## COURT OF APPEALS SECOND DISTRICT OF TEXAS FORT WORTH NO. 02 - 15 - 00464 - CR NO. 02 - 15 - 00465 - CR

DAVID ALLEN RUSSELL APPELLANT V. THE STATE OF TEXAS STATE

---------- FROM THE 396TH DISTRICT COURT OF TARRANT COUNTY

TRIAL COURT NO S . 0750351D, 07 47847D

---------- 

### MEMORANDUM OPINION 1

---------- These appeals arise out of Appellant David Allen Russell’s 2010 convictions for indecency with a child by contact. We previously affirmed those convictions on direct appeal. 2 The convictions became final when our mandate

1 See Tex. R. App. P. 47.4.

2 See Russell v. State , 341 S.W.3d 526 , 528 (Tex. App.

— Fort Worth 2011, no pet.).2

issued on June 16, 2011. See Ex parte Webb , 270 S.W.3d 108, 111 (Tex. Crim. App. 2008) (“It has long been the rule that a conviction from which an appeal has been taken is final . . . when the clerk of the court of appeals issues that cou rt’s mandate.”). On September 17, 2015 , Russell filed

— in both trial court cases

— a “Motion to Reform Judgment,” asking that the trial court reduce his sentence s due to alleged ineffective assistance of counse l during the hearing on the State’s motion
to r evoke his community supervision

. The motion also complains that Russell’s prior application for writ of habeas corpus was erroneously denied by the court of criminal appeals and requests the trial court set a hearing on the motion. The motion remains pen ding in both cases

. Russell filed notices of appeal, stating that “it has been more than sixty (60) days since the motion to reform the
sentence [s]

. . . and [ it ] should be ruled upon . . . . ” We generally do not have jurisdiction over proceedings re lated to a collateral attack of a final felony conviction. See, e.g. , Olivo v. State , 918 S.W.2d 519, 525 n. 8 (Tex. Crim. App. 1996) (explaining that the exclusive post

conviction remedy with regard to final felony convictions is through a writ of habeas corpus); Ater v. Eight h Court of Appeals , 802 S.W.2d 241, 243 (Tex. Crim. App. 1991) (orig. proceeding) (holding that the court of criminal appeals is “the only court with jurisdiction in final post

- conviction felony proceedings”)

. We also lack jurisdicti on when the trial court has not entered any appealable orders. See McKown v. State , 915 S.W.2d 160 , 160 (Tex. App.

— Fort Worth 1996, no3

pet.) (“Because we find that this appeal does not concern an appealable order, we dismiss this appeal for want of jurisd iction.”). On December 23, 2015, we sent a letter to Russell to inform him that we received his notices of appeal and that we were concerned that we lacked jurisdiction over the appeals because the trial court had not entered any appealable orders. We inf ormed Russell that we would dismiss the appeals for want of jurisdiction unless he or any party desiring to continue the appeal s filed a response showing grounds for continuing them within ten days . Although Russell filed a response, it does not r aise gro unds for continuing these appeal s

. The trial court has not entered any appealable order, and the court of criminal appeals

— not the trial court or us

— has exclusive jurisdiction over Russell’s post

- conviction felony challenge. See Olivo , 918 S.W.2d at 525 n. 8; Ater , 802 S.W.2d at 243; McKown , 915 S.W.2d at 160. 3 Accordingly, these appeals are dismissed for want of jurisdiction. See Tex. R. App. P. 43.2(f).

PER CURIAM
PANEL: WALKER, MEIER, and GABRIEL, JJ.

3 Alternatively, to the extent Russell’s notices of appeal co uld be liberally construed as petition s for writ s of mandamu s, he has failed to demonstrate that the trial court has jurisdiction to rule on his motion. See In re Belton , No. 12

- 13

- 00293

- CR, 2014 WL 2003108, at *1 (Tex. App.

— Tyler May 14, 2014, no pet.) (orig. proceeding) (mem. op., not designated for publication) (“Unless the trial court has jurisdiction, mandamus is not available to compel the court to rule on a motion that is filed after the judgment becomes final.”).4

DO NOT PUBLISH Tex. R. App. P. 47.2(b)
DELI VERED: February 25, 2016