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83–470 PDF 2002

S. HRG. 107–800

WEAK STATES IN AFRICA: U.S. POLICY IN

ANGOLA

HEARING

BEFORE THE

SUBCOMMITTEE ON AFRICAN AFFAIRS

OF THE

COMMITTEE ON FOREIGN RELATIONS

UNITED STATES SENATE

ONE HUNDRED SEVENTH CONGRESS

SECOND SESSION

OCTOBER 16, 2002

Printed for the use of the Committee on Foreign Relations

(

Available via the World Wide Web: http://www.access.gpo.gov/congress/senate

COMMITTEE ON FOREIGN RELATIONS

JOSEPH R. BIDEN, JR., Delaware, Chairman

PAUL S. SARBANES, Maryland

CHRISTOPHER J. DODD, Connecticut

JOHN F. KERRY, Massachusetts

RUSSELL D. FEINGOLD, Wisconsin

PAUL D. WELLSTONE, Minnesota

BARBARA BOXER, California

ROBERT G. TORRICELLI, New Jersey

BILL NELSON, Florida

JOHN D. ROCKEFELLER IV, West Virginia

JESSE HELMS, North Carolina

RICHARD G. LUGAR, Indiana

CHUCK HAGEL, Nebraska

GORDON H. SMITH, Oregon

BILL FRIST, Tennessee

LINCOLN D. CHAFEE, Rhode Island

GEORGE ALLEN, Virginia

SAM BROWNBACK, Kansas

MICHAEL B. ENZI, Wyoming

ANTONY J. BLINKEN, Staff Director

PATRICIA A. MCNERNEY, Republican Staff Director

SUBCOMMITTEE ON AFRICAN AFFAIRS

RUSSELL D. FEINGOLD, Wisconsin, Chairman

CHRISTOPHER J. DODD, Connecticut

BARBARA BOXER, California

JOHN D. ROCKEFELLER IV, West Virginia

BILL FRIST, Tennessee

SAM BROWNBACK, Kansas

GORDON H. SMITH, Oregon

(II)

CONTENTS

Page

Feingold, Hon. Russell D., U.S. Senator from Wisconsin, prepared statement .. 2

Kansteiner, Hon. Walter H., Assistant Secretary of State for African Affairs,

Department of State, Washington, DC ............................................................... 3

Prepared statement .......................................................................................... 5

Additional questions submitted for the record ............................................... 33

Global Witness, prepared statement submitted for the record ............................ 14

Kramer, David, attorney, Baird Holm, Omaha, NE ............................................. 23

Press release of David Kramer on Angola Political Environment ................ 27

Rostrup, Dr. Morten, president, Medecins Sans Frontieres/Doctors Without

Borders, Brussels, Belgium ................................................................................. 16

Prepared statement .......................................................................................... 19

(III)

(1)

WEAK STATES IN AFRICA: U.S. POLICY IN

ANGOLA

WEDNESDAY, OCTOBER 16, 2002

U.S. SENATE, SUBCOMMITTEE ON AFRICAN AFFAIRS, COMMITTEE ON FOREIGN RELATIONS, Washington, DC.

The subcommittee met, pursuant to notice, at 10:05 a.m., in room

SD–419, Dirksen Senate Office Building, Hon. Russell D. Feingold

(chairman of the subcommittee), presiding.

Present: Senator Feingold.

Senator FEINGOLD. I call this hearing to order. Good morning.

Today, the Subcommittee on African Affairs will focus on the

case of Angola. This hearing marks the last in a series of hearings

focusing on weak states of Africa and looking at our policy in those

states with fresh eyes in the wake of the horrific attacks of September 11, 2001.

My purpose in convening this series has been to try to draw attention to some of the manifestations of states’ weaknesses in various parts of Africa, both in terms of humanitarian and economic

collapse and in terms of such phenomena as piracy, illicit air transport networks, and trafficking in arms, gemstones, and people. I

wanted to call attention to these issues and to explore long-term

policy options for changing the context in these states and addressing the relationship between criminal activity, corruption, and humanitarian crisis to help make these states less appealing to criminal opportunists.

Earlier this year, the subcommittee took up the cases of Somalia,

the Democratic Republic of the Congo, and Liberia. Today, as we

turn our attention to Angola, we consider a state that, unlike the

DRC or Somalia, does not have trouble garnering attention at high

levels in the United States. Angola’s impressive oil resources and

the significant presence of the United States private sector in the

country pretty much ensure that Angola is not in danger of falling

off the policy map. In addition, the end of Angola’s long and costly

civil war presents a critically important opportunity for meaningful

change and progress in improving the lives of the Angolan people

and the capacity of the Angolan state.

In fact, I would say it seems that Angola’s weakness is qualitatively different from that of other states in this series. The Angolan Government functions well enough to host the international

private sector and functions well enough to have emerged the victor in the civil war. And yet malnutrition and infant mortality

rates in Angola are shocking, and many of the Angola people have

2

no access to basic services. News from Angola in recent years has

often featured prominent examples of corruption and of sanctions

busting activities, calling into question the state’s regulatory capacity. The state is weak, but in its own distinct way.

Confronted by these contradictory characteristics, it is not at all

clear how U.S. policy will proceed. How will the United States continue to protect U.S. business interests while simultaneously pushing the Angolan Government to clean up the rampant corruption

that has inspired an international campaign to improve transparency throughout the developing world known as ‘‘Publish What

You Pay’’? How can the United States work with other members

of the international community to take advantage of the peace to

improve the conditions of the Angolan people while still impressing

upon the Angolan Government that it has responsibilities in these

sectors, as well?

I remember very well visiting a camp in Angola for the internally

displaced, in 1994, on my first to Africa. Then I visited again in

1999, and I saw displaced people who were even worse off. Both

visits were powerful, but it was the realization that this degree of

hardship and suffering was not really temporary in any meaningful

sense that made the most powerful impression of all. I cannot

imagine how an outcome that could possibly be in the United

States’ interests could emerge from that kind of misery.

[The prepared statement of Senator Feingold follows:]

PREPARED STATEMENT OF SENATOR RUSSELL D. FEINGOLD

I call this hearing to order. Today, the Subcommittee on African Affairs will focus

on the case of Angola. This hearing marks the last in a series of hearings focusing

on weak states in Africa, and looking at our policy in those states with fresh eyes

in the wake of the horrific attacks of September 11, 2001. My purpose in convening

the series has been to draw attention to some of the manifestations of states’ weakness in various parts of Africa—both in terms of humanitarian and economic collapse and in terms of such phenomenon as piracy, illicit air transport networks, and

trafficking in arms, gemstones, and people. I wanted to call attention to these

issues, and to explore long-term policy options for changing the context in these

states—and addressing the relationship between criminal activity, corruption, and

humanitarian crisis—to help make these states less appealing to criminal opportunists.

Earlier this year, the Subcommittee took up the cases of Somalia, the Democratic

Republic of the Congo, and Liberia. Today, as we turn our attention to Angola, we

consider a state that, unlike the DRC or Somalia, does not have trouble garnering

attention at high levels in the United States. Angola’s impressive oil resources, and

the significant presence of the U.S. private sector in the country, ensure that Angola

is not in danger of falling off of the policy map. In addition, the end of Angola’s long

and costly civil war presents a critically important opportunity for meaningful

change and progress in improving the lives of the Angolan people and the capacity

of the Angolan state.

In fact, it seems that Angola’s weakness is qualitatively different from that of the

other states in the series. The Angolan government functions well enough to host

the international private sector, and functions well enough to have emerged the victor in the civil war. And yet malnutrition and infant mortality rates in Angola are

shocking, and many of the Angolan people have no access to basic services. News

from Angola in recent years has often featured prominent examples of corruption

and of sanctions-busting activities, calling into question the state’s regulatory capacity. The state is weak, but in its own distinct way.

Confronted by these contradictory characteristics, it is not at all clear how U.S.

policy will proceed. How will the United States continue to protect U.S. business interests while simultaneously pushing the Angolan government to clean up the rampant corruption that has inspired an international campaign to improve transparency

throughout the developing world, known as ‘‘Publish What You Pay’’? How can the

U.S. work with other members of the international community to take advantage

3

of the peace to improve the conditions of the Angolan people, while still impressing

upon the Angolan government that it has responsibilities in these sectors as well?

I remember visiting a camp for the internally displaced in 1994 on my first trip

to Africa. Then I visited again in 1999, and saw displaced people who were even

worse off. Both visits were powerful, but it was the realization that this degree of

hardship and suffering was not really temporary in any meaningful sense that made

the most powerful impression of all. I cannot imagine how an outcome that could

possibly be in the United States’ interests could emerge from that kind of misery.

Senator FEINGOLD. I know that Senator Frist is certainly going

to attempt to make it here, as the ranking member of the subcommittee, and, as I always want to indicate on the record, he is

such a committed advocate for Africa, and, if he is able to make

it, we’ll certainly turn to him for any remarks he wants to deliver.

But I do look forward to exploring these issues with our witnesses today. The Assistant Secretary of State for African Affairs,

Walter Kansteiner, is with us. He has made it a tremendous priority of his to be available to this subcommittee over the past year,

and I appreciate all of his efforts. Welcome back, Secretary, and

please proceed with your testimony.

STATEMENT OF HON. WALTER H. KANSTEINER, ASSISTANT

SECRETARY OF STATE FOR AFRICAN AFFAIRS, DEPARTMENT OF STATE, WASHINGTON, DC

Mr. KANSTEINER. Thank you, Mr. Chairman, very much, and it’s

a privilege to be back up in front of your subcommittee.

Your assessment on Angola is exactly the way we see it. This is

a different category than some of the other failed states that we

have looked at, although I would say it probably has been in that

failed state category, or close to it, during its war years. It is now

emerging as a potential leader for the region, and that is very exciting.

The international community has a historic opportunity to assist

Angola in following the right path after more than two decades of

that civil war. Secretary Powell witnessed firsthand the commitment of the Angolans in securing that peace and achieving national

reconciliation during his visit to Angola last month. We believe

that we should seize this opportunity to transform Angola from a

war-torn country to one that is stable and has an economic future

for all its people.

Our efforts in Angola are aimed at addressing humanitarian

needs, improving good governance, and building the private sector,

and help democracy flourish in a postwar environment.

Since April of this year, more than 84,000 UNITA soldiers have

reported with their families to 35 quartering areas. That is probably double what we had expected. Nearly 5,000 of these soldiers

have been selected for integration into the Angolan Armed Forces,

the FAA, or National Police. The remainder have now been decommissioned. The demobilization process has gone relatively smoothly, and effective reintegration over the long term now must include

the assistance of local Angolan NGOs and us, the international

community.

Angola, in concert with this international community, must now

find ways to consolidate this peace, achieve genuine democracy,

protect the rights of its citizens, and better the lives of all of its

people. Part of that effort will be through the Joint Commission;

4

and the United States, as a member of the troika, will play an active role in ensuring that the Joint Commission lives up to its Security Council mandate, again, a commitment that Secretary Powell highlighted in his visit.

As one of the troika members, we continue to exert diplomatic

pressure on the United Nations, on UNITA, on the MPLA, stressing the need for the Joint Commission’s work to develop a comprehensive, inclusive political framework for the country. We continue to train civil society actors so as to strengthen their ability

to influence Angolan Government policy and to represent the needs

of their constituents. We will also assist Angolans to successfully

make the painful transition from a closed, one-party system to,

hopefully, a truly pluralistic, open party democracy.

Strengthening the protection of human rights is also critically

important to establishing long-term peace. During the civil war, as

you know, Senator, grave human rights violations by the police, by

the FAA, by UNITA occurred, and occurred far too frequently. With

the advent of peace, it is imperative for the international community to work with the police, to work with the military and with

ordinary Angolans to improve the understanding of international

human rights norms.

Through our Democracy and Human Rights Fund, the United

States supports human rights education and training programs for

ordinary Angolans and supports indigenous NGOs in their efforts

to educate Angolans on human rights. For instance, we have a very

interesting legal assistance program providing legal and attorneys’ help in court settings. The judicial system is not at all ideal, so we

want to not only increase the capacity for the judicial system, but

we also want to provide legal guidance for those people that, in

fact, are charged.

We also have an interesting new program with a Luanda NGO

with prisons in trying to improve prison conditions, just some of

the NGO-type work that we are trying to do in this thing called

‘‘capacity building’’ to make the human rights community that

much stronger in the country.

While the Angolan civil war is now over, it does leave numerous

humanitarian challenges, as well as human rights challenges. We

have some 4.3 million Angolans that are internally displaced as a

result of the years of fighting; 1.9 million receive ongoing humanitarian assistance. Compounding these concerns are the 80,000

former UNITA combatants and the 300,000 UNITA family members that still remain in those 35 quartering areas.

