bombers, JH-7A fighter bombers, J-11 fighter jets, Y-9 transport aircraft, an-10 

attack helicopters.94 According to Senior Colonel Ren Guoqiang, spokesperson for the MND, “the exercise 

fully tested and improved the capabilities of the Chinese troops in trans-border projection, overseas 
21 

command, joint operation and logistics and released the effects of the Chinese defense and military 

reform.”95

Discipline and Corruption 

Corruption has frequently been cited as a constraint for PLA organizational reform and modernization, an 

assessment that has been especially relevant for the PLA logistics community. Processes and regulations 

established in the 1990s enabled the PLA to run businesses in the private sector. The PLA officially 

divested from these businesses in the late 1990s and 2000s, however there is evidence that many of these 

enterprises “remained under control of relatives or close associates of active duty officers”, enabling the 

continued direction of contracts to PLA-run businesses. As a result, logistics personnel have been a 

prominent target for General Secretary Xi Jinping’s anti-corruption efforts.96 

Concern over the dilutive effects of corruption on the still evolving PLA joint logistics system persists among 

Chinese observers. Major General Huang Tianxin, a political committee member with the Shenyang JLSC, 

stresses the need to confront corruption in a 2019 National Defense article on strengthening joint logistical 

reform and identifies a range of unprofessional practices, including the unwillingness of new leaders to fully 

address legacy practices that are affecting the efficiency and effectiveness of the new joint logistics system. 

He advocates for enhanced organizational and party supervision, increased spot inspections, and 

ultimately, zero tolerance even for the smallest act of corruption – a “‘sharp sword’ to strengthen the 

deterrent” (悬利剑强化震慑力).

97
22 

2. Bases and Basing Objectives 

This section seeks to understand where China may pursue overseas military bases and/or preferred 

access to commercial facilities abroad. Jane’s analyzes the likelihood of 18 overseas sites as future PLA 

bases. 

In its pursuit of expeditionary capabilities, Jane’s assesses that China is likely to rely on a combination of 

commercial facilities and light-footprint, dedicated military logistics bases to support PLA expeditionary 

operations throughout the medium term. Christopher Yung and Ross have previously argued that China 

will pursue a “Dual Use Logistics Facility” model, which mixes “access to overseas commercial facilities 

and a limited number of military bases.”98 This assessment also builds on that of the DoD’s 2019 Annual 

Report to Congress: Military and Security Developments Involving the People’s Republic of China, which 

argues that “China’s leaders may assess that a mixture of military logistics models, including preferred 

access to overseas commercial ports and a limited number of exclusive PLA logistics facilities, probably 

collocated with commercial ports, most closely aligns with China’s overseas military logistics needs.”99 

Jane’s assessment of Chinese expeditionary capabilities, potential overseas basing sites, and strategic 

goals suggests that China will primarily rely on overseas military logistics support from commercial facilities 

throughout the Indian Ocean Region, Red Sea, and Africa through approximately 2030. Additionally, there 

are a few sites in friendly countries, such as Pakistan and Cambodia, that could serve as military logistics 

facilities similar to China’s first overseas military base in Djibouti. However, as its expeditionary capabilities 

improve – including the introduction of new naval surface combatants, amphibious warfare ships, antisubmarine warfare capabilities, aircraft carriers, and strategic airlift and tanker fleets – China may pursue 

more formal military bases with prepositioned offensive capabilities and weapons as well. China may also 

increasingly consider access arrangements with countries in West Africa and in Latin America. 

The PLA’s expansion of its expeditionary capabilities is designed to support several broader Chinese 

goals. The PLAN is at the center of a broader PLA strategic shift from “offshore waters defense” to a 

mixture of offshore waters defense and “open seas protection.”100 According to Michael McDevitt, a senior 

fellow at CNA, the force structure for open seas protection is roughly equivalent to what the U.S. Navy 

might term a “Blue Water Navy,” which includes amphibious ships with helicopter capabilities and multimission large surface combatants with anti-submarine warfare and long-range air defense capabilities.101

These in-development capabilities could be used for a wider range of expeditionary operations, including 

amphibious assaults and strategic sea lines of communication protection on the high end, to humanitarian 

assistance and noncombatant evacuation operations on the low end. 

However, Chinese analysts note that offshore defense is an “active defense” – one that requires “offensive 

actions and tactics” to achieve defensive strategic effects.102 Therefore, offshore waters defense and open 

seas protection can be interpreted as existing upon a continuum, but sharing the use of expeditionary 

combat capabilities. Chinese writers make this point explicitly: “In fact, the Chinese navy is gradually 

possessing defense-in-depth combat capabilities, thereby protecting the country from attacks from the sea, 

and can move towards an ocean-going navy with expeditionary combat capabilities.”103

In addition to supporting the PLA’s broader active defense strategy, basing decisions and expeditionary 

combat capability development are designed to protect overseas investments through the Belt and Road 

Initiative (BRI). The expansion in the PLA’s expeditionary capabilities – and the Chinese government’s use 

of civilian and dual-use capabilities for expeditionary operations – must be understood within the context of 

how the PLA considers its power projection needs over the short, medium, and long term. Central Military 

Commission (CMC) Transport and Projection Bureau chief of staff Liu Jiasheng wrote that China’s 

expeditionary goals include: 
23 

 Short-term (2020-2025): Fighting and winning an “informatized limited war in the maritime 

direction”, requiring novel strategic sealift and airlift capabilities. 

 Medium-term (2025-2030): Projecting power to “countries and regions along the ‘Belt and Road’ 

and areas crucially related to key interests around the globe.” Notably, medium term goals add 

“overseas” to the goal of fighting and winning an “informatized limited war.” 

 Long-term (After 2030): Projecting power globally: “It will rely on China’s overseas bases and air 

and space multi-dimensional projection systems to meet the rapid reaction requirements of 

transportation projection capabilities, in the event of a war anywhere around the globe.”104 

Chinese defense analyst Jian Wu echoed the requirement that the PLA be capable of supporting its BRI 

investments: “It can be seen that with China's deep integration into international economic activities, the 

significant increase in overseas interests requires the navy to go to the distant sea, escort China's 

economic activities overseas, and safeguard China's overseas interests.”105

There is likely a connection between China’s repression and mass surveillance of citizens in the Xinjiang 

Uighur Autonomous Region and China’s concerns over protecting its BRI and other overseas economic 

interests.106 As Mollie Saltskog and Colin P. Clarke argue in Foreign Affairs, Xinjiang is critical to its landbased BRI interests, motivating the CCP’s repressive tactics to secure the region. They further argue that 

“terrorism has come to pose a growing threat to Chinese interests and nationals abroad... In 2019, terrorist 

organizations such as al Qaeda and ISIS explicitly mentioned China in many of their propaganda 

materials—citing the CCP’s abuse of Muslim minorities as a justification for going after China and Chinese 

nationals. On the messaging application Telegram, jihadi groups use images of Chinese atrocities against 

Uighurs to recruit and radicalize Muslims throughout the world. The situation in Xinjiang serves to rally 

extremists across the globe, just as U.S. abuses in Abu Ghraib Prison became a potent recruitment tool for 

al Qaeda in Iraq in 2004.” This could in turn motivate China to increase its military presence at BRI sites 

and in overseas locations with significant concentrations of Chinese nationals.107 
24 

First articulated in 2004 through the Booz Allen Hamilton report “Energy Futures in Asia”, the “String of 

Pearls” theory of Chinese overseas basing strategy argues that “Construction of commercial port 

infrastructure could serve as cover for construction of secret munitions stockpiles and other port 

infrastructure that could support combat operations. Chinese commercial ties with host countries could 

potentially translate into secret agreements to allow PLAN access to the facilities in a conflict.”108 As Yung 

and Rustici explain, this model differs from the Dual Use Logistics Facility model primarily based on the 

potential for China’s overseas commercial ports to eventually transition fully into military bases. 

Jane’s analysis supports that of Yung and Rustici in that many or all of these facilities are unlikely to house 

covert military stockpiles. Any prepositioned supplies would likely be dual-use goods, including petroleum, 

oil, lubricants, food, and water, rather than weapons, ordnance, or military platforms. Jane’s also argues 

that Chinese investments in commercial port facilities – particularly as part of the BRI – could nevertheless 

allow for commercial replenishment support of PLAN activities even if the ports themselves never transition 

into dedicated military facilities. China has begun experimenting with incorporating civilian organizations, 

ships, and aircraft into its logistics model.109 Therefore it is likely that China could incorporate overseas 

commercial facilities as nodes in its military expeditionary logistics network. 

Based on the emerging evidence, it is likely that nodes in China’s future overseas logistics network can be 

divided into several prominent categories, in order of their increasing dedication to supporting PLA 

activities: 

1. Commercial – indirect: Commercial facilities that indirectly support PLA operations via 

commercial ships for PLAN replenishment (i.e. a COSCO Shipping vessel departs from a BRI port 

to replenish a PLAN ship in open waters). 

2. Commercial – direct: Commercial facilities that directly support PLA operations (i.e. a PLAN task 

force docks at a commercial port for replenishment). 

Figure 3: China's BRI investments since 2013, colored by total spending. Pakistan, Indonesia, Russia, Singapore, Nigeria, and 

Malaysia have all received over $30 billion in investment funding. Data from the China Global Investment Tracker -- American 

Enterprise Institute and the Heritage Foundation. 
25 

3. Military logistics: Formal overseas military logistics facilities – following the model set by the 

Djibouti Logistics Facility. 

4. Military base: Formal overseas military bases with prepositioned weapons and platforms capable 

of offensive operations 

Unlike the String of Pearls argument, a reliance on Chinese capital for infrastructure development is not a 

necessary condition for any of the three logistics node categories. This distinction includes instances where 

China has been accused of predatory lending – also known as its “debt trap diplomacy” – such as with Sri 

Lanka’s Hambantota Port. 

Several Chinese sources have suggested criteria or actual sites for overseas bases or logistics access 

points. The 2013 Science of Military Strategy argues that, “we must build overseas strategic strongpoints 

that depend on the homeland, radiate into the periphery, and moves us in the direction of the two oceans 

[i.e. the Pacific and Indian Oceans]. These sites are to provide support for overseas military operations or 

act as a forward base for deploying military forces overseas, exerting political and military influence in 

relevant regions. We should form a posture with the homeland strategic layout that takes account of both 

the interior and the exterior, connects the near with the far, and provides mutual support.”110 A 2014 article 

by the Chinese Naval Research Institute (NRI) suggested seven sites for an overseas military base, 

including the Bay of Bengal, Sittwe, Myanmar, Gwadar, Pakistan, Djibouti, Seychelles, Hambantota, Sri 

Lanka, and Dar es Salaam, Tanzania.111 A report from the Army Transportation Academy suggests 

“Pakistan, United Arab Emirates, Sri Lanka, Burma, Singapore, Indonesia, [and] Kenya.”112

Besides a site’s geopolitical and security value, there are several factors that may increase the likelihood of 

a location becoming a military logistics node (see table below), including:113

Factor Icon 

Presence of major BRI infrastructure investments114

China’s 2015 defense white paper makes explicit China’s evolving commitment to protect 

its overseas economic interests, noting the importance of “the security of overseas 

interests concerning energy and resources, strategic sea lines of communication (SLOC), 

as well as institutions, personnel and assets abroad.”

115

Debt to China116

China’s BRI projects are primarily financed through loans that carry commercial interest 

rates often unsustainable for the host countries. A 2018 report from the Center for Global 

Development found that eight BRI recipient countries have a particularly high risk of 

defaulting on their loans.117 Two of these countries, Djibouti and Pakistan, either already 

have an overseas military base or have been rumored as a candidate for a future PLA 

base. When Sri Lanka was unable to pay its BRI loan for the construction of the 

Hambantota Port, China agreed to a 99-year lease for the port and 15,000 acres of land 

around the site. Some analysts and policymakers have expressed concern that this model 

was an intentional predatory lending strategy designed to secure access to site of 

geostrategic importance, while others have argued the deals are not an intentional, 

coherent “debt trap” strategy, but the result of domestic interest groups or poor political risk 

assessment.

118 

Replenishment port calls on China’s Gulf of Aden deployments 

The PLAN’s Gulf of Aden anti-piracy escort missions have allowed the PLAN to gain 

expeditionary experience without provoking significant international concern. On these 

deployments China has made numerous port calls for diplomatic and friendly visits as well 

as military replenishment. Sites with prior replenishment port calls are evidence that they 

could be used in the future for at least commercial direct/indirect replenishment. 
26 

Government support for Chinese presence (via arms sales, international visits, 

military exercises)119

Support from the host country’s political and military elite would be a requirement for any 

long-term basing option. This could be signaled through a high volume of arms sales, 

international visits between high-ranking political and military leaders, and joint military 

exercises. 

Prior openness to foreign military basing

A country’s prior willingness to host a foreign military base could be a good indication that 

might do so for China. For example, Djibouti notably had already allowed six countries to 

build a military base in the country before China. 

Open source reporting on either a basing offer (from the host country) or a basing 

request (from China)

China has been rumored to request basing rights in numerous countries throughout the 

last few decades, including (but not limited to) sites in Cambodia, Vanuatu, Pakistan, and 

the Seychelles. Additionally, there have been some Chinese-language military analyses 

that consider potential overseas basing locations.120

Based on these factors as well as a site’s geostrategic value, Jane’s selected 18 of China’s most probable 

potential overseas base locations over the next ten years for satellite imagery analysis. In selecting which 

sites to analyze in-depth, Jane’s first collected reports of potential overseas basing sites, then gathered 

data for each of the factors above. We used this data to both add sites that were not previously been the 

subject of news reports or speculation as well as to evaluate each site’s potential probability as an 

overseas military base or logistics node. The more risk factors a site has – i.e. the site of major BRI 

investments in a country that has close military and government ties to China, with high-level international 

visits and Gulf of Aden task force port visits – the more likely that the site was included for satellite imagery 

analysis. The 18 sites included: 

 Luanda Port, Angola 

 Chittagong Port, Bangladesh 

 Ream Naval Base, Cambodia 

 Mombasa Port, Kenya 

 Kota Kinabalu, Malaysia 

 Naval Intelligence Base, Myanmar 

 Sittwe Port, Myanmar 

 Port of Walvis Bay, Namibia 

 Lekki Port, Nigeria 

 Duqm Port, Oman 

 Port Salalah, Oman 

 Gwadar Port, Pakistan 

 Karachi Port, Pakistan 

 Port Victoria, Seychelles 

 Hambantota Port, Sri Lanka 

 Colombo Port, Sri Lanka 

 Dar es Salaam, Tanzania 

 Luganville Wharf, Vanuatu 
27 

Figure 4: Potential PLA overseas military base sites analyzed by Jane's. 

Many past analyses of Chinese overseas basing strategy focus on naval bases instead of access to 

overseas airfields or airbases. In large part this is because China’s expeditionary air capabilities were 

extremely limited. However, with the expanding production of the PLAAF’s Y-20 strategic transport aircraft 

and tanker variant, this is likely to change by 2030. According to military logistics experts interviewed by 

Yung and Rustici, air operations “require extensive practice, access to an airfield that can handle the type 

of aircraft being used, that is close to transportation assets, and that has the necessary fuel and 

maintenance capability.” As a result, air logistics are often based at a different location from naval logistics 

support.121 Therefore, we capture airfields that may be collocated with the port facilities at the sites above, 

but also separately consider additional airfields that could be of interest to the PLAAF, particularly after 

2025. 

Other longer-term basing options are considered separately, as satellite imagery analysis is less relevant 

for sites unlikely to support a Chinese military base until after 2030. Most of the locations analyzed already 

have some degree of infrastructure to support PLA logistics needs, usually through civilian commercial 

infrastructure and/or foreign military facilities. 

Data for the full list of locations may be found in Appendix B. However, the six most likely candidates for 

PLA overseas basing may be found below: 
28 

Ream Naval Base, Cambodia 

Potential use: Military logistics base 

In mid-2019 the Wall Street Journal reported that China had signed a secret deal for a 30-year lease of part 

of Ream Naval Base, which would allow the PLA to station troops and store weapons within the 192-acre 

installation. The article also noted the “construction of a military-grade airport and a development project of 

dubious commercial viability.”122 Cambodia has denied the agreement and there are currently no 

indications of PLA development of the port for military use. 

Cambodia is incredibly reliant on its relationship with China, with 21.7% of its 2017 GDP from China, and 

22.4% of GDP as Chinese debt, according to the Council on Foreign Relations.123 Cambodia has received 

nearly $10.3 billion in BRI-related construction projects and investments. A potential logistics facility at 

Ream would be representative of China’s anticipated overseas basing strategy through 2030, and likely 

similar to its facility in Djibouti. 

For comparison, the Djibouti Logistics Support Base has a pier that was constructed in mid-2018 that 

allows for 4-ship docking (including for the new Type 901 replenishment ships). It features a 400 m runway 

(unsuitable for fixed wing strategic military aircraft), eight hangars (seven of which are 27 x 30 m, and one 

that is 35 x 49 m), hardened bunkers for possible ammunition storage, heliport, barracks, a support 

complex, and a hardened underground complex. The port can support all major PLAN surface 

combatants, including four Type 054A frigates, 6 Type 056A corvettes, one Type 001 / 002 aircraft carrier, 

or two Type 052D destroyers. The base was more geopolitically feasible because of support from the host 
29 

country as well as the fact that its size suggested limited utility for expeditionary offensive platforms and 

weapons. Djibouti was one of seven sites considered by experts from China’s Naval Research Institute 

(NRI) in 2014 for China’s next overseas facility.124

Satellite imagery suggests that Ream Naval Base could be used as a PLAN support base option, as 

maintenance facilities and floating docks make repairs possible. The site currently features two 60 x 17 m 

floating docks, barracks, 2 helipads, and one 140 m dock. It can support small surface combatants up to 

Type 056A corvette size, two Type 054A frigate or a 056A corvette. 

Ream is located near the Dara Sakor land deal, which includes 20% of Cambodia’s coastline and was 

leased to China for 99 years in an unusual agreement. The Dara Sakor International Airport is currently 

under construction by China’s Development Group and set for completion in 2020. The company’s only 

international footprint is the Dara Sakor acquisition, and it won the contract without an open bidding 

process despite the fact that the land deal was triple the size allowed by Cambodian land laws. The airport 

itself will feature the longest runway in Cambodia, “complete with the kind of tight turning bay favored by 

fighter jet pilots,” according to the New York Times.

125 

Pentagon spokesperson Lt. Col. Dave Eastburn told the New York Times, “We are concerned that the 

runway and port facilities at Dara Sakor are being constructed on a scale that would be useful for military 

purposes and which greatly exceed current and projected infrastructure needs for commercial activity. Any 

steps by the Cambodian government to invite a foreign military presence would disturb peace and stability 

in Southeast Asia.” 126 The Cambodian government denied allowing a Chinese military presence in the 

country. Based on Chinese developments related to the Dara Sakor land deal and reporting on PLA 

access to Ream Naval Base, Isaac Kardon argues, “Cambodia, like Pakistan and North Korea, is among 

the countries most likely to cooperate in non-public ways with Beijing to provide reliable military access to 

the PLA.”127
30 

Gwadar Port, Pakistan 

Potential use: Military logistics base 

Gwadar port is a critical component of the BRI through the China–Pakistan Economic Corridor (CPEC) 

and one of the primary sites mentioned in open sources for China’s potential next overseas base.128

Pakistan has received the most BRI funding of any country worldwide, at nearly $44 billion. Pakistan’s 

other two ports in Karachi and Qasim reportedly have no further space for expansion. In early 2018, the 

South China Morning Post reported that China was close to setting up a naval base similar to that in 

Djibouti, quoting Beijing-based military analyst Zhou Chenming that “China needs to set up another base in 

Gwadar for its warships because Gwadar is now a civilian port.” A PLA source argued that it must be 

separate from the commercial port because “Gwadar port can’t provide specific services for warships... 

Public order there is in a mess. It is not a good place to carry out military logistical support.” Other reports 

suggest that PLAN marines could be deployed to protect Gwadar from terrorist threats.129 The Pakistani 

Navy often uses facilities in Gwadar so supporting PLAN activity would be possible, particularly in joint 

operations. Like Djibouti, Gwadar was one of seven sites considered by experts from China’s NRI in 2014 

for China’s next overseas facility.130

The site would also make sense from a military logistics perspective, as it is within the Y-20’s maximum 

range from Chengdu-Qionglai airbase in China. However, to date, there have been no open source 

indications – either through reporting or through satellite imagery – that China and Pakistan have moved 

forward with plans to develop a formal military base.131 As another study noted, “there seems little or no 
31 

evidence that a naval base facility is part of the package, or indeed that China has any current intention or 

capacity to maintain an Indian Ocean fleet for which Gwadar could be a base.”132 

The Pakistani Navy often uses the facility, so supporting PLAN activity would be possible, particularly in 

joint operations. The facility features helipads in the local area and minimal bunkering. Depending on port 

activity levels, berthing space can accommodate a large number of PLAN surface combatants including 

carriers. The smaller dock can berth one Type 056A corvette, while the larger dock can berth two Type 

052D or Type 055 destroyers, or one carrier and one destroyer, or four Type 054A frigates. 

Sittwe Port, Myanmar 

Potential use: Commercial direct / military logistics base 

Like Djibouti, Sittwe was one of seven sites considered by experts from China’s NRI in 2014 for China’s 

next overseas facility.133 China is building a deep-water port near Sittwe and also proposed building an 

economic corridor through Rakhine that would include roads and rail lines from China’s Yunnan 

Province.134 A naval base at Sittwe (or at the nearby Chinese-developed Kyaukpyu port), combined with 

the China-Myanmar Economic Corridor, would give the PLA convenient access to the Indian Ocean with 

overland resupply potential through the economic corridor. As Monica Wang noted at the Council on 

Foreign Relations, “building a military facility [at Sittwe] could help the Chinese manage traffic passing 

through the Strait of Malacca from the west. It also marks the start of the Myanmar pipeline, which supplies 

crude oil to southwestern China.”135
32 

China has sought closer military ties with Myanmar and has been “restrained” in its comments about the 

Rohingya despite international condemnation of Myanmar, and has attempted to mediate the crisis.136

56.5% of 2017 inward foreign direct investment came from China.137 In 2019 it was estimated that 40% of 

Myanmar’s debt is held by China.138

The port currently contains one larger berth (274 m) that could support most PLAN surface combatants, 

including three Type 056 corvettes, two Type 054A frigates, or one larger destroyer. There is a berth with 

crane for supply loading and three storage facilities, but no significant petroleum, oil, and lubricant (POL) 

storage, which would be important for naval replenishment. 

It should also be noted that Chairman Xi visited Myanmar on 17-18 January 2020, with the two sides 

agreeing to strengthen their BRI commitments, pushing to finalize a deal for Kyaukpyu port for US$1.3 

billion. During the visit Xi was expected to meet with Myanmar military chief General Min Aung Hlaing.139

Kyaukpyu port could be an additional long-term option for PLAN / PLAAF development, assuming 

successful conclusion of the BRI investment and deepening of military ties. 

However, Myanmar’s 2008 constitution explicitly forbids the deployment of foreign troops on Myanmar soil, 

meaning that the constitution would need to be changed for China to establish a permanent military 

presence.140 Unless this occurs, preferred access to commercial facilities is significantly more likely. 
33 

Duqm Port, Oman 

Potential use: Commercial direct 

A logistics or dual-use facility at or near Duqm would expand the PLAAF’s Y-20 range into the MENA 

region. Duqm Port is of significant geostrategic importance due to location along Gulf of Aden, Gulf of 

Oman, and Strait of Hormuz. Duqm is at the western edge of the Y-20’s maximum range (5,200 km with 

51,000 kg payload) from the Chengdu-Qionglai airbase, meaning that it could provide pivotal 

replenishment access to Africa and Middle East for the PLAAF from China (see map at Figure 5). Duqm 

could decrease the importance of the Strait of Hormuz, as fewer ships would need to enter the Strait to 

access oil and other products.141 Oman is a critical part of the BRI, joining in 2018. 

The United States also signed a port deal for facilities and ports at Salalah and Duqm in March 2019 in 

case access through the Strait of Hormuz is denied by Iran.142 

Large sections are under construction, so its capabilities for PLAN vessels and infrastructure are unknown, 

although there are few concrete indications that Duqm will evolve into anything more than a replenishment 

stop for PLAN vessels. However, large docks (2260 m, 1020 m, 800 m, 747 m, and 450 m, with two 400 m 

drydocks) make berthing a large PLAN surface group possible. The amount of regular commercial traffic is 

unknown at this time due to ongoing construction. 
34 

Luganville Wharf, Vanuatu 

Potential use: Military logistics 

In 2018, several news organizations reported that China approached Vanuatu about developing a 

permanent military presence in the country. Vanuatu has been a key recipient of Chinese BRI funding, 

particularly for the Chinese-built and financed Luganville Wharf. Australia has expressed particular concern 

over the loan (that it could fall victim to a “debt equity swap” similar to Sri Lanka’s Hambantota Port) and 

reports of a permanent base given its close proximity.143 

In response to reports that China has informally approached Vanuatu about a potential military base, 

analysts have argued that such a move could be to protect foreign Chinese nationals living and working in 

Southeast Asia, as the island’s location is not otherwise of obvious geostrategic importance due to its 

location east of Australia in the Pacific Ocean. According to the Sydney Morning Herald, “Multiple sources 

said Beijing’s military ambition in Vanuatu would likely be realized incrementally, possibly beginning with an 

access agreement that would allow Chinese naval ships to dock routinely and be serviced, refueled and 

restocked. This arrangement could then be built on.”144

Limited dock space (currently only one 360 m dock) and limited support facilities would require additional 

activity, including possible prepositioning of resupply materials to support PLAN operations. There is a 

possible second dock under construction approximately 1 km east of existing dock. 
35 

Walvis Bay, Namibia 

Potential use: Military logistics 

In 2014 reports emerged that China was in discussions to establish a military base at Walvis Bay, in 

addition to other locations. The Walvis Bay Expansion Project is a critical BRI project for China.145 As the 

Africa Center for Security Studies’ Paul Nantulya wrote, “The Namibian press has speculated that China 

seeks to establish naval facilities in Walvis Bay using the Djibouti model, pointing to similarities with the 

approach China used to acquire its Djibouti base, a process that started with the construction of a deep 

water port.”146 In 2018 China’s ambassador to Namibia called the Walvis Bay port China’s “most brilliant 

pearl” on Africa’s Atlantic coast.147 

Existing infrastructure could support nearly all PLAN surface combatants. Berthing will depend on 

commercial activity. Theoretically any PLAN surface combatant can be berthed. Non-container docks (908 

m, 600 m, and 504 m) can berth at least 12 x Type 056 corvettes, or at least 8 x Type 052D destroyers, for 

example. There are also three floating docks (2 x 139 m, 1 x 192 m). 

