United States General Accounting Office

GAO Report to the Chairman, Subcommittee

on National Security, International

Affairs, and Criminal Justice, Committee

on Government Reform and Oversight,

House of Representatives

April 1996 MILITARY BASES

Closure and

Realignment Savings

Are Significant, but Not

Easily Quantified

G O A

years

1921 - 1996

GAO/NSIAD-96-67

GAO United States

General Accounting Office

Washington, D.C. 20548

National Security and

International Affairs Division

B-270646 

April 8, 1996

The Honorable William H. Zeliff, Jr.

Chairman, Subcommittee on National Security,

 International Affairs, and Criminal Justice

Committee on Government Reform and Oversight

House of Representatives

Dear Mr. Chairman:

At your request, we examined cost and savings estimates for past base

realignment and closure (BRAC) actions. Specifically, we are reporting on

(1) the extent to which the Department of Defense (DOD) is achieving

actual savings from BRAC and (2) the adequacy of DOD’s process for

developing the cost and savings estimates reported in its annual budget

submissions.

Background The Congress passed initial legislation in October 1988 to bring DOD’s base

structure into line with its smaller post-Cold War force structure.

Generally, the process, as modified by subsequent legislation, called for

(1) establishing independent commissions to recommend installations for

realignment or closure and (2) implementing the commissions’

recommendations within 6 years of the date the President sends the

commissions’ recommendations to the Congress.

The realignment of underutilized bases and closure of unnecessary bases

were expected to result in significant savings, primarily from reduced base

support costs. The February 1992 DOD Base Structure Report defined base

support costs as the overhead cost of providing, operating, and

maintaining the defense base structure, including real property

maintenance and repair costs, base operations costs, and family housing

costs. According to historical information in DOD’s Future Years Defense

Program (FYDP) database, in fiscal year 1988 base support costs totaled

$41 billion.1

 During that year, most base support costs were paid from the

operations and maintenance account (54 percent); the military personnel

account (23 percent); and the family housing account (10 percent).

1

For consistency, we converted all cost data to fiscal year 1996 dollars using deflators in the DOD

Comptroller’s March 1995 National Defense Budget Estimates for Fiscal Year 1996.

Page 1 GAO/NSIAD-96-67 Military Bases
B-270646 

The Congress recognized that an up-front investment was necessary to

achieve the savings and established two accounts2

 to fund certain

implementation costs. These costs included (1) constructing new facilities

at gaining bases to accommodate organizations transferred from closing

bases, (2) remedying environmental problems on closing bases, and

(3) moving personnel and equipment from closing to gaining bases. In

addition, revenue generated when land at closing bases is sold is deposited

in the BRAC accounts and used to offset one-time implementation costs.

Moreover, the legislation required that DOD submit annual budgets

estimating the cost and savings of each closure or realignment, as well as

the period in which savings were to be achieved.

According to its February 1995 budget submission, DOD estimated that, for

the first three BRAC rounds, one-time implementation costs will total 

$16.3 billion and savings will total $16.1 billion, for a net cost of 

$189.6 million over the period.3

 According to DOD, the $16.1 billion in

estimated savings have been or will be reflected as reductions in DOD

component appropriation accounts. Once the implementation of the three

BRAC rounds is completed in fiscal year 1999, DOD estimates that annual net

savings will be $4.1 billion.

Results in Brief Our analysis of base support costs in the FYDP and at nine closing

installations indicates that BRAC savings should be substantial. However,

DOD’s systems do not provide information on actual BRAC savings.

Therefore, the total amount of actual savings is uncertain. If DOD does not

fully achieve estimated BRAC savings, it will affect DOD’s ability to fund

future programs at planned levels.

DOD has complied with the legislative requirement for submitting annual

cost and savings estimates, but there are limitations to the submissions’

usefulness. For example, the Air Force’s savings estimates were not based

on budget-quality data, and the Army’s estimates excluded reduced

military personnel costs that the Navy and the Air Force included in their

estimates. Further, BRAC cost estimates excluded more than $781 million in

economic assistance to local communities as well as other costs.

2

There are two BRAC accounts. BRAC I was established to fund base closures in the 1988 round.

BRAC II was established to fund base closures in the 1991, 1993, and 1995 rounds.