The United States has been supporting the World Food Program

[WFP] feeding efforts in quartering areas throughout the country,

and we will continue to provide food, commodities, and food donations through the USAID Office of Food for Peace. We had a number of airlifts, actually, three airlifts and two sea lifts, of emergency

food for those quartering areas in the last few months, and those

included everything from health kits to blankets to shelters to

tents. And most of those quartering areas still need assistance, and

we are trying to encourage the Angolan Government to provide

that assistance.

When it is necessary, the international community is willing to

step in, but, again, it is the Angolan Government’s first responsiVerDate 11-MAY-2000 13:16 Dec 23, 2002 Jkt 000000 PO 00000 Frm 00008 Fmt 6633 Sfmt 6602 83470 SFORELA1 PsN: SFORELA1
5

bility. That’s where it lies first. We’re willing to help. We want to

make sure that they are doing it as effectively as possible, and we

will continue to keep a very close eye on that.

Resettlement and reintegration of demobilized UNITA combatants and family members is also important: internally displaced

persons of all political sizes and shapes. They need to go home.

That groundwork to get them home has started. Tools, implements,

farm equipment, agricultural extension services, all of that is needed. On top of that, they need to be assured that when they get

home to their farm areas—and most of these people are farmers—

that they are de-mined—the areas are de-mined. That they are not

going to have to plant their mealie or cassava in an area that in

fact still has mines. So we have a large de-mining project ahead of

us, too. All told, for 2002, we have spent about $110 million on

food, supplies, agricultural, HIV awareness, and HIV prevention.

Consolidating peace in Angola requires, not only addressing the

humanitarian crisis, but also immediate, serious consideration of

the long-term economic development. A nation rich in both oil and

diamonds, Angola has the resources needed to greatly improve the

lives of its people, as you suggested in your opening remarks. This

is a remarkable country when it comes to its natural resources that

the good Lord has given it. The government must firmly put aside

its statist past and embrace a free market system led by the private sector, and a private sector that is willing to invest in their

own country.

Angola must now begin to tackle the problems of corruption—and

corruption is endemic at all levels. We will continue to encourage

the Angolan Government to implement and enforce anti-corruption

measures. We’re helping train indigenous NGOs in how to track

and spot corruption and how to ‘‘blow the whistle,’’ if you will. We

are also hopeful that multipartyism, a pluralistic system, will open

up the field for criticism of those government officials that are participating in corruption. There’s nothing better than an opposing

political party to blow the whistle. And so we think that part of

this pluralistic system is, in fact, an anticorruption angle.

Mr. Chairman, the Angolan civil war is at an end. Our policy

must now focus on the significant challenges associated with consolidating that peace. We see this as a window, a window of opportunity, and we look forward to working with you on how to let the

Angolan people really take advantage of this very unique opportunity in their history.

Thank you very much.

[The prepared statement of Mr. Kansteiner follows:]

PREPARED STATEMENT OF HON. WALTER H. KANSTEINER, ASSISTANT SECRETARY OF

STATE FOR AFRICAN AFFAIRS, DEPARTMENT OF STATE

Mr. Chairman, Members of the Committee. Thank you for inviting me to testify

today on the administration’s policy towards Angola.

The international community has a historic opportunity to assist Angola in following the right path after more than two decades of civil war and poor governance.

Secretary Powell witnessed first hand the commitment of Angolans to securing

peace and achieving national reconciliation and development during his visit there

in September. The Administration believes that we should seize this opportunity to

transform Angola from a war-torn nation to a center for stability and economic

growth in southern Africa. Angola is blessed with tremendous natural resources,

6

which can assist the country’s positive transformation. But they must be used to

benefit all Angolans and the region.

Angola will have a prominent role to play in international affairs and in both the

southern and central African regions. For the next two years, Angola will be seated

as the African regional representative on the United Nations Security Council. The

Government of Angola has just assumed the presidency of the Southern Africa Development Community.

Our efforts in Angola are aimed at addressing humanitarian needs, improving

governance, and building the private sector and democracy in the new post-war environment—all themes stressed with the Angolans during recent visits and underscored in our on-going diplomatic dialogue and assistance programs.

As you are well aware, the February 22 death of the National Union for the Total

Independence of Angola (UNITA) leader Jonas Savimbi and the subsequent April

4 demobilization accords ended a brutal civil war that cost one million lives and

squandered billions of dollars.

Since that time, more than 84,000 UNITA soldiers have reported with their families to 35 quartering areas and relinquished approximately 35,000 weapons. Nearly

5,000 of these soldiers have been selected for integration into the Angolan Armed

Forces (FAA) or National Police. The remainder were decommissioned on August 2.

The demobilization process has gone smoothly, and effective reintegration over the

long-term must include the assistance of local Angolan NGOs and the international

community.

This current success is due to the strong political will of both the Angolan Government and UNITA to finally bring the conflict to a definitive end. Angolans on both

sides are tired of fighting and of the destruction that has characterized the country

since its independence. The genuine desire to find a lasting peace and begin the

process of national reconciliation was stated when President Bush met with President dos Santos on February 26 for the Southern Africa Mini-Summit and evident

during Secretary Powell’s September visit. For the first time, ordinary Angolans and

politicians on both sides sincerely believe that peace has arrived to stay.

Angola, in concert with the international community, must now find ways to consolidate this peace, achieve genuine democracy, protect the rights of its citizens, and

better the lives of the Angolan people. This process has begun through the reconstitution of the Lusaka Protocol’s Joint Commission under the chair of the UN Secretary General’s new Special Representative Ibrahim Gambari. As a member of the

Joint Commission’s troika, the United States will play an active role in ensuring

that the Joint Commission lives up to its Security Council mandate, a commitment

highlighted by Secretary Powell in Luanda in September. We view the Joint Commission as a vital vehicle to help create the political framework that will enable the

advent of multi-party democracy in Angola.

To that end, any attempts to place artificial time limits or restrictions on the

body’s work must be avoided. The Joint Commission’s efforts must produce a comprehensive political framework that benefits all Angolans, not just UNITA and the

governing Popular Movement for the Liberation of Angola (MPLA).

The United States intends to remain engaged to help Angola achieve this peace.

As a troika member, we continue to exert diplomatic pressure on the United Nations, UNITA, and the MPLA, stressing the need for the Joint Commission’s work

to develop a comprehensive, inclusive political framework for the country. We continue to train civil society actors, so as to strengthen their ability to influence Angolan government policy and to represent the needs of their constituents. We will assist Angolans to successfully make the often painful transition from a closed one

party state to an open democracy, in training them on the role of political parties

in a democracy, encouraging them to engage with local civil society organizations,

and holding public hearings on proposed legislation. We also plan to train political

parties, including UNITA to transform it from an armed rebel movement to a constructive opposition political party. And, we will work in concert with other donors

to fund electoral preparations and ensure that free and fair multiparty elections

occur.

Strengthened protection of human rights is critically important to establishing

long-term peace. During the civil war, grave human rights violations by the police,

the FAA, and UNITA forces occurred. With the advent of peace, it is imperative for

the international community to work with the police, the military and ordinary Angolans to improve understanding of international human rights norms and standards. Such efforts under the leadership of the United Nations have begun. Through

our Democracy and Human Rights Fund, the United States supports human rights

education and training programs for ordinary Angolans and supports indigenous

non-governmental organizations (NGOs) in their efforts to educate Angolans on

human rights and pressure the government to improve its human rights records.

7

Similarly, human rights remain a key component of our on-going dialogue with the

government. Equally, the Angolan judicial system must be reformed to ensure its

independence and accessibility to all. We continue to pressure the government to include judicial reform as a critical component of its democratic transformation and

to provide adequate resources for the court system to function effectively.

The role of the Angolan Armed Forces, the FAA, will have to be carefully considered. Our engagement with the FAA will need to increase, primarily through increased diplomatic contacts with FAA leadership. With manpower strength of

around 100,000, the government will need to define for the FAA a new mission in

a post-conflict Angola that supports the political and economic development process.

The FAA can also contribute to regional peacekeeping. The United States European

Command (EUCOM) will invite General Cruz Neto and a delegation to visit the

EUCOM Headquarters to receive briefings. The goal is to build a rapport to allow

U.S. DOD officials and military personnel access and influence with Angolan civilian and military officials to help them to develop an apolitical and transparent institution. Training in civil-military relations, defense budgeting, and human rights are

priorities in our new engagement with the FAA, an engagement that could benefit

from a small carefully crafted expanded International Military Education and Training (E-IMET) program for Angola.

While the Angolan civil war is over, it leaves numerous humanitarian challenges

behind that if not adequately addressed could result in renewed societal conflict. 4.3

million Angolans are internally displaced as a result of the fighting, and 1.9 million

receive ongoing humanitarian assistance. The end of the war has opened previously

inaccessible areas to humanitarian organizations, and an additional 800,000 people

there may require assistance by year’s end. Compounding these concerns are the

80,000 former UNITA combatants and 300,000 family members that remain in 35

quartering areas and are dependent on assistance. The United States has been supporting WFP feeding efforts in quartering areas through on-going donations of food

commodities by the USAID Office of Food for Peace. In addition, the USAID Office

of Foreign Disaster Assistance arranged three airlifts and two sealifts of emergency

non-food items, including blankets, plastic sheeting, water containers, soap, kitchen

sets, and health kits to the quartering areas valued at over $2 million.

The United States has been at the forefront of responding to the humanitarian crisis with over $750 million in aid since 1990. Over half of our 2002 humanitarian

assistance to Angola is food aid for vulnerable populations. Provided by the USAID

Office of Food for Peace and USDA, it is valued at nearly $70 million. In addition,

the USAID Office of Foreign Disaster Assistance is providing over $20 million in

emergency support, including over $2 million for the quartering areas. The State

Department’s Bureau of Population, Migration, and Refugee Affairs is providing $9.9 million in earmarked funding to UNHCR to assist nearly 465,000 Angolan refugees in neighboring countries.

Resettlement and reintegration of demobilized UNITA combatants and family

members, internally displaced persons, and refugees are necessary to begin the

country’s economic recovery and lay the groundwork for elections. Success is dependent upon adequate support to enable Angolans to start over when they return

home. In response, over $3 million in the Office of Foreign Disaster Assistance’s

budget will be used to procure tools and seeds for some of the 500,000 internally

displaced that the UN Office for the Coordination of Humanitarian Affairs estimates

will begin to return home this year. The USAID Office of Food for Peace, through

its contribution to WFP, is supporting resettlement activities estimated at $23 million in FY 02. Additionally, the Office of Food for Peace is working to develop a resettlement program with a consortium of private voluntary organizations for FY 03.

The Department of State’s Humanitarian Demining Program is contributing $6.8

million this year to ensure the safety of returnees and other vulnerable groups.

This is not to suggest that humanitarian assistance does not continue without

challenges, particularly in the quartering areas. The Angolan Government failed to

deliver much of its promised assistance, necessitating rapid international intervention to ameliorate deteriorating conditions. While donor aid has been provided, bureaucratic delays, lack of transparency, and a lack of adequate Angolan logistical

support have delayed shipments and led to worsening conditions in a number of the

quartering areas. We are pressuring the Angolan government to meet its commitments and ensure that assistance reaches intended recipients in a timely fashion.

Consolidating peace in Angola requires not only addressing the humanitarian crisis, but also immediate, serious consideration of the long-term economic development of the country. A nation rich in both oil and diamonds, Angola has the resources needed to greatly improve the lives of its people. Angola has the potential

to develop far stronger commercial ties with the United States and our companies,

and to become in Africa and internationally a substantial and reliable supplier of

8

energy. But the government must firmly eschew its statist past and embrace a freemarket system led by private sector investment. And vast natural resources can be

a magnate for problems of transparency and revenue use. Angola must begin now

to tackle the problem of corruption at all levels and improve accountability. We will

continue to encourage the Angolan government to implement and enforce anti-corruption measures. Training of indigenous NGOs, financing for Voice of America’s

Angola programs, and planned support to the independent print media are important strategies to strengthen our partners in this fight.

International donors, NGOs, and the international financial institutions remain

seriously concerned by the large amounts of off-budget government revenue and expenditures in Angola. The Angolan Government must work with the international

community to bring such financial transactions on budget and to negotiate a new

program with the International Monetary Fund (IMF). In addition, the Angolan government must begin to increase its investment in the well-being of its people and

the country’s infrastructure to ensure that Angolans receive the peace dividend that

they deserve. We continue to underscore to the Angolan government that both actions are necessary precursors to any significant international reconstruction efforts.

Mr. Chairman, Members of the Committee, the Angolan civil war is at an end.

Our policy now must focus on the significant challenges associated with consolidating the peace and effecting true national reconciliation. We will press forward,

in partnership with all elements of Angolan society and the international community to build democracy, protect human rights, end the humanitarian crisis, and set

Angola on the path towards development and economic growth. In this way, we can

begin to strengthen both the Angolan state and the Angolan people. The Administration looks forward to working with Congress to that end.

