SUPERIOR COURT OF NEW JERSEY 

 APPELLATE DIVISION 

 DOCKET NO. A-0021-22 

RICHARD GARBACKI, 

 Plaintiff-Appellant, 

v.

ALSHON YOUNG, CHELSEA 

MANAGEMENT, LLC, and 

ECHELON GLEN 2016, 

LLC, a/k/a ECHELON GLEN 

APARTMENT HOMES, 

 Defendants-Respondents. 

_____________________________ 

Argued December 4, 2023 – Decided January 12, 2024 

Before Judges DeAlmeida, Berdote Byrne, and BishopThompson. 

On appeal from the Superior Court of New Jersey, Law 

Division, Camden County, Docket No. L-3134-20. 

Keith Andrew Peterson argued the cause for appellant 

(Donelson, D'Alessandro & Peterson, LLC, attorneys;

Keith Andrew Peterson, on the briefs).

NOT FOR PUBLICATION WITHOUT THE 

APPROVAL OF THE APPELLATE DIVISION 

This opinion shall not "constitute precedent or be binding upon any court." Although it is posted on the 

internet, this opinion is binding only on the parties in the case and its use in other cases is limited. R. 1:36-3.
2 A-0021-22

Jeffrey Francis Talbot argued the cause for respondents 

(Law Offices of James H. Rohlfing, attorneys; James

Patrick Meissler, on the brief). 

PER CURIAM 

In this appeal from a summary judgment order in a personal injury action 

alleging negligence, plaintiff argues the trial court erred in finding defendantlandlords breached no duty to plaintiff when he was injured after he opened his 

apartment door and was assaulted by an inebriated man. Because we find, after 

reviewing the totality of the circumstances, the landlords could not have 

foreseen this random, intentional assault, we concur with the trial court and 

affirm. 

I.

 Like the motion court, we view the evidence in the landlords' summary 

judgment motion in the light most favorable to plaintiff, the non-moving party. 

Harz v. Borough of Spring Lake, 234 N.J. 317, 329 (2018); Rivera v. Cherry 

Hill Towers, LLC, 474 N.J. Super. 234, 238 (App. Div. 2022). Plaintiff resided 

at Echelon Glen Apartments in Vorhees Township, an apartment complex owned 

and managed by defendants Echelon Glen and Chelsea management (landlords), 

comprised of approximately 36 buildings and 432 apartments on 25 acres. On 

November 8, 2018, plaintiff was in his apartment when defendant Alshon Young 
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(Young) knocked on the door. Plaintiff was expecting his wife, who had left to 

run an errand an hour prior, and did not look through the peephole before 

opening the door. 

Young believed he was knocking on his grandfather's door, where he was 

staying. When plaintiff opened the door, Young, apparently believing plaintiff 

was a stranger in his grandfather's apartment, pushed his way in and struck 

plaintiff several times, injuring him. After the attack, Young fell asleep on the 

couch. Plaintiff crawled out of his apartment and down the steps while bleeding 

until emergency responders and the police arrived. Young eventually pleaded 

guilty to a lesser charge for the aggravated assault on plaintiff. 

 Plaintiff filed a five-count complaint against Young, Echelon Glen, and 

Chelsea Management. Counts one through four alleged assault and battery, 

intentional infliction of emotional distress (IIED), negligent infliction of 

emotional distress (NEID), and trespass against Young. Counts three and five 

alleged NEID and premises liability against landlords. 

The landlords moved for summary judgment after the close of discovery. 

In their Rule 4:46-2(a) statement of material facts, they highlighted plaintiff's 

deposition testimony stating he "never had any visitors or strange people or 

solicitors or anything knock at the door." Additionally, they asserted the only 
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police reports involving the apartment complex were from three false burglar 

alarms in the management office in 2016, two years before the assault. 

 Plaintiff opposed summary judgment and emphasized two discrete 

incidents of criminal activity at the Vista apartments, a neighboring property 

also owned and managed by landlords, and a separate incident on a nearby road. 

Citing deposition testimony from landlords' principal, plaintiff stated landlords 

had "actual knowledge" of a prior similar criminal act of violence that occurred 

at the nearby Vista Apartments. 

The trial court granted summary judgment, dismissing landlords from the 

case with prejudice, after finding the determinative issue was whether the 

incident was a "foreseeable criminal act of third parties." In granting summary 

judgment, the trial court ultimately found plaintiff voluntarily opened his door, 

"there was no break in," and "[t]here was no inadequate lock on the door." The 

court further held plaintiff failed to produce any evidence from which a jury 

could find this type of criminal activity was foreseeable. This appeal followed. 

II. 

An appellate court reviews de novo orders granting summary judgment 

and applies the same standard that governed the trial court's ruling. Lee v. 

Brown, 232 N.J. 114, 126, (2018); see also Bhagat v. Bhagat, 217 N.J. 22, 38 
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(2014). Summary judgment will be granted if, viewing the competent evidential 

materials in the light most favorable to the non-moving party, "there is no 

genuine issue of material fact and 'the moving party is entitled to a judgment or 

order as a matter of law.'" Conley v. Guerrero, 228 N.J. 339, 346 (2017) 

(quoting Templo Fuente De Vida Corp. v. Nat'l Union Fire Ins. Co. of 

Pittsburgh, 224 N.J. 189, 199 (2016)). 

 In order to demonstrate the existence of a "genuine issue [of] material 

fact" and survive a summary judgment motion, "the opposing party [must] do 

more than 'point[ ] to any fact in dispute.'" Globe Motor Co. v. Igdalev, 225 

N.J. 469, 479 (2016) (emphasis omitted) (quoting Brill v. Guardian Life Ins. Co. 

of Am., 142 N.J. 520, 529 (1995)). "The practical effect of this rule is that 

neither the motion court nor an appellate court can ignore the elements of the 

cause of action or the evidential standard governing the cause of action." 