Over the next 5-10 years, it is more likely that the PLAN will use Walvis Bay for direct replenishment 

support through commercial facilities rather than the creation of a military logistics base. China’s security 

requirements on Africa’s Atlantic coast are nascent but could expand in parallel with its BRI projects in the 

region. In 2016, Ifeng news reported that several years prior a country on the west coast of Africa intended 

to let China build a military base, but China rejected the plan, which was a signal that “China has no 
36 

intention of confronting the United States” in the Atlantic Ocean.148 The country in the report is unknown, 

but the principle that China seeks to avoid confrontation with the U.S. in the Atlantic Ocean will likely hold 

for the next ten years as China develops its expeditionary capabilities, modernizes its surface combatant 

fleet to have the capacity to deter U.S. action, and refines its basing needs. Therefore, a commercial facility 

is much more likely over the next ten years. 

PLA Basing Strategy 2020 – 2030 

Most of the locations analyzed could accommodate PLAN ships for replenishment, are collocated with 

airports or airbases, and/or could be used as logistics nodes for civilian solid cargo ships and/or tankers, 

which might then replenish PLAN ships in open waters. The primarily civilian cargo ports were analyzed 

because of their strategic locations and BRI investments but are likely limited to replenishment via civilian 

vessels due to commercial traffic. 

The PLA’s actual fixed overseas footprint may continue to remain light until approximately 2030 because it 

can still rely on civilian infrastructure and platforms to support its expeditionary operations. The PLA’s 

strategic goals through approximately 2030 will likely be limited to (1) the protection of its overseas 

economic investments through the BRI, (2) the protection of Chinese nationals living and working abroad, 

and (3) its participation in international community operations. In particular, fulfilling the international 

responsibilities of a great power is frequently emphasized in Chinese-language reports on the PLAN’s Gulf 

of Aden participation.149 

China is likely to focus on PLAN basing opportunities and commercial access arrangements through 2030 

because it can project a larger force via ocean transport than through the air. This disparity between 

Chinese naval and air power projection capabilities is stark and will likely remain so until the PLAAF is able 

to introduce more Y-20s into service. A robust strategic airlift fleet will provide the PLAAF with the ability to 

rapidly respond to crises. 

If and when the PLAAF does pursue additional overseas logistics nodes, they are likely to share several 

characteristics. First, China would likely meet significant resistance to the establishment of a dedicated 

overseas airbase capable of supporting fixed wing aircraft – as they reportedly did in Djibouti before the 

establishment of the PLAN’s logistics base (which cannot support fixed wing aircraft).150 

Second, and similar to the PLAN, the PLAAF could use civilian airports and/or airbases of friendly foreign 

militaries. These options risk being unavailable during wartime, but China may pursue this arrangement for 

logistical support on operations short of war, particularly until approximately 2030. For example, the PLA 

has used Gao airport in Mali for its 2013 peacekeeping mission and El Fasher Airport in Egypt for a 

peacekeeping medical operation in Sudan.151 Similarly, the four PLAAF Il-76 transport aircraft used during 

the 2011 Libya evacuation operation stopped for refueling in Karachi, Pakistan and in Khartoum, Sudan.152

Third, nearly all of the sites above either already have runways onsite or have airbases or civilian airports 

nearby. It is also probable that a PLAAF base would be located within the Y-20’s maximum range so that it 

would not need inflight refueling in transit from its domestic base. The Y-20 has a maximum range of 3,700 

km with its max payload of 66,000 kg, or 5,200 km with a 51,000 kg payload. The map below shows 
37 

potential PLA overseas base sites color coded based on whether they are within the Y-20’s maximum 

range of 5,200 km. 

The PLAN is likely to use most, if not all, of the above facilities for replenishment on expeditionary 

operations short of armed conflict – including humanitarian assistance and disaster relief (HA/DR), 

noncombatant evacuation operations (NEO), anti-piracy missions, and United Nations deployments. 

However, as RAND noted in their analysis of the future of the PLAAF’s expeditionary capabilities, 

“Insufficient facilities abroad impose another serious constraint. To date, the most-common PLAAF 

overseas deployment remains the deployment of two to four large-transport aircrafts at a time for HA/DR, 

personnel recovery, or other nonwar missions. Security, logistics, and maintenance needs for larger groups 

of dissimilar aircraft impose serious constraints on the ability of the PLAAF to carry out expeditionary 

activities on a larger scale. In the future, the PLAAF will need to establish reliable access to overseas 

airfields if it hopes to operate missions of a broader variety and higher tempo abroad.”153 Jane’s analysis 

suggests that this is far more likely during the longer term, particularly after 2030, when the PLA has 

introduced sufficient quantities of expeditionary capabilities into service to require dedicated overseas 

facilities. 

PLA Basing After 2030 

It is important to recognize that this is far from an exhaustive list of PLA overseas basing candidates. Here 

we briefly consider sites that could be considered as overseas basing options after ~2030. 

 Dara Sakor, Cambodia: As noted above in the analysis of Cambodia’s Ream Naval Base, China 

could intend to use the in-development Dara Sakor airport for military operations. Preferred access 

to a civilian airfield or the development of a formal military base in Cambodia would expand the 

reach of China’s airborne capabilities throughout Southeast Asia. From 2025 and beyond, Jane’s 

Figure 5: Of the potential overseas basing location considered above, 10 are within maximum range from the Y-20's first domestic 

base at Chengdu-Qionglai. Source: Jane's 
38 

expects China to increasingly pursue access to overseas airfields for logistical purposes for the 

PLAAF’s growing strategic airlift fleet. 

 Khartoum, Sudan: One potential site for overseas airfield access could be Khartoum, Sudan, 

which PLAAF Il-76 strategic transport aircraft used as a stopover on the inbound and outbound 

legs of China’s 2011 Libya NEO operation. As Andrew Erickson and Gabe Collins note, “[A]s 

Chinese economic and human presence in Africa continues to rise, the fact that military aircraft 

were allowed to land and refuel there also suggest that the Sudanese government may be 

comfortable with the idea of fitting into a Chinese ‘places, not bases’ strategy whereby the 

[People’s Republic of China] ensures that it has access to various airfields to support future 

evacuation operations and other missions in Africa.”154 The Il-76s involved with the 2011 Libya 

NEO also conducted a refueling stop in Karachi, Pakistan (separately analyzed in Appendix B), 

which could also be a future site for overseas airfield access. 

 Terceira, Portugal: A 2016 letter from Representative Devin Nunes to then-Defense Secretary 

Ashton Carter noted that China was interested in expanding its presence on the island of Terceira, 

including the use of the runway at Lajes Field.155 Terceira, located in the Atlantic Ocean, is home to 

a U.S. military base at Lajes Field (which includes the Air Force’s 65th Air Base Group) that was 

downsized in the mid-2010s. Several Chinese delegations used the island for stopover flights 

between China and Latin America. There is concern that China could develop a formal or informal 

military presence if the U.S. withdraws from the island, particularly as the Azores regional 

government is interested in developing a deep-water port at the nearby harbor of Praia da 

Vitória.156 

 East Timor: In 2011, leaked U.S. diplomatic cables noted that East Timor rejected a Chinese 

proposal to develop a surveillance radar facility on East Timor’s northern coast in 2007. The offer 

was rejected because China wished to staff the facility with Chinese technicians, to which Deputy 

Prime Minister Jose Guterres argued “the radars could be used for purposes other than those 

touted by the Chinese. They could instead be used to extend China's radar-based intelligence 

perimeter deep into South East Asia.''157

 Las Lajas, Argentina: China also has a space monitoring station in a remote location in Argentina 

that became operational in March 2018. According to the Chinese government, the site is only 

used for peaceful space observation and exploration, and the contract with Argentina was revised 

in 2016 to specify that it could only be used for nonmilitary purposes. However, the Chinese space 

program is military-run, and while the agreement requires China to notify Argentina of its activities, 

there is little actual Argentinian oversight or enforcement.158 

 Venezuela, Panama, and other countries throughout Latin America: The development of the 

Argentinian space center coincided with increased Chinese involvement in Latin America more 

broadly. In 2015 the Chinese Ministry of Defense held a military logistics forum “Strengthening 

Mutual Understanding for Win-Win Cooperation” that included officials from 11 Latin American 

countries.159 Admiral Craig Faller, head of U.S. Southern Command, said in mid-2019 testimony 

that the U.S. cannot compete with Chinese financial influence in Latin America, but must instead 

rely on long-standing relationships between the U.S. and regional defense leaders, as well as 

increased intelligence, surveillance, and reconnaissance (ISR) assets, and the presence of highend U.S. naval assets like the littoral combat ship.160 Venezuela has purchased a relatively 

significant amount of Chinese weapons since 2010, including infantry fighting vehicles, Y-8 

transport aircraft, self-propelled mortars and multiple rocket launchers, and various missiles.161

According to Admiral Faller’s testimony, China is the largest creditor to the Maduro regime 

“saddling the Venezuelan people with more than $60 billion in debt.”162 Further, China has 

increased its port visits to the region by 70% over the last five years, while Chinese companies 
39 

have “over 50 active port projects in the hemisphere... In the future, China could use its control of 

deep-water ports in the Western Hemisphere to support global military deployments.”163 Adm. 

Faller particularly notes China’s presence in Panama, where Chinese firms Huawei and China 

Railways have won significant contracts. Former Panamanian president Juan Carlos Varela 

hosted Chairman Xi on a visit and voiced his support for the BRI.164

As seen in the locations above, China’s post-2030 basing and logistics network is likely to expand beyond 

east Africa and the Middle East as its interests expand across the globe. China’s BRI relationships in Latin 

America are critical to monitor, as a PLA base or preferred access in the Western Hemisphere would 

undoubtedly be of concern to the U.S. military and policymakers. Beyond geographic dispersion, we 

should also increasingly expect PLA access to overseas airfields as its Y-20 strategic transport fleet grows. 

The United States should recognize that China’s overseas basing agreements, which flow from broader 

diplomatic and economic relationships, may allow it to supplant the U.S. as a security partner in key 

regions. This could lead to the export of authoritarian ideology, tactics, and tools – including mass 

surveillance technologies and other tools of digital authoritarianism. According to the New York Times, 18 

countries have already received Chinese mass surveillance systems.165 Further, Chinese basing 

agreements and deepening relationships could lead to “diminished access for U.S. military forces during 

peacetime and in a conflict,” as Joel Wuthnow argues.166

3. PLA Expeditionary Operations Capabilities and Sustainment 

In section 3, Jane’s analyzes PLA expeditionary capabilities, with a focus on new logistics and 

expeditionary platforms within the PLAN, PLANMC, and PLAAF. 

China’s expeditionary logistics network has quickly matured thanks to over a decade of Gulf of Aden 

deployments, the introduction of two new supply ship variants, the establishment of the Djibouti logistics 

support base, and practice with new military-civil fusion / dual-use replenishment concepts of operation 

(CONOPS) that make use of China’s rapidly-expanding Belt and Road Initiative (BRI)-funded 

infrastructure. As a result, China can rapidly deploy limited naval and air capabilities in support of military 

operations other than war (MOOTW) but is unable to support major combat operations – including military 

operations in a hostile country or conflict with a peer or near-peer power – or deploy troops and equipment 

in large numbers overseas. 

While China’s expeditionary capabilities are rapidly improving qualitatively, the PLAN and PLAAF currently 

lack sufficient numbers of dedicated military strategic lift aircraft and auxiliary ships to project power for 

major combat operations overseas.167 Additionally, as Kristen Gunness explains, “The PLA has not yet 

had to face a sustained deployment of ground forces overseas—other than the small number of soldiers in 

permanent UN peacekeeping operations in Africa—and would likely encounter difficulties with maintaining 

a long-term presence in a land-based contingency.”168 

Despite the rapid increase in capabilities, the PLA is still in the early stages of its transition to an 

expeditionary force, especially in terms of the development, refinement, and dissemination of expeditionary 

concepts of operation and logistics. The following section will concentrate on the PLA’s dedicated military 

expeditionary capabilities, while section four will also consider the role of civilian and dual use organizations 

and capabilities in the pursuit of the short, medium, and long-term goals above. 

PLAN Expeditionary Capabilities 

The introduction of new PLAN surface combatants, including the Type 052D Luyang III class destroyer, 

Type 055 Renhai class destroyer, Type 071 amphibious assault ship, Type 075 landing helicopter dock, 
40 

and Type 002 aircraft carrier, have been in parallel with the modernization of the PLAN’s supply ship fleet.1

Principally these include the Type 903A Fuchi class and Type 901 combat support ships, which are large 

and fast enough, and are being produced in sufficient numbers, to support expeditionary operations. The 

Type 903A class replenishment ship has an estimated top speed of 19 knots, faster than any previous 

supply ships, while the two Type 901 replenishment ships in service have an estimated top speed of 25 

knots, allowing them to keep pace with aircraft carrier deployments.169 Type 901s are approximately 35% 

longer and twice as large as Type 903As. 

In August 2013 the first modified Type 903A was commissioned, with seven Type 903As introduced over 

the next six years. China had more limited auxiliary ship capacity until 2013, with only five total ships 

between the Type 905, Type 908, and original Type 903, which were first commissioned in 1979, 1996, 

and 2004 respectively. The two Type 905 replenishment ships are rapidly aging, having been first 

commissioned in 1979, while the single Type 908 reportedly had much of its large cargo tanks converted to 

dry storage and state rooms. Aside from being newer and offering the PLAN more total ships, the Type 

903A also improves on the original Type 903 class by featuring an improved flight deck and hangar 

capable of accommodating medium-lift helicopters such as the Z-8 or newer Z-18, as well as more cargo 

space.170 This likely allows it to increase Gulf of Aden task forces’ time-on-station during deployments. 

Type 903 replenishment ships have gained extensive experience in expeditionary operations supporting 

Gulf of Aden deployments. Gulf of Aden deployments typically consisted of two surface combatants along 

with a Type 903 or Type 908 (of which there is only one ship in its class, the ex-Ukrainian Qinghai Hu) 

supply ship in support. As the PLA Daily explains, for the first four years of PLAN deployments, only three 

resupply ships (the Weishanhu (Hull 887), Qiandaohu (Hull 886), and Qinghaihu (Hull 885)) continuously 

rotated on deployments. The PLA Daily explains that in this era of “supply ship troika”, “excluding regular 

maintenance, the three largest supply ships of the Chinese Navy at that time were always conducting 

escort missions.”171 

 

1 The Type 055 Renhai class (11,000 – 13,000 tons) is similar in size to the USN Aegis cruisers and destroyers – the 

Ticonderoga (CG-47) class (10,100 tons) and Arleigh Burke (DDG-51) class (9,300 tons). The Type 052D Luyang III 

destroyer displaces approximately 7,500 tons. The Type 071 LPD has an estimated displacement of nearly 20,000 

tons, compared with the USN’s 25,900 ton San Antonio class. The new Type 075 displaces 30,000 to 40,000 tons 

compared with the USN’s 40,500 ton Wasp class LHD. Comparisons via “China Naval Modernization: Implications for 

“U.S. Navy Capabilities – Background and Issues for Congress,” U.S. Congressional Research Service, January 22, 

2020 and Jane’s. 
41 

Figure 6: Comparison of PLAN auxiliary ships by displacement and top speed, with colors representing ship class. Data compiled 

from Jane’s Fighting Ships. Note that the Type 903A was first introduced in 2013, but the Type 903 was introduced in 2003.

Because of the introduction of new supply ships, the PLAN is no longer forced to send supply ships on 

back-to-back deployments to the Gulf of Aden. For example, the PLA Daily noted in August 2018 that the 

Type 903A ship Dongpinghu hadn’t deployed since 2016.172

The Type 903As have been identified under construction at the Guangzhou Shipyard International and 

Hudong-Zhonghua Shipyard in Shanghai. Because China’s current inventory of seven Type 903As (and 

two Type 903s) appears sufficient for the PLAN’s responsibilities in Gulf of Aden escort missions – Type 

903As or base Type 903s were used in 11 of the last 13 Gulf of Aden Task Forces dating back to mid2015 – additional satellite imagery noting new builds at these shipyards could be indicative of the PLAN’s 

intent to prepare for future expeditionary operations outside of their current escort missions and sporadic 

overseas NEO and HA/DR missions. (Note that there is some confusion over the exact total of Type 903 

replenishment ships in service; while open sources have identified nine total, the PLA Daily reported in 

2018 that “According to reports, China has completed ten Type-903 supply ships, with one still under 

construction.”)173 

Gulf of Aden missions employ one replenishment ship and two surface combatants, with two task forces 

deployed at any single time. China could allow each individual Type 903/A vessel a year between 

deployments with only five or six Type 903/A ships in inventory. Additional ships allow for either a longer 

time between deployments (which has been the case thus far, with the PLA Daily noting that the 

Dongpinghu hadn’t been deployed in over a year and a half) or for excess Type 903A to support additional 

overseas missions beyond just the task forces. 
42 

Platform In service 

(Planned) Delivery Max 

Speed Tonnage Fueling 

Stations 

Fuel 

capacity

Total 

cargo Helicopters 

Type 901 2 (4-8) 2017 25 kt 48,000 3P/2S 20,000 25,000 2 Z-8 / Z-18

Type 903/903A 9 (9) 2004 19 kt 23,369 1P/1S 10,500 11,400 1 Z-8 / Z-18

Type 908 1 (1) 1996 16 kt 37,594 2P/2S 9,630 23,000 1 Z-8 

Type 905 2 (2) 1979 18 kt 22,099 2P/2S 12,000 12,500 1 medium 

Type 904A/B 3 (3-7) 2007 ~22 kt 15,241 10,550 1 medium 

Figure 7: PLAN replenishment ships. Data compiled from Jane's Fighting Ships 

Contemporary Gulf of Aden deployments are exemplified by the 31st deployment, which included the Type 

071 amphibious dock landing ship Kunlunshan, the Type 054A Jiangkai II guided-missile frigate Xuchang, 

and the Type 903A comprehensive supply ship Luomahu.

174 The Kunlunshan featured embarked 

helicopters carrying special operations forces that were used to deter a suspected pirate ship.175 The 

standard Gulf of Aden Task Force is composed of a Type 903A replenishment ship and one or two Type 

054A frigates, occasionally rotating the second Type 054A with a destroyer or amphibious assault ship. 

Type 054A frigates have accompanied each of the last 13 deployments, while Type 903As have joined 

nine. On the 34th deployment, which left Sanya port on 23 December 2019 and included a Type 052D 

destroyer, Type 054A frigate, and Type 903 replenishment ship, the fleet carried two helicopters, “dozens 

of special operations personnel” and more than 690 troops.176

Overall, Gulf of Aden deployments take roughly two weeks to sail to the region, with the 31st Task Force 

taking 15 days on an “uninterrupted voyage” over the approximately 5,400 nautical miles from China’s 

coastline.177 The speed of a PLAN overseas deployment would be limited by the slowest ship in its task 

group, which is likely to be the replenishment ship in the case of a Type 903A (at 19 knots). The Type 901 

was designed to keep pace with aircraft carriers and has a maximum speed of 25 knots. We have limited 

information on how much advance notice would be necessary for a larger overseas mobilization. The 

PLAN’s nine in-service Type 903 and Type 903As are evenly divided between the North, East, and South 

Sea Fleets.178 

The following chart shows all task force deployments from November 2013 to the present – since the end 

of the “supply ship troika” with the introduction of the first Type 903A (the Haihu) into service. As seen in the 

table in Appendix A, the PLAN maintains two task forces deployed at any single time, with new task force 

departures operating on a steady schedule of one departure every four months, beginning every April, 

August, and December. The typical deployment is approximately 209 days, or nearly seven months. PLAN 

ships can transit between the Chinese mainland and Gulf of Aden in approximately two weeks, but nearly 

all task forces conduct friendly visit port calls on their way back to China. The Type 903A can support 2-3 

ships for approximately two weeks before needing replenishment. This suggests that PLAN ships are 

capable of operating for approximately two weeks of sailing time from the Djibouti Logistics Base (i.e., 

around the Horn of Africa or in the Mediterranean) before requiring replenishment. Without guaranteed 

access to a friendly civilian port or establishing a military base in the Pacific, PLAN vessels would be 

capable of operating a similar distance in the Pacific (approximately half of 5,400 nautical miles to ensure 

supplies for the return journey home). 
43 

The PLAN is beginning to develop and refine logistics operations for its aircraft carrier battle group 

operations. The Chinese Ministry of National Defense reported in December 2019 that the Type 901 class 

Hulunhu combat support ship conducted its first replenishment mission.179 According to an anonymous 

“Beijing-based military expert” who spoke with China’s Global Times, the Type 901 class will allow the 

PLAN to deploy “farther from coastal areas into deep blue waters without having to worry about 

logistics.”180 Type 901 class Hulunhu’s political commissar Ni Jingdong said on China Central Television 

(CCTV) in December 2019 that the Hulunhu was “now fully capable of comprehensively replenishing the 

carrier battle group.”181

Type 901 combat support ships are principally designed for carrier strike groups, with the first-in-class 

Hulunhu supporting the Type 001 Liaoning aircraft carrier and the second (Chaganhu) supporting China’s 

first indigenously produced carrier, the Type 002 Shandong (commissioned in 2019). The class is much 

larger than the Type 903A, with a length of 241 meters to the Type 903A’s 178.5 and displacing an 

estimated 48,000 tons to the 903A’s 23,369. The Type 901 was designed specifically for aircraft carrier 

replenishment, with photographs indicating that the class features gas turbine engines that would enable a 

max speed of the claimed 25 knots, as well as its arrangement of refueling stations, with three to port and 

two to starboard. This is because China’s aircraft carriers have their islands – that is, the flight deck 

command center – to starboard; China’s carriers are not nuclear powered, so require fuel for both the 

carriers themselves and their aircraft. As Andrew Erickson and Christopher Carlson previously noted in 

Jane’s Navy International, “It is clear that US oiler designs greatly influenced this PLAN tanker class. In fact, 

aside from largely cosmetic changes in the superstructure configuration and the use of large kingposts for 

the replenishment gear, the Type 901 is, arguably, identical to the USN Supply class.”182 The Type 901s 

however appear to be more focused on the replenishment of fuel and provisions compared to the USN 

Figure 8: PLAN Gulf of Aden Task Force deployments by deployment length. Bar color refer to the ship composition of each task 

force. The Type 054A frigates have accompanied each of the last 13 deployments dating back to mid-2015, while Type 903 and Type

903A replenishment ships have joined all but two of the last 13 task forces. Note that exact deployment lengths for the 18th, 20th, 26th, 

28th, and 33rd task forces were estimated based on previous missions. Data in chart compiled primarily from chinamil.com.cn. 
44 

Supply class based on the fact that it has only dry cargo delivery station compared to the Supply class’s 

three per side (which assists with UNREP of ordnance).183 

According to a CCTV report mentioned in the MoD article, the Hulunhu had spent over 200 days at sea for 

exercises in 2019. It is likely paired with China’s first aircraft carrier, the Liaoning, while China’s second 

Type 901 replenishment ship, the Chaganhu, will likely be paired with China’s first domestically-built aircraft 

carrier, the Shandong.

184 Future aircraft carriers – two to four more are expected, for a total of four to six in 

PLAN service – would likely require (at least) their own dedicated Type 901 replenishment ships as part of 

carrier battle groups. A CCTV report suggests the need for additional Type 901s as the PLAN introduces 

new aircraft carriers, as well as the potential to provide redundancy beyond the 1:1 aircraft carrier to Type 

901 ratio.185 It is also possible that additional Type 901s might be expected for the 40,000 ton displacement 

Type 075 LHD (of which Jane’s expects the class to number six to eight ships, and potentially up to 12, 

with 2-3 per fleet by 2030) in addition to additional aircraft carriers.186 Jane’s projects that China could 

acquire between four and eight Type 901s by 2030.187 

It will be important to monitor whether the Type 901s rotate into the Gulf of Aden deployments, particularly 

alongside the PLAN’s larger surface combatants like the newly introduced Type 055 or the Type 052D 

destroyers, or with the Type 075 LHD. Because these capabilities are of several magnitudes beyond what 

is necessary for anti-piracy escorts, it can be assumed that such an overseas deployment would be 

designed to provide the crews of the Type 901 (as well as its accompanying task force ships) experience 

conducting far seas replenishment operations. 

However, as Shanghai-based defense analyst Ni Lexiong argued in the South China Morning Post, 

“bigger supply ships were no substitute for more overseas bases when it came to supporting the 

expanding mission of China’s naval fleets... No matter how big the supply vessels are, they are still small 

compared to harbour cities... The vessels can only provide support for a limited amount of time.”188

The PLAN has important domestic bases for expeditionary operations at Zhanjiang, where the South Sea 

Fleet, including the 2nd Destroyer Flotilla, the 1st and 2nd Marine Corps Brigades, and the 6th Landing Ship 

Flotilla, are located, as well as at Yulin Naval Base, where the 9th Destroyer Fleet is located. 

