UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS
FOR THE TENTH CIRCUIT

________________ _________________ KRIS K. AGRAWAL, Plaintiff - Appellant,

v. COURTS OF OKLAHOMA; RICHARD V. OGDEN, Defendants - Appellees. No. 18-6144 (D.C. No. 5:18- CV-00396-D) (W.D. Okla.)

________________ _________________ ORDER AND JUDGMENT *

________________ _________________ Before McHUGH , BALDOCK , and KELLY , Circuit Judges.

________________ _________________ Kris K. Agrawal appeals pro se f rom the district court’s dismis sal of his complaint asserting due process claims against Richard V. Ogden , a state District Court judge. 1 The court held that Agrawal’s claims against Judge Ogden were barred

* After examining the briefs and appellate record, this panel ha s determined unanimously to honor the parties ’ request for a decision on the briefs without oral argument. See Fed. R. App. P. 34(f); 10th Cir . R. 34.1(G). The case is ther efore submitted without oral argument. T his order and judgment is no t binding precedent, except under the doctrines of la w of the case, res judicata, an d collateral estoppel. It may be cited, however, for its persuasive value consistent with Fed. R. App. P. 32.1 and 10th Cir. R. 32.1.

1 We construe Agrawal’s claims as brought pursuant to 42 U.S.C. § 1983. FILED United States Court of Appeals Tenth Circuit 

### March 12, 2019
Elisabeth A. Shumaker Clerk of Court2 by the doctrine of absol ute judicial immunity. 2 Exercising jurisdiction under 28 U.S.C. § 1291, we affirm. Judge Ogden presided in a wage c laim and collection action invo lving Agrawal in Oklahoma County Distr ict Court. In his federal cour t complaint, Agrawal alleged that Judge Ogden violate d his right to due process by r efusing to recuse and by presiding over the state-cour t action in violation of the au tomatic bankruptcy stay pursuant to 11 U.S.C. § 362(a) . Judge Odgen moved to dismiss t he claims against him under Fed. R. Civ. P. 12(b)(1) and (6). The district court granted the motion, holding that Judge Odgen was entitle d to absolute judicial immu nity. Agrawal appeals the dismissal or der entered July 9, 2018. 3
We review de novo whether a de fendant is immune from suit. Collins v.
Daniels , __ F.3d __, 2019 WL 908645, at *8 (10th Cir. Feb. 25, 2019). The appropriate inquiry in dete rmining whether a particular jud ge is immune is whether the challenged action was “judicial,” and whe ther at the time the challenged action was ta ken, the judge had subject mat ter jurisdiction. Stated differently, judges are liable only when they act in “clear absence of all jurisdiction” ; they are absolutely immune even when their action is erroneous, malic ious, or in excess of their jud icial authority. Van Sickle v. Holloway , 791 F.2d 1431, 1435 (10th Cir. 1986) (citation omitted) (quot ing Stump v. Sparkman , 435 U.S. 349, 356-57 (1978)). T he district court held that A grawal

2 Agrawal does not challenge on a ppeal the district court’s dism issal of his claims against the oth er named defendant, the “Courts of Oklaho ma.”

3 Agrawal has not appealed the dis trict court’s order denying hi s post-judgment motion to recons ider the dismissal order. See R., Vol. 2 at 7 (notice of appeal designating “Order dated 7/9/18”); Fed. R. App. P. 3(c)( 1)(B) (notice of appeal must “designate the judgme nt, order, or part thereof bei ng appealed”).3 alleged no facts suggesting that J udge Ogden did not act in his judicial capacity or that he took action in a clear abs ence of all jurisdiction. Agrawal’s appeal briefs are pro lix and primarily address the me rits of the wage claim and related collection action in state court—issues that are not before this court. But because he appears pro se, w e have liberally construed his filings “and have tried to discern the kernel of the issues []he wishes to present on appe al.” de Silva v. Pitts , 481 F.3d 1279, 1283 n.4 (10th Cir. 2007). T o the extent that A grawal does address the basis for the district court’s di smissal of his claims against Judge Ogden, he does not contend that Judge Ogden’s actio ns were non-judicial. He appea rs to argue that Judge Odgen acted in the clear absence of all jurisdiction because (1 ) he refused to recuse, violating Agrawal’s right to du e process, and (2) he took actio n in the state-court case in violation of the automatic ba nkruptcy stay. Neither contention has merit. “[T]he scope of the judge’s juri sdiction must be construed broa dly where the issue is the immunity of the judge.” Stump , 435 U.S. at 356. Moreover, there is “[a] distinction . . . between excess of jurisdiction and the clear absence of all jurisdiction over the subject-matter.” Id. at 356 n.6 (internal quotati on marks omitted). Nothing in Agrawal’s complaint suggested that Judge Odgen lacked subjec t-matter jurisdiction over the state-c ourt proceedings before him. See Van Sickle , 791 F.2d at 1435. Indeed, Oklahoma state Dist rict Courts are courts of gen eral jurisdiction. See Okla. Const. art. VII, § 7(a) (“ The District Court shall have u nlimited original jurisdiction of all justiciable matters . . . and such powers o f review of administrative action as may be provi ded by statute.”).4 Agrawal first contends that J udge Ogden is not immune because t he Judge deprived him of due process by c ontinuing to participate in the state-court case while Agrawal’s motion to disqualify was pending. But where the cour t is one of general jurisdiction, a judge’s alleged procedural error does not rende r him liable in damages for the consequences of his judicial action. See Stump , 435 U.S

