Reducing Launch Operation Costs: New

Technologies and Practices

September 1988

NTIS order #PB89-136402
Recommended Citation:

U.S. Congress, Office of Technology Assessment, Reducing Launch Operations Costs: New

Technologies andl%actices, OTA-TM-ISC-28 (Washington, DC: U.S. Government Printing Office, September 1988).

Library of Congress Catalog Card Number 88-600539

For sale by the Superintendent of Documents

U.S. Government Printing Office, Washington, DC 20402-9325

(order form can be found in the back of this report)
Foreword

Reducing the costs and improving the reliability of space transportation are key

to making more effective use of the space environment for commerce, science, exploration, and defense. In order to achieve these objectives, the United States needs to give

greater attention to launch and mission operations, the collection of processes and procedures used to ready vehicles and spacecraft for launch and insertion into orbit. Launch

operations make up a significant percentage of launch costs.

The United States already uses or has under development a variety of technologies

that can make launch operations more reliable, efficient, and cost effective. However,

as this technical memorandum explains, the United States has spent relatively little effort in applying them to operations. Just as important as cost saving technologies are

appropriate management methods, or strategies, to put these technologies to work. In

some cases, OTA has found, cost savings could be achieved by streamlining operations

and reducing the burden of documentation and reporting requirements that have slowly

expanded over the years.

This memorandum is part of a broader OTA assessment of space transportation

requested by the House Committee on Science, Space, and Technology, and the Senate

Committee on Commerce, Science, and Transportation. In July, OTA released a companion volume, Launch Options for the Future: A Buyer’s Guide, which explores several possible options for space transportation systems.

In undertaking this technical memorandum OTA sought the contributions of a broad

spectrum of knowledgeable individuals and organizations. Some provided information,

others reviewed drafts. OTA gratefully acknowledges their contributions of time and

intellectual effort. As with all OTA reports, the content of this technical memorandum

is the

sarily

. . .

Ill
Advisory Panel on Reducing Launch Operations Costs:

New Technologies and Practices

L.M. Granger Morgan, Chair

Head, Department of Engineering and Public Policy

Carnegie-Mellon University

I.M. Bernstein

Provost and Academic Vice President

Illinois Institute of Technology

Michael A. Berta

Assistant Division Manager

Space and Communications Group

Hughes Aircraft Company

Richard E. Brackeen

President

Martin Marietta Commercial Titan, Inc.

Edward T. Gerry

President

W. J. Schafer Associates, Inc.

Jerry Grey

Director, Science and Technology Policy

American Institute of Aeronautics and

Astronautics

William H. Heiser

Consultant

Otto W. Hoernig, Jr.

Vice President

Contel/American Satellite Corporation

Donald B. Jacobs

Vice President, Space Systems Division

Boeing Aerospace Company

John Logsdon

Director, Space Policy Institute

George Washington University

Hugh F. Loweth *

Consultant

Anthony J. Macina

Program Manager

IBM Federal Systems Division

George B. Merrick

Vice President

North American Space Operations

Rockwell International Corporation

Alan Parker

Senior Vice President

Technical Applications, Inc.

Gerard Pie]

Chairman Emeritus

Scientific American

Bryce Poe, II

General, USAF (retired)

Consultant

Ben R. Rich

Vice President and General Manager

Lockheed Corporation

Sally K. Ride

Professor, Center for International Security

and Arms Control

Stanford University

Tom Rogers

President

The Sophron Foundation

Richard G. Smith

Senior Vice President

JLC Aerospace Corporation

William Zersen

Project Manager

Space Flight Systems

United Technologies Corporation

NOTE: OTA appreciates the valuable assistance and thoughtful critiques provided by the advisory panel members. The views

expressed in this OTA report, however, are the sole responsibility of the Office of Technology Assessment. Participation on the advisory panel does not imply endorsement of the report.

iv
OTA Project Staff on Reducing Launch Operations Costs:

New Technologies and Practices

Lionel S. Johns, Assistant Director, OTA

Energy, Materials, and International Security Division

Peter Sharfman, International Security and Commerce Program Manager

Richard DalBello, Project Director

Ray A. Williamson, Principal Analyst

Eric O. Basques

Michael B. Callahan

Stephen W. Korthals-Altes

Gordon Law

Contractor

Trudy E. Bell

Administrative Staff

Jannie Home Cecile Parker Jackie Robinson
Workshop on Space Launch Management and Operations, Sept. 10, 1987

Jerry Grey, Chairman

Director, Science and Technology Policy

American Institute of Aeronautics and Astronautics, Washington, DC

Col. William Anders, USAF

Western Space and Missile

Center

Vandenberg Air Force Base, CA

Stewart Baily

Manager,

Govt. & Commercial Systems

ARINC Research Corp.

Annapolis, MD

Hal Beck

Assistant Division Chief

Mission Planning and Analysis

Johnson Space Center

Houston, TX

Aldo Bordano

Branch Chief

Guidance and Navigation

Johnson Space Center

Houston, TX

Alan Deluna

Program Manager,

Operations Integration

Lockheed Space Operations Co.

Titusville, FL

Cort Durocher

Program Manager,

Space and Missiles Group

Hughes Aircraft Co.

Los Angeles, CA

Douglas Heydon

President, Arianespace, Inc.

Washington, DC

James Hollopeter

Manager, ALS Operations

Space Systems Division

General Dynamics

San Diego, CA

Lyle Holloway

Director, Florida Test Center

McDonnell Douglas

Cape Canaveral, FL

Anthony J. Macina

Program Manager

Onboard Software Systems

IBM Federal Systems Division

Houston, TX

Allan McCaskill

Manager,

Launch Vehicle Program

INTELSAT

Washington, DC

Douglas Morris

Aerospace Engineer

Space Systems Division

NASA Langley Research Center

Hampton, VA

Walter J. Overend

General Manager

Programs & Performance

Engineering

Delta Airlines Engineering Dept.

Atlanta, GA

J.D. Phillips

Director,

Engineering Development

Kennedy Space Center, FL

Acknowledgments

The following organizations generously provided OTA with information and suggestions:

Aerojet Corp. McDonnell Douglas Rowan Companies, Inc.

Aerospace Corp. NASA Headquarters U.S. Air Force Cape Canaveral

Boeing Aerospace Operations Co. NASA Johnson Space Center Air Force Station

General Dynamics NASA Kennedy Space Center U.S. Air Force Directorate of

Lockheed Space Operations Co. NASA Langley Research Center Space Systems

Martin Marietta NASA Marshall Space Flight Center U.S. Air Force Space Division

This report has also benefited from the advice of many space transportation experts from the Government

and the private sector. OTA especially would like to thank the following individuals for their assistance and

support. The views expressed in this report, however, are the sole responsibility of the Office of Technology

Assessment.

Harry Bernstein

Aerospace Corp.

Darrell Branscome

NASA

William Case

Martin Marietta

John DiBattista

NASA

W.E. Fields

Martin Marietta

Hardie Ford

Kennedy Space Center

John P. Fredricks

McDonnell Douglas

John Gaines

General Dynamics

Charles Gunn

NASA

David Moore

Congressional Budget Office

William Strobl

General Dynamics

Col. John Wormington

U.S. Air Force

vi
Related OTA Reports

Civilian Space

●

●

●

●

●

●

●

●

●

●

●

●

●

Launch Options for the Future: a Buyer’s Guide. OTA-ISC-383, July 1988. GPO stock #052-003-01117-4; $5.00.

Commercial IVewsgathering From Space. OTA-TM-ISC-40, May 1987. GPO stock #052-O03-O1066-6; $3.00.

Space Stations and the Law: Selected Legal ksues. OTA-BP-ISC-41, September 1986. GPO stock

#052-003-01047-O; $3.75.

lrtternational Cooperation and Competition in Civilian Space Activities. OTA-ISC-239, July 1985. NTIS order #PB 87-136 842/AS.

U.S.-Soviet Cooperation in Space. OTA-Th4-STI-27, July 1985. GPO stock #052-O03-O1004-6; $4.50.

Civilian Space Stations and the U.S. Future in Space. OTA-STI-241, November 1984. GPO stock

#052-003-00969-2; $7.50.

Remote Sensing and the Private Sector: Issues for Discussion. OTA-TM-ISC-20, March 1984. NTIS order #PB

84-180777.

Salyut: Soviet Steps Toward Permanent Human Presence in Space. OTA-TM-STI-14, December 1983. GPO

stock #052-O03-O0937-4; $4.50.

UNLSPACE ’82: A Context for International Cooperation and Competition. OTA-TM-ISC-26, March 1983.

NTIS order #PB 83-201848.

Space Science Research in the United States. OTA-TM-STI-19, September 1982. NTIS order #PB 83-166512.

CiviZian Space Policy and Applications. OTA-STI-177, June 1982. NTIS order #PB 82-234444.

Radio frequency Use and Management: impacts From the World Administrative Radio Conference of 1979.

OTA-CIT-163, January 1982. NTIS order #PB 82-177536.

Solar Power Satellite Systems and Issues. OTA-E-144, August 1981. NTIS order #PB 82-108846.

Military Space

SD]: Technology, Survivability, and Software. OTA-ISC-353, May 1988. GPO stock #052-003-01084-4; $12.00.

Anti-SatelZite Weapons, Countermeasures, and Arms Control. OTA-IX-281, September 1985. GPO stock

#052-003-01009-7; $6.00.

BaZZistic Missile Defense Technologies. OTA-ISC-254, September, 1985. GPO stock #052-003-01008-9; $12.00.

Arms Control in Space. OTA-BP-ISC-28, May 1984. GPO stock #052-O03-O0952-8; $3.00.

Directed Energy Missile Defense in Space. OTA-BP-ISC-26, April 1984. GPO stock #052-003-00948-O; $4.50.

NOTE: Reports are available through the U.S. Government Printing Office, Superintendent of Documents, Washington, DC 20401 (202)

783-3238; and the National Technical Information Service, 5285 Port Royal Road, Springfield, VA 22161, (703) 487-4650.

vii
CONTENTS

Page

Chapter I: Executive Summary . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 3

Chapter 2: Major Issues in Launch and Mission Operations . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 13

Chapter 3: Operations Procedures . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 31

Chapter 4: Technologies and Management Strategies . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 53

Chapter S: Operations Policy . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 75

Appendix A: Cost-Estimating Relationships . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 89

Appendix B: Noneconomic Criteria . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 92

Appendix C: Reliability . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 94

. . . Vlll
Chapter 1

Executive Summary
CONTENTS

Page

Box

Box Page

I-A. Launch Operations ‘Processes . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 3
Chapter 1

Executive Summary

INTRODUCTION

Achieving low-cost, reliable space transportation is one of the most important space policy

challenges facing the United States today. The Nation’s ability to assure timely access to space, to

guarantee the general welfare of U.S. civilian

space activities, and to compete effectively with

other countries depends on meeting this challenge

squarely and thoughtfully.

Ground and mission operations processes are

highly complex and involve a wide variety of technologies. As support functions, they only become

obvious to the public and to Congress when they

fail to work properly. Because they constitute a

significant percentage of launch costs, reducing

the costs of these operations is crucial to lowering the overall costs of space transportation. Imcould also lead to greater flexibility and responsiveness to changing conditions in space activities.

Yet these relatively mundane processes and procedures seldom receive close scrutiny from the Congress, or attention from the policy community.

This technical memorandum is intended to help

Congress understand the launch process and how

the use of advanced technologies and management

techniques could reduce the costs of launching

payloads. It does not discuss the management of

payloads or crews for passenger-carrying vehicles.

The memorandum is part of an assessment of

advanced launch technologies, which was requested by the House Committee on Science,

Space, and Technology, and the Senate Committee on Commerce, Science, and Transportation.

It derives in part from a workshop held at OTA

on September 10, 1987, which met to discuss isproed operations technology and management sues of launch operations technology and manBox l-A.—Launch Operations Processes

Launch operations includes the procedures necessary for launching payloads to orbit. It does not include the management of payload or crew (for piloted vehicles) on orbit, which are generally considered

mission operations. Launch operations can be divided into the following overlapping steps:

● Processing and integration of vehicle: includes the assembly and testing of the launch vehicle, as

well as the integration of electrical, mechanical, and fluid systems. For reusable, or partially reusable vehicles, this step also includes testing of refurbished components to assure that their characteristics remain within design specifications.

c Processing and integration of payloads: comprises the assembly, testing, and mechanical and electrical integration of payloads with the launch vehicle. Payloads must also be tested with the vehicle’s mechanical and electrical systems to assure they will not interfere with proper operation of

the launch vehicle.

● Launch management and control: includes the preparation and testing of the launch pad, the control center, and all of the other facilities critical for launch, as well as the actual launch countdown.

During countdown, each critical subsystem must be continually monitored.

. Post launch responsibilities: includes the retrieval, return, and refurbishment of all reusable vehicle

components, and the cleanup and post-launch refurbishment of the launch pad. The launch of reusable, or partially reusable, vehicles introduces an extra layer of complexity to the launch process

and involves additional facilities and personnel.

c Logistics: encompasses the provision of spares, and replacement parts, as well as the scheduling of

tasks, personnel, and equipment, which must be coordinated across the entire launch process.

3
4

agement, and from OTA staff research. OTA staff

visited Air Force and National Aeronautics and

Space Administration (NASA) facilities’ and

gathered additional information from a literature

review and personal interviews with individuals

from the major aerospace firms.

1OTA site visits included: Air Force Space Division, Los Angeles;

Cape Canaveral Air Force Station; Edwards Air Force Base; Johnson Space Center; Kennedy Space Center; Langley Research Center; Marshall Space Flight Center; Vandenberg Air Force Base.

PRINCIPAL FINDINGS

Finding 1: Because launch and mission operations

constitute a sizable fraction of the cost of

launching payloads to orbit, developing new

launch vehicles will not, in itself, result in significant reductions of launch costs. If the United

States wishes to reduce launch costs, system

designers and policymakers must give greater

attention to operations.

Because launch and mission operations are responsible for up to 45 percent of the cost of each

launch, lowering these costs is crucial to reducing the overall cost of space missions. Prompted

by the needs of the spacecraft community, launch

system designers have traditionally focused greater attention on achieving high performance than

on operational simplicity or low cost. Recently,

plans for a permanently inhabited space station,

more extensive Department of Defense (DoD)

space activities, and problems with existing U.S.

launch systems have suggested the desirability of

attaining routine, low-cost launch operations.

NASA and DoD have funded several studies

aimed at identifying technologies and management practices capable of reducing the costs of

launch services.z The results show that a variety

of technologies, either new or in use in other industries, could help to reduce operations costs.

They also indicate that important reductions of

launch costs are unlikely unless launch operations

engineers and facilities managers have a greater

role in the design of future launch systems. The

development process should encourage a thor2The results of these studies are summarized in the report of the

Space Transportation Architecture Study: U.S. Government, National Space Transportation and Support Study 1995-2010, Summary Report of the Joint Steering Group, Department of Defense

and National Aeronautics and Space Administration, May 1986.

ough and frequent interchange of information and

ideas among representatives from operations, logistics, design, and manufacturing. It should also

contain sufficient incentives for reducing costs.

Finding 2: Technologies capable of reducing the

recurring costs of ground and mission operations exist today or are under development in

a variety of fields.

These include technologies for:

●

●

●

●

●

●

●

●

●

built-in test equipment;

management information systems;

automated test and inspection;

advanced thermal protection systems;

fault-tolerant computers;

adaptive guidance, navigation, and flight

control;

automated handling of launch vehicles and

payloads;

computer-aided software development; and

expert computer systems.

Some of these technologies could be incorporated into the design of the launch vehicle. For

example, built-in test equipment and software

could be used to detect faults in vehicle subsystems, reducing ground operations labor and

cost. Other technologies might find application

in the launch and mission operations facilities. For

example, management information systems could

sharply reduce the amount of human effort in

making, distributing, and handling paper schedules and information. Such systems could also reduce the number of errors experienced, and speed

up sign-off procedures.

The amount of money such new technologies

could save, either from building new launch sys-
5

terns, or from enhancing existing systems, depends

strongly on three factors: 1) the demand for

launch services, 2) the non-recurring costs of technology development and facilities, and 3) savings

achieved in operations. Unless launch demand for

the late 1990s increases sharply over current estimates, adopting new technologies could actually

increase the total (life-cycle) cost of space transportation.

Finding 3: Dramatic reductions in the costs of

launch operations (factors of 5 to 10) could be

achieved only under highly limited conditions.

Most experts OTA consulted thought that reductions in operations costs by five- or ten-fold,

as suggested by the Space Transportation Architecture Study and the Advanced Launch System (ALS) program,3 were unobtainable in practice even with proposed new technology and new

facilities. They pointed out that although the large

capacity vehicles contemplated for an ALS might

save costs by carrying more weight, they would

not be efficient for smaller payloads. In addition,

new ground facilities (e.g., launch complexes,

fabrication and assembly buildings) typically require investments of several hundred million or

even billions of dollars. Such investments seldom

look attractive in the short run—the most relevant time period in a stringent budget environment—and are therefore seldom adequately

funded. Finally, dramatic reductions in cost would

require significant changes in the institutional

mechanisms of launch operations, which would

be very difficult to achieve without considerable

institutional upheaval.

Such reductions would require high launch demand, a new generation of launch vehicles and

ground facilities designed to accommodate rapid

turn around, and payloads of uniform design and

orbital characteristics. In theory, it would be possible to create new advanced-technology launch

systems, such as those proposed for the ALS program. These launch systems would be most beneficial for launching many payloads with similar

technical and orbital characteristics, such as components of a space-based missile defense system,

or perhaps fuel to send humans to and from Mars.

Absent a decision to deploy SDI, or to increase

sharply spending on civilian payloads, the number and diversity of payloads NASA and DoD

now plan to launch through the late 1990s do not

meet the conditions necessary for dramatic cost

reductions.

Thus, under these conditions, the discounted

life-cycle cost—the total of recurring and nonrecurring costs, appropriately discounted—of

launching known or currently projected payloads

probably can be reduced only marginally by developing completely new launch systems. In addition, because a revolutionary launch design such

as envisioned for ALS would involve new design

approaches and some new technologies,4 the technological and economic risks would be higher

than for an evolutionary approach.

Finding 4: If the Federal Government wishes to

invest in new operations technologies, it should

have clear long-term goals and a well-defined

plan for developing and incorporating new

technologies in space transportation operations.

Such a plan must be buttressed by data from

new and more reliable cost models.

NASA and the Air Force are funding research

on new technologies for launch systems. NASA’s

Civil Space Technology Initiative (CSTI) is pursuing research on a number of technologies, including autonomous systems and robotics, that

could improve some launch procedures and might

even lead to cost savings. NASA and the Air Force

are collaborating on research in the Advanced

Launch System’s Focused Technology Program,

which may contribute to reducing the costs of

launch and mission operations. Yet these research

programs devote only a small percentage of their

budget to space transportation operations. In

addition, no well-organized or well-funded plan

exists to apply the technologies developed in these

programs to launch operations procedures, or to

coordinate research being carried out through the

existing technology R&D programs.

3

See especially U.S. Congress, Office of Technology Assessment,

Launch Options for the Future: A Buyer’s Guide, OTA-ISC-383

(Washington, DC: U.S. Government Printing Office, July 1988),

for an extensive discussion of launch system costs and capabilities.

4U. S. Government, National Space Transportation and Support

Study 1995-2010, Summary Report of the Joint Steering Group, Department of Defense and National Aeronautics and Space Administration, May 1986.
6

In fiscal year 1989, NASA plans to start an Advanced Operations Effectiveness Initiative, which

would develop and carry out a plan for inserting

the results of technology R&D into launch and

mission operations. However, NASA is allocating only $5 million to this initiative in the 1989

budget, an amount that will have a very small

effect on reducing launch and mission operations

costs.

To complicate matters, the current restrictive

budgetary environment makes it difficult to spend

money now on research and facilities that might

save money later. To respond to this suite of technical, institutional, and budgetary challenges, the

United States needs a coherent long-term plan for

developing and incorporating new operations

technologies into existing and future launch systems. A technology development plan should include work in all development phases:

● broad technology exploration (basic research),

● focused research leading to a demonstration,

and

● implementation to support specific applications.

Such a plan should be part of a more comprehensive National Strategic Launch Technology Plan

that would develop and insert new technologies

into U.S. launch systems.

Instituting a long-term research, development,

and technology application plan will be extremely

difficult for three reasons. First, policymakers in

Congress and the Administration have been unable to agree on overall long-term goals for the

publicly funded U.S. space program. Operations

procedures optimized for our current level of

space activities would differ substantially from

those designed to deploy space-based defenses or

mount a mission carrying humans to Mars.

Second, current ground and mission operations

are partially controlled or influenced by the technologies and management requirements from a

dozen or so different research centers, hundreds

of technical projects, and thousands of individuals in NASA, DoD, and the aerospace industry.

The Administration’s latest space policy statement

directs NASA and DoD to cooperate in pursuing

“new launch and launch support concepts aimed

at improving cost-effectiveness, responsiveness,

capability, reliability, availability, maintainability, and flexibility.”s This directive could provide

the impulse for developing a national research and

development plan. However, the institutional

structure and will to focus the efforts of these interested parties on the common purpose of reducing operations costs does not presently exist. Until

Congress and the Administration reach agreement

on specific national space policy goals, developing an effective, detailed, multi-year plan for developing and incorporating new technologies into

space transportation operations will be extremely

difficult. Encouraging NASA and DoD to reduce

operations costs substantially may require making major institutional changes to these agencies,

or developing a new agency for operations.

Finally, the lack of objective, verifiable cost estimation models makes it difficult to determine

which technologies are worth pursuing or which

should be discarded. Credible, objective operations cost methods—similar to those of the airline and other commercial industries—should be

developed, which would allow the Government

to estimate the total cost of incorporating a new

technology or management practice and the savings it could generate. Current models have

proven inadequate, in part because data on previous launch operations experience have neither

been collected in an organized way nor properly

maintained. Without adequate historical data to

use as a benchmark, cost estimation involves too

much guesswork. Congress may wish to direct

NASA and DoD, or some independent agency,

to collect the necessary historical data and to develop better cost estimating methods for space

transportation systems.

Finding 5: Although making evolutionary improvements to exizting launch systems may

prove difficult and expensive, such improvements could reduce the cost of existing launch

and mission operations.

Because launch vehicles and their ground support facilities are highly integrated and interdependent, it is difficult and expensive to incorporate

“’Presidential Directive on National Space Policy, ” White House

Office of the Press Secretary, Fact Sheet, Feb. 11, 1988.
7

new cost or time saving technologies. Nevertheless, experts consulted by OTA agreed that it

would be possible to reduce operations costs by

improving vehicle subsystems such as onboard

avionics, and many ground-based support activities such as payload handling and fuel loading,

through redesign, automation, and standardization. Technologies pursued for new launch systems may have application to existing systems and

vice-versa.

Finding 6: It will be difficult to improve the way

the United States manages its launch operations

without making significant changes to the institutions currently responsible for those operations.

Current U.S. space management practices result from a launch operations philosophy that emphasizes long-lived, expensive payloads, highperformance launchers, very high reliability, and

low launch rates. The Soviet Union, on the other

hand–both by choice and as a result of its limited

technology base—has in the past relied on relatively inexpensive short-lived satellites, reasonably reliable vehicles, and very high launch rates.

As a result, the Soviet launch infrastructure is

more “resilient” than its U.S. counterpart, although not necessarily more effective at accomplishing national goals.

The United States is now in the difficult position of attempting to retain its high-technology,

high-performance approach to payloads and vehicles while attaining Soviet-style routine, lower

cost access to space. This goal is probably unattainable unless the U.S. Government substantially alters the way it conducts space transportation operations. Such an alteration would

require significant changes to the institutional

structure and culture of NASA and DoD.

Congress could direct the Air Force and NASA

to:

●

●

●

turn launch operations for all new launch

systems over to the private sector;

establish operations divisions fully independent of launcher development, including development of a Shuttle or an ALS; or

purchase launch services, rather than vehicles, from the private sector for existing ELV

launch systems.

One way to manage the institutional challenge

is to maintain separate institutions for launch vehicle development and operations by turning over

operation of new launch systems to the private

sector. Under such an arrangement, the launch

company would assume control of launch operations after the systems were developed and

would provide launch services to the Government

on a contractual basis. In order to further reductions of cost, the company would also be encouraged to market its services to other payload

customers, either from the United States or

abroad. The European Space Agency (ESA) and

Arianespace have demonstrated that such an arrangement can be highly effective. ESA funded

development of the Ariane launch system under

the management of the French space agency,

CNES. Arianespace, S. A., a French corporation,

which manages the Ariane operation and markets

the Ariane launcher worldwide, set requirements

for a successful commercial venture.

Although the European model may not be fully

applicable to U.S. conditions, Congress must find

ways to give space transportation operations extra visibility and “clout” so they will not be considered a costly afterthought. Congress could

direct NASA and the Air Force to establish operations divisions fully independent of each agency's

launch development organization, with the charge

of operating launchers on the basis of increased

efficiency and reduced costs. This would require

considerable congressional oversight to assure that

the agencies carried out the will of Congress.

NASA and DoD could also reduce operations

costs by purchasing all expendable launch services, rather than launch vehicles, from the private

sector for existing systems. Recent Administration policy directs the civilian agencies, including NASA, to purchase expendable launch services from private companies. However, the policy

allows considerable latitude for DoD to continue

its current practice of involving Air Force personnel deeply in the launch process.

Finding 7: In addition to new technologies, adopting new management practices and design

philosophies could increase the efficiency and

reduce the cost of ground operations.
8

Management strategy may often be more important than new technology for achieving low

cost

●

●

●

●

●

launches. Cost-reducing strategies include:

reduce documentation and oversight,

create better incentives for lowering costs,

provide adequate spares to reduce cannibalization of parts,

develop and use computerized management

information systems, and

use an improved integrate/transfer/launch

philosophy.

Some management strategies could be enhanced

through the appropriate use of technology. For

example, OTA workshop participants pointed out

that operations costs will never fall significantly

unless ways are found to reduce the time consumed by human documentation and oversight.

In many cases, automated procedures would reduce the need for certain documentation, and

certainly shrink the necessary manpower to maintain it. However, reducing the amount of oversight significantly will be much more difficult.

Since the Titan and Shuttle losses of 1985 and

1986, the number of Government personnel responsible for contractor oversight has increased.

Also needed are incentives to encourage lower

operations costs. The current institutional management structure tends to penalize launch failure, but is poorly structured to reward the lowering of launch costs or increases in launch rate.

However, the Strategic Defense Initiative Organization found in a recent project6 that it was able

to cut overall project costs in half by incorporating

simple, common-sense management techniques

such as reducing Government oversight, delegating authority to those closest to the technical problem, maintaining short schedules, and paying employees bonuses for meeting deadlines. Although

the team was able to achieve some of its operations cost savings as a result of a concentrated,

narrow effort that would be difficult to maintain

for routine launches, the project nevertheless demonstrated that a management philosophy that includes incentives for launch managers and technicians can play a significant role in reducing the

cost of launch operations.

bThe Delta 180 experiment. See ch. 2, Issues, for a discussion.

Vehicle design can also play a crucial part in

the ability to reduce launch and mission operations costs. The accessibility of critical parts, the

weight and size of components, and the ability

to change out modules quickly all affect the speed

and effectiveness of operations. Several design

principles are particularly important. One should:

●

●

●

engage all major segments of launch team in

launch system design process;

design for simplicity of operation as well as

performance; and

design for accessibility, modularity, and simplicity of operation.

For example, considering all elements of the

launch system, including the operations infrastructure and operations management, as a collection of highly interactive parts will allow system designers to anticipate potential operations

and maintenance problems and provide for them

before the system is built. As was discovered with

the Space Shuttle main engines, certain subsystems may pose unexpected maintenance problems. All major subsystems should be designed

to be readily accessible, and, as much as possible

within weight and size constraints, should also be

of modular design in order to reduce maintenance

and integration costs.

Many concepts for improved launch operations

tend to shift costs from operations to other stages

in the launch services process, such as payload

processing. For example, requiring payloads to

provide their own internal power, rather than

relying on a source in the launcher, may reduce

ground operations costs, but could also increase

the cost of preparing payloads. In altering the

structure of space transportation operations, such

changes in procedure or technology should not

merely send problems elsewhere.

Finding 8: Unless the Government can stimulate

the innovative capacity of the private sector,

private sector contributions to reducing the

costs of space transportation operations will

continue to be quite limited.