PLAN Future Force Requirements 

China’s naval modernization and increasing activity in the Indian Ocean Region has fueled a strategic 

competition with India. As Yang Xiaoping, a senior research fellow at the National Institute of International 

Strategy within the Chinese Academy of Social Sciences, wrote, “India’s concerns about China’s 

encirclement are real, given China’s enabling of Pakistan as well as competition for influence among small 

states in the region.”189 Yung and Rustici have previously noted that the PLAN would likely require a 

minimum force equivalent to its current force structure as well as that of the Indian Navy in order to address 

both its local maritime security needs as well as an armed conventional conflict against India. This would 

be equivalent to approximately three aircraft carriers, 41 destroyers, 77 frigates, and 87 submarines.190 

While the focus of this report is on the development of China’s expeditionary capabilities particularly as 

relevant to the United States, the comparison with India’s navy is nevertheless useful as an indication of 

China’s broader long-term expeditionary capabilities and intentions. For example, as we argue, if China’s 

expeditionary naval capabilities are insufficient to sustain major combat operations against India before 

approximately 2025-2030 in the Indian Ocean, they would also be unable to sustain major expeditionary 

combat operations against the United States. As Yung and Rustici note, “The bottom line is that if China 

wants military dominance in the Indian Ocean (which implies the ability to fight and win major combat 
45 

operations), it would need a much larger navy and a logistics and support infrastructure that far exceeds 

current capabilities.”191

Given that a “replenishment relay” was required for the one-month journey to the Joint Sea 2017 exercise, 

while a single Type 903A replenishment ship is sufficient for the two-week voyage to the Gulf of Aden, 

operations beyond two to three weeks would likely require support for forward deployed vessels, civilian 

ships, and/or overseas bases and/or civilian ports (with much depending on the politics surrounding the 

contingency). Relying on civilian ports during a conflict with another state would be risky, given that PLAN 

use of civilian ports could give cause to consider the foreign state as an enemy combatant. 

At present, China is capable of deploying 3-6 surface warfare groups for several weeks at distances of 

approximately 2,500 to 3,000 nautical miles throughout the Indian Ocean Region. These groups would be 

principally comprised of Type 054A frigates and Type 052D destroyers. These groups have an expanding 

but still limited ASW capability. The first “stretched” Type 052D destroyer recently entered service, featuring 

an extended flight deck thought to be intended for a naval variant of the Z-20 medium-lift helicopter. The 

naval Z-20s will likely require an integrated surveillance radar, dipping sonar, and the ability to carry 

torpedoes. However, PLAN helicopter and ASW capabilities remain limited. 

Jane’s assesses that in 5-10 years these groups will begin to introduce the new Type 055 destroyers. 

Future deployable surface warfare group capacity will be dependent on the number of in-service 

replenishment ships and/or overseas bases. Assuming increased production of Type 901 fast 

replenishment ships beyond those necessary for carrier groups, the PLAN will have modernized surface 

combatants of Type 052D destroyer, Type 055 destroyer, and Type 054A frigate (and a potential future 

frigate class) classes available for overseas deployments. The Type 055 destroyers appear more 

optimized for ASW as well as ASUW, vastly improving the PLAN’s surface strike capabilities. 

China’s current carrier strike group capabilities are limited. Of its two aircraft carriers, only the Type 002 

Shandong is intended for operational service, but as described, its Short Take-Off Barrier-Arrested 

Recovery (STOBAR) system, oil-fired engines, and small airwing of J-15s limit its operational effectiveness 

for expeditionary operations. The PLAN is less likely to use its existing Type 001 and Type 002 aircraft 

carriers in an expeditionary role outside of its near seas and will likely instead wait for a future indigenous 

Type 003 aircraft carrier with a catapult-assisted take-off but arrested recovery (CATOBAR) – reportedly a 

locally developed Electromagnetic Aircraft Launch System (EMALS) that would enable it to “launch fighters 

carrying heavier fuel and mission payloads – significantly expanding on the carrier’s striking range and 

lethality options.”192 It is reasonable to expect that the Type 003 could be closer in capability to the U.K.’s 

Queen Elizabeth carrier.193 By 2030-2035, the introduction of additional Type 003 aircraft carriers and Type 

901 fast replenishment ships could allow for 2-3 carrier strike groups, with approximately 48 combat, ASW, 

and reconnaissance aircraft such as the J-15 fighter, and J-20 or J-31 stealth fighters. 

Other auxiliary ships, including additional hospital ships (of which the PLAN only has the lone Type 920 

Daishan Dao, or Peace Ark), submarine rescue ships (China has three Type 926 Dalao class), and semisubmersible vessels, would also be needed. 

Jane’s projects the PLAN of 2035 to include: 

 12 Type 055 destroyers 

 17+ Type 052D destroyers 

 28 Type 054A frigates 

 4-6 aircraft carriers 

 6-8 Type 075 LHDs 
46 

 8-10 Type 071 amphibious warfare ships 

 4-8 Type 901 replenishment ships 

 9 Type 903A 

 2+ Type 054A follow-on frigates (and building) 

The PLAN will have a significantly more formidable force by 2030-2035, but it likely will not have the 

surface combatants and logistical support ships necessary to sustain a protracted overseas campaign. 

Instead, the PLAN’s force structure projected to ~2030 suggests a focus on protecting its overseas 

investments – including overseas physical infrastructure, sea lanes, and overseas nationals. Similarly, the 

PLAAF has only nascent expeditionary capabilities, with few bombers, strategic airlift, or tankers. A robust 

strategic airlift fleet will enable the service to rapidly respond to limited contingencies by 2030. 

PLAN Marine Corps (PLANMC) deployment 

The PLAN Marine Corps has rapidly expanded since 2017, from a force of 10,000 to 12,000 personnel to 

approximately 35,000 at present. The PLANMC was able to achieve this expansion through the transfer of 

PLA ground forces. The PLANMC may ultimately number 40,000, with six brigades supplemented by 

aviation and special forces units. 194

With the rapid expansion of the PLANMC and the increase in available Type 071 LPDs, there is a 

possibility that the PLANMC could adopt a concept of operations similar to that of a U.S. Marine 

Expeditionary Unit (Special Operations Capable) (MEU[SOC]). This would allow the PLANMC to conduct 

land operations, including noncombatant evacuation operations (NEO), humanitarian assistance/disaster 

relief (HA/DR), and limited counterinsurgency operations without forward, ground-based stationing of 

weapons and supplies.195 Prior testimony to the USCC has attested to this possibility, with Christopher D. 

Yung noting in 2016 that, “the PLA is probably not far off from deploying PLA ground forces like the USMC 

deploys MEUs on [amphibious ready groups (ARGs)],” without necessarily requiring an onshore basing 

presence.196

MEUs are composed of an amphibious assault ship, a landing platform dock (LPD), and landing ship dock 

(LSD), along with their onboard air and amphibious platforms. MEUs carry approximately 2,600 Sailors 

and Marines and are able to sustain combat operations for up to 15 days with organic supplies, while 

regularly being deployed for six-month rotations.197 

China could field a similar amphibious unit by 2030 that would allow for air and ground contingency 

operations overseas, as seen in the notional layout in Figure 9. With the upcoming Type 075 LHD, Type 

071 LPD, and either a second Type 071 LPD or a Type 072A landing ship, the PLAN could conduct and 

sustain sea-based amphibious and ground combat operations of a similar length of time (approximately 

two weeks) as a USMC MEU. The PLAN launched its first Type 075 LHD in September 2019, which is 

likely to enter service in 2020 or early 2021. Jane’s identified a third Type 075 LHD under construction at 

the Hudong-Zhonghua shipyard in Shanghai in November 2019.198 A three-ship package as described 

above could include approximately 36 helicopters, approximately ten LCACs, and likely more than 30 

amphibious IFVs for amphibious operations. 
47 

It is probable that the PLAN has permanently shifted production from the Type 071 LPDs to the Type 075 

LHDs.199 The Type 075 has a top speed of between 23 and 25 knots (similar to the Type 901 

replenishment ship), allowing it to cross the Taiwanese Strait in approximately a day. Based on interviews 

with Taiwanese Defense Minister Yan Defa, Taiwan has closely monitored the Type 075’s development 

and impact on China’s amphibious warfare capabilities.200 However, the introduction of the Type 075 

should be viewed not only in the context of Taiwan contingencies, but also in regards to potential 

expeditionary operations outside of China’s near seas. 

China is likely currently capable of deploying two limited amphibious task forces at once, for roughly sixmonth deployments, anywhere in the Middle East, Indian Ocean region, or potentially into southeast Asia 

and the Pacific. This would include unit strengths of approximately four battalions of infantry between 

approximately four Type 071 LPDs. These groups would currently be highly unlikely to sustain combat 

operations overseas for more than a few weeks. 

By 2030-2035 the PLAN and PLANMC could increase to approximately six MEU-sized amphibious 

groups, depending on the final number of Type 075s (or follow on variants) the PLAN opts for. A future 

MEU-style contingent of a Type 075 LHD, and either two Type 071 LPDs or one Type 071 LPD and a 

Type 072A landing ship could contain approximately 35 helicopters, 50 Type 05 amphibious vehicles, and 

ten Type 726 LCACs, as well as approximately 2,500 marines and sailors. These groups would provide 

the PLANMC with a self-contained amphibious combat force for operations up to two weeks. Jane’s 

estimates that the PLAN could be capable of deploying approximately four of their six MEU-sized 

amphibious groups, which could combine for over a brigade’s worth of personnel supported by organic 

helicopter capabilities.201 

Figure 9: Notional layout of a MEU in comparison with a potential layout of a projected similar PLAN rapid reaction force. 
48 

China will likely gradually introduce Type 075 LHDs into expeditionary deployments over the next ten years 

to gain operational experience, and it will test the international reaction to increasing distant deployments of 

its aircraft carriers and Type 075 LHDs as they are introduced into service. 

The rapid expansion in the number of PLAN replenishment ships, an increase in their capability to 

transport solid cargo, an increase in helicopters available to the PLAN and PLANMC, and/or the prepositioning of ordnance overseas are liminal moments for Chinese expeditionary ambitions and 

capabilities. These incidents would signal an improved ability to conduct and sustain expeditionary 

amphibious and naval surface combat operations for the PLAN and PLANMC. 

There are numerous challenges China must overcome before using such an amphibious ship package, 

however. As is common to the entire PLA, the PLANMC does not have combat experience. Many PLAN 

marines are new recruits or were converted from PLA ground forces. Further, “neither the PLAN nor 

PLANMC have the number of troop-carrying helicopters that would be required for a significant amphibious 

airborne assault (air assault by helicopter or vertical assault in a contested environment) and they appear to 

be competing with the PLA” Army for new helicopters.202 

Any Chinese MEU would require a significant number of PLANMC troop transport and assault helicopters. 

The East Sea Fleet’s rotary wing assets are the 11th Regiment in the 4th Division at Ningbo-Zhuangqiao. 

The North Sea Fleet’s rotary wing assets are in the 5th Regiment of the 2nd Division at Qingdao-Cangkou. 

The South Sea Fleet’s rotary wing assets are in the 23rd Regiment of the 8th Division at Guiping. 

While a U.S. Wasp-class LHD can accommodate F-35 fighters, the Type 075 LHD is only expected to be 

able to accommodate rotary wing assets. This suggests that even the future PLANMC of 2030 would 

struggle to penetrate adversary air defense systems without carrier support. 

In addition to known projects underway, China observers should expect an increased focus on 

incorporating unmanned assets into the PLAN’s force structure. For example, a PLANMC equivalent of the 

Leidos/US Marine Corps’ Marine Warfighting Laboratory autonomous beach landing capability should be 

expected.203 The PLANMC is already experimenting with unmanned amphibious platforms, as the 

Wuchang Shipbuilding Industry Group (under China Shipbuilding Industry Corporation (CSIC)) announced 

the world’s first unmanned amphibious assault vehicle, known as the Marine Lizard, in April 2019.204

PLAN Expeditionary Logistics Models 

The PLAN is developing five basic logistics models for conducting expeditionary operations. Any individual 

operation may combine multiple models depending on the duration of the deployment and the size of the 

expeditionary force. 
49 

Figure 10: PLA military logistics models. Images from chinamil.com.cn 

Accompanying Ships 

The standard logistics model, the PLAN has sent a replenishment ship – either a Type 908, Type 903, or 

Type 903A – on every Gulf of Aden deployment, and Type 901 replenishment ships accompany the 

PLAN’s two aircraft carriers. A single replenishment ship is rarely sufficient to supply a task force or other 

expeditionary group by itself. Based on past deployments, a single replenishment ship can likely support 2-

3 surface combat ships for 2-3 weeks at a time before the group requires external support via UNREP or 

docking in a foreign civilian or military port. 

Civilian Ports 

The PLAN often stops at foreign civilian ports for replenishment and friendly visits. The PLAN has stopped 

at numerous foreign ports on Gulf of Aden missions and en route to overseas exercises, including ports in 

Djibouti, France, Greece, Indonesia, Italy, Oman, Pakistan, Portugal, Saudi Arabia, Singapore, South 

Africa, Spain, Sri Lanka, and Yemen. Civilian port calls are valuable for PLAN soft power and broader 

diplomatic goals “by facilitating interaction and dialogue between China and the many countries whose 

ports and geographic locations heighten the strategic value of these relationships.”205 In addition to 

logistical considerations (i.e. distance to destination, harbor depth and space, local security concerns), the 

choice of civilian ports to use for replenishment will increasingly be driven by broader strategic needs. 

Task force's 

replenishment ship 

(i.e. Type 903A | 

Type901) is 

sufficient for 

deployment

Accompanying 

Ships

Task force uses 

civilian ports in 

friendly country for 

replenishment stop 

(i.e. the Port of 

Salalah, Oman)

Civilian Ports

The PLAN uses its 

logistics base in 

Djibouti, or 

develops additional 

logistics-focused 

military bases

Logistics Bases

Task force uses an 

already-deployed 

replenishment ship 

as a "mobile supply 

point" to replenish 

en route to other 

objective

Replenishment 

Relay

Task force 

rendezvous with a 

civilian ship to 

provide 

replenishment

Civilian UNREP
50 

Figure 11: Confirmed PLAN replenishment port calls during Gulf of Aden anti-piracy deployments. The task forces are likely to have 

received replenishment at other ports that were not explicitly identified as replenishment stops through Chinese news sources. 

Source: Jane's, compiled from PLA Daily reports 

Logistics Bases 

While the PLA currently only has one military logistics base in Djibouti, additional logistics bases and/or 

larger bases with pre-positioned troops, weapons, and other supplies would offer the PLAN a dedicated 

location for rest and resupply that would offer fewer constraints on its use, particularly during military 

conflicts. Purpose-built military facilities also offer additional advantages over dual use facilities and 

infrastructure. 

Of note, the JLSF has reportedly improved its ability to replenish supplies in urgent and emergency 

situations. A late December 2019 report noted that a fuel shortage caused by an increase in flight trainings. 

The JLSF “accelerated the establishment of a new military transport delivery mechanism and a military 

transport delivery plan in the theater” in early 2019, which helped mitigate the shortage.206 This was a 

domestic replenishment and it is currently unknown how the improvement could translate to overseas 

bases and operations, although the increased numbers of available Y-20 should increasingly facilitate 

emergency replenishment overseas, pending the ability to land at friendly civilian airfields. 

Civilian UNREP 

In late November 2019, China’s MND reported that the PLAN had successfully tested underway 

replenishment (UNREP) from a civilian container ship, the COSCO Fuzhou. The Fuzhou provided logistics 

support for the Type 054A frigate Linyi as well as the accompanying Type 903 replenishment ship Taihu. 

The MND’s report concluded that, “Using civilian ships to carry out UNREP for naval ships is a new attempt 

in the field of naval logistics support. The civilian vessels cover a wide range of routes, thus have large 

potential for replenishment at sea, which implies remarkable military economic benefits. The success of the 

test provides important technical support for the future development of underway replenishment control 

technology.”207
51 

The MND reported on the UNREP test on 21 November 2019. According to open source ship tracking 

data, the Fuzhou’s last port call was at Dar es Salaam, Tanzania, between 15 and 18 November. Over the 

last three months the Fuzhou also visited Mombasa, Kenya, in addition to locations in Singapore and 

China.208 

It is therefore possible that the PLAN could use sites such as Dar es Salaam and Mombasa, among other 

COSCO ports, not as formal military resupply bases, but as dual-use nodes for a largely civilian port 

network that nevertheless serves PLAN ships in an expeditionary capacity. COSCO has numerous 

container ships operating in the region as part of its fleet of 1,318 vessels (the third-largest in the world).209

Other COSCO ships stop at Port Colombo, Sri Lanka, Karachi, Pakistan, and Jeddah, Saudi Arabia, all of 

which are both notable Belt and Road Initiative locations and/or are locations visited previously by PLAN 

ships on Gulf of Aden deployments.210

As Jane’s noted following the MND’s report on the Fuzhou’s UNREP test, “The PLAN’s requirement for 

this capability is not entirely clear... If the PLAN has a requirement for additional ‘ships taken up from trade’ 

(STUFT), it suggests that the PLAN envisages the need to support multiple task groups on extended or 

distant operations, beyond the capacity of the existing 11 auxiliaries.” Chinese media reports tended to 

emphasize the civilian UNREP transfer of dry cargo replenishment – that is, food, weapons, and other 

miscellaneous supplies. The U.S. and other navies often practice vertical replenishment via shipborne 

helicopter for solid stores. Further from Jane’s November 2019 report, “If the PLAN sees a future 

requirement to be able to replenish solids by jackstay transfer from commercial vessels, rather than by 

vertical replenishment, this suggests that the PLAN does not envisage the currently limited capacity of its 

embarked helicopters increasing significantly in the near future.”211 

It could also suggest that the PLAN might be considering alternative replenishment models as a backup to 

the availability of larger Type 901s. Type 903As have relatively limited solid cargo capacity, with a total 

cargo capacity of 11,400 tons but with 10,500 tons for fuel alone. The Type 901s have approximately 

25,000 tons of total capacity with 20,000 tons for fuel, but if their availability is limited then civilian ships 

could help close the gap for solid cargo replenishment on expeditionary missions over two weeks. 

Noticeably, photographs of the Fuzhou’s fuel transfer show only a small-bore hose between the two ships 

during the UNREP, suggesting a slow fuel transfer rate comparable to astern refueling rather than that of a 

conventional refueling at sea rig.212

Replenishment Relay 

Additional information regarding China’s ability to sustain expeditionary operations is provided by PLAN 

participation in overseas military exercises. En route to the “Joint Sea 2017” exercise in St. Petersburg in 

July 2017, the Type 052D destroyer Hefei and Type 054A frigate Yuncheng received a “replenishment of 

fuel and fresh water” from the Type 903A Gaoyouhu in the Indian Ocean, despite being accompanied by 

the Type 903A Luomahu. According to an anonymous military expert interviewed by the PLA Daily, “the 

amount of supplies it carries is limited and not capable of meeting the needs of the other two warships for 

fuel, fresh water and other supplies during the one-month-long voyage” that would see the group pass 

through the Suez Canal, the Mediterranean, and the Baltic Sea.213 This transit was approximately twice the 

length (in days) as the voyage from China to the Gulf of Aden anti-piracy missions. 

The PLA Daily referred to this expeditionary logistics model as a “replenishment relay” or “mobile supply 

point”, contrasting this method with other PLAN models that rely on either replenishment in foreign 

countries’ ports (primarily civilian ports, but also including the Djibouti Naval Support Base) or 

accompanying replenishment ships. The PLA Daily suggested that this model reduces the cost of 
52 

replenishment in foreign countries’ civilian ports. According to the military expert quoted in the article, “It is a 

useful exploration for the Chinese navy to take advantage of its escort taskforce in the Gulf of Aden to 

conduct front-end replenishment for Chinese warships passing by this water, which will be of great help for 

Chinese navy's similar ocean-going operations in the future.”214

PLAAF Expeditionary Capabilities 

While the PLAN has been at the center of China’s expeditionary capabilities modernization and strategy, 

Chinese strategists are increasingly concentrating on the need to improve the PLAAF’s strategic airlift. In 

2016, a PLA Daily article noted that “In the future, long-range combat areas will mostly be located in global 

‘public domain frontiers’ far from the country,” requiring the rapid delivery of materials for which strategic 

airlift is the only viable option. The author notes the example of the U.S. military: “In recent local wars, the 

U.S. military was the first to call an airlift unit to deliver troops, and its forces were about 20 times the speed 

at sea.”215

In 2017, then-new commander of the PLAAF, Lieutenant General Ding Laihang, told China National Radio

that the service would increasingly focus on long-range missions to realize its goal of becoming a 

“strategic” service capable of conducting operations in the service of the national interest “wherever they 

exist.” As quote in China Daily, General Laihang said that "In the past, our strategies and guidelines 

focused on territorial air defense. Now we have been shifting our attention to honing our ability in terms of 

long-range strategic projection and long-range strike."216

In response, Wang Yanan, editor of the Chinese Aerospace Knowledge magazine, was quoted by China 

Daily as saying that the PLAAF will prioritize ensuring its new aircraft are combat-ready and maintained: 

“For instance, the air force now has Y-20 heavy-lift transport jets, but it needs to design methods and gain 

experience when it comes to airdropping armored vehicles... owning advanced weapons does not equate 

to being able to use them well".217 

These comments reinforce the observation that the PLAAF, like the PLAN, is becoming an expeditionary 

service, and will begin to conduct trainings and exercises over the next few years to ensure the readiness 

and interoperability of its new equipment with the joint force, as well as to test expeditionary logistical 

support models. 

In parallel with the PLAN, the PLAAF’s transition to an expeditionary force has been hindered by a lack of 

transport and replenishment capabilities, including strategic lift and tanker aircraft. The PLAAF has pursued 

both short- and long-term solutions to this problem. In the short term, the PLAAF acquired ten Il-76MD 

strategic transport aircraft between 2012 and 2015 as well as three Il-78 tankers from Ukraine between 

2011 and 2016. The Il-76MDs more than doubled the PLAAF’s 13th Transport Division’s fleet of Il-76 

strategic transport aircraft, while the Il-78s augmented the PLAAF’s limited fleet of H-6U/DU tankers.218

These aircraft are stop-gap capabilities until China can complete the development and production of 

indigenous designs, which are focused on the Y-20 transport aircraft, as well as a probable Y-20 tanker 

variant. As PLAAF Senior Colonel Shen Jinke noted, “The Y-20 heavy transport aircraft is a crucial element 

for improving China's aerial logistics and delivery abilities.”219 Approximately 12 Y-20s have been 

confirmed as in service based on their serial numbers, nine of which are serving at the PLAAF 4th

Transport Division 12th Air Regiment at Chengdu/Qionglai. However, 15-20 additional platforms are known 

to have been built and identified at the Xi’an Aircraft Corporation (XAC) factory in Xian-Yanliang, and could 

be only waiting for engine integration.220 In February 2020 images emerged of two additional Y-20s 

bearing serial numbers that suggest their operation by the 13th Transport Division (37th Air Regiment) at 
53 

Keifeng.221 An additional Y-20 is in service with the Central Theater Command. The number of Y-20 

dedicated to special operational forces is currently unknown. 

 

Production was limited for years by engine availability, as the PLAAF signed a contract for an additional 

224 Russian-made D-30KP II-Series turbofan engines in 2016. China has tested the indigenously 

produced WS-20 engine, although recent updates have been limited. Chinese news sources have quoted 

the Y-20’s max payload as 66 tons, or 51 tons at a range of 5,200 km. 

In June 2018 China announced that the PLAAF had completed its first heavy equipment airdrop training 

with multiple infantry fighting vehicles. This significantly increases the ability of the PLAAF to conduct 

expeditionary operations in remote areas with more than just paratroopers.222

In November 2018 Jane’s identified a Y-20U tanker variant with a probable underwing inflight refueling pod 

at XAC’s main manufacturing facility. An in-flight image later appeared on Chinese online forums in 

October 2019.223 The PLAAF was previously reliant on its 20 H-6U and three Il-78 tankers, while the 

PLANAF had converted several H-6D aircraft into tankers. The H-6Us are capable of offloading 18.5 metric 

tons of fuel out of a total of 37 metric tons carried. A 2019 report in Ordnance Industry Science Technology, 

a Chinese defense industry periodical, suggested that a Y-20 tanker variant would carry 90 tons of fuel, 

suggesting that a tanker variant triple China’s existing tanker capabilities in the H-6.224 Reports suggest that 

the refueling pod may be based on the Il-78’s Russian UPAZ-1A pod. 

Figure 12: China's PLAN and PLAAF bases that contain expeditionary capabilities. Source: Jane's 
54 

According to the Xi’an-based Ordnance Industry Science Technology magazine, the PLAAF could install 

underwing and rear refueling pods on the Y-20 in the short term (similar to the Il-78 and A400M), while a 

longer term option would be to integrate the refueling platform within the fuselage (similar to the KC-767). 

The Y-20’s chief designer said in March 2019 that the Y-20 "can serve as a general platform from which a 

variety of variants can be derived." According to Xinhua News, China aims for the PLAAF to be a “modern” 

strategic air force by 2035.225 A senior PLAAF commander told CCTV on 24 February 2020 that a Y-20 

tanker variant would appear in public in the near future.226

At present, China has approximately 12 Y-20s and six Il-76s available for deployment, although their 

availability would be dependent on domestic requirements. Further, their overseas deployment would be 

limited by access to overseas airfields in friendly countries, likely in the context of various humanitarian 

assistance missions. As a recent RAND report notes, “In the future, the PLAAF will need to establish 

reliable access to overseas airfields if it hopes to operate missions of a broader variety and higher tempo 

abroad.”227 The PLAAF’s deployment capacity of combat fixed wing fighter and bomber aircraft is currently 

extremely limited outside of military airshows and exercises, and is limited by the lack of dedicated 

overseas military bases and tanker aircraft. 

Jane’s sources indicate that the Y-20 is able to transport approximately 120 fully equipped troops when 

configured as a tactical transport or approximately 250 individuals without equipment or civilians. China’s 

current Y-20 fleet, and its estimated paratrooper capacity of 110 – 120 troops, suggests the capability to 

conduct a tactical airborne insertion of up to approximately 1,200 – 1,300 paratroopers, followed by 

approximately 22 Type 05 infantry fighting vehicles or 33 parachutable ZBD-05 fighting vehicles per 

sortie.228 

In the event of a NEO or rescue operation with host country support, Jane’s believes China could currently 

evacuate approximately 2,750 individuals per day. This estimate is based on 250 individuals per aircraft, 

with all 11 confirmed in-service aircraft participating. According to Chinese media reports from the 2011 

NEO of Chinese nationals from Libya, four Il-76s completed two evacuation sorties each in 46 hours 

between Sebha Airport in Libya and Khartoum International Airport in Sudan, moving 1,655 individuals, or 

an average of 207 individuals per flight.229 The PLAAF’s current capability to conduct NEOs in hostile 

territory would be extremely limited. This estimate also suggests that as the Y-20 fleet expands to 100 

aircraft, observers may continue to expect the capacity to conduct at least one sortie per day per aircraft, 

with approximately 250 individuals per sortie, for a maximum capacity of 25,000 individuals per day. 