3

Budget years for BRACs I through III cover fiscal years 1990 through 1999. Budget years for each are

as follows: BRAC I—fiscal years 1990-95; BRAC II—fiscal years 1992-97; and BRAC III—fiscal years

1994-99.

Page 2 GAO/NSIAD-96-67 Military Bases
B-270646 

Consequently, the Congress does not have an accurate picture of the

savings achieved by the BRAC process.

BRAC Savings Should

Be Substantial, but

Are Difficult to

Quantify

Our analysis of the FYDP indicates that DOD plans to substantially reduce

spending for base support programs. Furthermore, our analysis of

operations and maintenance costs at nine closing installations indicates

that actual base support costs have been reduced at those installations and

therefore savings should be substantial. However, the DOD FYDP and service

accounting systems are not configured to provide information concerning

actual BRAC savings, and failure to achieve them would affect the quality of

base support services or DOD’s ability to fund other programs.

Overall Base Support Costs

Have Been Reduced

Table 1 shows that by fiscal year 1997 DOD expects to reduce annual base

support costs by about $11.5 billion from a fiscal year 1988 baseline. The

cumulative reduction over the period is about $59 billion. DOD’s

information system does not indicate how much of the reduction is due to

BRAC versus force structure or other changes. In addition, an Office of the

Deputy Assistant Secretary of Defense (Installations) official stated that

DOD is reviewing the classification of base support programs in the FYDP,

which could affect future analyses.

Table 1: Analysis of Base Support

Cost Reduction From Fiscal Years

1988-97

Fiscal year 1996 dollars in billions

Fiscal year

Base support

costsa

Change from 1988

baseline

Cumulative

reduction

1988 $41.0 0 0

1989 40.1 $0.9 $0.9

1990 38.3 2.7 3.6

1991 37.9 3.1 6.7

1992 36.7 4.3 11.0

1993 34.2 6.8 17.8

1994 32.4 8.6 26.4

1995 30.6 10.4 36.8

1996 30.3 10.7 47.5

1997 29.5 11.5 59.0

aDoes not include base support costs paid by the Defense Business Operations Fund (DBOF)

and includes only those military construction costs that are related in the FYDP to base operations

and real property programs.

Page 3 GAO/NSIAD-96-67 Military Bases
B-270646 

Our analysis of the FYDP shows that, within reduced overall base support

spending levels, DOD plans to increase average spending on family housing

from $1,880 to $2,730 for each active duty military person between fiscal

years 1988 and 1997. Average spending for the remaining base support

activities is expected to remain relatively stable over the 10-year period.

However, table 2 shows that, over the period, DOD’s force structure is

expected to be reduced by 680,000 military personnel and average base

operations and real property support costs are expected to fall slightly to

about $16,600 per person.

Table 2: Analysis of Base Support

Costs, Excluding Family Housing

Costs, and Military Personnel Levels

for Fiscal Years 1988 Through 1997

Fiscal year

Base operations

and real property

support costs

(FY96 dollars in

billions)

Number of active

duty military

personnel

(thousands)

Average costs per

person (FY96

dollars in

thousands)

1988 $36.9 2,209 $16.7

1989 36.0 2,202 16.3

1990 34.6 2,143 16.1

1991 34.1 2,077 16.4

1992 32.6 1,880 17.3

1993 30.1 1,776 16.9

1994 28.7 1,678 17.1

1995 27.0 1,588 17.0

1996 26.2 1,550 16.9

1997 25.3 1,529 16.6

Information Concerning

Actual Savings Is Limited

Key requirements for calculating actual BRAC savings include information

on decreased support costs at closing bases and the offsetting increases at

gaining bases. DOD cannot provide accurate information on actual savings

because (1) information on base support costs was not retained for some

closing bases and (2) the services’ accounting systems cannot isolate the

effect on support costs at gaining bases. DOD officials stated that designing

and implementing a system for collecting actual BRAC savings information

would be difficult and extremely expensive, and they questioned the value

of such a system.