Almost all of the recent effort in improving

launch operations has been instigated by NASA

and the Air Force in connection with the Space
9

Transportation Architecture and the Advanced

Launch System studies.g Private sector initiatives,

such as competitive bidding for components, and

introducing some new technologies, show what

can be done in a modest way to reduce costs.

However, these efforts are still relatively limited

and reflect the tenuous nature of the U.S. commercial launch industry.

The Government could use the talents of the

private sector most effectively, and in the process encourage a more competitive industry, by

purchasing the services of expendable launchers

rather than vehicle systems, and by offering strong

incentives for decreasing costs. Although it is

theoretically possible for the Government to purchase services for piloted launchers, such as the

Space Shuttle, private industry is unlikely to offer such services in the near future because the

technologies of reusable vehicles are still immature and the costs of change are great.

Congress could also enhance the development

of new operations technologies and assist private

sector competitiveness by funding an “operations

test center” composed of a mock launch pad and

facilities. Such a center should be specifically designed to enable tests of new technologies for incorporation into existing and new launch systems.

The ability to try out new operations technologies

on a working launch pad is limited. A center

‘U.S. Government, National Space Transportation and Support

Study 1995-2020, Summary Report of the Joint Steering Group, Department of Defense and National Aeronautics and Space Administration, May 1986.

8The results of seven contractor reports for phase I of these studies

have not yet been released. ALS phase II studies are scheduled to

begin in August 1988.

would give the private sector the opportunity to

try out new operations technologies free from the

demands of routine operations. Such a center

could be a government-owned, contractor-operated facility. Alternatively it could be partially

funded by the private sector, and operated by a

consortium of Government agencies, private sector companies, and universities.

Finding 9: For certain aspects of launch operations, the broad operational experience of the

airlines and the methods they employ to maintain efficiency may provide a useful model for

space operations.

Although airline operations face different technical and managerial constraints than space launch

operations, certain airline methods used in logistics, maintenance, task scheduling, and other

ground operations categories could make launch

operations more efficient and cost-effective.

The following airline practices could be of particular interest for space transportation operations:

●

●

●

●

●

●

●

●

involve operations personnel in design

changes;

develop detailed operations cost estimation

models;

stand down to trace and repair failures only

when the evidence points to a generic failure of consequence;

design for fault tolerance;

design for maintainability;

encourage competitive pricing;

maintain strong training programs; and

use automatic built-in checkout of subsystems between flights.

84-755 - 88 - 2 : QL 3
Chapter 2

Major Issues in Launch

and Mission Operations
CONTENTS

Page

Introduction . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 13

Major Issues . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 14

Issue A: Can New Technologies and Management Strategies Reduce

Operations Costs?. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 14

1ssue B: Is the United States Devoting Adequate Attention To Reducing the

Costs of Space Transportation Operations . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 16

Issue C: What Factors Impede the Introduction of New Technologies and

Management Strategies in Launch and Mission Operations? . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 18

Issue D: What Impediments To Reducing Operations Costs Are Unique to

the Space Shuttle?. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 21

Issue E: What Can the Operational Experience of the Airlines Contribute to

Space Operations? . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 22

Issue F: Does the United States Possess Adequate Techniques To Judge the

Relative Benefit of Improvements in Launch and Mission Operations

Procedures? . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 23

Issue G: Are the Near-Term Launch Systems Under Study by NASA and the

Air Force Likely To Generate Major Reductions of Launch Operations

Costs? . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 24

Issue H: How Do Concerns for Launch System Reliability Affect Launch

Operations? . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 26

Boxes

Box Page

2-A. Required Changes to Other Shuttle Subsystems If Shuttle Main Engines

Are Altered Significantly . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 14

2-B. The Delta Experience . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 17

Figures

Figure Page

2-I. Shuttle Recurring Cost . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 13

2-2. Titan IV Estimated Cost per Flight . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 13

2-3. Delta 180 Project Schedule Reductions . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 15

2-4. Cost of Achieving Extremely High Reliability. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 27

Tables

Table Page

2-1. Cost Reduction Factors for the Delta 180 Project . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 16

2-2. Approaches to Low-Cost Launch Design . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 17

2-3. Civil Space Technology Initiative Funding.. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 18

2-4. Advanced Launch System Focused Technology Program . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 19

2-5. Steps in the Changeout of Defective Parts in the Shuttle Orbiter When

Replacement Spares Are Unavailable . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 22
Chapter 2

Major Issues in Launch

and Mission Operations

INTRODUCTION

Launch and mission operations constitute a significant fraction of the cost of launching payloads

to orbit. For example, prior to the loss of Challenger, Shuttle operations costs, including mission

operations, accounted for about 46 percent of the

cost of a flight. Of that, ground operations totaled at least 24 percent (fig. 2-l). Projected lifecycle costs of the Shuttle suggest that some 86 percent of the total can be attributed to the recurring costs of launch and mission operations.1

Because of recently mandated safety-related modifications, recurring costs are likely to be higher

when the Shuttle flights resume. For today’s expendable launch vehicles (ELVs), operations costs

are generally a smaller percentage of the total, in

large part because these vehicles do not contain

reusable components and do not carry humans.

However, they are still significant. For example,

in the Titan series, launch operations costs can

reach about 20 percent of total costs per flight (fig.

2-2).

‘National Aeronautics and Space Administration, “Shuttle Ground

Operations Efficiencies/Technologies Study,” Kennedy space c~rlt~r,

NAS1O-11344, May 4, 1987.

Figure 2“1 .—Shuttle Recurring Cost

(percent per flight)

Operations

Flight 10“Y “’ ”

Ops ‘7

16 550/0

Launch ops

O~erations costs Hardware

(percent of total recurring costs)

SOURCE’ National Aeronautics and Space Administration.

Attempts to reduce operations costs must cope

with the complexity of launch and mission operations, and the relative lack of policy attention

they have received over the years. Workshop participants and others who contributed to this study2

identified the following primary issues that should

be addressed in developing a sound Federal policy toward reducing costs and increasing efficiency

of launch and mission operations.

‘The many interim reports related to the Space Transportation

Architecture Study and the Advanced Launch System effort provided much of the initial information for OTA’s effort. In addition,

the study team interviewed officials from the Air Force, NASA, and

private industry.

Figure 2-2.-Titan IV Estimatad Cost per Flight

(in millions)

64%

Hardwarea

$83

16% \

20%

Warrtwre costs based on annual buy rote of Wyr

bGowrnment ~ts include propellant, r~go SUpp@,mcemtwes, Aerospace Corfx3-

ratlon support, etc

SOURCE: Aerospace Corp

13
14

MAJOR ISSUES

ISSUE A: Can New Technologies and Management Strategies Reduce Operations Costs?

Existing Systems

Evolutionary improvements to existing launch

systems appear to provide opportunities for making modest, but meaningful, reductions in ground

and mission operations costs. Reducing operations

costs for existing launch systems generally means

reducing the size of operations staffs and shortening the time it takes to prepare and launch a

vehicle. Vehicle subsystems, such as avionics, and

many ground-based support facilities can be improved through redesign, automation, and standardization.3

It is extremely costly to shorten vehicle turnaround and processing substantially by making

incremental upgrades of the vehicle, because vehicle subsystems are highly integrated and interdependent. As a result, altering one subsystem

often requires changing others. For example, even

small alterations of the orbiter outer structure may

require significant changes of parts of the thermal protection system. Box 2-A presents a list of

changes that could be required in other systems

if the design of the Shuttle main engines were

materially altered. Such changes would involve

multiple NASA centers and contractors, and require considerable coordination.

Commercial launch companies are investing in

performance improvements and exploring ways

to reduce launch operations costs. For example,

General Dynamics has developed a new avionics

package for the Atlas-Centaur that reduces the

weight of the avionics package and increases its

reliability. It also includes self-testing procedures

that will reduce operations costs slightly. Other

launch companies are exploring similar ways of

reducing costs of the launcher and launch operations.

Because changes in the design of vehicle subsystems often have a direct effect on ground operations or mission operations procedures, it is im3National Aeronautics and Space Administration, “Shuttle Ground

Operations Efficiencies/Technology Study, ” KSC Report NASIO11344 Boeing Aerospace Operations Co., May 4, 1987.

Box 2-A.—Required Changes to Other Shuttle

Subsystems If Shuttle Main Engines Are

Altered Significantly

● Main Engine Controller (computer) hardware

and software.

● Engine interface Unit Hardware—device that

couples the main engine controller computer

to the General Purpose Computer network.

● Flight Software Applications executing in the

General Purpose Computer Complex.

 The Pulse Code Modulation Master Unit data

access programs and telemetry formats—

device that receives data from the main engine

for telemetry to Earth.

● Various Ground Checkout hardware and software at K!K—especially the Launch Processing System applications software.

c Mission Control Center software—used f o r

monitoring of engine performance during

launch.

● Main Engine Environment Models—used in

the following simulation and test facilities:

—Software Production Facility

—Shuttle Mission Simulator

—Shuttle Avionics Integration Facility

—Various flight design engineering simulators

portant for design engineers to work closely with

operations personnel to establish the best way to

proceed in making changes appropriate to operations and maintenance processes. Whether particular changes will result in net reductions in lifecycle costs will depend on a variety of economic,

technical, and managerial factors. Chapter 4 discusses these factors for several specific cases.

Although new technology or design changes

may lead to reduced costs, management changes

may be more important. For example, a recent

Strategic Defense Initiative Organization experiment called the Delta 180 Project used new management techniques to achieve reduced project

costs. Project managers found that decreasing the

burden of oversight and review, and delegating

authority to those closest to the technical problems, resulted in meeting a tight launch schedule

and reducing overall costs.4 Maintaining a short

4Department of Defense Strategic Defense Initiative Office/ Kinetic Energy Office, “Delta 180 Final Report, ” vol. 5, March 1987.
15

schedule (fig. 2-3) reduced overhead

entire project by about 50 percent.

was achieved by giving contractors

costs of the

In part this

cash incentives to achieve the demanding project schedule.

Company employees shared in bonuses paid to

the company for meeting deadlines, which gave

them strong incentives to increase productivity.

Table 2-1 lists the major factors that led to lower

costs and shorter project schedules for the Delta

180 project. Although the team was able to achieve

some of its cost savings as a result of a focused,

narrow effort, which would be difficult to maintain for routine launches, the project nevertheless

demonstrated that management philosophy can

play a significant role in reducing the costs of

launch operations.

Today launch system planners are focusing

directly on reducing the labor and attendant costs

of launch operations. Historically, the chief means

of reducing operations costs, relative to achieved

lift capacity, is to increase vehicle performance.

Over the years, NASA, the Air Force, and the

launch vehicle manufacturers have made incremental improvements to launch system performance and reliability that have also led to operations cost savings. For example, in its early flights

in the 1960s, the Delta was able to launch only

100 lbs. to geosynchronous transfer orbit (GTO).

Today, the Delta can launch over 2,800 lbs. to

GTO. Launch operations costs’ are now about 10

5

The Space Shuttle presents a counter example. Because of the

desire to improve the safety of Shuttle crews and payloads, the payload capacity of the Shuttle has actually decreased over the years.

Originally designed to carry about 65,000 lbs. to low Earth orbit

(at 160 nautical miles), the Shuttle’s payload capacity is now only

about 48,000 lbs.

bThese costs include only contractor personnel and other recurring costs directly attributed to the launch. They do not include maintenance and other general costs associated with the launch pad.

Figure 2“3.— Delta 180 Project Schedule Reductions

r

Contract start

to launch

55% reduct ion

and fabri~ation*-

On stand

to launch* ●

20°\0 reduction

I 1 I

,

I 1 I I

o 5 10 15 20 25 30 35 40

Months

Typical Delta schedule

● Represents design and fabrication of the PAS—essentiaily a new third stage.

● ‘Includes the PAS which doubles requirements of a normal Delta launch.

SOURCE National Aeronautics and Space Admlnlstratlon
16

Table 2=1.—Cost Reduction Factors for the

Delta 180 Project

● Given program autonomy—minimum program

management and reporting

● Short statements of work—2 pages

● Organized in terms of working groups responsible for

specific tasks—given autonomy to solve problems

within working groups

● Within working groups, contractors worked as an

integrated team from the beginning—close contact

among all team members, open discussion

SOURCE: Department of Defense Strategic Defense Initiative Office/Kinetic

Energy Office, “Delta 1S0 Final Report,” vol. 5, March 1987.

percent of the total costs per flight. Performance

improvements to the Delta7 (designated a Delta

II) should increase its lift capacity to 4,000 lbs.

to GTO, but are not expected to alter significantly

the complexity or the cost of ground operations,

though the cost of the vehicle has certainly increased. s Hence, should the per flight costs directly attributable to operations remain constant,

operations costs of the Delta II per pound9 could

decrease by about 40 percent compared to the current Delta launcher.10 11 Historically it has taken

about 150 resident McDonnell Douglas personnel

at Cape Canaveral to perform the launch vehicle

processing activity at a 6-launch-per-year rate.

This includes all administrative functions, ground

support equipment operation and sustaining,

cedure preparations, payload integration

launch vehicle processing through launch.

proand

7McDonnell Douglas is making these improvements in connection with the Air Force MLV program. The first Delta II launch is

expected in 1989.

‘Lyle J. Holloway, McDonnell Douglas Astronautics Co., 1987.

9This example illustrates one kind of savings possible as vehicles

are improved. However, for many purposes, figuri, ~ costs of launching payloads on a per pound basis may not be appropriate. The

life-cycle cost of a launch system for a given collection of payloads

over the years is often a more appropriate measure. See U.S. Congress, Office of Technology Assessment, Launch Options for the

Future: A Buyer’s Guide, OTA-ISC-383 (Washington, DC: U.S.

Government Printing Office, July 1988).

*“These performance improvements will be accomplished by improved solid rocket booster engines and an improved main engine.

“Concurrently, the Delta launch crew efficiency has also improved, resulting in a higher percentage of launch successes, and

the potential for a higher launch rate (box 2-B). Delta has improved

its launch success rate over the years from 93 percent (170 out of

182 launches) in the 1960s to nearly 98 percent in recent years (one

failure in 48 launches since 1977).

New Launch Systems

Several recent studies’z have suggested that

starting fresh and designing to cost rather than

for performance would lead to significant reductions in the costs of launch operations. These

studies identified several approaches to system design. The OTA workshop generated its own list

of design goals (table 2-2). The discussion in chapter 4 elaborates on these goals, and lists a number of technologies that would serve them.

NASA and the Air Force are working on a variety of new launch system designs. In particular, they are collaborating on a major study of

an Advanced Launch System (ALS), whose goals

are to increase the payload capacity per launch

by a factor of 3 or 4 and to reduce the cost per

pound of launching payloads to space by an order of magnitude.13 Although a “clean sheet of

paper” approach to launch system design offers

potential benefits in reducing life-cycle costs, it

also increases the technical and cost risk of launch

system manufacturing and operations. In addition, the non-recurring investment in new facilities, and research and development, will offset

part of the savings in recurring costs anticipated

from such changes.14 Thus it is necessary to address the entire set of launch procedures, including aircraft, trains, barges, and other auxiliary

facilities, which function as a single integrated

system.

ISSUE B: Is the United States Devoting Adequate

Attention To Reducing the Costs of Space Transportation Operations?

Both NASA and the Air Force are funding research on new technologies for launch systems.

Yet only a small percentage of this research is

devoted to development of technologies for space

transportation operations and only part of this

is directed toward improving existing operations.

“U.S. Government, National Space Transportation and Support

Study 1995-2010, Summary Report of the Joint Steering Group, Department of Defense and National Aeronautics and Space Administration, May 1986; Advance Launch System Phase I Study briefings, 1987, 1988.

13 See U.S. Congress, Office of Technology Assessment, Launch

Options for the Future: A Buyer’s Guide, OTA-ISC-383 (Washington, DC: U.S. Government Printing Office, July 1988), ch. 5.

141 bid., ch. 7.
17

Box 2-B.—The Delta Experience

The following illustrates one company’s experience in providing launch services to the Government.

● Minimal oversight. Part of the key to lowering launch operations costs is to keep the number of Government personnel devoted to overseeing contractor preparations as small as possible. Responsibility for

management of the Delta program has recently shifted to DoD. When under the management of NASA,

McDonnell Douglas’ main customer for Delta launches was the NASA Goddard Space Flight Center

(GSFC), whose primary mission is the preparation and launch of NASA’s scientific payloads. GSFC employed 15 to 20 engineers to oversee the Delta launch operations. The GSFC team was kept deliberately

small, to avoid the temptation to over-manage McDonnell Douglas’ launch preparations. McDonnell

Douglas attempted to discuss launch problems and resolve them with GSFC immediately. GSFC personnel worked with the contractor’s internal documentation, and if a Government or military specification

or procedure showed greater risk in cost than it was likely to return in increased reliability it was discarded or tailored. Documentation requirements were kept to a minimum.

 Self-sufficiency. McDonnell Douglas has minimized the number of associate contractors or subcontractors with their own independent documentation procedures and systems necessary to work on the vehicle or facility. In addition, the Delta team prepares the vehicle on the basis of a single Launch Preparation Document, which includes inputs from all departments. It gives all requirements for assembly and

test of the vehicle, traceability and accountability of all flight and non-flight hardware, and of all test

and operational requirements. Daily meetings near launch time with all the technicians, inspectors, test

engineers, managers, and the customer for the launch, enables significant problems to surface. This results in a single, informed team with a common objective.

 Mindset toward economy. Although the Delta has always been operated on a budget typical of small

scientific or commercial payloads, in the late 1970s McDonnell Douglas began to explore new ways to

economize on the Delta when it became apparent that Government use of all ELVS was to be phased

out after the Space Shuttle became operational. McDonnell Douglas funded (with RCA) the development of upgraded Castor IV strap-on solid rockets, which increased Delta payload capacity 50 percent,

and also found ways to economize on launch operations procedures. Although each individual step has

been small, over time, such steps have made the entire set of procedures more cost effective.

SOURCE: McDonnell Douglas Astronautics Corporation.

Table 2-2.—Approaches to Low”Cost Launch Design prove some launch procedures and might even

● Include all segments of the launch team (including

managers) in the design of a new launch system

● Reduce launch system complexity

● Increase maintainability

—Increase subsystem accessibility

—Design for modularity

—Include autonomous, high-reliability flight control

and guidance systems

—Build in testing procedures, for mechanical and fluid

systems, as well as for electronic systems

● Make payloads independent of launcher, with standardized interfaces

SOURCE: Office of Technology Assessment, 19SS.

Through its Office of Aeronautics and Space Technology, NASA has funded a Civil Space Technology Initiative (CSTI), which is pursuing research on a number of technologies, including

autonomous systems and robotics~that could im~

lead to cost savings (table 2-3).

As part of the CSTI, all the NASA centers are

involved to some extent in the Systems Autonomy Technology Program, which has been designed to develop and demonstrate the feasibility of using “intelligent autonomous systems” in

the U.S. civilian space program, and to enhance

NASA’s in-house capabilities in designing and applying autonomous systems. Some of these systems, if successful, will have direct applications

for launch and mission operations. For example,

the Systems Autonomy Technology Program is

developing an online expert system to assist flight

controllers in monitoring and managing Space

Shuttle communications. It is also developing the

hardware and software for autonomous diagnostics and control for the KSC Launch Processing
18

System. Both systems would increase the reliability and capability of mission and launch operations and could eventually lead to reductions in

the number of personnel necessary for these tasks.

The CSTI is designed to demonstrate the feasibility of selected technologies. However, without

a clear and focused plan for choosing which technologies are needed for launch and mission operations, and inserting them into existing procedures, they may not be applied effectively. The

NASA Office of Space Flight is planning an Advanced Operations Effectiveness Initiative, to begin in fiscal year 1989, that would provide plans

for inserting new technology into launch and mission operations. Though funded at only $5 million per year, this initiative should play an important role in improving operations procedures,

because it can verify, validate, and demonstrate

technologies developed under the CSTI. In the

long run, it could also lead to lower operations

costs. Congress could consider funding this program at a higher level.

Through the Focused Technology Program,

funded within the Advanced Launch System program, NASA and the Air Force are working together on research crucial to reducing operations

costs. Some of these technologies may also contribute to improving the efficiencies of existing

systems (table 2-4).

The National Aeronautics and Space Act of

1958 gave NASA the responsibility of “the preservation of the role of the United States as a leader

in aeronautical and space science

ogy. 15 Its role as a research and

15 Natjona] Aeronautics and Space Act, Sec.

2451.

and technoldevelopment

102(5), 24 U.S.C.

Table 2-3.—Civil Space Technology Initiative Funding

(in miiiions)

Program area FY 88 FY 89 (requested)

● Automation and robotics ... .$25.1 $25.9

Propulsion . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 23.8 46.7

Vehicle (aeroassist flight

experiment). . . . . . . . . . . . . . 15.0 28.0

‘Information technology . . . . . 16.5 17.1

Large structures and control. 22.0 25.1

Power . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 12.8 14.0

Total ... ... ... ... ... ... .$1 15.2 $156.8

“Technologies of importance to launch and mission operations.

SOURCE: National Aeronautics and Space Administration.

(R&D) organization is firmly imbedded in its institutional culture. The Air Force is mission oriented; its launch systems organization is therefore

organized to respond to the special transportation

needs of the DoD payload community. Both organizations have developed different institutional

cultures applying different operational approaches,

which occasionally lead to costly friction in programs of mutual interest. For example, in the area

of launch vehicle R&D development, the two organizations continue to compete for funding and

for program lead. Yet, especially in this era of

budget stringency, the Air Force and NASA must

work together more effectively on research to improve existing systems and develop the next-generation launch systems.

ISSUE C: What Factors Impede the Introduction

of New Technologies and Management Strategies in Launch and Mission Operations?

Existing launch and mission operations are extremely complicated, and have unique requirements for technology, facilities, and management.

For example, operations procedures may necessitate airplane runways; test facilities for a wide

variety of equipment; massive, environmentally

controlled buildings for launcher assembly and

checkout; and fixed and mobile launch pads. Logistics, including the provisions of parts and supplies, contributes its own complexities. Each

facility adds additional complexity and distinctive management requirements. In addition, the

Government is both financially and institutionally invested in existing operations procedures.

The following factors make it difficult to reduce

operations costs significantly for existing launch

systems:

Investment in Existing Infrastructure.—The

United States has already invested billions of dollars in facilities at Kennedy Space Center (KSC),

Johnson Space Center (JSC), Cape Canaveral, and

Vandenberg.

From a near-term budget perspective, it is easier to justify refurbishing old facilities than to

build totally new ones because the short term costs

are often lower. However, existing facilities that

were built for earlier launch programs require continued modernization and repair, and the resulting inefficiencies become part of the work flow
19

Table 2-4.—Advanced Launch System Focused Technology Program (in millions of 1988 dollars)

Year

1987188 1989 1990 1991 1992

Propulsion:

Engine definition/demonstration . . . . . . . . . . . . $ 12.00 $ 6.00 $ 16.50 $30.10 $ 31.40

LOX/LH2 engine . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .

LOX/LHc engine . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .

Propulsion subsystems . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .

Solid rocket booster . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .

Propulsion facilities . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .

Total . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .

Avionics/Software:

● Adaptive guidance, navigation and control . . .

● Multi-path redundant avionics . . . . . . . . . . . . . .

● Expert systems . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .

● Electromechanical actuators . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .

Flight simulation lab . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .

Total . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .

Structures/Materiais:

Cryogenic tank(s) . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .

Booster . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .

NDE for SRB . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .

Structural certification . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .

Total . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .

Aerothermodynamics/Fiight mechanics:

● Precision recovery . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .

Multi-body ascent CFD . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .

Aero data base . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .

Base heating codes . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .

Total . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .

Groundandfiight operations/Manufacturing:

● Ground operations . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .

● Health monitoring demo . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .

● ManTech . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .

Total . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .

17.60

32.90

0.50

7.00

24.00

94.00

26.80

16.30

1.40

12.00

34.00

96.50

45.60

32.90

4.50

15.00

20.00

134.50

18.20

28.60

5.60

15.50

7.00

105.00

9.60

11.50

4.00

17.50

2.00

76.00

6.10

10.30

3.50

6.50

2.00

28.40

6.40

0.00

0.00

0.00

2.50

8.90

7.00

0.00

0,00

0.00

3.00

10.00

4.00

0.00

0.00

0.00

3.00

7.00

5.00

0.00

0.00

0.00

3.00

8.00

15.00

6.00

2.00

5.70

28.70

15.00

6.00

4,00

10.00

35.00

19.00

8.00

4.00

3.00

34.00

12.00

11.00

2.00

1.00

26.00

14.00

3.00

1.00

8.00

26.00

2.50

0.50

0.50

0.50

4.00

4.00

0,00

0.00

0.00

4.00

5.00

0.00

0.00

0.00

5.00

5.00

0.00

0.00

0.00

5.00

2.00

0.00

0.00

0.00

2.00

14.10

4.00

4.50

22.60

7.00

4.63

5.20

16.83

13.00

5.16

7.22

25.38

12.00

4.63

5.70

22.33

7.00

3.58

4.03

14.61

Grand total . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . $175.00 $154.93 $209.88 $173.33 $126.61

“Technologiesof importance in launch and mwslon operations

SOURCE: U.S. Alr Force.

and extend throughout the life of theprogram.16

For example, because the Vehicle Assembly Building, used for attaching the Shuttle orbiter to the

external tank and solid rocket boosters, was originally built for the Saturn 5 program, it does not

have the optimum size and shape for the Shuttle,

which leads to longer and more complicated vehicle assembly. Thus, the long-term costs maybe

greater than if a new, more appropriate, facility

were built.17

On the other hand, any investments in new facilities, such as a new launch complex, must also

be weighed against the expected savings to be

gained over the expected life of the launch system. If the up-front costs are great enough, they

could outweigh the total operational costs for current systems, even if some reductions in operations costs are achieved. However, because facilities become obsolete and equipment wears out

over time, and must be replaced, opportunities

will arise for making program changes in the

course of replacing outdated facilities. Program

changes that require either major alterations, or

replacement of otherwise usable launch facilities,

may lead to greater life-cycle costs. Because they

involve projects requiring considerable manpower,

the construction and geographical placement of

1bNationa] Aeronautics and Space Administration, “Shuttle

Ground Operations Efficiencies/Technology Study, ” KSC Report

NAS1O-11344, Boeing Aerospace Operations Co., May 4, 1987, p. 4.

IT]n addition, many replacement parts required for certain Shuttle test or training systems are no longer being manufactured and

must be custom built or refurbished by NASA.
20

new facilities may also face political constraints

that affect life-cycle costs.

Old Systems That Need Upgrading.—Because

the United States decided in the early 1980s to

phase out ELVS and depend solely on the Shuttle

for launch services, needed improvements to the

efficiencies of ELV launch fleets and facilities were

not made. Many of these improvements, including performance upgrades, lighter and more capable avionics packages, and higher performance,

safer solid rocket motors, are being made today

as part of the Air Force’s competitive ELV purchases.

Because certain parts of the Shuttle system are

now more than a decade old, they need to be upgraded as well. For example, both the Shuttle’s

flight computers and the Shuttle processing system computers are being replaced. These changes

are unlikely to lead to cheaper operations, though

they will increase the capability of the Shuttle system and may contribute to greater reliability.

Excessive Documentation, Oversight, and Paperwork.—As one workshop participant charged, “it

is the Government’s excessive oversight and documentation that have kept the cost of space launch

management and operations outrageously high. ”

Both the Government and the contractor incur

high costs from extra oversight personnel and

from reporting requirements such as the Cost and

Schedule Reporting System (C/SCSC). Although

this system can provide useful information for reducing costs, “it must be tailored to the program

and its true cost to administer must be carefully

weighed against its advantages. ”18

Excessive Government oversight and reporting

requirements generally develop incrementally as

a response to real problems of quality control, a

concern for safety, and the desire to complete high

cost projects successfully. Over time these small

increments of personnel or paper build to the

point that they impede efficient operations, limit

contractor flexibility, and add unnecessary costs.

Chapter 4 discusses several technological options for reducing the paperwork burden through

18C@cesy~tems and @eratjons Cost Reduction and Cost Credibility Workshop: Executive Summary (Wasl@@v DC: National

Security Industrial Association, January 1987), p. 2-5.

installation of automated systems. It also examines the inefficiencies introduced by excessive oversight of contractors during the launch process.