Over the next 5-10 years, Jane’s expects that the PLAAF could have up to 70 strategic lift assets by 2025, 

including 18 Il-76s and roughly 50 Y-20s, with 100+ Y-20s possible by 2030. The China National Defense 

University’s Center for Economic Research produced a “Chinese Military and Civilian Integration 

Development Report, 2014” report that recommended the PLAAF acquire up to 400 Y-20s, although a 

more realistic goal for ~2030 is 100-125.230 This would allow for tactical airborne insertion of up to 

approximately 10,000 paratroopers. Deployment of fighter and bomber will remain constrained by the lack 

of overseas airbases. 

4. Role of Civilian Organizations in Expeditionary Operations 

Section 4 assesses how civilian organizations contribute to PLA expeditionary operations through dual-use 

technologies and broader military-civil fusion. 

In addition to PLA capabilities, China has focused in recent years on integrating civilian and dual-use 

capabilities into its expeditionary CONOPS through the “strategic projection support ship fleets” (战略投送
55 

支援船队), “strategic projection air support fleets” (战略投送支援机队), and the potential development of 

additional overseas bases.231 

In June 2015 China issued the Technical Standards for the Implementation of National Defense 

Requirements for Newly Built Civil Ships, which requires new civilian ships to be built to standards allowing 

for conversion for military use if required. This is in addition to laws such as Regulations on National 

Defense Mobilization of Civil Transport Capacity and the National Defense Traffic Law.

232 The standards 

apply to five types of ships -- container, roll-on/roll-off, multipurpose, bulk carrier and break bulk. At the time 

of its introduction, China Daily reported that the national legislature was working on a National Defense 

Transport Law that would allow civilian shipbuilders to receive funds to cover the costs of higher standards 

for military ship use as well as insurance in case of damage during conflict. The PLAN reportedly based its 

standards on the example set by the United Kingdom during the 1982 Falklands War.233 Civilian shipping 

companies repeatedly emphasize the importance of contributing to the national defense effort by 

participating in exercises and adapting ships for military use in addition to merely complying with 

regulations.234

Chinese analysts explicitly connect BRI investments with the need for military-civil fusion partnerships to 

safeguard their investments, proposing increased use of civilian container ships and roll-on roll-off ships 

(RO-RO) for expeditionary military operations. An analysis from the Ocean University of China noted that 

there was a “deep internal relationship between the two,” referring to military-civil fusion and the BRI, and 

that “Chinese enterprises participating in the ‘Belt and Road’ construction, whether state-owned or private, 

must consciously establish... assistance and support for China's national defense construction and military 

industry development.”235 Further, in an analysis of the overlap between the BRI and military-civil fusion, a 

professor from the Chinese Academy of Social Sciences Institute of Contemporary Political History argues 

that, “It is necessary to comprehensively consider national security needs through various types of [Belt 

and Road] infrastructure construction and form a resource sharing mechanism.”236 CMC Transport and 

Projection Bureau chief of staff Liu Jiasheng noted that the PLA will focus on developing the ability to 

project power to BRI countries through the medium-term.237

Civilian overseas port facilities 

In addition to frequently using civilian ports for rest and replenishment on Gulf of Aden missions, China 

joined the international community in the destruction of Syrian chemical weapons in 2013. Colonel Cao 

Weidong of the Naval Academy of Military Research analyzed China’s participation, which included naval 

escorts in the Mediterranean. Col Weidong said that, “[I]n the Mediterranean region, China Ocean Shipping 

Group (COSCO) has a lot of supply points, which provide daily services for civilian ships. Chinese naval 

warships can also enter the port for supply.”238 

COSCO has over 53 container terminals, with 197 container berths in 37 ports worldwide, and is actively 

looking for new terminals for expansion.239 Its container ships have global routes between, with notable 

transit routes that link strategically important ports in Port Klang, Malaysia, Djibouti Port, Djibouti, Karachi, 

Pakistan, Gwadar, Pakistan, Port Qasim, Pakistan, Jakarta Port, Indonesia, and Colombo, Sri Lanka, 

among many others.240 

RO-Ros and Container ships 

China’s civilian shipping industry is large and can significantly augment PLAN expeditionary capabilities. 

According to PLA experts, there are currently approximately 63 RO-RO ships capable of supporting 

military operations over long distances. For example, the Bohai Ferry Group has 11 RO-RO that have 

been organized into the “Eight Transport Dadui” within the strategic support ship fleet. While there are 
56 

questions as to the strength of the deck structures for the heaviest platforms (such as PLA Type-96 and 

Type-99 main battle tanks), recently-built ships like the Bohai Cuizhu have been built explicitly to defense 

standards.241 Kennedy notes that RO-ROs from the Hainan Strait Shipping Co. Ltd. have joined the “Ninth 

Transport Dadui”, and CSC RORO Logistics Co. of the China Merchants Group contains the “Fifth 

Transport Dadui”.242 In February 2018, the Wuxi JLSC “practiced transporting ammunition on a civilian rollon/roll-off ship that met military transportation standards.”243 

Authors Liu Baoxin and Su Chunhua suggest that container ships could be used for both transporting 

military equipment in containers as well as for “personnel living containers” on ship decks. The authors note 

that, “In recent years, China has advocated and proposed the "Belt and Road" strategy, and urgently 

requires military forces to ‘go out’ in a peaceful posture to provide a strong guarantee for the expansion of 

China's overseas interests... Due to the limited number of equipment required for these military operations, 

it is often difficult to find suitable cargo ships or RO-RO ships for short periods of time, which affects the 

completion of military operations, while container ships have stable schedules, high speeds, and long 

sailing times... [I]f military equipment can be transported in containers, container ships will surely become 

the preferred tool for overseas transportation of military equipment.”244 

Chinese defense analysts have extensively studied U.S. container-based multimodal transport. Yuan Mu 

and Liu Baoxin note that “The supply of U.S. military supplies and equipment abroad mainly relies on 

container multimodal transport from home to foreign military bases” noting that “about 90% of the U.S. 

military's existing materials have been containerized.” In recommendations for the PLA, the authors argue 

that China should focus on “a strong military-civilian integrated container transport capacity”, as well as 

“advanced information technology” to monitor and track shipments, as well as advanced technologies – 

including self-loading and unloading technologies – particularly at the point of delivery in the field.245 Other 

analysts have further emphasized the need to utilize military-civil fusion (军民融合) particularly in “the last 

thousand meters” to unloading at an overseas base using ruggedized civilian equipment.246

China COSCO Shipping operates over 360 container ships, with the third-largest container fleet capacity 

worldwide. Of COSCO’s container ships, 64 can both transport over 10,000 Twenty-Foot Equivalent Units 

(TEUs) and travel at more than 20 knots (for comparison, PLAN Type 903As and Type 901s are capable 

of top speeds of 19 and 25 knots, respectively).247 Issac Kardon has argues that COSCO is “a most-likely 

candidate for facilitating military utilization of its port facilities (and its shipping, container, and general 

logistics capacity)” because of its lack of transparency and heavy government subsidization.248 

In November 2018, Sinotrans & CSC’s subsidiary Shanghai Changjiang Shipping Co., Ltd. participated in 

a military exercise under the Eastern Theater Command’s Transport and Projection Bureau’s Dispatch 

Center.249 The exercise included coordination of “transportation support forces, ship-shore 

communications, fire rescue and other emergency situations” between the company and the Strategic 

Marine Brigade. The two organizations set up a working group “with the guidance and support of the 

military theater delivery dispatch center in the eastern theater.”250

China has also conducted its first UNREP with a civilian ship with a COSCO cargo ship, as detailed above. 

The PLAN installed a “modular navigation horizontal replenishment system” on the Fuzhou container ship 

with technologies such as an “all-electric drive, super capacitor energy storage, and constant tension 

control.” The focus appears to have been on the transfer of solid cargo. A Chinese news article notes that 

China has plentiful civilian container ships that operate on a wide range of routes, offering a “great potential 

for building maritime supply forces and has significant military economic benefits.”251 
57 

The Fuzhou is far smaller than many COSCO container ships – it has a length of 231.5 m, beam of 32.2 

m, and a maximum speed of 22.5 knots. Those are similar measurements to the Type 901s, although the 

Type 901s are slightly faster. COSCO has over 230 ships of equal or larger size and of comparable 

speeds. 

Tankers 

Civilian tankers have also been used for PLAN replenishment. Among others, the Ningbo East Sea 

Shipping Co. signed agreements with the military to build tankers that meet military specifications and 

created a marine brigade after delivering its first tanker that was constructed to military specifications.252

The China Shipping Group’s Huachuan was featured in a 2014 article on military-civil fusion, noting that it 

had been constructed with stronger engines for speed, extra personnel accommodation cabins, military 

communication equipment, and military refueling equipment. The Huachuan conducted alongside UNREP 

with the Type 053H3 frigate Putian in 2014.253 The Ruiyuan-5 tanker also was called for refueling trials in 

2016.254

Strategic airlift 

Similar to the PLAN, the PLAAF employs civilian assets to supplement military lift capabilities, with 

“strategic air support fleets” since 2013. Chinese analysts view military-civil fusion as particularly important 

for strategic airlift: “Air strategic projection capabilities can promote military-civilian integration. Air strategic 

projection is the largest integration of national air transport capacity. It is manpower-intensive, technologyintensive, and capital-intensive. It is difficult for the military itself to form a ‘strategic’ level of delivery 

capability. Therefore, it is necessary to rely on the entire national system to promote the organic use of 

military and civilian transportation Integration.”255

A division director within the PLAAF Logistics Department Transport and Projection Bureau said in 2019 

that “the strategic air projection force system is currently stepping up construction primarily with the 

military’s air transport forces supplemented by civilian aviation transport forces.”256 He further notes that 

Chinese experts within the Chinese Army Military Transportation University estimate that China will have 

approximately 8,000 civilian passenger aircraft and over 2,600 cargo aircraft by 2035, up from 3,160 total 

passenger aircraft and only 143 medium and large civilian cargo aircraft today.257

Several companies have disclosed agreements with the PLAAF Logistics Department for military-civil 

fusion, including SF Express and JD Logistics, two logistics and e-commerce companies, to provide 

logistics support through their mature supply chains and delivery experience. JD Logistics will “jointly build 

an information sharing platform for system docking to provide real-time logistics information sharing and 

data visualization. ‘We will also provide personnel training and support services for the Air Force Logistics 

Department.’” SF Express will reportedly provide support via unmanned aircraft, including an unmanned 

amphibious aircraft.258 SF Express operates a fleet of 58 aircraft, and JD Logistics, through its partnership 

with HNA Group’s Tianjin Air Cargo, plans to purchase or lease between 50-100 cargo aircraft within the 

next few years.259 

China Postal Airlines has long supported PLA operations by participating in HA/DR missions, but also 

conducted its first PLAAF strategic combat readiness exercise in September 2017.260 The airline has 33 

cargo aircraft in its inventory and formed a strategic support cargo brigade in 2015. Many other civilian and 

military organizations attended the exercise as well, including the Wuhan JLSF base, Air China, and China 

Eastern Airlines. Civilian aircraft from China Eastern Airlines and China Cargo Airlines were used in 

November 2014 to transport nearly 300 medical staff and 767 tons of supplies to Guinea, Liberia, and 

Sierra Leone.261 Further, Chinese reports reference the National Defense and Transportation Law, which 
58 

“puts forward clear requirements for the postal industry to do a good job in national defense and 

transportation, and gives the industry a new mission.”262

 
59 

Recommendations for Congress 

Based on China’s overseas basing strategy and future military and dual-use expeditionary capabilities, 

Jane’s has several recommendations for the United States: 

First, Congress should carefully monitor the transfer of enabling technologies for 

expeditionary operations. In conjunction, Congress should provide oversight to ensure 

that the DoD fully implement the National Defense Strategy’s modernization goals. This 

would include investing in federally funded basic science research and in applied 

research and development for emerging technologies to counter potential Chinese 

advances. 

China is rapidly developing capability in emerging defense technologies, including but not limited to 

unmanned and autonomous systems, artificial intelligence, cyber capabilities, quantum capabilities, 

hypersonic weapons, and directed energy weapons. These could allow China to impose significant costs 

on adversaries or deter adversaries disproportionate to the number of physical platforms it possesses. As 

the Center for a New American Security (CNAS) report “Rising to the China Challenge” notes, “China is 

now a global powerhouse in a number of strategic technologies, equal to or ahead of the United States in 

critical areas such as quantum computing, artificial intelligence, and genomics. If current trends continue, 

the downstream military, economic, and political consequences could tip the scales toward China’s vision 

of regional order in the Indo-Pacific.”263 While this report focused on conventional military and dual-use 

expeditionary capabilities, China’s advances in conventional expeditionary capabilities must be viewed 

within the larger context of China’s military modernization, where significant progress has been made in 

emerging technologies. 

As a result, the United States must increase its own investment in emerging technologies to counter any 

Chinese advances. While U.S. defense R&D budgets have hit record highs in nominal terms, Congress 

must provide enhanced oversight of DoD budget requests to ensure investment in promising emerging 

technologies and basic research and development. Congress should also regulate the transfer of 

emerging technologies that could further China’s expeditionary capabilities. Congress can accomplish this 

through: 

 Demanding DoD transparency through regular classified and unclassified updates on progress, 

long-term program management strategy, and long-term funding guarantees for programs related 

to key emerging technologies R&D, such as hypersonic weapons, directed energy weapons, and 

artificial intelligence.264

 Support funding for DoD programs that increase the resiliency of U.S. forward-deployed forces 

and improve U.S. capabilities to operate in contested environments. This involves programs 

related to secure and resilient communications networks, hardened facilities and platforms, 

terminal missile defense technologies for protecting high-value targets, unmanned assets to 

operate in high risk areas, and long-range strike capabilities that are effective outside of Chinese 

air defense networks. 265

 Congressional additions and budgetary rebalances where necessary to ensure the prioritization of 

emerging technology R&D in the National Defense Authorization Act. Funding requests for 

emerging technologies has been uneven and insufficient to fully implement the modernization 

goals within the National Defense Strategy.266 These technologies reinforce deterrence against the 

use of Chinese force overseas while also increasing the capability of the United States to operate 

in contested environments if deterrence fails.267
60 

 Considering a law to incentivize Chinese nationals studying in the U.S. to remain rather than return 

to China. Student visas issued to Chinese nationals have declined since 2016, while the overall 

level of international students studying in the U.S. has plateaued during the same time frame. 

International students are critical to U.S. research in high-technology areas and U.S. national 

security would be improved by retaining top talent from abroad. 

 Reviewing and potentially regulating trade between U.S. exporters and Chinese companies that 

could facilitate the expansion of Chinese expeditionary capabilities. As detailed in this report, China 

prioritizes military-civil fusion, using dual-use technologies, companies, and facilities around the 

world to enable and extend its expeditionary capabilities. The Committee on Foreign Investment in 

the United States process should review the transfer of dual-use technologies that China has 

prioritized for expeditionary operations, including containerization and palletization technologies, 

unmanned systems that enable automated loading and unloading, precision airdrop technology, 

and oil pipeline monitoring technologies, among others.268

Second, the U.S. should bolster its non-military tools to engage with countries in which 

China seeks to develop an overseas presence. 

The U.S. should recognize that China may pursue overseas logistics nodes in countries that experience a 

vacuum of U.S. engagement. Particularly after 2030, China will likely pursue additional dedicated military 

bases overseas. U.S. economic and diplomatic engagement with these countries – both bilateral and 

through multilateral international organizations – will be critical to managing Chinese military ambitions. 

The USCC has previously recommended that Congress “provide resources for programs that support 

independent media and the free flow of information to prioritize Indo-Pacific countries in their efforts to 

counter China’s influence and propaganda efforts.”269 To this Jane’s would add support for African 

countries as well. By providing resources to counter Chinese propaganda, Congress can help countries 

around the world make more transparent decisions on when and how to engage with Chinese investors. 

Congress should be a vocal proponent of State Department actions to engage with foreign governments to 

provide “legal and managerial advice on how best to retain control over important operational elements of 

their infrastructure.”270

Center for Strategic and International Studies’ fellow LtCol William Pacette proposed the creation of an 

Infrastructure Development Coalition (IDC) initially funded through the Asia Reassurance Initiative Act of 

2018 (ARIA) to counter China’s expeditionary strategy through the BRI. According to the report, the IDC 

would meet countries’ infrastructure needs while limiting the ability of the BRI as a geopolitical tool with the 

ability to: “limit the BRI’s continued expansion; establish or enhance allied presence and influence that can 

directly counter Chinese influence; provide a better program that may force China to change its BRI 

practices so it can remain competitive with the IDC; salvage poor BRI projects; or potentially provide 

selective bail-outs to prevent BRI recipients from becoming beholden to Beijing.”271 Such a strategy – 

multilateral and based on increased holistic engagement with countries in which China might seek an 

expeditionary base or logistics node – would limit China’s ability to establish overseas bases. Absent a 

unifying strategy like the IDC, Congress should support multilateral regional dialogues that increase 

information sharing between U.S. regional security partners and allies. The 2019 U.S.-Australia-IndiaJapan (“The Quad”) consultations are one manifestation of this strategy. 
61 

Third, China’s expeditionary strategy includes the proliferation of digital authoritarian 

technologies to legitimize illiberalism abroad. Congress should take the lead in creating a 

legal framework for maintaining privacy and civil liberties in the face of emerging mass 

surveillance technologies. By passing laws to ensure Americans’ civil liberties are 

protected against digital authoritarian technologies, Congress can then support 

international treaty efforts to limit the spread of these technologies globally. 

China’s pursuit of expeditionary capabilities is designed not only for the protection of its overseas economic 

interests, but are also relevant for its diplomatic goals, which include the international legitimacy of 

illiberalism. As China purses both overseas access arrangements and dedicated military facilities the U.S. 

should recognize the likelihood for China to also export its tools for digital authoritarianism, which include 

mass surveillance systems aided by artificial intelligence. CNAS argues: “Overseas, China has reoriented 

its Belt and Road strategy to focus more on digital connectivity, exporting infrastructure not only for 

communications, but also surveillance and censorship. Through the provision of technology, funding, and 

know-how, Beijing’s digital expansion is making repression easier and more attractive to governments with 

weak democratic institutions, and further entrenching the rule of fellow authoritarian regimes. As China 

increases its role in the digital ecosystem of the developing world, Beijing is leveraging its influence to 

encourage a global shift toward a more closed model of internet governance. Left uncontested, already 

burgeoning trends of democratic decline and digital repression are certain to accelerate.”272 

A 2019 New York Times report noted that, “Under President Xi Jinping, the Chinese government has 

vastly expanded domestic surveillance, fueling a new generation of companies that make sophisticated 

technology at ever lower prices. A global infrastructure initiative is spreading that technology even further... 

With China’s surveillance know-how and equipment now flowing to the world, critics warn that it could help 

underpin a future of tech-driven authoritarianism, potentially leading to a loss of privacy on an industrial 

scale.”273 18 countries are already using Chinese intelligence monitoring systems. 

These capabilities are fundamentally at odds with American values of civil liberties, democracy, and human 

rights. The United States should both set the example in data privacy as well as pursue international 

agreements to stem the proliferation of these systems worldwide. As Naazneen Barma, Brent Durbin, and 

Andrea Kendall-Taylor argue, “if the United States hopes to shape the future use of these technologies, it 

must have a political and legal framework in place that other countries want to replicate. Without 

congressional action, this is unlikely to happen.”274

In agreement with Barma, Durbin, and Kendall-Taylor, Jane’s recommends revisiting section 230 of the 

Communications Decency Act to incentivize the moderation of authoritarian social media tactics, as well as 

considering export controls on American-made surveillance tools abroad.275
62 

 

Appendix A: Gulf of Aden Task Forces 

Task 

Force 

Departure Return Deployment 

Length 

Surface Combat 

Ship 1 

Surface Combat 

Ship 2 

Replenishment 

Ship 

33 8/29/2019 

Type 052D 

Destroyer Type 054A Frigate Type 903A 

32 4/4/2019 10/29/2019 208

Type 052C 

Destroyer Type 054A Frigate Type 903A 

31 12/9/2018 7/12/2019 215 Type 071 LPD Type 054A Frigate Type 903A 

30 8/6/2018 1/27/2019 174 Type 054A Frigate Type 054A Frigate Type 903A 

29 4/4/2018 10/4/2018 183 Type 054A Frigate Type 054A Frigate Type 903 

28 12/3/2017 6/26/2018* 205* Type 054A Frigate Type 054A Frigate Type 903 

27 8/3/2017 3/20/2018 229

Type 052C 

Destroyer Type 054A Frigate Type 908 

26 4/1/2017 10/23/2017* 205* Type 054A Frigate Type 054A Frigate Type 903A 

25 12/15/2016 7/4/2017 201 Type 054A Frigate Type 054A Frigate Type 903A 

24 8/10/2016 3/9/2017 211 

Type 052 

Destroyer Type 054A Frigate Type 903A 

23 4/7/2016 11/1/2016 208 Type 054A Frigate Type 054A Frigate Type 903A 

22 12/6/2015 6/30/2016 207

Type 052 

Destroyer Type 054A Frigate Type 903A 

21 8/3/2015 3/8/2016 218 Type 054A Frigate Type 054A Frigate Type 908 

20 4/3/2015 10/31/2015* 211 

Type 052 

Destroyer Type 054A Frigate Type 903 

19 12/1/2014 7/10/2015 221 Type 054A Frigate Type 054A Frigate Type 903 

18 8/1/2014* 2/28/2015* 211 

Type 071 

Amphibious 

Assault Ship Type 054A Frigate Type 903A 

17 3/24/2014 10/22/2014 212

Type 052C 

Destroyer Type 054A Frigate Type 903A 

16 11/30/2013 7/18/2014 230 

Type 053H3 

Frigate Type 054A Frigate Type 903A 

Data compiled from various Chinese news sources, primarily the PLA Daily at chinamil.com.cn. * Signifies an estimated date. 
Appendix B: Djibouti Base and Potential Base Locations Jane’s analyzed 18 sites as potential overseas PLA bases. These included: 

 Luanda Port, Angola  Chittagong Port, Bangladesh  Ream Naval Base, Cambodia  Mombasa Port, Kenya  Kota Kinabalu, Malaysia  Naval Intelligence Base, Myanmar  Sittwe Port, Myanmar  Port of Walvis Bay, Namibia  Lekki Port, Nigeria 

 Duqm Port, Oman  Port Salalah, Oman  Gwadar Port, Pakistan  Karachi Port, Pakistan  Port Victoria, Seychelles  Hambantota Port, Sri Lanka  Colombo Port, Sri Lanka  Dar es Salaam, Tanzania  Luganville Wharf, Vanuatu 

The sites are organized below based on their likelihood of being used as a PLA base. 

Factor 

Presence of major BRI infrastructure investments276

China’s 2015 defense white paper makes explicit China’s evolving commitment to protect its overseas economic interests, noting the importance of “the security of overseas interests concerning energy and resources, strategic sea lines of communication (SLOC), as well as institutions, personnel and assets abroad.”277

Debt to China278

China’s BRI projects are primarily financed through loans that carry commercial interest rates often unsustainable for the ho

countries. A 2018 report from the Center for Global Development found that eight BRI recipient countries have a particularly high risk of defaulting on their loans.279 Two of these countries, Djibouti and Pakistan, either already have an overseas milit

base or have been rumored as a candidate for a future PLA base. When Sri Lanka was unable to pay its BRI loan for the construction of the Hambantota Port, China agreed to a 99-year lease for the port and 15,000 acres of land around the siteSome analysts and policymakers have expressed concern that this model was an intentional predatory lending strategy designed to secure access to site of geostrategic importance, while others have argued the deals are not an intentional, coherent “debt trap” strategy, but the result of domestic interest groups or poor political risk assessment.280

Replenishment port calls on China’s Gulf of Aden deployments The PLAN’s Gulf of Aden anti-piracy escort missions have allowed the PLAN to gain expeditionary experience without provoking significant international concern. On these deployments China has made numerous port calls for diplomatic and 

friendly visits as well as military replenishment. Sites with prior replenishment port calls are evidence that they could be use

the future for at least commercial direct/indirect replenishment. 
Government support for Chinese presence (via arms sales, international visits, military exercises)281

Support from the host country’s political and military elite would be a requirement for any long-term basing option. This coulsignaled through a high volume of arms sales, international visits between high-ranking political and military leaders, and jomilitary exercises. 

Prior openness to foreign military basingA country’s prior willingness to host a foreign military base could be a good indication that might do so for China. For exampDjibouti notably had already allowed six countries to build a military base in the country before China. Open source reporting on either a basing offer (from the host country) or a basing request (from China)China has been rumored to request basing rights in numerous countries throughout the last few decades, including (but nolimited to) sites in Cambodia, Vanuatu, Pakistan, and the Seychelles. Additionally, there have been some Chinese-languagmilitary analyses that consider potential overseas basing locations.282Location Reasons for 

inclusion 

Distance(nautical miles)283

Description Docks Imagery Assessment 

PLA Support Base, Djibouti

6,200 nm BRI: Djibouti has only received slightly over $1 

billion in BRI-related investments and construction. For context, that is 82nd-most out of 

112 countries receiving BRI investments. BRI investments include the Doraleh Multi-Purpose Port (China State Construction Engineering) and the Djibouti-Ethiopia Railway (China Railway Construction). The median level of investment by country is $3.16 billion. Debt: However, the Council on Foreign Relations estimates that over 79% of Djibouti’s GDP is indebted to China.284

Gulf of Aden: Task forces regularly stop at Djibouti for replenishment, as that was the PLAN’s stated goal for the base. Government support: China’s first overseas military facility, the support base is a prototype for future logistics and support sites that are not capable of supporting major offensive combat operations. Foreign basing: Djibouti hosts more foreign military bases than an

y other country. 

