U.S. Fire Administration/Technical Report Series

Special Report:

Operational Considerations 

for Highrise Firefighting

USFA-TR-082/April 1996

U.S. Fire Administration Fire Investigations Program

T

he U.S. Fire Administration develops reports on selected major fires throughout the country. 

The fires usually involve multiple deaths or a large loss of property. But the primary criterion 

for deciding to do a report is whether it will result in significant “lessons learned.” In some 

cases these lessons bring to light new knowledge about fire--the effect of building construction or 

contents, human behavior in fire, etc. In other cases, the lessons are not new but are serious enough 

to highlight once again, with yet another fire tragedy report. In some cases, special reports are developed to discuss events, drills, or new technologies which are of interest to the fire service.

The reports are sent to fire magazines and are distributed at National and Regional fire meetings. The 

International Association of Fire Chiefs assists the USFA in disseminating the findings throughout the 

fire service. On a continuing basis the reports are available on request from the USFA; announcements of their availability are published widely in fire journals and newsletters.

This body of work provides detailed information on the nature of the fire problem for policymakers 

who must decide on allocations of resources between fire and other pressing problems, and within 

the fire service to improve codes and code enforcement, training, public fire education, building 

technology, and other related areas.

The Fire Administration, which has no regulatory authority, sends an experienced fire investigator 

into a community after a major incident only after having conferred with the local fire authorities 

to insure that the assistance and presence of the USFA would be supportive and would in no way 

interfere with any review of the incident they are themselves conducting. The intent is not to arrive 

during the event or even immediately after, but rather after the dust settles, so that a complete and 

objective review of all the important aspects of the incident can be made. Local authorities review 

the USFA’s report while it is in draft. The USFA investigator or team is available to local authorities 

should they wish to request technical assistance for their own investigation.

For additional copies of this report write to the U.S. Fire Administration, 16825 South Seton Avenue, 

Emmitsburg, Maryland 21727. The report is available on the Administration’s Web site at http://

www.usfa.dhs.gov/

Special Report: 

Operational Considerations for

Highrise Firefighting

Investigated by: Reade Bush

J. Gordon Routley

This is Report 082 of the Major Fires Investigation Project conducted 

by Varley-Campbell and Associates, Inc./TriData Corporation under 

contract EME-94-C-4423 to the United States Fire Administration, 

Federal Emergency Management Agency.

Department of Homeland Security

United States Fire Administration

National Fire Data Center

U.S. Fire Administration

Mission Statement

As an entity of the Department of Homeland 

Security, the mission of the USFA is to reduce life and economic losses due to fire 

and related emergencies, through leadership, advocacy, coordination, and support. 

We serve the Nation independently, in coordination with other Federal agencies, 

and in partnership with fire protection and 

emergency service communities. With a 

commitment to excellence, we provide public education, training, technology, and data 

initiatives.

TAble OF COnTenTS

OVERVIEW. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1

SUMMARY OF KEY ISSUES. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 2

PART I: BACKGROUND INFORMATION ON RECENT MAJOR HIGHRISE FIRES. . . . . . . . . . . 3

PART II: MAJOR PROBLEMS NOTED DURING RECENT HIGHIRISE FIRES. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 7

WATER SUPPLY IN HIGHRISE BUILDINGS. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 7

FAILURE OF COMPONENTS OF A FIRE PROTECTION SYSTEM. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 13

EVACUATION OF OCCUPANTS. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 14

PART III: ADDRESSING MAJOR HIGHRISE FIREFIGHTING PROBLEMS. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 15

HIGHRISE STANDARD OPERATING PROCEDURES. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 15

HIGHRISE PRE-FIRE PLANNING AND SYSTEM INSPECTION. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 24

TRAINING IN FIRE PROTECTION SYSTEMS. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 25

OCCUPANT EVACUATION TRAINING. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 25

RECOMMENDATIONS. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 26

Appendix A: Sample Highrise Standard Operating Procedures. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 29

Appendix B: Excerpt from Vancouver Fire Department Highrise Pre-Fire Plan. . . . . . . . . . . . 41

1

Special Report: 

Operational Considerations for

Highrise Firefighting

OVeRVIeW

Highrise buildings exist in virtually every mid- to large-size city and even in some relatively small 

jurisdictions across the United States. Highrises vary in age, size, height, construction, occupancy 

type, and design features, including the types of fire protection systems that are installed in them. 

Fires in highrise buildings can present severe challenges to all types of fire departments. Every fire 

department that could respond to this type of incident should be prepared to operate in this complex 

environment.

Fires in highrise buildings generally require more complicated operational approaches than most 

structure fires. Tasks that are normally considered routine for most fire departments, such as locating 

and attacking the fire, evacuating occupants, and performing ventilation can become very difficult in 

highrises. Operations are affected by several specific challenges:

• Access to floor levels that are beyond the reach of aerial apparatus is generally limited to the 

interior stairways. The use of elevators is usually restricted or prohibited because of safety 

concerns.

• Hundreds or even thousands of occupants may be exposed to the products of combustion 

while they are evacuating or unable to descend past a fire on a lower floor. Their exits may 

be limited to two narrow stairways, which are also the only access for firefighters coming up 

to assist with evacuation and to fight the fire.

• The ability to contain and control the fire is increasingly dependent on the construction of the 

building and the ability of sprinkler and/or standpipe systems to deliver water to the fire area.

• Ventilation can be much more complicated and critical in highrises than in other types of 

structures. Vertical ventilation is often limited to stairways or elevator shafts, both of which 

may also have to be used to evacuate occupants. Horizontal ventilation, by breaking out windows, presents the risk of falling glass to those outside the building. The stack effect causes 

smoke to rise rapidly through the vertical passages and accumulate on upper floors.

• Reflex time, or the amount of time it takes to react and take action, is usually much higher 

in highrise buildings than in non-highrise buildings. It often takes longer to travel from the 

ground floor to the fire floor than it takes to respond from the fire station to the building. 

Firefighters may have to climb dozens of floors before they can even reach the fire floor.

• Communications, command, and control can be very difficult in a highrise fire. Radio transmissions through a building’s concrete and steel infrastructure may be compromised. The 

size and complexity of these buildings require large forces of firefighters and well coordinated operations in a very complex tactical environment. Effective coordination and control 

of strategy and tactics are essential.
2 U.S. Fire Administration/Technical Report Series

Firefighters must rely on the built-in fire protection systems to help them control a fire and protect 

occupants. It is essential for highrise building fire protection systems to work properly. Several 

major fires have occurred in highrise buildings where fire protection systems failed to work properly, 

creating situations where some of the most experienced and well- equipped fire departments could 

not control the fires. Several of these fires presented extremely challenging tactical and logistical 

problems.

The lessons learned from these and other highrise fires have established that automatic sprinklers are 

the most effective way to prevent a major highrise fire. Fire departments must work to ensure that 

all highrise fire protection systems are tested regularly and function properly. They must prepare for 

the challenges of highrise fires by developing distinct standard operating procedures for highrise 

incidents and conducting realistic training.

This report first provides a brief overview of several major highrise fires that have occurred over the 

past decade. The second section discusses three problem areas of which have been noted in several 

recent highrise fires:

 1. Water supply

 2. Functionality of fire protection systems

 3. Occupant evacuation

The third area of this report discusses how some of these problems can be addressed and even 

eliminated through the use of highrise standard operating procedures, inspection programs, and 

occupant evacuation training.

SUMMARY OF KeY ISSUeS

ISSUE COMMENT

Highrise SOPs Standard operating procedures (SOPs) are needed for highrise buildings because 

of the special challenges presented and the strategies and tactics that must be 

employed to perform safely and effectively in a highrise environment.

Highrise Operational Training The infrequent occurrence of highrise fires relative to other types of fires in most 

cities necessitates special highrise training drills for firefighters.

Knowledge of Fire Protection Systems Fire departments must be familiar with the capabilities, limitations, and designs 

of the fire protection systems that they will rely on during a fire. Effective tactical 

operations may depend on the functionality of these built-in systems.

Pre-fire Plans for Highrises Pre-fire plans are essential for highrise buildings. These plans should address, at 

a minimum, the types and capabilities of the mechanical fire protection systems, 

the layout of the building, locations of stairwells and elevators, and evacuation 

considerations.

Inspection and Testing of Fire Protection 

Systems 

Fire departments should work closely with building management to ensure that all 

fire protection systems are tested on a regular basis.

Failure of One or More Components of a 

Highrise Fire Protection System

Fire departments should anticipate what would happen if one or more components of a highrise’s fire protection system were to fail. They should have 

contingency plans in place in case a system fails to work properly.
USFA-TR-082/April 1996 3

ISSUE COMMENT

Pressure Reducing Devices Problems with pressure reducing devices have been noted in several major 

highrise fires in the United States. The consequences of these problems have 

been inadequate water pressure or volume from the standpipe systems to fight 

the fires.

