PUBLISHED

UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS

FOR THE FOURTH CIRCUIT

LARRY S. HYMAN, as Liquidating 

Trustee of Governmental Risk

Insurance Trust,

Plaintiff-Appellant,  No. 05-1981

v.

CITY OF GASTONIA,

Defendant-Appellee. 

Appeal from the United States District Court

for the Western District of North Carolina, at Charlotte.

Graham C. Mullen, Chief District Judge.

(CA-04-523-3)

Argued: May 22, 2006

Decided: October 16, 2006

Before WILLIAMS and GREGORY, Circuit Judges, and

Henry F. FLOYD, United States District Judge

for the District of South Carolina, sitting by designation.

Dismissed by published opinion. Judge Williams wrote the opinion,

in which Judge Gregory and Judge Floyd joined. 

COUNSEL

ARGUED: Lee S. Haramis, GRAY ROBINSON, P.A., Jacksonville,

Florida, for Appellant. Josephine Herring Hicks, PARKER, POE,

ADAMS & BERNSTEIN, L.L.P., Charlotte, North Carolina, for
Appellee. ON BRIEF: Daniel A. Nicholas, GRAY ROBINSON,

P.A., Jacksonville, Florida, for Appellant. Richard J. Rivera, PARKER, POE, ADAMS & BERNSTEIN, L.L.P., Charlotte, North Carolina, for Appellee. 

OPINION

WILLIAMS, Circuit Judge: 

Larry S. Hyman, the Liquidating Trustee for the Governmental

Risk Insurance Trust (GRIT), appeals the district court’s application

of North Carolina’s doctrine of abatement, which resulted in the dismissal of GRIT’s diversity action against the City of Gastonia, North

Carolina (Gastonia). For the reasons that follow, we dismiss the

appeal for lack of jurisdiction.

I.

GRIT is a workers’ compensation self-insurance fund that was

formed to provide workers’ compensation insurance to governmental

entities. Gastonia entered into a contract with GRIT for GRIT to provide workers’ compensation insurance in exchange for premiums that

Gastonia paid to GRIT. The contract was in effect until March 2000,

when GRIT filed for bankruptcy. 

In November 2002, GRIT sued Gastonia in Florida state court

under various state-law contract theories alleging that Gastonia owed

it $701,431.52 in unpaid premiums. Gastonia removed the case to the

United States District Court for the Middle District of Florida based

on diversity of citizenship. See 28 U.S.C.A. § 1441 (West 1994 &

Supp. 2006); § 1332 (West 1993). After removing the case, Gastonia

filed a motion to dismiss arguing, inter alia, that venue was improper,

see Fed. R. Civ. P. 12(b)(3), that service of process was insufficient,

see Fed. R. Civ. P. 12(b)(5), and that the complaint failed to state a

claim upon which relief could be granted, see Fed. R. Civ. P.

12(b)(6), because the statute of limitations had run. The Florida district court agreed that venue was improper and transferred the case to

the United States District Court for the Western District of North Car2 HYMAN v. CITY OF GASTONIA
olina. Thereafter, the North Carolina district court granted Gastonia’s

Rule 12(b)(5) motion to dismiss for insufficient service of process and

dismissed the action without prejudice.1See Fed. R. Civ. P. 41(b)

("For failure of the plaintiff to prosecute or to comply with [the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure] or any order of the court, a defendant

may move for dismissal of an action . . . ."). GRIT appealed the district court’s dismissal. Hyman v. City of Gastonia (Hyman I), 137 F.

App’x 536 (4th Cir. 2005) (unpublished). 

While GRIT’s appeal in Hyman I was pending in this court, GRIT

filed a second diversity action (Hyman II) against Gastonia in the

same North Carolina district court, this time properly effecting service. GRIT’s second action set forth the same claims, involved the

same transactions and occurrences, and sought relief identical to that

sought in GRIT’s first action. Indeed, as GRIT candidly admits,

Hyman II is the "same cause of action" as Hyman I. (Appellant’s Br.

at 21.) Gastonia moved under Rule 12(b)(6) to dismiss Hyman II,

arguing that the complaint failed to state a claim upon which relief

could be granted because it was subject to dismissal under North Carolina’s doctrine of abatement. Under this doctrine, a defendant may

assert, as an affirmative defense requiring dismissal, that a substantially identical, earlier-filed action is pending on appeal. Clark v. Craven Reg’l Med. Auth., 387 S.E.2d 168, 171 (N.C. 1990). 