Senator FEINGOLD. Thank you, Mr. Kansteiner, for your always

clear presentation, and we appreciate your help with this. I have

a series of followup questions.

Would you go over to what extent the April 2002 cease-fire agreement has actually been implemented, which provisions have not

yet been carried out, and what are the main implementation issues

that remain?

Mr. KANSTEINER. The military demobilization component is essentially done. That is, the UNITA troops have come to the quartering areas. They have been disarmed. They have been demobilized. On August 2, those that were not going to go into the Armed

Forces or the police were, in fact, decommissioned. Uniforms are

gone. They are civilians.

Those UNITA forces that will be integrated into the armed services, including the police, that process is just beginning, so we’ve

got a ways to go on that, and we’re watching that carefully, because that integration of UNITA forces into the FAA, into the police, is important. It acts as that balance. And it’s also symbolic

that former fighters are now actually serving in the same Armed

Forces.

A slightly different aspect, of course, is the internally displaced

people. There are some 4 million, as I mentioned, and that is going

to be a tremendous task to get those people reintegrated. We’re

talking almost a third of the population of Angola is not living

where they want to live.

Senator FEINGOLD. Let me follow with a few more specific questions concerning the demobilization. Maybe you’ve already answered this, but I want to be sure. How many UNITA ex-combatants and related military personnel were demobilized?

Mr. KANSTEINER. Well, I think we’ve got about 5,000 going into

the—5,000 will be reintegrated, and so about 70, say, 70,000 to

75,000 were demobilized.

9

Senator FEINGOLD. Do any of the UNITA personnel remain

armed?

Mr. KANSTEINER. No. No, UNITA personnel. They have all been

disarmed.

Senator FEINGOLD. How many former UNITA personnel have

been integrated into the Angolan Armed Forces and to the National

Police respectively? I think you talked about that some.

Mr. KANSTEINER. Yes. And again, that is a process that is ongoing, and it’s nearly 5,000.

Senator FEINGOLD. That’s the 5,000?

Mr. KANSTEINER. They have been selected. That integration is

now just beginning.

Senator FEINGOLD. Is that a combined figure for the Armed

Forces and the National Police?

Mr. KANSTEINER. That is combined. That is for both the FAA, the

Angolan Armed Forces, as well as the National Police.

Senator FEINGOLD. What’s the breakdown?

Mr. KANSTEINER. A hundred to the police and the——

Senator FEINGOLD. Dominantly the——

Mr. KANSTEINER. Yes, dominantly to the Armed Forces.

Senator FEINGOLD. OK. How many and what kinds of weapons

have been surrendered by UNITA? And what has been the disposition of those weapons?

Mr. KANSTEINER. There have been all sorts and sizes and shapes

of weapons, probably not as many as we had thought per man, but

there were more UNITA forces than we had anticipated. A lot of

them, quite frankly, were not armed. There were a lot of porters

and foot soldiers that did not have weapons. But plenty of them

did. About 35,000 total arms were collected, and I would guess the

majority of that would be AK–47s.

Senator FEINGOLD. You talked about the conditions in the socalled ‘‘family reception areas,’’ FRAs, in which the demobilized

UNITA ex-combatants and their dependents are quartered. How

many are in the FRAs, and who is responsible for provisioning

them with food and medicine? Are they adequately supplied? And

until when and on the basis of what criteria will these FRAs remain in operation?

Mr. KANSTEINER. Well, that’s a very good question and a very

timely one. There are some 300,000 UNITA members and their

families in these quartering areas. We had gotten reports a couple

of weeks ago that the government was considering closing these

camps and basically encouraging, I suppose would be the diplomatic word, those folks to return to their homes. Clearly, they

weren’t ready to be returned to their homes. The preparation to receive them in their homes had not been made. Again, back to the

de-mining issue, tools, and implements, agricultural extensions,

any kind of skilled training had not taken place. So we, in fact,

demarched the Angolan Government to please refrain from closing

these. They have refrained from closing them. They are still open,

and these quartering areas are still up and running.

They are currently being supplied. But, again, you know, these

are the same quartering areas that we had to send in some emergency shipments to, back some months ago. We’re concerned about

it, and we’re watching it closely.

10

Senator FEINGOLD. Are they adequately supplied now?

Mr. KANSTEINER. They are, yes.

Senator FEINGOLD. What is the Angolan Government actually

doing to support the reintegration of ex-combatants? Say a little bit

more about what they are doing.

Mr. KANSTEINER. Well, they have set up a new ministry for basically reintegration of their population, both ex-combatants and internally displaced people. They have a road map. They have a

game plan. They are starting to work with the U.N. on how that

road map is going to actually be implemented. We are encouraging

them to work with the U.N. This is a task that’s going to require

a lot of helpful hands, and we think the U.N. can be helpful.

My analysis is that the Angolan Government has the will to do

this. They have the political will. It’s an enormous task, and I

think we need to help them with the actual implementation of it.

Senator FEINGOLD. What about humanitarian assistance? To

what extent and at what funding level is the Angolan Government

actually providing humanitarian assistance to its population?

Mr. KANSTEINER. They are providing significant humanitarian

assistance, and we have explained to them—in fact, Secretary Powell explained to them, in no uncertain terms, that the more that

they provide for their own people, they will actually get large dividends from the international community, because the international

community will see that they are willing to spend their own money

on their own people, and that encourages donors like us to do likewise. If they are stingy and withholding and looking like they are

playing politics with their humanitarian assistance, we’re all going

to be that much more reluctant to come in. And they got it. And,

in fact, in the last few weeks it seems as if they are moving toward

bigger procurement, more frequent procurement.

Senator FEINGOLD. Is there some kind of quantification of this?

Do you have numbers?

Mr. KANSTEINER. About $52 million in food stuffs and basic supplies in the last probably—well, probably since April, you could say.

Senator FEINGOLD. Let’s talk a bit about the situation in

Cabinda. Has the end of the war with UNITA led the Angolan Government to focus its efforts on definitively defeating the insurgency

in Cabinda? To what extent does instability in Cabinda affect the

rest of Angola or neighboring African states?

Mr. KANSTEINER. Well, the instability in Cabinda has been a

long-term problem, as you know. And a few months ago, there were

attacks on some LIANS THAT WERE VERY, VERY CONCERNING. THE

SECURITY APPARATUS OF THE FAA DID GO UP INTO CABINDA IN A

SIGNIFICANT SORT OF WAY. IT SEEMS AS IF THE SECURITY SITUATION

IN CABINDA IS IMPROVED, IT’S GOTTEN BETTER.

Cabinda is also sensitive in the sense that it is in proximity to

some of the oil-producing areas just offshore. Cabinda is probably

the single largest producing block right now. Future blocks will end

up producing more, it is our guess, but right now that is the major

production source. So for the Angolans, it has a real national security import. But also it is one that has historically been problematic

for them.

Senator FEINGOLD. Let me talk about another obviously important resource in Angola. Efforts to curtail sources of financial supVerDate 11-MAY-2000 13:16 Dec 23, 2002 Jkt 000000 PO 00000 Frm 00014 Fmt 6633 Sfmt 6602 83470 SFORELA1 PsN: SFORELA1
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port to UNITA focused a great deal of attention, of course, on Angola’s diamond sector. What can you tell me about recent efforts to

regulate the diamond sector in Angola? And what do these efforts

tell us about the prospects for reform in other sectors?

Mr. KANSTEINER. We actually have some fairly good news on the

diamonds. The Angolan Government has been very cooperative

with the Kimberly Process. The Kimberly Process, as you know, is

now close to being signed in Switzerland early next month. The Angolan Government is moving to register small-scale miners and the

middlemen who trade diamonds and establish basically a single

channel diamond marketing system.

This is one of those cases where a single channel marketing system is maybe not all bad. We’re often talking about we need proliferation of the private sector, we want competition, and all that;

but, in this particular commodity, it will be a more controlling influence, and we think it’s probably a good step.

But, basically, they are taking some actions. And, most importantly, they’re willing to participate in the international Kimberly

Process.

Senator FEINGOLD. It’s my understanding that Angola is not currently eligible for African Growth and Opportunity Act [AGOA]

benefits. Of course, one of the eligibility requirements for gaining

these benefits relates to a subject that you’ve discussed already,

anticorruption measures. What steps must the Government of Angola take in this regard before the administration will consider

changing Angola’s AGOA status?

Mr. KANSTEINER. Well, as you know, there is no one criterion

that gets you in or keeps you out, but there are a number of factors. The corruption factor is clearly one. Human rights, we’re concerned that there really isn’t that much of a institutional capacity

to implement good human rights policies.

We also have economic measures that we are looking for: privatization, for instance. The Angolan Government has committed itself

to a privatization process, but we haven’t seen a whole lot of traction there. So I think, collectively, we’ll have to look at all of them.

Senator FEINGOLD. What’s the status of the International Monetary Fund’s oil diagnostic audit? What actions, if any, is the Angolan Government taking to improve fiscal transparency and increase

public accountability?

Mr. KANSTEINER. Well, I think there is some good news and bad

news, Mr. Chairman. The good news is that the Central Bank is

going through an audit system, and that’s good. It’s going well. It’s

working. Part of that, and in conjunction with that Central Bank

auditing, is the oil diagnostic, which, of course, is to look at the

cash-flow of the oil funds, where that revenue goes and how it’s

generated and how it flows and where it ends up. There are a number of private accounting firms that have been tasked with this,

given a contract to do this, along with the IMF, and that diagnostic

is seeming to be slowed. That study is seeming to be going very

slowly.

Why? I would say it has to do with the Angolan Government

opening up their books and showing exactly how that money flows.

Some of the oil diagnostic is complete. I mean, they have done

some work. There’s just some missing pieces of information that

12

are very important, and the IMF, the United States, and, I say, the

international community, writ large, is pushing hard to get these

blanks filled in.

I might just add, Senator, that there is also a piece of good news

on the customs receipts. The Port of Luanda was long notorious for

its ‘‘falling off the back of the truck’’ problem. You know, something

like 25 percent of all goods that flowed through the Port of Luanda

came up missing at one point. This was some 5 or 6 or 10 years

ago. That has drastically improved with the implementation of

Crown Agents, the British private firm that is now actually running Angola’s customs receipts at the Port of Luanda.

Senator FEINGOLD. When did that start?

Mr. KANSTEINER. About 4 months ago.

It took them awhile, as I understand it, to get up and running,

but they are now in the process of becoming the customs agents for

the country of Angola. It’s good.

Senator FEINGOLD. Well, I certainly recall specific comments

about this on both of my trips there, and I’m pleased to hear that

at least something is happening in this regard.

Why is the United States maintaining sanctions on UNITA at

this point? And what benchmarks would have to be met before the

sanctions would be lifted?

Mr. KANSTEINER. Well, that’s a very timely question. We are now

working with our colleagues in the U.N. at the Security Council,

with our colleagues in the troika, to remove those sanctions. The

notion that we’re asking Angola to be a open, pluralistic,

multiparty country and then have international sanctions against

one party is schizophrenic and doesn’t make any sense. So we need

to go ahead and remove those travel sanctions, those financial

sanctions, what they call ‘‘diplomatic sanctions,’’ which essentially

allows a political party to have an office overseas. We will be pushing and working with our U.N. colleagues to have those removed.

Senator FEINGOLD. Are you saying there are essentially no

benchmarks that have to be met?

Mr. KANSTEINER. Well, there are a couple of other sanctions that

we are concerned about. One is the arms sanctions, and we think

it’s probably wise to let those stay on. Political parties don’t need

weapons. So it kind of goes back to the notion of, well, what is good

for pluralism? What is good for multipartyism in Angola? Guns

aren’t. But certainly a party needs finances.

Senator FEINGOLD. I’ve heard about that.

Mr. KANSTEINER. Exactly. And they certainly need to be able to

travel. So with the benchmark being what makes sense for an open

political system in Angola, that’s what we’re measuring against.

Senator FEINGOLD. What are the Angolan Government’s primary

post-conflict reconstruction priorities now that the civil war is no

longer the government’s top priority? What is the top thing on their

agenda?

Mr. KANSTEINER. Well, it is exactly the question that Secretary

Powell asked President dos Santos last month. And I was pleased—

surprised, but pleased, to hear that President dos Santos’ response

was, you know, ‘‘This country is a former Marxist, statist, centrally

planned economy. What we’re trying to move to is an open market,

13

private sector-dominated economy, but I don’t have a private sector. There is no private sector in Angola.’’ And so his No. 1 economic/development issue clearly was, ‘‘How

do I build an entrepreneurial class in my country? How do I take

what’s always been owned and run by the government and actually

put it into private ownership?’’ And it was good that he clearly recognized this as a problem and wanted it to be a priority.