According to DOD officials, the accounting systems were not designed to

isolate the impact of specific initiatives, such as BRAC, on base support

costs. With the disestablishment of the 509th Bombardment Wing and

closure of Pease Air Force Base, for example, the Wing’s FB-111 bombers

Page 4 GAO/NSIAD-96-67 Military Bases
B-270646 

were placed in storage as part of a force structure change, while its KC-135

refueling aircraft were transferred to five gaining bases along with their

crews, support personnel, and equipment. The largest group of aircraft, six

KC-135s, was transferred to Fairchild Air Force Base. According to Air

Force officials, their systems would not allow them to determine

• how much of the reduction in Pease Air Force Base support costs was due

to the changing strategic bomber force structure as opposed to the closure

of Pease Air Force Base and

• how much of any increase in Fairchild Air Force Base support costs was

due to the arrival of Pease aircraft. Officials stated that, since the arrival of

the 6 KC-135 aircraft from Pease, Fairchild has received over 50 KC-135

tankers from other bases.

The Army Audit Agency had similar difficulties in determining the actual

savings from the closure of 10 Army BRAC I installations. According to the

Agency’s November 1995 report, the Army’s system of management

controls did not ensure that adequate documentation was retained to

determine actual savings or reliable estimates of savings. The report

stated, for example, that auditors were unable to locate the accounting

records necessary to determine base support cost savings at one site. In

addition, they could not determine incremental base support cost

increases at gaining installations because the Army’s accounting system

did not contain all the necessary information.

We analyzed base support costs paid from the operations and maintenance

account for the eight installations for which data were available. The

analysis shows that the closures will have a combined net cost of

$7.6 million for the implementation period, and an annual recurring

savings of $212.8 million thereafter. As table 3 shows, four bases (Chase

Field, the Long Beach Naval Hospital, Pease, and Williams) are expected

to have a net savings at the end of the implementation period, indicating a

payback period of less than 6 years. The longest payback period is Fort

Devens at about 11 years.

Page 5 GAO/NSIAD-96-67 Military Bases
B-270646 

Table 3: Base Support Savings and

BRAC Implementation Costs for Eight

Installations

Fiscal year 1996 dollars in millions

Installation

6-year base

support

savings

6-year

implementation

costsa

6-year net

savings/

(costs)

Annual

recurring

savings

Bergstrom Air

Force Baseb

0 0 0 0

Chase Field Naval

Air Station

$74.0 $28.8 $45.2 $15.1

Fort Benjamin

Harrison

163.6 170.4 (6.8) 35.4

Fort Devens 83.8 169.2 (85.4) 24.5

Long Beach Naval

Hospital

27.7 10.3 17.4 7.0

Moffett Field Naval

Air Stationc

98.6 137.2 (38.6) 25.2

Pease Air Force

Base

178.5 159.4 19.1 38.1

Sacramento Army

Depot

76.9 144.5 (67.6) 36.4

Williams Air Force

Base

162.0 52.9 109.1 31.1

Total $865.1 $872.7 $(7.6) $212.8

aImplementation costs were based on information in DOD’s 1995 budget submission.

bBaseline base support cost data were not available.

cCurrent base support costs for reserve and other units at Moffett Field were not considered since

those costs were excluded from the baseline provided by the Navy.

Our estimates reflect force structure savings at closing bases and do not

reflect incremental base support cost increases at gaining bases unless

they were readily identifiable. Additionally, estimated implementation

costs do not include economic assistance costs to the area affected by the

closure or other costs not reported in DOD’s budget submission. Including

these factors would reduce the net savings. However, our estimates also

do not reflect savings due to reduced base support costs paid from the

military personnel and military construction accounts or reduced family

housing costs, which would increase savings. For example, at the three Air

Force bases we reviewed, the Air Force estimated military personnel

savings at $669.6 million over the implementation period and

$156.6 million annually thereafter.

Page 6 GAO/NSIAD-96-67 Military Bases
B-270646 

BRAC Savings Are

Essential to Future

Defense Programs

DOD expects BRAC savings to provide much of the funding necessary for

quality-of-life initiatives and defense modernization efforts. In

November 1994, for example, the Secretary of Defense stated that the

fiscal year 1996 DOD budget will increase funding by $94 million for

community and family support projects, including increasing eligibility for

child care support by up to 38,000 families and strengthening programs

aimed at preventing family violence.