Highrise Hose and Nozzle Combinations Many highrise standpipe systems are designed around the concept of the fire 

department using a specific combination of hoses and nozzles. The use of other 

combinations can create serious problems.

Highrise Automatic Sprinklers Very few fire departments have the capability to rapidly extinguish a large volume 

of fire that is above the reach of aerial streams. Properly maintained sprinkler 

systems have proven successful in controlling and extinguishing these fires and 

protecting building occupants.

Compartmentation Compartmentation in highrise buildings is important to help contain a fire, but 

sprinklers provide the best protection.

Evacuation of Occupants Highrise building occupants rely on the construction of the building and the 

functionality of fire protection systems to protect them during a fire. Occupant 

evacuation training is essential to a workable response in an emergency. Such 

training should include existing drills, information on building layout, when to stay 

in place, and so forth.

PART I: bACKGROUnD InFORMATIOn On ReCenT MAJOR HIGHRISe FIReS

Between 1977 and 1996, 16 firefighters died from traumatic injuries suffered in highrise fires in 

the U.S.1

 Even though this figure is small compared to the total of 2,277 firefighters who have died 

in the line of duty since 1977, it is significant because of the relatively small proportion of actual 

highrise fires to other fires. (Table 1 lists traumatic firefighter fatalities in highrise fires between 

1977 and 1996 compiled by the NFPA.)

Several major highrise fires in the past decade have demonstrated the complexities of fighting these 

fires and the potential for major problems due to the failure of one or more components of the 

building’s fire protection systems. These incidents also show how the presence of a properly maintained and functioning automatic sprinkler system could have minimized the damage and the number of firefighter and occupant fatalities.

Meridian Plaza Fire --On February 23, 1991, a fire in the 38-story Meridian Plaza building in Philadelphia 

killed three firefighters and one occupant. It was the largest and most costly highrise office building 

fire in modem American history, destroying eight floors before being extinguished by ten sprinkler 

heads on the 30th floor.

The fire broke out on a Saturday evening on the 22nd floor in a pile of oil-soaked rags. A smoke 

detector on the 22nd floor detected the fire, but due to incomplete coverage, the fire was already well 

advanced before the detector was activated. The building was partially sprinklered, but none of the 

floors between the 22nd and 30th had sprinklers.

1

 Traumatic Firefighter Fatalities in Highrise Office Buildings in the United States, 1977 - Present. National Fire Protection 

Association, February, 1995.
4 U.S. Fire Administration/Technical Report Series

Suppression operations were compromised by problems with pressure-reducing valves, which were 

improperly set and provided inadequate pressure for fire attack using 1 3/4 inch hose and automatic 

fog nozzles. Firefighters attempted to resolve this problem by boosting the pressure in the standpipe system using pumpers, but the valves prevented the standpipe outlet pressure from increasing. 

Firefighters did not have the tools or expertise needed to adjust the valve settings.

They then stretched 5-inch supply line up the stairwell to the 22nd floor, which took nearly one 

hour. By this time, the fire was extending vertically by lapping from window to window.

Firefighting operations were also compromised when the fire burned through the building’s main 

electrical feed, short circuiting the building’s entire power system. The primary and back-up electrical feeds were installed in a common, unprotected shaft. All lighting, elevators, pumps, fans and 

other electrical devices were rendered inoperable as a result of this system failure.

A crew of three firefighters conducting ventilation operations became disoriented and ran out of air 

on the 28th floor before rescue teams could locate them. These three firefighters died from asphyxiation above the fire floors.

Once a water supply was established, using the 5-inch hoseline as a standpipe, firefighters attempted 

to knock down the fire, but the volume of fire on multiple large area floors was too large for handlines to be effective. Ten hours after the fire began, all crews were withdrawn from the building. 

Efforts were made to control the fire using masterstreams directed from adjacent buildings, but 

the fire continued to extend vertically until it reached the 30th floor. Nine hours later, the fire was 

controlled by 10 sprinklers that had been installed on the 30th floor. The estimated total dollar loss 

from this fire was over $2 billion, including litigation costs.

First Interstate Bank Fire --On the night of May 4, 1988, a fire destroyed five floors of the 62-story First 

Interstate Bank building in downtown Los Angeles. The fire department arrived on the scene to find 

heavy fire on the 9th or 10th floor which was spreading vertically. The department’s response had 

been delayed by several minutes due to late notification by building personnel who had unsuccessfully attempted to reset the building’s alarm system three times.

Firefighters initiated an interior attack from the stairwells, but were initially hampered by low water 

pressure. On the night of the fire, contractors working on the installation of a sprinkler system on 

an upper floor had shut down the building’s fire pump and drained the risers. Three fire pumpers charged the standpipe system. The building fire pumps were reactivated by contractors soon 

thereafter.

Even after the attack began, conditions deteriorated rapidly as smoke filled the stairwells. While 

crews tried to extinguish the fire on floors 12 and 13, additional crews were deployed above the fire 

to prepare to stop the vertical advance. Fire department officials estimated that over 2,500 gallons 

per minute was delivered via multiple handlines and that it took nearly 400 firefighters rotating 

through attack and support functions to control the fire.

At the time of the fire, contractors were connecting a new sprinkler system on the 58th floor to the 

riser and had shut down the building’s fire pump and drained the riser. The retrofit installation was 

90 percent completed including the floors that burned. However, the valves were closed between 

the standpipe riser and the sprinkler system on each floor. Building officials and the contractors had 

decided not to activate the system until it was fully installed, even though installation had been completed on most floors. After the water supply was restored, firefighters had to contend with problems 
USFA-TR-082/April 1996 5

involving some of the pressure reducing valves which were installed on standpipe risers to control 

outlet pressures (the building had a single zone system for all 62 floors). Improperly set pressure 

reducing valves allowed excess pressures to reach the hoselines; some of them burst handlines, while 

others were difficult to control.

Firefighters could not use elevators because fire department policy prohibited their use. All equipment (including over 300 air cylinders) had to be carried up stairs to fight the fire. The building’s 

electrical system and internal communications systems also failed, primarily due to water damage.

Several occupants were rescued from the roof by helicopter. A crew of firefighters was flown to the 

roof to access the stairwells and rescue other trapped occupants. These efforts were unsuccessful 

because the stair shafts had become virtual chimneys. The electrical failure shut down stairwell pressurization fans. Stairwell doors, kept ajar by handlines, allowed for infiltration of smoke. One of the 

rescue teams had to be rescued by a second team.

A civilian security guard who took an elevator to the fire floor to investigate the alarm was the only fatality. 

Fourteen firefighters were injured in the fire. The fire caused an estimated $450 million in damages.

Bankers Trust Fire --On the night of January 31, 1993, a fire destroyed two floors of the unsprinklered 

42 story Bankers Trust building in New York City. The fire is believed to have broken out in the plenum space on the sixth floor. Fire quickly spread through the common plenum space and involved 

the floor area as the ceiling collapsed.

Firefighters initiated an aggressive interior attack, but despite the aggressive efforts of over 400 very 

experienced highrise firefighters, the fire extended vertically to the next floor through exterior windows. Doors held ajar by hoselines allowed smoke and heat to enter the stair shafts. Heavy fire, heat, 

and smoke conditions forced firefighters to withdraw and an exterior attack was mounted. Elevated 

streams directed from aerial platforms ultimately controlled the fire. Firefighters probably would not 

have been able to control this fire had it occurred several floors higher, above the reach of exterior 

aerial apparatus. The fire caused an estimated $10 million in damage.

World Trade Center Bombing--On February 26, 1993, a terrorist truck bomb exploded in the underground garage of the 110 story World Trade Center in New York. The massive explosion sparked several car fires and destroyed most of the building’s primary and backup emergency systems. Smoke 

infiltrated the stair shafts because doors at the basement level were blown off and pressurization fans 

could not operate due to the destruction of the electrical systems.

This event demonstrated the magnitude of problems that result when there is a complete failure of 

the emergency systems in a highrise building. Thousands of occupants were trapped on office floors, 

many of which were filling with smoke that was rising through the stair shafts. Others were trapped 

in elevators which stopped when the power was interrupted. Many of the occupants suffered smoke 

inhalation while descending from as high as the 110th floor in the smoke-filled stairways. In these 

conditions, the majority of the occupants would have been safer staying in their work areas where 

smoke conditions were less severe.

The FDNY was able to control the fires in about one hour which eliminated the source of the smoke. 

The incident could have been much worse had there been other fires on higher level floors. These 

fires probably would have been very destructive and difficult, if not impossible, to extinguish since 

the main water supply systems were incapacitated by the explosion.
6 U.S. Fire Administration/Technical Report Series

Date Location Description

May 10, 1977 Baltimore, Maryland 37 story office 

building

Firefighter found dead in elevator stopped on the 

fire floor. He was not wearing protective clothing 

or carrying or using SCBA. Elevator malfunction 

possibly involved.