. at 359-60. This is so even where, as here, the error is alleged to have resulted i n a denial of due process.
See id. at 359 (rejecting contention th at judicial immunity does not a pply where a judge “fail[s] to comply with ele mentary principles of procedur al due process” (internal quotation marks omitted)). Alternatively, Agrawal argues that Judge Ogden is not immune be cause the Judge took action in the state-c ourt case while an involuntary bankruptcy was pending against Agrawal. 4 This court has held that a c ourt “lack[s] power” to enter an order affecting a debtor whe n proceedings are stayed pursuan t to 11 U.S.C. § 362(a), and that “any action ta ken in violation of the stay i s void and without effect.” Ellis v. Consol. Diesel Elec. Corp. , 894 F.2d 371, 372-73 (10th Cir. 1990). But an automatic bankruptcy sta y did not depri ve Judge Ogden of subject-matter jurisdiction, bro adly construed, over the state-court case. Th us, even were Judge Ogden to take action in violati on of the stay, his act would no t be in a clear absence

4 Judge Ogden asserts that no bankr uptcy stay was in place, but he appears to overlook In re Agrawal , No. 16-11253 (Bankr. W.D . Okla.), an involuntary bankruptcy petition filed agains t Agrawal by a number of his cr editors. That case was pending from April 4, 2016, t hrough January 22, 2019. Agra wal referenced this bankruptcy case in an exhibit to his complaint. See R., Vol. 1 at 72-81.5 of all jurisdiction, and he woul d therefore still be immune fro m suit. See Womack v. Mays (In re Womack) , 253 B.R. 241, 242-43 (Bankr. E.D. Ark. 2000) (holding judicial immunity “holds true even where the action seeks damag es for violation of the automatic stay”); Coates v. Peachtree Apar tments (In re Coates) , 108 B.R. 823, 825 (Bankr. M.D. Ga. 1989) (same). Finally, Agrawal argues in his r eply brief that he did not seek monetary damages from Judge Ogden in his c omplaint. To the extent he cl aims that his complaint sought only injunctiv e relief and that Judge Ogden is therefore not immune, see Pulliam v. Allen , 466 U.S. 522, 541-42 (1984) , we decline to consider that contention. First, “[t]his court does not ordinarily revi ew issues raised for the first time in a reply brief.” Stump v. Gates , 211 F.3d 527, 533 ( 10th Cir. 2000). Additionally, the contention is perfunctory, at best. See Murrell v. Shalala , 43 F.3d 1388, 1389 n.2 (10th Cir. 1994) ( “[P]erfunctory complaints fail to frame and develop an issue sufficient to invoke appellate rev iew.”). Although we liberally construe Agrawal’s pro se briefs, we “wil l not craft a party’s arguments for him.” Perry v. Woodward , 199 F.3d 1126, 1141 n.13 (10th Cir. 1999). 5

5 In any event, Agrawal cannot obt ain injunctive relief against Judge Ogden under § 1983. See Knox v. Bland , 632 F.3d. 1290, 1292 (10th Cir. 2011) (holding that the Federal Courts Improve ment Act of 1996 precludes injun ctive relief against a judicial officer under § 1983); 42 U.S.C. § 1983 (providing tha t “in any action brought against a judicial officer for an act or omission taken in such officer’s judicial capacity, injunctive reli ef shall not be granted unles s a declaratory decree was violated or declarator y relief was unavailable”).6 The judgment of the district c ourt is affirmed. Judge Ogden’s motion to dismiss the appeal is denied as moot.

Entered for the Court

Paul J. Kelly, Jr. Circuit Judge