1, two sided: 370 m left, 330 m right 

PLAN forward support 1 runway, 400 m. 8 hax 30 m (x7), 35 x 49 mHardened bunkers for ammunition storage, hebarracks, support comphardened underground complex. Can support PLAN surface combataType 054A frigate, or 6 056A corvette, or 1 Typ001/002 carrier and 2 T052D destroyers. 
Chinese basing: However, the PLA has conducted live-fire drills at the Djibouti Logistics Support Base with anti-tank infantry fighting vehicles (IFVs) in November 2017.285

Additionally, the mid-2018 construction of pier should allow for 4-ship docking, including for new Type 901 replenishment ships. Strategic requirement: As Jane’s has noted in its analysis of the Djibouti support base, “China has presented its first military base in a foreign country as a facility that supports counter-piracy and peacekeeping operations in the region. However, the apparent port call by a Chinese submarine in April 2018 raised the possibility that it could be used to extend the endurance of diesel-electric attack boats operating in the Indian Ocean.”286As noted by China Military 

Online, “The geographical position of Djibouti 

provides favorable access for global naval escort troops to rest and conduct replenishment. Many vessels including Chinese ships will choose Djibouti to rest and replenish when travelling to the Gulf of Aden for escort missions.”287 A key feature of the Djibouti 

support base, and potential future support bases in its mold (such as Ream Naval Base in Cambodia) is that it is more politically tenable for both the host country and for China’s potential adversaries like the U.S. and India, because these facilities theoretically lack the capacity to support prepositioned weapons and platforms that would allow for sustained offensive combat operations. 
Ream Naval Base, Cambodia

~2,220 nm 

BRI: Cambodia has received nearly $10.3 billion in BRI-related construction projects and investments. Major projects include the Lower Sesan Two Hydropower Dam. Debt: Cambodia is incredibly reliant on its relationship with China, with 21.7% of its 2017 GDP from China, and 22.4% of GDP as Chinese debt, according to the Council on Foreign Relations.288

Gulf of Aden: No known replenishment stops. Government support: Reporting on Chinese naval base, as well as major BRI investments suggest high-level support. Foreign basing: No known foreign military bases. Chinese basing: In mid-2019 the Wall Street Journal reported that China had signed a secret deal for a “30-year lease on the port and permit the stationing of troops and storing of weaponry in an installation that covers 192 acres and includes one pier and other facilities. Images have also shown the construction of a militarygrade airport and a development project of dubious commercial viability.”289 Cambodia has denied the agreement. Strategic requirement: A potential logistics facility at Ream would be representative of China’s anticipated overseas basing strategy through 2030, and likely similar to its facility in Djibouti. 

1: 140 m Possible PLAN supp

option, maintenance 

and floating docks mak

possible. 2 x 60 x 17 m 

docks. Barracks, 2 h

Can support small s

combatants up to Typ

corvette size; 2 Type 

frigate or 056A cor

Port of Walvis Bay, Namibia

8,622 nm via Cape of Good Hope 

BRI: The Walvis Bay Expansion Project is a critical BRI project for China.290

Debt: Debt to China is not seen as a significant factor in Namibian-Chinese relations. Gulf of Aden: Namibia has no known replenishment port calls on Gulf of Aden deployments. Government support: No significant military sales, however in 2018 Namibia’s president said 

3: 908 m, 

600 m, 

504 m 

Berthing will depen

commercial activ

Theoretically any PLA

combatant can be bert

container docks can 

least 12 x Type 056 co

at least 8 x Type 0

destroyers, for examp

floating docks (2 x 13

192 m). Minima
China was not colonizing Africa, indicating some level of support.291

Foreign basing: No known permanent foreign military bases. Chinese basing: In 2014 reports emerged that China was in discussions to establish a military base at Walvis Bay, in addition to other locations. As the Africa Center for Security Studies’ Paul Nantulya wrote, “The Namibian press has speculated that China seeks to establish naval facilities in Walvis Bay using the Djibouti model, pointing to similarities with the approach China used to acquire its Djibouti base, a process that started with the construction of a deep water port.”292

Strategic requirement: In 2018 China’s ambassador to Namibia called the Walvis Bay port China’s “most brilliant pearl” on Africa’s Atlantic coast.293 Existing infrastructure could 

support nearl

y all PLAN surface combatants. 

Gwadar Port, Pakistan

5,500 nm BRI: Gwadar is a critical component of the BRI 

through the China–Pakistan Economic Corridor (CPEC) and one of the primary sites mentioned in open sources for China’s potential next overseas base.294 Pakistan has received the 

most BRI funding of any country worldwide, at nearly $44 billion. Pakistan’s other two ports in Karachi and Qasim reportedly have no further space for expansion. Debt: Pakistani debt to China is significant, with the Council on Foreign Relations estimating nearly 7% of Pakistan’s GDP. Gulf of Aden: The PLAN frequently stops at Karachi Port for replenishment on Gulf of Aden task force missions. Government support: China-Pakistan cooperation is significant, with multiple joint military exercise including Warrior VII and joint naval drills in 2020. It has also supplied Pakistan with si

gnificant arms sales, includin

g ei

ght Type 

2: 600 m, 

100 m 

Pakistani Navy often us

so supporting PLAN 

would be possible, par

joint operations. Helipa

local area. Minima

bunkering. Dependen

activity levels but berth

can accommodate 

number of PLAN s

combatants includin

smaller dock can berth 

056A corvette, larger d

berth 2 x Type 052

destroyers, or 1 x CV 

DDG/CG, or 4 x Typ

frigates. 
041 submarines, Wing Loong UAVs, JF-17 fighters, helicopters, and Type 054A frigates. Foreign basing: No permanent foreign military bases. Chinese basing: In early 2018, the South China Morning Post reported that China was close to setting up a naval base similar to that in Djibouti, quoting Beijing-based military analyst Zhou Chenming that “China needs to set up another base in Gwadar for its warships because Gwadar is now a civilian port.” A PLA source argued that it must be separate from the commercial port because “Gwadar port can’t provide specific services for warships... Public order there is in a mess. It is not a good place to carry out military logistical support.” Other reports suggest that PLAN marines could be deployed to protect Gwadar from terrorist threats.295 The Pakistani Navy often uses 

facilities in Gwadar so supporting PLAN activity would be possible, particularly in joint operations. Strategic requirement: The site would also make sense from a military logistics perspective, as it is within the Y-20’s maximum range from Chengdu-Qionglai airbase in China. However, to date, there have been no open source indications – either through reporting or through satellite imagery – that China and Pakistan have moved forward with plans to develop a formal military base.296 As another study noted, “there 

seems little or no evidence that a naval base facility is part of the package, or indeed that China has any current intention or capacity to maintain an Indian Ocean fleet for which Gwadar could be a base.”297
Karachi Port, Pakistan

5,350 nm BRI: Overall Pakistan has the highest amount 

of BRI investment of any country, with 57 projects. Karachi is home to the PeshawarKarachi Motorway project as well as the Karachi Circular Railway. 

Debt: Pakistani debt to China is significant, with 

the Council on Foreign Relations estimating nearly 7% of Pakistan’s GDP. Gulf of Aden: The PLAN frequently stops at Karachi Port for replenishment on Gulf of Aden task force missions. Government support: China-Pakistan cooperation is significant, with multiple joint military exercise including Warrior VII and joint naval drills in 2020. It has also supplied Pakistan with significant arms sales, including eight Type 041 submarines, Wing Loong UAVs, JF-17 fighters, helicopters, and Type 054A frigates. Foreign basing: No permanent foreign military bases. Chinese basing: As noted above, Gwadar has frequently been rumored as China’s next overseas military base. Strategic requirement: A previous study has suggested that the “port at Karachi would be better able to satisfy PLAN requirements than the new port at Gwadar.”298 Massive 

commercial complex suggests PLAN is likely to use military berths unless advance notice is given. However, 1235 m dock, capable of supporting larger surface combatants, has been used to support PLAN port visits in the past. Additionally, the Il-76s involved with the 2011 Libya NEO also conducted a refueling stop in Karachi, which could also be a future site for overseas airfield access. 

6: 1235 m, 

960 m, 600 m, 575 m, 500 m, 

340 m 

Massive commercial 

suggests PLAN is like

military berths unless 

notice is given. Sub

maintenance facilitie

area. Multiple comm

facilities. Naval base 

could accommodate 

Type 052D DDGs. S

number of vessels smaller ships likely 

Pakistani Navy pres
Luganville Wharf, Vanuatu

4,103 nm BRI: Vanuatu has been a key recipient of 

Chinese BRI funding, particularly for the Chinese-built and financed Luganville Wharf. Debt: Australia has expressed particular concern over the loan (that it could fall victim to a “debt equity swap” similar to Sri Lanka’s Hambantota Port) and reports of a permanent base given its close proximity.299

Gulf of Aden: No known replenishment stops on Gulf of Aden missions. Government support: China’s support for Vanuatu has primarily been financial without significant arms sales. Foreign basing: No known foreign military bases. Chinese basing: In 2018, several news organizations reported that China approached Vanuatu about developing a permanent military presence in the country. According to the Sydney Morning Herald, “Multiple sources said Beijing’s military ambition in Vanuatu would likely be realized incrementally, possibly beginning with an access agreement that would allow Chinese naval ships to dock routinely and be serviced, refueled and restocked. This arrangement could then be built on.”300

Strategic requirement: In response to reports that China has informally approached Vanuatu about a potential military base, analysts have argued that such a move could be to protect foreign Chinese nationals living and working in Southeast Asia, as the island’s location is not otherwise of obvious 

geostrate

gic importance. 

1: 360 m Limited dock space an

support facilities would 

additional activity supossible preposition

resupply materials to 

PLAN operations. P

second dock under co

approximately 1 km 

existing dock

Lekki Port, Nigeria

~10,480 nm 

BRI: In October 2019, the China Development Bank loaned $629 million to “accelerate the completion of Lekki Deep Seaport project”, of which China Harbour Engineering Company (CHEC) owns the majority of shares.301

Debt: Nigeria reportedly owes more debt to China than an

y other country.302

1: 129 m Massive commercial 

suggests PLAN is like

military berths unless 

notice is given. Mass

facility serving comm

interests. Maintenance 

in the area. Multiple ta
Gulf of Aden: No known replenishment port calls on Gulf of Aden deployments. The PLAN has had a port call at other ports in the Gulf of Guinea that are also BRI / Maritime Silk Road sites, including the Tincan Island port.303

Government support: Nigerians have high views of China, with 80% expressing positive opinion of China in 2014.304

Foreign basing: No known permanent foreign military bases. Chinese basing: Unlike Walvis Bay, there does not appear to be significant local media speculation about a future PLAN base. Strategic requirement: Similar to Walvis Bay in that the site is one of major BRI investment that could give the PLAN a replenishment node on the Atlantic Ocean in Africa. 

suggest refueling ca

container port, military 

m dock can accommo

Type 056 corvette or 

054A frigate. Larger v

possible dependin

positioning. 77 m pie

possibly berth 1 x Ty

corvette each, or a Ty

frigate depending on p

101 m pier may be civ

therefore less likely to 

Port Victoria, Seychelles

5,530 nm BRI: No major BRI projects. 

Debt: Debt to China does not appear to be a significant impediment to relations. Gulf of Aden: No confirmed replenishment stops on Gulf of Aden missions. Government support: President Danny Faure visited China to further Chinese investment in the Seychelles through the BRI in September 2018.305

Foreign basing: The Seychelles signed a revised deal with India for a military base on the Seychelles’ Assumption Island.306

Chinese basing: In December 2011, Seychelles announced that it had invited China to establish a military presence on the island of Mahe to further its antipiracy operations. Seychelles Foreign Minister Jean Paul Adam said: "China is studying this possibility because [it] has economic interests in the region and Beijing is also involved in the fight against piracy." Like Djibouti, the Seychelles were one of seven sites considered by experts from China’s NRI in 2014 for China’s next overseas facility.307

8: 60 m, 

73 m, 106 m, 121 m, 

158 m, 220 m, 265 m, 

370 m 

Multiple smaller docks 

the possibility of berthin

number of ships. How

370 m dock is likely 

option given it is a relat

container port. The 60 

docks are possibly too 

be of use. The 106 m 

could berth a Type 

corvettes. The 121, 2

265 m docks could ber

combatant such as 

052D destroyers, while 

m dock's proximity to t

dock makes berthing 

combatant such as a T

frigate or 056 corvett

likely. Airport nearby. T

suggests refueling ca

multiple berths, po

maintenance faci
Strategic requirement: The Djibouti base likely obviates the immediate need for a similar base in Seychelles, particularly as the Djibouti base was developed following the offer from the Seychelles. The port does have multiple smaller docks that suggest the possibility of berthing a large number of PLAN ships. 

Sittwe Port, Myanmar

3,828 nm BRI: China is building a deep-water port near 

Sittwe and also proposed building an economic corridor through Rakhine that would include roads and rail lines from China’s Yunnan Province.308 Other BRI projects include the 

Kyaukpyu Deep Sea Tanker Port and Kyaukpyu Special Economic Zone, Dawei Port, Myistone Dam, and Muse-Mandalay Railway. Debt: 56.5% of 2017 inward foreign direct investment came from China.309 In 2019 it was 

estimated that 40% of Myanmar’s debt is held by China.310

Gulf of Aden: No known Gulf of Aden replenishment stops. Government support: China has sought closer military ties with Myanmar and has been “restrained” in its comments about the Rohingya despite international condemnation of Myanmar and has attempted to mediate the crisis.311 It 

should also be noted that Chairman Xi visited Myanmar on 17-18 January 2020, with the two sides agreeing to strengthen their BRI commitments, pushing to finalize a deal for Kyaukpyu port for US$1.3 billion. During the visit Xi was expected to meet with Myanmar military chief General Min Aung Hlaing.312

Foreign basing: Myanmar’s 2008 constitution explicitly forbids the deployment of foreign troops on Myanmar soil, meaning that the constitution would need to be changed for China to establish a permanent military presence.313 Unless this 

occurs, preferred access to commercial facilities is si

gnificantl

y more likel

y. 

2: 274 m, 

73 m 

Possibly useful as a r

base provided supp

prepositioned. Berth w

for supply loading. No 

significant POL storag

possible storage fa

Smaller berth likely un

Larger berth can supp

major PLAN surf

combatants. 3 x Typ

corvettes or 2 x Typ

frigates may be possi

larger DDG or CG also 
Chinese basing: Like Djibouti, Sittwe was one of seven sites considered by experts from China’s NRI in 2014 for China’s next overseas facility.314

Strategic requirement: A naval base at Sittwe (or at the nearby Chinese-developed Kyaukpyu port), combined with the China-Myanmar Economic Corridor, would give the PLA convenient access to the Indian Ocean with overland resupply potential through the economic corridor. As Monica Wang noted at the Council on Foreign Relations, “building a military facility [at Sittwe] could help the Chinese manage traffic passing through the Strait of Malacca from the west. It also marks the start of the Myanmar pipeline, which supplies crude oil to southwestern China.”315The port currently 

contains one larger berth (274 m) that could support most PLAN surface combatants, including three Type 056 corvettes, two Type 054A frigates, or one larger destroyer. There is a berth with crane for supply loading and three storage facilities, but no significant petroleum, oil, and lubricant (POL) storage, which would be important for naval replenishment. Kyaukpyu port could be an additional long-term option for PLAN / PLAAF development, assuming successful conclusion of the BRI investment and deepenin

g of military ties. 

Duqm Port, Oman

~ 5,600 nm 

BRI: Oman is a critical part of the BRI, joining in 2018. In addition to Duqm are various oil and gas projects including several with China’s Power Construction Corp. Duqm could decrease the importance of the Strait of Hormuz, as fewer ships would need to enter the Strait to access oil and other products.316

Debt: Oman has a high amount of sovereign debt, although the amount to China is unclear. Gulf of Aden: While Duqm has not been a replenishment stop for Gulf of Aden missions, 

5: 2260 m, 

1020 m, 

800 m, 747 m, 

450 m 

Large docks availabl

berthing a large PLAN 

group possible. Am

regular commercial t

unknown at this time 

ongoing construction

sections under const

Two 400 m drydo
Port Salalah has been the PLAN’s most frequent stop. Government support: The two countries agreed to increase cooperation in November 2019. Foreign basing: Hosts several foreign military bases. Chinese basing: Duqm’s potential as a Chinese base is primarily a result of significant Chinese investment and the geostrategic logic rather than concrete evidence. Strategic requirement: Of significant geostrategic importance due to location along Gulf of Aden, Gulf of Oman, and Strait of Hormuz. Large sections are under construction, so its capabilities for PLAN vessels and infrastructure are unknown, although there are few concrete indications that Duqm will evolve into anything more than a replenishment stop for PLAN vessels. However, Duqm is at the western edge of the Y-20’s maximum range (5,200 km with 51,000 kg payload) from the Chengdu-Qionglai airbase, meaning that it could provide pivotal replenishment access to Africa and Middle East for the PLAAF from China (see map at Figure 5). The United States also signed a port deal for facilities and ports at Salalah and Duqm in March 2019 in case access through the Strait of Hormuz is denied b

y Iran.317

Chittagong Port, Bangladesh 

3,980 nm BRI: Chinese imports were 5.8% of 2017 GDP 

and Bangladesh is an important BRI country, with $23.3 billion in BRI investments and construction projects (eighth most worldwide).318

These include the Padma Rail Link, Natural Gas project, and the Shaka-Chattogram Rail Route. Notably however, a May 2019 Lowy Institute analysis said that none of China’s Bangladeshi BRI projects were “strategically controversial”, although India has voiced concerns over 

2: 127 m, 

104 m 

Possible PLAN supp

option, can support sub

experienced naval 

maintenance facilitie

floating dock make 

possible. 117 m floati

Naval base experien

serving surface comba

submarines, bunkering 

in the area. Can supp

surface combatants i
proposed Chinese-constructed ports at Chittagong. Debt: Debt to China represents 4.4% of GDP according to the Council on Foreign Relations. Gulf of Aden: No known replenishment stops on task force missions. Government support: Bangladesh is a major importer of Chinese weapons, including naval vessels, missiles, tanks, and fighters. China also donated two aging Type 053H3 frigates to Bangladesh in December 2019.319

Foreign basing: No permanent overseas military bases. Chinese basing: Jane’s satellite imagery analysis echoes that of Yung and Rustici, in that the port meets many criteria necessary for military use. Yung and Rustici note that “only Chittagong port in Bangladesh has most of the physical features necessary to support major combat operations.”320 The Chinese-sponsored 

Payra port is unlikely to be used for Chinese surface vessels as the port “must be approached by a 75-kilometre-long canal being dredged through mudflats.”321

Strategic requirement: A base would provide China access and replenishment in the Indian Ocean. 

Type 054A frigates a

corvettes; smaller do

berth 1 Type 056 co

larger dock can berth 

056 corvette or Type 

frigate. 

Kota Kinabalu, Malaysia

1,911 nm BRI: Malaysia has received the sixth-most BRIrelated construction and investment funding 

worldwide, with $31.4 billion. Projects include the East Coast and Germas-Johor Bahru Railways, among others. 

Debt: China is Malaysia’s largest export market 

and Malaysia’s Prime Minister Mahathir Mohamad has resisted what he calls China’s “debt trap” although debt to China does not currently seem to be a problem.322

Gulf of Aden: There have been no known replenishment port calls on Gulf of Aden 

3: 350 m, 

250 m, 

200 m 

Naval base experien

serving surface comba

submarines, bunkering 

in the area. Airport n

hardened bunkers for 

ammunition stora
deployments or any known news reports on a basing offer or request. Government support: Malaysia purchased four offshore patrol vessels from China in 2017. The two countries have overlapping claims in the South China Sea.323

Foreign basing: Malaysia does have experience permanently hosting foreign militaries, with the Royal Australian Air Force at Royal Malaysian Air Force Base Butterworth. Chinese basing: In 2015, following a visit from PLAN commander Admiral Wu Shengli, Malaysia granted China stopover rights at Kota Kinabalu Port. The port is already open to stopovers by Western navies. According to Hoo Tiang Boon of Singapore’s Nanyang Technological University, this move should be seen as a “gesture of neutrality” rather than an indication that the port was necessarily destined to become a PLAN base.324

Strategic requirement: Access would provide replenishment opportunities directly outside the first island chain. 

Port Salalah, Oman

~5,600 nm 

BRI: Duqm is to date the most important BRI project in Oman. In addition to Duqm are various oil and gas projects including several with China’s Power Construction Corp. Duqm could decrease the importance of the Strait of Hormuz, as fewer ships would need to enter the Strait to access oil and other products.325

Debt: Oman has a high amount of sovereign debt, although the amount to China is unclear. Gulf of Aden: A frequent replenishment stop for PLAN Gulf of Aden task force visits. Government support: Chinese top advisor Yang Wang visited Oman in November 2019, with the two countries agreeing to increase BRI investment, including infrastructure construction, industrial parks, and energy and innovation.326

8: 2200 m, 

1267 m, 

602 m, 515 m, 445 m, 284 m, 

195 m, 67 

m 

Berthing will depen

commercial activ

Theoretically any PLA

combatant can be bert

container docks can 

least 17 x Type 0

destroyers, for exa

indicating space exis

substantial surface w

group. Airport nearby. 

bunkering facilities, ta

and apparent facil

refueling. 
Foreign basing: Oman hosts several foreign military bases. Chinese basing: Port Salalah is primarily considered because it is the most frequent Gulf of Aden replenishment stop and would provide refueling at the edge of the Y-20’s range. Strategic requirement: Similar to Duqm Port; of significant geostrategic importance. Likely outside of Y-20 range from Chengdu-Qionglai without in-flight refueling. PLAN berthing would depend on commercial traffic, although there is space for an

y PLAN surface combatant. 

Colombo Port, Sri Lanka

4,030 nm BRI: The Port City and harbor is the largest BRI 

project in Sri Lanka, and is developed by the China Communication Construction company. Debt: Debt to China represents 9.5% of Sri Lanka’s GDP. Gulf of Aden: Several stops on Gulf of Aden replenishment missions. Government support: China donated a Type 053 frigate to Sri Lanka in June 2019.327

Foreign basing: No permanent foreign military bases. Chinese basing: Several Chinese submarines docked at Colombo in late 2014 despite Indian concerns, although Sri Lanka later rejected a Chinese request to dock its submarines in 2017, following “fierce opposition” from India.328

Strategic requirement: The port has significant capacity to dock PLAN vessels, but the large scale of commercial traffic renders this less likely. Potential PLAN use / creation of facilities in Sri Lanka must be viewed within context of broader India – China rivalry, which includes economic and military competition. Following the January 2020 visit to Myanmar by Chairman Xi, Archana Atmakuri, a research analyst at the National University of Singapore, said that port development projects (including those in Sri Lanka) are feel like an “encirclement strategy

13: 1200 

m, 940 m, 

650 m, 645 m, 600 m, 425 m, 410 m, 380 m, 367 m, 362 m, 273 m, 200 m, 

128 m 

13 large docks and m

smaller piers sugges

number of vessels c

accommodated. How

large scale of commer

renders this less like

possible that PLAN 

combatants could ma

the sheltered harb

maintenance facilitie

degree dependent 

amount of commercia

the area. Multiple dry 

Large maintenance 
towards India.”329 This echoes the String of 

Pearls theory, although there are limited indications that many of these sites – including those are Hambantota and Colombo – are intended to be developed into formal military bases or even military logistics bases. Regardless of China’s intentions, India has expanded its military basing in the Indian Ocean Region partly as a result, including signing a revised deal for a military base on the Se

ychelles’ Assumption Island.330

Dar es Salaam, Tanzania

6,504 nm BRI: Tanzania has received $10.9 in BRI related 

investments and construction funding, 17th-most 

worldwide. Tanzania and the China Merchants Holdings have had a setback over the development of the Bagamoyo Port (75 km from Dar es Salaam), with Tanzania suspending the project indefinitely in June 2019 and the two sides failing to come to an agreement in October 2019 follow-up talks. The disagreements center on terms of deal, related to factors like the length of the lease, taxes, and ability to operate other businesses.331Debt: Debt to China does not appear to be a major factor in relations. Gulf of Aden: The PLAN has visited Dar es Salaam port for friendly and replenishment visits. Government support: Tanzania and China have expanded ties, with the more than 350 Chinese nationals living and working in the country.332 The two countries conducted a 25-

day-long military exercise known as Sincere Partners 2019 from December 2019 to 16 January 2020. Foreign basing: No permanent foreign military bases. Chinese basing: Like Djibouti, Dar es Salaam was one of seven sites considered by experts from China’s NRI in 2014 for China’s next overseas facility.333

4: 74 m 

(military), 

326 m, 770 m, 

1260 m 

Large amount of civili

suggests PLAN presen

most likely take adva

military dock unless a

notice is given. Two-si

dock could possibly b

Type 056A corvettes. 

tank farms suggest r

capability, container po

dock. 
Strategic requirement: If the Bagamoyo deal does go through, that could be an additional site for long-term monitoring as a PLAN logistics node. 