May 19, 1977 Omaha, Nebraska 8 story vacant Firefighter who was assisting in the lobby of hotel 

the hotel after performing interior operations 

without SCBA died from a heart attack.

June 14, 1979 New York City, New York 20 story department store Firefighter became separated from other crew 

members and ran out of air and died from asphyxiation. The search for the lost firefighter was 

hampered by extreme heat and smoke conditions.

September 22, 1981 Chicago, Illinois 38 story office building Two firefighters died after becoming lost in extreme 

heat and smoke conditions. One fell into an elevator shaft, and the other also fell while attempting to 

rescue his comrade.

August 12, 1984 Newark, New Jersey 14 story office 

building

A firefighter became disoriented and lost in heavy 

smoke conditions, and ran out of air.

December 1, 1984 New York City, New York 13 story office 

building

A firefighter performing search and ventilation 

operations on the floor above the fire died after 

running out of air.

February 23, 1991 Philadelphia, Pennsylvania 38 story office 

building

Three firefighters became disoriented on the upper 

floors of the building and died after running out of 

air.

February 5, 1992 Indianapolis, Indiana 9 story hotel Two firefighters operating handlines on the third 

floor died of injuries suffered when caught by rapid 

fire growth.

February 24, 1993 White Plains, New York 12 story apartment buildingA firefighter died from asphyxiation after becoming 

trapped in an elevator while trying to gain access to 

the fire floor..

August 14, 1993 San Francisco, California 20 story apartment buildingA firefighter died from bum injuries suffered while 

forcing entry to a third floor apartment.

April 11, 1994 Memphis, Tennessee 11 story apartment 

building

Two firefighters died from smoke inhalation after 

exiting an elevator on the fire floor and becoming 

disoriented.

January 6, 1996 New York City, New York 13 story apartment buildingOne firefighter died from facial and respiratory injuries suffered while forcing entry to an apartment.

Table 1. Traumatic Firefighter Fatalities in Highrise Buildings 

in the U.S., 1977 to 1996
USFA-TR-082/April 1996 7

PART II: MAJOR PRObleMS nOTeD DURInG ReCenT HIGHIRISe FIReS

Three major problems have emerged from recent major highrise fires across the country. These 

areas are:

1. Water supply

2. Functionality of fire protection systems

3. Occupant evacuation

This section provides background information on each of these problem areas, and discusses how 

these problems affected operations at recent major fires.

WATER SUPPLY IN HIGHRISE BUILDINGS

All highrise fire protection systems involve water. To fight a fire, the water must be delivered to the 

floor where it is needed via standpipes.

Classes of Water Supply Systems --Standpipe systems are the main source of water supply for fighting fires 

in highrise buildings. There are three classes of standpipe systems:

Class I--2-1/2-inch outlets for fire department use

Class II--1-1/2-inch hose outlets for occupant-use hose

Class III--Combination standpipe, incorporates both Class I and II into a single system

A Combined Sprinkler/Standpipe System incorporates a water supply for automatic sprinklers 

with a Class III standpipe system (in some cases the occupant hose connections are not required 

when automatic sprinklers are provided.)2

Until the 1970s, many building codes required either separate Class I and Class II standpipes, or a 

Class III system. Many jurisdictions allowed Class II standpipe outlets for occupant use to be supplied 

by the building’s domestic water system and permitted dry standpipes to meet the Class I requirements. The dry standpipe risers would only be charged with water when hoselines were connected 

to the fire department connection (FDC). Other jurisdictions required a built-in water supply for the 

Class I or Class III standpipes, which generally required one or more fire pumps to boost the pressure 

from the public water system.

Since the 1970s, the trend has been to require automatic sprinkler systems in almost all new highrise 

buildings. There has also been a trend to encourage or require sprinklers to be installed in existing 

highrise buildings. Most new systems are installed as combined sprinkler/standpipe systems, and 

many older Class I or Class III standpipe systems have been converted to combined systems to supply 

water for retrofit automatic sprinkler systems.

Combined sprinkler/standpipe systems generally require a fire pump to increase the pressure coming in from the public water system, in order to deliver adequate pressure at the upper levels of the 

2Note that a “combined” system is different from a ‘combination” system. Combination refers to a system with both 

Class I and Class II outlets, whereas a combined system is an integrated standpipe/sprinkler system.
8 U.S. Fire Administration/Technical Report Series

building. These pumps may be electrically driven or powered by internal combustion (generally 

diesel) engines. Some codes require a backup water supply system on the premises, in case the 

public water system is out of service due to an earthquake or other disruption.

Virtually all standpipe, sprinkler, or combined systems require fire department connections so that 

the water supply can be augmented by fire department pumpers. In most newer buildings a single 

set of connections supplies water to all of the fire protection systems in the building, while older 

buildings may have a multitude of different connections that each supply water to a different area or 

system within the building.3

 Therefore, it is important for fire departments to have information about 

the water supply and connections for each specific building. This information should be available 

through a pre-fire plan system.

Pressure Reducing Devices --Pressure reducing devices prevent dangerously high discharge pressures 

from hose outlets. There are two major types of pressure reducing devices that can be installed on 

standpipe outlets: flow restricting devices and pressure reducing valves.

Flow restricting devices control the discharge pressure by restricting the flow to a reduced opening, which must be sized to a specific pressure and discharge rate. The most common type of 

flow restricting device is an orifice plate (see Figure 1). Flow restricting devices do not reduce the 

static pressure (pressure with no water flowing), thereby allowing higher pressures at lower flow 

rates. Some jurisdictions require flow restricting devices to be adjustable or removable by the fire 

department.

Pressure reducing valves (see Figure 2) limit the pressure on the downstream side at all flow rates. 

The valve is set to deliver a specific pressure which will not be exceeded under any flow condition 

(i.e., static and flowing pressures will remain constant). A pressure reducing valve must be set for 

the specific pressure condition and is usually not adjustable without special tools. These valves are 

often installed on the connections between the standpipe risers and the automatic sprinklers on the 

individual floors of a highrise building, in addition to hose outlets.

Pressure Control Requirements --The pressure and volume of water that are available at a standpipe outlet must be sufficient to supply hoselines that are expected to be connected to them and must not 

exceed a safe operating pressure. The required flow rate and the maximum and minimum pressure 

requirements used by most jurisdictions are specified in NFPA 14, Standard for the Installation of 

Standpipe and Hose Systems.

Prior to 1993, the minimum pressure required by NFPA 14 was 65 psi at the required flow rate 

at the highest outlet in the system (see Table 2). This requirement anticipated that the fire department would utilize 2 1/2 inch hoses with smooth bore tips, which require approximately 50 psi 

nozzle pressure to operate (i.e., 65 psi minus 15 psi for friction loss). The maximum pressure 

allowable at an outlet was limited to 100 psi at the required flow rate, and the maximum static 

pressure at any outlet was limited to 175 psi. The same limitations applied to both 1 1/2 inch 

and 2 1/2 inch outlets.

3

 It is not unusual to find these connections mislabeled or without labels to indicate where to connect to supply more 

water to which systems.
USFA-TR-082/April 1996 9
10 U.S. Fire Administration/Technical Report Series
USFA-TR-082/April 1996 11

The minimum and maximum pressure limitations were revised in 1993, after several reports of 

fires where crews had difficulty operating effective hose streams due to inadequate pressures (see 

Table 3). A large number of fire departments were found to be using 1-3/4- or 2-inch attack hose 

with combination fog nozzles, especially automatic nozzles, which require at least 100 psi at the 

nozzle to operate properly. As a result, in 1993 the pressure limit for all outlets greater than 1-1/2 

inches was increased to 100 psi minimum flow pressure and 175 psi maximum static pressure. 

The standard also specified that pressure reducing devices must be installed on 1-1/2 inch outlets 

that would exceed 100 psi flow pressure at the required flow rate.4

 Pressure reducing valves, which 

control water under flowing and static conditions, must be installed on all outlets that exceed 175 

psi static pressure.