Uniqueness of Launch Pad and Other Facilities.—

Current U.S. facilities are often unique to a given

launch system, and therefore different facilities

cannot be shared. It may be possible to design future launch pads to accommodate several different launch vehicles in order to save on facilities

costs. For example, the Aerospace Corporation

has explored the potential of using a universal

launch complex, which would be designed with

a universal launch stand, a universal mobile

launch platform, and a modular assembly integration building. 19 A modular integration building,

in which a variety of vehicle designs can be assembled and integrated, is particularly important.

However, such designs would represent a major

change in the way the United States manages its

launch operations and would require strong interaction between launch vehicle designers and

facilities planners. These changes in operations

procedures would also mark a step toward establishing launch operations that functioned more

like airline operations.

Lack of Sufficient Incentives for Lowering

Costs.—The current institutional and management structure provides few incentives for reducing costs of launching the Shuttle or ELVS for

Government payloads. “The system does not have

incentives built in for achieving low-cost, successful launches,” observed one workshop participant.

“There is the incentive not to fail, but not the incentive to lower costs. ” Several participants noted

that NASA lacked the administrative structure for

tracking funds and responsibilities by item to reward managers directly for reducing costs and increasing efficiency. Participants also pointed to

the fact that although it is possible to fashion incentives for top-level management, it is difficult

to make suitable incentives “transfer down to the

guys who do the work” on the launch pad.

A recent study echoed these points and found

that contractors generally have little incentive to

reduce costs because “their profit/cash flow is

“U.S. Air Force, “Strategic Defense Initiative Launch Site Considerations,” Report No. TOR-0084A(5460-04 )-1 (Los Angeles, CA:

Air Force Space Division, July 1985).
21

reduced when they perform under budget. ” In

addition, the program officers “do not have an

incentive to reduce spending below the program

budgeted amount.”2

°

ISSUE D: What Impediments To Reducing Operations Costs Are Unique to the Space Shuttle?

The complexity of Shuttle and payload processing, and crew training, require substantial annual investment in personnel and facilities. The

following points illustrate the most important impediments to reducing the costs of Shuttle launch

and mission operations:

● Shuttle still in development. —Although NASA

declared the Shuttle system operational after the fourth flight, it has as yet not achieved

true operational status.21 Because the Shuttle is still undergoing major design changes,

it requires a larger launch operations staff

than an “operational”22 system. For example,

NASA employs about 5000 engineers at

KSC, Marshall Space Flight Center, and JSC

who work on Shuttle systems. They have

strong incentives to implement changes for

increasing safety and performance, many of

which increase the time and cost of preparing Shuttle for flight. On the other hand,

there are few incentives for increasing operations efficiency and reducing costs.

● Safety requirements. —Because the Shuttle

carries human crews, and because it is a

highly visible symbol of American technological prowess, safety issues receive unusually great attention. As a result of the investigation of Shuttle subsystems following

the loss of Challenger and its crew in January, 1986, the Shuttle system is now undergoing many major safety-related changes,23

which have led to considerable system re-

●

●

‘“Space Systems and Operations Cost Reduction and Cost Credibility Workshop: Executive Summary (Washington, DC: National

Security Industrial Association, January 1987), p. 2-2.

Z] George E. Mue]]er, Panel discussion, Space Systems productivity

and Manufacturing Conference W (El Segundo, CA: Aerospace

Corp., August 1987), pp. 232-235.

“The term “operational” irnp]ies that the vehicle in question is

capable of being launched routinely on a well-defined schedule with

a minimum of unplanned delays.

23 Major alterations include improvements to the SRBS, modifications of the SSMES, and installation of an escape hatch in the

orbiter.

design. These changes have also increased the

time and complexity of launch operations.

Prior to the loss of Challenger, NASA had

reduced the turnaround time necessary to

prepare the Shuttle orbiter for flight to about

55 workdays (three shifts a day) .24 NASA expects orbiter turnaround for the first few

flights to equal about 150 workdays, decreasing to an average 75 workdays only after 4

years of additional experience.25 However,

judging from the experience in preparing Discovery for the first reflight of the Shuttle

since the Challenger explosion, this sort of

turnaround may be extremely difficult to

achieve.

Lack of spares; cannibalization of orbiter

parts. —The Shuttle program has had a continuing problem maintaining a sufficient

stock of major spare parts and subsystems.

For example, 45 out of 300 replacement parts

needed for Challenger on mission 51-L had

to be removed from Discovery.2b This has

significantly impeded the ability of launch

crews to refurbish and test Shuttle orbiters

between flights. Each time a part must be

taken from one orbiter to substitute for a

defective part in another, the amount of labor required more than doubles (table 2-5).

In addition, the process increases the chances

of damaging either the part or the subsystem

from which it is removed. Although NASA

has improved its stock of spares for the Shuttle, the budget allocated for spares continues

to be a target for reductions. NASA runs a

continuing risk of having to cannibalize parts

from one orbiter to process another.

Complexity of the Shuttle systems.—The

Shuttle was a revolutionary step in launch

systems, and was not designed for operational simplicity. As with experimental aircraft, many of its systems are highly complex, and made up of a multitude of parts

Z4This does not include time the orbiter spends in the Vehicle Assembly Building and on the launch pad.

Z5Charles R. Gunn, “Space Shuttle Operations Experience, ” paper presented at the 38th Congress of the International Astronautical Federation, Oct. 10-17, 1987. ZbReport of the presidential Commission on the Space Shuttle

Challenger Accident (Washington, DC: U.S. Government Printing

Office, 1986).
22

Table 2-5.—Steps in the Changeout of Defective

Parts in the Shuttle Orbiter When Replacement

Spares Are Unavailable

A part is needed for orbiter A. It is not in the parts inventory,

but is available in orbiter B, which is not scheduled to fly for

several months. The following steps are necessa~:

+

+

+

+

+

Document steps of part% removal from orbiter B.

Remove part from orbiter B. (It takes longer to

remove a part from an orbiter than to take it from

storage.)

Document installation in orbiter A.

install the part in orbiter A.

Test part in orbiter A.

Document installation of replacement part in orbiter B.

instaii replacement part in orbiter B.

Test replacement part in orbiter B.

+ = Addition to standard procedure.

SOURCE: Office of Technology Assessment, 198S.

that need to be inspected or repaired.27 For

example, each of the solid rocket boosters

(SRBS), one of the simpler Shuttle elements,

contains about 75,000 parts and components.

Of these, about 5,000 are removed, inspected, and replaced or refurbished after

each Shuttle flight. A design that required inspecting and handling of fewer parts would

require fewer launch personnel. However,

the costs of redesign, testing, and acceptance

of such a simplified design must be taken into

account.

The thermal protection system, composed

of over 31,000 fragile tiles, requires careful

inspection and repair, an extremely labor intensive operation. Although only about so

tiles now need replacing because of damage

after each flight, all of them must be inspected. 28 Not only must they be inspected

for damage, they must also be tested for

adherence to the vehicle, and the gaps between tiles carefully measured to assure sufficient space for thermal expansion upon reentry. (See ch. 4, box 4-A for a description of

ZTGeorge E. Mueller, “Panel on Productivity Issues for Space and

Launch Systems, ” Space Systems Productivity and Manufacturing

Conference W (El Segundo, CA: The Aerospace Corporation, 1987),

pp. 232-35.

zeonly a few ti]es are interchangeable; most are unique three

dimensional shapes that are fitted to the curved surfaces of the orbiter. Charles R. Gunn, “Space Shuttle Operations Experience, ” paper presented at the 38th Congress of the International Astronautical Federation, Oct. 10-17, 1987, p. 2.

a semi-automated system for inspecting and

replacing the TPS. )

Finally, the Shuttle orbiter has about

250,000 electrical connections which must be

tested for continuity. Each time one of the

8,000 connectors is disconnected or removed,

there is a chance that one or more pins will

be damaged or will otherwise fail to reconnect properly.

ISSUE E: What Can the Operational Experience

of the Airlines Contribute to Space Operations?

Although the technical and managerial constraints on airlines operations are quite different

than for launch vehicles, certain of their methods used in logistics, maintenance, task scheduling, and other ground operations categories may

provide a useful model for making launch operations more efficient and cost-effective. Because

of the extreme volatility of launch propellants and

a relatively low launch rate, other airlines methods may not be applicable to launch or mission

operations. Chapter 4 discusses the specific applications of airline operations practices to space

operations. Many of these lessons are being applied in the Advanced Launch System program

(see

●

●

ch. 4). The airlines:

. . . begin cost containment program at planning stage. 29 New aircraft design takes into

account operational requirements such as

support equipment, logistics flow, and facility design, as well as payload characteristics

and route structure, in the early planning

stages.

. . . involve operations personnel in design

changes. As one workshop participant observed, “the chief objective of the airlines is

to move a seat from A to B as quickly and

efficiently as possible. Safety is a primary

goal, but increased efficiency is a basic requirement for making any design change.”

Increases in efficiency must outweigh any

shortcomings brought about by incorporating such a design change in the entire system.

“’’Space Systems and Operations Cost Reduction and Cost Credibility Workshop,” Executive Summary (Washington, DC: National

Security Industrial Association, January 1987), pp. 2-18-2-19.
23

●

●

●

●

●

. . . have developed detailed cost estimating

relationships for operations. When an aircraft

manufacturer suggests improved equipment

for an aircraft subsystem, the airline can generally estimate the recurring and nonrecurring costs and any potential savings to

be gained. The airlines also have an extensive historical database to assist them in testing the accuracy of their own cost estimation

models.

. . . stand down to trace and repair failures

only when the evidence points to a generic

failure. Generally the airlines continue flying when one aircraft has crashed unless there

is clear initial evidence of a generic fault in

the aircraft model. For example, in the November, 1987 crash of a DC9 in a Denver

snowstorm, other DC9s continued to fly.

However, in the 1979 crash of a DC1O in Chicago, the entire DC1O fleet was grounded because there was early evidence that the wing

mounting of one of the engines had failed,

and safety officials were concerned that

generic structural faults might have caused

the failure.

. . . insist on aircraft designed for fault tolerance. Commercial aircraft are designed to

be robust enough to fly even when they have

known faults. Airlines, with thousands of

flights per day, have developed a minimumequipment list—a list of vital operations

equipment that is absolutely mandatory for

flight; if any of this equipment malfunctions

on pre-flight check-out, the plane is grounded

until the problem is fixed. The existence of

such a list means that an aircraft can fly with

known faults as long as they are not on the

minimum equipment list.

. . design aircraft for maintainability. Commercial airliners are designed to be inspected

periodically and to have certain parts and

subsystems pulled and inspected after a given

number of hours of flight. The airlines call

this practice “reliability-centered maintenance.”

. . . encourage competitive pricing. For the

manufacturers of aircraft and aircraft subsystems, the ability to purchase competitive

systems from several suppliers acts as an incentive not only to reduce costs, but to improve reliability.

●

●

. . . maintain strong training programs. In

the airlines, at all times some 10 percent of

the operations crews are in training. Training includes all aspects of the operations procedures. Extensive training contributes to

flight safety as well as to lowering costs.

. . . use automatic built-in checkout of subsystems between flights. Many aircraft subsystems can be checked from the cockpit or

from mobile ground units between flights,

and in some cases, even in-flight with the aid

of ground-based data links. Because they involve minimum operator interaction, these

procedures tend to be more accurate than

non-automated systems.

ISSUE F: Does the United States Possess Adequate

Techniques To Judge the Relative Benefit of Improvements in Launch and Mission Operations

Procedures?

When debating the relative merits of either improving current launch systems or developing a

major new one, the principal question for Congress is: will the investment in a new system be

worth it? In other words, will spending more

money now yield greater savings later in the life

cycle of a system? Answering this straightforward

question is impossible without adequate models

for estimating costs. OTA workshop participants

generally agreed the United States has not developed adequate cost estimating models for launch

and mission operations procedures.

Workshop participants noted that estimating

costs of new or improved systems requires data

from existing systems. Commercial airlines use extensive historical data to help them create accurate

models for estimating costs, but launch operations

do not have a comparable database to draw upon.

In addition, NASA and the Air Force have made

no focused effort to collect such information. For

example, there are no detailed historical records

tracing the number and cost of personnel for

different components of space operations. One

reason is that this information, where gathered,

often rests with the contractors, who regard it as

proprietary, In addition, for systems in development, the technologies tend to be more fluid, and

therefore operations data that could be collected

are poor predictors of the applicable costs for later
24

routine launches. A deeper reason is that the funding required to gather and analyze such historical data is often the first thing to be eliminated

from a program to save money —’’but what is being eliminated is the future capability to learn

from mistakes,” stated one workshop participant.

Today we do not have sufficient data on which

to base a more meaningful cost estimation model.

STAS contractors focused some effort on cost

modeling, but their work was hampered by inadequate historical data. In addition, the accuracy

of cost models developed by the contractors

awaits validation. The ALS Phase 1 study teams

have continued work on developing better cost

models.

What is often unclear in policy debates over the

choice of a new space transportation system is that

estimating the costs of ground operations is necessarily uncertain and partially subjective. Program managers often fail to calculate and present

to policymakers the uncertainties in estimated

costs. New cost models will reduce the uncertainty

and subjectivity of cost estimation but not eliminate them. If such uncertainties and subjective

judgments were made more explicit, it would be

possible to give policy makers a clearer sense of

the economic risks of alternatives.30

Appendix A contains a brief summary of current cost estimation methods that illustrates the

uncertainty and subjectivity involved. Methods

used in the Space Transportation Architecture

Study (STAS) are typical and are used as examples.

ISSUE G: Are the Near-Term Launch Systems Under Study by NASA and the Air Force Likely

To Generate Major Reductions of Launch Operations Costs?

The goal of the Advanced Launch System

(ALS) program is to design a low cost, heavy lift

launch system to serve U.S needs at the turn of

the century. al Chapter 4 examines many of the

30T, Mu]]in, “Experts’ Estimation of Uncertain Quantities and Its

Implications for Knowledge Acquisition,” LFEE Transactions on Systems, Man, and Cybernetics [to be published].

JIThe program’s original goal was to design a heavy-lift launch

system that would serve U.S. needs at the turn of the century, resulting in a so-called “objective” system, with an “interim” system

based on existing technologies for the mid 1990s. However, conoperations technologies under study in the ALS

program. However, because an ALS would require some technologies not fully developed at this

time, and because NASA and the Air Force would

like to be prepared to meet any additional demand

for launch services in the mid 1990s, they are also

considering options for new, interim, high capacity launch systems based on current technology .32

The following paragraphs discuss the launch

operations requirements of two options, one

based on Shuttle technology, the other based on

a variety of other technologies, and explores

whether they would lead to reduced operational

costs. OTA’s analysis of these proposed systems

leads to the general conclusion that although careful design, which took into account the operational requirements of such systems, could indeed

reduce operating costs, the investment cost of adding the necessary operations infrastructure and its

attendant recurring costs might offset such gains,

especially if launch demand remains low. Policy

makers should carefully scrutinize estimated lifecycle costs of any new system.

Shuttle-C (Cargo Vehicle)

NASA’s version of a heavy-lift launch vehicle

is the Shuttle-C, which in several respects competes with Air Force heavy-lift concepts. The

Shuttle-C 33 would be an unpiloted cargo vehicle

based primarily on Shuttle technology. It would

use the solid rocket boosters, the external tank,

and the main engines (SSMES) from the Shuttle

system. A large cargo canister, capable of transporting some 85,000 to 100,000 Ibs. of payload

to low-Earth orbit, would take the place of the

current Shuttle orbiter.34 If Shuttle-C is used to

ship major subassemblies of the space station to

orbit, one Shuttle-C flight would replace two

or three Shuttle missions. These could reduce

gressional resistance to funding a system capable of launching a

space-based ballistic missile defense system caused Congress to forbid

expenditures for studies of an interim ALS system.

Szsee U.S. Congress, Office of Technology Assessment, Launcb

Options for the Future: A Buyer’s Guide, OTA-ISC-383 (Washington, DC: U.S. Government Printing Office, July 1988), ch. 4,

331bid.

34sTAsa]so considered in-]ine Shuttle-derived vehicles, but these

are considered to require too much development to be considered

as a low-cost alternative at the present time.
25

the need to fly all of NASA’s planned shuttle

missions.

Shuttle-C would have the advantage of using

much of the same technology and many of the

same parts that have already proved successful

in 24 flights. To keep fixed costs down, it would

use the same launch pads, vertical integration facilities, and launch support crews now used for

the Shuttle. It carries the disadvantage that a stand

down of the Shuttle might well result in delaying

Shuttle-C flights for the same reasons.

However, the following considerations would

affect the costs of launch operations for the

Shuttle-C:

● Not having to process a Shuttle orbiter would

likely speed up launch operations and therefore reduce total operations costs compared

to the Shuttle.35 However, it would still be

necessary to assemble, integrate, and test the

Shuttle-C before flight. In addition, some

Shuttle-C designs call for employing a reusable engine/avionics package that would

need to be refurbished after each flight. If the

Shuttle-C were not specifically designed for

simplicity and ease of operation, its operational costs could grow to become a significant fraction of the cost of preparing the

Shuttle orbiter.

● Shuttle-C will affect the processing flow of

the Shuttle orbiter. Because the Shuttle-C

would be the same overall size and configuration as the Shuttle, it could be processed

in the same facilities as” the Shuttle, and inserted into the Shuttle flow, if the Shuttle

launch schedule permits. This raises several

cost-related issues.

First, because NASA intends to use Shuttle-C for transporting major components of

the space station to orbit, which are likely

to be of substantially greater value than the

vehicle, NASA would have considerable incentive to process the Shuttle-C as carefully

as it processes the Shuttle, and with the same

crews and procedures.3b

●

JsBecause it takes ]onger than any other single ground operations

procedure, processing of the Shuttle orbiter effectively sets the Shuttle

launch rate.

3’It might even cost more to develop independent launch processes for Shuttle-C because NASA would then have to train additional launch crews.

Second, the Shuttle facilities themselves,

including the launch pads, may constrain

NASA’s ability to reach the 12-14 launches

per year projected for a 4-orbiter fleet, and

simultaneously launch Shuttle-C two or three

times a year. Launching both vehicles requires either shifting some payloads, such as

space science missions, to the Shuttle-C and

flying fewer orbiter missions, or building new

facilities to accommodate Shuttle-C. New or

upgraded facilities might include increased

engine shop facilities, an engine/avionics

processing facility, and a mobile launch platform. Any necessary new facilities should be

taken into account when costing the ShuttleC system.37

Inserting Shuttle-C into the Shuttle processing flow could actually increase costs for

launching the orbiter because of the risk of

slipping Shuttle-C schedules. Experience has

shown that nonstandard tasks, such as engineering modifications or special instrumentation, imposed on the Shuttle processing

flow can contribute as much as 50 percent

to an orbiter’s turnaround time.38 Because,

except for the orbiter, Shuttle-C hardware

would be quite similar to Shuttle hardware,

we should expect Shuttle-C to experience

similar delays for several years after being

introduced into NASA’s fleet. Modifications

to non-orbiter Shuttle subsystems would

have to be made on the Shuttle-C as well.

Finally, because Shuttle-C would share

many parts with the Shuttle, delays may occur in one or the other launch system should

the parts supply system become choked. On

the other hand, because parts become cheaper when purchased in quantity, the existence

of a Shuttle-C might reduce the costs of some

parts.

Mission Operations would be simpler and

therefore less costly than for the Shuttle orbiter. Because the Shuttle-C would not carry

humans, mission operations would consist

JTRecent NASA estimates for the cost of additional facilities at

KSC range from $60 to $3oO million depending on the number of

projected Shuttle and Shuttle-C flights.

38 Charles R. Gunn, “Space Shuttle Operations Experience,” paper presented at the 38th Congress of the International Astronautical Federation, Oct. 10-17, 1987.

84-755 - 88 - 3 : (JL 3
26

●

Air

primarily of control, navigation, and guidance, and releasing the payloads at the proper

time and in the proper orbit.

Payload manifesting. For non-monolithic

payloads, the costs of payload manifesting

and integration are likely to be comparable

to the Shuttle. NASA’s experience on the orbiter has shown that payloads may interact

in unforeseen ways, and require considerably more testing. If payloads were required

to be self-contained, as suggested for the Advanced Launch System, it might be possible

to reduce some of these costs. However, because the payloads would be required to

provide services normally provided by the

launcher, such payloads would likely weigh

much more. (See ch. 4 for a discussion of this

point. )

Force Near-Term Launch Systems

The Air Force is considering building larger capacity vehicles to carry spacecraft designed for

ongoing Air Force programs, which are slowly but

steadily growing in payload mass and size as they

grow more capable. Modifications to existing vehicles to increase payload capacity offer no great

operations savings .39

A new high capacity interim launch vehicle specifically designed for rapid ground operations

might reduce launch operations costs sufficiently

to pay for the necessary R&D. However, this

would also require high demand for launch services Q

40 If high demand for cargo launch failed to

materialize during 1992-1997, it would not be prudent to invest in a high capacity launch system

designed to respond to high launch rate.41’ Developing a new system, even from existing technology, also incurs substantial risk that the new vehicles could not be processed for launch as quickly

as planned, whether for technical or “cultural”

3Whe Aerospace Corp., Space Transportation Development Directorate, Air Force-Focused Space Transportation Architecture Study

(El Segundo, CA: The Aerospace Corp., Report TOR-O086A(2460-

01)-2, August 1987).

dOThe only program currently under consideration that could require this sort of payload demand is the deployment of space-based

ballistic missile defenses (SDI).

41see u. S. Congress, Office of Technology Assessment Special

Report, Launch @tions for the Futm: A Buyer’s Guide, OTA-ISC383 (Washington, DC: U.S. Government Printing Office, July 1988).

reasons. In fact, OTA workshop participants were

extremely skeptical that launch processing times

could be dramatically accelerated in the near term.

They argued that only if radical changes were

made in the methods of launching space vehicles

and the institutional culture surrounding launch

processing could costs be brought down significantly.

ISSUE H: How Do Concerns for Launch System

Reliability Affect Launch Operations?

The reliability of a launch vehicle (see app. C)

has always been of concern to payload managers,

because the cost of a payload may amount to two

to eight times the cost of launch services. Although some commercial communications satellites are relatively inexpensive compared to research or national security spacecraft, companies

may stand to lose potential revenue amounting

to hundreds of millions of dollars if their spacecraft fail to reach orbit. Payload owners regard

the incremental costs of additional procedures to

increase launcher reliability, even for unpiloted

vehicles, as worth the cost. The built-in conflict

between the desire to reduce launch operations

costs and the desire to increase the success of

launching spacecraft typically results in increased

attention to detail and a consequent increase in

costs.

For the high visibility Shuttle, national prestige

and leadership as well as safety and reliability are

at stake. Losing an orbiter, or even encountering

non-catastrophic failures, are blows to national

prestige. Nevertheless, in the view of some launch

managers, launch operations currently assume

more than their share of the cost burden for improvements in the reliability of an operational system. Launch operations tend to be complex and

time consuming because vehicles have been designed to achieve high performance rather than

rapid, inexpensive launch turnaround, and because launch managers perceive they can improve

the chances of launch success by repeatedly testing every possible subsystem before launch. Their

confidence in the reliability of a launch system

is generally lower than the calculated engineering estimates .42

4zIbid., p. 85.
27

Some experts argue that it may not be possible

to lower overall launch costs (including the vehicle, payload, and other subsystems) significantly

without increasing system reliability because the

costs of losing launch vehicles and payloads are

too high. A reusable system, especially, depends

upon successful recovery and easy refurbishment

of expensive components. On the other hand, the

experience with recent improvements to the Shuttle system demonstrates how expensive it can be

to improve a launch system’s reliability. Although

experts disagree about the estimated reliability of

the Shuttle with these improvements, they do

agree that instituting and carrying out a test program capable of substantially improving confidence in the reliability of the Shuttle is likely to

be costly. Figure 2-4 illustrates the expected rapid

rise in costs as engineers attempt to design vehicles for reliabilities above the 99 percent level.

Because of Titan and Shuttle launch failures in

1985 and 1986, the time it now takes to assemble,

integrate, check out and launch these vehicles is

much greater than before the failures. Increased

emphasis on safety and subsystem testing and

quality control to catch potential failures contribute most of such increases. Managers now know

much more about the vehicles, though they can

seldom point to a specific example of a fault that

would likely have led to a launch failure unless

repaired .43

430TA staff were told at a briefing at Vandenberg Air Force Base

in July 1987 that the non-destructive testing of Titan solid rocket

motors instituted after the 1986 Titan launch failure had revealed

a number of imperfections in the propellant of solid rocket motors

segments, which had been stored for some time. These were reworked to eliminate such imperfections. However, it is not at all

clear that they would have caused a launch failure if they had gone

undiscovered.

Figure 2-4.—Cost of Achieving

Extremely High Reliability

80l I

0

Operations

Production

Facilities

Design, development,

testing and engineering i

0.98 0.99 .9999

Based on: Reliability

. Expendable vehicle, 20 years of flight, 1 launch site

. 5M lb to LEO, 125K capability

. 40 flights per year, 100% load factor

SOURCE: Mmlin Marietta
Chapter 3

Operations Procedures
CONTENTS

Page

The Titan 34D and Titan IV . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 31

Launch Operations—Cape Canaveral . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 35

Launch Operations—Vandenberg Air Force Base ..,... . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 39

The Space Shuttle . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 39

Payload Processing . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 40

Pre-launch Processing, . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 41

Mission Operations . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 47

Post-launch Processing. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 47

Boxes

Box Page

3-A. Titan 34D and Titan IV Launch Systems . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 33

3-B. The Space Shuttle Launch System . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 41

Figures

Figure Page

3-I. Overview of Vandenberg Titan Launch Facilities . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 31

3-2. Kennedy Space Center Payload Facilities . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 32

3-3. Titan 34D Launcher . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 34

3-4. Titan IV Launcher . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 34

3-5. Geosynchronous Orbit . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 34

3-6. High Inclination Orbit . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 35

3-7. Typical Titan Receipt-to-Launch Flow . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 36

3-8. Typical Titan Launch Schedule, Cape Canaveral. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 37

3-9. Titan Integrate/Transfer/Launch . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 37

3-10. Titan 34D Checkout and Launch Control Equipment . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 38

3-11. Launch Complex 40 . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 39

3-12. Orbiter Ground Turnaround Operations . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 40

3-13. The Orbiter Challenger Rests on the Mobile Launcher at Pad 39A With

the Rotating Service Structure Containing the Payload Canister Moved

Back From the ShuttIe (January 1983) . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 40

3-14. Space Shuttle Payloads Processing Classifications . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 42

3-l5. Payload Processing Flows at the Kennedy Space Center . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 43

3-16. Kennedy Space Center Space Shuttle System Ground Flow.... . . . . . . . . . . 44

3-17’. Orbiter Ground Turnaround Experience . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 45

3-18. Aerial Photograph—Important Facilities at Kennedy Space Center . . . . . . . 46

3-19. The Orbiter Columbia, Undergoing Launch Processing for Its Second

Voyage Into Space, Is Gently Lowered Toward the Solid Rocket Boosters

and External Tank for Mating (August 1981) . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 47

3-20. The Space Shuttle Columbia Begins Its Roll Up the Ramp to Pad 39A

After Completing the 3% Mile Journey From the Vehicle Assembly

Building (September 1982). . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 48

3-21. The Space Shuttle Challenger Lifts Off in the First Nighttime Launch of

the Shuttle Era (August 1983). . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 49

Table

Table Page

3-1. Shuttle Mission Operations Functions. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 49
Chapter 3

Operations Procedures

Existing operations, which are enormously var- ment techniques (fig. 3-1; 3-2). Mission operations

ied and complex, offer important lessons for the includes all activities associated with planning and

design of future vehicles. Launch operations in- executing a mission—flight planning, documentacludes all the resources required to maintain and tion, mission support, and training. This chaplaunch space vehicles, including unique facilities, ter summarizes operations procedures and schedspecialized equipment, computer systems, sched- ules as they are currently followed for the Titan

u-ling, documentation, personnel, - and manage- and the Shuttle. -

Figure 3-1. —Overview of Vandenberg Titan Launch Facilities

Oxidizer farm

SOURCE: Aerospace Corp.