Additionally, in January 1996, the Secretary stated that DOD will need to

increase modernization programs to ensure the long-term readiness of

defense forces. According to the Secretary, failure to achieve savings from

earlier initiatives required DOD to restructure the budget. DOD stated that

estimated savings from BRAC are taken out of the services’ budgets up

front. This is the same process that was followed in implementing budget

reductions under the defense management review initiatives. To the extent

BRAC savings are not realized at the levels that were anticipated, it could

have similar effects on DOD’s FYDP.

Limitations on DOD’s

Cost and Savings

Estimates

DOD’s savings estimates are inconsistent because the services used

different estimating methodologies, and are unreliable because the

services excluded some savings and did not update some estimates to

reflect revised closure schedules. In addition, DOD’s cost estimates are

incomplete because the services did not include many BRAC-related

nondefense costs.

Savings Estimates Were

Inconsistently Developed

and Are Unreliable

The methodologies used for developing the savings estimates differed

among the services. The Air Force used savings estimates that were

developed through the Cost of Base Realignment Actions (COBRA) model,4

with adjustments for inflation and recurring cost increases at gaining

bases, as the basis for its estimates. The adjustments accounted for

differences in the way inflation and recurring costs were treated in the

COBRA and budget estimates. According to an Air Force official, however,

major commands and installations were not requested to provide

budget-quality data to revise the COBRA savings estimates for their bases.

The Navy, on the other hand, used its Comptroller’s analyses of expected

increases and decreases in each base’s costs, but no documentation was

available to show how specific estimates were calculated. For example,

4

According to DOD, COBRA provides a methodology for consistently estimating costs and savings

from alternative closure options and was not intended to provide budget-quality estimates.

Page 7 GAO/NSIAD-96-67 Military Bases
B-270646 

the Navy’s estimate for the Long Beach Naval Hospital savings assumed,

among other things, that the Civilian Health and Medical Program of the

Uniformed Services (CHAMPUS) costs at gaining bases would be reduced by

about $143 million over the 6-year implementation period and about

$38 million for each year thereafter. The Navy Comptroller was unable to

provide documentation to show how that estimate was calculated.

The Army based its estimates on detailed implementation plans prepared

by major commands after the BRAC Commissions announced their

decisions. Unlike the Navy, however, the Army eliminated CHAMPUS savings

from its estimates. Also, unlike the other services, the Army excluded

savings from military personnel reductions from its BRAC II and III savings

estimates. The Air Force, the Navy, and DOD agencies estimated that BRACs

II and III would eliminate the need for about 28,000 military personnel and

save about $3.9 billion during the 6-year implementation periods. An Army

official stated that military personnel savings were excluded because the

reductions had already been recognized in previous initiatives. Closure

implementation plans for the three Army bases we examined stated that

the installations were authorized 475 military personnel for base support

functions.

Further, a Navy official stated that Navy estimates were reviewed annually

and revised during the budget review process. According to Army and Air

Force officials, their savings estimates are not routinely updated, even

though some bases close faster than initial estimates, thereby resulting in

increased savings. For example, the 1995 Fort Benjamin Harrison savings

estimate, which has not changed since it was initially submitted in 1992,

does not reflect significant operation and maintenance savings until fiscal

year 1995. Our analysis indicates that savings started in fiscal year 1992

and totaled over $92 million by fiscal year 1995.

According to a DOD Comptroller official, the Office of the Secretary of

Defense provided no additional guidance to the services on developing

savings estimates other than the guidance on preparing COBRA estimates.

He said that DOD headquarters and the services focused most of their

attention on monitoring and managing BRAC costs rather than savings.

Cost Estimates Are

Incomplete

In March 1996, we reported that DOD’s cost estimates for closing

maintenance depots excluded some BRAC-related costs that have been or

Page 8 GAO/NSIAD-96-67 Military Bases
B-270646 

will be paid from DBOF or the operation and maintenance account.5 For

example, the Navy estimates that, through fiscal year 1995, closing naval

aviation depots and shipyards would have an accumulated operating loss

of about $882 million that would be recouped from its operation and

maintenance account ($695 million) or written off within DBOF

($187 million). Some of this loss was directly related to depot closures. We

also reported that closing Army depots had closure-related costs and

losses that were financed by DBOF. In fiscal year 1993, for example, the

Sacramento Army Depot charged about $12 million in closure-related

costs, including employees’ voluntary separation incentive pay,6

 to DBOF

instead of the BRAC account. The Navy and other organizations charge

separation incentive pay to their BRAC account. In addition to depot-related

closure costs, DOD estimates do not include $781 million for the following

BRAC-related economic assistance costs, much of which is non-DOD:

• The Economic Development Administration began providing funds for

BRAC-related activities in fiscal year 1992, and has obligated about

$371 million for them between fiscal years 1992 and 1995.

