UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS 

FOR THE TENTH CIRCUIT 

_________________________________ 

KRIS K. AGRAWAL, 

 Plaintiff - Appellant, 

v. 

COURTS OF OKLAHOMA; RICHARD 

V. OGDEN, 

 Defendants - Appellees. 

No. 18-6144 

(D.C. No. 5:18-CV-00396-D) 

(W.D. Okla.) 

_________________________________ 

ORDER AND JUDGMENT*

_________________________________ 

Before McHUGH, BALDOCK, and KELLY, Circuit Judges. 

_________________________________ 

Kris K. Agrawal appeals pro se from the district court’s dismissal of his 

complaint asserting due process claims against Richard V. Ogden, a state District 

Court judge.1

 The court held that Agrawal’s claims against Judge Ogden were barred 

 * After examining the briefs and appellate record, this panel has determined 

unanimously to honor the parties’ request for a decision on the briefs without oral 

argument. See Fed. R. App. P. 34(f); 10th Cir. R. 34.1(G). The case is therefore 

submitted without oral argument. This order and judgment is not binding precedent, 

except under the doctrines of law of the case, res judicata, and collateral estoppel. It 

may be cited, however, for its persuasive value consistent with Fed. R. App. P. 32.1 

and 10th Cir. R. 32.1. 

1

 We construe Agrawal’s claims as brought pursuant to 42 U.S.C. § 1983. 

FILED 

United States Court of Appeals 

Tenth Circuit 

March 12, 2019

Elisabeth A. Shumaker 

Clerk of Court
2 

by the doctrine of absolute judicial immunity.2

 Exercising jurisdiction under 

28 U.S.C. § 1291, we affirm. 

Judge Ogden presided in a wage claim and collection action involving 

Agrawal in Oklahoma County District Court. In his federal court complaint, Agrawal 

alleged that Judge Ogden violated his right to due process by refusing to recuse and 

by presiding over the state-court action in violation of the automatic bankruptcy stay 

pursuant to 11 U.S.C. § 362(a). Judge Odgen moved to dismiss the claims against 

him under Fed. R. Civ. P. 12(b)(1) and (6). The district court granted the motion, 

holding that Judge Odgen was entitled to absolute judicial immunity. Agrawal 

appeals the dismissal order entered July 9, 2018.3

We review de novo whether a defendant is immune from suit. Collins v. 

Daniels, __ F.3d __, 2019 WL 908645, at *8 (10th Cir. Feb. 25, 2019). 

The appropriate inquiry in determining whether a particular judge is 

immune is whether the challenged action was “judicial,” and whether at the 

time the challenged action was taken, the judge had subject matter 

jurisdiction. Stated differently, judges are liable only when they act in 

“clear absence of all jurisdiction”; they are absolutely immune even when 

their action is erroneous, malicious, or in excess of their judicial authority. 

Van Sickle v. Holloway, 791 F.2d 1431, 1435 (10th Cir. 1986) (citation omitted) (quoting 

Stump v. Sparkman, 435 U.S. 349, 356-57 (1978)). The district court held that Agrawal 

 2

 Agrawal does not challenge on appeal the district court’s dismissal of his 

claims against the other named defendant, the “Courts of Oklahoma.” 

3

 Agrawal has not appealed the district court’s order denying his 

post-judgment motion to reconsider the dismissal order. See R., Vol. 2 at 7 (notice of 

appeal designating “Order dated 7/9/18”); Fed. R. App. P. 3(c)(1)(B) (notice of 

appeal must “designate the judgment, order, or part thereof being appealed”). 
3 

alleged no facts suggesting that Judge Ogden did not act in his judicial capacity or that he 

took action in a clear absence of all jurisdiction. 

Agrawal’s appeal briefs are prolix and primarily address the merits of the wage 

claim and related collection action in state court—issues that are not before this court. 

But because he appears pro se, we have liberally construed his filings “and have tried to 

discern the kernel of the issues []he wishes to present on appeal.” de Silva v. Pitts, 

481 F.3d 1279, 1283 n.4 (10th Cir. 2007). To the extent that Agrawal does address the 

basis for the district court’s dismissal of his claims against Judge Ogden, he does not 

contend that Judge Ogden’s actions were non-judicial. He appears to argue that Judge 

Odgen acted in the clear absence of all jurisdiction because (1) he refused to recuse, 

violating Agrawal’s right to due process, and (2) he took action in the state-court case in 

violation of the automatic bankruptcy stay. Neither contention has merit. 