Senator FEINGOLD. You talked a little bit about the FRAs, and

I believe you suggested that the government, for awhile, was considering closing them down, I think prematurely. But clearly one

of the long-term goals, when you’re talking about a third of the

population, has to be resettling these people that have suffered so

much. Yet has the Angolan Government made any real efforts in

regard to preparing for that?

Mr. KANSTEINER. They’re at the very early stages, quite frankly,

and that preparation is everything from the de-mining, the infrastructure—i.e., roads. There has to be an agricultural extension—

agricultural assistance of some kind. You cannot expect these people, although they are people of the land and know how to grow

and know how to farm on a subsistence basis, they still are going

to need the basic implements to do their trade. And the Angolan

Government is just now wresting with how they get those things

that are needed in the hands of those that need to go back home

and start their lives again.

Senator FEINGOLD. Well, let’s sort of tie the last two questions

together, because you did indicate what President dos Santos said

about his priority apparently being a very important issue of developing a legitimate private sector. But did Secretary Powell get a

sense that President dos Santos believes that humanitarian issues

and basic social services should also be a government priority?

Mr. KANSTEINER. He did, and we made that point, and we made

it in the context of the internally displaced people. Everyone in Angola is in need of and deserving of social services, but those internally displaced people are at the bottom rung of the ladder, and

they need at least something there to help them get on with their

lives.

Secretary Powell met with some street children in Luanda, which

was fascinating, in the sense that here were internally displaced

children that made their way to Luanda. And the stories they had

to tell were harrowing. I mean, it was absolutely frightening to

know what these kids have been through in the time of war, but

it was also enlightening in the sense that they were incredibly optimistic because peace had come to their country.

So it is a window of opportunity, and we need to push and cajole

the Angolan Government into keeping their priorities straight, and

we need to help out when we can.

Senator FEINGOLD. Well, let me strongly agree with that, because

I was struck by the optimism of the people even in the midst of

all this, in 1994 and 1999, in similar conversations, and also struck

by the President’s prism of reality being, obviously, this war and

his fight with Mr. Savimbi. So what I’m looking for here, and I

think we’re all looking for, is a sign that he is ready to move on

to these critical priorities for the people who have suffered so

much.

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Finally, recently, reports have surfaced alleging that Angola has

deployed troops to Cote d’Ivoire. What can you tell us about these

reports? Are Angolan troops currently operating in other countries

in the region?

Mr. KANSTEINER. Senator, I saw that same report this morning.

We are looking into that.

As far as Angolans in other countries, as you know, the Angolan

troops have been in Congo Brazzaville and also Congo Kinshasa.

They have some minimal troop levels in both those countries still,

but I think they are relatively minimal.

The Cote d’Ivoire issue concerns us, and we will be checking into

that.

Senator FEINGOLD. I look forward to hearing from you when you

determine that.

Thank you very much, Mr. Kansteiner for your testimony, again.

Mr. KANSTEINER. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.

Senator FEINGOLD. All right. We have a very good second panel

of witnesses today to follow Mr. Kansteiner’s testimony. Dr. Morten

Rostrup and Mr. Kramer, please come forward.

Dr. Rostrup is president of the International Council of Doctors

Without Borders, the private international humanitarian organization that won the Nobel Peace prize in 1999. Doctors Without Borders recently released two reports detailing the humanitarian crisis

in Angola. A specialist in internal medicine, Dr. Rostrup headed

the Norwegian branch of Doctors Without Borders before assuming

his current position. He has experience working in Liberia, Kosovo,

Sudan, Angola, Zaire, Rwanda, and Tanzania.

Dr. David Kramer is an attorney with the Baird Holm law firm

in Omaha, Nebraska. From 1996 to 1998, David served as the resident program director for the International Republican Institute in

Rwanda. In August of 2001, David led a Consortium for Elections

and Political Process Strengthening delegation, including representatives from IRI, the National Democratic Institute, and the

International Foundation for Electoral Systems, to assess the prospects for elections in Angola. David returned with the Consortium

for Elections and Political Process Strengthening delegation team

to Angola in May of 2002 to launch their report.

Originally, we planned to have three witnesses, but, unfortunately, Global Witness was not able to send a representative. However, they have submitted written testimony, which I will now

place in the record, without objection.

[The written testimony of Global Witness follows:]

PREPARED STATEMENT OF GLOBAL WITNESS

BACKGROUND

Since December 1999 Global Witness has been investigating the role of oil and

banking in the privatization of Angola’s war. This work has followed from its launch

of the ‘‘conflict diamond’’ issue in December 1998. In March 2002, Global Witness

published its second report, ‘‘All the Presidents’ Men,’’ which provides the reader

with a detailed discussion of the scale of state-looting in Angola. Please see web site:

www.globalwitness.org

Simultaneously over this period, Global Witness has been involved in a process

of dialogue with key oil companies and government officials to explore how to deliver transparency of oil revenues into Angola. The central premise being that it is

not possible for Angolans to hold their government to account for the expenditure

of resource revenues, if there is no available information about government inVerDate 11-MAY-2000 13:16 Dec 23, 2002 Jkt 000000 PO 00000 Frm 00018 Fmt 6633 Sfmt 6621 83470 SFORELA1 PsN: SFORELA1
15

come—of which, according to the IMF, approximately 87% is derived from oil extraction and related activities.

ANGOLA—LOOTING THE WAR, INTO LOOTING THE PEACE?

It is hard to overstate the scale of state-looting that has taken place in Angola

over the past few years. In 1993, following huge loss of territory to UNITA, the Angolan Government embarked on a desperate effort of self-defense, pulling out an

SOS in the direction of the Mitterrand Presidency in France. This call for help resulted in the introduction of two key individuals who, following their being given

Angolan diplomatic status, organised the funding and supply of weapons to Angola,

through a Czech front company, which appears to have connections to the Russian

heavy armament industry.

The Angolan Government usually paid approximately 30-35% of the contract

value of the shipments. Key individuals in the supply chain then acquired weaponry

for approximately 25% of the contract value. Typically, this left approximately 10%

of the contract value—the remainder of the Angolan Government’s down-payment

as spare cash. At this point, the remainder of the contract value would be made up

by the negotiation of an oil-backed loan—where oil not yet extracted would be

pledged against up-front payments from a variety of banks. This oil loan cash, together with the remainder of the Government down-payment would then be spare

cash, available for the elite and all players to direct as required. As such, the Angolan State had a very poor deal, receiving weapons worth only a fraction of what was

paid—in contrast to elites, where it is possible to argue that there was a financial

vested interest for the conflict to continue. The scale of this operation was so vast

that Global Witness estimates, conservatively, that at least US$1-1.5 billion has

gone missing every year for the past five years.

AFTER THE PEACE—WHAT NOW?

Following the death of Jonas Savimbi, and the end of the war, Angola now has

an ideal opportunity to change. However, Global Witness is concerned that the infrastructure of off-shore companies, trusts and organizations, established to supply

weapons, finances and the capacity to loot state income remains in place. In fact,

some of the individuals involved have worked their way into almost every sector of

the Angolan economy and have become sufficiently elevated in importance that they

broker access to the Presidency. Are we moving from looting the war, to the next

phase of looting the peace—which is likely to be even more lucrative?

There are a number of issues that continue to surface since the end of the war,

which indicate a ‘‘business as usual’’ approach. They are best summarized as follows:

• A perceived effort by some in the French judiciary that France will close down

the ‘‘Angolagate’’ investigations, ending the possibility of there being a trial of

amongst others, Jean-Christophe Mietterrand, Charles Pasqua, Pierre Falcone,

and Arkadi Gaidamak.

• A Judge in Geneva froze an account at a branch of the UBS bank containing

over US$770 million. These funds are believed to be that which was stolen from

an Angolan debt-to-Russia renegotiation scam. Angola undertook significant

diplomatic effort to close down this investigation. The funds remain frozen.

• One of the key individuals involved in the structure of state-looting in Angola

continues to negotiate oil-backed loans.

• Angola passed a State Secrecy law in June 2002, which appears to give the

state (read elite) the capacity to declare anything a state secret. This is a major

threat to press freedom and government accountability. There is a specific

clause relating to ‘‘state income,’’ which would tend to suggest that the Government has no intention of releasing such information, which would be a necessary precursor for accountability.

THE PROCESS OF DELIVERING TRANSPARENCY

In February 2001, BP announced that it would publish payments and other data

for its operations in Angola. Two weeks after, BP received a letter which threatened

to terminate their contract, should they proceed, and which was copied to all the

other oil companies operating in Angola.

This brave move forward has had a profound effect on Global Witness’ thinking

about how to move things forward. This is because, on the one hand BP demonstrated that there is no legal excuse for all the other companies not to also declare

their payments, but on the other, the reaction of the Angolan authorities clearly

16

demonstrates the impossibility of making such a move unilaterally and on a voluntary basis. The threats to company interests are simply too high.

For this reason, Global Witness is convinced for the need for a regulatory framework for companies to declare such data. Such a regulatory approach would not be

a threat to any company, as all would have to do it. Our vision of how to move this

forward is best encapsulated in a campaign we launched with George Soros and others in London in June 2002, called ‘‘Publish What You Pay.’’ This campaign envisages the quickest, most cost-effective and painless (for all) route to achieve transparency of income from this sector is through a listing requirement on all the major

stock-exchanges that holds extractive company stock. The idea is that it would be

a condition of listing, that companies would declare all net payments that they

make to each government of operation. In this way, this issue now goes far beyond

Angola. Indeed, though Angola makes a compelling case for one of the worst case

scenarios, it is clear that lack of transparency of state income from extractive companies is a major problem in many other African countries; from an oil perspective,

one only has to think of Equatorial Guinea, Congo-B, Gabon, Cameroon, and so on,

not those areas beyond Africa, including countries such as Khazakhstan to see that

there is an urgent need for such a move on a global basis.

Senator FEINGOLD. And I would ask, Dr. Rostrup, to please begin

with your testimony.

STATEMENT OF DR. MORTEN ROSTRUP, PRESIDENT, INTERNATIONAL COUNCIL OF DOCTORS WITHOUT BORDERS

[MEDECINS SANS FRONTIERES], BRUSSELS, BELGIUM

Dr. ROSTRUP. Thank you very much, Senator Feingold, and

thank you for inviting Medecins Sans Frontieres [MSF] to this very

important hearing.

As you know, MSF, we have been working in Angola since 1983,

so we have been in the country, and vast parts of the country, for

quite a long time period, and we have observed what has been happening in this time that has passed.

I, myself, just to say that, also worked in Angola in 1997-1998

in a small town called Camacupa where I was the only doctor in

a very small hospital. And at that point of time, which was some

years ago, I could already see the precarious situation of the civilian population: a very huge amount of malnourishment. We had

very severe malaria cases. We had a very high case fatality rate.

So it was pretty difficult to work under those circumstances. And

we also witnessed at that time that the health system was not really functioning. And MSF, as such, we had to run the health care

systems in many, many of the provinces in Angola.

We had to evacuate Camacupa because of the resumption of the

war in 1998, and, as you know, it has been—especially the last

part of the war, from 1998 up until now, the cease-fire, has been

a very, very difficult situation for the civilian population.

The civilians there have been targeted in this war. They have

been used as instruments in the war. They have been abused in

this war. And last week, as you mentioned, we released two reports

in Angola which are directly witnessing of the civilian population

that survived this period. And I think these reports are very, very

telling.

What we are facing today, after the cease-fire, is a civilian population that has been suffered tremendously—both physically, but

also mentally. There are a lot of traumas, psychological traumas,

as you can imagine. And when the cease-fire—and that was also

one of the problems we faced in this last part of the war, humanitarian agencies who didn’t have access to these agencies—so they

17

were both abused in warfare and in denied access, and this made

a kind of double suffering of these people.

So what we did after the cease-fire was signed April 4, was that

suddenly we had access to these areas and we did a lot of rapid

assessments only to get to know that the mortality was very high

and the malnutrition rate was also very high. We talked about

mortality rates 5, sometimes up to 10 times what is considered the

emergency threshold in this population, and we also had

malnourishment figures of severe malnourishment, which is a lifethreatening condition, affecting 13 percent of children in many

places and went up sometimes to 20 percent.

So the situation was very, very severe, and we launched a huge

kind of relief response, one of the largest we have launched, in fact,

MSF, and we have all in all now taken care of almost 16,000 children that have been in a very, very precarious situation.

So I went back to Angola, in fact, in May and June just to get

some firsthand knowledge about the situation, and I was very

shocked at what I was seeing. I went to the quartering family

areas, which they were called at that point of time, in which there

was no assistance to them—to the civilians. I went to IDP camps.

I went to the hospitals. I watched children die of malnutrition,

hypothermia, hypoglycemia, all kind of conditions because they

have a very reduced immune system.

So I was pretty shocked about the situation and also lack of response. And I think I’m happy now, of the reports I’ve got from Angola is that the situation has improved considerably in many, many

areas where they are working.