THE TITAN 340 AND TITAN IV

The Titan 34D (fig. 3-3; box 3-A), an expend- several models of the Titan III launcher the Air

able launch vehicle which evolved from the Ti- Force developed to launch a variety of military

tan II intercontinental ballistic missile,l is one of and civilian spacecraft. In January 1988, the Air

Force took delivery of the first Titan IV launcher

1A crew-rated version of the Titan 11 served as the launch vehicle (fig. 3-4; box 3-A), which is larger and delivers

for the Gemini program of the early 1960s. a heavier payload to orbit than the Titan 34D.

31
32
33

Box 3-A.—Titan 34D and Titan IV Launch Systems

The Titan 34D Vehicle

The Titan 34D is an expendable launch vehicle developed by Martin Marietta Corporation under contract with the Air Force. It is capable of launching up to 4,000 pounds of payload into geosynchronous

orbit, or 30,000 pounds of payload into low earth orbit (LEO), and is now available commercially. * It consists of a two-stage liquid-fuel rocket core vehicle, which carries the payload, and two strap-on solid-fuel

rocket motors.2

The solid-fuel rocket motors,3 which are 122 inches in diameter and 90.4 feet long, develop about 1.4

million lb. thrust each. They are similar in construction to the solid-fuel rocket boosters for the Shuttle

(though they rely on a different design for the seals between segments), and are built up of 5 individual

segments.

The Titan IV Vehicle

The Titan IV expendable launch vehicle is the latest in the Titan family of launch vehicles. Developed

by Martin Marietta Corporation under contract to the Air Force, the Titan IV uses the same fuels and subsystems as its sister vehicle, and provides the lift and cargo capability of the Space Shuttle. It is capable

of launching 10,000 pounds of payload into geosynchronous orbit, or 39,000 pounds into low earth orbit,

using the Centaur upper stage.

The overall design is similar to the Titan 34D but its core vehicle has been lengthened approximately

20 feet to carry more liquid propellant. The solid rocket motors have been increased to seven segments.

Recently, Martin Marietta selected Hercules Aerospace Co. as an additional supplier of solid rocket boosters

for the Titan IV.4 These boosters will provide a 25 percent increase in payload capacity, The Air Force

and Martin Marietta have developed three major versions of the Titan IV: a No Upper Stage (NUS), an

Inertial Upper Stage (IUS), and a Centaur Upper Stage (Centaur).

Generic Titan Systems

The valves, ignition system, guidance system, and all the other systems aboard both launchers are

controlled either by avionics located in the second stage of the core vehicle, or by telemetry from the ground.

Guidance signals for the avionics complement are generated in the upper stages. The launch complexes

and associated facilities are similar for both vehicles; they differ primarily in size.

Typically, a Titan 34D launch costs about $90 to $110 million including launch services. Launch services account for 12 to 20 percent of the total cost, depending on the extent and complexity of services required. A Titan IV launch costs $120 million, including launch services.

I In 1987, Martin Marietta formed a subsidiary corporation, Commercial Titan, Incorporated to market Titan launch services. Martin Marietta

has negotiated with the Air Force to use launch complex 40 at Cape Canaveral (for a fee) for commercial launches. Andrew Wilson, “Titan Grows

Stronger, ” SPACE, vol. 3, pp. 8-11, 1987.

2Budt by Chemical Systems Division, United Technologies Corp. It supplies similar, larger solid rocket boosters for the Titan 4.

The propellant in the core vehicle is hyperbolic, meaning that the fuel (Aerozine-50) and the oxidizer (nitrogen tetroxide) ignite on contact and

therefore need no ignition system; at the right moment during the countdown, computers at the launch control center direct fuel valves to open, allowing

the two fluids to mix. Turbopumps feed the liquid fuel engines, which are hydraulically gimbaled for steering.

‘The propellant is a mixture of powdered aluminum, ammonium perchlorate, synthetic rubber, and various additives. The recent explosion at one

of the Nation’s two ammonium perchlorate plants has caused a severe shortage of the chemical for boosters.

4See “Hercules Wins Contract for Titan 4 SRM Work, ” Aviation Week and Space Technology, Oct. 26, 1987, p. 31.
34

Figure 3-3.-Titan 340 Lsuncher

162’

——

SOURCE: Martin Marietta

I Core vehicle stage II

Solid rocket motors

d

Core vehicle stage I

- Stage engine

The Air Force maintains two Titan launch complexes at Cape Canaveral Air Force Station,

Florida, and two at Vandenberg Air Force Base,

California. As the result of their geographical

location at 28° north latitude, the East Coast

launch complexes are used for launching payloads

toward the East into low inclination and geosynchronous orbits (fig. 3-s). The West Coast launch

complexes are used for launching payloads south

into high inclination orbits, such as sun-synchronous, polar orbits (fig. 3-6).

Figure 3-4. -Titsn IV Lsuncher

T / +

2a

I 1

,-- -

56’

I

I Centaur mod G’ : :

I 1

8 I upper stage ‘ :

I 1

8

I I 8 “ : :

t - - Ius upper : ;

# stage t --- 4

i i

stage II

Stage II

/ engine ~

. . . -

, .

L*

+

I

SOURCE: Martin Marietfa

Figure 3-5.-Geosynchronous Orbit

174’

,—

SOURCE: Office of Technology Aaseaament, 19SS
35

Figure 3-6. - High Inclination Orbit in the Vertical Integration Building and Solid MoN

/

Orbit path a

s

SOURCE: Office of Technology Assessment, 1988

Launch Operations—Cape Canaveral2

Contractors’ assemble and prepare the launch

vehicle and payloads, monitored by Air Force personnel (figs. 3-7 and 3-8). At Cape Canaveral, the

launcher is prepared and launched following a

modified integrate-transfer-launch procedure

(ITL),4 in which the launch vehicle is assembled

‘Much of the data for this section was supplied by the “Spacecraft Users Guide, ” Martin Marietta, April 1982.

3Martin Marietta, which builds the Titan launch vehicle, is the

principal contractor. Other major contractors involved in the launch

process include the Chemical Systems Division of United Technologies (solid rocket motors), McDonnell Douglas (payload fairing),

Boeing (Inertial Upper Stage), and General Dynamics (Centaur Upper

Stage).

4The Cape Canaveral launch complex was originally designed to

support up to 60 launches per year. However, it has never reached

that productivity goal, in part because launch procedures have grown

more complicated and require a greater number of facilities than

are available. In addition, high demand for launches never materialized. See chs. 4 and 5 for additional details.

tor Assembly Building, and wheeled out to the

launch complex on a transporter (fig. 3-9). Other

procedures, such as stacking of the solid rocket

motors, can be carried out in parallel while the

core vehicle is assembled and tested. This technique minimizes the amount of time the vehicle

must remain on the launch pad.

At Cape Canaveral, the ITL concept makes it

possible to sustain about four Titan launches per

year from each of two pads (pad 40 and 41). The

addition of some new facilities and upgrades of

existing facilities would enable six to eight

launches from each pad. Currently, the Air Force

plans to launch approximately six vehicles per

year from the East Coast. Martin Marietta expects

to launch an additional three commercial vehicles per year from pad 40 at Cape Canaveral.

The average time from receipt of launcher components and payload at Cape Canaveral to launch

is 5 to 9 months, depending on the complexity

of the vehicle desired.5 The Air Force expects each

Titan IV to spend 8 to 9 1/2 weeks on the launch

pad, and each commercial Titan 34D about 6

weeks.

Launch operations begin with the arrival of the

parts of a launch vehicle, by rail, truck, and

aircraft.

Solid Rocket Motors

Solid-fuel rocket motor segments and other

solid rocket booster parts arrive at the launch center by rail. After inspecting the parts visually,

technicians inspect the propellant-filled motor segments for internal manufacturing flaws in the

Non-destructive Test Facility.’ These items are

5Assembly and checkout of the Titan IV is likely to take several

weeks longer than the Titan 111 because Martin Marietta is doing

most of the initial assembly at Cape Canaveral rather than the factory in Denver.

bAfter a Titan 34D exploded 8.5 seconds into flight on April 18,

1986, the Air Force launched a detailed investigation into the cause

of the failure. After discovering that the failure was likely the result of debonding of the insulation within the Titan solid rocket motor (see “Titan Solid Booster Failure Caused Vandenberg Accident, ”

Aviation Week and Space Technology, May 5, 1986, pp. 24-5), the

Air Force developed an extensive non-destructive inspection program to qualify the booster segments. It also included additional

sensors to monitor launcher systems. See “Titan Mission Success

Based on Tighter Heavy Booster Standards, ” Aviation Week and

Space Technology, Nov. 2, 1987, pp. 25-6.
36

IT-

——— . — — — J
37

Figure 3-8.–Typlcai Titan Launch Scheduie,

Cape Canaverai

Vehicle integration

Phase 1 definition

phase

Phase II –

implementation

period

Anafysis (loads, ftt

mechanics, etc.)

Software

development

Targeting cycle

Manufacturing

– Material

procurement

– Detail &

subassembly

– Major weid/

final assembly

LV pack and ship

VIB & SMAB

operations

Launch complex

operations

Payload fainng

procurement

Payload fainng

preparation

Initial launch

;apability

Payload integration

Phase I definition

phase

Phase II –

implementation

period

Analysis (loads, flt

mechanics, etc.)

Fit controls

Manufacturing

(LV T34D)

– Material

procurement

– Detail &

sub-assembly

– Major weld/

final assembly

LV pack and ship

Launch complex

operations

Initial launch

capability (ILC)

SOURCE: Marhn Marietta

!hS

30333 (

Monms

3 6 9 12 15 18 21 24 27 3033 3(

Figure 3-9.—Titan integrate/Transfer/Launch

Launch

SOURCE. Martin Marietta.

transported to the Solid Motor Assembly Building (SMAB), where they are stored. In the SMAB,

the contractor erects the solid rocket boosters, beginning with the the aft subassembly. Electrical

cabling and other supports are installed, as well

as emergency-destruct explosive charges.

Core Vehicle

Concurrently, the two stages of the core vehicle are inspected and assembled atop the launch

vehicle transporter in the Vertical Integration

Building (VIB). The VIB contains two cells for assembly and checkout and two cells capable of

storing Titan core vehicles. Technicians connect

and test the electrical umbilicals and staging connectors, check out the inertial guidance system,

and install connections for the payload.

Launch Vehicle Assembly

The core vehicle, mounted on its transporter,

is towed to the Solid Motor Assembly Building,

where the solid rocket motors and other launcher

components are positioned and attached. In the

SMAB, technicians thoroughly check all subsystems of the core vehicle and the solid rocket

boosters—electrical, propulsion, flight control,

hydraulic, guidance, airborne instrumentation,

tracking, and flight safety subsystems (fig. 3-10).

Payload Integration and Processing

Payload integration begins months before the

payload or launch vehicle arrives at the launch

facility, often while the payload is in production.
38

Figure 3-10.—Titan 34D Checkout and Launch

Control Equipment

Launch control

Launch control center

+

A

— Control room .

— Instrumentation room ‘“~.

Launch complex ,~

SOURCE: Martin Marietta.

Payload managers discuss flight plan and payload

requirements for vehicle services with the launch

vehicle managers and determine the appropriate

launch vehicle configuration. Several different

payload fairings and upper stages are available,

depending on the size, weight, and configuration

of the payload.

When the payload arrives at the launch facility, it is assembled, checked out, and tested in facilities off the pad; it is installed on the vehicle

at the launch complex several weeks before

launch. Payload technicians make all electrical

and other connections and test for mechanical and

electrical integrity with the launch vehicle.

Launch Complex

The launch complexes 40 or 41,7 several thousand feet from the VIB, comprise many subsystems (fig. 3-11). Before the vehicle reaches the

launch complex, contractor technicians also inspect, test, and repair each subsystem in the

appropriate launch complex—the concrete deck

of the pad and its exhaust duct, water deluge system (to cool the exhaust and lower the pressure

from hot exhaust gases), and vehicle air-conditioning system. They fill the fuel and oxidizer storage tanks and erect support stands for the flex7Launch Complex 40 will be used for Titan 34D commercial and

government launches. Launch Complex 41 has been modified to accommodate the Titan IV.

ible hoses necessary for filling, venting, and

draining the rocket.

After the launcher is completely assembled in

the Solid Motor Assembly Building, the transporter tows it to one of the two launch complexes.

The Mobile Service Tower rolls into position

around the vehicle, and access platforms are lowered into place. Payload specialists then install and

test the payload, which has been processed in parallel with the vehicle. Launch vehicle specialists

also carry out tests of the vehicle.

The actual time the vehicle must spend on the

launch pad depends directly on the type and complexity of the upper stages and payload. With a

standard payload, such as a geosynchronous communications satellite, which is encapsulated offpad, average total pad time is about 6 weeks. If

significant checkout and servicing must occur just

before launch, as in the case of a payload requiring extensive fueling or the Interim Upper Stage,

the payload may remain on the pad for as long

as 11 weeks.

In preparation for the final countdown, all the

ordnance is installed, and the liquid oxidizer and

fuel are loaded into the core vehicle. After batteries of tests, simulations, and verifications, the

rocket is declared ready for launch. The range

contractor monitors and evaluates all pre-launch

environmental conditions at the launch site, including ground winds, gusts, high-altitude winds,

ceiling, cloud cover, and visibility.

A typical terminal launch countdown lasts less

than one shift, and includes preparations and rollback of the mobile service tower. Commanddestruct loops are checked with range safety; the

telemetry system is checked. The mobile service

tower is rolled back. The core vehicle propellant

tanks are pressurized to flight pressure, the pressures inside the solid-fuel rocket motor casings are

verified as stable, and the guidance system

checked. Final checkout, countdown, and launch

are monitored and controlled from the control

center, located in the VIB.

Post Launch Activities

Launch processing is not complete with the

launch. After liftoff, the launch control center is

shut down and reset. The launch area is tested
39

Figure 3.11.— Launch Complex 40

AGE Building Fuel Holding Pond

Fual Holding Area Film Camera

Fuel Vant Stack TO Ribbon Frame camera

/ Refrigeration Building Umbilical Tower I

\

Protective Clothing Building

\ \

w

CCTV Tower\ ; “~ Mobile Service Tower

.

‘————————

I

CCTV Tower

- 1

Fan House -f--

CCTVTower

Traffic Control House

Film Camem Pad

Security Fence

Oxidizer Vent Stack

‘ To Ribbon Frame

Camera I Launch Pad

Oxidizer Holding Area

SOURCE: Martin Marietta

for toxic vapors and inspected to determine how

much damage was sustained from the high-temperature rocket exhaust and vibration, and how

much refurbishment the transporter and pad will

need before the next launch.

Whether the launch is successful or not, launch

data, both from the ground facilities and from the

launcher g are recorded and analyzed for anomalies or other indications of future problems. If the

launch is unsuccessful for some reason, these data

may be the only means of determining the cause

of failure.

a

The launch vehicle carries hundreds of sensors to record various environmental factors during launch, including temperature,

vehicle acceleration, and vibration. This information is telemetered

to the launch complex for later analysis.

THE SPACE SHUTTLE

Unlike the Titan, the Shuttle orbiter was designed to be reused, which means that launch

processing includes recovering and refurbishing

the orbiter and the solid rocket boosters (fig. 3-

12). The current Shuttle (fig. 3-13; box 3-B) can

Launch Operations—Vandenberg

Air Force Base

As noted, vehicle assembly and processing differ significantly at Vandenberg Air Force Base,

primarily because the vehicle is fully assembled

on the pad. The launch complex is therefore considerably simpler, as there is no Vehicle Integration Building, Launcher Transporter, or Solid Motor Assembly Building. Consequently the launch

rate is lower, as an average of 163 days are required for assembly and launch of each Titan 34D

with its payload. This allows only about two and

one-quarter launches per pad per year from Vandenberg.

lift up to 48,000 pounds into low-Earth orbit

(about 160 nautical miles above Earth’s surface).

Shuttle launch operations requires the use of

a wide variety of both advanced and routine tech-
40

Figure 3-12. -Orbiter Ground Turnaround Operations

, Landing

I

‘ r

Orbiter processing

Operations (OPF)a

~ ’

Launch

I

I

I

I

I

I

I

I

Shuttle I

Integrated

Operations

I

ET checkout (VAB) b

I

OPS I

H/SRB I

J

VAB fl/SRB operations’

1

a ~rbtier Pmessing FaciliW

bvehlcle Aasemb~ Building

c Vehicle Assembly Building External Tank/Solid Rocket Booster Operations

SOURCE: National Aeronautics and Space Administration

nologies and interrelated subsystems. At Kennedy

Space Center (KSC), Shuttle processing is carried

out by contractors monitored by NASA employees. Lockheed Space Operations Company currently holds the prime contract for this work.

Lockheed subcontracts with a variety of other

companies, including Rockwell International, the

prime contractor for the Shuttle orbiter. Approximately 6,550 contractors and 640 NASA employees directly support Shuttle launch operations at

KSC. Johnson Space Center has responsibility for

on-orbit mission operations and some launch

operations, which involve about 5,675 contracFigure 3-13.—The Orbiter Challenger Rests on

the Mobile Launcher at Pad 39A With the Rotating

Service Structure Containing the Payload Canister

Moved Back From the Shuttle (January 1983)

SOURCE: National Aeronautics and Space Administration.

tors and 1,065 NASA employees. Marshall Space

Flight Center contributes engineering expertise for

Shuttle modifications and supports the Shuttle

with approximately 1,000 NASA employees and

11,000 prime contractor employees.

Payload Processing

Payloads for the Space Shuttle can be installed

either horizontally or vertically (figs. 3-14 and 3-

15). Horizontal payloads, such as Spacelab, are

installed in the orbiter when it is still in the Orbiter Processing Facility, prior to being mated with

the external tank and solid-fuel rocket boosters.

Vertical payloads are installed in the orbiter’s payload bay after the fully assembled Shuttle arrives

at the launch pad.

The payload owner assembles the payload to

its final launch configuration by, for example, in-
41

Box 3-B.—The Space Shuttle Launch System

The shuttle launch vehicle consists of three major subsystems:

● the orbiter, with the crew compartment and

payload bay, which also contains the three

Space Shuttle main engines (SSMES). About

the size of a DC-9, the orbiter weighs about

215,000 Ibs., without its payload, and has

a 15 by 60 foot cylindrical payload bay. I

● the extermd tank, which holds liquid hydrogen and oxygen to fuel the SSMES.

● two segmented solid-fuel rocket boosters

(SRBS). These are each made up of 5 motor

segments.

At launch, the main engines are ignited, followed seven seconds later by the SRBS. Two and

one-half minutes into the flight, explosive bolts

separate the orbiter from the SRBS, which parachute into the Atlantic Ocean and are recovered.

After about eight minutes of flight, the Shuttle

main engines shut down and the external tank

separates from the orbiter, breaks up as it

reenters the atmosphere and falls into the Indian

Ocean. In space, the orbiter maneuvering system, fueled by hyperbolic propellants, propells

the craft into the orbit desired for the mission.

After the Shuttle crew completes its mission,

the orbiter returns to earth where it can land on

any of several runways,2 and is carried back to

Kennedy Space Center, to be refurbished for the

next launch. Although the Air Force built a Shuttle processing center and launch pad at Vandenberg Air Force Base, CA, it is now in the process of being mothballed.

‘Following the loss of Challenger, the fleet now consists of three

orbiters—Columbia, Discovery, and Atlantis. NASA has contracted

with Rockwell International to build a fourth orbiter, which will replace Challenger by 1992.

‘For safety reasons, especially after the loss of Challenger, the Shuttle WI1l normally land at Edwards Air Force Base, However, in an

emergency, the Shuttle can touch down at Cape Kennedy, or one

of the alternative emergency landing sites.

stalling solar panels, antennas or other items, and

performing minor repairs. Payload owners have

five options for processing payloads, ranging from

minimum KSC involvement—essentially “ship

and shoot, ” where the payload is ready for launch

and can be installed in the orbiter 2 to 50 days

before launch with no servicing, to maximum

KSC involvement—where all flight experiments

and component hardware must be delivered up

to a year before launch for technicians to assemble,

integrate and test.9

Pre-launch Processing

The basic processing flow is organized according to the integrate—transfer—launch (ITL) concept, which separates the major processing elements and allows certain functions to proceed in

parallel until the vehicle is assembled in the Vehicle Assembly Building and carried to the launch

pad (fig. 3-16).

Orbiter Processing

Orbiter processing constitutes the critical limit

to the achievable flight rate. Refurbishing the orbiter Columbia for the second Shuttle flight consumed nearly 200 work days (three shifts per day).

By the ill-fated flight of the Challenger in January 1986, this turnaround time had been reduced

to 55 days (fig. 3-17).10 However, the numerous

modifications to the process of orbiter refurbishment, made as a result of the Challenger accident,

have led to an estimated future orbiter turnaround

of about 160 days, to decrease over four years

t. 75 days. 11 FOr a four orbiter fleet, a 75 day Orbiter turnaround time would allow 12 to 14 flights

per year.

In the Orbiter Processing Facility, NASA contractors check and refurbish every major system

in the orbiter after each flight, including the

avionics, brakes, electrical systems, and windows.

They inspect the Shuttle main engines, and completely replace the bearings and turbines. Any of

the 31,000 ceramic tiles of the thermal protection

system that are missing or damaged during the

flight are also replaced; all tiles are re-waterproofed. Modifications to the orbiters are made

during refurbishment.lz Finally, any horizontal

‘For a detailed breakdown of these options, see James M. Ragusa,

“Historical Data and Analysis for the First Five Years of KSC STS

Payload Processing,” NASA, September 1986, ch. 4. IOchar]es R. Gunn, “space Shuttle Operations Experience, ” Paper IAF-87-216, delivered at the 38th Congress of the International

Astronautical Federation, Oct. 10-17, 1987.

llHoWever, some Shutt]e operations experts have raised concerns

that new safety related requirements for orbiter processing may make

it extremely difficult to reach the goal of 75 days turnaround within

4 years.

IZThese modifications can significantly lengthen the time necessary to process the orbiter.

84-755 - 88 - 4 : (2L 3
42

- — —- ———-— —- — — ---- -

.— —- — —-—— — —— -- — - - -
43 I L I a

1-

U) z

avm

(suca

45

220

200

180

160

140

120

100

80

60

40

20

0

Figure 3-17.—Orbiter Ground Turnaround Experience

Shuttle fits: 1

d

.

234 5

1-

9 10 11 12 13 14 15 16 17 18 19 20 21 22 23 24 25

n PAD workdays

c 1

VAB workdays

d

OPF workdays

SOURCE: National Aeronautics and Space Administration.

payloads, such as Spacelab, are installed in the

. -. When the segments arrive at KSC, they are moved

payload bay. into the Rotational Processing and Surge Facility

where they are inspected and stored until needed.

Solid Rocket Boosters (SRBS) Assembling and testing the SRBS requires about

The contractor (Morton Thiokol) ships new 33 days (three shifts). After the aft booster

solid-fuel rocket motor segments and associated assemblies are attached to support posts on the

hardware, including the forward and aft closures, mobile launcher platform, the rocket motor segnozzle assemblies, and nozzle extensions by rail. ments—all filled with live propellant—are added,
46

inspected and tested. During the stacking process, which lasts several hours per segment, everyone but the stacking crew must evacuate the Vehicle Assembly Building (fig. 3-18).

External Tank

Meanwhile, the external tank, which is manufactured by Martin Marietta, is transported to

KSC by sea barge from the Michoud Assembly

Facility at New Orleans, Louisiana. In the Vehicle Assembly Building (VAB), contractors inspect

the external insulation and comections for ground

support equipment, as well as the cryogenic tanks

for holding liquid oxygen and liquid hydrogen.

A crane hoists the tank to a vertical position and

transfers it to the mobile launcher platform, where

it is mated with the twin SRBS. The electrical systems are checked and the many fluid valves tested.

Vehicle Assembly and Integration

After orbiter processing is complete, it is towed

to the VAB High Bay, lifted to the vertical, and

mated to the external tank and SRBS (fig. 3-19).

After mating all the sections of the Shuttle and

connecting all umbilicals, technicians test each

connection electrically and mechanically.

The computer-controlled launch processing system, which is operated from the firing rooms of

SOURCE: National Aeronautics and Space Administration
47

Figure 3-19.—The Orbiter Columbia, Undergoing

Launch Processing for Its Second Voyage Into Space,

Is Gently Lowered Toward the Solid Rocket Boosters

and External Tank for Mating (August 1981)

SOURCE: National Aeronautics and Space Administration.

the launch control center, semi-automatically controls and checks out much of the Shuttle vehicle,

both in the VAB and at Launch Complex 39. If

any subsystem is found unsatisfactory, the computer will provide data that help isolate the fault.

Transfer and Launch

When the Shuttle is fully assembled on the Mobile Launch Platform, a crawler-transporter slips

under and slowly (1 mph) moves the Shuttle to

Launch Complex 39A or B (fig. 3-20). Once at

the pad, workers gain access to the Shuttle

through the fixed service structure, which also

provides liquid hydrogen and oxygen to the external tank. The rotating service structure gives

access to service fuel cells and the life-support system, to load and remove payloads, and to load

hyperbolic fuels for the orbital maneuvering system and the reaction control system. Those payloads to be installed vertically are transported to

the rotating service structure in a protective payload canister.

After the Shuttle arrives at the pad, most checkout operations are controlled from the launch control center. After these operations, power is applied to the orbiter and supporting ground support

equipment, launch-readiness tests are performed,

and the tanks are prepared to receive their fuels.

The Shuttle is now ready for the cryogenic propellants to be loaded and the flight crew to board.

During the final six or seven hours of the countdown, the mission software is updated and the

liquid hydrogen and liquid oxygen loaded into the

external tank. Finally, the flight crew and operations personnel complete all preparations and the

Shuttle lifts into space (fig. 3-21).

Mission Operations

Mission operations (table 3-1) comprise all

activities associated with planning and executing

a mission and the payloads to be carried. The primary focus is on gathering data, performing analyses, and developing the software required to

meet the mission’s objectives. Mission operations

begin the first day a payload is conceived, continue through the day of the launch, and end only

after the mission is satisfactorily completed and

the data analyzed. From early mission planning

to completion, mission operations for a Shuttle

flight may take two years or more.

Tracking stations scattered around the world

and the Tracking, Data, and Relay Satellite System (TDRSS) give orbiter crews access to Mission

Control for most of the orbit .13 The Johnson Space

Center (JSC) at Houston, TX is the central control point for Shuttle missions; payloads and related systems are controlled from the Jet Propulsion Laboratory (Pasadena, CA), the Goddard

Space Flight Center (Greenbelt, MD), or JSC.

Post= launch Processing

Two minutes into the Shuttle’s flight, the two

solid-fuel rocket boosters are jettisoned and parachute into the Atlantic Ocean downrange from

KSC. Two specially designed retrieval vessels recover the boosters and their various components.

The smaller components are hauled on board the

ships, whereas the boosters are towed back to the

IJwhen TDRSS deployment is complete (three spacecraft), it will

allow the crew to contact Mission Control nearly 100 percent of

the time in orbit. The second of two TDRSS satellites is scheduled

for deployment on the first Shuttle flight after standdown.
48

Figure 3-20.—The Space Shuttle Columbia Begins Its Roll Up the Ramp to Pad 39A After Completing the

3.5 Mile Journey From the Vehicle Assembly Building (September 1982)

SOURCE: National Aeronautics and Space Admlnlstration.
49

Figure 3-21 .–The Space Shuttle Challenger Lifts Off

in the First Nighttime Launch of the Shuttle Era

(August 1983)

SOURCE: National Aeronautics and Space Administration

Table 3-1.—Shuttle Mission Operations Functions

●

●

●

●

●

b

—

Design Shuttle trajectory and flight plan

Develop flight and ground documentation to support

operations

Provide mission support with flight planning, flight

systems, payload support, and trajectory teams

Provide maintenance, operations, mission

reconfiguration, and sustaining engineering for support

facilities (mission control center and simulation and

training facilities)

Develop plans and provide training to crews,

customers, and flight controllers

Develop operating concepts and requirements

SOURCE: Johnson Space Center

KSC Solid Rocket Booster Disassembly Facility.

At this facility, the boosters and other components

are washed, disassembled, cleaned, and stripped

before they are shipped by rail to the prime contractor (Morton Thiokol) for refurbishing and

reloading.