Table 2. NFPA 14 Requirements Prior to 1993

Outlet Size Allowable Flow Pressure Flow Restricting Device 

Required if:

Pressure Reducing Valve 

Required if:

1-1/2” 65 psi min

100 psi max

residual pressure between 

100 psi and 175 psi

static pressure greater than 

175 psi

2-1/2” 65 psi min

100 psi max

residual pressure between 100 

psi and 175 psi

static pressure greater than 

175 psi

Table 3. NFPA 14 Requirements 1993 Edition

Outlet Size Allowable Flow Pressure Flow Restricting Device 

Required if:

Pressure Reducing Valve 

Required if:

1-1/2” 65 psi min residual pressure between 

100 psi and 175 psi

static pressure greater than 

175 psi

2-1/2” 100 psi min

175 psi max

(Optional as long as static 

pressure less than 175)

static pressure greater than 

175 psi

The higher pressures that are required today for 2-1/2-inch and larger outlets are intended to provide sufficient pressure for hoselines to be operated with 100 psi nozzle pressure. Nozzles that are 

designed to operate at lower pressures (70 psi) have also been developed and may be particularly 

useful for fire departments that respond to buildings that have standpipe systems that were designed 

to meet the pre-1993 standards.

4

The 1-1/2-inch valves were limited to 100 psi residual pressure because these lines are usually considered occupant 

attack lines. Pressures exceeding 100 psi may overwhelm occupant users.
12 U.S. Fire Administration/Technical Report Series

Advantages and Problems of Pressure Reducing Valves --As stated previously, pressure reducing valves (PRVs) 

regulate both residual (flowing) and static pressure. Prior to their development, the only type of 

pressure reducing devices were the flow restricting devices which do not regulate static pressure. 

In tall buildings, standpipe systems which utilized flow restricting devices were limited to approximately 20 stories per zone, to stay within the limit of 175 psi maximum static pressure (see Figure 

3). Each 20 story zone required its own fire pump(s) and fire department connections.

Today, however, standpipe zone heights are no longer restricted if PRVs are used. PRVs simplify the 

design and installation of sprinkler and standpipe systems by allowing their installation without a 

height limitation. The pressure in the risers may be very high in a tall building (particularly on the 

lower level floors), however, the pressure reducing valves should ensure that the static and residual 

pressures that are available at an outlet valve are within the required range for safe and effective hose 

stream operations.

The rationale for PRVs is the concern that firefighters would be exposed to dangerous operating 

pressures and forces if they connected hoselines to outlets near the base of standpipe risers of substantial height, particularly those supplied by stationary fire pumps.5

 For example, in a 275-foot high 

standpipe zone, a pressure of 234 psi is required at the base of the riser to overcome elevation and 

produce the minimum required outlet pressure of 115 psi at the riser’s top outlet.6

 At this pressure, 

a standard 2-1/2-inch fire hose fitted with a 1-1/2-inch straight bore nozzle would produce a back 

pressure (reaction force) in excess of 500 pounds.

Some fire departments have encountered problems where the pressure reducing valves were not 

properly set for the required discharge pressure. In these cases, firefighters faced either inadequate 

or excessive handline pressures. The NFPA standard now requires a test/drain riser to be installed 

adjacent to the standpipe risers that are equipped with pressure reducing valves so that the flow and 

discharge pressure can be set and checked during regular inspections.

Highrise Hose and Nozzle Ensemble--Since standpipe outlet pressures may be as low as 65 psi in 

systems designed prior to the 1993 version of NFPA 14, or lower due to an improperly set PRV, fire 

departments should be prepared to make an attack under low pressure conditions. A smooth bore 

tip requiring only 50 psi nozzle pressure should be used in these situations (see Table 4). Also, the 

greater friction loss in 1-1/2-inch hose could reduce the nozzle pressure to a level below the 50 psi 

needed for the nozzle. Therefore, it is preferable for fire departments to carry 2-inch or 2-1/2-inch 

hose with a smooth bore tip for highrise operations.

Another option is to carry a nozzle designed specifically for highrise standpipe operations. A highrise “break-apart” nozzle provides the combined benefits of a fog nozzle and a smooth bore nozzle, 

both designed to operate at limited pressures. Firefighters can use the fog nozzle (designed to 

deliver its rated flow at 75 psi), or remove the fog tip, leaving a smooth bore tip (designed to operate 

at 50 psi).

5Routley, J. Gordon. Highrise Office Building Fire, One Meridian Plaza, Philadelphia, Pennsylvania. U.S. Fire 

Administration Technical Report Series, February, 1991, pg. 25.

6NFPA Alert Bulletin 9 1-3, Pressure Regulating Devices in Standpipe Systems. National Fire Protection. Association, 

May, 1991.
USFA-TR-082/April 1996 13

Table 4. Comparison of Nozzles

Type Approximate Nozzle Pressure 

Required Advantages/Disadvantages

Straight Stream Nozzle 50 psi Excellent penetration and good reach at low operating 

pressure; no fog pattern available

Combination (Fog) Nozzle 

(Automatic or Adjustable 

Gallonage)

100 psi Good penetration and reach with straight stream; capable 

of producing fog pattern; high pressure needed to operate 

nozzle may not always be available

Highrise (“Break-Apart”) Nozzle 75 psi (for fog portion

50 psi (for straight tip)

Combines reach and penetration features listed above 

depending on which portion of the nozzle is used; fog 

portion requires less operating pressure than some combination nozzles; provides greatest flexibility for highrise 

firefighting

FAILURE OF COMPONENTS OF A FIRE PROTECTION SYSTEM

Each of the major highrise fires discussed earlier in this report presented special challenges to firefighters because of the failure of one or more components of a building’s fire protection systems. 

These incidents emphasize the possibility that fire departments may have to contend with unanticipated problems with these systems while fighting a highrise fire.

Fire departments can never be sure that every component of every system will work 100 percent of 

the time. Regular inspection, maintenance and testing programs are essential.

Water supply systems can fail under many circumstances. Closed valves may block the water supply 

to the system, as happened at the First Interstate Bank fire. A fire pump will fail if the main power 

supply or a backup supply fails. Fire department connections may be obscured from view, blocked, 

or relocated, especially during construction

Pressure reducing valves may be improperly set or improperly installed, as discussed previously. At 

the Meridian Plaza fire in Philadelphia, the pressure reducing valves were found to be improperly set 

and would not deliver sufficient pressure for a functional hose stream. At the First Interstate Bank 

Building in Los Angeles, some of the pressure reducing valves failed and allowed pressures estimated 

at 500 psi to reach handlines. In each of these cases the fire department operations were severely 

hampered in attempting to control major fires that destroyed multiple floors and caused millions of 

dollars in damage.

Electrical system failure can be catastrophic since many components of a highrise fire protection 

system are powered by electricity. Many buildings have emergency generators, in case the main feed 

to the building is lost. However, even with the presence of backup power systems, the entire system 

may fail if fire impinges on the main feed, as happened at the Meridian Plaza fire.

Stair shafts may become filled with products of combustion, even in buildings designed with protected, pressurized stairs. The First Interstate Bank fire, Meridian Plaza fire, and World Trade Center 

fire all demonstrated that positive pressure protection can be quickly lost when stairway doors are 
14 U.S. Fire Administration/Technical Report Series

opened by evacuees and firefighters, or held ajar by hoselines going into the fire floor. Protected 

stairways intended to provide a safe exit path for both occupants and firefighters are transformed 

into chimneys carrying smoke and toxic gases.

Elevator failures have hampered operations in many highrise fires. Some departments prohibit the 

use of elevators, especially when the bank serves the affected floor, while others allow firefighters to 

use separate unaffected banks to transport personnel and equipment to staging areas. Firefighters are 

particularly dependent on elevators when the fire is on an upper level floor. The Meridian Plaza fire 

demonstrated how firefighting efforts were hampered and delayed when an elevator system failed 

due to a power loss.

Each of the major fires described in this report demonstrates how the failure of one or more systems 

can hinder fire department operations enough to result in a very large fire. The failure of one component often leads to the failure of other components, generally because the failure allows the fire to 

grow so large that it impinges on other components, or overpowers the ability of other components 

to function properly. Fire control is virtually impossible when multiple components fail.

EVACUATION OF OCCUPANTS

The recent major highrise fires have shown that fire departments are likely to have serious problems 

evacuating occupants from a highrise--particularly if systems fail--when there is a large volume of 

fire and no built-in sprinkler system, when occupants are not trained properly, or when the fire is 

not controlled rapidly. The World Trade Center bombing demonstrated the problems with evacuation when stairway pressurization systems failed. Even when pressurization systems work properly, 

however, stairshafts may become filled with the products of combustion because doors on the fire 

floor are propped open by hoselines and the effect of pressurization is lost as occupants open stairway doors to exit.

Both the First Interstate Bank fire and the Meridian Plaza fire could have trapped thousands of occupants had the fires occurred during weekday hours. The best way to protect highrise building 

occupants from smoke and fire is to control the fire rapidly, and this is best achieved by a sprinkler 

system. Unfortunately, many existing buildings do not offer this protection, which means that fire 

departments may have to contend with large fires that pose serious evacuation problems.