On February 7, 2005, the North Carolina district court granted Gastonia’s motion, holding that this was "a classic case for application of

the doctrine of abatement" under North Carolina law. (J.A. at 340.)

On May 23, 2005, we affirmed the district court’s dismissal in Hyman

I. 137 F. App’x at 537. The district court granted GRIT leave to file

an out-of-time notice of appeal in Hyman II, and on August 18, 2005,

GRIT filed its notice of appeal. 

1GRIT’s service of process was improper because GRIT failed to

deliver the summons and complaint to the appropriate Gastonia officials.

HYMAN v. CITY OF GASTONIA 3
II.

A.

GRIT primarily argues that the district court erred in dismissing

Hyman II because application of North Carolina’s doctrine of abatement is inconsistent with the district court’s Rule 41(b) withoutprejudice dismissal of Hyman I and, under Erie R. Co. v. Tompkins,

304 U.S. 64 (1938), Rule 41(b), not North Carolina’s doctrine of

abatement, should apply. 

We have an obligation to inquire into jurisdictional issues sua

sponte. Ridpath v. Bd. of Governors Marshall Univ., 447 F.3d 292,

304 (4th Cir. 2006). Therefore, after we heard oral argument in this

case, we directed the parties to submit supplemental briefs on whether

we have the authority to consider Hyman’s appeal in light of 28

U.S.C.A. § 2105 (West 1994) ("There shall be no reversal in the

Supreme Court or a court of appeals for error in ruling upon matters

in abatement which do not involve jurisdiction.").2

We now conclude that we lack jurisdiction to hear Hyman’s appeal

because the district court dismissed this case under North Carolina’s

doctrine of abatement. Although § 2105 has existed, with slightly different wording, since the Judiciary Act of 1789, see Stephens v.

Monongahela Nat. Bank, 111 U.S. 197 (1884), there have been few

applications of this statute, and we have no relevant precedents interpreting its provisions.3

 Nevertheless, we conclude that § 2105 bars our

2We note that because this appeal involves a final decision of the district court to dismiss GRIT’s suit under North Carolina’s doctrine of

abatement, 28 U.S.C.A. § 1291 (West 1993) would allow for our review.

See id. ("The court of appeals . . . shall have jurisdiction of appeals from

all final decisions of the district courts . . . ."). Jurisdiction over this

appeal is not conferred, however, if another statute bars appellate review.

3An earlier version of 28 U.S.C.A. § 2105 (West 1994) prohibited

reversals for errors in a district court’s findings of fact, and this provision

was cited in Virginian Ry. Co. v. Armentrout, 166 F.2d 400, 408 (4th Cir.

1948). Section 2105 no longer includes such language. Luxenberg v.

United States, 45 F.2d 497 (4th Cir. 1930), held that § 2105 applies to

criminal trials, but the Supreme Court reversed Luxenberg in Roche v.

Evaporated Milk Ass’n, 319 U.S. 21 (1943) (holding that § 2105 is inapplicable to criminal trials). 

4 HYMAN v. CITY OF GASTONIA
consideration of this appeal because (1) the district court’s abatement

ruling falls within the strictures of § 2105 as interpreted by the

Supreme Court, and (2) the statute deprives us of appellate jurisdiction to review the district court’s abatement ruling. 

B.

1.

Section 2105 places restrictions on appellate review of "matters in

abatement," but the statute does not define that phrase. Generally

speaking, abatement refers to "[t]he suspension or defeat of a pending

action for a reason unrelated to the merits of the claim." Black’s Law

Dictionary 3 (8th ed. 2004). At common law, abatement is the equivalent of a dismissal, and it results from the defendant raising some procedural or formality error in the plaintiff’s action. 1 Am. Jur. 2d

Abatement, Survival, and Revival § 1 (2006). Examples of abatement

defenses include (1) a defense of prematurity, i.e., that the plaintiff

commenced the lawsuit before the underlying cause of action

accrued; (2) a defense that the plaintiff’s interest in the pending lawsuit has terminated or transferred to another party; (3) a defense that

a lawsuit cannot proceed because of the death of either the plaintiff

or the defendant; and (4) a defense that there is a separate, identical

lawsuit pending. 1 Am. Jur. 2d Abatement, Survival, and Revival

§§ 1-44. Because abatement defenses defeat the particular action for

procedural defects that are unrelated to the merits of the plaintiff’s

claim, the plaintiff can typically correct the defects and proceed in

another action. See Bowles v. Wilke, 175 F.2d 35, 38 (7th Cir. 1949)

(noting that an abatement defense defeats the pending action but not

the cause of action). 