• The Federal Aviation Administration provided about $182 million to BRAC

bases through fiscal year 1995.

• The Department of Labor said it could not readily tell how much it spent

on BRAC-related activities between 1988 and 1990. It spent about

$103 million on BRAC-related activities from fiscal years 1991 through 1995.

This does not include funds distributed to states under block grants or

funds spent on DOD demonstration projects, such as projects at

Philadelphia and Charleston, because these funds are administered by the

states.

• DOD’s Office of Economic Adjustment provided $125 million to BRAC bases

from fiscal years 1988 to 1995.

In addition, DOD paid about $500 million in unemployment compensation

to civilian employees who lost their jobs from fiscal years 1990 through

1995. According to DOD, the BRAC process resulted in the elimination of

about 31,000 civilian positions during that period, which indicates that

some unemployment costs could be categorized as BRAC related.

Because much of the information necessary to prepare comprehensive and

reliable savings estimates for all the installations is no longer available, we

5

Closing Maintenance Depots: Savings, Workload, and Redistribution Issues (GAO/NSIAD-96-29,

Mar. 4, 1996.)

6

To encourage voluntary departures, DOD gave employees at closing bases up to $25,000 if they

voluntarily retired or resigned. According to its fiscal year 1995 budget submission, the Army used its

operation and maintenance account to reimburse DBOF for voluntary separation incentives in fiscal

year 1994, and it increased customer rates to pay for these costs in fiscal year 1995.

Page 9 GAO/NSIAD-96-67 Military Bases
B-270646 

are not recommending the revision of these estimates. However, should

there be future BRACs, we believe the Secretary of Defense should provide

and the services should implement guidance to ensure estimates are

comprehensive, consistent, and well-documented.

Recommendation We recommend that the Secretary of Defense, at a minimum, explain the

methodology used to estimate savings in future BRAC budget submissions.

Also, the submissions should note that all BRAC-related costs are not

included.

Agency Comments

and Our Evaluation

In commenting on a draft of this report, DOD indicated that the

inconsistencies in its budget savings estimates we cited were the result of

an attempt to give the services reporting flexibility. DOD acknowledged that

cost estimates in BRAC budget submissions do not include some costs that

were paid from other DOD accounts or from non-DOD appropriations. DOD

agreed that the BRAC budget submissions should include an advisory

statement that economic assistance and non-DOD costs are not included.

DOD also indicated that it was willing to consider including a brief

statement that the BRAC budget submissions are based on the initial cost

and savings estimates, which are subsequently refined through the use of

site surveys. However, DOD did not believe that using different

methodologies was a weakness that needed to be reported.

To clarify the inconsistencies we found among the services, we have

expanded the report to show the differences in (1) the extent to which

COBRA estimates were updated and (2) the treatment of military personnel

and CHAMPUS savings in the services’ budget estimates. We believe that

eliminating the inconsistencies in the preparation of savings estimates for

future BRACs would enhance the usefulness of the budget submissions.

However, we deleted the term weakness in describing the differences in

the various methodologies. With regards to non-DOD costs, the information

on many excluded costs is readily available. For example, information on

$781 million in BRAC-related economic assistance costs incurred through

fiscal year 1995 was readily available from various agencies. We also

believe that including information from the other agencies would give the

Congress a more comprehensive overview to use in evaluating the success

of BRAC implementation. DOD comments are presented in their entirety in

appendix I.

Page 10 GAO/NSIAD-96-67 Military Bases
B-270646 

Scope and

Methodology

We reviewed reports, documents, and legislation relevant to BRAC cost and

savings estimates. We also interviewed BRAC and Comptroller officials

from the Office of the Secretary of Defense and the military services. From

officials of the Departments of Labor and Commerce and the Federal

Aviation Administration, we obtained data on their BRAC-related costs.