When the Shuttle orbiter returns from its mission in space, it normally lands at Edwards Air

Force Base in California. In emergencies, it can

also land at KSC; White Sands, NM; Zarogosa,

Spain; Casablanca, Morocco; Rota, Spain; or

Guam. After landing, it must be drained of hazardous fuels and inspected for any exterior damage. Payload technicians remove any payloads

brought back to Earth. If it lands anywhere but

KSC, the orbiter must be lifted onto the back of

a specially equipped Boeing 747 and flown back

to the Shuttle Landing Facility at KSC.
Chapter 4

Technologies and

Management Strategies
CONTENTS

Page

Introduction . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .

Technologies for Ground and Mission Operations

Automated Data Management System . . . . . . . .

Automated Test and Inspection . . . . . . . . . . . . . .

Computer-Aided Software Development . . . . . .

Expert Systems . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .

Technologies for Launch Vehicles . . . . . . . . . . . . . .

Vehicle Design Principles. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .

Vehicle Technologies . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .

Management Strategies . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .

Facilities . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .

Operations Management . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .

Assessing Technological Options . . . . . . . . . . . . . . \.

Economic Criteria . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .

Non-economic Criteria . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .

Economic Benefits. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .

Boxes

Box

4-A. Shuttle Tile Automation System . . . . . . . . . . .

4-B. Expert Systems for Launch Operations . . . . .

4-C. Vehicle-Payload Interfaces on the Advanced

4-D. Economic Criteria . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .

Figures

Figure

4-I. Interim Problem Report: LES, the Lox Expert

4-2. Universal Launch Complex . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .

4-3. Economic Benefits of Emerging Technologies

Tables

Table

4-1.

4-2.

4-3.

4-4.

4-5.

4-6.

4-7.

4-8.

Technologies for Operations . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .

ALS Launch Operations Specifications . . . . . .

Launch Vehicle/Payload Interface Issues . . . .

. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .

. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .

. . . . . . .

. . . . . . .

. . . . . . .

. . . . . . .

. . . . . . .

. . . . . . .

. . . . . . .

. . . . . . .

. . . . . . .

. . . . . . .

. . . . . . .

. . . . . . .

. . . . . . .

. . . . . . .

. . . . . . .

Launch

. . . . . . .

System

. . . . . . .

. . . . . . .

. . . . . . .

. . . . . . .

. . . . . . .

. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .

. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .

. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .

. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .

. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .

. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .

. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .

. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .

. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .

. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .

. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .

. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .

. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .

. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .

. . . . . . .

system”

. . . . . . .

53

53

53

54

54

55

59

59

62

64

64

65

66

67

68

69

. . . . . . . . . . . .

. . . . . . . . . . . .

. . . . . . . . . . . .

. . . . . . . . . . . .

Page

55

56

61

67

Page

. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 57

. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 65

. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 71

. . . . . ..!!.. . . . . . . . . .

. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .

. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .

Page

Vehicle Technologfis To Facilitate Ground Operations . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .

NASA’s Advanced Operations Effectiveness Initiative . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .

Non-economic Criteria for Judging Space Transportation

System Performance. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .

Estimated Economic Benefits of Developing Technologies To Facilitate

Ground Operations. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .

Technology Development Benefits: AComparison of Estimates by Two

STAS Contractors. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .

53

62

62

62

66

68

69

70
Chapter 4

Technologies and Management Strategies

INTRODUCTION

Launch and mission operations could be made

more efficient and less expensive by employing

emerging technologies in the three major components of the launch system—ground support facilities, mission control facilities, and launch vehicles. These technologies must be put to work

in an institutional structure and culture that facilitates, rather than hinders, their use. Therefore,

efficient management strategies must also receive

consideration.

The first section of this chapter, Technologies

for Ground and Mission Operations, introduces

operations technologies that could be used in an

advanced launch system specifically designed for

low cost. They are consonant with technologies

for the Advanced Launch System (ALS) currently

under consideration by the Air Force and NASA.

Many of them would also be appropriate either

for enhancing existing launch systems or for inclusion in new launch systems built with existing

technologies.

The next section, T’echnologies for Launch Vehicles, introduces launch design principles and explores technologies that could be inserted into vehicles to reduce the costs of launch and mission

operations. The section on Management Str-ategies examines some methods of organizing and

managing launch systems to achieve low cost

operations. Finally, Assessing Technological Options and Costs discusses the principal trade-offs

to consider in designing new facilities and a new

launch operations strategy, and explores how

these concepts and techniques may affect the

design, costs, and processing of vehicles and

payloads.

TECHNOLOGIES FOR GROUND AND MISSION OPERATIONS

Because of considerable overlap in the technologies that could be employed in launch and mission operations, this section discusses them together. Some of these technologies exist in one

form or another today, but would need to be

modified for specific space applications; others require additional research and development. Table 4-1 lists some major categories of technologies

or applications. Those marked with an asterisk

are described and discussed briefly in the text.

Automated Data Management System

Computer work stations linked through a network that provides a common database can assist the speed and accuracy of information transfer and make it possible to speed up sign-off

procedures. Such automated data management

systems are in common use in manufacturing and

service industries.

“One of the highest cost items, if you look at

the Shuttle program today, is the operations cost

Table 4-1.—Technologies for Operations

Automated data management system*

Automated test & inspection*

Automated launch vehicle and payload handling

Database management systems

Computer-aided software development ●

Ex~ert systems*

● Discussed in text.

SOURCE: Office of Technology Assessment, 19S8

associated with all the data processing systems involved, ” observed one OTA workshop participant. On-board systems, flight-design-and-preparation, training, launch processing, and mission

control systems have all evolved over the years.

They are complex, written in different computer

languages, and sometimes poorly documented.

Each uses different, unlinked databases. Participants further explained that individual program

elements have their own autonomous mission

planning jobs and their own manner of sending

information among the subsystems; people use

“bulky paper, communications, phone calls, ” and

53
54

group meetings, and use no integrated approach

to transferring the data to all elements, even

though they are all interdependent. As a result,

although the flow of information within NASA

during the launch sequence is excellent, during the

months leading up to launch, information flow

is very poor. The events before the failure of the

Challenger provide an unfortunate example of

how constrained the flow of information can be

in the months prior to launch.1

An automated data management system should

be incorporated into any future launch systems.

Workshop participants urged planners of future

systems to: standardize the architecture of onboard and ground systems, standardize the code

used, and minimize custom hardware and software by using commercially available products

where possible. One participant estimated that an

integrated paperless information-management system could reduce the time spent in launch operations by one-half. The space station project plans

an integrated, paperless information system to assist in managing space station operations. Many

of the lessons learned in that effort could be applied to launch and mission operations.

Automated Test and Inspection

Automating certain test and inspection procedures could also reduce costs. However, before

automating current procedures, they should be

carefully examined to see which ones are necessary, and whether some steps can be simplified

or even eliminated. “It makes no sense to automate nonsense, ” asserted one workshop participant. Certain kinds of automation such as the assembly and test of electrical and electronics

systems may be technically straightforward, but

difficult to incorporate because workers understand current procedures well and are reluctant

to change. Workers require incentives and additional training to smooth the transition to new

procedures.

Automating the assembly and test of mechanical, pneumatic, and fluid systems is a major chalIReport of the Presidential Commission on the Space Shuttle

&d)engerAcudent (Washington, DC: U.S. Government Printing

Office, 1986), ch. 5.

lenge. Today, mechanical and fluid systems create the most operations delays and verification

problems, whereas electrical and electronic systems are already well-instrumented and tend to

be reliable. For example, on the Delta launch vehicle, more time is spent in mating the strap-on

solid- fuel rocket motors to the liquid rocket, fitting the cork insulation, and doing the leak check

on the pneumatic hydraulic systems than in checking out the entire electronic system. On the Atlas,

part of the leak check test calls for looking for

bubbles or listening for leaks—something very difficult to automate.

Box 4-A presents an example of a semi-automated system for inspecting the thermal protection tiles on the Shuttle orbiter. The system, developed by NASA, Stanford University, and

Lockheed Space Operations Company, promises

to make tile inspection more reliable and may

lower its cost.

Computer-Aided Software

Development

Traditional methods of developing software

and writing the necessary computer code are

highly labor-intensive and require skilled programmers. However, new techniques promise to

improve the speed and accuracy of software development.

Computer-aided software development options

range in power and complexity from commercially-available, so-called software engineering

environments, 2 which are program libraries, editors, and program debuggers, to automatic programming. 3

The benefits of using computer-aided software

development include reliability, economy, and

responsiveness, a key aspect of operational flexibility. Proponents of computer-aided software development suggest that it will be applicable to

both mission control and ground operations.

‘For example, SmallTalk: Adele Goldberg, SznaMalk-80 (Reading, MA: Addison-Wesley, 1983).

‘Skeptics contend that “automatic programming has always been

a euphemism for pro ramming with a higher-level language than

was presently availabf e to the programmer. ’’-D. L. Parnas, “Software Aspects of Strategic Defense Systems, ” American Scientist,

November 1985.
55

Box 4-A.—Shuttle Tile Automation System

Inspecting the some 31,000 thermal protection

system (TPS) tiles on the Shuttle orbiters and

repairing damaged ones is highly labor intensive.

Automating the inspection procedures could reduce overall labor costs, and increase inspection

speed and accuracy. In 1986 NASA began the

Space Systems Integration and Operations Research Applications (SIORA) Program as a cooperative applications research venture among

NASA-KSC, Stanford University, and Lockheed

Space Operations Company. One of its initial

tasks is to apply automation and robotics technology to all aspects of the Shuttle tile processing and inspection system.

The team is developing an automated work

authorization document system (AWADS) that

will enable technicians to document the condition of each tile, determine any necessary repairs

or replacement, and generate work instructions.

With the automated system, the computer,

which is programmed to recognize each technician’s voice, prompts the technician to find the

correct tile, enter its number, and report on its

condition in a systematic way. The TPS quality

control technician first inspects the tiles after each

flight and enters the part number, location, and

condition of each tile into a computer base by

voice. The computer’s central database automatically generates a problem report in electronic

format, which a TPS engineer uses to identify

and recommend proper repair procedures for the

tile. The problem report proceeds through an

electronic signature loop until final approval for

the repair. Finally, the TPS technician uses the

voice data entry method to indicate tile status

as repair procedures are completed.

The AWADS system and other automated

systems developed in the SIORA program use

the Ada programing language,l the software

environment that will be used in the space station, and other large NASA programs in the future. It offers the advantages of excellent portability from one hardware system to another, a

rich set of programming functions and tools, and

a uniform code documentation. The tile automation system is expected to be operational by January 1989.

‘Ada was originally developed for use by the armed services. It

has become the DoD software standard,

When used in the appropriate application, “it will

minimize programming time and effort . . . and

improve the probability of mission success. ”4

Expert Systems

Some systems attempt to capture experts’ problem-solving knowledge in a computer program.

So-called “expert systems” could provide considerable assistance in automating complex launch

and mission operations procedures, such as fuel

loading and gantry disconnect, where the experts’

knowledge can be codified. Expert systems can

also be applied to maintenance checks and fault

isolation procedures which are currently performed manually. In their most mature form, expert systems are used as diagnostic assistants.

Knowledge engineers and programmers have developed expert systems for a diversity of disciplines, including medicine, geology, chemistry,

military science, electronics, education, agriculture, and law.

Expert systems solve problems arising in a particular discipline using the same rules of thumb

that humans employ in decisionmaking. A typical expert system has two parts:

●

●

A knowledge base: typically including

descriptions of relationships among objects

or a set of rules describing actions. These

rules take the form, “if the power is turned

off, then the system won’t work. ”

An inference engine: typically including a

rule base (in this case, a set of rules of thumb

to be used for problem-solving) and metarules (instructions that determine the order

in which to use the rules in the rule base when

solving a problem).

Each knowledge base is specific to a particular

domain of knowledge and must be appropriate

for the type of problem to be solved. The inference engine, on the other hand, is generic; it is

developed by programmers trained in the methods of artificial intelligence and, once developed,

4USAF Space Division, Launch Systems for the Strategic Defense

Initiative–Data Book (Los Angeles Air Force Station, CA: Headquarters, U.S. Air Force Systems Command Space Division, December 1986), p. 6-93.
56

can be used with appropriate knowledge bases to

solve a variety of problems.5 At present, knowledge engineers act as intermediaries in the process. The knowledge engineers and programmers

‘Cf. critiques by F.P. Brooks, Jr., “No silver bullet—essence and

accidents of software engineering, “ Computer, April 1987, pp. 10-

19; and F. Flores and T. Winograd, Understanding Computers and

Cojmition: A New Foundation for Design (Norwood, NJ: Ablex,

are now aided, and may eventually be replaced,

by computer programs that help translate the experts’ rules of thumb into formats the inference

engine can interpret. b Box 4-B discusses three expert systems that could be used for launch operations.

bW. B. Gevarter, “The nature and evaluation of commercial ex19~6). pert system building tools, ” Computer, May 1987, pp. 24-41.

Box 4-B.—Expert Systems for Launch Operations

Expert systems that are potentially useful in space transportation systems include LES (LOX Expert

System), KATE (Knowledge-Based Automatic Test Equipment), and ISIS (Intelligent Scheduler and Information Systems).1

LES is a quasi-expert system built to demonstrate monitoring and troubleshooting of the portion of

the Shuttle Launch Processing System that performs liquid oxygen (LOX) loading of the Shuttle at KSC.2

Sensors at numerous points in the LOX loading system report the temperature, pressure, and operating

status of various subsystems to the Shuttle Launch Processing System. LES was designed to:

1. identify abnormal sensor readings immediately;

2. deduce whether an abnormal reading indicates a problem in the loading procedure or merely failed

instrumentation; and

3. override reactions to apparent system failures, such as the safing operation, countdown hold, or

launch abort, if it identifies failed instrumentation as the cause.

LES produces reports in the format of an Interim Problem Report, a paper form used at KSC for many

years (figure 4-I). LES can also display and print schematic diagrams of the wiring and plumbing it monitors.

In developing prototype expert systems for use in launch operations, NASA engineers chose to apply

an expert system to the LOX loading system because a complete functional description of the Shuttle Launch

Processing System was available. This improved LES’S performance but made LES a questionable model

for other expert systems that must reason about domains about which they have only fragmented and sometimes inconsistent descriptions. An upgraded version of LES (KATE-see below) subsequently demonstrated

an ability to diagnose problems even when it had only limited information about the domain, by producing a list of “suspect” faults.

LES’S developers also chose to use algorithmic reasoning rather than than applying “rules of thumb”

gained by experience. In other words, LES follows programmed instructions to achieve full logical consistency of its diagnoses. In this respect LES is not a true expert system. It also cannot understand systems

with feedback or diagnose multiple failures.

Nevertheless, LES’S developers are enthusiastic about its potential for use on other KSC fluids systems. They suggest that “the cost of . . . software would plummet while the reliability and safety of the

control software would rise dramatically. ”3

KATE is an expert system developed to demonstrate monitoring, diagnosis, and control of systems

with electrical, mechanical, hydraulic, and pneumatic components. 4 The present KATE system is being

‘For other examples, see NASA Advanced Technology Advisory Committee, Advancing Automation and Robotics Technology for the Space Station and for the U.S. Economy, NASA TM-87566, v. II, March 1985, and NASA Ames Research Center, “Systems Autonomy Technology-Program

Plan,” briefing slides, 1987.

‘J. R. Jamieson, et al., “A knowledge-based expert system for propellant system monitoring at the Kennedy Space Center, ” Proceedings of the 22d

Space Congress, Cocoa Beach, Florida, 1985, pp. 1-9; E.A. Scarl, et al., “A fault detection and isolation method applied to liquid oxygen loading for

the Space Shuttle,” Proceedings of the Ninth International Joint Conference on Artificial Intelligence, 1985, pp. 414-416.

3Jamieson, et al., op. cit., pp. 1-9 .

‘E.A. Scarl, et al., “Diagnosis and sensor validation through knowledge of structure and function, ” IEEE Transactions on Systems, Man, and Cybernetics, vol. SMC-17, No. 3, May/June 1987, pp. 360-368; M. Cornell, “Knowledge-Based Automatic Test Equipment, ” Proc. ROBEXS 86, NASA JSC,

June 1986.
57

Figure 4=1

I N T E Ft I tl F’ R O E! L E M R E P O R T it*it**itit********

tlonday the twenty-fifth of Ilarch, 1985; 3:38:23 pm

REPORTED FJY: LES the LOX Expert System

PROBLEM llESCi?IPTION:

GLOX3043E the replenish valve open measurement ne. 2 is not reading correctly .

It now reads: OFF ,but should read: ON .

ANALYSIS & TROUBLESHOOTING STEPS:

1) GLOP2045R the replenish valve signal pressure measurement detects the current

state of A3370&, because if A33706 was failed to ON, then EiLOP2045fi would

have to be reading between -0.5 and 0.5.

2) GLOP2045A the replenish valve signal pressure measurement detects the current

state of A3370EI, because if A33708 was failed to ON, then GLOP2045A would

have to be reading between -0.5 and 0.5.

3) GLOP20450 the replenish valve signal pressure measurement detects the current

state of A33709, because

if h33709 was failed to ON, then GLOP2045fi would have to be reading

between -0.5 and 0.5.

however, GLOP204511 is reading 15, thus clearing:

20-PSI-PR1, A33784, A33709, A33706, K105, and A33708.

Suspects now are: A8646 01 64019452, 6602111-F2, +22D180B1 and GLOX3043E.

41 GLOX2043E the replenish valve open measurement no. 1 is NOT reading

correctly thus clearing: GLOX3043E.

Suspects now are A86460, 6401A452, 6602G1-F2, and +22D180B.

5) GLOH30449 the replenish valve position indicator no. 2 detects the current

state of /!86460, because if A86460 was between 0.0 and 93, then GLOH3044A

would have to be reading between -5.0 and 98.

however, GLOH3044A is reading 99, thus clearing:

A864LI0.

Suspects now are: 6401A452, 6602AI-F2, and +221)180B.

61 GLOX2035E replenish valve secondary pressures okay measurements detects the

current state of +22D180)3! because if +22D180)3 was failed to OFFf then

FLOX2035E would have to be reading OFF.

however, GLOX2035E is reading ON, thus clearing:

6602A1-F2 and +22D180B.

Suspects now are: 6401A452.

Monday the twenty-fifth of March, 1985:

3:38:42 p m

At this point It appears that the most likely

single point failure is 6401A452 the

replenish valve open limit switch. The rest

of the measurements will be searched for

conflicting evidence.

7) The balance of the RELATED MEASUREMENTS

have been examined, and cannot add additional

information to the above analysis.

CONCLUSION:

It is determined that the most likely single Pump

point failure is 6401~452 the replenish valv e

open llmit switch

Thank VOU----LES r ’

Monday’the twenty-fifth of March, 1985:

3:38:44 pm aouRcE:wlonal&~ and~Mminhtration
58

demonstrated on a laboratory air purge system. Like LES, KATE is neither designed to understand systems

with feedback nor to diagnose multiple failures.

KATE was developed from LES by modifying the program so that it could not only diagnosis faults

in a monitored system but could also control the system. For example, it can turn valves and motors on

and off in an attempt to keep sensor measurements within specified limits. LES diagnoses faults by: 1)

hypothesizing faults that might cause sensors to report the undesirable measurements observed; and then

2) deducing whether they would cause the undesirable measurements. KATE’s developers realized that the

same method could be used to hypothesize commands that might cause sensors to report acceptable measurements and then deducing whether they would cause all sensors to report acceptable measurements.

KATE’s developers added an ability to learn about its domain by experimentation. KATE’s Learning

System enables KATE to construct a partial knowledge base, or a complete knowledge base of a simple

system, by observing the performance of a system to which it is connected. KATE “issues combinations

of inputs, each time looking for measurement reactions and filing the results in a table. When all combinations have been tried, the table is evaluated to produce frames5 representing the tested system. ”b KATE

has produced complete knowledge bases about simple digital circuits by experimenting with them. KATE’s

approach may be inappropriate for learning about complicated real systems because experimenting with

all combinations of inputs would take time and might even cause failures in some systems.

1S1S7 is a job scheduler. It is designed to solve “work flow” problems such as:

We want to produce Tethered Upper Stage Knobs (TUSKS)

8 at the maximum rate possible without buying

new tools. Each TUSK requires casting for five hours, milling for two hours, grinding for three hours, two

different half-hour inspections, and five different one-hour tests. We have two molds, one milling machine,

two grinding machines, one inspector qualified to perform each inspection, and one test cell for each required test. The casting must precede the milling, which must precede the grinding. Any tests and inspections, which are the last stages of TUSK manufacture, can be done in either order, although it has proven

economical to inspect before testing. The time required to transfer an unfinished TUSK from one work cell

to another depends upon the origin and the destination; these times have been measured and tabulated. By

what path or paths should unfinished TUSKS be routed among the operations?

If only one TUSK were to be produced, this scheduling problem would be a “traveling salesman problem” with additional constraints upon the routes the “salesman” [unfinished TUSK] can take through the

“cities” [operations] he must visit. The additional constraints can be used to simplify the search for the

shortest route, but the resulting simplified problem is still of the traveling-salesman type. The computational effort required to solve such problems by the fastest published methodsg grows exponentially (in

the worst case) as the number of operations increases. The scheduling problem in the example above, although far simpler than an actual one, is even more complicated than a traveling salesman problem; it

is analogous to the problem of coordinating the itineraries of a succession of traveling salesmen—one departing each day—so that the average trip duration is minimized, subject to the condition that no two can

be in the same city on the same day.

At KSC, Shuttle processing operations are now scheduled manually by individuals who maintain charts

showing durations of individual operations as horizontal bars; these Gantt charts cover several walls. Portions of the charts are photographed, printed, and distributed daily and weekly. When schedule interruptions, delays, or speed-ups occur, schedulers modify the charts; they must determine a new schedule which

satisfies all constraints, for example, on the order in which operations can be performed. Except fortuitously, such a procedure will not result in the most efficient schedule for the workforce. Although schedulers

also try to minimize processing time, they find it impossible to determine and compare all possible schedules satisfying all constraints resulting in the most efficient schedule.l” How much vehicle processing time

could be reduced and costs saved by more efficient computer scheduling has not been explored.

5A “frame” is a list of statements about an object’s properties and relations (e. g., connections) to other objects.

6M. Cornell, op. cit.

7Mark S. Fox and Stephen F. Smith, “ISIS-a knowledge-based system for factory scheduling, ” Expert Systems, vol. 1, No. 1, July 1984, pp. 25-49.

‘For illustration only. Any resemblance to acronyms in current or previous use is purely coincidental.

‘S. Kirkpatrick, et al., “Optimization by simulated annealing, ” Science, vol. 220, No. 4598, May 13, 1983, pp. 671-680.

‘°Critical path methods are used to monitor payload integration schedules at KSC but cannot be used to schedule processing operations; these

methods can identify the sequence of operations that will take the longest to perform (the “critical path”) but cannot rearrange the sequences to save time.
59

TECHNOLOGIES FOR LAUNCH VEHICLES

Vehicle Design Principles

As experience with the Space Shuttle illustrates,

vehicle design significantly affects launch and mission operations and plays a crucial part in the ability to reduce costs. Many Shuttle subsystems are

extremely difficult and time consuming to maintain or repair because Shuttle designers focused

on attaining optimum performance and high

safety, often at the expense of ease of ground operations, maintenance, or mission control.7 In order to determine which technologies might reduce

costs most, launch system designers should consider certain design principles.

Include all segments of the launch operations

team (including logistics personnel) in the

design of any new launch system.

When plaming and designing a new launch system, it is essential to consider the entire system

as an interactive entity, including the operations

infrastructure, and operations management. This

enables system designers to anticipate potential

operations and maintenance problems and provide for them before the system is built.

Reduce number and complexity of tasks

requiring human intervention.

Complexity of documentation, maintenance,

and interfaces among subsystems generally lead

to higher system costs. ‘Therefore, reductions in

the number and variety of tasks necessary for

launch preparation, especially those that require

human involvement, could assist in reducing

launch costs.g However, vehicle subsystems themselves can be complex, if they are designed to simplify each procedural step. For example, including self-testing electronics in an avionic subsystem

makes that subsystem complex, but reduces the

number of tasks required of launch personnel.

ESA achieved simplicity in the Ariane by using

‘George E. Mueller, Panel discussion, Space Systems Productivity

and Manufacturing Conference IV (El Segundo, CA: Aerospace

Corp., August 1987), pp. 233-35.

‘1-l. S. Congress, Office of Technology Assessment, Low-Cost,

Low-Technology Space Transportation Options, staff paper, in preparation.

a high degree of commonality in the design of

different vehicle stages, and evolutionary design

from one vehicle to the next. In addition, Arianespace has simplified the payload/launcher interfaces that are required for Ariane.

Increase maintainability.

Launcher designers have paid relatively little

attention to providing the ease and simplicity of

assembling or maintaining vehicles. As one OTA

workshop participant observed, “One problem

with the Shuttle is that the systems on board are

not designed for changeout. You can pull a box,

but you have to do copper path testing to get it

back up there. And on the Shuttle, there area lot

of boxes to fail. ” Even with ELVS, the amount of

testing that is done on the pad requires greater

attention to the principles of maintainability. The

following would contribute to launch system

maintainability:

 Increase subsystem accessibility. It would be

highly desirable to design subsystems that are

more accessible to repair and changeout. One

way to assure more accessible subsystems is

to include operations people in the design

process.

Such involvement might avoid situations

in which some subsystems later turn out to

require a lot of detailed inspection and changing, such as the Shuttle main engines, or even

the air filters in the Shuttle crew cabins,

which collect unanticipated amounts of hair,

blue-suit lint, washers, and screws. These

subsystems are difficult to access and repair.

Even where frequent maintenance has been

anticipated, such as in the avionics packages,

pulling and replacing electronics boxes requires time-consuming retesting to ensure the

integrity of hundreds or even thousands of

electrical connections.

Workshop participants noted that fluid

and mechanical systems particularly need

more accessible design and an improved capabilit y for making internal tests. A future

reusable system might also take a lesson from

aircraft design: airliners are designed to have

certain parts and subsystems pulled and in-
60

●

●

●

spected after a given number of hours of

flight. On the Shuttle, however, most subsystems require disassembly, reassembly, and

retest after each flight.

Design for modularity. Workshop participants also suggested that as much as possible, components should be modular, standardized and interchangeable. To achieve

design modularity means deciding which

functions must be handled separately from

others and how they must be connected, and

even what standards (such as electrostatic

discharge protection) must be used. Having

standardized interfaces would improve the

chances for achieving modularity. This practice is widely used in the design of both military and commercial aircraft. Thus a considerable base of experience already exists.

Arianespace has attempted to assure that

the Titan 3 and the Ariane 4 use similar payload interfaces, because it is in the customers’ best interests to have alternative launch

vehicles to turn to. In the opinion of one participant, “an absolute mistake on the Shuttle was marrying the payload to the vehicle, ”

which results in major software changes for

each flight and complicates the task of remanifesting payloads for other vehicles.

Standardized interfaces do, however, exact

a marginal cost in performance. Hence they

require that payloads be designed slightly

lighter and smaller than the vehicle’s theoretical maximum capacity. Moreover, it may

not be possible to design standardized interfaces across all types of vehicles and missions

because the mission requirements for, say,

launching into geosynchronous orbit are very

different than for low-Earth orbit.

Include autonomous, high-reliability flight

control and guidance systems. This technology has yet to be fully developed for space

systems, and will be very expensive.

Build-in testing procedures, especally for mechanical and fluid systems, as well as for electronic systems. As noted in a later section,

designers already know how to incorporate

test procedures in the electronic systems. The

biggest hurdle is in the mechanical and fluid

systems, which are difficult to test.

Make payloads independent of launcher.

Payload integration constitutes a major fraction of the cost of launch operations. In the Shuttle, payload integration has turned out to be a

“long, complex, and arduous task, compared to

integrating a payload on an expendable launch

vehicle. ”9 In large part this complexity results from

the potential influence of multiple payloads on

each other as well as the interaction of the payloads’ weight distribution and electrical systems

with launcher subsystems. In the case of the Shuttle, payload customers must also take part in planning and training for deployment or operation of

their payloads. Prior to the loss of Challenger,

payload integration for the Shuttle typically required about 24 months.l0

Workshop participants agreed that payloads

should be designed to be as independent as possible of the launch vehicle. From the standpoint

of the launch system managers, the payloadvehicle interfaces should be standard and incorporate automated checkout procedures, off-line

processing, and testing prior to delivery at the

launch site. However, such an approach finds few

adherents among payload designers, who generally find themselves pushed by the payload performance requirements and weight limitations.