To decide whether § 2105 applies to this case, however, we need

not determine whether "matters in abatement" include each of the

abatement defenses listed above. Instead, we can rest solely on the

Supreme Court’s decisions in Piquignot v. Penn. R. Co., 57 U.S. 104

(1853), and Stephens.

4

4These cases addressed an earlier statutory incarnation of § 2105.

There are no relevant differences between the earlier statute and § 2105.

HYMAN v. CITY OF GASTONIA 5
In Piquignot, the plaintiff sued the defendant in state court and

then, while the state court suit was pending, sued the defendant in federal trial court on the same cause of action. 57 U.S. at 104. The defendant raised as an abatement defense the fact that the state court suit

was pending, and the federal court ruled for the defendant. The

Supreme Court concluded that § 2105 applied to this type of abatement defense and accordingly refused to review the federal court’s

abatement ruling. Id.

Stephens involved the same abatement defense, i.e., that the federal

court should not proceed in the case because of a pending state court

suit between the same litigants for the same cause of action. 111 U.S.

at 197. Citing Piquignot, the Supreme Court held that an abatement

defense that "another action [was] pending" fell within the meaning

of § 2105 and that the Court could not review the federal court’s ruling on that defense. Id. The Supreme Court explained that § 2105 bars

appellate review of a ruling on an abatement defense because "[t]he

defense is one which merely defeats the present proceeding," and

therefore does not address the merits of the action or prevent the

plaintiff from suing in the future. Id.

Piquignot and Stephens set forth the rule that whatever else the

phrase "matters in abatement" means in the context of § 2105, it

surely encompasses a ruling in which a trial court dismisses a case

because there is a separate, identical pending case. This rule covers

the exact circumstances here: the district court dismissed Hyman II

because of GRIT’s identical, pending action in Hyman I. Because the

Supreme Court has held that such a ruling involves a "matter in abatement" under § 2105, we conclude that the statute applies to our

review of the district court’s abatement ruling.5See also Teixeira v.

Goodyear Tire & Rubber Co., 261 F.2d 153, 154 (1st Cir. 1958)

(holding that § 2105 applies to a judgment of abatement for another

action pending); Green v. Underwood, 86 F. 427, 430 (8th Cir. 1898)

(same); 15A Charles Alan Wright, Arthur R. Miller, & Edward H.

Cooper, Federal Practice & Procedure § 3903 (2d ed. 1992) ("By far

the most common cases in which [§ 2105] has been invoked involve

5We note that nothing in this opinion implies that § 2105’s force

should be extended beyond the scope of the Supreme Court’s prior interpretations of the statute. 

6 HYMAN v. CITY OF GASTONIA
rulings on motions to stay proceedings in deference to an action pending in another court."). 

2.

GRIT offers three unpersuasive arguments for why § 2105 does not

apply to this case. First, GRIT contends that the district court’s abatement ruling was not a "matter in abatement" within the meaning of

§ 2105 because although a dismissal under abatement typically leaves

a plaintiff free to recommence the legal action, here GRIT could be

barred by the statute of limitations from bringing a future action; consequently, GRIT asserts that this dismissal affects the merits of

GRIT’s suit. GRIT errs by conflating the nature of the district court’s

abatement ruling with its potential effects. Like other withoutprejudice dismissals that contemplate the plaintiff refiling a new

action, abatement does not exempt a new action from a statute of limitations defense. See Mendez v. Elliot, 45 F.3d 75, 78 (4th Cir. 1995)

(concluding that while a "without prejudice" dismissal "permits a

plaintiff to refile the complaint as if it had never been filed . . . . [it]

does not, however, give the [plaintiff] a right to refile without the consequences of time defenses, such as the statute of limitations").