Bhagat, 217 N.J. at 38. 

 Whether plaintiff is owed a legal duty is a question of law ripe for 

summary judgment. See Delvalle v. Trino, 474 N.J. Super. 124, 135 (App. Div. 

2022); see also Clohesy v. Food Circus Supermarkets, Inc., 149 N.J. 496, 502 

(1997) (citing Carvalho v. Toll Bros. & Devs., 143 N.J. 565, 572 (1996); Kelly 

v. Gwinnell, 96 N.J. 538, 552 (1984)). 
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III. 

 Plaintiff argues the trial court resolved "disputed material facts in favor of 

the moving party" by commingling two prior discrete events — the criminal act 

at the Vista apartments and the shooting on a nearby road — into one event, 

diminishing the significance of each event in the process. He argues the trial 

court engaged in impermissible fact finding by conflating the two incidents. He 

further argues those facts should have been resolved by the jury, because a 

reasonable jury could find that two incidents of prior criminal acts, as opposed 

to merely one, could make the difference "in the determination of the landlord's 

duty." 

 Landlords argue neither Echelon Glen nor Chelsea Management had 

notice of criminal activity to justify heightened security on the premises. They 

argue even assuming the trial judge found two separate incidents of prior 

criminal activity near the property, those incidents were so isolated and distinct 

in time and manner from the present incident that no rational fact finder could 

find defendants breached a duty to plaintiff. Additionally, they argue any 

precautions landlords could have taken would not have prevented this incident. 

We agree. 
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 The "mere relationship of landlord and tenant imposes no duty on the 

landlord to safeguard the tenant from crime." Braitman v. Overlook Terrace 

Corp., 68 N.J. 368, 387 (1975). However, "a residential landlord has a legal 

duty to take reasonable security measures for tenant protection on the premises." 

Scully v. Fitzgerald, 179 N.J. 114, 122 (2004) (citing Trentacost v. Brussel, 82 

N.J. 214, 231 (1980)). "Negligence is tested by whether the reasonably prudent 

person at the time and place should recognize and foresee an unreasonable risk 

or likelihood of harm or danger to others." Trentacost, 82 N.J. at 222 (quoting 

Rappaport v. Nichols, 31 N.J. 188, 201 (1959)). Foreseeability of harm is 

"essential to holding a landlord potentially liable," E.S. for G.S. v. Brunswick 

Inv. Ltd. P'ship, 469 N.J. Super. 279, 297 (App. Div. 2021), and is a factsensitive inquiry, Coleman v. Martinez, 247 N.J. 319, 339 (2021). 

 Foreseeability of criminal incidents is determined by a review of the 

totality of the circumstances. Clohesy, 149 N.J. at 507 (1997). In the case of a 

residential landlord, harm may be reasonably foreseeable by a high incidence of 

crime in the area, previous attempted break-ins, or failure to equip doors with 

working locks. Trentacost, 82 N.J. at 222-23. Evidence of break-ins at other 

apartments in a general area may also be considered. Braitman, 68 N.J. at 373, 

382. 
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 Plaintiff's reliance upon Clohesy is misplaced. The Court in Clohesy 

specifically rejected finding liability based solely on prior similar criminal 

incidents, in favor of a totality of the circumstances analysis. Est. of Desir ex 

rel. Estiverne v. Vertus, 214 N.J. 303, 319 (2013). Although prior criminal 

incidents may be considered as a factor in assessing the totality of the 

circumstances, the incidents must be numerous and sufficiently frequent to be 

foreseeable and constitute, at minimum, constructive notice. Inapposite to 

Clohesy, where "approximately sixty criminal incidents either on or near" the 

supermarket premises occurred over the course of the preceding two years, there 

were no prior reported incidents at the Echelon Glen apartment complex. 

Plaintiff relies upon a report summarizing violent crimes in all of Voorhees from 

2015 through 2018, and an eleven-page police report regarding a February 2017 

shooting on a nearby road at a different apartment complex, stating a gun went 

off by accident during an argument. Plaintiff also relies on deposition testimony 

from landlord's principal, where he recalled "one incident" at the Vista 

apartment complexes, not Echelon Glen. There was no documentation of that 

incident other than this testimony, which may have been referring to the same 

event – the misfiring of a gun on a nearby road. 
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Regardless, even accepting plaintiff's position, these two discrete 

incidents do not establish a duty. Plaintiff fails to show "the landlord[s] ha[d] 

sufficient control to prevent [plaintiff's attack]." Scully, 179 N.J. at 123 (citing 

Braitman, 68 N.J. at 382-83); see Peguero v. Tau Kappa Epsilon Loc. Chapter, 

439 N.J. Super. 77, 87 (App. Div. 2015) (defendants owed no duty to protect 

plaintiff from being shot by a third-party assailant). Plaintiff cannot articulate 

any action landlords could have taken to prevent Young, who was staying with 

his grandfather in another apartment at the complex, from knocking on the 

wrong door. The totality of the circumstances here demonstrates a random, 

unpreventable criminal act by a third party and plaintiff's suggestion, that the 

landlords had a legal obligation to post nearby crime statistics, could not have 

prevented plaintiff's injuries. 

 To the extent we have not addressed plaintiff's remaining arguments, they 

are without sufficient merit to warrant discussion in a written opinion. R. 2:11-

3(e)(1)(E). 

 Affirmed.