Several workshop participants warned that

nothing is gained in reducing overall costs by

changes in procedure or technology that merely

send problems elsewhere. Many of the ALS and

STAS concepts for improved launch operations

tend to shift costs from operations to other stages

in the launch services process, such as payload

processing. For example, requiring payloads to

provide their own internal power, rather than

relying on a source in the launcher, may reduce

ground operations costs, but may also increase

the cost of preparing payloads. On the other

hand, if launch costs per pound were sufficiently

cheap, it might be possible to construct less costly

payloads (box 4-C).

9Charles R. Gunn, “Space Shuttle Operations Experience, ” paper presented at the 38th Congress of the International Astronautical Federation, Oct. 10-17, 1987.

l~T’& too is likely to increase with the new safety requirements

for the orbiter.
61

Box 4-C.—Vehicle-Payload Interfaces on the Advanced Launch System

One of the recommendations of the Space Transportation Architecture Study] was to eliminate or sharply

reduce the burden of supplying special services from the launch vehicle to the payload. This strategy would

assist in reducing vehicle turnaround on the pad, which in turn reduces the launch operations costs. ALS

study managers have accepted that recommendation and adopted the philosophy that the ALS will provide

minimum services to the payload.

Because the payload designers have been severely constrained by the total weight launchers could carry

to orbit, their previous practice has been to consider the launch vehicle as almost an extension of the payload, and to expect it to provide a variety of special fittings, upper launch stages, and services such as

power, cooling, and fueling. Not only does such an approach lead to extra costs for the launch vehicle

itself, it dramatically raises the costs of integrating and launching the payloads. ALS managers also maintain that payloads could be much cheaper to build if the payload designers were less severely constrained

by weight capacity of the launch vehicle.

They have asked the payload community to consider the ALS as a transportation system capable of

launching high mass payloads safely and on time, but which will provide only standard interfaces and limited

services (table 4-2). As one Air Force manager put it, “This won’t sit well [with the payload designers]

because it’s new and it won’t be the same way we’re doing business now. ” He went on to say, “We mean

to force a revolution in the design of launch vehicles. An evolutionary approach won’t reach cost reductions of a factor of ten. It just won’t do it. ”

Participants at two Air Force ALS workshops2 on the launcher/payload interface were asked to consider and analyze payload designs based on minimum services from the vehicle, and to identify any services they considered essential. In addition, they were asked to consider the effects on payload design of

delivering payloads to a ballistic trajectory, just short of orbit. Such a plan would make the launch vehicle

much simpler because it would avoid adding rockets to the core vehicle to send it into the ocean after delivering its cargo. However, the payload designers would be required to provide their own boost to operational orbit. In return, they could count on vastly reduced costs per pound to reach space.

Considerably more design work will be necessary to determine whether these stratagems could reduce

total launch costs dramatically, and consequently lead to cheaper payload designs. If successful, they could

ease many of the current payload design restrictions. For example, with a ten-fold reduction in cost-perpound to orbit, the weight of the payload and its upper stage could grow by a factor of two and still result

in reductions of a factor of five in cost per payload to orbit. In addition, if designers do not have to find

innovative but costly ways to shave weight, payloads could be much cheaper to design and build. However, if these tactics lead primarily to shifting most launch costs to the payload accounts, the exercise will

prove moot. In addition, if payload weights continue to grow to meet or exceed launch vehicle capacity,

costs cannot be reduced. At present, the payload community, especially the designers of highly complicated national security spacecraft, have met the suggestions with profound skepticism (table 4-3).

‘U.S. Government, National Space Transportation and Support Study 1995-2010, Summary Report of the Joint Steering Group, Department of

Defense and National Aeronautics and Space Administration, May 1986.

‘Held at Aerospace Corp., Los Angeles, CA, November 1987, and January 1988.

SOURCE Of f]ce of Technology Assessment, 1988

Use less toxic propellants. spacecraft as well as for launch vehicles because

Storable high-performance propellants such as engines using such propellants can be started and

nitrogen tetroxide or monomethylhydrazine of- stopped easily.

fer significant advantages where the size of the Although such propellants will continue to have

propellant tanks is an issue, or where propellants an important role in space transportation, they

must be stored for long periods of time, especially are also toxic and corrosive, giving rise to human

on orbit. These propellants can be used in rela- health risks and maintenance problems. Launch

tively simple engines and are frequently used for personnel must be protected by special suits from
62

Table 4-2.—ALS Launch Operations Specifications

● Separate launcher preparation from payload preparation

● Place payloads in standard cannisters

● Provide no access to payloads when vehicle is on the

pad

● Provide no flight power and communications interfaces

SOURCE: Air Force Space Division, 1987.

Table 4=3.—Launch Vehicle/Payload Interface Issues

● How beneficial is standardization of launch vehicle/

payload interface?

● How will needed payload sewices be provided if

minimize sewices provided by launch vehicle?

● Are total system costs lowered as launch vehicle costs

are lowered and vehicle availability enhanced by

keeping launch vehicle-provided sewices at a

minimum?

● Can generalized ALS mission analyses provide timely

loads and environment analysis to payload?

● Can payload requirements still be met if launch vehicle

design is insensitive to payload type?

SOURCE: Air Force Space Division, 1987.

exposure to carcinogenic or corrosive materials.

When propellant technicians work with these

fluids, other launch personnel must evacuate the

area. Toxic propellants also tend to destroy seals

and metal containers and create internal leaks.

Solving these problems could eliminate a significant amount of ground processing—especially for

reusable systems, which require post-flight handling. Developing better materials for storage vessels would help in this effort.

Cryogenic propellants offer lower production

costs and higher energy density per pound of

propellant. However, cryogenic rocket engines

and logistical support are generally more complex

and expensive than storables.

Vehicle Technologies

The particular technologies used in a launch vehicle may enhance or hinder ground and mission

operations. Table 4-4 provides a list of several advanced technologies that could lower launch operations costs when incorporated in a vehicle.

Table 4-4.-Vehicle Technologies To Facilitate Ground

Operations

Built-in test equipment (BITE)

Thermal protection system (TPS)

Fault-tolerant Computers

Autonomous and adaptive guidance, navigation, & control

(GNC) system

SOURCE: Office of Technology Assessment, 1988.

Built-in Test Equipment (BITE)

Future launch vehicles are likely to incorporate

built-in test equipment and software to detect

faults and reconfigure redundant systems; this

would thereby reduce ground operations labor

and cost. It could also increase vehicle reliability

and autonomy during flight, easing mission control requirements. Technology for built-in test of

avionics, especially computers, is most mature.

Technology for built-in test of mechanical and

fluid systems, especially sensors, will require more

development. More reliable sensors could reduce

false alarms, and software similar to the expert

system KATE (see box 4-B) could diagnose sensor faults.

Thermal Protection System

Reusable vehicles, such as the Space Shuttle,

require a thermal system to protect the vehicle

upon reentry. As noted in chapter 3, the Shuttle

thermal protection system, which was the first reusable system to be developed, has proven expensive to maintain. A more robust thermal protection system would reduce the complexity of

inspection and repair and dramatically reduce the

costs of refurbishment. Advanced materials, such

as carbon-carbon composites and titanium-aluminum alloy, which are being developed for the X30 program,ll promise much greater tolerance to

the heating and buffeting experienced on atmospheric reentry than do the current Shuttle thermal protection tiles.

1lu. s. con~ss, General Accounting Office, National Aero-Space

Plane: A Technology Development and Demonstration Program to

Build the X-30, GAO/NSIAIM8-122 (Washington, DC: U.S. Government Printing Office, 1988), pp. 37-38. For a detailed discussion

of new structural materials and composites, see U.S. Congress, Office of Technology Assessment, Advanced Materials By Design,

OTA-E-351 (Washington, DC: U.S. Government Printing Office,

June 1988).
63

Fault-Tolerant Computers

The on-board computers of future launch vehicles could consist of identical computer modules “mass-produced” for economy and connected

by optical fibers for reduced susceptibility to electromagnetic interference. These modules could

hold software that allows several of them to perform each calculation, compare results, and vote

to ignore modules that report “dissenting” results.

This approach, now used on the Shuttle in an

early version employing less sophisticated computers,12 would enable the launch vehicle to tolerate failures in one or more computer modules.

Computers with a high degree of fault-tolerance

would allow the launch of a vehicle with a known

fault rather than holding the launch to replace a

failed module and retest the system.

The full potential of fault-tolerant computers

to reduce maintenance, turn around times, and

cost may not be realized until space transportation managers gain sufficient confidence to accept

the small risks inherent in launching vehicles with

certain known faults. For example, the Shuttle has

a quintuple-redundant primary computer system

and dual-redundant software for these computers.

Shuttle avionics also have triple- and quadrupleredundant sensors. Four of its five computers

could fail during flight, or before launch, without causing mission failure. Yet, NASA’s highly

conservative launch criteria now require all these

systems to be operational before the Shuttle can

be launched. This increases safety and the probability of mission success, possibly at the expense

of economy, resiliency, and access probability.

In contrast, airlines will fly aircraft with faulty

or failed equipment, as long as the equipment is

not vital to safety, or has sufficient redundancy

for safe operations.

Autonomous and Adaptive Guidance,

Navigation, and Control

Current launch vehicle avionics that perform

navigation, guidance, and control must be up12A Spmtor and D. Gifford, “The Shuttle primary Computer SYStern, ” Communications of the Association for Computing Machinery, vol. 27, No. 9, September 1984, pp. 874-901.

dated before launch with data such as payload

masses and positions within the vehicle, launch

time, and predicted winds aloft. Launch delays

or changes in weather or payload configuration

can require additional updates.

Advanced avionics and software could make

the mission software less sensitive to payload configuration and weather, by monitoring a vehicle’s

response to commands during the early flight

stages. For example, an adaptive guidance and

control system could estimate payload mass distribution and use the estimate to calculate guidance and control for the remainder of the flight.

Similarly, wind could be measured by its effects

on vehicle acceleration, trajectory, and structural

strain, and control surfaces could be moved not

only to steer the vehicle, but also to alleviate structural stresses. A vehicle with these capabilities

would not only require less detailed programming

before launch, it could also be lighter because it

would “know” when to “give” under unanticipated stress. Some current military and civilian

aircraft use such systems.13

Computer-Aided Design and ComputerIntegrated Manufacturing

Computer-aided design and computer-integrated manufacturing can make vehicle design and

production faster and probably reduce life-cycle

cost even at low launch rates. Computer-aided design techniques can speed vehicle development by

automating the distribution, retrieval, and utilization of design information. Computer-integrated

manufacturing techniques can reduce production

costs by automating selected manufacturing operations. ’4 This will require specifically designing

systems to facilitate their manufacture by computer integrated methods.

‘

3 E.g., Airbus Industries A320; tested on the B-52 and F-4.

14 For examp]e,Hercules corporation has used automation to increase the speed and safety of its manufacture of solid rocket motors for the Titan IV.
64

MANAGEMENT STRATEGIES

Without appropriate management strategies,

the ability of launch and mission operations

managers to utilize new technologies efficiently

is likely to be limited. In addition, management

strategies that lead to improvements in the ways

existing technologies are used could result in cost

reductions. IS This section examines several management strategies that experts have suggested

would increase the efficiency of operations and

decrease costs.

Facilities

Use an integrate/transfer/launch (ITL)

approach.

The ITL method of launch operations (figure

2-9), in which each individual component in the

launch process has its own dedicated set of facilities, is essential for achieving high launch rates.

Separating the different launch operations functions in this way means that parallel processes,

such as payload checkout and vehicle assembly,

can proceed at the same time. However, ITL necessarily requires substantial investment in facilities. Further, ITL requires mobile platforms and

other facilities for moving launch vehicles along

the steps of the process.

Shuttle operations at Kennedy Space Center

(KSC) and Titan operations at Cape Canaveral

were originally designed to use the ITL approach.

By contrast, the launch complexes at Vandenberg

Air Force Base require assembly and integration

on the pad. Payloads must also be tested and integrated with the vehicle on the pad. Such procedures necessarily limit the rate at which Vandenberg can launch. However, even at KSC and

Cape Canaveral, the launch rate for existing vehicles is highly limited, in part because the available facilities are too few and overscheduled to

allow the ITL method to be fully realized.

Future launch complexes might be designed to

accept several different launch vehicles in the same

‘

s

’’Space Systems and Operations Cost Reduction and Cost Credibility Workshop,” Executive Summary (Washington, DC: National

Security Industrial Association, January 1987), p. 2-1,2.

general size class (figure 4-2).16 As Arianespace

has demonstrated in a limited way, the same

launch pad can be used for different launch systems with a minimum of alterations to the launch

complex.

Locate manufacturing facilities near launch

complex.

Placing the launcher manufacturing facilities

near the launch complex would shorten and simplify the launch vehicle supply lines, and eliminate the need for most acceptance testing at the

launch complex. However, unless the launch rate

was expected to be extremely high, such a strategy might not pay for itself, because it would require substantial capital investment in facilities.

In addition, it would require the manufacturing

workforce to relocate near the launch complexes.

Use off-shore launch pads.

New locations for launching space vehicles may

be needed if demand for launch services increases

significantly. Because of restraints caused by lack

of suitable real estate and cultural and environmental restrictions, the Air Force and its ALS contractors am studying several off-shore launch concepts, including offshore drilling rigs, small

offshore islands, or even mid-Pacific islands. In

addition to easing many of the restrictions of

coastal launch pads, such options have potential

for launching toward all azimuths.

The Air Force is taking a preliminary look at

the potential for using offshore drill rigs, because

they seem to present greater opportunity for operational flexibility than an island. It is exploring

launch pad designs similar to floating oil drilling

rigs that could be loaded with a rocket, towed to

an offshore site, and, in a matter of hours, turned

into a stable launch platform.17 For this and other

offshore possibilities, technical feasibility (especially safe handling of toxic and cryogenic fuels),

lbpeter L. Portanova and l-lardd S. Smith, “Strategic Defense Initiative Launch Site Considerations,” Aerospace Corporation Report

No. TOR-0084A(5460-04 )-1.

“’’USAF Studies Concept for Launching Heavy-Lift Rockets from

Offshore Rig,” Aviation Week and Space Technology, Feb. 1, 1988,

p. 42.
65

Figure 4-2.—Universal Launch Complex

Modular Assemblv

r 7

v

; area

* 1!

: ’

as required]

1

Y

------ -

r

Mobile launch ~latform ~

/ . , /

● Propellant loading

k

‘ [h

\> \

, ‘ /[

● Countdown and launch

: /

I

‘\’ \ One universal launch stand can provide

<’... % ,

I

high launch rate capability for various vehicles

I

:y -

~ —

r

. ,., . , .,’ .“-:,:, / /><> .

.?.” >

\ ’

.’ ..* .

●. . .

:“:.,,/ ,, ;/ / ‘. . /

,>; ‘ .:

j>. - ~

Main principles ‘ \ \\ ? : ‘

1

●

●

New operational philosophy ● Containerized cargo

(enhanced ITL) c Rapid recovery capability

Simplified launch stand sized for ● Integrated manufacturing/operat ions

largest vehicle processing on or near launch site

Minimum time on launch stand ● Adaptable launch mounts

(support beams adjustable for vehicle size)

SOURCE: Alr Force Space Dlvlslon

cost, logistics, and onshore facility and harbor requirements will all need considerable study.

Operations Management

Create incentives for achieving low cost,

successful launches.

The current institutional structure tends to

penalize launch failure, but is poorly structured

to lower launch costs or increase launch rate. Although commercial launch service offerors now

have the incentive of competition to encourage

them to drive down operations costs, similar

incentives are not apparent for Government

launches.

Centralize facilities, management, mission

control.

One way to lower the overall costs of launch

and mission control is to centralize the facilities
66

and personnel. For example, because responsibility for Shuttle launch operations and mission control is divided among KSC, Johnson Space Center, and Marshall Space Flight Center, NASA

must duplicate some facilities and personnel, and

provide appropriate coordination among centers.

Develop and use computerized management

information systems.

Although computer systems play a major part

in all parts of mission preparation, launch, and

control, they are seldom used for scheduling

launch vehicle preparation and keeping track of

the status of launch vehicle and payload systems.

For the Shuttle at KSC, for example, Shuttle orbiter refurbishment, system status reports, and

subsystem alterations are all handled by paper

documents. Not only is a paper system more cumbersome and subject to error, it requires considerably more time.

The fundamental difficulty in changing over to

a computerized system is that not only would it

require the development and installation of a large

computer system, it would lead to substantial alterations of the ways in which managers interact

with each other. In other words, it would require

fundamental changes in the institutional culture

of NASA and the Air Force. The computer screen

would replace the “in-box. ”

Increase autonomous operations.

Many operations procedures now carried out

by humans, especially routine ones, can be automated to reduce the “standing army” of human

operators. Automation could also reduce the time

spent in preparing for launch and mission operations, and increase system reliability. However,

to be automated, operations procedures must also

be standardized.

In fiscal year 1989, NASA’s Office of Space

Flight will start an Advanced Operations Effectiveness Initiative to focus on automating portions

of launch and mission operations (table 4-s). Its

goals are to:

●

●

●

●

improve the efficiency and productivity of

STS operations;

develop an integrated software strategy;

develop an autonomous space flight operations software test bed for:

—determining enabling technologies for

“fully” autonomous operations;

—performing hardware/software trade-offs

among operational systems;

—characterizing flight operations procedures/techniques

organize existing autonomous capabilities

in~o an integrated system.l a -

NASA’s program will serve as a test bed for

inserting automated procedures into space transportation operations. It should also assist in making automation more acceptable to launch managers, if it is successful in demonstrating the

applicability and safety of autonomous operations.

18NASA JSC Mission planning and Analysis Division, “Autonomous Spaceflight Operations, ” briefing to OTA staff, Aug. 5, 1987.

Table 4-5.-NASA’S Advanced Operations

Effectiveness Initiative

Kennedy Space Center

● Prelaunch processing/preparation

● Launch operations

Johnson Space Center

● Flight planning/preparation

● Flight control

● On-orbit operations

● Postflight analysis

SOURCE: National Aeronautics and Space Administration, 19S7.

ASSESSING TECHNOLOGICAL OPTIONS

Although launch system operations could be Do they contribute to other desired ends, such as

improved in a variety of ways, any proposed im- improving U.S. economic or political competitiveprovement must meet the test of several measures ness? Do they help or hurt the morale of the work

of merit. Do the intended changes improve effi- force? The primary criteria for judging space

ciency, reduce costs, and/or enhance reliability? transportation system performance and economy
67

include cost, reliability, access to space, and operational flexibility.

19 Proposed changes in launch

system operations can be evaluated on the basis

of their effects on these criteria.

Economic Criteria

Space transportation analysts have used several economic criteria (box 4-D) to judge space

transportation system economy. The decisions

about which economic criteria to use to evaluate

a particular technology for a new system, or for

improvements to an existing system, will affect

the choice of technology and even of launch system design. For example, selecting new launch systems on the basis of the lowest non-recurring cost

generally favors existing technologies and may

penalize designs chosen for highest maintainability. The Nixon Administration apparently considered low non-recurring cost as paramount in

the initial budgeting for the Space Shuttle,20 which

led in part to a vehicle design that is difficult and

expensive to prepare for launch.

On the other hand, selecting minimum recurring cost as the sole criterion may favor technolZONationa] Aeronautics and Space Administration, “Shuttle

19STASJoint Task Team, Nationai Space Transportation and $UP- Ground Operations Efficiencies/Technolo@es Study, ” (Boeing Aeroport Study, Annex C, May 1987; p, 12, Table 2-3: “Space Trans- space Operations Company), (Kennedy Space Flight Center, NASIOportation Architecture Screening Criteria. ” 11344), vol. 1, p. 2.

Box 4-D.—Economic Criteria

nonrecurring costs include costs of vehicle design, development, test, and evaluation (DDT&E), and construction or improvement of facilities for manufacturing vehicles, processing and integrating vehicles

and payloads, and mission control. The costs of facilities and equipment existing at the beginning of

the accounting period are considered to be “sunk” and are not included in most calculations of net benefit for new systems. Costs of developing technologies should be fully included unless they are being developed for other purposes.

recurring costs include costs of flight hardware (expendable or reusable) and costs of operations and support (e.g., wages). Some recurring costs (e.g., ELV purchases) increase roughly in proportion to the number

of launches; Recurring costs such as salaries are moderately insensitive to launch rate.

life cycle cost (LCC) is the sum of the nonrecurring costs and the recurring costs paid to operate a space

transportation system for a specified period to transport specified payloads to their operational orbits.

Unless otherwise indicated, LCC generally refers to the undiscounted life cycle cost, i.e., the total dollars spent regardless of the year in which they were spent.

present value (PV) LCC discounted at a specified rate to reflect the benefit of not investing for a deferred

return. Depending on the goals they wish to achieve, experts differ concerning which discount rate should

be used. A 5 percent discount rate (often used in STAS) is considered a reasonable “real” discount rate

for use as an adjustment for risk and time preference for government investment but should be increased

to adjust for inflation. A 10 percent discount rate was sometimes used in STAS and could be considered

the sum of a 5 percent “real” discount rate and a 5 percent inflation rate.

cost risk was defined in STAS as the percentage increase in the present value (of life-cycle cost discounted

at 5 percent per annum) which would be exceeded with a subjectively estimated probability of only 0.3.

net benefit is the decrease in present value of life cycle cost that could be obtained by an improvement

in a space transportation system, for example, by applying new technology to vehicles, building new

support facilities, or changing management methods. The calculated net benefit of an improvement will

depend upon the discount rate assumed.

cost leverage: is the net benefit of an improvement divided by the present value of the cost of implementing

it. The calculated cost leverage of an improvement will depend upon the discount rate assumed.

internal rate of return (IRR) is the discount rate at which the net benefit of an improvement would be zero.

‘Robert C. Lind, Discounting for Time and Risk in Energy Policy (Washington, DC: Resources for the Future, 1982).
68

ogy development with little regard for its cost,

if system life expectancy is assumed to be long.

The language of the act appropriating fiscal year

1987 supplemental funding for the Advanced

Launch System requires NASA and the Air Force

to obligate and expend funds “only for ALS variants which embody advanced technologies with

a design goal of reducing the cost to launch payloads to low-Earth orbit by a factor of ten compared with current space boosters . . . “21 Because

launch operations account for a substantial percentage of overall launch costs, the agencies would

therefore have to reduce these recurring costs significantly.

Present value of life-cycle cost is a flexible criterion that can be made to resemble either nonrecurring cost (by using a high or variable discount rate) or recurring cost (by using a low discount rate). STAS analysts used present value of

life-cycle cost discounted at a rate of five percent

per annum as the fundamental economic criterion;

they also used discount rates of zero percent and

10 percent.

The criteria of net benefit, cost leverage, and

internal rate of return (IRR) have been used to

identify technologies that could be applied beneficially in a space transportation system. All three

criteria have been used for evaluating options for

technology development, system design, and

management. However, they are not equivalent;

options may be ranked differently when evaluated by different criteria. An option may even be

judged an improvement according to one criterion

and undesirable according to another; an option

with a positive IRR would have negative net benefit and cost leverage at discount rates greater than

its IRR. For example, Boeing Aerospace Co. estimated that automating the handling and transfer

of components for a proposed cargo vehicle would

yield an IRR of three or four percent and save $55

million in an SDI deployment scenario, but would

have a negative net benefit ($17 million) at a discount rate of five percent, increasing the present

value of life-cycle cost by $17 million .22

ZIFiscal Year 1987 supp]em~tal Appropriations Act: Public Law

100-71.

ZZUSAF Space Division, Launch Systems for the Strategic mfense

Initiative–Data Book (Los Angeles Air Force Station, CA: Headquarters, U.S. Air Force Systems Command Space Division, December 1986), pp. 7-22 and C-9.

Noneconomic Criteria

Several non-economic criteria have been used

to rate space transportation system performance

(table 4-6 and app. B).23 In addition, other noneconomic criteria, such as international technological, political, or economic leadership, are often

employed in choosing among competing paths.

Because both ground operations and mission

operations are integral parts of the launch system,

they play significant roles in meeting the noneconomic, as well as the economic criteria. For

example, the Titan 34D fleet had low operational

availability for 1986 and most of 1987 as the result of the failure of a liquid fuel pump and a solid

rocket motor respectively, and of standdown policy. During the standdown of the Titan, the Air

Force developed non-destructive testing methods

to test the rocket motors prior to assembly. These

methods are now in use at Vandenberg and at

Cape Canaveral.

The example of non-destructive testing illustrates the tradeoff among economic and noneconomic criteria. Although developing and installing these methods of testing were relatively

expensive and will increase the costs of preparing a Titan for launch, the perceived improvement

ZQther criteria u=d iri STAS are defined in Joint Task Team,

National Space Transportation and Support Study 1995-2010, Annex E (“DoD Functional/Operational Requirements”), May 1986,

p. 5, and Annex C (“Space Transportation Architecture”), p. 12,

Table 2-3 (“Space Transportation Architecture Screening Criteria”).

Table 4-6.—Non-economic Criteria for Judging

Space Transportation System Performance

●

●

●

●

●

●

Capacity—maximum annual launch rate or payload

tonnage to given orbits.

F/exibi/ity—ability of a launch system to meet

alterations of schedule, payload, and situation, and to

satisfy missions in more than one way.

Re/iabi/ity—the probability with which a system will

perform an intended function successfully.

Resi/iency—the ability of a space transportation

system to adhere to launch schedules despite

failures—to “spring back” after failure.

Operational Avai/abi/ity—the probability that a fleet, or

a muHi-fleet system, will be operating (i.e., not

standing down).

Access Probability—the probability that a launch

system can launch a payload on schedule and that the

payload will reach its operational orbit intact.

SOURCE: Office of Technology Assessment, 1988.
69

in access probability was considered to outweigh

the costs incurred.

Economic Benefits

Several contractors participating in the Space

Transportation Architecture Study estimated the

economic benefits24 to U.S. space transportation

of developing or applying technologies to facilitate ground operations. Table 4-7 illustrates one

set of estimated benefits. 25 The technologies assessed include some that would be used in launch

vehicles (e.g., built-in test equipment) and others

that would be used in ground support equipment

or facilities (e.g., automated data management

system). The technologies of table 4-7 are considered “enhancing” technologies—they reduce

costs in the assumed demand scenario but are not

required to build or operate the chosen mix of

launch vehicles and facilities.2b

The benefits of each technology are estimated

in terms of three criteria: internal rate of return,

undiscounted net benefit, and net benefit dis24Thw ~timates app]y Ody tO U.S. Space transpofiation ‘x~nditures. Benefits of technology transfer to other sectors is difficult

to estimate even a posteriori; see NASA Advanced Technology Advisory Committee, Advancing Automation and Robotics Technology

for the Space Station and for the U.S. Economy, NASA-TM87566,

March 1985, vol. II, p. 104. It would be very difficult to forecast

spin-off benefits from the technologies described above, and OTA

knows of no such forecast.

ZSBWing Ae~SpaCe company; from space Transportation Ad?itecture Study, In-Progress Review Number 5 (Seattle, WA: Boeing

Aerospace Company, Apr. 7, 1987), p. 209.

ZbThe mix assumed in table 4-7 features a new piloted orbiter,

a flyback booster, and a cargo vehicle core stage with a recoverable propulsion/avionics module,

counted at 5 percent per annum. The technologies

are listed here in order of their estimated internal

rates of return. As the table illustrates, if they were

ranked according to undiscounted or discounted

net benefit, the order would differ. For example,

“expert systems” rank highest in undiscounted net

benefit but tenth in internal rate of return. The

benefits are sensitive to changes in mission model,

discount rate, or mix of launch vehicles.

Similar estimates by other contractors differ in

detail but generally predict that development of

these technologies would be beneficial. Table 4-

8 compares internal rates of return estimated by

Boeing Aerospace C0.

27 with estimates by the

Space Systems Division of General Dynamics.28

Comparison of the two sets of estimates is complicated because the two companies defined technology categories differently. For example, Boeing defined a category it called built-in test

equipment (BITE), while General Dynamics included BITE used for pre-flight testing in a category it called automated ground operations and

BITE used for in-flight testing in a category it

called flight management systems. The flight management systems and automated ground operations categories included equipment other than

BITE. For example, flight management systems

27Boeing Aerospace Company, op. cit.