Mombasa Port, Kenya

6,448 nm BRI: Overall Kenya has received $9.2 billion in 

BRI-related investments and construction projects, including the SGR, Africa Economic Zone (AEZ) industrial park from the Guangdong New South Group. Debt: In December 2018 it emerged that Kenya risks losing control of Mombasa Port to China if it defaults on a $2.3 billion loan for the MombasaNairobi standard gauge railway (SGR) to China Exim Bank, for which the port’s assets are collateral.334 There is concern that Mombasa 

Port is another example of predatory lending. However, interviews by scholar Huang Zhengli suggest that China is unlikely to actually take control of Mombasa Port even in the event of default, as doing so would be a strategic and public relations disaster for the BRI following the predatory lending accusations following Hambantota. China would reportedly be concerned that another port takeover would undermine its larger BRI strategy.335

Gulf of Aden: No known replenishment port calls on Gulf of Aden deployments. Government support: Chinese arms sales have been relatively limited. Foreign basing: Kenya hosts a British Army training unit. Chinese basing: No known news reports on a basing offer or request. Strategic requirement: A large amount of civilian traffic suggests PLAN presence would most likely take advantage of the existing military dock unless advance notice is given. 245 m dock could berth 2 Type 056 corvette or one larger surface combatant. 164 m dock could 

8: 880 m, 

840 m, 780 m, 730 m, 350 m, 

245 m 

(military), 

230 m, 

164 m 

(military) 

Large amount of civili

suggests PLAN presen

most likely take adva

military dock unless a

notice is given. 245 

could berth 2 Type 

corvettes or one large

combatant. 164 m do

berth one surface com

to Type 052D DDG, 

Type 055 DDG. Airpo

Tank farms suggest r

capability. Naval bas

area. Multiple comm

facilities. 
berth one surface combatant up to Type 052D destroyer, possibly Type 055 destroyer. 

Luanda Port, Angola

9,519 nm via Cape of Good Hope 

BRI: Angola has received $9.5 billion in BRI investments and construction contracts, including for the Benguela Railway (by the China Railway 20 Bureau Group Corporation).336

Debt: Angola is heavily indebted to China with US$22.8 billion in debts as of Q1 2019, and has used its oil as collateral for Chinese credit. Dependent on oil market prices for collateral stability.337

Gulf of Aden: No known replenishment port calls on Gulf of Aden deployments. Government support: Visited by Chinese military delegation in June 2019 with pledge to increase defense ties. According to Angolan President Joao Lourenco, “Angola and China have the same or similar positions on many international affairs, understanding and supporting each other's concerns on core interests.” 338

Foreign basing: No permanent foreign military bases. Chinese basing: No known news reports on a basing offer or request. Strategic requirement: A base or host country on the West African coast would be very beneficial for China’s longterm presence in the Atlantic. 

6: 1473 m, 

1093 m, 1073 m, 

385 m, 345 m, 

161 m 

Berthing will depen

commercial activ

Theoretically any PLA

combatant can be bert

container docks can 

least 19 Type 052D de

for example, indicatin

exists for a substantia

warfare group. Airpor

Apparent bunkering f

tank farm, and appare

for refueling. 
Hambantota Port, Sri Lanka

~ 3,900 nm 

BRI: In addition to Hambantota, the Colombo Port City and harbor is the largest BRI project in Sri Lanka and is developed by the China Communication Construction company. Debt: Hambantota has been one of the primary examples that critics use to accuse China of predatory lending through the BRI. Gulf of Aden: Colombo, rather than Hambantota, is a frequent replenishment stop on Gulf of Aden missions. Government support: Relatively minor arms sales, including second-hand frigate sale in 2016. Foreign basing: No known permanent foreign military bases. Chinese basing: The BRI-financed port of Hambantota has long been rumored as the potential site for a PLA base, particularly following its handover to China in December 2017. The New York Times notes that “Though 

Chinese officials and analysts have insisted that China’s interest in the Hambantota port is purely commercial, Sri Lankan officials said that from the start, the intelligence and strategic possibilities of the port’s location were part of the negotiations.” Indian officials were fearful that the deal always had a military component, leading them to ask Sri Lanka forbid use by the PLA: “Sri Lankan officials are quick to point out that the agreement explicitly rules out China’s military use of the site. But others also note that Sri Lanka’s government, still heavily indebted to China, could be pressured to allow it.”339 Like 

Djibouti, Hambantota was one of seven sites considered by experts from China’s NRI in 2014 for China’s next overseas facility.340

Strategic requirement: PLAN use would be dependent on commercial port activity levels, but berthing space can accommodate a large number of PLAN surface combatants. China 

4: 2 x 836 

m, 460 m, 

720 m 

PLAN support is depe

civilian activity. Bunker

and 2 refueling berth

expeditionary suppor

Dependent on port act

but berthing space 

accommodate a large 

of PLAN surface com

including CVs 
donated a Type 053 frigate to Sri Lanka in June 2019.341

Great Coco Island, Myanmar

~3,600 nm 

BRI: BRI projects include the Kyaukpyu Deep Sea Tanker Port and Kyaukpyu Special Economic Zone, Dawei Port, Myistone Dam, and Muse-Mandalay Railway. Debt: In 2019 it was estimated that 40% of Myanmar’s debt is held by China.342

Gulf of Aden: No known replenishment port calls on Gulf of Aden deployments. Government support: It should also be noted that Chairman Xi visited Myanmar on 17-18 January, with the two sides agreeing to strengthen their BRI commitments, pushing to finalize a deal for Kyaukpyu port for US$1.3 billion. During the visit Xi was expected to meet with Myanmar military chief General Min Aung Hlaing.343

Foreign basing: Myanmar’s 2008 constitution explicitly forbids the deployment of foreign troops on Myanmar soil, meaning that the constitution would need to be changed for China to establish a permanent military presence.344

Chinese basing: Long rumored (since the 

1990s) to house a secret PLA SIGINT base, but satellite imagery suggests there is not significant evidence to support these rumors. Myanmar has admitted that China has assisted with local civil and military infrastructure upgrades (there is currently a runway under construction near the dock, for example), but has denied a Chinese facility on the island. In 2005 India’s Chief of Naval Staff told reporters that India has “firm information that there is no listening post, radar or surveillance station belonging to the Chinese on Coco Islands.”345

Strategic requirement: Jane’s previously detailed the geostrategic advantages of a base at Sittwe, but a base at Great Coco Island would 

1: 100 m Dock could theoretical

large surface comba

apparent shallow wate

dock makes this prob

without dredging. 1 r

under construction, 2

(estimate). 
not have the same overland access advantages that Sittwe would. 
84 

Appendix C: Satellite Imagery of Potential Overseas Chinese Bases
85 
86 
87 
88 
89 
90 
91 
92 
93 
94 
95 
96 
97 
98 
99 
100 
101 
102 

 
103 

Endnotes 

1 亚丁湾上的中国担当 [“Chinese role on the Gulf of Aden”]. PLA Daily. December 24, 2019. 

http://military.people.com.cn/n1/2019/1224/c1011-31520247.html

2 Viola Zhou and Sarah Zheng, “China commissions new naval supply ship,” August 1, 2017, 

https://www.scmp.com/news/china/diplomacy-defence/article/2105010/china-commissions-new-naval-supply-ship 3 Joel Wuthnow, “The PLA Beyond Asia: China’s Growing Military Presence in the Red Sea Region,” National Defense University 

Institute for National Strategic Studies Strategic Forum, January 2020 4 Nevertheless, China’s involvement in Central Asia is important. For example, see Catherine Putz, “China in Tajikistan: New Report 

Claims Chinese Troops Patrol Large Swaths of the Afghan-Tajik Border,” The Diplomat, June 18 2019, 

https://thediplomat.com/2019/06/china-in-tajikistan-new-report-claims-chinese-troops-patrol-large-swaths-of-the-afghan-tajik-border/ 5 “China’s National Defense in the New Era”, State Council Information Office of the People’s Republic of China, July 2019, 

http://en.people.cn/n3/2019/0724/c90000-9600021.html 6 China Military Logistics Encyclopedia [中国军事后勤百科全书] (Beijing: Golden Shield Publishing House [金盾出版社], August 

2002), vol. I, 43.

7 Addressing corruption, particularly in the former General Logistic Department (GLD), was also a driver of reform. This section is 

focused on articulating the motivation for China’s move toward a stronger joint logistics system

8 Li Dianren [李殿仁] et al., “Foreword” [前言], Study on the Development of Joint Commanding Officers [联合作战指挥人才培养] 

(Beijing: National Defense University Press [国防大学出版社], 2008), 1. 

9 U.S.-China Economic and Security Review Commission, “2018 Annual Report to Congress, Section 2: China’s Military 

Reorganization and Modernization: Implications for the United States”, November 14, 2018, 

https://www.uscc.gov/sites/default/files/2019-09/Chapter%202%20Section%202-

%20China's%20Military%20Reorganization%20and%20Modernization,%20Implications%20for%20the%20United%20States_0.pdf

10 “China’s National Defense in the New Era”, State Council Information Office of the People’s Republic of China, July 2019, 

http://en.people.cn/n3/2019/0724/c90000-9600021.html

11 LeighAnn Luce and Erin Richter, “Handling Logistics in a Reformed PLA”, Chairman Xi Remakes the PLA, National Defense 

University Press, 2019, page 258, https://ndupress.ndu.edu/Portals/68/Documents/Books/Chairman-Xi/Chairman-Xi.pdf 12 Luce and Richter, page 258 and Kevin McCauley, “Modernization of PLA Logistics: Joint Logistic Support Force”, Testimony before 

the U.S.-China Economic and Security Review Commission: China’s Military Reforms and Modernization: Implications for the United

States, February 15, 2018, https://www.uscc.gov/sites/default/files/McCauley_Written%20Testimony.pd 13 “Defense Ministry Holds News Conference on Joint Logistic Support System Reform”, China Military Online, September 14, 2016, 

http://eng.chinamil.com.cn/view/2016-09/14/content_7258622.htm 14 Zhou Bo, “The Future of the PLA”, Foreign Policy, August 6, 2019, https://foreignpolicy.com/2019/08/06/the-future-of-the-pla/ 15 China’s National Defense in the New Era”, State Council Information Office of the People’s Republic of China, July 2019, 

http://en.people.cn/n3/2019/0724/c90000-9600021.html 16 Michael Peck, “China Is Tripling the Size of Its Marine Corps”, The National Interest, November 2, 2019, 

https://nationalinterest.org/blog/buzz/china-tripling-size-its-marine-corps-92891 17 Ankit Panda, “China Dispatches New Naval Fleet for Gulf of Aden Escort Mission”, The Diplomat, December 11, 2018, 

https://thediplomat.com/2018/12/china-dispatches-new-naval-fleet-for-gulf-of-aden-escort-mission/ 18 “The Bab el-Mandeb Strait is a strategic route for oil and natural gas shipments”, The U.S. Energy Information Administration, 

August 27, 2019, https://www.eia.gov/todayinenergy/detail.php?id=41073 19 Zhou Bo, “The Future of the PLA”, Foreign Policy, August 6, 2019, https://foreignpolicy.com/2019/08/06/the-future-of-the-pla/ 20 “China sends new naval fleet for escort mission”, Xinhua, December 9, 2018, 

https://www.chinadaily.com.cn/a/201812/09/WS5c0cf250a310eff30328feef.html 21 Ibid.

22 Department of Defense, “Annual Report to Congress: Military and Security Developments Involving the People’s Republic of China 

2018”, Office of the Secretary of Defense, May 16, 2018, page 21, https://media.defense.gov/2018/Aug/16/2001955282/-1/-1/1/2018-

CHINA-MILITARY-POWER-REPORT.PDF 23 Ryan D. Martinson, “China as an Atlantic Naval Power”, The RUSI Journal, Volume 164, 2019-Issue 7, pages 18 – 31, published 

December 16, 2019, https://www.rusi.org/publication/rusi-journal/china-atlantic-naval-power 24 Huang Panyue, “PLA medical staff in Djibouti awarded Independence Day Medal”, China Military Online, January 20, 2020, 

http://eng.chinamil.com.cn/view/2020-01/20/content_9720967.htm 25 Amy Cheng, “Will Djibouti become the latest country to fall into China’s debt trap”, Foreign Policy, July 31, 2018, 

https://foreignpolicy.com/2018/07/31/will-djibouti-become-latest-country-to-fall-into-chinas-debt-trap/

26 Liu Zhen, “US warns airmen to beware of laser attacks near China’s military base in Djibouti”, South China Morning Post, May 2, 

2018, https://www.scmp.com/news/china/diplomacy-defence/article/2144387/us-warns-airmen-beware-laser-attacks-near-chinas 27 Li Jiayao, “Multinational officers watch the China-German ‘Combined Aid-2019’ drill”, China Military Online, July 12, 2019, 

http://english.chinamil.com.cn/view/2019-07/12/content_9556296.htm 

 
104 

 28 Zhang Zhihao, “Chinese, German armed forces hold joint medical support drill”, China Daily, July 10, 2019, 

https://www.chinadaily.com.cn/a/201907/10/WS5d255702a3105895c2e7cb41_1.html 29 “China’s National Defense in the New Era”, State Council Information Office of the People’s Republic of China, July 2019, 

http://en.people.cn/n3/2019/0724/c90000-9600021.html

30 Liu Zhen, “Chinese troops in first joint medical drill with major NATO power in Europe”, South China Morning Post, July 9, 2019, 

https://www.scmp.com/news/china/military/article/3017936/chinese-troops-first-joint-medical-drill-major-nato-power

31 Ibid. 

32 Ibid.

33 “Germany hosts Chinese troops for special training exercise”, Deutsche Welle, https://www.dw.com/en/germany-hosts-chinesetroops-for-special-training-exercise/av-49618363 34 Yao Jianjing, “China, Israel vow to enhance military logistics cooperation”, China Military Online, February 21, 2017, 

http://eng.chinamilcom.cn/view/2017-02/21/content_7496087.htm 35 Huang Panyue, “Chinese general meets with British logistics delegation”, China Military Online, June 28, 2017, 

http://eng.chinamil.com.cn/view/2017-06/28/content_7655815.htm 36 “China – Latin America military logistics forum opens in Beijing”, China Military Online, July 21, 2017, 

http://eng.chinamil.com.cn/view/2017-07/21/content_7685348.htm 37 Zhang Tao, “Chief of PLA Logistical Support Department meets with New Zealand counterpart”, China Military Online, November 2, 

2011, http://eng.chinamil.com.cn/view/2017-11/02/content_7810455.htm 38 “China, S. Africa vow to boost mil-to-mil logistics exchange”, China Military Online, May 2, 2017, 

http://english.chinamil.com.cn/view/2017-05/02/content_7584899.htm 39 Ryan D. Martinson, “China as an Atlantic Naval Power”, RUSI Journal, Volume 164, 2019-Issue 7, Pages 18 – 31, December 16, 

2019, https://www.rusi.org/publication/rusi-journal/china-atlantic-naval-power 40 “MND holds press conference on CMC organ reshuffle”, China Military Online, January 21, 2016, 

http://eng.mod.gov.cn/Press/2016-01/12/content_4636293.htm 41 Ibid. 

42 Ibid. 

43 Ibid. 

44 Joel Wuthnow and Phillip C. Saunders, “Introduction”, Chairman Xi Remakes the PLA, National Defense University Press, 2019, 

page 6, https://ndupress.ndu.edu/Portals/68/Documents/Books/Chairman-Xi/Chairman-Xi.pdf 45 Xu Yi, “Chinese military to promote modular buildings and prefabricated structures”, China Military Online, December 4, 2019, 

http://eng.mod.gov.cn/news/2019-12/04/content_4856228.htm 46 Department of Defense, “Annual Report to Congress: Military and Security Developments Involving the People’s Republic of China

2019”, Office of the Secretary of Defense, May 2, 2019, page 51, https://media.defense.gov/2019/May/02/2002127082/-1/-

1/1/2019_CHINA_MILITARY_POWER_REPORT.pdf 47 习近平向武汉联勤保障基地和各联勤保障中心授予军旗并致训词, 81.cn, September 14 2016, 

http://www.81.cn/jfjbmap/content/2016-09/14/content_156617.htm 48 陈建少将已担任武汉联勤保障基地副政委, thepaper.cn, November 22, 2017, 

https://www.thepaper.cn/newsDetail_forward_1875855

49 中国人民解放军联勤保障部队, Baidu, September 13, 2016, 

https://baike.baidu.com/item/%E4%B8%AD%E5%9B%BD%E4%BA%BA%E6%B0%91%E8%A7%A3%E6%94%BE%E5%86%9

B%E8%81%94%E5%8B%A4%E4%BF%9D%E9%9A%9C%E9%83%A8%E9%98%9F/23882549?fromtitle=%E4%B8%AD%E5

%A4%AE%E5%86%9B%E5%A7%94%E8%81%94%E5%8B%A4%E4%BF%9D%E9%9A%9C%E9%83%A8%E9%98%9F&fro

mid=19962697#8; 白忠斌出任解放军联勤保障部队副司令员, Sina News, June 6, 2018, http://news.sina.com.cn/o/2018-06-06/docihcqccip0263972.shtml

50 Zang Yangfei, “PLA pipeline soldiers keep the fuel flowing”, China Daily, August 13, 2019, 

https://www.chinadaily.com.cn/a/201908/13/WS5d5200d9a310cf3e355655a9.html 51 Zhao Lei, “Upgraded PLA forces make a big impression”, China Daily, October 3, 2019, 

http://www.chinadaily.com.cn/a/201910/02/WS5d93c90fa310cf3e3556e8dd.html 52 Zhang Zhihao, “President encourages PLA logistics force”, China Daily, October 21, 2019, 

https://www.chinadaily.com.cn/a/201910/21/WS5dace947a310cf3e3557184c.html 53 “Defense Ministry Holds News Conference on Joint Logistic Support System Reform”, China Military Online, September 14, 2016, 

http://eng.chinamil.com.cn/view/2016-09/14/content_7258622.htm 54 Table derived by Jane’s using multiple sources, notably McCauley, 5-7 and Luce and Richter, 272-275. 55 McCauley, 7 

56 McCauley, 12 - 14

57 “The Military Balance”, International Institute of Strategic Studies, Routledge, February 2018, page 250. 

58 Ministry of National Defense, “National Defense Reserve Buildup”, http://eng.mod.gov.cn/ArmedForces/reserved.htm 59 Ibid. 

60 Yao Jianing, “China to reduce army reserves as part of military reform”, Global Times, March 10, 2017, 

http://eng.chinamil.com.cn/2017special/2017-03/10/content_7521739.htm 
105 

 61 Dai Sven and Yu Ning, “Reserve Logistics Support Brigade’s new annual training blood boiling ( 预备役后勤保障旅新年度训练热

血沸腾), China Military.com, January 19, 2017, http://www.81.cn/zgyby/2017-01/19/content_7447161.htm 62 Lyle Goldstein, “China’s Logistics Modernization is Changing the Pacific Military Balance”, The National Interest, February 17, 2019, 

https://nationalinterest.org/feature/chinas-logistics-modernization-changing-pacific-military-balance-44612

63 Larry Wortzel, “The Limitations of Military-Civil Mobilization: Problems with Funding and Clashing Interstes in Industry-Based PLA 

Reserve Units”, Jamestown Foundation, China Brief, Volume 19, Issue: 18, October 8, 2019, https://jamestown.org/program/thelimitations-of-military-civil-mobilization-problems-with-funding-and-clashing-interests-in-industry-based-pla-reserve-units/ 64 “Defense Ministry Holds News Conference on Joint Logistics Support System Reform”, China Military Online, September 14, 2016, 

http://eng.chinamil.com.cn/view/2016-09/14/content_7258622.htm 65 Ouyang, “PLA logistics support troops join nation’s fight against new coronavirus pneumonia”, China Military Online, January 25, 

2020, http://eng.chinamil.com.cn/view/2020-01/25/content_9725068.htm 

66 Yang Pei, Yue Song, Min Yu, “A New Approach to Organization and Implementation of Military Medical Treatment in Response to 

Military Reform and Modern Warfare in the Chinese Army”, Military Medicine, November 12, 2017, 

https://academic.oup.com/milmed/article/182/11-12/e1819/4661614 67 Huang Tianxin. “Reflections on strengthening the organizational system construction of the joint security force under the new 

system” (对新体制下加强联勤保障部队组织体系建设的思考), National Defense, 2019 Volume 01, 44-47. 

68 Ian Burns McCaslin and Andrew S. Erickson, “The Impact of Xi-Era Reforms on the Chinese Navy”, Chairman Xi Remakes the 

PLA, National Defense University Press, 2019, page, 139, https://ndupress.ndu.edu/Portals/68/Documents/Books/ChairmanXi/Chairman-Xi.pdf and Liu Wei [刘伟], ed., “Theater Joint Operations Command” [战区联合作战指挥], (Beijing: National Defense 

University Press [国防大学出版社], 2016), 293 69 Department of Defense, “Annual Report to Congress: Military and Security Developments Involving the People’s Republic of China

2019”, Office of the Secretary of Defense, May 2, 2019, page 1117, https://media.defense.gov/2019/May/02/2002127082/-1/-

1/1/2019_CHINA_MILITARY_POWER_REPORT.pdf

70 McCaslin and Erickson, 139 

71 Luce and Richter, 260 

72 Zhang Aimin. Study on the construction of joint operational logistics and equipment support forces in war zones (战区联合作战后勤

与装备保障力量建设研究[J]). Journal of the Military Transport Academy, 2018, 20(10): 27-31. 

73 Xiong Gang, Gao Jie and Guo Bin, “Demystifying the newly established Joint Support Force of the Central Military Commission (揭

秘中央军委联勤保障部队:绷紧战备弦军民融合), China Youth Daily, January 19, 2017, 11th Edition, http://mil.gmw.cn/2017-

01/19/content_23510595.htm 74 Conor M Kennedy, “China Maritime Report No. 4: Civil Transport in PLA Power Projection”, CMSI China Mariime Reports. 4, 

December 2019, page 4, https://digital-commons.usnwc.edu/cmsi-maritime-reports/4/ 75 Xu Yi, “Civilian ship debuts underway replenishment to PLA naval ships”, China Military Online, November 21, 2019, 

http://eng.mod.gov.cn/news/2019-11/21/content_4855357.htm 76 Kennedy, 29 

77 Department of Defense, “Annual Report to Congress: Military and Security Developments Involving the People’s Republic of China

2019”, Office of the Secretary of Defense, May 2, 2019, page 52, https://media.defense.gov/2019/May/02/2002127082/-1/-

1/1/2019_CHINA_MILITARY_POWER_REPORT.pdf

78 Xiong Gang, Gao Jie and Guo Bin, “Demystifying the newly established Joint Support Force of the Central Military Commission (揭

秘中央军委联勤保障部队:绷紧战备弦军民融合), China Youth Daily, January 19, 2017, 11th Edition, http://mil.gmw.cn/2017-

01/19/content_23510595.htm 

79 Guo Shijun, Luo Ting, and Qing Taiping [郭石军, 罗挺, 卿太平], “Application of IoT Technology in Integrated Military Logistics 

Information System” [物 联网技术在一体化军事物流信息系统中的应用], Logistics Technology [物流技术], no. 2 (2012), 209–212, 

available at <cf.lcchina.org.cn/docbak/5/6/d/163862_50dbea604056d.pdf>. and Luce, 265 

80 Guo Chen, Wang Nana, “CMC logistical support department announces 63 research projects for local research unit” (军委后勤保

障部 63 项科研项目面向地方公开选取承研单位), China Military Online, June 12, 2017, http://www.81.cn/jwgz/2017-

06/12/content_7635221.htm 81 Kennedy, 32 

82 “China’s National Defense in the New Era”, State Council Information Office of the People’s Republic of China, July 2019, 

http://en.people.cn/n3/2019/0724/c90000-9600021.html 

83 Zhang Aimin. Study on the construction of joint operational logistics and equipment support forces in war zones (战区联合作战后勤

与装备保障力量建设研究[J]). Journal of the Military Transport Academy, 2018, 20(10): 27-31. 

84 “China’s National Defense in the New Era”, State Council Information Office of the People’s Republic of China, July 2019, 

http://en.people.cn/n3/2019/0724/c90000-9600021.html
106 

 85 “China’s National Defense in the New Era”, State Council Information Office of the People’s Republic of China, July 2019, 

http://en.people.cn/n3/2019/0724/c90000-9600021.html 86 Zhang Zhihao, “President encourages PLA logistics force”, China Daily, October 21, 2019, 

https://www.chinadaily.com.cn/a/201910/21/WS5dace947a310cf3e3557184c.html 87 Department of Defense, “Annual Report to Congress: Military and Security Developments Involving the People’s Republic of China

2019”, Office of the Secretary of Defense, May 2, 2019, page 23, https://media.defense.gov/2019/May/02/2002127082/-1/-

1/1/2019_CHINA_MILITARY_POWER_REPORT.pdf and 

Zhang Zhihao, “President encourages PLA logistics force”, China Daily, October 21, 2019, 

https://www.chinadaily.com.cn/a/201910/21/WS5dace947a310cf3e3557184c.html 88 Zhang Zhihao, “Military hones its skills in exercise”, China Daily, January 8, 2018, 

http://www.chinadaily.com.cn/a/201801/08/WS5a52a4c0a31008cf16da592f_8.html 89 Zhang Zhihao, “Chinese, German armed forces hold joint medical support drill”, China Daily, July 10, 2019, 

https://www.chinadaily.com.cn/a/201907/10/WS5d255702a3105895c2e7cb41_1.html and Li Jiayao, “Multinational officers watch the 

China-German ‘Combined Aid-2019’ drill”, China Military Online, July 12, 2019, http://eng.mod.gov.cn/news/2019-

07/12/content_4845699.htm 90 “Peace Train-2019 China – Laos joint rescue drill kicks off”, Xinhua, August 16, 2019, www.xinhuanet.com/english/2019-

08/16/c_138314743.htm 91 “Laos dam collapse: hundreds missing after flash floods hit villages”, BBC News, YouTube, July 24, 2018, 

https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=nb1xgIqV7fM 92 Li Jiayao, “Joint medical rescue exercise promotes China-Laos military ties”, China Military Online, August 1, 2018, 

http://english.chinamil.com.cn/view/2018-08/01/content_9238778.htm 93 Yao Jianing, “China-Vietnam joint medical examination in border areas concludes”, China Military Online, August 29, 2018, 

http://english.chinamil.com.cn/view/2018-08/29/content_9266656.htm 94 Huang Panyue, “China sends H-6K bombers to Russia for strategic drills”, Global Times, September 9, 2019, 

http://english.chinamil.com.cn/view/2019-09/09/content_9614996.htm 95 Defense Ministry’s Regular Press Conference on September 26, 2019, China Military Online, September 26, 2019, 

http://eng.chinamil.com.cn/view/2019-09/27/content_9637911.htm 96 Luce and Richter, 269-270 

97 Huang Tianxin, “Reflections on strengthening the organizational system construction of the joint security force under the new 

system,” (对新体制下加强联勤保障部队组织体系建设的思考), National Defense, Volume 01 (2019): 44-47. 

