IN THE COURT OF APPEALS OF TENNESSEE

AT NASHVILLE

Assigned December 8, 2010

GURSHEEL DHILLON, MD v. STATE OF TENNESSEE HEALTH

RELATED BOARDS

Appeal from the Chancery Court for Davidson County

No. 10-449-II Carol L. McCoy, Chancellor

No. M2010-01085-COA-R3-CV - Filed December 9, 2010

This appeal involves a doctor’s challenge to disciplinary charges brought against him by the

Department of Health, Division of Health Related Boards. After the trial court denied the

doctor’s request for a temporary injunction prohibiting the defendant from proceeding with

a hearing on the disciplinary charges, the doctor filed a notice of appeal to this court.

Because the order appealed does not resolve all the claims raised by the doctor, we dismiss

the appeal for lack of a final judgment.

Tenn. R. App. P. 3 Appeal as of Right; Appeal Dismissed

FRANK G. CLEMENT, JR., ANDY D. BENNETT, RICHARD H. DINKINS, JJ.

Gursheel S. Dhillon, Estill Springs, Tennessee, Pro Se

Andrea Huddleston, Sue Ann Sheldon, Nashville, Tennessee, for the appellee, State of

Tennessee Health Related Boards.

MEMORANDUM OPINION

1

On November 20, 2009, the Department of Health, Division of Health Related Boards,

filed an Amended Notice of Charges and Memorandum for Assessment of Civil Penalties

Tenn. R. Ct. App. 10 states: 1

This Court, with the concurrence of all judges participating in the case, may affirm, reverse

or modify the actions of the trial court by memorandum opinion when a formal opinion

would have no precedential value. When a case is decided by memorandum opinion it shall

be designated “MEMORANDUM OPINION,” shall not be published, and shall not be cited

or relied on for any reason in any unrelated case.
alleging that Gursheel S. Dhillon, M.D., had failed to comply with certain conditions

imposed on him by the Board of Medical Examiners in a March 19, 2008 final order. The

matter was scheduled for a contested case hearing before the Board of Medical Examiners

on May 19, 2010. On March 16, 2010, Dr. Dhillon filed a complaint in the Chancery Court

for Davidson County seeking a temporary injunction prohibiting the Department from

proceeding with the hearing, a permanent injunction, a stay of the administrative

proceedings, a declaratory judgment, and other relief. On April 13, 2010, the trial court

denied Dr. Dhillon’s request for a temporary injunction prohibiting the defendant from

proceeding with the hearing. Dr. Dhillon filed his notice of appeal on May 12, 2010.

A party is entitled to an appeal as of right only after the trial court has entered a final

judgment. Tenn. R. App. P. 3(a); In re Estate of Henderson, 121 S.W.3d 643, 645

(Tenn.2003); King v. Spain, No. M2006-02178-COA-R3-CV, 2007 WL 3202757 at *8

(Tenn. Ct. App. October 31, 2007). A final judgment is a judgment that resolves all the

claims between all the parties, “leaving nothing else for the trial court to do.” State ex rel.

McAllister v. Goode, 968 S.W.2d 834, 840 (Tenn. Ct. App. 1997). An order that adjudicates

fewer than all the claims between all the parties is subject to revision at any time before the

entry of a final judgment and is not appealable as of right. Tenn. R. App. P. 3(a); In re Estate

of Henderson, 121 S.W.3d at 645.

Like the trial court, we find it difficult to determine from the complaint exactly what

additional relief Dr. Dhillon is seeking. Nevertheless, it is clear that additional claims

remain. The trial court’s April 13, 2010 order merely denies Dr. Dhillon’s request for a

temporary injunction. It does not address any other requests for relief in the complaint. It

does not dismiss the complaint or tax the costs. Indeed, the trial court noted in its ruling that

it would entertain a motion to dismiss if and when the defendant filed such a motion.

Accordingly, the April 13, 2010 order is not a final judgment and is not subject to an appeal

as of right pursuant to Tenn. R. App. P. 3.

On September 9, 2010, this court ordered Dr. Dhillon either to obtain a final judgment

from the trial court within sixty (60) days or else to show cause why the appeal should not

be dismissed. Dr. Dhillon has responded that the refusal to issue a preliminary injunction is

an appealable order pursuant to Ala. R. App. P. 4(a)(1)(A), and Baldwin County Elec.

Membership Corp. v. Catrett, 942 So. 2d 337, 349 (Ala. 2006). Proceedings before this court

are governed by the Tennessee Rules of Appellate Procedure, not the Alabama Rules of

Appellate Procedure. Neither Ala. R. App. P. 4(a)(1)(A) nor the Alabama appellate decisions

interpreting that rule are applicable in this court. Under Tenn. R. App. P. 3(a), an order

denying a temporary injunction is not appealable as of right.

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Dr. Dhillon’s response also requests direct appellate review of the administrative

proceeding pursuant to Tenn. R. App. P. 12. However, Tenn. R. App. P. 12 applies only in

those rare instances where there is specific statutory authority for an appeal directly to this

court from a decision of an administrative agency. There is no such statutory authority for

a direct appeal to this court from a decision of the Department of Health, the Division of

Health Related Boards or the Board of Medical Examiners. Likewise, Tenn. R. App. P. 12

does not apply to appeals from the Chancery Court for Davidson County, even where the

case arises out of an administrative proceeding.

Finally, Dr. Dhillon has moved the court to consider his appeal as an extraordinary

appeal pursuant to Tenn. R. App. P. 10. Having reviewed the motion and the entire record

on appeal, we cannot conclude that the trial court has so far departed from the accepted and

usual course of judicial proceedings as to require immediate review or that an extraordinary

appeal is necessary for a complete determination of the action on appeal. Accordingly, an

extraordinary appeal is not warranted, and we decline to consider the appeal pursuant to

Tenn. R. App. P. 10.

This appeal is dismissed for lack of a final judgment without prejudice to the filing

of a new appeal once a final judgment has been entered. The case is remanded to the trial

court for further proceedings consistent with this opinion. The costs of the appeal are taxed

to Gursheel S. Dhillon and his surety for which execution may issue.

PER CURIAM

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