ZSGeneral Dynamics Space Systems Division, Space Transportation Architecture Study, Special Report—Interim Study Results, report GDSS-STAS-87-031 (San Diego, CA: General Dynamics Space

Systems Division, May 12, 1987), vol. 2, book 3, pp. 7-90-7-91.

Table 4-7.—Estimated Economic Benefits of Developing Technologies to Facilitate Ground Operations

(“Normal Growth” mission model)

Internal rate Net benefit Net benefit

Technology of return (undiscounted) (discounted 5°\0 pa.)

Built-in test equipment. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 140.0?40 $2,617M $911 M

Automated data management system . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .

Automated test and inspection . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .

Accelerated load calculations. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . , . . .

Thermal protection system . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .

Fault-tolerant computers . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . , . . .

Automated launch vehicle and payload handling . . . . . . . .

Database management system . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .

Computer-aided software development . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .

Expert systems . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .

Autonomous and adaptive guidance, navigation, and

control system . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .

115.0

61.0

19.5

16.0

15.5

15.0

13.5

12.5

11.5

6.0

1,898M

1,454M

247M

218M

106M

830M

5,413M

2,225M

5,775M

716M

709M

498M

48M

59M

30M

227M

1,472M

552M

1,372M

43M

NOTE: Not endorsed by OTA; sensitive to architecture and mission model.

SOURCE: Boeing Aerospace Co.
70

Table 4-8.—Technology Development Benefits: A Comparison of Estimates by Two STAS Contractors

(“Normal Growth” mission model)

Boeing Aerospace Co. General Dynamics

proposed vehicles proposed vehicles

Technology IRR IRR Technology

Fault-tolerant computers 15.50/0

Built-in test equipment 140.00/0

Automated test and inspection 61 .t)”/o

Automated component handling 15.00!0

Automated data management systemb 115.OYO

Database management systemc 13.50/0

Expert systems 11 .50/0

Accelerated load calculations 19.50/0

Computer-aided software development 12.59’o

Thermal protection system 16.0°\o

Autonomous, adaptive guidance, navigation, 6.00/0

and control system

Kerosene engine NAd

Actuators NAd

Hang gliders NAd

43.40/0

9.1 0/0

17.8°10

30.50/0

21.8°\o

21 .7”!0

31.1 0/0

4.1 0/0

1.9?40

Flight management systems

Automated ground operations

Advanced information processing

Expert systems

Automated software generation and validation

Reusable cryogen tankage

Adaptive guidance, navigation, and control

Liquid oxygen/hydrocarbon engine

Precision recovery

%eneral Dynamics included built-in test equipment et al. in two categories: flight management systems and automated ground operations,

bFor ground operations.

c

For mission control.

d No

t assessed: Boeing assumed this technology to be enabling–ie. necessa~ for its recommended architecture–and assessed its net benefit but fIOt its IRR.

e Not assessed: General Dynamics assumed this technology to be enabling—i,e, necessa~ for its recommended architecture—and did tlOt assess itS IRR.

SOURCES: Boeing Aerospace Co. and General Dynamics Space Systems Division

included fault-tolerant computers,

defined as a separate category.

which Boeing

In table 4-8, OTA attempted to group overlapping technology categories. For example, the first

group of rows includes four categories defined by

Boeing and two, covering the same applications,

defined by General Dynamics. The second group

of rows includes the Boeing categories “automated

data management system” (for ground operations)

and “database management systems” (for mission

control) and the General Dynamics category “advanced information processing” (for both ground

operations and mission control). The third group

of rows includes the Boeing categories “expert systems,” and “accelerated load calculations” and the

General Dynamics category “expert systems, ”

which would include expert systems for load calculations. For those technologies that can be compared (e.g. “computer-aided software development” versus “automated software generation and

validation”), the estimated internal rates of return

differ because of differing vehicle concepts, technology application concepts, estimation techniques, databases, and judgments.

The economic benefits of so-called “enabling”

technologies, which are required in order to build

a given mix of launch systems, can also be estimated. For example, figure 4-3 displays estimates

of the undiscounted net benefits of four technologies that, if developed, would enable the Nation

to develop a mixed fleet of advanced vehicles proposed by Boeing Aerospace C0.

29 Boeing estimated the undiscounted life-cycle cost of the reference launch system mix (featuring the Shuttle for

manned flights and Titan IV for cargo) to be $248

billion in the STAS “normal growth” scenario.

Developing kerosene-burning rocket engines, reusable liquid hydrogen tanks, actuators for the

control surfaces of reusable vehicles, and Rogallo

wings and control systems (“hang gliders”) to return propulsion/avionics modules to the launch

area, would enable the United States to build new

kinds of vehicles that could carry the assumed

traffic for $197 billion-about $50 billion (21 percent) less than the reference mix would cost.

ZqThis vehicle mix features a new piloted orbiter, flyback booster,

and cargo vehicle core stage with recoverable propulsion/avionics

module.
71

Figure 4-3.— Economic Benefits of Emerging Technologies

● Built-in test

● Auto data mgt.

● Expert systems

● etc.

.

Enhance

new vehicles i

I

Enable

new vehicles

save $50B (21 O\O)

“ ~

● Kerosene engines

. Reusable tanks

● Actuators

● Rogallo wing

SOURCE: Office of Technology Assessment. Based on estimates by Boeing Aerospace Co.

The figure also displays Boeing’s estimates of

the undiscounted net benefits of applying groundoperations technologies and other technologies30

to enhance a launch system. Enhancing the reference launch system would save $22 billion, or 9

percent of $248 billion. Using the same technologies to enhance operations of advanced vehicles

embodying the chosen enabling technologies

sOThe enhancing technologies include some (e.g., expendable

aluminum-lithium tankage), which would not significantly affect

ground operations but which could reduce life-cycle costs in other

ways.

would save $25 billion, or 13 percent of $197 billion. The total savings afforded by enabling new

vehicles to be built and then enhancing their operations is estimated to be $76 billion or about 70

percent of the undiscounted life-cycle cost of the

reference Shuttle-Titan IV launch system. The enhancing technologies would save $3 billion more

if applied to the new launch system (as Boeing

recommended) than if applied to the reference

launch system, an example of synergism between

the enabling and enhancing technologies.
Chapter 5

Operations Policy
CONTENTS

Page

Improving Operations for Existing Systems. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . , . . . . . . . . . . . 75

Purchasing Launch Services Rather Than Vehicles . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 75

Charging Payload Programs the Costs of Services. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 76

Congressional Oversight . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 76

Future Launch Systems . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 77

Technology Research and Development.. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 78

Estimating Operations Costs . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 79

The Role of the Private Sector. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 79

Purchasing Services . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 80

Incentives for Reducing Costs . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 81

Launch Operations Test Center . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 81

Institutional policy . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 82

New Unpiloted Launch Systems . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 82

Existing Launch Systems . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 84

Foreign Competition in Launch Vehicles . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 84

Figure

Figure Page

5-1. ESA/Arianespace Relationship . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 83
Chapter 5

Operations Policy

As previous chapters emphasize, substantially

increasing the efficiency of space transportation

operations, and reducing costs, will require improvements in both management strategy and the

application of technology. Neither alone will be

sufficient. Reducing costs will also require greater

attention to launch and mission operations within

the National Aeronautics and Space Administration (NASA) and the Air Force, and oversight by

Congress. Although modest reductions in operations costs are possible for existing launch systems, new launch systems, especially designed for

low-cost operations, appear to offer the potential for significant savings. The following discussion explores several policy options for putting

the necessary technologies and management strategies to work.

IMPROVING OPERATIONS FOR EXISTING SYSTEMS

The current U.S. launch fleet consists of a range

of vehicles and systems capable of placing from

440 to 40,000 lbs, into low-Earth orbit. Even if

Congress funds development of a new launch system to be built in the mid to the late 1990s, the

United States will continue to use most of the current fleet (with relatively minor modifications) until the beginning of the 21st century.1 Operating

the existing systems will be expensive. For example, the Shuttle system will cost the U.S. taxpayer

approximately $2.5 to $3.5 billion per year (1988

dollars) for the foreseeable future.2 Of this, some

$1.5 to $2.0 billion per year will be devoted specifically to ground and mission operations. Annual operations costs for the ELV fleet could total $120 to $150 million.3

Congress could assist efforts within the Air

Force and NASA to reduce operations costs of

current systems by using its legislative authority

to require both NASA and the Air Force to purchase launch services, rather than vehicles, from

private industry. Reducing costs for Govemmentoperated launch systems is inherently difficult because Government lacks the cost saving pressures

of a competitive market environment. NevertheILJ. S. Congress, Office of Technology Assessment, Launch Options for the Future: A Buyer’s Guide, OTA-ISC-383 (Washington,

DC: U.S. Government Printing Office, July 1988).

‘U.S. Congress, Congressional Budget Office, The 1988 Budget

and the Future of the NASA Program, Staff Working Paper, March

1987.

3Based on an annual launch rate of six Titan IVS, 4 Delta 11s, and

4 Atlas-Centaurs.

less, Congress could help by requiring NASA and

the Air Force to charge the costs of ELV launches

to the program that uses or “owns” the payload.

Congress could also use its oversight authority to

conduct site visits focused on launch and mission

operations, hold hearings on cost reductions, and

mandate reports to Congress on the agencies’ efforts to reduce operations costs.

Purchasing Launch Services Rather

Than Vehicles

The Administration’s latest space policy, which

was released February 11, 1988, specifically directs

NASA and other civilian agencies to purchase

launch services rather than launch vehicles for expendable launchers, unless they require the use

of the Titan IV, which is under Air Force ownership and control.4 This policy is intended to assist the development of the private launch industry by putting the private sector in charge of the

production and operation of most expendable

launch systems. The policy should also have the

effect of lowering operations costs for these launch

systems, if launch services are procured competitively and if launch companies are given the

authority to determine the most cost-effective

“’Civil Government agencies will encourage, to the maximum extent feasible, a domestic commercial launch industry by contracting for necessary ELV launch services directly from the private sector or with DoD. ” White House, Office of the Press Secretary, “Fact

Sheet, ” Feb. 11, 1988, p.9.

75
76

operations methods, consistent with safety and

reliability y.

For national security space activities, the President’s space policy allows the Department of Defense (DoD) to procure either ELV launch services or launch vehicles.5 Congress could strengthen

these two policies by including them in legislation. Congress could expand space transportation

policy and encourage private sector competition

by directing the Air Force and other national security agencies to purchase launch services rather

than vehicles for all expendable launches, including the Titan IV. Such a policy would require

turning over the responsibility for the operation

of the Titan IV and any new launch systems to

private industry.

Charging Payload Programs

the Costs of Services

Space transportation costs make up a significant fraction of the total cost of a payload mission, yet within NASA and the Air Force the

budget for payload design, development, and construction is independent of the budget for space

transportation services. Thus, payload program

managers have little direct incentive to seek reductions in transportation hardware or operations

costs. One way to reduce operations costs over

the long term, especially for existing systems,

would be to require NASA and the Air Force to

charge each payload program the recurring costs

of transportation services provided. Such a policy would enable each agency and the Congress

to develop a more realistic picture of the overall

cost of a scientific or applications program. If payload managers had to pay for launch services out

of their payload budgets, they would have greater

incentive to encourage designers to design payload/vehicle interfaces that are cheaper to integrate and service.

This policy would be more effective for ELVS

than for the Shuttle, because the latter is still undergoing considerable modification and many of

the costs for the Shuttle are development costs.

In addition, a large portion of the investment in

the Shuttle is in the reusable orbiters, which function both as space platforms and launch vehicles.

Apportioning costs of the Shuttle to the different

users would also raise the question of competition between using the Shuttle and using an ELV.

Congressional Oversight

Reducing the operations costs of existing launch

systems will require a series of evolutionary steps

involving new technology and incremental changes

in management strategies. Inserting new technology into current space transportation operations

is costly and time-consuming. The complex procedures and myriad rules of launch and mission

operations that have evolved over 30 years of the

publicly funded space program are extremely difficult to change significantly, even for a new

launch system, because they are so complex and

interrelated, and require such varied human skills.

Altering one aspect of a launch system forces

other parts to change, often unwillingly. Because

of these complex human and technological interactions, operations managers tend to be highly

conservative in adopting proposed changes in

launch procedures. Reducing operations costs will

require the willingness of NASA and Air Force

management to focus continual attention on inserting new cost-saving technology and innovative management strategies into operations processes. It will also require congressional oversight

to assure agencies’ attention to cost reduction

strategies and consistent funding by Congress.

Changes of management strategy alone can

yield significant savings in operations costs (see

also ch. 2). For example, the Strategic Defense Initiative experiment Delta 180, which was flown on

a Delta launch vehicle, demonstrated that reducing NASA and Air Force oversight and reporting requirements can decrease launch operations

costs. b These requirements work against contractor innovation because launch services companies

find it easier to keep the payload customer happy

with the same “tried and true methods” than to

change them. Current requirements reduce the potential for applying new technologies to launch

‘Ibid., p. 8.

bDepartment of Defense Strategic Defense Initiative Office/Kinetic Energy Office, “Delta 180 Final Report, ” vol. 5, March 1987.
77

operations and raises the cost of launch services

to the Government.7

Congress could assist the introduction of more

efficient management methods by directing NASA

and the Air Force to reduce their direct involve7As one launch company official that OTA queried put it, “it costs

in two ways. NASA hires more people than it needs to, and we [the

launch company] have to hire extra people to respond to NASA’s

concerns. ”

FUTURE LAUNCH SYSTEMS

The most promising means of reducing the

operating costs of launch systems is to develop

a new system specifically designed with that goal

uppermost. The Air Force and NASA are currently working on an Advanced Launch System

(ALS) program with the goal of reducing the cost

of launch per pound by a factor of 10 over current costs. Efficient, cost-effective ground operations are essential elements of the ALS Program,

but would require considerable initial investment

in new facilities and operations technology in order to realize the benefits of the ALS designs currently proposed. ALS planners are developing vehicle designs that incorporate rapid, low cost

vehicle processing. Carrying out the goals of the

ALS program would also require implementing

a management philosophy that stresses the importance of low-cost operations.

If Congress wishes to lower the operational

costs of future launch systems significantly, it

must be willing to appropriate funds for the necessary launch operations facilities as new systems

are developed. New launch pads and associated

facilities would be needed. Many of the current

inefficiencies in U.S. launch systems are the result of adding to or improving existing aging facilities. For example, many of the facilities at Johnson Space Center and Kennedy Space Center were

originally built in the 1960s for Saturn 5. The

Shuttle launch complex SLC-6 at Vandenberg Air

Force Base was modified from a facility originally

built for the Air Force’s Manned Orbiting Laboratory, a program that was canceled in the early

1970s.

Some analysts have argued that the next major space transportation system, designed for lowment in the launch process, especially for expendable launch vehicles. Congressional attention in

the form of site visits, hearings, and reports to

Congress would play an important part in assuring that such direction is carried out effectively.

In this, as in other areas of congressional oversight, Congress should be cautious not to burden

the agencies with reporting requirements that inhibit the agencies’ ability to conduct efficient operations.

cost operations, should be funded in a multiyear

procurement that would require Congress to commit the country’s resources over a period of several years, just as it does with certain weapons

systems. Such a multiyear procurement could allow for larger production runs of launch vehicles

and major investments in new launch operations

infrastructure. This strategy could reduce the cost

per unit vehicle, and provide additional incentives

to design and build modular facilities capable of

being modified to accommodate new technology.

A recent study by the Congressional Budget Office has shown that where the development

and procurement of weapons systems has been

stretched out, whether because of Administration

or congressional action, costs of weapons have

risen. s The Space Shuttle program provides an excellent example of this phenomenon in the civilian space program.

However, as the OTA Special Report, Launch

Options for the Future: A Buyer’s Guide, points

out,9 such a strategy would also require the Administration and Congress to agree on long-term

goals for the space program and a level of funding to support such goals. IO

‘U.S. Congress, Congressional Budget Office, Effects of Weapons Procurement Stretch-Outs on Costs and Schedules (Washington, DC: U.S. Government Printing Office, November 1987).

‘W.S. Congress, Office of Technology Assessment, Launch Options for the Future: A Buyer’s Guide, OTA-KC-383 (Washington,

DC: U.S. Government Printing Office, July 1988).

:Osee u.S. Congress, Congressional Budget Office, The NASA

Program in the 199(% andl?eyond (Washington, DC: U.S. Government Printing Office, 1988) for a comprehensive discussion of the

budgetary impacts of different development paths for the civilian

space program.
78

TECHNOLOGY RESEARCH AND DEVELOPMENT

Research and development efforts have a continuing role in reducing costs of space transportation. The Space Transportation Architecture

Study11 and OTA’s own examination of space

transportation have provided a substantial list of

technologies that could serve as a foundation for

improved launch efficiency and lower operations

costs (tables 4-1 and 4-4). Because many of these

technologies would be related to those required

for operating ELVS, the Shuttle or even a space

station, the various governmental programs could

be closely linked. For example, research devoted

to the development of autonomous systems for

handling hazardous substances for the Shuttle and

expendable launchers could be applied to similar

systems for a space station.

In order to accomplish the goals of increasing

efficiency and reducing costs, Congress could authorize, and appropriate funds for, a technology

development and insertion plan specifically directed toward these goals. OTA workshop participants supported the development of a national

strategic technology plan designed to improve

launch technologies for a wide range of launch

problems and activities. A national plan would

also provide interagency and interagency coordination in order to reduce any duplication of research and development being done in NASA and

the Air Force.

Part of this national plan should be directed specifically at launch operations. “We need long-term

objectives, ” said one participant, “which are

handed down from the highest levels to determine

where we go with the technology. I think that

today a great deal of money is spent and invested

in shotgun development that really has a limited

yield. Budget constraints are real and are here to

stay. With a well-developed strategic plan, you

can accomplish a lot more with the same money

that is being spent in the agencies today. ” Such

a plan would enable NASA and the Air Force to

coordinate their efforts and to focus on a variety

IIU.S. Government, National Space Transportation and Support

Study 1995-2010, Summary Report of the Joint Steering Group, Department of Defense and National Aeronautics and Space Administration, May 1986, pp. 15-19.

of technologies having both near and far term

payoffs.

Since the early 1970s, when NASA decided to

focus its space transportation efforts on the space

shuttle, the United States has invested very little

in technologies that would lead to improving the

efficiency and reducing the costs of launch operations procedures and payload processing. NASA’s

Civil Space Technology Initiative, and the Air

Force and NASA Focused Technology Program

that is part of the ALS program (see ch. 2, Issue

B) could contribute to achieving these goals. However, they do not spend enough effort on inserting technology into operations.

A thoughtfully constructed technology development plan would generate an ongoing program

of incremental improvements to launch vehicles,

facilities, and launch operations. One of the goals

of such a program should be to develop operations technology and procedures designed to foster

routine launching. It would assist the need for improvements in current vehicle systems and support research and development of operations for

advanced vehicles. A technology development

plan should include work in all phases of technology development:

●

●

●

broad technology exploration (basic research)

—in areas of potentially high payoff such as

automation and robotics, built-in-test procedures, and fault tolerant computers;

focused research leading to a demonstration

—of flight or ground operations systems such

as avionics packages, expert systems, automated inspection systems; and

implementation to support specific applications—in day-to-day operations. This phase

should also include the development of methods to insert such technology with minimum

disruption to existing procedures.

Even without a national technology plan, Congress could assist the integration of new technologies into Shuttle launch operations by providing modest additional funding specifically for a

NASA technology insertion program. In addition,

it could hold hearings to assess the progress NASA

and the Air Force are making in coordinating ex-
79

isting research and development programs for

launch and mission operations.

Congress could also enhance the development

of new operations technologies by funding an

operations test center specifically designed to carry

out tests of new technologies for incorporation

into existing and new launch systems (see The

Role of the Private Sector, below) .12 Such a cen12As ~art ofits study of AIS for the Air Force, General Dynamics

Space Systems Division has specifically suggested turning Launch

Complex 13 at Cape Canaveral into an “ALS Operations EnhanceESTIMATING OPERATIONS COSTS

As noted in chapter 4, projected future savings

in operations costs will have to be examined carefully to assure that the costs of making the proposed changes (up-front, fixed costs) are less than

the savings realized in recurring costs over the life

of the program. To accomplish this, design and

development of improvements to operations will

require adequate cost estimation models in order

for the agencies and Congress to make informed

decisions about whether the proposed improvements meet cost reduction goals. As noted in

chapter 3, existing cost estimation models have

proven grossly inadequate in estimating operations costs. Workshop participants urged that new

cost-estimating models be developed. Although

the current ALS Program includes funding to support the development of accurate cost models,

congressional oversight may be required to assure

that the agencies focus on this issue.

Congress could require that the Air Force and

NASA report on their progress in developing

ter would consist of a mock launch complex and

the necessary supporting facilities for testing new

concepts and technologies outside the flow of normal launch operations. It could enhance both the

CSTI and the ALS Focused Technology Program

and could also demonstrate the insertion of new

methods, techniques, and equipment into existing launch systems.

ment Center, ” which would be available to the entire aerospace

industry—General Dynamics briefing to OTA, Mar. 15, 1988.

more accurate cost estimating models. As pointed

out in chapter 3, many of the data that could be

used to verify the accuracy of new models have

not been gathered, particularly for launch operations. In part this has been the result of congressional and Administration cost-cutting measures.

However, such measures only inhibit future cost

estimation, because reliable models cannot be developed without access to this important information. Collecting and maintaining such data

could be much cheaper in the long run than attempting to make decisions based on incomplete

information. NASA and the Air Force should require contractors to provide this information.

A new cost estimation model should be as free

as possible of potential bias. To avoid such bias,

or a more direct conflict of interest, it may be

appropriate to task an independent agency such

as the National Academy of Sciences, or the General Accounting Office, to develop an independent cost model.

THE ROLE OF THE PRIVATE SECTOR

One of the difficulties the Government faces in

establishing its own programs to reduce costs is

that such programs generally lack the sort of incentives provided by the competitive environment

of the marketplace. Until recently, the development and operation of U.S. launch vehicles were

the sole responsibility of the Government. Now,

however, three private U.S. firms offer commercial launch services on ELVS originally developed

with Government funding—General Dynamics

(Atlas Centaur), Martin Marietta (Titan), and

McDonnell Douglas (Delta). In addition, three

startup companies are also marketing space

launch services—Space Services, Inc. (Conestoga), Orbital Sciences Corporation (Pegasus) and

Amroc Corporation (Industrial Launch Vehicle).
80

The French firm Arianespace, the Soviet Union,

and the Peoples Republic of China also offer a

wide range of ELV services.

Competition among U.S. firms, and with foreign launch companies, which receive substantial

r !

go ernment subsidy, may eventually spur U.S.

fi ‘s to invest in additional facilities and technologies for reducing the cost of launch operations. However, the industry is not yet involved

enough in developing new operations technologies. 13 Two Primaw factors in the existing institutional arrangements for launch operations impede privately funded innovations.

First, private launch firms only have incentive

to invest in new facilities and technologies for reducing costs if the up-front investment leads to

sufficient future profits. Yet launch demand for

commercial payloads in the mid-1990s does not

appear large enough to foster such private investment today.

Second, all current ELV launch facilities, including the safety and range components, are owned

and operated by the Air Force. Private firms lease

them for commercial launches on a cost reimbursable basis. Although industry can institute some

cost savings measures in launch operations at

these Government-owned facilities, they are constrained by the necessity to deviate as little as possible from procedures and facilities used for

launching government payloads. To do otherwise

would not in general be cost-effective. Unless the

government encourages such investment by removing unnecessary barriers of documentation

and reporting and rewarding innovation, launch

firms are unlikely to assume such risks on their

own,

The Government could stimulate the innovative power of the launch industry by purchasing

services rather than systems; providing incentives

for developing new, cost saving methods; and by

providing a Government-funded operations test

bed.

‘

3

’’ Space Systems and Operations Cost Reduction and Cost Credibility Workshop,” Executive Summary (Washington, DC: National

Security Industrial Association, January 1987), p. 2-22.

Purchasing Services

In 1985, Congress appropriated funds for the

Air Force to procure an improved Titan launch

vehicle (the Titan IV) to serve as a backup to the

Shuttle for critical DoD payloads. By committing

to purchase several vehicles at once in a “block

buy,” the Air Force saved money. Although the

Air Force purchase of the Titan IV has stimulated

the domestic ELV launch industry and resulted in

savings on vehicle hardware, it has not reduced

operations costs very much. In a truly competitive environment, relatively high demand for

Government payloads could lead to reduced operations costs, especially if private firms had greater

control over launch operations. However, block

buys are not in themselves likely to result in savings on launch operations, because the Government still controls the manufacturing and launch

processes.

More recently, the Air Force conducted a competition to purchase a lower capacity Medium

Launch Vehicle II (MLV-2). This purchase represents a different strategy in which the Air Force

purchases launch services rather than vehicles.

Under this form of purchase, the Government

treats launch service providers much as it treats

competitive commercial procurements from any

other service industry, and pays for the delivery

of a payload to a specified orbit. The launch services company provides the launch vehicles and all

supporting services, including launch operations.

Government officials work with the launch firm

to assure that the firm meets Government standards of manufacture and service. However, they

limit their involvement in the details of the manufacturing and launch process. The launch firm,

not the Government, accepts the financial risk of

a launch failure, and guarantees a reflight or other

compensation. However, because a launch failure would mean losing an expensive payload as

well as a vehicle, Government officials have

strong incentives to maintain current levels of

launch operations oversight despite attempts to

reduce oversight. They are concerned that the risk

of failure and a subsequent free reflight may not

be sufficient discipline for the launch firm.
81

General Dynamics Corporation, which won the

Air Force MLV-2 competition, will provide 11

Atlas-Centaur-2 launchers and associated launch

services for a firm fixed price of about $40 million each. The Government will rely on a delivery schedule, performance, and reliability guaranteed by General Dynamics. If the launcher fails

for reasons associated with manufacture or preparation, General Dynamics guarantees a reflight.

This arrangement will require fewer Government

oversight personnel and give General Dynamics

a financial incentive to improve the efficiency and

reduce the costs of launch operations. Although

precise figures for the savings involved are impossible to derive because this version of the

Atlas-Centaur has not existed before, company

spokesmen estimate this method of procurement

resulted in savings to the Government of 12 to

20 percent. Savings of this magnitude are possible both because the Government makes a “block

buy, ” which reduces the cost of manufacturing

each vehicle, and because the Air Force will not

be overseeing the Atlas-Centaur production line.

Purchasing launch services rather than vehicles

has not resulted in immediate savings in launch

operations, in part because the Air Force still

manages the launch pads. Additional savings

should be possible as experience with this method

of providing launch services grows. For the purchase of launch services to be most effective, the

Government will have to carry through with its

resolve to reduce oversight to a minimum and give

private firms greater control over launch operations. Under the terms of a fixed price services

contract, tasks outside the scope of the contract,

such as increased documentation and reporting

requirements, will cost the Government more.

Government purchases of commercial launch

services offer the potential for synergism between

Government and private sector attempts to reduce

operations costs. The large Government purchases

give private industry an assured financial base

from which to work in competition with foreign

firms. As the U.S. launch industry begins to demonstrate cost reductions in its commercial launch

operations, some of these gains may be transferable to Government launch operations.

Incentives for Reducing Costs

OTA workshop participants pointed out that

the Government agencies had been less innovative than they might have been in providing contractors with direct incentives to lower the costs

of launch operations. In part, this is the result of

their historical focus on the performance and

safety of launch vehicles, and a desire to limit initial investment, rather than on reducing long-term

operations and maintenance costs .*4

As the Delta 180 program demonstrated, cash

incentives for meeting schedules can be an effective means of increasing launch operations performance (see Issue A, ch. 2). The Government

could explore other possible incentives for reducing costs. Existing types of incentives do not specifically address the reduction of operations costs.

Launch Operations Test Center

As noted in the section above on Technology

Research and Development, a space transportation operations test center could assist innovation

in operations technology. NASA currently operates several aeronautics test facilities, which the

aircraft industry uses on a fee basis. For example, the NASA Wallops Island facility maintains

a runway and associated test facilities for assisting the private sector in improving the landing

and flying characteristics of commercial aircraft.

Such a facility could be operated as a Government-owned, contractor-operated establishment.

Alternatively, Congress might deem it appropriate to establish a center that is funded in part

by the private sector. Such a center could be operated by a private consortium that brought together experts from private companies, the Government, and the university community.