Still, we do see a mixed picture in Angola today, and we still

have, in fact, some areas in which there are still nutritional emergencies. I can mention Mavinga, in the eastern part of Angola, in

which you now have a nutritional emergency going on, and we

have 250 children in our feeding center for intensive care feeding,

and we have to supply 10,000 people weekly with food rations.

On top of this, we see epidemics. We have had some cases of

shigella. That is blooded dysentery, which is a real killing disease

when it affects a very malnourished population. And we have also

seen the consequences of a stop in general food distribution due to

the mines problems, and I will come back to that afterwards.

In Baiundo, where I went in May, June, still we have a lot of

children in our feeding centers. Still we have 90 children per week

coming in a very severe condition. So even though we see a large

improvement in many parts of the areas, we still have a nutritional

emergency going on.

And then I would call attention to the food insecurity, and I

think this is also very essential, because whatever you do in a

therapeutic feeding center, it doesn’t help much if you don’t have

a general food distribution in place so you can prevent them to fall

back into malnutrition. And there we have seen a total lack of resources. WFP is saying that they are 76 percent underfunded, that

they have just one quarter of what they need to really supply 1.9

million people who now need food, and well into 2003.

In addition to lack of resources, we see also huge logistical constraints. The roads are very bad, as you may be aware of. The

rainy season is now coming up and makes it even worse. And, of

18

course, access is severely hampered due to the mines and the mine

problem. And we have instances that you can travel 150 kilometers

or miles and use 3 to 4 days to travel this distance, just to tell how

difficult it is to get around.

There have been some mine incidents, because during the rainy

season, which is coming up, the mines also have a tendency to

move, so roads that were considered safe are not safe anymore.

And there was last week, in Lavinga, a mine accident killing 13

people due to, supposedly, movement of old mines.

We have also seen that in Kumbulu in Lunda Norte, that due to

one of such mine incidents, they had to stop the food distribution

because it was considered too risky. It had to be secured, these

roads. And we saw an increased level in malnourishment pretty

soon after this disruption in food deliverances. And it tells very

clearly that the population now that have really survived the period of war and have been malnourished and been helped a bit

back to a kind of life, they are very, very vulnerable, and it’s not

much disruption that is necessary for them to slide back into a severe malnutrition state.

And, on top of this, we know that malnourished people have been

suffering during the civil war. They also are very susceptible to get

diseases, all kind of diseases, especially infectious diseases. The immune system is really not functioning a hundred percent in those

patients.

And then what we do see is a very disrupted health care system,

as well, in Angola. Much was destroyed by the war itself and also

by neglect in the years that has passed. So, in Lunda Norte, for instance, we did an assessment just some weeks ago in which we

found a totally destroyed hospital and a health post who had 4 people. They hadn’t received any salary for some months. They didn’t

have any medicines to give to the people. And, of course, if they

have this kind of health care system, we will see a lot of problems

in these vulnerable people.

We have already seen the measles epidemics. We have launched

a vaccination campaign, the Minister of Health, as well, for thousands and thousands of children, because this is also a killing disease when people are so malnourished and have been through the

civil war and really been shaken up. And we see also TB. It’s a

problem. Malaria is striking pretty severely. And this is constituting, then, another problem, the lack of, really, a health care system in place.

And then, on top of this, again, we see population movements.

We see people—some spontaneously—trying to move into their

places of origin, and some of them hope that there will be support

in these places, and there should be, before people move to a place,

there should be a certain minimum support to these. There should

be shelter, there should be food, there should be water, there

should be a health care system, there should be security, when it

comes to mines, and there should be some authorities in place.

Many places, this is not at all there.

And the United Nations, themselves, they estimated that in August and September there were 6,000 to 10,000 people per day

spontaneously moving back to their home places. But only in 20

percent of these places, the conditions were acceptable.

19

So what we see is a vulnerable population on the move into areas

where there is very little, if any, assistance. And what will happen

later is that they have to move again to get assistance. And this

continued movement of people will make them even more vulnerable.

We have also observed that authorities have tried to put some

pressure on people to move back to their places of origin. We have

an incident in Qatata recently in which MSF also protested and

said that, for the first, we should not put pressure on people to

move. It should be a voluntary and well informed movement of people. And to do this was not according to international standard

rules. So the pressure was stopped at that incident.

In May, we observed that also people were told to go to a certain

place and told that there was assistance. We went to this place.

There was nothing. And thousands of people had moved to this

place. So I think it’s very important to focus on the criteria for resettlement in this very precarious situation of the people there.

We also have registered that there was a point of closing the reception areas, but that has now been changed, and that is, in our

opinion, also good.

So, just to make a short conclusion of the situation, as we see

it, as a humanitarian organization, we have millions of people in

a very precarious situation still. Even though the peak of the emergency is over, these may enter into a new emergency situation if

they are not assisted satisfactorily.

We do still find pockets of famine. There are still areas in Angola

where nobody has been to assess the situation. It’s very difficult.

But still, we have perhaps defined even more pockets of famine.

And what is needed, definitely, is more food, more support. WFP

doesn’t have enough resources to deal with the crisis. Access problems, de-mining here is pretty essential to get access to the people

and get supplies to them.

The health care system must be given the utmost priority, building up a system that effectively can take care of the people. And

the resettlement must be voluntary and well informed and only encouraged to places where there is support in place.

So, thank you.

[The prepared statement of Dr. Rostrup follows:]

PREPARED STATEMENT OF DR. MORTEN ROSTRUP, PRESIDENT, MEDECINS SANS

FRONTIERES/DOCTORS WITHOUT BORDERS, BRUSSELS, BELGIUM

We want to thank the Senators of the Committee on Foreign Relations, especially

Senator Feingold, for this opportunity to report on the recent and current humanitarian situation in Angola. At the hearing we hope to bring to your attention what

we believe are the major humanitarian issues that require urgent consideration.

Doctors Without Borders/Medecins Sans Frontieres (MSF) is an international,

independent emergency medical aid organization that has been working in Angola

since 1983. Since then MSF has worked in 15 of the 18 provinces, running primary

health care services in displaced camps, nutritional programs and emergency feeding programs, supporting hospitals and other health structures and running surgical, sleeping sickness and tuberculosis programs. Our medical presence alongside

the Angolan population, all directly affected by the war, provides us with a clear

understanding of the scale of the humanitarian crisis in Angola, its causes, and

what must be done to assure the medical wellbeing of the Angolan people.

It is premature to think that the post-conflict situation in Angola has become normalized. A large number of Angolans are still in a precarious situation. This testimony will address the continuing nutritional crisis; food insecurity; MSF’s concerns

20

about the resettlement of displaced people; and the lack of access to health care for

many Angolans.

1. BACKGROUND

The end of the fighting in April revealed a humanitarian crisis previously hidden

during Angola’s three decade long war. Hundreds of thousands of starving civilians

emerged from rural areas to which MSF and other agencies had been denied access

by both the Angolan Armed Forces (FAA) and UNITA. Our teams recorded mortality figures nearly four times greater than what is internationally accepted as the

threshold for an emergency. Rapid assessments found moderate malnutrition rates

as high as 50% and severe acute malnutrition higher than 20%.

These people were starving not because of natural disaster, drought or crop failure, but as a direct result of how the war was fought. War tactics pursued by both

parties directly caused the pockets of famine MSF encountered immediately after

the ceasefire. In willful violation of international humanitarian law, both warring

parties cut civilians off from humanitarian assistance for years. From 1998-2002,

sanctions against UNITA, compounded by UNITA’s own strategies, prevented agencies to operate under areas they controlled. The Government of Angola restricted aid

agencies to provincial capitals, and even in these government-held regions, the neglect of the health system led to a near-complete failure of health services.

Peace may have silenced the guns, but it did not bring relief: thousands of Angolans who had survived the horrors of the war, and who could have been saved, died

needlessly. For example, in Malange province, MSF found in May that 17% of the

women whose children were receiving emergency nutritional care said they had lost

children since the beginning of 2002.

Consistent with these urgent needs, MSF mobilized its largest worldwide operation, with 175 international volunteers and 2,200 national staff working or monitoring activities in 15 of Angola’s 18 provinces. Unfortunately, the slow humanitarian response to this immense crisis by the Government of Angola, aid agencies

and the UN, as well as serious logistical constraints, prolonged the crisis throughout

the summer.

So far MSF has treated more than 16,000 children at our therapeutic feeding centers (TFCs). In June, we were treating 3,600 children in more than 20 intensive

feeding centers throughout the country, and provided supplementary feeding to

more than 10,400. A preliminary retrospective mortality survey showed death rates

of 3.3/10,000 per day for children under 5 years of age.

2. THE CURRENT SITUATION

‘‘My husband received half a cup of rice. We, the family, received half a

cup of rice and one tin of sardines. That was one month ago. Since then no

one has given us anything. . . . We haven? eaten anything for four days.’’*

*J, 27 year old woman, mother of four children, one of whom is cared for in an MSF

nutritional center in Mavinga, Cuando Cubango Province, June 2002.

Current Nutritional Crisis

Today, Angola presents a mixed picture. Across the country, we are treating 1,400

children at 14 centers for acute severe malnutrition. While the acute emergency has

eased in most parts of the country, localized emergencies persist, particularly in

Mavinga and Bailundo.

The worst nutritional crisis is unfolding in the southeastern town of Mavinga. In

this pocket of dramatic famine, we are treating 250 children in our Therapeutic

Feeding Center (TFC); we are supplying 10,000 children and vulnerable adults with

weekly food rations there and in two nearby Reception Areas with a combined population of 70,000. Families walked through the bush for weeks to reach Mavinga,

abandoning their homes and fields, and had no means to provide for themselves.

Some people starved after arriving. A recent shigella outbreak (bloody dysentery) affected 392 patients, and 100 people remain in an isolation ward.

When General Food Distribution to the area was halted in August because mines

were discovered on the landing strip, an estimated 10,000 people went to Mavinga

in search of food, overwhelming the town and our feeding facilities. Our medical

teams even report that children treated in our TFCs during the summer have been

readmitted in the past few weeks with the same deadly symptoms of acute malnutrition.

Conditions are serious in Huambo Province as well, where MSF is currently treating 350 children in therapeutic feeding centers in Bailundo alone. This is certainly

an improvement over the past 2 months, when we were treating more than 600. But

we receive 90 new patients each week.

21

From Famine To Food Insecurity

‘‘ We don’t have food or clothing because we didn’t get anything when we

arrived. The people from the WFP came by two weeks ago to register the population, but they haven’t been back since. They say they want to give us food

for two weeks so that we have enough time to return to Jamba Queio, but

we don’t know when the government is going to decide on our return. For

the moment to get food to eat, the women work in nearby fields. One day

of work equals one basket of manioc. People who have family in Menongue

are getting help from them.’’*

*M, about 50 years old. He is originally from Huambo Province, June 2002.

There should be no sense of false security. Even though the people we treat successfully may be strong enough to leave intensive care, they are still in the process

of recovering from horrific conditions. MSF continues to gain access to some previously cut-off regions, finding high levels of malnutrition. The survivors of today

are in an unsteady state, and it will not take much to disrupt such a fragile balance.

Lack of Resources

Several categories of displaced people each received different levels of attention:

the 85,000 former UNITA combatants along with 350,000 family members regrouped at 38 Reception Areas (RAs), a ‘‘new’’ IDP population of those who were

trapped in isolated areas during years of conflict, and the approximately 335,000 Internally Displaced People receiving food aid prior to the April 4th ceasefire agreement. There were also those in the ‘‘newly accessible areas’’ immobilized by illness

or the threat of mines. WFP integrated all of these groups into one caseload, increasing their estimate of people requiring food aid from 1.5 to 1.9 million.

The WFP estimates these nearly 2 million people will need food aid for their daily

survival until well into 2003. These people are extremely vulnerable to inconsistencies in food supplies, and their nutritional status could quickly deteriorate if confronted with prolonged interruptions in aid deliveries.

Agencies involved in food supply already operate under several constraints. As of

early October, WFP’s budget for Angola was 74% under-funded, and cereal supplies

are predicted to run out in January. Even now, the WFP is delivering one month’s

worth of food every six weeks in Mavinga, further weakening food security. Donor

countries need to insure such interruptions do not occur.

Logistical Constraints

Food distribution is severely hampered by logistical constraints, by the everpresent threat of mines, and by damaged roads and collapsed bridges. For example

WFP General Food Distributions have been suspended in large parts of Huambo,

Cuanza Sul and Cuando Cubango Provinces because they do not have enough

heavy-duty vehicles needed to transport cargo across rough terrain, they have difficulty identifying Implementing Partners who manage on site general food distributions, cannot ensure the security of field staff because of the presence of landmines.