98 Christopher Yung and Ross Rustici, “Not an Idea We Have to Shun”: Chinese Overseas Basing Requirements in the 21st Century, 

(Washington, D.C.: Center for the Study of Chinese Military Affairs, Institute for National Strategic Studies, National Defense

University, 2014), https://ndupress.ndu.edu/Portals/68/Documents/stratperspective/china/ChinaPerspectives-7.pdf 99 Annual Report to Congress: Military and Security Developments Involving the People’s Republic of China, Annual Report to 

Congress: Military and Security Developments Involving the People’s Republic of China § (2019). 100 Ibid. 101 McDervitt, Michael, “China’s Far Sea’s Navy: The Implications of the “Open Seas Protection” Mission,” CNA, April 2016, 

https://www.cna.org/cna_files/pdf/China-Far-Seas-Navy.pdf

102 历史告诉未来中国海军建设思想是这样衍变 [History tells the future how China's naval construction thought evolved], Xinmin 

Weekly, 24 April 2019, https://m.xinminweekly.com.cn/content/12209.html 103 Ibid. 104 Short, medium, and long-term years are estimates made by Jane’s analysts. Conor M. Kennedy, "China Maritime Report No. 4: 

Civil Transport in PLA Power Projection," (CMSI China Maritime Reports, 2019), 4; 刘嘉生, 孙大同, 彭富兵 [Liu Jiasheng, Sun 

Datong, and Peng Fubing], “基于国家安全需求的战略投送载运工具建设,” https://digitalcommons.usnwc.edu/cgi/viewcontent.cgi?article=1003&context=cmsi-maritime-reports; [“Development of Carriers for Strategic 

Projection in Response to National Security Needs”], 军事交通学院学报 [Journal of Military Transportation University], no. 2, (2019). 

http://www.en.cnki.com.cn/Article_en/CJFDTotal-JSTO201902003.htm 

105 历史告诉未来中国海军建设思想是这样衍变 [“History tells the future how China's naval construction thought evolved”], Xinmin 

Weekly, April 24, 2019. https://m.xinminweekly.com.cn/content/12209.html 106 Austin Ramzy and Chris Buckley, “‘Absolutely No Mercy’: Leaked Files Expose How China Organized Mass Detentions of 

Muslims,” New York Times, November 16, 2019, https://www.nytimes.com/interactive/2019/11/16/world/asia/china-xinjiangdocuments.html 107 Mollie Saltskog and Colin P. Clarke, “China’s Rights Abuses in Xinjiang Could Provoke a Global Terrorist Backlash,” Foreign 

Affairs, January 16, 2020, https://www.foreignaffairs.com/articles/china/2020-01-16/chinas-rights-abuses-xinjiang-could-provokeglobal-terrorist-backlash

108 Yung and Rustici, “Not an Idea We Have to Shun” 109 Xu Yi, “Civilian Ship Debuts Underway Replenishment to PLA Naval Ships - Ministry of National Defense,” China Military Online,

accessed January 29, 2020, http://eng.mod.gov.cn/news/2019-11/21/content_4855357.htm. 
107 

 110 Shou Xiaosong (寿晓松). 2013. Science of Military Strategy (战略学). Beijing: Military Science Publishing (军事科学出版社), as 

cited in Kardon, Testimony Before the U.S.-China Economic and Security Review Commission” 111 Li Jian, Chen Wenwen, and Jin Chang, “Overall Situation of Sea Power in the Indian Ocean and the Expansion in the Indian 

Ocean of Chinese Seapower” (Yinduyang haiquan geju yu Zhongguo haiquan de Yinduyang kuozhan; 印度洋海权格局与中国海权

的印度洋扩展), Pacific Journal (Taipingyang xuebao; 太平洋学报) 22, no. 5 (2014): 74-75, as cited in Downs, Erica, Jeffrey Becker 

and Patrick deGategno, “China’s Military Support Facility in Djibouti: The Economic and Security Dimensions of China’s First 

Overseas Base,” CNA, July 2017, https://apps.dtic.mil/dtic/tr/fulltext/u2/1038215.pdf 112 Wang Tianze, Qi Wenzhe, Hai Jun (王天泽, 齐文哲, 海军). 2018. “An Exploration Into Logistical Support of Transportation and 

Projection for Military Bases Abroad (海外军事基地运输投送保障探讨).” Defense Transportation Engineering and Technology (国

防交通工程与技术), no. 1, p. 34; as cited in Kardon, “Testimony before the U.S.-China Economic and Security Review Commission” 113 Several of the factors are from Erica Downs, Jeffrey Becker, and Patrick deGategno. China’s Military Support Facility in 

Djibouti: The Economic and Security Dimensions of China’s First Overseas Base, (Arlington, VA: Center for Naval Analyses, 2017), 

https://apps.dtic.mil/dtic/tr/fulltext/u2/1038215.pdf 114 “China Global Investment Tracker: American Enterprise Institute,” AEI, https://www.aei.org/china-global-investment-tracker/. 115 “China’s Military Strategy (2015),” The State Council Information Office of the People’s Republic of China, May 2015, 

https://jamestown.org/wp-content/uploads/2016/07/China%E2%80%99s-Military-Strategy-2015.pdf

116 Data on imports from China (countries’ goods imports from China as a percentage of their gross domestic product), foreign direct 

investment (using IMF data to measure the proportion of countries’ total inward FDI that comes from China), and CFR Index of Debt to 

China (CFR estimate of countries’ stocks of external debt to China as a percentage of their GDP) are from Benn Steil and Benjamin 

Della Rocca, “Belt and Road Tracker,” Council on Foreign Relations, May 8, 2019, https://www.cfr.org/article/belt-and-road-tracker 117 John Hurley, Scott Morris, and Gailyn Portelance, “Examining the Debt Implications of the Belt and Road Initiative from a Policy 

Perspective,” Center for Global Development, March 2018, https://www.cgdev.org/sites/default/files/examining-debt-implications-beltand-road-initiative-policy-perspective.pdf 118 Jonathan Hillman, “Game of Loans: How China Bought Hambantota,” Center for Strategic and International Studies, April 2 2018, 

https://www.csis.org/analysis/game-loans-how-china-bought-hambantota; Matt Ferchen and Anarkalee Perera, “Why Unsustainable 

Chinese Infrastructure Deals Are a Two-Way Street,” Carnegie-Tsinghua Center for Global Policy, July 2019, 

https://carnegieendowment.org/files/7-15-19_Ferchen_Debt_Trap.pdf 119 Data from “Importer/Exporter TIV Tables,” Stockholm International Peace Research Institute (SIPRI), 

http://armstrade.sipri.org/armstrade/page/values.php 120 Li Jian, Chen Wenwen, and Jin Chang, “Overall Situation of Sea Power in the Indian Ocean and the Expansion in the Indian 

Ocean of Chinese Seapower” (Yinduyang haiquan geju yu Zhongguo haiquan de Yinduyang kuozhan; 印度洋海权格局与中国海权

的印度洋扩展), Pacific Journal (Taipingyang xuebao; 太平洋学报) 22, no. 5 (2014): 74-75, as cited in Downs, Erica, Jeffrey Becker 

and Patrick deGategno, “China’s Military Support Facility in Djibouti: The Economic and Security Dimensions of China’s First 

Overseas Base,” CNA, July 2017, https://apps.dtic.mil/dtic/tr/fulltext/u2/1038215.pdf

121 Yung and Rustici, “Not an Idea We Have to Shun” 122 Timothy Heath, “The Ramifications of China’s Reported Naval Base in Cambodia,” World Politics Review, August 5, 2019, 

https://www.worldpoliticsreview.com/articles/28092/the-ramifications-of-china-s-reported-naval-base-in-cambodia; Jeremy Page, 

Gordon Lubold, and Rob Taylor, “Deal for Naval Outpost in Cambodia Furthers China’s Quest for Military Network,” Wall Street 

Journal, July 22, 2019, https://www.wsj.com/articles/secret-deal-for-chinese-naval-outpost-in-cambodia-raises-u-s-fears-of-beijingsambitions-11563732482. 

123 “Trace China's Growing Economic Influence,” Council on Foreign Relations, accessed January 29, 2020, 

https://www.cfr.org/article/belt-and-road-tracker. 124 Wenwen Jian, and Chang, “Overall Situation of Sea Power”; Becker Downs and deGategno, “China’s Military Support Facility”

125Hannah Beech, “A Jungle Airstrip Stirs Suspicions About China’s Plans for Cambodia,” New York Times, December 22, 2019, 

https://www.nytimes.com/2019/12/22/world/asia/cambodia-china-military-bases.html 126 Ibid. 127 Kardon, “Testimony Before the U.S.-China Economic and Security Review Commission” 128 David Brewster, “China’s new network of Indian Ocean bases.” The Interpreter. January 30, 2018. 

https://www.lowyinstitute.org/the-interpreter/chinas-new-network-indian-ocean-bases 129 Huang Panyue, “China poised to expand its Marine Corps.” China Military Online. March 15, 2017. 

http://eng.chinamil.com.cn/view/2017-03/15/content_7526499.htm 130 Wenwen Jian and Chang, “Overall Situation of Sea Power” ; Downs, Becker and deGategno, “China’s Military Support Facility” 131 Krzysztof Iwanek, “No, Pakistan’s Gwadar Port Is Not a Chinese Naval Base (Just Yet).” The Diplomat. November 19, 2019. 

https://thediplomat.com/2019/11/no-pakistans-gwadar-port-is-not-a-chinese-naval-base-just-yet/; Yung, Christopher and Ross Rustici, 

“Not an Idea We Have to Shun”: Chinese Overseas Basing Requirements in the 21st Century, Washington, D.C.: Center for the Study 

of Chinese Military Affairs, Institute for National Strategic Studies, National Defense University. 2014 

https://ndupress.ndu.edu/Portals/68/Documents/stratperspective/china/ChinaPerspectives-7.pdf 132 Stephen Marks, “Understanding China’s Strategy: Beyond ‘Non-Interference’,” in Pambazuka 

News, November 05, 2008, available at <www.pambazuka.org/en/category/books/51762> 133 Jian, Wenwen, and Chang, “Overall Situation of Sea Power” ; Downs, Becker and deGategno, “China’s Military Support Facility”
108 

 134 Dipanjan Roy Chaudhury, “India acts fast to counter Chinese moves in Myanmar,” Economic Times, July 13, 2018, 

https://economictimes.indiatimes.com/news/defence/india-acts-fast-to-counter-chinese-moves-inmyanmar/articleshow/61826389.cms?from=mdr 135 Monica Wang, “China’s Strategy in Djibouti: Mixing Commercial and Military Interests,” Council on Foreign Relations, April 13 

2018, https://www.cfr.org/blog/chinas-strategy-djibouti-mixing-commercial-and-military-interests 136 Kinling Lo, “China eyes closer military cooperation with Myanmar as it looks to expand sphere of influence near India’s borders,” 

South China Morning Post, November 23, 2017, https://www.scmp.com/news/china/diplomacy-defence/article/2121298/china-eyescloser-military-cooperation-myanmar-it-looks; Poppy McPherson, Ruma Paul, and Shoon Naing, “China struggles in new diplomatic 

role, trying to return Rohingya to Myanmar,” Reuters, January 20, 2020, https://www.reuters.com/article/us-myanmar-rohingya-chinainsight/china-struggles-in-new-diplomatic-role-trying-to-return-rohingya-to-myanmar-idUSKBN1ZJ0SY 137 “Trace China's Growing Economic Influence,” Council on Foreign Relations, accessed January 29, 2020, 

https://www.cfr.org/article/belt-and-road-tracker. 138 Bertil Lintner, “Poor and isolated, Myanmar backs into a China debt trap,” Asia Times, January 31, 2019, 

https://asiatimes.com/2019/01/poor-and-isolated-myanmar-backs-into-a-china-debt-trap/ 139 “Xinhua Headlines: Kyaukpyu port to become model project in China-Myanmar BRI cooperation,” Xinhuanet, January 18, 2020 

http://www.xinhuanet.com/english/2020-01/18/c_138716099.htm?fbclid=IwAR0BvjxDqT6TfI_DUiSeoPBE8KF1--

xs6zoH3JYbFaUjnXfxe90U_76-wV4; Zhou, Laura, “China sees Myanmar as stepping stone to Indian Ocean, energy security,” South 

China Morning Post, January 15, 2020, https://www.scmp.com/news/china/diplomacy/article/3046218/china-sees-myanmar-steppingstone-indian-ocean-energy-security 140 Gregory Poling, “Kyaukpyu: Connecting China to the Indian Ocean,” Asia Maritime Transparency Initiative, Center for Strategic 

and International Studies, April 4 2018, https://amti.csis.org/kyaukpyu-china-indian-ocean/ 141 “Oman’s Duqm, a New Port City for the Middle East?” Belt and Road News, February 11, 2019, 

https://www.beltandroad.news/2019/02/11/omans-duqm-a-new-port-city-for-the-middle-east/ 142 Phil Stewart, “With an eye on Iran, U.S. clinches strategic port deal with Oman,” Reuters, March 24, 2019, 

https://www.reuters.com/article/us-usa-oman-military/with-an-eye-on-iran-u-s-clinches-strategic-port-deal-with-omanidUSKCN1R50JD

143 Bohane, Ben. “South Pacific Nation Shrugs Off Worries on China’s Influence.” New York Times. June 13, 2018. 

https://www.nytimes.com/2018/06/13/world/asia/vanuatu-china-wharf.html; Wroe, David. “China eyes Vanuatu military base in plan 

with global ramifications.” Sydney Morning Herald. April 9, 2018. https://www.smh.com.au/politics/federal/china-eyes-vanuatu-militarybase-in-plan-with-global-ramifications-20180409-p4z8j9.html

144 Ibid. 145 Zhang Yiming, “Why Belt and Road Initiative is a Great Opportunity for Namibia,” Embassy of the People’s Republic of China in 

Namibia, May 31, 2019, http://na.china-embassy.org/eng/sgxw/t1668339.htm; Paul Nantulya, “Chinese Hard Power Supports Its 

Growing Strategic Interests in Africa,” Africa Center for Strategic Studies, January 17, 2019. https://africacenter.org/spotlight/chinesehard-power-supports-its-growing-strategic-interests-in-africa/ 146 Ibid. 147 “China's cranes to promote Namibia's port construction,” Xinhua Net, February 10, 2018, http://www.xinhuanet.com/english/2018-

02/10/c_136964590.htm

148 Jin Hao, 吉布提:人民解放军首个海外基地 [“Djibouti: People's Liberation Army's First Overseas Base”], Ifeng, April 11, 2016, 

http://news.ifeng.com/a/20160411/48414276_0.shtml

149 亚丁湾上的中国担当 [“Chinese role on the Gulf of Aden”]. PLA Daily. December 24, 2019. 

http://military.people.com.cn/n1/2019/1224/c1011-31520247.html 150 David Brewster, “China’s Moves in Vanuatu: What Should Australia Do?” The Diplomat, April 12, 2018, 

https://thediplomat.com/2018/04/chinas-moves-in-vanuatu-what-should-australia-do/. 151 Chen Zhuo,“Chinese peacekeeper: for peace, I'm ready to fight,” China Military Online, November 22, 2019. 

http://eng.chinamil.com.cn/view/2019-11/22/content_9681276.htm; “Chinese peacekeepers transfer heavily-injured Egyptian police in 

Sudan for treatment,” Xinhuanet, October 29, 2019, http://eng.chinamil.com.cn/view/2019-10/29/content_9663095.htm. 152 Cristina L. Garafola and Timothy R. Heath, The Chinese Air Force's First Steps Toward Becoming an Expeditionary Air Force. 

(Santa Monica, CA: RAND Corporation, 2017), https://www.rand.org/pubs/research_reports/RR2056.html. 153 Ibid. 154 Gabe Collins and Andrew Erickson, “Implications of China’s Military Evacuation of Citizens from Libya,” Jamestown Foundation 

China Brief 11, no. 4, March 11 2011, https://jamestown.org/program/implications-of-chinas-military-evacuation-of-citizens-from-libya/

155 Kates, Graham, “Defense Dept. decision gives China chance for foothold between U.S. and Europe,” CBS News, 

September 20, 2017, https://www.cbsnews.com/news/azores-withdrawal-gives-china-foothold-between-us-europe/ 156 Paul Ames, “China’s Atlantic stopover worries Washington,” Politico, September 29, 2016, https://www.politico.eu/article/chinasatlantic-stopover-terceira-worries-washington-li-keqiang-united-states/ 157 Philip Dorling, “Timor rejected Chinese spy offer,” Sydney Morning Herald, May 10, 2011, https://www.smh.com.au/world/timorrejected-chinese-spy-offer-20110509-1efv1.html

158 Cassandra, Garrison, “China's military-run space station in Argentina is a 'black box',” Reuters, 31 January 2019, 

https://www.reuters.com/article/us-space-argentina-china-insight/chinas-military-run-space-station-in-argentina-is-a-black-boxidUSKCN1PP0I2
109 

 159 Ernesto Londoño, “From a Space Station in Argentina, China Expands Its Reach in Latin America,” New York Times, 28 July, 

2018, https://www.nytimes.com/2018/07/28/world/americas/china-latin-america.html 160 Mehta, Aaron, “What the US needs to counter ‘unprecedented’ Chinese influence in South America,” Defense News, July 9, 2019, 

https://www.defensenews.com/pentagon/2019/07/09/what-the-us-needs-to-counter-chinese-influence-in-south-america/ 161 SIPRI Arms Transfers Database 162 Faller, Admiral Craig S., “Statement of Admiral Craig S. Faller Commander, United States Southern Command Before the 116th 

Congress Senate Armed Services Committee Subcommittee On Emerging Threats and Capabilities,” Senate Armed Services 

Committee, July 9, 2019, https://www.armed-services.senate.gov/imo/media/doc/Faller_07-09-19.pdf 163 Ibid. 164 Zamorano, Juan Kathia Martinez and JOE McDonald, “China’s construction binge spreads to Americas, rattles US,” AP News, 

April 4, 2019, https://apnews.com/01e30c76567f40ce9d5dabc20788139c; Youkee, Matt, “The Panama Canal Could Become the 

Center of the U.S.-China Trade War,” Foreign Policy, May 7, 2019, https://foreignpolicy.com/2019/05/07/the-panama-canal-couldbecome-the-center-of-the-u-s-china-trade-war/

165 Paul Mozur, Jonah M. Kessel and Melissa Chan, “Made in China, Exported to the World: The Surveillance State,” The New York 

Times, April 24, 2019, https://www.nytimes.com/2019/04/24/technology/ecuador-surveillance-cameras-police-government.html 166 Wuthnow, “The PLA Beyond Asia” 167 Andrew Erickson and Christopher Carlson, “Sustained support: the PLAN evolves its expeditionary logistics strategy,” Jane’s Navy 

International, March 9, 2016, https://janes.ihs.com/Janes/Display/jni77511-jni-2016 168 Kristen Gunness, “The Dawn of a PLA Expeditionary Force?” in NBR Special Report #80: Securing the Belt and Road Initiative: 

China's Evolving Military Engagement Along the Silk Roads, ed. Nadege Rolland, (2019). 169 “Type 901 Class,” Jane’s Fighting Ships, October 2, 2019, https://janes.ihs.com/Janes/Display/jfs_c444-jfs; “Fuchi (Type 

903/903A) class,” Jane’s Fighting Ships, September 10, 2019, https://janes.ihs.com/Janes/Display/jfs_5720-jfs_ 170 Erickson and Carlson, “Sustained Support” 171 Bei Guo Fang Wu, “PLA Navy ends era of "supply-ship troika" in its escort mission,” China Military Online, August 9, 2018, 

http://eng.chinamil.com.cn/view/2018-08/09/content_9247256.htm 172 Zhang Hailong, Lai Yonglei and Xue Chengqing, “China's 30th and 31st naval escort taskforces join forces in Gulf of Aden,” China 

Military Online, December 26, 2018, http://english.chinamil.com.cn/view/2018-12/26/content_9389069.htm. 173 Wu, Bei Guo Fang. “PLA Navy ends era of "supply-ship troika" 174 Zhang Hailong, Lai Yonglei and Xue Chengqing, “China's 30th and 31st naval escort” 175 Xue Chengqing and Cui Xiaoyang, “31st Chinese naval escort taskforce deters six suspected pirate boats,” China Military Online, 

January 25 2019, http://eng.chinamil.com.cn/view/2019-01/25/content_9414225.htm

176 第 34批护航编队起航 [“The 34th escort formation set off”], People.com.cn, December 24, 2019, 

http://military.people.com.cn/n1/2019/1224/c1011-31520270.html. 177Zhang Hailong, Lai Yonglei and Xue Chengqing, “China's 30th and 31st naval escort; Wu, Bei Guo Fang. “PLA Navy ends era of 

"supply-ship troika" 

178 “Fuchi (Type 903/903A) class,” Jane’s Fighting Ships 179 Liu Xuanzun, “Advanced supply ship conducts carrier group supplement mission,” Global Times, December 22, 2019, 

http://eng.chinamil.com.cn/view/2019-12/22/content_9701373.htm 180 Ibid. 181 Ibid. 182 Andrew Erickson, and Christopher Carlson, “Sustained support” 183 Ibid. 184 Liu Xuanzun, “Advanced supply ship” 

185 中国海军最大补给舰二号舰将入役航母与其编队将获最强战力, [“The Chinese Navy's largest supply ship No. 2 will enter 

service and its formation will receive the strongest combat power”], military.cctv.com, February 21, 2019, 

http://military.cctv.com/2019/02/21/ARTIHtUyglsboSRcx8acPPOn190221.shtml 186 “PLA Navy Amphibious Assault Ship Procurement Programme,” Jane’s Defense Procurement, 

https://janes.ihs.com/MilitaryShips/Display/17478

187 “PLA Navy Replenishment Ship Procurement Programme,” Jane’s Defense Procurement, 

https://janes.ihs.com/MilitaryShips/Display/17120

188 Viola Zhou and Sarah Zheng, “China commissions new naval supply ship,” August 1, 2017, 

https://www.scmp.com/news/china/diplomacy-defence/article/2105010/china-commissions-new-naval-supply-ship

189 Yang Xiaoping, “When India’s Strategic Backyard Meets China’s Strategic Periphery: The View from Beijing,” War 

on the Rocks, April 20, 2018, https://warontherocks.com/2018/04/when-indias-strategic-backyard-meets-chinasstrategic-periphery-the-view-from-beijing/

190 Yung and Rustici, “Not an Idea We Have to Shun”

191 Ibid. 192 Ridzwan Rahmat, “Power projection: China sharpens its carrier strike capabilities,” Jane’s Navy International, August 15, 2018, 

https://janes.ihs.com/Janes/Display/FG_1002420-JNI 193 James Maclaren, “With Its New Aircraft Carrier, Is China Now a Blue Water Navy?” The Diplomat, January 25, 2020, 

https://thediplomat.com/2020/01/with-its-new-aircraft-carrier-is-china-now-a-blue-water-navy/
110 

 194 Andrew Tate, “Growing force: China’s PLAN Marine Corps expands and evolves,” Jane’s Navy International, April 11, 2019, 

https://janes.ihs.com/Janes/Display/FG_1844745-JNI 195 Christopher Yung and Ross Rustici, “Not an Idea We Have to Shun” 196 Christopher Yung, “China’s Expeditionary and Power Projection Capabilities Trajectory: Lessons from Recent 

Expeditionary Operations,” U.S.-China Economic and Security Review Commission, January 21, 2016, 

https://www.uscc.gov/sites/default/files/USCC%20Testimony%202016_Yung.pdf 197 “Types of MAGTFS,” Marines.mil, https://www.candp.marines.mil/Organization/MAGTF/Types-of-MAGTFs/ 198 Sean O’Connor, “China building third Type 075 LHD,” Jane’s Defence Weekly, November 13, 2019, 

https://janes.ihs.com/Janes/Display/FG_2433064-JDW 199 Henri Kenhmann, “Fin (?) du programme Type 071, début du Type 075,” East Pendulum, August 5, 2019, 

http://www.eastpendulum.com/fin-du-programme-type-071-debut-du-type-075 200 Tu Juxuan, 中國 075兩棲攻擊艦釀威脅?嚴德發:我們不會讓它過來 [“China 075 amphibious assault ship threatened? Yan 

Defa: We will not let it come over”], News.ltn.com, September 25, 2019, https://news.ltn.com.tw/news/politics/breakingnews/2926165 201 Dennis Blasko and Roderick Lee, “The Chinese Navy’s Marine Corps, Part 2: Chain-of-Command Reforms and Evolving 

Training,” Jamestown Foundation China Brief, February 15, 2019, https://jamestown.org/program/the-chinese-navys-marine-corpspart-2-chain-of-command-reforms-and-evolving-training/

202 Andrew Tate, Jane’s Defence Weekly, June 11, 2019, https://janes.ihs.com/Janes/Display/FG_2075627-JDW 203 Christopher P Cavas, “No hand at the helm: US Navy pushes ahead with unmanned surface vessel development,” Jane’s Navy 

International, December 13, 2019, https://janes.ihs.com/Janes/Display/FG_2593207-JNI 204 Huang Panyue, “China builds world's first armed amphibious drone boat that can lead land assault,” Global Times, April 15, 2019, 

http://english.chinamil.com.cn/view/2019-04/15/content_9477847.htm 205 Andrew Erickson and Austin Strange, “China’s Blue Soft Power,” Naval War College Review 68 no. 1, 2015, https://digitalcommons.usnwc.edu/cgi/viewcontent.cgi?article=1182&context=nwc-review

206 联勤保障部队探索建立新型军事运输投送机制 [“Joint logistics support forces explore the establishment of a new military 

transport delivery mechanism”], China Military Online, December 31, 2019, http://www.81.cn/lqbz/2019-12/31/content_9706775.htm 207 Xu Yi, “Civilian ship debuts underway replenishment to PLA naval ships,” China Military Online, http://eng.mod.gov.cn/news/2019-

11/21/content_4855357.htm

208 “COSCO Fuzhou,” My Shipping Now, https://www.myshiptracking.com/vessels/cosco-fuzhou-mmsi-477690800-imo-9403009 209 “Group Profile,” China COSCO Shipping Corporation Limited, http://en.coscocs.com/col/col6918/index.html 210 Yung and Rustici, “Not an Idea We Have to Shun” 211 Andrew Tate, “PLAN trials underway replenishment from commercial ships,” Jane’s Defence Weekly, November 20, 2019, 

https://janes.ihs.com/Janes/Display/FG_2438028-JDW 212 Ibid. 213 Li Jiavao, “Chinese navy establishes "mobile supply point" in Indian Ocean,” China Military Online, July 10, 2017, 

http://eng.chinamil.com.cn/view/2017-07/10/content_7671106.htm 214 Ibid. 

