Filed 4/19/21 P. v. Chalquest CA2/6

NOT TO BE PUBLISHED IN THE OFFICIAL REPORTS

California Rules of Court, rule 8.1115(a), prohibits courts and parties from citing or relying on opinions 

not certified for publication or ordered published, except as specified by rule 8.1115(b). This opinion 

has not been certified for publication or ordered published for purposes of rule 8.1115. 

IN THE COURT OF APPEAL OF THE STATE OF CALIFORNIA

SECOND APPELLATE DISTRICT

DIVISION SIX

THE PEOPLE,

 Plaintiff and Respondent,

v.

CHRISTINE ELLEN 

CHALQUEST,

 Defendant and Appellant.

2d Crim. No. B302637

(Super. Ct. No. 2019002076)

(Ventura County)

Christine Ellen Chalquest appeals from the judgment 

after a jury convicted her of driving under the influence of alcohol 

with a qualifying prior conviction (Veh. Code,1 §§ 23550.5, subd. 

(a), 23152, subd. (a); count 1), a felony, and driving with a blood 

alcohol content over 0.08% with a qualifying prior conviction 

(§§ 23550.5, subd. (a), 23152, subd. (b); count 2), a felony. 

Chalquest admitted she had a prior conviction for driving under 

1 Further unspecified statutory provisions are to the 

Vehicle Code. 
2

the influence and causing bodily injury (§ 23153, subd. (a)). The 

trial court placed her on probation for five years with terms, 

including one year in county jail.

Chalquest contends the trial court erred when it 

admitted into evidence her statements obtained in violation of

Miranda.

2 We affirm.

FACTUAL AND PROCEDURAL HISTORY

The Traffic Collision

L.B. was stopped at a traffic light around noon when 

Chalquest hit L.B.’s car from behind. L.B. honked her horn to get 

Chalquest’s attention, but Chalquest continued driving. L.B. 

followed Chalquest. 

When Chalquest stopped in a parking lot, L.B. 

approached Chalquest and asked her why she did not stop. 

Chalquest “looked like she didn’t seem to know exactly what 

happened.” Chalquest said that she knew she hit a car, but did 

not know what happened to the car. L.B. had to ask Chalquest 

for her insurance information four times before Chalquest 

produced the information.

About an hour later, Chalquest drove to her place of 

employment. An individual who worked next door saw Chalquest 

park in her usual spot in an “odd” and “crooked[]” way. The 

individual also noticed the car was dented in the front.

About twenty minutes later, ambulance and 

firefighters arrived at the location to treat Chalquest. Two 

Ventura County police officers were also dispatched to 

investigate an “injury collision.” When the officers arrived, 

Chalquest was sitting in the back of the ambulance. Officer

2 Miranda v. Arizona (1966) 384 U.S. 436. 
3

Christopher Aguilar spoke to the fire captain, who said that 

Chalquest reported an injury from an earlier collision and that 

she had “consumed approximately five to ten 20-ounce alcoholic 

beverages.”

The Interview

Chalquest was transported to a hospital, where the 

two officers interviewed her. When they arrived, Chalquest was 

sleeping on a hospital stretcher, and the officers had to wake her 

up. Aguilar testified he “immediately noticed that she had red 

and watery eyes, she had very slurred speech, and she had a 

strong odor of alcohol emitting from her body.”

The interview lasted about two to three hours. 

During that time, the officers went “back and forth trying to talk 

to [Chalquest]” while they did paperwork, Chalquest went “in 

and out of sleep,” and the medical personnel took tests and 

treated her.

Chalquest told the officers she “rear-ended” a car 

earlier that day. Aguilar asked if she had consumed alcohol or 

taken any medication. Chalquest responded that she had 

consumed alcohol and taken medication that made her drowsy

“between the hours of 9:00 a.m. and noon that day.” She 

admitted that she was “guilty” of “driving while intoxicated.”

While Chalquest was answering questions, another

officer began administering a horizontal gaze nystagmus test. 