One of the major humanitarian priorities will be demining. Provisions must be

made to expand and accelerate demining activities. In spite of investments in

demining programs and increases in demining teams, mines remain a significant

threat throughout the country, particularly on those routes that have not been traveled for decades. For example, the detonation in August of two anti-tank mines in

the Cuango area led to the suspension of all aid to Xa-Muteba RA for several weeks.

Further such incidents, complicating the delivery of aid, should be expected. The

scale of the problem demands far greater resources.

The network of roads has not been maintained for years, and bridges spanning

key rivers are down, posing a constant challenge to access. Travel from Malange to

the quartering area in Xa-Muteba, Lunda Norte Province, a distance of about 150

miles, can take three to four days because a bridge is destroyed and up to a hundred

trucks queue at a river ford waiting to be hauled across. The journey from Luanda

to Mussende in Cuanza Sul Province should take less than a day. It took MSF three

days last month, traveling roads that had not seen traffic since before the war and

crossing bridges only designed for pedestrians. Mussende RA with 10,700 residents

has still received no food aid.

The rainy season, in full force by the end of October, poses a dual threat to access.

The already deteriorated roads will become impassible as torrential rains erode the

unpaved stretches, undermine weakened pavement, and turn the powdery dry clay

into deep bogs that few vehicles can negotiate. Intense rains also expose buried

landmines and set them in motion. Areas previously thought safe will suddenly and

tragically prove otherwise. Just outside the city of Malange last week, thirteen people were killed when their van swerved just off the main road to avoid a pothole

22

and hit an antitank mine that was probably placed years before at a long-since forgotten checkpoint. It is likely that recent heavy rains had eroded previously compacted earth above this mine to render this stretch of road lethal once again.

This combination of a destroyed road network, the presence of mines, and the lack

of long term funding commitments compromises the food security of this vulnerable

population.

Lack of Access to Health Care

‘‘The government does nothing for the people of Angola. They just take the

money for the school and hospital and put it in their pockets. It doesn’t matter to them, because if their child is sick they just send them to Namibia

or South Africa and they just send their children to school to be educated

outside Angola. This is the way it is here in Angola.’’*

*Elderly displaced man from Jamba Municipality, Huila Province, Nov. 2001.

As the malnutrition emergency recedes, lack of general healthcare comes more

into focus.

The health care infrastructure in Angola was not only destroyed by war. Years

of neglect have left most Angolans with inadequate basic services. The problem is

especially acute in the areas to which people are returning. Before the ceasefire

MSF was present in 11 of the 18 provinces of Angola, operating feeding centers and

supporting hospitals with medical personnel and drugs. We continue to support hospitals and health posts in nine areas in addition to operating feeding centers.

Outside the former security cordons, extending around provincial capitals, we see

little improvement in the provision of healthcare. Preventative healthcare is rarely

provided, and curative care at the primary level is either non-existent or limited to

infrequent and inadequate supplies of drugs. Referral services are similarly not in

evidence. In a recent assessment to Lunda Norte province, we found that the hospital had been destroyed during the war. The health post had been without medical

supplies since July, and the 4 person nursing staff had not been paid for months.

This is the only health facility serving an area that, when last surveyed, had a population of 147,000.

Reports of measles outbreaks continue to confirm the poor vaccination coverage

countrywide. MSF has reported Measles outbreaks in Saurimo, Jumenge-Cameia

and Lago Dilolo municipalities in Mexico, and in Cuanza Sul and Lunda Sul Provinces. Sometimes reported outbreaks prompt authorities to carry out vaccination

campaigns, and MSF itself has vaccinated more than 50,000 children against this

deadly disease.

Return and Resettlement

‘‘We all want to go back to living like we did before, in 1978 and 1979.

The public servants could stay here in the town. The ordinary people could

go back to their fields and take responsibility for themselves again. We know

that all this will take time, but we have hope, hope that everything will turn

out alright.’’*

M, 32 year old man living in Mavinga with his wife and two children. June 2002.

Massive population movements over recent months, as well as further anticipated

movements threaten to affect food security adversely. MSF is seriously concerned

that the resettlement process is not proceeding according to international standards

or national laws. Resettlement must be voluntary and returnees well-informed, and

only in places that have minimum necessary access to drinking water, food, shelter

health services, seeds and tools, healthcare assistance and government administration.

MSF has observed acute food shortages and inadequate sanitary conditions among

the 430,000 people living in RAs. These camps cannot be closed without providing

the mechanisms necessary for resettlement.

Where resettlement for hundreds of thousands of displaced Angolans has already

occurred, it has been hasty and haphazard. The UN estimated that during August

and September, between 6,000 and 10,000 people per day were spontaneously returning to their place of origin. Up to 80% of these people were returning to areas

that were considered unsuitable for resettlement.

Population movements also seem to have occurred through pressure. MSF discovered how local authorities in Catata told the people living in displaced camps that

they were obliged to return to their village of origin, and that their huts would be

destroyed. MSF notified those responsible that any return had to be voluntary, and

in the end, people were allowed to stay.

23

An earlier example of this is the departure in May of about 12,900 displaced people from camps surrounding Kuito in Bie ́ Province. This movement followed administration assurances that there would be no more aid for them in Kuito and that

food and materials would be distributed in Trumba, 30 km away. Aid agencies were

not informed of the administration’s decision, and on a subsequent visit to Trumba,

MSF found that there was little provision of assistance.

Spontaneous movements or an accelerated resettlement process jeopardizes the

safety and health status of returnees. Any return should be voluntary, well informed, and in accordance with international standards and norms. Only then will

these people receive even a measure of the dignity that has been denied them for

so long.

3. CONCLUSIONS AND RECOMMENDATIONS

1. Emergency nutritional needs must be met in the isolated pockets of dramatic famine that persist. And nutritional assessments must continue to areas

that are still cut off from assistance.

2. Sufficient food stocks and their delivery must be guaranteed to ensure that

food reaches the nearly 2 million people estimated by WFP who will require

such assistance well into 2003.

a. Donor commitments must be met.

b. Access to isolated populations is seriously hampered by a severely deteriorated road network and destroyed bridges spanning major rivers.

c. De-mining operations must be accelerated to support food distribution

programs, the provision of health services and the resettlement process.

3. People must be provided with adequate basic health care, with a focus on

training, primary health care, and basic referral systems.

4. Resettlement must be voluntary and returnees well informed. The process

must be implemented in compliance with international standards as well as the

government of Angola’s Norms on the Resettlement of Displaced Populations.

This includes:

a. The adequate assessment of resettlement areas to ensure security, access to health care, and proper sanitation.

b. The prevention of forced and coerced resettlement.

c. Meaningful protection for returnees.

d. The distribution of food, non-food items, seeds and farming tools to

provide returnees with food and shelter while they resume farming activities to become food self-sufficient.

Senator FEINGOLD. Thank you, doctor, for your excellent testimony and certainly your work and the work of your organization,

the commitment to the people of Angola throughout these many

years, and especially now, when, despite the very serious problems,

there at least is some hope that maybe some of these can be resolved. So I thank you for being here and for your work.

Mr. Kramer, you may proceed with your testimony.

STATEMENT OF DAVID KRAMER, ATTORNEY, BAIRD HOLM,

OMAHA, NE

Mr. KRAMER. Mr. Chairman, thank you very much. It’s a pleasure and a privilege to be here today.

My name is David Kramer. And in the fall of 1996, a series of

personal and professional events came together in a confluence that

gave me the opportunity to move to Luanda, Angola. And I’ll never

forget the phone call I got when I was asked, ‘‘Do you even know

where Luanda, Angola, is?’’ And I said, yes, that I had followed

U.S. foreign policy. I had followed that region of the world for some

time, and I looked forward to the opportunity to move to Luanda

and work with the Angolan political parties, with the Angolan Parliament on political party development, national reconciliation, and

parliamentary reform.

24

1The report is entitled, ‘‘Angola Pre-Election Assessment Report,’’ March 2002. The assessment was conducted by the International Foundation for Election Systems, International Republican Institute, and National Democratic Institute, and can be accessed at www.iri.org.

What brings me here today is an opportunity that I had last fall

as the head of a delegation—and one of my colleagues from IFES,

the International Foundation for Election Systems, Laurie Cooper.

I want to say thank you to Laurie for being here. Also to the representative of the National Democratic Institute [NDI], who,

Jamina is here, as well. And I want to say a special thanks to my

colleagues who participated in that mission and who returned with

me this past spring to present a report 1 outlining what steps the

Angolan Government needed to take, the international community

needed to take, and political parties and civil society in Angola

needed to take in order to prepare for a situation where they might

have elections.

And I want to talk a bit today, not so much about elections, but

about basic conclusions of our report that deal with what steps

need to be taken, what priorities there ought to be for democratic

advancement, in general, in Angola, which may ultimately one day

lead to elections, with particular emphasis on civil society and political parties, which we focused our report upon.

I’d also like to take the opportunity to share a little bit about

what our perception is on the relationships between governance,

corruption, and the conditions that exist currently for the Angolan

people, and some recommendations that we have about foreign policy in the future toward Angola.

We start from a series of fundamental premises that are, I think,

very important to remember, and we often, as Americans who travel abroad, forget. But in Angola, it’s the Angolans who have to

drive the process of democratic growth, of transparency, of good

governance, with the support, encouragement, and sometimes open

criticism by the international community. And we, in the United

States, have a particularly important role to play in Angola, given

our historical involvement there and given the respect that we

have among all Angolan players today.

Second of all, that it ultimately will be the Angolan Government

that has the primary responsibility for creating the conditions for

there to be real democratic growth in Angola. It’s easy sometimes

to be in the opposition, because all you have to do is point the finger. It’s very hard to govern, and we have to encourage and support

the Angolan Government as they go forward trying to make the reforms necessary.

The third fundamental premise that we operated under is that

the process of democratic growth must be one that is a result of

free, open, and broad-based discussions among Angolans, not just

among the political elite, not just among the economic elite, but

among the broadest segments of society possible, bringing in the

civil society organizations, bringing in political parties, bringing in

all interested citizens.

And the fourth fundamental premise that I wanted to mention

today is that peaceful elections in a climate of openness, trust, and

national reconciliation based in a constitution that’s accepted by

Angolans are a necessary step on the road to bringing true democratic development to Angola.

25

And it’s interesting that we’ve talked a lot—I heard earlier testimony by both of my colleagues who are testifying today about ways

to encourage the Angolan Government to effectuate change. I believe that the way we are most likely to encourage the Angolan

Government to effectuate change is if the Angolan people themselves demand it of their government.

And we’ve talked today about optimism in Angola. I received an

e-mail message from a friend of mine yesterday, and I would like

to emphasize that Angola is a country that has been at war for 30

years. They have been in the longest sustained period of peace now

for about 6 months. And there is incredible optimism, thousands

and thousands of people in Angola who have been reunified with

family members who they thought were dead. People who believe

and now—at a time of war, when there was no opportunity for the

government and others in power to point the finger at UNITA or

point the finger at war—there is now an opportunity for them to

begin the process of providing basic services to the Angolan people.

And, more importantly, I think, there is opportunity for the Angolan people to demand that of their government.

There are a number of priorities that we identified in our report

that ought to be focused on. First, the restoration of basic freedoms.

It’s easy to harp on the negative.

And I want to emphasize that, since 1992, there has been significant progress in Angola on basic freedoms, freedom of expression,

freedom of association, but the progress is not enough. There are

huge numbers of displaced persons, which, from our perspective, is

the second critical priority, relocation of displaced persons. And,

doctor, I think you said it best when you talked about the fact that

it has to be voluntary, that we have to create the conditions for

people to be able to choose, do they want to stay in Luanda or in

Huambo or wherever they’re at, or do they want to go back? And

it shouldn’t be a forced one before the conditions are created.

Third, a critical concern about the situation in Angola is that

while we talk about that there may be 12 million, 13 million, 15

million Angolans, there are many Angolans who aren’t—we don’t

dispute they’re Angolans, but have no way of proving it. They have

no basic means of identity documentation. And as the process goes

forward for preparations for elections, for preparation for participation in basic government, who is it that’s entitled to receive benefits? People who cannot even establish that they’re Angolan citizens

will have a much more difficult time to participate in all segments

of the process.

The fourth priority we’ve spoken about is the lessening of state

control of the media. There has been some political liberalization

of the media since 1992, but it continues to be state owned and

state run. There is one truly independent media, the Catholic station, Radio Ecclesia. If there is to be development, from a perspective of freedom of expression, ability to air alternative ideas, the

ability to question government, the ability to look into transparency

issues, there has to be a freedom of expression, freedom of greater

access to the media.

The fifth priority we talk about would be the strengthening of

civil society and political parties. The emergence of a politically active civil society of organizations is one of the largely unheralded

26

events in Angola that’s occurred over the last several years. It’s exciting to see people in the midst of war come together to advocate

for social justice issues, for basic equity, for basic human rights— not just the international community, but Angolans doing so of

their own volition. Well known political party activists are beginning to work together with civil society organizations, which is

something that never happened.