I iNational Aeronautics and Space Adm inistrat ion, ‘‘Shuttle

Ground Operations Efficiencies/Technology Study, ” KSC Report

NAS1O-11344, Boeing Aerospace Operations Co, May 4, 1987, p. 2.
82

Congress could also direct the Air Force and

NASA to fund research within private firms to

examine ways of reducing the weight and complexity of payloads. As noted in chapter 4, launch

vehicles are only part of the equation for obtaining assured access to space. If launch operations

costs are to be reduced significantly, there must

be a complementary emphasis on reducing payload costs and simplifying payload designs. The

INSTITUTIONAL POLICY

Attempts to reduce operating costs in planning

a new launch system would be more effective if

those responsible for managing launch and mission operations and facilities were directly involved throughout the design and demonstration

process. However, they must not only be involved

in these processes, but have the institutional influence, or “clout,” to make their views heard and

acted upon. Giving operations experts broader influence over launch system planning and design

will require substantial changes in the “institutional culture” of NASA and the Air Force.

New Unpiloted Launch Systems

As pointed out in chapter 4, to reap the potential gains offered by revolutionary changes in technology will also require revolutionary management changes. However, the United States is not

likely to achieve the desired result if the current

institutional structures of NASA and Air Force

are left intact. One way to effect change in the

institutional culture of launch operations and give

operations personnel more influence in launch system design would be to separate the responsibility for system design and development from the

operations responsibility. For example, Congress

could decide to fund development of a new launch

system under the management of the Air Force

and NASA with the understanding that the operation of the new launch system would be conducted by the private sector. Under such an arrangement, the launch company would commence

operation after the completion of development

flights and would provide launch services to the

Government on a contractual basis. In order to

encourage attention to cost reduction, the comprivate sector could help with these. A wide variety of new ideas have surfaced with the DoD

Lightsat’ 5 and ALS programs. These and related

ideas should be examined for their potential applicability to lowering launch operations costs.

lsThe LightSat program, funded by DARPA, is exploring ways

to increase the cost+ffectiveness of spacecraft by reducing the weight

and size of payloads.

pany would also be encouraged to market its services to other payload customers, either from the

United States or abroad.

The European Space Agency has found such an

arrangement effective. When planning for the development and operation of the European Ariane

launcher, ” the European partners decided early

to separate the functions of launcher development

and operation. ESA, using the French space

agency CNES as technical manager, has devoted

its efforts to building an efficient, low-cost vehicle; Arianespace, S. A., a private French corporation, has focused on developing cost-effective

operations (figure 5-1). Arianespace markets the

Ariane launcher and provides launch services.

Neither institution can proceed without the help

and expertise of the other, but each contributes

to the development of an efficient launch system.

The result has been a relatively simple vehicle that

can be prepared and launched quickly with a minimum of personnel .18

The Ariane example presents an attractive

model for launch operations because it created a

substantive division between the responsibility

l~see U.S. Congress, Office of Technology Assessment, Civi)ian

Space Policy and Applications (Springfield, VA: National Technical Information Service, June 1982), for a description of the development of the Ariane and the role of ESA.

1l’Because it owns a substantial percentage of Arianespace stock,

the French government has significant influence over decisions made

by Arianespace.

18The typical Ariane 3 launch requires about 35 full-time launch

personnel, plus additional personnel who assist in preparing the vehicle. The Ariane 3 typically requires about 4 weeks to assemble,

integrate, and test, and 2 weeks on the pad. The Atlas-Centaur,

which has approximately the same payload capacity, takes about

twice as long for the same procedures.
83

Figure 5-1. - ESA/Arianespsce Relationship

P

ESA member

states

ESA as customer , ,

m ‘

i s

~ Mt&?$paM$ Other

customem

ESA as monitor

I CNES* I v 4

Anane 1 Anane 2/3 Anane 4 Anane 1

develop develop develop production

%antre Nationale D’ 6tudes Spatiales (the French Space Agency)

I

Launch Marketing

operations sales

finance

Production

Ariane 213/4 I

SOURCE: Arianespace

and authority for development and that for operations. This institutional division gives each institution a base of power from which to work in

arguing its technical case for reducing operations

costs. Because Arianespace competes in the international marketplace, it has strong commercial

incentives to minimize these costs.

In order to make such an arrangement function

in reducing costs, the U.S. Government would

have to purchase services rather than vehicles,

provide a strong economic incentive to reduce

costs, and limit Government oversight, provided

the launch company proved its capacity to deliver

payloads to orbit within schedule a~[d budget. The

launch company would also have to assume a major portion of the economic risk of launch failure.

Such a division of responsibility would have

several advantages. First, launch costs would be

more visible and comprehensible than they are

within the current institutional structure. Second,

because the launch company would focus on

launching vehicles and payloads for its clients,

rather than on vehicle or payload development,

it would have a major stake in limiting the number and extent of vehicle modifications that would

negatively affect its ability to launch on schedule. Third, because the launch operations company would also be encouraged to compete for

launch services in the international market, it

would have considerable incentive to lower

launch operations costs. Finally, if the ALS or

other launch development program succeeds in

substantially reducing launch costs, the launch

firm would likely have many more private sector and foreign customers for launches than can

be foreseen under existing demand projections.

In general, the institutional tension that such a

division of authority and responsibility would create could enhance innovation and lower costs of

production.

This institutional arrangement would be successful only if the technology used in the ALS

were, and were perceived to be, well within the

state of the art. If significant components of the

ALS pushed the limits of technology, such an arrangement would likely to be considered too risky
84

by both Government officials and private industry.

The arrangement would wrest much of the control the Air Force and NASA now exert over

launch operations from these institutions. However, unlike earlier proposals for privatizing the

Shuttle system, this policy option would not involve piloted launchers, and therefore would not

encounter the objection that a private corporation should not have control over a symbol of

U.S. technological prowess. In other words, this

model does not seem appropriate for operation

of piloted reusable research and development vehicles.

Existing Launch Systems

In the absence of a massive reorganization of

the launch institutions in NASA and the Air

Force, it may still be possible to focus increased

attention on reducing the Government’s costs of

operations.

In order to assist NASA and the Air Force in

reducing operations costs for current launch systems, Congress could direct these agencies to

establish an operations division independent of

their launch development responsibilities. In both

agencies, these functions are mixed. Consequently, because budgets are also co-mingled, it

is often difficult or impossible to determine what

operations procedures really cost. Separating development activities from operations more clearly

would allow the agencies “and Congress to focus

more effectively on the true extent of operations

costs. Such an institutional change has the strong

advantage that it would lead to relatively few disruptions of NASA’s and Air Force’s current organizational structure and procedures. However,

it has the disadvantage that it would force only

a limited cultural change within the agencies

toward operating launchers on the basis of lowered costs. This option, if pursued by Congress,

would require considerable congressional oversight to assure that the agencies carried out the

will of Congress. It would only work if users were

required to pay launch costs.

The proposed space station is another large

project in which operations costs would constitute a significant proportion of life-cycle costs. Because of its concern over the cost and management of space station operations, the National

Research Council recently urged a similar organizational structure for the U.S. space station

program. It has suggested “an organizational entity, independent of the space station development

hierarchy, with the ultimate responsibility for

operating the space station. ”19

In any event, Congress may wish to direct the

Agencies to develop a plan with the goal of giving launch operations and logistics managers a

stronger voice in the design of launch vehicles.

The OTA workshop on launch operations affirmed the importance of giving launch operations

and logistics managers an early and influential role

in the design of new launch vehicles. They should

also be given greater control over the budget for

operations. Most participants agreed that any design changes to current vehicles should be made

with the principle of lower operations and maintenance costs as a foremost criterion.

1gNatjona] Research Council, Report of the Committee on the

Space Station (Washington, DC: National Academy Press, 1987),

p. 34.

FOREIGN COMPETITION IN LAUNCH VEHICLES

NASA, the Air Force, and commercial launch nology application, and we can go off and do it

companies should examine launch operations in as well as or better than anyone else. Thus we are

other countries. U.S. agencies and companies tend reluctant to look at other nations and learn from

to suffer from the “not invented here” syndrome. their approaches.” However, launch organizations

As one OTA workshop participant put it, “we in in other countries may have something to offer

the U.S. believe that we are the leaders in tech- in reducing operational costs.
85

For example, Arianespace, the commercial

operator of the European Ariane launcher,20 has

focused its attention on reducing the costs of constructing and launching the Ariane, which unlike

U.S. expendable launchers was originally designed

as a launch vehicle not a missile. In designing the

Ariane system, the European launch designers

learned a tremendous amount from previous U.S.

experience and used it in their own designs.

ZOThe European Space Agency (ESA) developed the Ariane

launcher in the late 1970s. After extensively testing the Ariane, in

1984, ESA turned over management of launch operations to Arianespace, a French corporation supported in part by the French government.

Japan has made considerable progress in developing its HI and HII launch systems. Because Japan is likely to offer the latter commercially, it

will also give considerable attention to launch

operations costs, especially because Japan needs

a second launch center located near the equator

in order to reach geosynchronous orbit more efficiently.

The United States can expect future foreign

launch concepts like the U.K. HOTOL, the German Saenger, or the Japanese Spaceplane to be

directed in part at commercial sales. The HOTOL

and the Saenger, especially, are being designed

with careful attention to improving launch operations efficiencies.
Appendixes
Appendix A

Cost-Estimating Relationships

This appendix contains a brief summary of current

cost estimation methods to illustrate the uncertainty

and subjectivity involved. Methods used in the Space

Transportation Architecture Study (STAS) are typical and are used as examples for the general discussion. The second half of this appendix presents three

examples from STAS. One illustrates the derivation

of a cost-estimating relationship for vehicle structures; l

the other two illustrate estimated labor cost savings

achievable by developing and applying automation

technology.

A Summary of Cost Estimating

Relationships Used in STAS

Ground Rules and Assumptions

A cost estimation effort such as undertaken in STAS

must begin by making basic assumptions; those made

by the sponsor of the analysis are included in stated

ground rules, which also specify what the system must

do. For example, STAS specified a matrix of possible

mission models and required: 1) design and cost estimates of a minimum of two independent vehicles, with

no major subsystems in common, including launch,

orbital transfer, and return of specific high-priority

payloads “to provide assured access”; and 2) design

of facilities and equipment allowing a surge factor of

40 percent over the nominal launch rate.

Parametric Cost Estimation: When, as in STAS, systems are to be designed for economy, designers do not

know optimal values of system parameters such as size

and weight at the outset. The costs of vehicles or vehicle subsystems are therefore estimated parametrically; in other words, they are expressed as formulas

called cost-estimating relationships, or CERS, which

may be used to calculate estimated cost in terms of parameters such as weight.

A CER for a vehicle may be derived in a “bottomup” manner by designing several launch vehicles that

are similar except in size, and, for each vehicle, adding up the estimated costs of the subsystems and labor required. The costs of the subsystems maybe estimated in a similar manner by designing them and

adding up the estimated costs of the parts and labor

required to build them, etc. This approach is laborintensive, because it requires preliminary design of a

vehicle.

‘In STAS, costs of expendable hardware and spare reusable hardware are

included in operations costs.

Alternatively, a CER may be derived by fitting a

curve to a “scatter plot” of the weights and inflationadjusted costs of similar vehicles that have actually

been built.z The most common procedure is a combination of these approaches: designers develop a preliminary design for a vehicle in only enough detail to

estimate the weights of its major subsystems in terms

of the vehicle weight or its payload capacity. CERS

for the subsystems are then derived by extrapolation

and interpolation from historic data, if they are

available.

Individual CERS are derived for development costs

and for the cost of producing the first unit. Incremental

costs of additional units are assumed to be lower than

the cost of producing the first unit by a factor that depends upon the number of units produced (learning

effect) and the production rate (rate effect). CERS for

labor costs of ground operations are derived in a similar manner.

Manifesting and Optimization

After CERS for vehicles, facilities, and operations

have been developed, manifesting and optimization

programs are employed to determine the most economical types and sizes of vehicles for the mission

model. First, a trial mix of vehicles is assumed. A size

is assumed for each vehicle, and its cost is estimated

from the CERS. Then a manifesting program is run to

determine the least costly way of combining (co-manifesting) payloads on vehicles so they reach their operational orbits in the specified year, taking into account

any restrictions on co-manifesting for security and

safety. The launch rates in the resulting manifest determine the operations costs, and the maximum launch

rate, inflated by 40 percent to provide a surge capability, determines the number of facilities required for

processing and launch. Costs of development, facilities, vehicle production, and operations are discounted and totalled to obtain a projected present

value of life-cycle cost. The process is repeated assuming different vehicle mixes, sizes, and technologies, and

different ground operations and mission control technologies, to determine the most economic architecture

and technology content.

‘For a comprehensive published description of this approach, see D.E.

Koelle, “Cost Model for Space Transportation Systems Development, Fabrication and Operations” (Ottobrunn, FRG: Messerschmitt-Boelkow-Blohm

GmbH, Bericht Nr. TN-RX1-328 B, 1983).

89
90

Estimation of Risk of GreaterThan-Expected Cost

STAS contractors estimated cost risk subjectively

at the level of the vehicle systems mix, not in a bottomup manner. The estimated risk, expressed as a cost,

was given as percent weight in the overall score used

to screen system mixes, as specified by stud~ ground

rules. Those who estimated the risk may halve been

unfamiliar with cost risks apparent to subsystem experts. Moreover, cost risk was estimated assuming

ground rules were met; risk that ground rules will not

be met increases cost risk.

Cost Estimation Examples

Example 1: Parametric Estimation of

Vehicle Structure Cost

To derive a CER for the cost of vehicle structures

(e.g., inter-stage adapters), one contractor began by

plotting the weights and inflation-adjusted costs of vehicle structures it had built previously.3 The resulting

scatter plot is shown in figure A-1.

‘Such data are often proprietary, which makes valid comparisons with

CER’S derived by other manufacturers very difficult.

Figure A-l. - Historical Costs and Weights of

Vehicle St-n =

o

+

w

g 

1

“

0 -

●

/! ●

●

● 0

●

0.1 I I

100 1,000 10,OOO

Weight (lb)

Legend:

● non-man-rated expendable

+ mm-rated expendable

O man-rated reusable

The contractor observed that the costs of the structures rated for human use-especially the reusable one,

were significantly higher in proportion to their weights

than were the costs of the expendable structures not

rated for humans. It therefore decided to derive a basic

CER for unpiloted expendable structures and assume

that the greater costs of crew-rating and reusability

could be represented by “complexity factors” by which

the basic cost should be multiplied. The basic CER is

represented by a straight solid line in figure A-1, and

complexity factors for crew-rating and reusability y are

represented by arrows from this line up to the data

points for the crew-rated systems. Figure A-2 was derived from three assumptions: 1) that design for reusability increases cost by a factor independent of structure weight, or 2) rating for human use, and 3) that

the complexity factor for rating for human use is independent of structure weight.

Critique: The contractor could verify assumption

(3) by comparison with a commercially available CER,

presumably derived from different data and independent assumptions; the contractor found good agreement, but this does not imply that the assumption

would be correct in all cases. Assumptions 1 and 2

were neither supported nor contradicted by the limited

data available to the contractor; they are educated

guesses—the best the contractor could do under the

circumstances. Although they are not clearly incorrect,

their accuracy is unknownj and the contractor preFigure A-2.-Coat-Estimating Relationships (CERS)

for Vehicie Structures (first-unit production costs)

0.1 ~

100 1,000 10,OOO

Weight (lb)

Legend:

— non-man-rated expendable

SOURCE: Office of Techno@y Assesament, 19W SOURCE: Office of Technology Assessment, 1988
91

sented no estimates of uncertainty in the complexity

factors. If the contractor or a Government agency had

access to proprietary data of other contractors on expendable structures rated for humans, there might be

enough data points to test assumptions 1 and 2, although the variety of vehicles built to date maybe inadequate to accept or reject the assumptions with high

confidence.

Example 2: Savings From Automating

Ground Operations

This example and example 3 summarize the procedures a different STAS contractor employed to estimate potential savings from automating ground operations and mission control functions.

To estimate savings from automating ground operations, the contractor first calculated the labor required

to perform functions such as refurbishing avionics

using current methods based on estimates of labor required to perform similar functions on existing vehicles, and adjusted to reflect the fact that a new vehicle would have different needs. For example, a flyback

booster would require a more robust thermal protection system than the Shuttle orbiter and would not require refurbishment. A percentage reduction in labor

for each such function was then estimated for each new

technology proposed (e.g., automated test & inspection). This reduction was assumed to be achieved by

decreasing the crew size and the number of shifts by

equal percentages; the reduction in processing time

(number of shifts) allowed the required number of vehicles per year to be processed with fewer facilities,

thus saving costs and lead time as well as direct labor

costs for new facilities. From these savings was subtracted the costs of developing the new technology required and applying it; these costs “were estimated

based on the costs associated with similar programs,

including the costs of developing the STS Launch Processing System. ”

Critique: The relevance of such costs as a basis for

extrapolation could be questioned, because comparable automation was not developed for the STS Launch

Processing System.

Example 3: Savings From Automating

Mission Control

To estimate savings from automating mission control, the contractor first estimated the recurring and

non-recurring costs of performing five mission control

functions (flight planning, simulation and training,

payload integration, data load preparation, and flight

control) using current technology. The costs of performing these functions in 1995, using 1990 technology, and in 2000, using 1995 technology, were also

estimated; in general, the recurring costs were lower

while the non-recurring costs were higher. At the high

launch rates assumed, the life-cycle costs were lowered

by assuming use of the new technology, when available. The fractions of net savings (cost reduction minus cost of technology development) for each function attributable to each new technology and to

improved management were then allocated according

to a formula, e.g., 40 percent of net savings on flight

planning was attributed to use of expert systems. Technology development funding requirements were listed

by year, although the contractor’s reports do not make

clear the basis for their derivation.

Critique: The costs of developing “ordinary” software have proven difficult to estimate accurately, even

a posteriori, when the size of the program (on which

some estimates are based) is known.4 The accuracy

with which existing methods can estimate costs of developing software such as expert systems is not known.

‘Chris F. Kemerer, “An Empirical Validation of Software Cost Estimation

Models,” Communications of the Association for Computing Machinery, vol.

30, No. 5, May 1987, pp. 416-429.
Appendix B

Noneconomic Criteria

Capacity of a space transportation system can be

described in terms of maximum annual launch rate or

payload tonnage. However, capacity is actually multifaceted and is better described by a set of numbers:

the maximum launch rate of each fleetl to each of several reference orbits, along with trade-offs among

these, if any (e.g., sharing of launch pads by different

fleets).z

Flexibility is the “ability of the space transportation

system to . . . respond to schedule, payload, and situation changes with . . . responsiveness . . . [and] capacity, ”3 “ . . . and to satisfy missions in more than

one way.”4 For example, a fleet’s ability to share traffic (carry some or all payloads manifested for a different fleet) improves the flexibility of a multi-fleet system. Flexibility may be valued for its own sake or

indirectly, if it contributes to resiliency, operational

availability, or access probability.

Reliability is the probability with which a system

will perform an intended function. A system designed

to perform several distinct functions will have a reliability corresponding to each function. For example, a

fully reusable vehicle would be designed to transport

payloads to orbit safely anc3 return safely. The probability that it will reach orbit and safely deploy a payload (its ascent reliability) is greater than its mission

success reliability—the probability that it will reach

orbit, safely deploy a payload, and return. Mission

success reliability is a commonly used criterion, but

reliabilities of non-critical subsystems are also of interest because they affect maintenance costs.

High reliability contributes to, but is not required

for, resiliency and operational availability; it is necessary for high probability of access and return. Ascent and return reliabilities determine the risks of loss

of payloads and reusable vehicle components; these

risks include expected replacement costs as well as nonfinancial risks, e.g., to national security or political

support of space programs. One of the difficulties in

using reliability as a criterion is the uncertainty in estimates of the reliabilities of operational vehicles and,

especially, proposed vehicles.

1A fleet is that portion of a space transportation system which consists of

launch vehicles of a single type, e.g., the Shuttle fleet, the Titan-IV fleet, etc.

‘Capacity was not used as a screening criterion in STAS because candidate architectures were required to have sufficient capacity to fly all missions

in the mission model. Excess capacity contributed to architecture scores indirectly through effects on operational flexibility and resiliency, etc.

‘Joint Task Team, National Space Transportation and Support Study 1995-

2010, Annex E (“DoD Functional/Operational Requirements”), May 1986,

p. 5.

‘Ibid., Annex C, p. 12, tab. 2-3.

Because perfect reliability is unattainable, the marginal cost of reliability must increase without bound

as reliability approaches 1.0, and a lower reliability

must be optimal (see figure 2-4 in chapter 2). The optimal reliability would be the reliability at which the

value of reliability less the cost of achieving that reliability is greatest. The value of reliability has been estimated in some cases by calculating the expected replacement costs of payloads and reusable vehicle

components; such estimates have been used to argue,

e.g., that reusable systems with reliability below .985

should not be considered as viable candidates. However, such estimates are likely to undervalue reliability because they neglect intangible risks. The costs of

providing various reliabilities have been estimated by

considering different configurations of critical components (e. g., engines) with different degrees of redundancy, totalling component costs, and estimating reliability from estimates of component reliabilities.

Resiliency is the ability of a space transportation system to adhere to launch schedules despite failures—

to “spring back” after failure. A fleet is considered to

be resilient if the probability of a failure while recovering from a failure is less than 0.35.5 This criterion

is derived from several assumptions:

1. Payloads are launched at a nominal launch rate

until a failure occurs.

2. After a failure, launch attempts cease for a duration called the downtime, during which the cause

of the failure would be investigated and corrected; however, the reliability of the launch vehicle is assumed to remain the same.

3. Reservations for some payloads scheduled to be

launched during the standdown are assumed to

be canceled; the rest, a fraction called the backlog factor, are added to the pre-failure backlog

(if any) of payloads queued for launch.

4. When launches resume, payloads are launched

at the maximum launch rate (the surge rate) at

which the system can operate in an effort to reduce the backlog. Meanwhile, new payloads are

readied for launch at the nominal launch rate and

are added to the backlog.

5. Launches continue at the surge launch rate until

the backlog is eliminated, unless another failure

occurs first.

5The resiliency of each fleet of a multi-fleet space transportation system

may be calculated as though it were the only fleet, if no fleet can carry payloads manifested for a different fleet. The resiliency of the multi-fleet system

is considered inadequate if the resiliency of any of its fleets is inadequate.

If the fleets can share payloads, calculation of the probability of a failure

during a surge period can be very complicated.

92
93

If the probability of a failure during a surge period

exceeds 0.35, it is unlikely that the backlog can ever

be eliminated after a first failure.’ However, resiliency

may be made as good as desired by changing any one

(or any combination) of three of the four parameters

that determine fleet resiliency: reliability, downtime,

and nominal launch rate. Increasing surge launch rate

results in only limited improvement in resiliency.7

Operational Availability is the probability that a

fleet, or a multi-fleet system, will be operating (i.e.,

not standing down) at a randomly selected time.8

Operational availability is intimately related to

resiliency; a fleet or system with high resiliency will

have a high operational availability. Reducing downtime can make operational availability as great as

desired; a fleet that never stands down is always available, even if unreliable. A mixed fleet is not required

for high operational availability.

Access Probability is the probability that a space

transportation system can launch a payload and that

“Harry Bernstein & A. Dwight Abbott, “Space Transportation Architecture Resiliency,” (El Segundo, CA: The Aerospace Corp., March 1987).

‘The probability of a failure during a surge period (PF) may be calculated

from the formula

T K(T#?n/(S–1) PF = 1– Ps d

where Ps is the launch vehicle reliability, I?n is the nominal launch rate, SRn

is the surge launch rate, S is the surge factor (SRn/ Rn), Td is the downtime,

and K(Td) is the backlog factor, which depends on the downtime. Downtime is defined as the interval from a failure until the next operational launch

attempt. K(Td) = 1— Td/6 is assumed.

‘This does not mean that it must always have an unreserved vehicle on

a pad ready to launch on a day’s notice.

the payload will reach its operational orbit intact. Two

kinds of access probability can be distinguished: probability of access on demand, and probability of access

on schedule. High probability of access on demand requires flexibility—so that a high-priority launch can

be scheduled quickly when required for national security—and high probability of access on schedule, so

that the scheduled launch will most likely be successful. Probability of access on schedule is operational

availability (the probability that a launch can be attempted when scheduled) times vehicle reliability (the

probability that the payload will reach its intended orbit intact if launched).g 1°

A space transportation system is often said to provide assured access if it provides means for placing

high-priority payloads in their operational orbits on

demand with high probability. Access probability depends on the payload—and the variety of vehicles that

can launch it—and is more important for some payloads than for others.

‘N .b.: traffic sharing is not required. Cf. STAS groundrule A-1: “Viable

architecture will be based on a mixed fleet concept for operational flexibility. As a minimum, two independent (different major subsystems) launch,

upper stage, and return to Earth (~pecially for manned missions) systems

must be employed to provide assured access for the specific, high priority

payloads designated in the mission model. ”

10If downtime has not been minimized, traffic sharing may improve access

probability, otherwise it can reduce it. If a reliable launch vehicle fails, using

a backup vehicle that is less reliable than the primary launch vehicle payload

wilI decrease the probability of getting the shared payloads to orbit safely.

If the primary vehicle were indeed more reliable, it would be safer to use

it while accident investigation proceeds; its unreliability, even if due to systematic problems, would be lower. Moreover, it would be costly to maintain a backup fleet.
Appendix C

Reliability

Launch vehicles can in principle be made very reliable by incorporating redundant components and subsystems, and by detailed testing during manufacturing and launch operations. However, it is costly to

manufacture a highly reliable vehicle, and maintaining and verifying its reliability until launch imposes

heavy burdens, high costs, and delays on ground operations. Yet, operating a fleet of unreliable vehicles is

also costly: direct financial costs may include the

replacement costs of payloads and vehicles and the

costs of supporting the launch operations force during a standdown.

If only financial costs are considered, it is possible

to determine the most economical reliability for a vehicle, if payload replacement costs, etc., can be estimated before the vehicle is designed. This has been

done for some launch vehicles and orbital transfer vehicles.’ Intangible costs may also be included if ex-

‘Boeing Aerospace Corp. has developed a computer program called STROP

to perform such an analysis; it was first used to determine the most economical

reliability for the Inertial Upper Stage.

pressed in monetary terms. However, this requires subjective judgement of the value of military satellites to

national security, 2 and other intangibles.

The reliabilities of currently operational launch vehicles are not known with certainty or precision. On

the basis of actual launch experience, they can only

be said to lie within certain confidence intervals with

corresponding statistical confidence. As more launches

are attempted, the confidence intervals will shrink and

statistical confidence will grow. The reliability of a

proposed launch vehicle or variant can only be hypothesized on a semi-analytical, semi-subjective basis. Confidence levels for the reliabilities of currently

operational launch vehicles are listed in table C-13

‘U.S. Congress, Office of Technology Assessment, Anti-Satellite Weapons, Countermeasures, and Arms Control, OTA-ISC-281 (Washington, DC:

U.S. Government Printing Office, September 1985), p. 33.

3Confidence intervals are estimated from statistics in Harry Bernstein and

A. Dwight Abbott, “Space Transportation Architecture Resiliency,” (El

Segundo, CA: The Aerospace Corp., March 1987), using the exact confidence

bounds of Y. Fujino, Biometrika, vol. 67, 1980, pp. 677-681.

Table C-1 .-Launch Success Statistics (since 1976)

Successes Average Minimum reliability

Vehicle /attemDts success rate at eaual confidence

Delta . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 60/63 95.20/o 900/0

Atias E . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 25/28 89.30/o 81 0/0

Atlas/Centaur. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 26/29 89.70/o 81 0/0

scout . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 14/14 100.00/0 87°!o

Titan . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 51/54 94.40/0 880/0

Shuttle . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 24125 96.00/0 870/o

Ariane . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 14118 77.8?40 690/o

NOTE: Forecasts (for which OTA does not vouch) of the reliabilities of proposed vehicles differ, e.g.:

S1S.1 (post-Ch#lengerj: 0.98 [Aerospace Corp.], 0.997 [GD], 1.0 [NASA HQ].

Tltm.lV: 0.98 [Aerospace Corp.], 0.98 [GD].

MLV (Delta derivative): O.M [Aerospace Corp.], 0.978 [G D].

SOURCE: Office of Technology Assessment, 1988.

94