In some cases, occupants may be safest if they remain in place or evacuate to a floor beneath the fire 

floor instead of exiting the building. Firefighters should determine as quickly as possible in a fire 

incident whether a full, partial, or no evacuation is necessary, and communicate their evacuation plan 

to occupants by using a public address system or other means. Experience shows that occupants will 

need guidance with evacuation. This will require the assignment of companies to assist specifically 

with evacuation.
USFA-TR-082/April 1996 15

PART III: ADDReSSInG MAJOR HIGHRISe FIReFIGHTInG PRObleMS

The problems associated with operations at highrise fires, as described in the previous section, may 

not always be avoidable, but the chance of their occurrence can be minimized by developing and 

following standard operating procedures. Inspection, maintenance, and training programs, along 

with public education also contribute to safety and to risk reduction.

HIGHRISE STANDARD OPERATING PROCEDURES

Standard operating procedures play an integral role in establishing order and consistency in operations at any emergency scene. They are especially important in highrise incidents because of the 

inherent complexities of fighting a highrise fire. SOPs should be written to achieve these purposes:

• Establish chain-of-command and command sectors

• Establish levels of response (i.e., number of units assigned on each alarm)

• Establish roles and responsibilities of arriving companies and company officers

• Establish a system of operations familiar to all members of the organization

SOPs provide the framework of a fire department’s response to an emergency incident. They establish a degree of order to emergency scenes which by nature are usually chaotic. Generic topics to 

cover in highrise SOPs are listed below.

• Level of response (i.e., number and type of apparatus dispatched)

• Duties of incoming apparatus (1st, 2nd, 3rd due)

• Establishment and structure of command

• Accountability

• Safety

• Use of elevators and stairwells

• Evacuation and rescue

• Water supply

• Hoses and nozzles for interior operations

• Ventilation

• Contingency plans for failure of fire protection systems

Highrise SOPs from several medium and large size cities were reviewed for this report. Below is a 

discussion of different topics that can be included in highrise SOPs and an overview of some of the 

different procedural approaches being taken by fire departments from across the country.

Levels of Response --Specific levels of response should be developed for highrise structures. The 

number of units dispatched to a highrise emergency will vary from locality to locality depending 

upon the size of the department, the types and number of units in the department, and, the nature 

of the call.
16 U.S. Fire Administration/Technical Report Series

Most departments establish three levels of response for highrise structures based on three common 

scenarios: an activated alarm only, a report of smoke in the structure, or a working fire. New York 

City, for example, dispatches one engine to investigate an automatic fire alarm in a highrise. If there 

is any indication of smoke or fire, a box alarm is transmitted, providing three engine companies, 

two ladder companies, one rescue squad, and one battalion chief. A working highrise fire upgrades 

the box assignment to include a total of four engine companies, four ladder companies, two rescue squads, four battalion chiefs, one division chief, one Highrise Company, one Command Post 

Company, one Field Commander, and one Mask Service Unit.

Some departments dispatch special teams when a working fire is declared. Phoenix, for example, is 

revising its SOPs to include the dispatch of a specially trained highrise unit to working fires. In addition to its normal box assignment complement, Memphis dispatches a “Rapid Intervention Team” 

on working highrise fires.

Command --Most departments utilize a version of the Incident Command System (ICS) to manage 

resources and coordinate operations at major fires. All of the highrise SOPs reviewed for this report 

include ICS. The command structure for highrise fires includes several functions that are not used 

at other structure fires: Interior Staging (Resource) Sector, Stairway and Support, and Lobby Control 

Sector. In cases of major highrise fires, most SOPs expand the structure to utilize the full Incident 

Command System, which includes the four major ICS sections, Planning, Finance, Logistics, and 

Operations.

Some SOPs direct the first arriving battalion chief to proceed to the fire floor to lead the Fire Attack 

Sector or Operations Sector, while the second arriving Battalion Chief takes command of the incident; other SOPs reverse these responsibilities.

Phoenix lists the following priorities for first arriving units and command officers:

• Identify fire floor

• Provide an attack on the fire floor with at least three companies

• Provide for the life safety of persons in immediate danger

• Provide water supply for the initial attack

• Establish lobby control

• Make a size-up of the fire floor and the floor above

• Call for additional resources

• Begin to establish support systems (staging, resources, etc.)

• Establish a ventilation sector

Most SOPs allow the IC to establish the command post in the most suitable position, either inside 

or outside, while some cities, such as Los Angeles, require the command post to be at least 200 feet 

from the building. Phoenix’s SOPs, however, state that “the need for establishing Command “’in the 

street” is secondary to the urgency of getting an officer and crew up to the fire area...The first arriving company should...pass command to the next arriving officer.” The SOPs further explain that this 
USFA-TR-082/April 1996 17

policy should not preclude the initiation of a personnel accountability system from the outset. They 

also emphasize the importance of assigning a company to the building’s fire control room to manage 

and monitor systems, and to direct evacuation using public address systems.

The Fire Attack Sector is generally assigned to the first arriving engine company. This sector may be 

termed “Attack Sector,” or “Fire Floor (Number) Sector,” and it is usually commanded by the officer on the first due engine. Some departments require the fire attack team to minimally comprise 

an engine and truck company before personnel are allowed to ascend, while others allow a single 

engine to assume this position.

FDNY assigns two engine companies and one ladder company per attack position. Its SOPs generally require the Fire Attack Sector officer to communicate which stairway is being utilized by the 

attack team. Chicago established a priority that a crew with hoselines be positioned above the fire 

floor to control any lapping or vertical extension. The first due truck or squad is generally assigned 

to assist with fire attack while the second due truck or squad performs search and rescue above the 

fire floor.

The Interior Staging (Resource) Sector is usually formed at large fires where multiple companies will need 

to be rotated through the attack and rehabilitation sectors. Most SOPs state that this function will be 

established one to two floors below the fire floor. Usually, several companies are assigned to manage 

personnel and equipment assigned to this function. Very few of the SOPs pointed to the importance 

of establishing this sector in the early stages of a major highrise fire, or to who will establish this 

sector. In many cases, once this area is established, it will take time to stockpile the equipment 

(especially spare air bottles) in the interior staging area. Memphis requires all incoming crews on a 

working fire to take spare equipment and one spare SCBA cylinder per firefighter into the building. 

The companies fighting the fire will rely on this sector within the first 15 to 20 minutes in, then 15 

to 20 minutes to rehabilitate the personnel and change cylinders. The relief crew and air cylinders 

must be ready at the Resource Sector when the first wave is ready to rotate out of the incident as 

they retreat for new air bottles and equipment. The Chicago Fire Department requires the officer of 

this sector to maintain enough personnel to staff its “three man relief” system, whereby one crew is 

attacking the fire, one is on backup line, and one is in position to replace the backup team when the 

attack team withdraws. Memphis also requires a standby crew in this sector at all times.

The Exterior Staging (Base) Sector is the area where incoming forces gather outside of the highrise. Some 

departments, such as Milwaukee, assign this task in their SOPs to the first arriving engine on the 

second alarm. Other departments assign it to a chief’s aide. Most SOPs call for the exterior staging 

area to be set up several blocks from the scene so that staged units are not confused with on-scene 

units, and to keep streets around the incident as open as possible. Generally, staged personnel are not 

allowed to leave the staging area until requested by the IC.

The officer in charge of this area must keep track of staged resources and let the incident commander 

know when additional resources are needed in staging.

The Lobby Control Sector is one of the most important sectors on the fireground. Some SOPs give this 

sector a small area of responsibility, but others give it many vital duties. Philadelphia, for example, 

assigns lobby control on dispatch to the third due ladder truck.

Eventually, the officer on the ladder truck is relieved by an incoming battalion chief. Some of the 

duties commonly assigned to the Lobby Control Sector include:
18 U.S. Fire Administration/Technical Report Series

• Securing the elevators and ensuring they have all been recalled

• Assisting with evacuation through the lobby area

• Making announcements and directing evacuation over the building’s public address system

• Making an accountability list of incoming firefighters

• Acquiring building floor plans and keys

• Locating security guards or engineers

• Verifying functionality of building HVAC system, fire pump, emergency generator, etc., and 

shutting down the HVAC system if necessary

• Monitoring the fire alarm annunciator panel

Several cities have added specific responsibilities to this sector. Los Angeles requires this sector to 

report to the Incident Commander the number of floors in the building and to ensure that stairwells are positively pressurized. This sector also establishes a stockpile of equipment in the lobby 

which can be transported to the interior staging area. Philadelphia gives the Lobby Control Sector 

the responsibility of acquiring tools which can be used to adjust pressure reducing valves on the 

standpipe system.

The Top Sector is established one or two floors above the fire. It is responsible for, among other things, 

conducting search and rescue above the fire, preventing vertical spread, and ensuring that ventilation 

hatches are open in stairwells. This sector is usually headed by an officer from the third arriving 

engine or a unit on the second alarm.