We know, in this country, that we talk about the influence of

special interests. Special interests have influence why? Because we,

as those in politics, listen to our constituents. In Angola, that

doesn’t happen.

And so as we help the development of civil society, I believe very

strongly, and our report articulates, there has to be a parallel assistance in development on the political side of things, and, more

importantly, creation of the expectation that the two should not

run parallel paths, but that the two should interact with one another and that there’s a responsibility on the part of those who govern to listen to the governed.

With respect to the political parties, there is not a level playing

field in Angola today. There is only one political party that has the

control of state resources to engage in its activities. If we want to

have a multiparty system, there are significant issues that will

have to be addressed to that. The recent reunification of UNITA is

a good step in that direction, and there are 3 or 4 other political

parties that have significant potential at whatever time there may

be an opportunity for there to be elections.

The sixth priority ought to be, and it’s an internal one for Angolans, the resolution of the constitutional question. There’s a debate

today over whether or not there should be a new Angolan constitution. It’s something that needs to be resolved before they go forward.

The seventh priority would ultimately be preparation for elections, electoral reform, setting a date certain for elections, because

I believe, as a political activist, that the impetus for the Angolan

Government and for other political parties to begin to pay attention

to what’s going on in Angolan society will be the prospect of elections. And as the Angolan Government—one of the recent comments that we heard on numerous occasions while we were in

Luanda in May was that many people believed, with the advent of

peace, that the government would feel a greater responsibility to

provide basic services to people on the thought that there might be

an election. And the longer it got away from war, the harder it

would be to justify the continuance of the types of situations that

have been talked about today.

Let me close by making a few basic recommendations and a comment. There’s no question that good governance, transparency, corruption, all lead to the inability of the Angolan citizens to participate in the system and really to demand change. And everything

that we’ve tried to encourage in our report has been designed to increase transparency by the government, but also to empower and

encourage citizens in Angola to demand that of their government

and, interestingly, to demand it of their political parties. As we’ve

talked about political parties who criticize the government for not

being transparent, but who are not transparent in their own fiVerDate 11-MAY-2000 13:16 Dec 23, 2002 Jkt 000000 PO 00000 Frm 00030 Fmt 6633 Sfmt 6602 83470 SFORELA1 PsN: SFORELA1
27

nances, we talk about that basic hypocrisy. And why should we

trust them, as a political party, to govern differently if they don’t

handle their own internal affairs the same way? And so transparency is a large component of what we talk about in preparation

for a new Angola.

As to a few recommendations, Senator, I can’t emphasize enough,

having lived on the ground for 2 years, having continued to stay

engaged in Angola, that we have to adopt a policy and stick to that

policy for an extended period of time. We have a tendency in—the

good folks at USAID, who I’ve duked it out with on one occasion

or another—have a tendency to change policy in midstream at a

point at which you’re just beginning to make headway. We ought

to commit to what our policy is going to be, fund our NGOs to implement that policy, and let them go, instead of nickel and diming

them and changing direction every couple of years. I understand

the difficulty of demonstrating results, but having lived on the

ground, I’ve had my feet cut out from under me more than once

because, just as we are making progress, somebody decided they

wanted to go a different direction.

Second of all, I believe very firmly that this commitment ought

to be made not just to civil society. Civil society must work together with the political side. And if civil society advances much

faster than the political component, and there are those in Angola

who will tell you that over the last two and a half years civil society has advanced much more quickly than the political, because

there’s not capacity building going on—you’re going to have the inability of the political to respond to the demands of civil society.

Last, I would say let’s focus on the fact that only 6 months have

passed since the cease-fire. The last time we went through this exercise, UNITA’s leadership did not come to Angola—to Luanda.

They’re all there today.

There is tremendous opportunity. I, perhaps, am one of the few

people who would describe himself as an optimist about Angola.

The people of Angola are excited. I’m excited. The members of our

team who were there are excited. We think there’s great potential

because of the vast resources they have, but, more importantly, because of the resiliency of the Angolan people. And so I would hope

that we could do everything we can to support them in their endeavor to become an example of success in Africa.

Thank you, Mr. Chairman.

[A press release on Angola Political Environment follows:]

[Press Release, October 16, 2002]

IRI CONSULTANT, DAVID KRAMER, TO ADDRESS CONGRESS ON ANGOLA POLITICAL

ENVIRONMENT

WASHINGTON, D.C. —David Kramer, a consultant for the International Republican

Institute (IRI), will testify before the Senate Foreign Relations Committee on

Wednesday, October 16 in a hearing on Angola’s political climate and the prospects

for future democratic elections.

Angola’s political landscape has changed drastically in 2002. The death of UNITA

leader Jonas Savimbi in February, the renewed implementation of the Lusaka Protocol and the resulting return of the Angolan Joint Commission have brought an

end to the country’s 27 year civil war. These developments may provide Angolans

with the first real opportunity in decades for sustained peace and a new era of democracy.

28

Kramer will address the country’s political environment, as well as potential challenges in the current peace and reconciliation process. Kramer will share the joint

assessment recommendations with congressional members regarding Angolan government, political parties, civil society organizations and the international community preparations for fully participatory and open elections. Additionally, Kramer’s testimony will provide benchmarks by which Angolans and the international community can evaluate the reconciliation process’ and the election process’ progress.

Kramer’s comments will be based on a joint political assessment in which IRI participated with NDI and IFES in August 2001. The assessment took place in Luanda

and involved meetings with representatives of the Angolan government, the president of the 1992 Angolan Electoral Commission, political leaders, leaders of civil society organizations, representatives of the state and independent media, church

leaders and other relevant officials. The assessment team’s report is available on

IRI’s Web site at www.iri.org.

After conducting several effective political party training and governance assistance programs in Angola in the 1990s, IRI’s expertise was requested in assisting

the political parties prepare for the upcoming elections. Their assistance to the political parties in 2002 will include capacity-building workshops and a technical resource center.

IRI is a nonprofit, nonpartisan organization dedicated to advancing democracy

worldwide. IRI’s programs span the globe and include a wide range of programs including, training on civic responsibility and the legislative process, strategies for

building political parties and election campaigns, energizing women and youth to engage in the political process, communication training and election monitoring. IRI

is funded through federal grants, as well as private contributions from individuals,

corporations and foundations. For more information, please visit our Web site at

www.iri.org.

Senator FEINGOLD. Thank you, Mr. Kramer. I found your testimony interesting and very useful as well, and I appreciate your

help.

Let me ask some questions, first, of Dr. Rostrup. Would you provide sort of an overview of international aid delivery in Angola?

How effectively is the humanitarian aid pipeline actually functioning? And what are the most serious constraints on the delivery

of humanitarian aid?

Dr. ROSTRUP. I think it’s—what we have seen during the last

half year, after April the 4th, is that, to start with, there was really

a clear insufficiency in the deliverance of aid. And that was, in our

opinion, a kind of failure of the international community, but also

the U.N. And we went public criticizing, among other things, the

United Nations, the WFP, because it seemed that there was not the

same way of judging the situation as an emergency, as we did after

our assessments. So there were, obviously—in June, when I was

there, there were very big shortages in the food pipeline. They said

they had food perhaps three to four more months. They lacked

funding to really reestablish storage of food for the rest of the year.

Still, what we do see now is both, as I said, the lack of resources

that the WFP, who is the major actor here in food distribution, still

say they just have one-quarter of what they need to give food to

the people well into 2003, which will be necessary for 1.9 million

people, according to the estimates. And we know that monthly deliverance in some places, which should take place, is taking place

on a 6-week basis, leaving periods without food.

And we have in the field, as I also mentioned, seen how precarious a situation this may end up with, because with short food

deliverances, then people very fast backslide into malnutrition.

So I think it’s pretty clear that we don’t have enough resources.

There is not enough food in place. There is not enough money in

place to secure the population.

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In addition, we face the logistical constraints. And this is another

problem. Even though we had enough food, to some extent, to bring

it out to the people is another problem. And the de-mining efforts

is an emergency in this situation, as well, to get food out to the

people, and then to avoid huge population movements into areas

where they may be very difficult to access.

So I think overall it has scaled up quite a lot since June, July.

There’s been huge efforts from many aid organizations to assist the

population. The situation has improved, overall, quite a lot. But we

still feel that, in the future, if we don’t do anything really to speed

up the process and get enough resources, they can fall back into

a very precarious situation.

Senator FEINGOLD. What portion of the Angolan budget is spent

on health care?

Dr. ROSTRUP. Well, the number I’ve heard is about 4 or 5 percent, but this is some time ago. So, of course, as we have said it

before, because we are working in the health care system for quite

a long time in Angola, and we have raised this issue with the Angolan Government several times, that they need more investment

in the health care system. And as we see it, as a medical/humanitarian organization, the fact that we are present in Angola is really

a sign of failure of the government. We should never have been

there. This is the government’s responsibility, and we need to push

for the government to take these responsibilities.

Senator FEINGOLD. What kind of cooperation does the Angolan

Government typically provide to humanitarian agencies that are

operating in the country?

Dr. ROSTRUP. I think we have been able to operate pretty freely

now in Angola. We have been managing our health care programs,

hospitals, and so on. Still what is needed is more resources from

the government side into the health care system, and we are pushing for that. But we can more or less do our job without any big

obstacles for the time being.

What we saw during the war was another situation in which we

were denied access to areas, both from the government forces and

from the UNITA forces, which was another situation which made

the situation very, very bad for the civilian population.

Senator FEINGOLD. But that’s not happening now.

Dr. ROSTRUP. No. No, it’s not happening.

Senator FEINGOLD. Does the so-called culture of corruption in

Angola affect the humanitarian efforts? And if so, how?

Dr. ROSTRUP. Well, it’s nothing special I can comment on that,

actually, because I don’t know all the details. Of course, there is

a bureaucracy, as in many countries, and we have to deal with that

to import goods and so on. We have addressed some of this, but

usually for MSF, as an independent organization, we do control all

other—you know, the whole pipeline, from importing and to delivery of the goods. So we will—we have managed—as far as the reports I’ve got, we have managed pretty well to control this.

Senator FEINGOLD. Finally, I recall being told, I assume accurately, that there was good land for producing food in Angola, but,

obviously, because of the mines and other problems, the idea of

food self-sufficiency is very questionable. Long term, is food selfVerDate 11-MAY-2000 13:16 Dec 23, 2002 Jkt 000000 PO 00000 Frm 00033 Fmt 6633 Sfmt 6602 83470 SFORELA1 PsN: SFORELA1
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sufficiency a realistic goal for Angola? And what steps have to be

taken to improve the food security situation, in terms of—— Dr. ROSTRUP. I think, in the long term, de-mining of the fields

is very, very essential. And in the current situation, I know that

a lot of the civilian population, they want to go on cultivating the

land if it’s secure, if they get the seeds, tools to do that. I don’t

have, honestly, a total overview on what the food security or the

possibilities will be for Angola in the future, but I would presume

that they would be able to take care of themselves in the future,

taking these measures.

Senator FEINGOLD. Thank you, doctor.

Mr. Kramer, what can you tell me about the state secrecy law

that was passed in June of this year? I understand there is a

clause relating to so-called state income. What effect will this have

on efforts to increase the transparency of the state revenues?

Mr. KRAMER. Well, in a word, chilling. Any legislation designed

to hide, whether it be—well, primarily, I’d guess, financial data as

a state secret is something that ought to be opposed.

To the extent that—I mean, every country certainly does have

state secrets, but—if you want to take the time to read through the

volumes of our budget, you can. Unfortunately, in Angola, there

isn’t the accuracy in the budget.

There’s also a relatively recent law that continues to be debated

but has been enacted that puts significant restrictions on the

media, access to the media. Those types of laws, to the extent that

they prohibit the ability of the average citizen—be they from civil

society activists, political party activists—to participate and engage

in the system, are something we should strongly oppose.

Senator FEINGOLD. How is UNITA attempting to transform itself

into a conventional political party? Are the leaders of UNITA able

to freely organize? And do they have unhindered freedom of movement?

Mr. KRAMER. Let me say that, first of all, we don’t even have to

talk about UNITA, in particular, with respect to the issues of freedom of movement. I think any active political party that has a seat

in parliament will tell you that ability to do anything outside of

Luanda is severely restricted. The ability in Luanda, on some occasions, to display your party flag at the Angolan national football

game—‘‘football’’ being soccer for the rest of us—but, you know, it’s

very, very difficult. There’s not a great deal of tolerance and openness for different political thought.

UNITA—the fundamental—from when I was there originally for

the 2-years, to the times I’ve been back, to me the critical difference now is that UNITA’s military leadership, which historically

had stayed in the bush, is gone from the bush and has come to

Luanda now. And they have transformed themselves, I believe, into

a political party. The reunification that occurred, actually just

within the last several days, the final components of reunification,

suggest to me that they’re making great strides.