Our examination of cost and savings estimates focused on BRACs I through

III because DOD had not yet developed BRAC IV estimates at the time we

initiated our review. In addition, we focused our analysis of actual costs

and savings on BRACs I and II because many BRAC III installations were still

being closed.

For our analysis of actual savings, we analyzed trend data from DOD’s

historical and current FYDP databases, which were updated through

June 1995. We identified base support costs by examining program

element titles and discussing the costs with officials in DOD’s Office of

Program Analysis and Evaluation and from the military services. We did

not assess the reliability of the FYDP database.

We also attempted to obtain information on actual base support costs for

nine closures. We selected the closures from a listing of BRACs I and II to

obtain three closing installations from each of the military services, and to

ensure each closing installation was from a different major command. For

one of the nine installations selected, base support cost data was not

available. Where possible, we obtained actual base support cost data for

the operation and maintenance account from the responsible major

command. Our estimates of base support cost reductions at closing

installations and incremental increases at gaining bases were based on

major command estimates or our analysis of trends in the closing and

gaining bases’ actual support costs. We estimated fiscal years 1995 and

1996 costs on the basis of fiscal year 1994 costs. Our analysis of the nine

bases cannot be projected to all BRAC bases. While overall trends indicate

substantial savings, it is possible that net savings may not be achieved at

an individual location.

We conducted our work from March 1995 to February 1996 in accordance

with generally accepted government auditing standards.

Page 11 GAO/NSIAD-96-67 Military Bases
B-270646 

Unless you publicly announce its contents earlier, we plan no further

distribution of this report until 10 days after its issue date. At that time, we

will send copies to the Secretaries of Defense, the Army, the Navy, and the

Air Force; the Director, Office of Management and Budget; and other

interested parties. We will also make copies available to others upon

request. If you have any questions concerning this report, please call me

on (202) 512-8412. Major contributors to this report are listed in 

appendix II.

Sincerely yours,

David R. Warren, Director

Defense Management Issues

Page 12 GAO/NSIAD-96-67 Military Bases
Page 13 GAO/NSIAD-96-67 Military Bases
Contents

Letter 1

Appendix I 

Comments From the

Department of

Defense

16

Appendix II 

Major Contributors to

This Report

22

Tables Table 1: Analysis of Base Support Cost Reduction From Fiscal

Years 1988-97

3

Table 2: Analysis of Base Support Costs, Excluding Family

Housing Costs, and Military Personnel Levels for Fiscal Years

1988 through 1997

4

Table 3: Base Support Savings and BRAC Implementation Costs

for Eight Installations

6

Abbreviations

BRAC base realignment and closure

CHAMPUS Civilian Health and Medical Program of the Uniformed

Services

COBRA Cost of Base Realignment Actions

DBOF Defense Business Operations Fund

DOD Department of Defense

FYDP Future Years Defense Program

Page 14 GAO/NSIAD-96-67 Military Bases
Page 15 GAO/NSIAD-96-67 Military Bases
Appendix I 

Comments From the Department of Defense

Page 16 GAO/NSIAD-96-67 Military Bases
Appendix I 

Comments From the Department of Defense

Now on pp. 7-8.

Page 17 GAO/NSIAD-96-67 Military Bases
Appendix I 

Comments From the Department of Defense

Page 18 GAO/NSIAD-96-67 Military Bases
Appendix I 

Comments From the Department of Defense

Now on pp. 8-10.

Page 19 GAO/NSIAD-96-67 Military Bases
Appendix I 

Comments From the Department of Defense

Now on pp. 4-6.

Page 20 GAO/NSIAD-96-67 Military Bases
Appendix I 

Comments From the Department of Defense

Now on pp. 3-4.

Now on p. 10.

Page 21 GAO/NSIAD-96-67 Military Bases
Appendix II 

Major Contributors to This Report

National Security and

International Affairs

Division, Washington,

D.C.

James Wiggins

John Klotz

Richard Meeks

Barbara Wooten

San Francisco

Regional Office

John Schaefer

Eddie Uyekawa

(709135) Page 22 GAO/NSIAD-96-67 Military Bases
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