Although any new action by GRIT may be subject to a statute of limitations defense, that does not transform the district court’s abatement

ruling in this case into a decision on the merits. 

Second, GRIT contends that the district court’s abatement ruling

fits within § 2105’s exception for "rulings on matters in abatement

which . . . involve jurisdiction" because the district court was in effect

deciding not to exercise its jurisdiction. See Aetna State Bank v.

Altheimer, 430 F.2d 750, 753-54 (7th Cir. 1970) (concluding that

§ 2105’s exception for rulings which involve jurisdiction allows

appellate review of a district court’s decision to abstain from exercising jurisdiction), overruled on other grounds by Calvert Fire Ins. Co.

v. Will, 560 F.2d 792 (7th Cir. 1977). We disagree that the word "jurisdictional" in § 2105 reaches such a broad definition. Otherwise, the

statute’s exception would "swallow[ ] the entire rule" because "all

matters of abatement . . . involve the same basic question whether the

court should presently exercise its jurisdiction." Wright, Miller, &

Cooper, supra, § 3903. Moreover, the broad definition of "jurisdiction" that GRIT propounds is contrary to the Supreme Court’s appliHYMAN v. CITY OF GASTONIA 7
cation of § 2105 in Piquignot and Stephens, in which the Court

concluded that abatement rulings identical to the one in this case fell

within § 2105’s bar, not its exception. 

Finally, GRIT contends that § 2105 does not apply here because

the district court erroneously applied North Carolina’s doctrine of

abatement under the Erie doctrine. We disagree. The statute explicitly

prohibits appellate reversal for "errors in rulings upon matters in

abatement." 28 U.S.C.A. § 2105 (emphasis added). This broad prohibition applies to all non-jurisdictional errors and contains no exceptions for an erroneous choice of law. Therefore, even if GRIT is

correct that the district court erred by applying North Carolina’s doctrine of abatement, § 2105 prohibits our correction of that error.

C.

Having determined that the district court’s dismissal under North

Carolina’s doctrine of abatement falls within § 2105 because it is a

ruling on a "matter in abatement," we must now determine if § 2105

is jurisdictional in the sense that it restricts our authority to review the

district court’s ruling. We keep in mind the Supreme Court’s admonition that we not loosely characterize a statute as "jurisdictional" when

it is actually a claim-processing rule that can be forfeited. Kontrick v.

Ryan, 540 U.S. 443, 454 (2004) ("Jurisdiction . . . is a word of many,

too many, meanings." (internal quotation marks omitted)). Properly

used, "jurisdiction" refers to the "classes of cases . . . falling within

a court’s adjudicatory authority." Id. at 455. 

Section 2105 does not use typical modern-day jurisdictional language. For example, the statute does not state that abatement rulings

are "not reviewable" or that the court of appeals "lacks jurisdiction."

See, e.g., Things Remembered, Inc. v. Petrarca, 516 U.S. 124, 128-29

(1995) (concluding that there is no appellate jurisdiction over an order

that a statute specifies as "not reviewable"). Instead, the statute states

that "[t]here shall be no reversal" of an abatement ruling. Because of

this peculiar language, some courts of appeals have held — or at least

implied — that § 2105 only deprives courts of jurisdiction to reverse.

See Merchs. Ins. Co. v. Lilgeomont, Inc., 84 F.2d 685, 687 (5th Cir.

1936) ("The statute indeed prohibits only a reversal, and we shall not

reverse."); United States v. Alcon Labs., 636 F.2d 876, 885 n.2 (1st

8 HYMAN v. CITY OF GASTONIA
Cir. 1981) (concluding that § 2105 did not bar review, in part because

the disposition of the case — vacate and remand — was "not, technically, a ‘reversal’"). According to these courts’ reasoning, an appellate court must examine the merits of the abatement ruling before

determining whether jurisdiction exists: if the abatement ruling was

correct, jurisdiction exists to affirm; but if the abatement ruling was

in error, the case must be dismissed. 