Now, UNITA has one major problem. And actually all political

parties, other than the MPLA, have one major problem. It’s a problem that I know, Senator, you’ve tried to deal with here, and that’s

access to financial resources to make them competitive. Given that

the MPLA routinely utilizes the resources of the state, from the

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media to others, as part of the—there’s not an independence between the party and governance—it makes it particularly difficult

for any other political party to develop.

One last note about UNITA. UNITA and MPLA are fundamentally different than any of the other political parties, for a very interesting reason. There is no unanimity of thought within those

two political parties. Some of the smaller parties, there is not much

dissension from what the President of the party says. Even today,

as I traveled in, we were there in May, and I met with three different people in MPLA who, if dos Santos doesn’t run for President,

will run for President. Within UNITA, there are three or four people who I’ve had the opportunity to meet with who, if given the opportunity, will run for President. There is political debate going on

within UNITA, as a party. There’s political debate within MPLA

going on, as a party. And that is a great, positive sign to me about

the potential for those parties to engage in a broader debate on nationally important issues.

Senator FEINGOLD. How about the role that civil society plays in

influencing the course of public policy in Angola? I’ve seen, in different places around the world, especially in African countries,

what a very valuable role civil society can play. To what extent are

Angolan citizens able to engage in civic organizing?

Mr. KRAMER. Well, the biggest difficulty that the Angolans face

today is the fact that there is a registration process for civil society

organizations that, when organizations have the potential vote to

be perhaps significantly influential, they may not get the appropriate registration, or the registration process becomes delayed. It’s

something that we’ve heard about on a number of different occasions during both of our most recent trips to Luanda.

As I said in my opening remarks, one of the most exciting things

and exciting developments in the last two and a half years in

Luanda, in particular, not so much outside of Luanda: there are

two different worlds in Angola—but in Luanda, has been the emergency of civil society organizations. What’s critical at this juncture

is the ability to get them to talk to one another.

Now, the activism of some MPLA—I won’t call them ‘‘dissidents,’’ but at least internal critics in a couple of the new civil society organizations is a positive development. It remains to be seen whether

or not those are serious involvements and the politicos will pay attention to what civil society has to say.

I have very strong feelings about one of the—from my personal

opinion, one of the critical causes of this, and it’s the system of governance that Angola has chosen, in terms of elections. The MPs are

elected based on a party list, not to any defined constituency. There

are 90 of them who are elected, 5 per province. But many of those,

and I understand that conditions didn’t exist for extensive travel,

but many of those members of parliament who are elected from a

particular province haven’t been back there since 1992. I know that

NDI is doing a great job there of trying to take MPs out to do town

hall-type meetings to create the concept of constituency and the responsibility to constituency.

Today, the senior elected folks are responsible to the party and

to the President, who’s the one who ensures whether they get their

checks, their cars, those kinds of things.

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One other positive development in that vein is the fact that Angolans, in the constitutional revision, and the MPLA, while they’re

against election of Governors, because they consider Governors to

be an extension of state administration, the proposals—even the

MPLA proposal for a new constitution contemplated having local

elections, municipal and village councils, maybe mayors. As a political activist, that will grow the expectation—if it’s your friend or

your neighbor who’s your councilman or your mayor—you know,

Senator, people come to you when they need something, and if it’s

somebody you know, you tend to be more responsive. And something—that development is a positive one in Angola, which will

make a difference.

Senator FEINGOLD. Finally, let me ask you—because I’ve raised

issues in this regard when I’ve been to Angola, and I know many

others have—how free is the Angolan press, itself?

Mr. KRAMER. One of my dear friends has been in jail a number

of times because it’s not that free. Things are improving. Radio

Ecclesia is a great development. We hope that Radio Ecclesia will

get a nationwide permit. They have an application pending. But

open criticism of the government in the media is still not completely welcome. And it’s, more than anything, it’s just a historical

bias about the way things—it’s not that the journalists intentionally do it a lot of times.

I’ll close with the example that there was a call-in radio show on

national radio during one of the periods that we were there, and

somebody called in to be critical of the government and without

missing a beat, the DJ said, ‘‘Oh, you must be a UNITA guy.’’ And

he said, ‘‘No, I’m not a UNITA guy. I’ve been MPLA my entire life.’’

But it’s just something that’s ingrained historically, and it’s something that, with time, training, adequate resources, encouragement,

demand from the people, will change.

Senator FEINGOLD. Thank you.

I thank everyone who testified today. I think we all share a passion to see Angola succeed. But the context of these hearings has

been—this being the last—what we’ve described as ‘‘failed states.’’ And certainly that has been my observation with regard to Angola

in the 10 years that I’ve been in the Senate.

We very much, as a country, want to stay engaged in trying to

help Angola come out of that status, not simply because of the obviously important economic relationship we have with the country,

but because, as several of you have indicated, this is a country that

has enormous potential to be a beautiful and wonderful place in

the world. But it cannot be done without the reforms of the government and the recognition that the people of the country have to be

taken care of first. Otherwise, I fear that the country will continue

on the path that it has been on for far too long.

But I thank you all, and I assure those who are here that this

subcommittee will continue to work closely in terms of following

the events in Angola and to continue to strengthen our role with

regard to helping Angola succeed.

That concludes the hearing.

[Whereupon, at 11:30 a.m., the subcommittee adjourned, to reconvene subject to the call of the Chair.]

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ADDITIONAL QUESTIONS SUBMITTED FOR THE RECORD

RESPONSES OF HON. WALTER H. KANSTEINER, ASSISTANT SECRETARY OF STATE FOR

AFRICAN AFFAIRS, TO ADDITIONAL QUESTIONS FOR THE RECORD SUBMITTED BY THE

SENATE FOREIGN RELATIONS COMMITTEE

Question. The Agency for International Development has indicated that the Office

of Transition Initiatives will begin a program in Angola this fiscal year, but that

the program would not include the re-integration of UNITA ex-combatants because

the government of Angola has made a commitment to do so. To date, what has the

government of Angola done to support the re-integration of UNITA former soldiers?

What has the government of Angola done to support the re-integration and/or family

reunification of child soldiers and UNITA ‘‘wives’’ who were kidnapped into UNITA

ranks? In what specific ways has the U.S. government supported these efforts?

Answer. The Angolan Government has publicly committed to undertake the reintegration and resettlement of all former UNITA combatants and their family

members. Reunification of both child soldiers and UNITA ‘‘wives,’’ to the extent feasible, is to be included as part of these efforts. Under the April 4 Luena Agreement,

all UNITA personnel and family members were instructed to report to one of 35

quartering and family member reception areas located throughout the country.

Since that time 84,000 soldiers and approximately 300,000 family members have arrived at what are now termed ‘‘gathering’’ areas. Initial focus in the gathering areas was on the registration, disarmament, and decommissioning of UNITA combatants. This process was concluded on August 2. As

a first step to reintegration 5,007 UNITA members were identified for integration

into the Angolan Armed Forces and 40 for integration into the National Police. The

integration process is proceeding with training and assignments for those selected.

The first step towards resettlement and reintegration of the remaining demobilized combatants and their family members is to complete family registration in the

gathering areas. The Angolan Government in cooperation with the UN Office for the

Coordination of Humanitarian Affairs (OCHA) is finalizing this process.

The Angolan Government has established the National Commission for the Reintegration and Resettlement of the Demobilized and Displaced under the chairmanship of the Interior Minister, which will have the lead in the resettlement/reintegration process. We are concerned that the National Commission has not been provided

with adequate resources to carry out its responsibilities, including administration of

the gathering areas for which it technically assumed responsibility in August. Since

that time, the Commission has refused to coordinate adequately with humanitarian

operators and the international community on relief efforts in the camps. Camp administration has largely been left to the Angolan Armed Forces, which have not

been provided adequate resources to carry out this responsibility. The National

Commission has been working with the World Bank to design a reintegration/resettlement strategy, but regrettably this process has not adequately sought the full

input of relevant stakeholders, including UNITA and others in the international

community. Launch of the World Bank resettlement/reintegration program is expected in April, following the end of the rainy season. International humanitarian

operators agree that this is the earliest launch date possible due to logistical challenges.

The U.S. Government has been the largest international donor in the gathering areas. The USAID Office of Food for Peace has provided over $70 million to Angola

in FY 02, a portion of which has been used to support food aid needs in the gathering areas. The USAID Office of Foreign Disaster Assistance (OFDA) has arranged

three emergency airlifts and two sealifts of non-food items, including blankets, plastic sheeting, water containers, soap, kitchen sets, and health kits to the gathering

areas valued at $4 million. OFDA has awarded a $3 million grant to the UN Office

for the Coordination of Humanitarian Affairs to support an emergency response

fund to meet the needs of demobilized soldiers and family members.

As part of our support for resettlement, reintegration, and reunification activities,

OFDA has provided $3 million to the Food and Agriculture Organization for seeds

and tools to support resettlement of demobilized soldiers and family members.

OFDA is also working with NGO partners to expand coverage under existing programs to meet the humanitarian needs of former UNITA combatants and family

members who have left the gathering areas and moved to urban areas. The USAID

Office of Food for Peace, through its contribution to WFP supported resettlement activities estimated at $23 million in FY 02, and is working to develop a resettlement

program with a consortium of private voluntary organizations for FY 03.

Given the importance that the Administration attaches to well-organized reintegration and resettlement activities for former UNITA combatants and their famVerDate 11-MAY-2000 13:16 Dec 23, 2002 Jkt 000000 PO 00000 Frm 00037 Fmt 6633 Sfmt 6621 83470 SFORELA1 PsN: SFORELA1
34

ily members, our Embassy in Luanda continues to raise the issue as a critical part

of discussions in the Lusaka Protocol’s Joint Commission. We are concerned by recent Angolan Government statements that it intends to close the gathering areas

by the end of 2002. We and other international donors believe that such a move is

premature given that organized resettlement cannot realistically occur by that time.

We are continuing to pressure that Angolan Government at all levels to rescind this

decision and to fully cooperate in organizing a resettlement program over a realistic

timeframe for former UNITA combatants and family members.

Question. The World Food Program has indicated that its appeal for Angola has

been funded at less than thirty percent. The United States has been its most generous donor, according to the WFP country representative in Luanda. What diplomatic efforts by the United States are underway to ensure that the rest of the donor

community shoulders its share of the humanitarian response needed in Angola and

in the rest of the southern African region?

Answer. The United States through the USAID Office of Food for Peace and the

Department of Agriculture have contributed approximately $100 million in food assIstance to Angola in FY 2002. This assistance is channeled through the World Food

Program (WFP). Given the preeminence of the WFP role in providing food assistance to 1.9 million food insecure (mainly internally displaced) Angolans, we consider

it a priority to ensure that WFP has the necessary resources to fully meet humanitarian needs.

Key donor countries meet on a regular basis on Angola both in Luanda and in

New York to coordinate humanitarian assistance. As a part of those on-going consultations, the United States consistently underscores the need to ensure that adequate resources are provided to major international operators, including WFP, to

meet the humanitarian challenges in Angola. We have, thus far,been disappointed

by the response of other international donors to the WFP appeal for Angola and continue to encourage our partners to share the burden of providing support both to

Angola and to southern Africa as a whole.

Question. Your written testimony indicates that military to military contact between the United States and Angola will need to ‘‘increase,’’ and that an Expanded

Military Education and Training Program would be beneficial. What will the specifics of such an E-IMET program be? When will the program begin? Have plans

been developed for regular International Military Education and Training programs

for Angola? What specifically will such a program entail and when will it begin?

Answer. We anticipate initiating a small E-IMET program ($100,000) for Angola

in FY 03 conditioned on continued progress by the government on the peace process

and evenhanded treatment of former UNITA combatants. The initial program would

consist of the establishment of an English language laboratory in Luanda and the

training of English language instructors. Establishment of an adequate English language training capacity within the Angolan Armed Forces (FAA) is a useful step toward the goal of enabling FAA participation in regular IMET courses. Pending implementation of the initial E-IMET program, we have not begun planning for followon IMET activities.

In addition to establishing an English language laboratory and training language

qualified FAA personnel, we anticipate seeking FAA participation in other E-IMET

courses. The emphasis within this program will be on courses dealing with military

justice, defense resource management and civil-military relations, all areas in which

additional training is needed. As was noted in our FY 03 Congressional Budget Justification, such a limited IMET program will advance initiatives to promote greater

awareness in the Angolan military of democracy, human rights, the rule of law, and

effective civil military relations and improve the Angolan military’s ability to effectively interact with U.S. officials. Improved defense resource management will assist

efforts to increase budget transparency and accountability across the Angolan Government and ensure that all expenditures are on-budget in conformity with IMF requirements.

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