The Rehabilitation Sector is responsible for rehydrating firefighters and monitoring the physical condition of firefighters at a major incident. Some departments establish this sector on the same floor as 

interior staging, while others establish it one floor below. Usually an EMS officer heads this sector. 

Dallas and Fairfax County require Rehabilitation Sector personnel to take a full set of firefighting 

protecting equipment and SCBA with them into a highrise.

Other sectors can be established at a highrise fire. Dallas’ SOPs include a Safe Refuge Area five floors 

below the fire floor. Floors below the fire floor in a highrise building are generally considered safe 

areas. This area is staffed by one engine company which assists with the evacuation. A Safe Refuge 

Area usually is established in the tall buildings where occupants may have difficulty descending all 

the way to the ground level.

Los Angeles City includes an Air Operations Sector in their highrise SOPs. In some cases, the fire 

department may call on one of its helicopter to evacuate persons or firefighters from the roof of a 

highrise. The SOPs strictly specify that the helicopter landing zone be at least one-half mile from 

the incident and that the helicopter not fly within 500 feet of portions of the building affected by 

fire. Previous experience has shown the problems created when wind generated by the helicopter 

literally fanned the flames.

Size-up and Verbal Communications --Size-up is an assessment of the emergency scene. It provides a 

firsthand account by fire department personnel to incoming units and units on the fireground. 

Incoming units base their actions upon arrival on information communicated in the initial size-up. 
USFA-TR-082/April 1996 19

All of the highrise SOPs reviewed require the first arriving engine to provide a size-up but only a 

few describe what information is to be communicated. Items to communicate in a highrise size-up 

may include:

• Evidence of smoke or fire

• Number of floors in the building and location of smoke or fire (count floors from top of 

building down)

• Presence of persons trapped at windows or on balconies

• Whether or not building is being evacuated

• Which side(s) of building have been surveyed

Very few of the SOPs assign a particular company with size-up of all sides of a structure; Fairfax 

County, however, assigns this task to the third arriving engine company noting that “the officer may 

see a critical situation and communicate information that could change the whole situation.” After 

the size-up is performed, the engine is to report to the incident commander for an assignment. 

Other cities assign this role to the second due ladder truck, chiefs aide, or an ambulance (if it is part 

of the fire department).

Most of the SOPs reviewed remind personnel to minimize radio traffic at a highrise fire, but a few 

noted the importance of communicating the initial size-up through the chain of command--especially when a hazardous condition is found or when a company believes the Incident Commander 

is missing vital information that would alter operational tactics. Fairfax’s SOPs, however, emphasize 

the need for continual size-ups by all companies through the duration of the incident. They state, 

“Companies must keep their superiors informed of the conditions in their area of responsibility 

so their superior can inform the next higher ranking officer of the conditions in that area...During 

multi-company operations, each unit must be aware of the identity of units adjacent to them and 

areas of responsibility must be understood. If one company’s area develops problems, that company 

officer must inform the adjacent companies and their superiors.”

Water Supply --One of the greatest problems with controlling the major highrise fires discussed earlier 

in this report was obtaining adequate pressure and flow to initiate an attack. Generally, the problems 

were due to the failure of pressure reducing valves or the building fire pump to operate properly. The 

best way for fire departments to address these problems is through inspection and testing of system 

components to ensure they are working to expected levels (this is discussed in detail later).

Highrise SOPs should instruct firefighters to use hoses and nozzles which can operate under low 

pressure conditions. As previously discussed, static pressures at standpipe outlets in highrises can 

be as low as 65 psi. SOPs should address this reality by establishing 2 1/2 inch hose as the choice 

hoseline for highrise fire attack. Smooth bore nozzles should be carried in highrise hosepacks since 

they require about one-half the operating pressure of most fog nozzles.

SOPs should also contain contingency procedures for situations where water supply is compromised 

by a problem with the fire protection system. SOPs should establish methods to check building systems which do not appear to be operating properly, including the fire pump(s). Many of the SOPs 

reviewed assign this task to Lobby Control personnel, who can check fire pumps, generators, and 

other emergency equipment, and attempt to manually activate equipment if necessary.
20 U.S. Fire Administration/Technical Report Series

Water supply SOPs should also establish which unit(s) is responsible for supplying the fire department connection(s). Special pumping procedures can also be included. Dallas’ highrise SOPs specify 

that two pumpers supply the standpipe system in case one pumper fails or higher pressure is needed. 

They also disallow the use of large diameter hose between the engine and standpipe because this 

hose generally is not rated to the high pressures (over 200 psi) that may be required for supplying 

the fire department connector(s).

Elevators --Besides incident command, elevator usage is the most strictly regulated practice in the 

SOPs reviewed. Most of the SOPs define when and when not to use elevators. One set says, “Most 

procedures recognize that elevators are the most effective and efficient means to transport personnel 

and equipment in highrises, but improper use of elevators [at improper times] in fire situations can 

expose personnel to serious risks.”

Elevator SOPs should specify certain steps firefighters must take before using them. First, elevators 

must be recalled and switched to manual or bypass mode if this feature is available. This feature overrides all elevator controls except those in the car and gives firefighters control over an elevator. The 

manual mode disables the door’s electric eye (which could be blocked open by smoke) and prevents 

the elevator from being called accidentally to another floor. Fairfax County’s SOPs prohibit use of 

elevators which cannot be operated manually until the officer on the first arriving engine determines 

which floor is affected by the fire.

Many SOPs also establish what equipment firefighters must carry when using an elevator. Firefighters 

are to be equipped with full protective clothing, SCBA turned on, an activated PASS device, and forcible entry tools. All of the SOPs prohibit firefighters from getting off on the floor where the alarm 

is activated, but at least one city, Dallas, allows firefighters to go to the floor of alarm if a guard or 

building engineer has personally confirmed there is no sign of smoke or fire. In general, the SOPs 

reviewed require firefighters to stop one to two floors below the floor in alarm.

SOPs should also establish who is responsible for establishing control over the elevators. This job is 

usually assigned to the first arriving engine or truck, and ultimately may be assigned to the Lobby 

Control Sector.

Milwaukee’s SOPs note that firefighters should look up into the shaft through the elevator’s trap 

door or through cracks between the floor and elevator to verify that there is no smoke in the shaft. 

If there is smoke, firefighters are cautioned against using the elevator. Los Angeles City specifically 

prohibits firefighters from using elevators in buildings under investigation for a fire emergency until 

it is determined by fire department personnel that the entire shaft is not threatened by fire.

Dallas, Philadelphia, and Chicago require that a firefighter with a portable radio be assigned to 

operate an elevator. Milwaukee’s SOPs state that it is preferable to use a service elevator in a building serviced by split banks because the service elevator most likely serves the entire building, while 

Philadelphia’s procedures recommend firefighters avoid using these elevators because they are typically slower and sometimes do not have firefighter bypass switches. Chicago and Dallas both require 

that firefighters manually stop an elevator every five floors to confirm that it is functioning properly. 

Dallas also prohibits firefighters from passing the fire floor in an elevator because of the significant 

hazard this creates. Dallas and Philadelphia restrict personnel from initially using an elevator if there 

is reasonable suspicion of a working fire below the eighth floor. Memphis’s SOPs prohibit the use of 

elevators which serve the fire area when a working fire is declared.
USFA-TR-082/April 1996 21

Some departments do not allow firefighters to ascend a highrise unless they are carrying a highrise 

hosepack. This policy is designed to prevent a truck company from investigating a fire or even an 

activated alarm without having proper equipment to fight a fire. Los Angeles City’s and Memphis’ 

SOPs require that firefighters using elevators take at least one fire extinguisher with them and have 

it pointing at the elevator doors when they open. Some cities also require personnel using an elevator to carry forcible entry tools that could be used in an emergency to pry open elevator doors and, 

possibly, to break through the walls of the elevator shaft.

Dallas’ elevator SOPs call for the dispatch of the department’s high angle rescue team for cases when 

an elevator cannot be recalled and there is reasonable suspicion of a working fire. Los Angeles City 

requires personnel to be assigned to check elevators in banks serving the fire floor to verify that all 

are empty. Fairfax County’s SOPs note the importance of immediately searching elevator lobbies on 

floors affected by the fire. Many occupants still try to exit using elevators, despite warnings against 

it, and there is a higher probability that elevator lobby areas will contain victims than other areas of 

a floor.

Evacuation and Stairwells --Evacuation of a highrise can be one of the biggest challenges in controlling a 

highrise fire emergency. Firefighters depend on a prompt, organized evacuation by occupants so that 

they only have to concentrate on rescuing disabled persons, and on the fire attack. Unfortunately, 

building occupants do not always follow evacuation plans, and many persons may delay exiting 

and become trapped. This is why it is important for the fire department to establish procedures for 

managing occupant evacuation.