We respectfully disagree with this interpretation of § 2105 and note

that it raises a serious constitutional issue: by restricting the authority

of appellate courts to change the result, the statute strongly suggests

that any appellate review of abatement rulings would be purely advisory and therefore be beyond a federal court’s Article III powers. See

Wright, Miller, & Cooper, supra, § 3903 n.24 ("Since [appellate]

courts lack power [under § 2105] to reverse, the result of unfavorable

review would be purely advisory and beyond the limits of Article

III."); United States v. Evans, 213 U.S. 297, 301 (1909) (noting that

federal courts lack constitutional authority to give advisory opinions);

11126 Baltimore Blvd. v. Prince George’s County, Md., 924 F.2d

557, 558 (4th Cir. 1991) (dismissing appeal for lack of jurisdiction

because appellant was seeking an advisory opinion). 

We need not address this constitutional issue, however, because the

better interpretation of § 2105 — one that avoids the constitutional

problem — is that the statute completely deprives this court of authority to review the district court’s abatement ruling. See Solid Waste

Agency of Northern Cook County v. U.S. Army Corps of Eng’rs, 531

U.S. 159, 173 (2001) ("[W]here an otherwise acceptable construction

of a statute would raise serious constitutional problems, the Court will

construe the statute to avoid such problems unless such construction

is plainly contrary to the intent of Congress." (internal quotation

marks omitted)). 

A brief review of the Judiciary Act of 1789, coupled with the

Supreme Court’s decision in Stephens, confirms that the dated language of § 2105 was meant to exclude abatement rulings from appellate jurisdiction. See Act of Sept. 24, 1789, § 22, 1 Stat. 73, 84-85.

Section 22 of the Judiciary Act established appellate jurisdiction over

"final decrees and judgments in civil actions" in district courts. Id.;

see Piquignot, 57 U.S. at 104 ("The twenty-second section of the

HYMAN v. CITY OF GASTONIA 9
Judiciary Act . . . defines what decrees or judgments in civil actions

may be made the subjects of appeals . . . ."). After setting forth this

general appellate jurisdiction, however, Congress added some exceptions to appellate jurisdiction, including the exception that "there shall

be no reversal . . . for error[s]" in abatement rulings. Act of Sept. 24,

1789, § 22, 1 Stat. 84-85. The purpose of this language was to permit

appellate jurisdiction over a case, which could include multiple rulings subject to appellate review, while excluding abatement rulings

from appellate review. See Charles Warren, New Light on the History

of the Federal Judiciary Act of 1789, 37 Harv. L. Rev. 49, 104 (1923)

(stating that the words "no reversal" were used to remove appellate

jurisdiction over certain rulings). The Supreme Court’s application of

§ 2105 in Stephens confirms this reading. In that case, after determining that the abatement ruling fell within the strictures of § 2105, the

Court declined to analyze the correctness of the abatement ruling,

stating that the abatement ruling "‘was not subject to . . . revision.’"

Stephens, 111 U.S. at 198 (quoting Piquignot). The Court went on,

however, to analyze the merits of other issues raised on appeal. 

The statute, then, is best read as excluding from general grants of

appellate jurisdiction an appellate court’s authority to review abatement rulings. Thus, we agree with the courts that have concluded that

§ 2105 completely deprives appellate courts of jurisdiction to review

the merits of a district court’s abatement ruling. See Teixeira, 261

F.2d at 154 (concluding that § 2105 completely deprives an appellate

court of jurisdiction to review an abatement ruling); Bowles, 175 F.2d

at 38 (same); Green, 86 F. at 430 (same). 

III.

Section 2105 may be "[o]ne of the most commonly ignored provisions of the Judicial Code . . . ." Wright, Miller, & Cooper, supra,

§ 3903. Regardless, the statute remains in effect, and we are bound to

consider it. Moreover, the Supreme Court applied § 2105 in Piquignot

and Stephens to abatement rulings indistinguishable from the abatement ruling in this case. Although they are old cases, their continuing

vitality has never been called into question by the Court. We therefore

must heed the instruction that "[i]f a precedent of [the] Court has

direct application in a case," we must follow it, "leaving to [the] Court

the prerogative of overruling its own decisions." Agostini v. Felton,

10 HYMAN v. CITY OF GASTONIA
521 U.S. 203, 237 (1997). Because the only issue in this appeal —

whether the district court properly dismissed Hyman II because

Hyman I was pending on appeal — is an abatement ruling that falls

within provisions of § 2105, we do not have appellate jurisdiction to

review the district court’s dismissal. We accordingly dismiss GRIT’s

appeal.

DISMISSED

HYMAN v. CITY OF GASTONIA 11