Aguilar noticed that Chalquest’s eyes were “immediate[ly]

bouncing,” which indicated that there was “a good amount of 

alcohol in her system.” The officer could not complete the test 

because Chalquest “became uncooperative and turned her body 

away” from the officer. At the end of the interview, the officers 

placed Chalquest under arrest and gave her Miranda warnings.
4

Hospital personnel took a sample of Chalquest’s blood

at 3:42 p.m. She had a blood alcohol content of 0.305%. The 

officers found 14 empty beer bottles in a bag inside Chalquest’s 

car trunk.

DISCUSSION

Custodial Interrogation

Chalquest contends the trial court erred when it 

admitted her interview with the officers into evidence because 

her statements were obtained in violation of Miranda. We 

disagree.

Miranda warnings are only required when a person 

is subject to custodial interrogation. (Miranda, supra, 384 U.S. 

at p. 444.) “Custodial” means a situation in which a reasonable 

person in the defendant’s position would not have “‘felt free to 

end the questioning and leave.’” (People v. Leonard (2007) 40 

Cal.4th 1370, 1400 (Leonard).)

A defendant is not in custody where an officer asks 

“‘[g]eneral on-the-scene questioning as to facts surrounding a 

crime . . . .’ [Citation]. A custodial interrogation does not occur 

where an officer detains a suspect for investigation and the 

questioning is limited . . . ‘to obtain [sufficient] information 

confirming or dispelling the officer’s suspicions. [Citation.]’” 

(People v. Davidson (2013) 221 Cal.App.4th 966, 970 (Davidson).)

Determining whether a person is in custody is an 

objective test. (Davidson, supra, 221 Cal.App.4th at p. 971.) 

“The totality of the circumstances is considered and includes ‘(1) 

whether the suspect has been formally arrested; (2) absent formal 

arrest, the length of the detention; (3) the location; (4) the ratio of 

officers to suspects; and (5) the demeanor of the officer, including 

the nature of the questioning.’ [Citation.] Additional factors are 
5

whether the officer informed the person he or she was considered 

a witness or suspect, whether there were restrictions on the 

suspect’s freedom of movement, whether the police were 

aggressive, confrontational, and/or accusatory, and whether the 

police used interrogation techniques to pressure the suspect. 

[Citation.]” (Id. at p. 972.)

Whether a defendant was in custody for Miranda

purposes is a mixed question of fact and law. (People v. Ochoa

(1998) 19 Cal.4th 353, 401.) Where, as here, the facts are largely 

undisputed, we independently review the question of whether 

there was custodial interrogation. (Leonard, supra, 40 Cal.4th at 

p. 1400.)

The trial court properly found that Chalquest was not 

in custody. She was on a hospital stretcher during the interview,

receiving treatment for her injuries. She was not formally 

arrested or handcuffed. Although it lasted about two to three 

hours, the interview was interrupted several times so that 

Chalquest could receive treatment, or while the officers 

performed other tasks. Only two officers were present, and 

medical personnel were also present during parts of the 

interview. (See People v. Mosley (1999) 73 Cal.App.4th 1081, 

1091 [circumstances, including the presence of medical personnel 

treating a defendant’s gunshot wound during an interview, 

created a non-custodial environment].)

Aguilar’s questions were not aggressive,

confrontational, or accusatory. He asked Chalquest preliminary 

questions about the traffic collision and whether she consumed 

alcohol or medication before the accident. (Davidson, supra, 221 

Cal.App.4th at p. 970.) A reasonable person in Chalquest’s 

position would have “‘felt free to end the questioning.’” (Leonard, 
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supra, 40 Cal.4th at p. 1400.) Apparently so did Chalquest, as at 

one point during the contact, she stopped cooperating with the 

officers and ended the interaction.