Occupant evacuation management requires that first arriving officers make an assessment of the risks 

posed to occupants who are still in the building. SOPs should emphasize the importance of making 

a decision in the early stages about whether firefighters should concentrate on suppressing the fire 

or helping occupants out of the building. Suppression and evacuation are usually the two biggest 

priorities at highrise fires. In some cases the best way to protect trapped occupants is to concentrate 

on extinguishing the fire before it reaches those above it. In other cases, the fire may be so large and 

uncontrollable that the best action is to protect stairwells from products of combustion and assist 

occupants out of the building. Once a decision is made, SOPs should instruct firefighters to communicate their plan with occupants in the building.

Los Angeles City’s SOPs provide a lengthy discussion of evacuation procedures for large highrises. 

They note that in some cases thousands of people may try to leave the building. Evacuating a large 

number of people in a timely manner is impossible and would hamper firefighting operations. The 

SOPs call for the incident commander to assign an engine company to assist with evacuation. This 

crew can utilize the public address system in the stairwells and on floors, or use other means to communicate messages to occupants about who needs to evacuate and how to evacuate. In most cases, 

the department will evacuate three floors at a time to prevent stairwell overcrowding. Phoenix’s SOPs 

state that occupants in the immediate fire area should be evacuated as quickly as possible, but that 

“further evacuation should be predicated on risk to the occupants since premature evacuation often 

hinders fire control efforts and adds to general confusion at the scene.”

Some of the SOPs reviewed also established procedures to protect stairwells from the products of 

combustion. This is an important tactic for buildings which do not have built-in fans to create a 

pressurized environment. Los Angeles City’s SOPs require firefighters to place positive pressure fans 

at the base of stairwells to establish a positive pressure environment, or to augment built-in pressur-
22 U.S. Fire Administration/Technical Report Series

ization fans. In buildings over 25 stories, the fans are to be placed every 25 floors. Although many 

departments prohibit the use of gasoline powered, carbon monoxide producing positive pressure 

fans in stairwells, some departments allow their usage if there is sufficient air flow to remove the 

carbon monoxide fumes.

Very few of the SOPs reviewed noted the importance of checking early in the incident to verify that 

stairwell roof hatches are open. Fire protection systems that activate fans to pressurize stairwells 

usually open hatches automatically. Closed hatches prevent smoke from escaping and create a stack 

effect.

Many SOPs urge firefighters to establish separate stairwells for evacuation and as a base for fire attack. 

In reality this may be impossible unless the stairwells or building are equipped with a public address 

system that allows firefighters to communicate the evacuation plan to occupants. The Milwaukee Fire 

Department SOPs require that civilians be evacuated from the stairwell(s) before firefighters begin 

suppression operations.

Fairfax County’s SOPs prioritize search areas in a highrise. The fire floor and floor above are to be 

searched first, followed by the top floor before searching the floors in between. For large or very 

populated highrises, the SOPs recommend relocation of occupants on the fire floor and two floors 

above and below the fire. The remaining occupants probably will be safer staying where they are in 

the building, particularly if the building is sprinklered.

Fire Attack --Some of the highrise SOPs reviewed for this report provide basic guidelines about the 

size and type of team which should be assembled to initiate fire attack in a highrise. The size of 

attack teams varies from department to department, but most of the SOPs reviewed required the 

attack comprise the first engine and first truck, at a minimum, if there is indication of a working fire. 

Memphis’ SOPs, which were revised following a highrise fire that killed two firefighters, stipulate 

that all operations be conducted by task forces comprised of two engines and one truck. Task forces 

are assigned particular missions, i.e. fire attack, rescue, ventilation, etc.

Memphis believes this unique arrangement of personnel “improves accountability and provides sufficient personnel and equipment for meeting the complex demands of a highrise fire.”

Chicago’s SOPs specify that a crew with an attack line should be put in place on the floor above the 

fire as quickly as possible to prevent any lapping or vertical extension. This is particularly important 

if windows begin to fail on the fire floor. Los Angeles City’s SOPs state the firefighters should try to 

initiate an attack from the stairwell containing a roof hatch if possible so that there is no ventilation 

problem or stack effect in the stairwell. Some SOPs say that in cases where the fire can be controlled 

quickly, fire attack may be given priority over evacuation of occupants.

Fairfax County’s SOPs warn officers about conducting simultaneous fire attacks from different stairwells because of the possibility of a situation where two attacks oppose one another. Operations 

from different stairwells may be necessary if there is a large volume of fire, but this attack must be 

well coordinated. The SOPs also warn about negative effects of compartmentation and partitions 

which are routinely found in highrises. These internal structural divisions are designed to contain 

the fire, but they may allow firefighters to unknowingly go past the fire and become entrapped.

Because of the unusual designs and layouts of highrise buildings, Fairfax County’s SOPs require the 

first arriving engine company to provide a verbal size-up of the fire floor to the Incident Commander. 
USFA-TR-082/April 1996 23

The size-up should include information about the floor layout and their exact location relative to the 

fire’s location. The SOPs state, “The first arriving engine company officer should remember that the 

Battalion Chief will normally build his strategy around the engine company’s first tactics. All facts 

that are found in the fire area must be communicated to the incident commander.”

Safety --Safety is given very little attention in many of the SOPs reviewed. Due to the potential size 

and complexities of fighting a highrise fire, highrise SOPs should emphasize safety by designating 

an individual to function as the Safety Officer. This individual should be given the responsibility of 

monitoring hazards specific to highrises including falling glass. Complex highrise fires may require 

a lead safety officer at the command post and several other safety officers assigned to specific sectors 

(e.g., interior safety, exterior safety). Interior safety officers should have another firefighter accompanying them so they are not alone in a hazardous environment.

One set of SOPs reviewed for this report requires firefighters to establish a safe access corridor 

between the street and the building, and that ventilation efforts be prohibited above the corridor. 

Philadelphia’s SOPs include a position for an interior safety officer who is responsible for ensuring 

that personnel are moved, controlled, and supported in a safe manner. Memphis requires that at 

least one task force (two engines, one truck) be kept in the exterior staging area at all times during 

a working fire. In addition, a safety team labeled the “Rapid Intervention Team” is dispatched to 

working highrise fires. Its personnel ascend to the interior staging area for the purpose of providing 

rapid intervention in the event that firefighters become trapped, lost, or need emergency assistance.

Communications Equipment --Several of the fires previously discussed demonstrate the communications 

difficulties which can arise while operating within highrise buildings. Highrise building construction may shield radio waves and hamper communications between exterior and interior personnel. 

Highrise SOPs should develop communications contingency plans. For example, some of the SOPs 

reviewed suggest using simplex (non-repeated) channels when personnel are unable to transmit 

over primary channels. Newer highrise buildings may be equipped with internal communications 

systems. Pre-fire plans for highrise buildings should document these features, with instructions on 

how to use them

Los Angeles City urges the first arriving companies to note the number of the phone in the lobby 

area before investigating the fire in case a radio fails and a firefighter needs to telephone the incident 

commander.

Ventilation --Many of the SOPs reviewed require Command to establish a ventilation sector early in a 

highrise incident. This sector’s responsibilities generally include:

• shutting down the building’s HVAC system unless it is capable of providing smoke removal 

without spreading smoke to the rest of the building

• setting up positive pressure fans at the base of stairwells and ensuring that stairwell pressurization fans are working

• opening roof hatches as necessary

• providing horizontal ventilation by breaking out windows only after consulting with the IC 

and notifying ground companies.
24 U.S. Fire Administration/Technical Report Series

One set of SOPs specified that firefighters are to break a small hole in a window and then reach out 

through the hole and push the glass inward, if possible. The SOP also requires ventilation companies 

to tape windows prior to ventilation to prevent untempered glass from shattering.

Accountability --Accountability is integral to effective management of a highrise fire. Several of the 

firefighter fatalities in highrise structures listed earlier in this report were caused by firefighters who 

became lost or disoriented. The mazes of hallways, rooms, and partitions found in highrises (particularly in office highrises) and limited evacuation routes increases the likelihood that a firefighter 

could become lost. This is why it is particularly important to have a system to account for personnel 

fighting a highrise fire.

Highrise SOPs should build upon the fire department’s standard accountability system. Two major 

types of highrise personnel accountability systems are discussed in the SOPs reviewed. The most 

prevalent type is to have one firefighter from the first alarm units establish Lobby Control and record 

the names of firefighters entering the building. Another approach is to have units post a Velcro passport containing the names of firefighters on the respective units on a command board on the first 

arriving vehicle or in the lobby.