“[T]he scope of the judge’s jurisdiction must be construed broadly where the 

issue is the immunity of the judge.” Stump, 435 U.S. at 356. Moreover, there is “[a] 

distinction . . . between excess of jurisdiction and the clear absence of all jurisdiction 

over the subject-matter.” Id. at 356 n.6 (internal quotation marks omitted). Nothing 

in Agrawal’s complaint suggested that Judge Odgen lacked subject-matter 

jurisdiction over the state-court proceedings before him. See Van Sickle, 791 F.2d at 

1435. Indeed, Oklahoma state District Courts are courts of general jurisdiction. See

Okla. Const. art. VII, § 7(a) (“The District Court shall have unlimited original 

jurisdiction of all justiciable matters . . . and such powers of review of administrative 

action as may be provided by statute.”). 
4 

Agrawal first contends that Judge Ogden is not immune because the Judge 

deprived him of due process by continuing to participate in the state-court case while 

Agrawal’s motion to disqualify was pending. But where the court is one of general 

jurisdiction, a judge’s alleged procedural error does not render him liable in damages 

for the consequences of his judicial action. See Stump, 435 U.S. at 359-60. This is 

so even where, as here, the error is alleged to have resulted in a denial of due process. 

See id. at 359 (rejecting contention that judicial immunity does not apply where a 

judge “fail[s] to comply with elementary principles of procedural due process” 

(internal quotation marks omitted)). 

Alternatively, Agrawal argues that Judge Ogden is not immune because the 

Judge took action in the state-court case while an involuntary bankruptcy was 

pending against Agrawal.4

 This court has held that a court “lack[s] power” to enter 

an order affecting a debtor when proceedings are stayed pursuant to 11 U.S.C. 

§ 362(a), and that “any action taken in violation of the stay is void and without 

effect.” Ellis v. Consol. Diesel Elec. Corp., 894 F.2d 371, 372-73 (10th Cir. 1990). 

But an automatic bankruptcy stay did not deprive Judge Ogden of subject-matter 

jurisdiction, broadly construed, over the state-court case. Thus, even were Judge 

Ogden to take action in violation of the stay, his act would not be in a clear absence 

 4

 Judge Ogden asserts that no bankruptcy stay was in place, but he appears to 

overlook In re Agrawal, No. 16-11253 (Bankr. W.D. Okla.), an involuntary 

bankruptcy petition filed against Agrawal by a number of his creditors. That case 

was pending from April 4, 2016, through January 22, 2019. Agrawal referenced this 

bankruptcy case in an exhibit to his complaint. See R., Vol. 1 at 72-81. 
5 

of all jurisdiction, and he would therefore still be immune from suit. See Womack v. 

Mays (In re Womack), 253 B.R. 241, 242-43 (Bankr. E.D. Ark. 2000) (holding 

judicial immunity “holds true even where the action seeks damages for violation of 

the automatic stay”); Coates v. Peachtree Apartments (In re Coates), 108 B.R. 823, 

825 (Bankr. M.D. Ga. 1989) (same). 

Finally, Agrawal argues in his reply brief that he did not seek monetary 

damages from Judge Ogden in his complaint. To the extent he claims that his 

complaint sought only injunctive relief and that Judge Ogden is therefore not 

immune, see Pulliam v. Allen, 466 U.S. 522, 541-42 (1984), we decline to consider 

that contention. First, “[t]his court does not ordinarily review issues raised for the 

first time in a reply brief.” Stump v. Gates, 211 F.3d 527, 533 (10th Cir. 2000). 

Additionally, the contention is perfunctory, at best. See Murrell v. Shalala, 43 F.3d 

1388, 1389 n.2 (10th Cir. 1994) (“[P]erfunctory complaints fail to frame and develop 

an issue sufficient to invoke appellate review.”). Although we liberally construe 

Agrawal’s pro se briefs, we “will not craft a party’s arguments for him.” Perry v. 

Woodward, 199 F.3d 1126, 1141 n.13 (10th Cir. 1999).5

 5

 In any event, Agrawal cannot obtain injunctive relief against Judge Ogden 

under § 1983. See Knox v. Bland, 632 F.3d. 1290, 1292 (10th Cir. 2011) (holding 

that the Federal Courts Improvement Act of 1996 precludes injunctive relief against a 

judicial officer under § 1983); 42 U.S.C. § 1983 (providing that “in any action 

brought against a judicial officer for an act or omission taken in such officer’s 

judicial capacity, injunctive relief shall not be granted unless a declaratory decree 

was violated or declaratory relief was unavailable”). 
6 

The judgment of the district court is affirmed. Judge Ogden’s motion to 

dismiss the appeal is denied as moot. 

Entered for the Court 

Paul J. Kelly, Jr. 

Circuit Judge