Chalquest cites to People v. Caro (2019) 7 Cal.5th 

463, 490 (Caro), in which a defendant argued that statements

made while she was treated at a hospital were obtained in 

violation of Miranda. Our Supreme Court did not resolve 

whether the interaction in Caro constituted a custodial 

interrogation. Instead, it concluded that even if the interaction 

“was sufficient to violate Caro’s constitutional rights . . . [the 

admission of the statements] was harmless beyond a reasonable 

doubt.” (Id. at p. 493.)

Moreover, Caro is distinguishable because the 

circumstances there constituted a more coercive environment. 

Caro was the main suspect in the murder of her three sons. She 

underwent surgery for a gunshot wound to the head on the same 

night of the murder. (Caro, supra, 7 Cal.5th at p. 473.) The day 

after surgery, two police officers interviewed her in her hospital 

room. (Ibid.) The interview was recorded, at least one officer 

stayed in the hospital room the entire time, and two individuals 

from the district attorney’s office were also present for parts of 

the interview. (Id. at p. 490.) The interview lasted about three 

hours, but the questioning was intermittent. Caro was in pain 

during the interview, and before she received pain medication, 

the hospital staff “checked in” with the officers to ensure that 

they would not “‘mess up’” the interview. (Ibid.) Toward the end 

of the interview, the officer told Caro she was a suspect and gave 

her Miranda warnings. (Ibid.) The court noted that “[s]uch

circumstances heighten the risk of coercion.” (Id. at p. 493.) The 

court placed emphasis on the “constant presence of one or more 
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law enforcement officers and the suggestion of two staff members 

that they would not, or could not, interfere with the interview.” 

(Id. at pp. 492-493.)

Here, the officers were not a “constant presence,” as 

they went “back and forth” interviewing Chalquest while they 

performed other tasks. There was no suggestion that medical 

personnel could not interfere with the interview. Under the 

totality of circumstances here, Chalquest was not in custody.3 

Harmless Error

In any event, any error in admitting Chalquest’s

statements was harmless beyond a reasonable doubt. (Chapman 

v. California (1967) 386 U.S. 18, 24; Arizona v. Fulminante (1991) 

499 U.S. 279, 306.) Even without evidence of her statements to 

the police officers, the evidence that she drove under the 

influence was overwhelming. Chalquest caused the collision and 

drove away from the scene. When confronted, Chalquest’s 

responses were “odd,” and she looked “like she didn’t seem to 

know exactly what happened.” She later parked her car at her 

workplace in an “odd” and “crooked[]” way.

After the collision, Chalquest told the fire captain

that she consumed “approximately five to ten 20-ounce alcoholic 

beverages” that day. When Aguilar encountered her, he

“immediately noticed that she had red and watery eyes, she had 

very slurred speech, and she had a strong odor of alcohol emitting 

3 Chalquest also argues that the interview constituted an 

interrogation for Miranda purposes. Because we conclude 

Chalquest was not in custody at the time of the interview, we 

need not address whether she was interrogated. Both custody 

and interrogation are necessary to trigger the requirement of a 

Miranda admonition. (People v. Underwood (1986) 181 

Cal.App.3d. 1223, 1231.)
8

from her body.” Chalquest’s horizontal gaze nystagmus test and 

the blood test results showed that she was under the influence of 

alcohol a few hours after the accident. And, there were 14 empty 

beer bottles in the trunk of her car. Any error in admitting 

Chalquest’s statements was therefore harmless.

DISPOSITION

The judgment is affirmed.

NOT TO BE PUBLISHED.

TANGEMAN, J.

We concur:

GILBERT, P. J.

PERREN, J
Anthony J. Sabo, Judge

Superior Court County of Ventura

______________________________

Richard B. Lennon and Michael L. Tetreault, under 

appointment by the Court of Appeal, for Defendant and 

Appellant.

Xavier Becerra, Attorney General, Lance E. Winters, 

Chief Assistant Attorney General, Susan Sullivan Pithey, 

Assistant Attorney General, Steven D. Matthews and Ryan M. 

Smith, Deputy Attorneys General, for Plaintiff and Respondent.