Helicopter Operations --Dallas’ and Los Angeles City’s highrise SOPs incorporate procedures for the use 

of helicopters in highrise fire emergencies. The teams have been incorporated primarily to evacuate occupants who flee to the roof, but also to provide a means of delivering firefighters to the roof 

to open ventilation hatches or descend into the building. Los Angeles City established a helicopter 

operations sector at least one-half mile away from the scene and notes that helicopter operators must 

stay at least 500 feet away from the sides of the affected building to avoid blowing smoke and fanning the flames. Some buildings there are required by code to have helipads on their roofs.

HIGHRISE PRE-FIRE PLANNING AND SYSTEM INSPECTION

The major fires previously discussed demonstrate the fire department’s dependence on built-in fire 

protection systems to successfully control a fire in a highrise building. Most fire departments across 

the country are accustomed to regularly testing fire hydrants and conducting pre-fire plans of water 

supply systems in their communities, however, many fire departments do not give this high level of 

attention to fire protection system testing and pre-fire planning of highrises.

Fire departments also should conduct pre-fire plans of individual highrises so that they have a written plan for handling a fire before it happens. A recent article on major highrise fires noted, “System 

failures - power, elevator, and stairway pressurization - are common to most [recent major fires]. 

While the [recent major fires] are not a representative sample of incidents, they suggest that these 

systems are more vulnerable than we may think. Failure of critical systems should be incorporated 

into pre-fire plans for highrise office buildings.”7

 At a minimum, pre-fire plans should address the 

types and capabilities of fire protection systems, the layout of the building, locations of stairwells and 

elevators, and how evacuation will be handled.

The Vancouver, British Columbia Fire Department has devised a unique and comprehensive method 

for developing and updating pre-fire plans for highrises. The fire department authorized several 

7 Jennings, Charles. “Highrise Building Evacuation Planning.” Journal of Applied Fire Science, Vol. 4 No. 4, 1994, 

pg. 294.
USFA-TR-082/April 1996 25

firms in the city to write comprehensive pre-fire plans for highrise buildings. Each firm produces 

plans in a standard format established by the fire department. Highrise building owners are required 

to select one of these firms to write a plan for their building. Once the plan is written, a copy is kept 

in the fire control room and one is filed with the fire marshal’s office. Building owners must have 

one of the firms revise the plan every five years. A sample of a Vancouver Fire Department pre-fire 

plan is included in Appendix B.

Since successful tactical operations depend heavily on the functionality of a highrise building’s fire 

protection system, fire departments must ensure through testing and inspections that the systems 

are maintained and work properly. Fire protection systems should be inspected upon installation 

and regularly thereafter. Inspections should ensure that standpipe outlet pressures and flows are 

sufficient; that primary systems are working up to the level of expectation; that backup systems will 

work if primary systems fail; and that the proper valves and connections are open and functional. 

Regular testing of systems can be performed or observed by fire department personnel, but most 

cities require building management to have systems inspected by a private contractor who is certified 

by the city to perform inspections. Inspections should include testing of all outlets with pressure 

reducing devices to ensure adequate flow and pressure under flowing and non-flowing conditions.

TRAINING IN FIRE PROTECTION SYSTEMS

This report has emphasized the fire department’s reliance upon built-in fire protection systems to 

control a highrise fire emergency. Firefighters should be trained on the capabilities and limitations 

of these systems, and they should know how to intervene if a system component fails.

Fire departments which protect highrise structures should have personnel with special knowledge of 

fire protection systems. An individual or select group of individuals could be given special training 

on fire protection systems, or the department may hire or establish a relationship with a knowledgeable fire protection engineer. These individuals would have the knowledge and ability to provide 

technical advice if a system component failed or to answer general questions about systems.

Many large city departments have a staff position for a fire protection engineer. Some departments 

also have specially trained highrise units. The Phoenix Fire Department is in the process of forming 

a special highrise response team which will be given advanced training and equipment for handling 

a highrise fire. The goal of the team is to “make the building behave in a way that ensures the safest 

operation possible for firefighters and occupants.” In Phoenix, a fire protection engineer responds to 

working fires to confer with the building owners and managers.

OCCUPANT EVACUATION TRAINING

Fire departments generally do not have the manpower to rescue hundreds of trapped occupants 

in a highrise fire. They will usually be able to manage the evacuation and directly assist those near 

the fire floor. If the fire cannot be controlled rapidly or occupants removed quickly, a disaster may 

result. Automatic sprinkler systems are the most effective way to control a highrise fire quickly so 

that occupants are not threatened. If sprinklers do not immediately suppress the fire, they generally delay its growth and allow time for occupants to escape. It is much more likely for there to be 

evacuation problems in unsprinklered buildings. Fire departments must be prepared to manage the 

evacuation of occupants from these buildings. Given the problems which can be anticipated with 

evacuation from unsprinklered buildings, fire departments should ensure that occupants of these 
26 U.S. Fire Administration/Technical Report Series

buildings routinely practice evacuation procedures and understand the importance of a prompt and 

orderly response.

Experience clearly shows that it is easier for firefighters to manage evacuation if the occupants have 

been trained in evacuation procedures. During a highrise fire at the Peachtree building in Atlanta, 

government employees on the floor above the fire who were regularly required to participate in 

evacuation drills successfully evacuated; however, five employees of private firms which did not 

regularly participate in regular drills died.8

 Some jurisdictions across the country have also dedicated 

fire prevention staff to work with building managers to practice occupant evacuation. Some fire 

departments across the country require that highrise building managers design an occupant evacuation plan to train occupants how to respond to an emergency. Most highrise occupant evacuation 

plans are based on the premise that occupants exit the building through protected stairwells in a 

prompt and orderly manner.

Building public address systems is an important tool for evacuation management. Many newer 

highrise buildings have incorporated public address systems into their design. These systems allow 

the fire department to communicate evacuation instructions to occupants. They are particularly 

important to have when occupants become trapped above the fire and firefighters cannot reach them. 

Firefighters should be trained about how to evacuate a building using public address systems. In the 

absence of these systems, fire department personnel will have a difficult time managing the evacuation of a highrise building.

RECOMMENDATIONS

The following recommendations about highrise firefighting are taken from lessons learned at recent 

major highrise fires across the country. Departments that protect highrise structures should consider 

the following to maximize their ability to handle the inherent complexities and hazards of a highrise 

fire emergency.

1. All fire departments which have highrise buildings in their response areas should have highrise SOPs to address incident command, water supply, and occupant evacuation. The recent 

major highrise fires illustrate the need for these due to the inherent challenges and hazards 

presented by a highrise structure.

2. Pre-fire planning of highrise building fire protection systems is essential for conducting a 

safe and orderly fire attack and occupant evacuation.

3. Local jurisdictions must work closely with highrise building management to ensure that 

highrise fire protection systems are tested on a regular basis and that individual components are functioning to the fire departments’ expectations. Departments should give particular attention to pressure reducing devices to ensure that they provide adequate water volume 

and pressure at all levels throughout the structure.

4. Fire departments should be prepared for the failure of key fire protection system components in a highrise building, and should have contingency plans in place in case a component fails to work properly.

8 Ibid.
USFA-TR-082/April 1996 27

5. Highrise hose and nozzle packs must be designed to operate under potential low pressure water 

supply scenarios.

6. Properly designed, installed, and maintained sprinkler systems have proven to be the best method 

to successfully control and extinguish highrise fires and protect occupants.

7. Special highrise training drills should be conducted regularly to allow firefighters and command 

officers the opportunity to become familiar with the highrise firefighting operations. Drills 

should cover three important areas: incident command, firefighting and tactics, and evacuation 

and management of occupants.

8. Regular occupant evacuation training in commercial and residential highrises is essential to an 

organized occupant response in a real emergency.

29

APPenDIx A

Sample Highrise Standard Operating Procedures
30 U.S. Fire Administration/Technical Report Series

Appendix A (continued)
USFA-TR-082/April 1996 31

Appendix A (continued)
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Appendix A (continued)
USFA-TR-082/April 1996 33

Appendix A (continued)
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Appendix A (continued)
USFA-TR-082/April 1996 35

Appendix A (continued)
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Appendix A (continued)
USFA-TR-082/April 1996 37

Appendix A (continued)
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Appendix A (continued)
USFA-TR-082/April 1996 39

Appendix A (continued)
40 U.S. Fire Administration/Technical Report Series

Appendix A (continued)
USFA-TR-082/April 1996 41

APPenDIx b

Excerpt from Vancouver Fire Department 

Highrise Pre-Fire Plan
42 U.S. Fire Administration/Technical Report Series

Appendix b (continued)
USFA-TR-082/April 1996 43

Appendix b (continued)
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Appendix b (continued)
USFA-TR-082/April 1996 45

Appendix b (continued)
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Appendix b (continued)
USFA-TR-082/April 1996 47

Appendix b (continued)
48 U.S. Fire Administration/Technical Report Series

Appendix b (continued)
USFA-TR-082/April 1996 49

Appendix b (continued)