215 Bin Bin Wang Shengli, 现代战争优势战斗力的来源:强大的空中战略投送能力 [“The Source of the Superior Fighting Power of 

Modern Warfare: Strong Air Strategic Projection Capability”], PLA Daily, June 12, 2016, http://www.81.cn/kj/2016-

06/12/content_7095608.htm. 216 Zhao Lei, “Air Force set on long-range mission,” China Daily, September 5, 2017, http://usa.chinadaily.com.cn/china/2017-

09/05/content_31577141.htm; Gabriel Dominguez, “PLAAF to increasingly focus on ‘strategic projection’, says new commander,” 

Jane’s, September 6, 2017, https://janes.ihs.com/Janes/Display/FG_638832-JDW. 217 Ibid. 218 Craig Caffrey and Sean O’Connor, “China focuses on strategic airlift to support power projection,” Jane’s, November 6, 2018, 

https://janes.ihs.com/Janes/Display/FG_1205576-JIR. 219 Zhang Zhihao, “Air Force to put whole country under its wing,” China Military Online, November 12, 2017, 

http://eng.chinamil.com.cn/view/2017-11/12/content_7821158.htm 220 Andreas Ruprecht, “Image shows possible PLAAF Y-20 tanker variant in flight,” Jane’s, October 28, 2019, 

https://janes.ihs.com/Janes/Display/FG_2423377-JDW. 221 “Newest group of army medics arrives in Wuhan,” China Military Online, February 18, 2020, http://eng.chinamil.com.cn/view/2020-

02/18/content_9745060_3.htm; Andreas Rupprecht, “Y-20A aircraft is now operational with a second PLAAF transport division,” 

Jane’s, 13 February 2020, https://janes.ihs.com/Janes/Display/FG_2699712-JDW 222 Li Qiang, “Y-20's completion of first heavy equipment airdrop is of great significance,” China Military Online, June 12, 2018,

http://eng.chinamil.com.cn/view/2018-06/12/content_8059912.htm. 223 Ruprecht, “Image shows possible PLAAF Y-20” 224 Caffrey and Tate, “Possible Y-20 tanker variant spotted”; Andrew Tate, “Y-20 tanker and AEW&C variants in the pipeline, senior

PLAAF officer confirms,” February 26, 2020, https://janes.ihs.com/Janes/Display/FG_2716114-JDW 225 Liu Xuanzun, “Two options for China to turn Y-20 strategic cargo plane into aerial tanker: magazine,” Global Times, July 21, 2019, 

http://www.globaltimes.cn/content/1158603.shtml. 226 Tate, “Y-20 tanker and AEW&C variants” 227 Garafola and Heath, The Chinese Air Force's First Steps 
111 

 228 Estimate based on Il-76. “Ilyushin Il-76,” Jane’s All the World’s Aircraft,” June 14, 2019, 

https://janes.ihs.com/Janes/Display/jawa0767-jawa; “XAC Y-20,” Military Today, http://www.military-today.com/aircraft/y20.htm; 

Sebastien Roblin, “Forget About China's Stealth Fighter or Aircraft Carriers. This Is the Plane America Needs to Worry About,” The 

National Interest, September 15 2018, https://nationalinterest.org/blog/buzz/forget-about-chinas-stealth-fighter-or-aircraft-carriersplane-america-needs-worry-about

229 Zhang Jinyu and Shen Jinke, “PLA Air Force Transporters Bring Home Chinese Evacuees from Libya,” China Military Online in 

English, March 4, 2011; “PLA Details Chinese Military Operations Other than War Since 2008,” 2011; cited in Garafola and Heath,

The Chinese Air Force's First Steps

230 Richard D. Fisher Jr. and James Hardy, “China's NDU recommends 400-strong Y-20 fleet,” Jane’s, July 28, 2014, 

https://janes.ihs.com/Janes/Display/jdw56045-jdw-2014 231 Conor M. Kennedy, "China Maritime Report No. 4: Civil Transport in PLA Power Projection," CMSI China Maritime Reports, 2019 

232 Xiong Huaming, 如何让民用船舶助力军事运输?[“How can civilian ships help military transportation?”], China National Defense 

Network, May 24, 2019, http://www.81.cn/gfbmap/content/2019-05/24/content_234451.htm. 233 Zhao Lei, “New rules mean ships can be used by military,” ChinaDaily.com.cn, June 18, 2015, 

http://www.chinadaily.com.cn/china/2015-06/18/content_21036944.htm. 234 Xiong, “How can civilian ships help military transportation?”. 235 军民融合与“一带一路”要协同发展 [“Military-civilian integration and "Belt and Road" development”], Academy of Ocean China, 

http://aoc.ouc.edu.cn/2f/3b/c9824a208699/pagem.htm; “一带一路”背景下军民融合取得重要进展, Zhuanlan Zhihu, May 11 

2015, https://zhuanlan.zhihu.com/p/26845606 236 沈雁昕 [Chen Yan Xin], 统筹推进军民融合与“一带一路”[“Making overall plans to advance military-civilian integration and the 

‘Belt and Road’”], QSTheory, April 25 2017, http://www.qstheory.cn/dukan/hqwg/2017-04/25/c_1120868189.htm

237 Kennedy, "China Maritime Report No. 4; 刘嘉生, 孙大同, 彭富兵 [Liu Jiasheng, Sun Datong, and Peng Fubing], 基于国家安全需

求的战略投送载运工具建设 [“Development of Carriers for Strategic Projection in Response to National Security Needs”], 军事交通

学院学报 [Journal of Military Transportation University], no. 2, (2019) http://www.en.cnki.com.cn/Article_en/CJFDTotalJSTO201902003.htm. 

238 中国参与叙化武销毁行动海军赴地中海护航, Jiadong News, December 20, 2013, 

http://www.jiaodong.net/news/system/2013/12/20/012136191.shtml. 239 “Group Profile,” China COSCO Shipping Corporation Limited, http://en.coscocs.com/col/col6918/index.html; “Interim Report 2019:

Gearing Up for Growth,” COSCO Shipping Ports Limited, 2019, https://doc.irasia.com/listco/hk/coscoship/interim/2019/intrep.pdf. 240 “Routes,” COSCO Shipping Lines Co, http://lines.coscoshipping.com/home/Services/route/14. 

241 李鹏, 孙浩, 赵喜庆 [Li Peng, Sun Hao, Zhao Xiqing], 国家战略投送能力发展对合成部队建设的影响与对策 [“Impact of National 

Strategic Delivery Capability Development on Construction of Synthetic Forces and Countermeasures”], 军事交通学院学报 [Journal 

of Military Transportation University], no. 8 (2019), quoted in Kennedy, “China Maritime Report No. 4” 242 Kennedy, "China Maritime Report No. 4” 243 Department of Defense, “Annual Report to Congress: Military and Security Developments Involving the People’s Republic of 

China 2019”, Office of the Secretary of Defense, May 2, 2019, https://media.defense.gov/2019/May/02/2002127082/-1/-

1/1/2019_CHINA_MILITARY_POWER_REPORT.pdf

244 Liu Baoxin and Su Chunhua, 军事装备的水路集装箱运输研究 [“Research on Waterborne Container Transportation of Military 

Equipment”], 物流技术与应用, https://www.ixueshu.com/document/55ec50dd5050528abafae32faf5e676f.html. 

245美军开展集装箱多式联运的做法及启示 , [“The U.S. military's practice of container multimodal transport and its inspiration”], 

Shangexinzhi, May 9, 2019, https://www.shangyexinzhi.com/article/details/id-119708/

246 美军远程投送“最后一千米”的重要组件, [“U.S. military long-range delivery of important components of the ‘last mile’”], Dazuig, 

September 2, 2019, http://m.dazuig.com/juns/jswz/561886.html 247 Data compiled from “COSCO Shipping Lines VESSELS,” COSCO Shipping Lines, 

http://lines.coscoshipping.com/home/Services/ship/0. 248 Issac Kardon, “Testimony before the U.S.-China Economic and Security Review Commission: Panel II: China’s Development of 

Expeditionary Capabilities: ‘Bases and Access Points,’” U.S.-China Economic and Security Review Commission, February 20 2020 249 Kennedy, "China Maritime Report No. 4” 

250 上海长江轮船有限公司战略海运大队专项军事训练突出实战 [Special strategic military training for Shanghai Yangtze River 

Shipping Co., Ltd”], Sinotrans & CSC, November 30, 2018, http://cjhyb.sinotrans-csc.com/art/2018/11/30/art_5096_278839.html. 

251 重大突破!民船为海军水面舰艇实施干货补给, Guancha, November 15, 2019, 

https://www.guancha.cn/politics/2019_11_15_525320.shtml.; Kennedy, "China Maritime Report No. 4” 

252 军运登上民船,企业有啥想法, 81.cn, April 14, 2016, quoted in Kennedy, "China Maritime Report No. 4” 
112 

 253 东海舰队深化军民融合开辟海上油料补给新通道 [“East China Sea Fleet deepens military-civilian integration and opens new 

channel for maritime fuel supply”], 81.cn, November 19, 2014, http://www.81.cn/hj/2014-11/19/content_6230767.htm; quoted in 

Kennedy, "China Maritime Report” 

254揭秘中央军委联勤保障部队:绷紧战备弦军民融合, [“Demystifying the Joint Military Support Force of the Central Military 

Commission: Tightening Readiness for Military-civilian Integration”], China Youth Daily via mil.gmw.cn, January 19, 2017, 

http://mil.gmw.cn/2017-01/19/content_23510595.htm. ; cited in Kennedy, "China Maritime Report No. 4” 

255 现代战争优势战斗力的来源:强大的空中战略投送能力, [“The Source of the Superior Fighting Power of Modern Warfare: 

Strong Air Strategic Projection Capability”], PLA Daily, June 12, 2016, http://www.81.cn/kj/2016-06/12/content_7095608.htm

256 陈瑜, 李剑肆, 曾宇, [Chen Yu, Li Jiansi, Zeng Yu], 境外空中战略投送能力建设研究 ,[“Research on Development of Overseas 

Strategic Airlift Capability”], 军事交通学院学报 [Journal of Military Transportation University], no. 2 2019, quoted in Kennedy, "China 

Maritime Report No. 4” 

257孙振岚, 海军 [Sun Zhenlan, Hai Jun], 我国民航运输业建设现状与未来发展 [“On the Present Situation and the Future 

Development of the Construction of the Civilian Aviation Transportation in China”], 2019, 国防交通工程与技术 [Traffic Engineering 

and Technology for National Defence], no. 1, quoted in Kennedy, "China Maritime Report No. 4”. 

258 京东、顺丰与空军后勤部达成战略合作布局军民融合 [“JD.com, SF Express and Air Force Logistics Department reached 

strategic cooperation layout for military-civilian integration”], EEO.com.cn, October 25, 2017, 

http://www.eeo.com.cn/2017/1025/315365.shtml. 259 “CFA: JD Logistics’ cross-border expansion to rely mostly on partner capacity,” Cargo Facts, April 24, 2019, 

https://cargofacts.com/allposts/business/strategy/cfa-jd-logistics-cross-border-expansion-to-rely-mostly-on-outsourced-capacity; “SF 

Airlines (ShunFeng Airlines) Fleet Details and History,” PlaneSpotters.net, December 11, 2019, 

https://www.planespotters.net/airline/SF-Airlines-%28ShunFeng-Airlines%29. 260 Kennedy, “China Maritime Report No. 4” 261 Xiang Bo, “Nine Chinese aircraft finish Ebola rescue task,” Xinhua, November 19, 2014, https://reliefweb.int/report/liberia/ninechinese-aircraft-finish-ebola-rescue-task

262 邮政航空首次进行战略投送支援机队战备演练 [“Post Airlines' first strategic projection support fleet readiness exercise”], 

news.ifeng.com, September 26, 2017, http://news.ifeng.com/a/20170926/52165620_0.shtml 263 “Rising to the China Challenge: Renewing American Competitiveness in the Indo-Pacific,” Center for a New American Security, 

January 28 2020, https://www.cnas.org/publications/reports/rising-to-the-china-challenge 264 Jacqueline N. Deal, “Testimony before the U.S.-China Economic and Security Review Commission: Hearing on China’s Military 

Reforms and Modernization: Implications for the United States,” U.S.-China Economic and Security Review Commission, February 

15, 2018, https://www.uscc.gov/sites/default/files/Deal_Written%20Testimony.pdf 265 Kathleen H. Hicks, “Testimony before the U.S.-China Economic and Security Review Commission: PLA Modernization and 

Implications for the United States and Beyond,” U.S.-China Economic and Security Review Commission, February 15, 2018, 

https://www.uscc.gov/sites/default/files/Hicks_Written%20Testimony.pdf 266 Chad Peltier, “Put Your Money Where Your Strategy Is: Using Machine Learning to Analyze the Pentagon Budget,” War on the 

Rocks, March 23, 2020, https://warontherocks.com/2020/03/put-your-money-where-your-strategy-is-using-machine-learning-toanalyze-the-pentagon-budget/ 

267 M. Taylor Fravel, “Testimony before the U.S.-China Economic and Security Review Commission Hearing on A ‘World-Class’ 

Military: Assessing China’s Global Military Ambitions,” U.S.-China Economic and Security Review Commission, June 20, 2019, 

https://www.uscc.gov/sites/default/files/Fravel_USCC%20Testimony_FINAL.pdf 268 Kevin McCauley, “Testimony before the U.S.-China Economic and Security Review Commission: ‘China’s Military Power 

Projection and U.S. National Interests:’ China’s Logistic Support to Expeditionary Operations,” U.S.-China Economic and Security 

Review Commission, February 20 2020, https://www.uscc.gov/sites/default/files/McCauley_Written%20Testimony_0.pdf 269 “Comprehensive List of the Commission’s Recommendations,” U.S.-China Economic and Security Review Commission, 

November 2019, https://www.uscc.gov/sites/default/files/2019-11/2019%20Recommendations%20to%20Congress.pdf 270 Issac Kardon, “Testimony before the U.S.-China Economic and Security Review Commission Hearing: China’s Military Power 

Projection and U.S. National Interests. Panel II: China’s Development of Expeditionary Capabilities: ‘Bases and Access Points,’”U.S.-

China Economic and Security Review Commission, February 20 2020, 

https://www.uscc.gov/sites/default/files/Kardon_Written%20Testimony_Final.pdf 271 William C. Pacatte, “Competing to Win: A Coalition Approach to Countering the BRI,” Center for Strategic and International 

Studies, December 2019, https://csis-prod.s3.amazonaws.com/s3fspublic/publication/191219Pacatte_Countering_BRI_WEB_FINAL.pdf?ivg8369pub0VTUmhYbJgfbVLTaK4HXL8 272 “Rising to the China Challenge,” CNAS 273 Paul Mozur, Jonah M. Kessel and Melissa Chan, “Made in China, Exported to the World: The Surveillance State,” The New York 

Times, April 24, 2019, https://www.nytimes.com/2019/04/24/technology/ecuador-surveillance-cameras-police-government.html 274 Naazneen Barma, Brent Durbin, and Andrea Kendall-Taylor, “Digital Authoritarianism: Finding Our Way Out of the Darkness,” War 

on the Rocks, February 10 2020, https://warontherocks.com/2020/02/digital-authoritarianism-finding-our-way-out-of-the-darkness/
113 

 275 Naazneen Barma, Brent Durbin, and Andrea Kendall-Taylor, “Digital Authoritarianism: Finding Our Way Out of the Darkness,” War 

on the Rocks, February 10 2020, https://warontherocks.com/2020/02/digital-authoritarianism-finding-our-way-out-of-the-darkness/

276 “China Global Investment Tracker: American Enterprise Institute,” AEI, https://www.aei.org/china-global-investment-tracker/., 277 “China’s Military Strategy (2015),” The State Council Information Office of the People’s Republic of China, May 2015, 

https://jamestown.org/wp-content/uploads/2016/07/China%E2%80%99s-Military-Strategy-2015.pdf

278 Data on imports from China (countries’ goods imports from China as a percentage of their gross domestic product), foreign direct 

investment (using IMF data to measure the proportion of countries’ total inward FDI that comes from China), and CFR Index of Debt to 

China (CFR estimate of countries’ stocks of external debt to China as a percentage of their GDP) are from Benn Steil and Benjamin 

Della Rocca, “Belt and Road Tracker,” Council on Foreign Relations, May 8, 2019, https://www.cfr.org/article/belt-and-road-tracker 279 John Hurley, Scott Morris, and Gailyn Portelance, “Examining the Debt Implications of the Belt and Road Initiative from a Policy 

Perspective,” Center for Global Development, March 2018, https://www.cgdev.org/sites/default/files/examining-debt-implications-beltand-road-initiative-policy-perspective.pdf 280 Jonathan Hillman, “Game of Loans: How China Bought Hambantota,” Center for Strategic and International Studies, April 2 2018, 

https://www.csis.org/analysis/game-loans-how-china-bought-hambantota; Matt Ferchen and Anarkalee Perera, “Why Unsustainable 

Chinese Infrastructure Deals Are a Two-Way Street,” Carnegie-Tsinghua Center for Global Policy, July 2019, 

https://carnegieendowment.org/files/7-15-19_Ferchen_Debt_Trap.pdf 281 Data from “Importer/Exporter TIV Tables,” Stockholm International Peace Research Institute (SIPRI), 

http://armstrade.sipri.org/armstrade/page/values.php 282 Li Jian, Chen Wenwen, and Jin Chang, “Overall Situation of Sea Power in the Indian Ocean and the Expansion in the Indian 

Ocean of Chinese Seapower” (Yinduyang haiquan geju yu Zhongguo haiquan de Yinduyang kuozhan; 印度洋海权格局与中国海权

的印度洋扩展), Pacific Journal (Taipingyang xuebao; 太平洋学报) 22, no. 5 (2014): 74-75, as cited in Downs, Erica, Jeffrey Becker 

and Patrick deGategno, “China’s Military Support Facility in Djibouti: The Economic and Security Dimensions of China’s First 

Overseas Base,” CNA, July 2017, https://apps.dtic.mil/dtic/tr/fulltext/u2/1038215.pdf

283 Naval distances calculated using Sea-Distances.org 

284 “Belt and Road Tracker,” Council on Foreign Relations, May 8, 2019, https://www.cfr.org/article/belt-and-road-tracker 285 Dong Zhaohui, “Live-fire exercises conducted by PLA base in Djibouti,” China Military Online, November 25, 2017, 

http://eng.chinamil.com.cn/view/2017-11/25/content_7842734.htm. 286 Jeremy Binnie and Sean O’Connor, “Event analysis: Chinese activity in Djibouti,” Jane’s Satellite Imagery Analysis, June 13, 2018, 

https://janes.ihs.com/Janes/Display/FG_955295-JSIA 287 Chen Zhuo, “Chinese Navy imprints its escort efforts on embankment of Djibouti,” China Military Online, March 18, 2019, 

http://eng.chinamil.com.cn/view/2019-03/18/content_9452242.htm. 288 “Trace China's Growing Economic Influence,” Council on Foreign Relations, accessed January 29, 2020, 

https://www.cfr.org/article/belt-and-road-tracker. 289 Timothy Heath, “The Ramifications of China’s Reported Naval Base in Cambodia,” World Politics Review, August 5, 2019, 

https://www.worldpoliticsreview.com/articles/28092/the-ramifications-of-china-s-reported-naval-base-in-cambodia; Jeremy Page, 

Gordon Lubold, and Rob Taylor, “Deal for Naval Outpost in Cambodia Furthers China’s Quest for Military Network,” Wall Street 

Journal, July 22, 2019, https://www.wsj.com/articles/secret-deal-for-chinese-naval-outpost-in-cambodia-raises-u-s-fears-of-beijingsambitions-11563732482. 

290 Zhang Yiming, “Why Belt and Road Initiative is a Great Opportunity for Namibia,” Embassy of the People’s Republic of China in 

Namibia, May 31, 2019, http://na.china-embassy.org/eng/sgxw/t1668339.htm; Paul Nantulya, “Chinese Hard Power Supports Its 

Growing Strategic Interests in Africa,” Africa Center for Strategic Studies, January 17, 2019. https://africacenter.org/spotlight/chinesehard-power-supports-its-growing-strategic-interests-in-africa/ 291 “Namibia president says China not colonizing Africa -China state media,” Reuters, March 31, 2018, 

https://www.reuters.com/article/us-china-africa/namibia-president-says-china-not-colonizing-africa-china-state-mediaidUSKBN1H80TY

292 Ibid. 293 “China's cranes to promote Namibia's port construction,” Xinhua Net, February 10, 2018, http://www.xinhuanet.com/english/2018-

02/10/c_136964590.htm

294 Brewster, David. “China’s new network of Indian Ocean bases.” The Interpreter. January 30, 2018. 

https://www.lowyinstitute.org/the-interpreter/chinas-new-network-indian-ocean-bases 295 Panyue, Huang. “China poised to expand its Marine Corps.” China Military Online. March 15, 2017. 

http://eng.chinamil.com.cn/view/2017-03/15/content_7526499.htm 296 Iwanek, Krzysztof. “No, Pakistan’s Gwadar Port Is Not a Chinese Naval Base (Just Yet).” The Diplomat. November 19, 2019. 

https://thediplomat.com/2019/11/no-pakistans-gwadar-port-is-not-a-chinese-naval-base-just-yet/; Yung, Christopher and Ross Rustici, 

“Not an Idea We Have to Shun”: Chinese Overseas Basing Requirements in the 21st Century, Washington, D.C.: Center for the Study 

of Chinese Military Affairs, Institute for National Strategic Studies, National Defense University. 2014 

https://ndupress.ndu.edu/Portals/68/Documents/stratperspective/china/ChinaPerspectives-7.pdf 297 Stephen Marks, “Understanding China’s Strategy: Beyond ‘Non-Interference’,” in Pambazuka 

News, November 05, 2008, available at <www.pambazuka.org/en/category/books/51762> 
114 

 298 Yung, Christopher and Ross Rustici, “Not an Idea We Have to Shun”: Chinese Overseas Basing Requirements in the 21st

Century, Washington, D.C.: Center for the Study of Chinese Military Affairs, Institute for National Strategic Studies, National Defense 

University. 2014 https://ndupress.ndu.edu/Portals/68/Documents/stratperspective/china/ChinaPerspectives-7.pdf 299 Bohane, Ben. “South Pacific Nation Shrugs Off Worries on China’s Influence.” New York Times. June 13, 2018. 

https://www.nytimes.com/2018/06/13/world/asia/vanuatu-china-wharf.html; Wroe, David. “China eyes Vanuatu military base in plan 

with global ramifications.” Sydney Morning Herald. April 9, 2018. https://www.smh.com.au/politics/federal/china-eyes-vanuatu-militarybase-in-plan-with-global-ramifications-20180409-p4z8j9.html

300 Ibid. 301 “Nigerian official says China-funded deep sea port to boost local economy,” Xinhua Net, October 25, 2010, 

http://www.xinhuanet.com/english/2019-10/25/c_138503178.htm 302 Tope Alake, “Nigeria Owes More Money to China Than Any Other Country: Chart,” Bloomberg, August 9, 2019, 

https://www.bloomberg.com/news/articles/2019-08-06/nigeria-owes-more-money-to-china-than-any-other-country-chart 303 Issac Kardon, “Panel II: China’s Development of Expeditionary Capabilities: “Bases and Access Points,” U.S.-China Economic and

Security Review Commission, 20 February 2020, https://www.uscc.gov/sites/default/files/Kardon_Written%20Testimony_Final.pdf 304 “BBC World Service Poll,” BBC, June 3, 2014, http://downloads.bbc.co.uk/mediacentre/country-rating-poll.pdf 305 Betymie Bonnelame, “Seychelles and China sign agreements as president of island nation continues visit,” Seychelles News 

Agency, September 3, 2018, 

http://www.seychellesnewsagency.com/articles/9678/Seychelles+and+China+sign+agreements+as+president+of+island+nation+con

tinues+visit

306 George, Steve, Manveena Suri, “As China concerns grow, India looks to build military presence in Seychelles,” CNN, February 18, 

2018, https://www.cnn.com/2018/02/18/asia/india-military-base-seychelles-intl/index.html 307 Jian, Wenwen, and Chang, “Overall Situation of Sea Power” ; Downs, Becker and deGategno, “China’s Military Support Facility” 308 Dipanjan Roy Chaudhury, “India acts fast to counter Chinese moves in Myanmar,” Economic Times, July 13, 2018, 

https://economictimes.indiatimes.com/news/defence/india-acts-fast-to-counter-chinese-moves-inmyanmar/articleshow/61826389.cms?from=mdr 309 “Trace China's Growing Economic Influence,” Council on Foreign Relations, accessed January 29, 2020, 

https://www.cfr.org/article/belt-and-road-tracker. 310 Bertil Lintner, “Poor and isolated, Myanmar backs into a China debt trap,” Asia Times, January 31, 2019, 

https://asiatimes.com/2019/01/poor-and-isolated-myanmar-backs-into-a-china-debt-trap/ 311 Kinling Lo, “China eyes closer military cooperation with Myanmar as it looks to expand sphere of influence near India’s borders,” 

South China Morning Post, November 23, 2017, https://www.scmp.com/news/china/diplomacy-defence/article/2121298/china-eyescloser-military-cooperation-myanmar-it-looks; Poppy McPherson, Ruma Paul, and Shoon Naing, “China struggles in new diplomatic 

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