NOTICE: NOT FOR OFFICIAL PUBLICATION.

UNDER ARIZONA RULE OF THE SUPREME COURT 111(c), THIS DECISION IS NOT PRECEDENTIAL

AND MAY BE CITED ONLY AS AUTHORIZED BY RULE.

IN THE

ARIZONA COURT OF APPEALS

DIVISION ONE

U.S. BANK NATIONAL ASSOCIATION, Plaintiff/Appellee,

v.

EVAN A. KURTZ, Defendant/Appellant.

No. 1 CA-CV 18-0440 

Appeal from the Superior Court in Maricopa County

No. CV2018-004772

The Honorable Lindsay P. Abramson, Judge Pro Tempore

AFFIRMED

COUNSEL

McCarthy & Holthus, L.L.P., San Diego, CA

By Melissa Robbins Coutts

Counsel for Plaintiff/Appellee

Evan A. Kurtz, Phoenix

Defendant/Appellant

MEMORANDUM DECISION

Judge Kenton D. Jones delivered the decision of the Court, in which 

Presiding Judge Michael J. Brown and Judge Jon W. Thompson joined.

FILED 6-13-2019
US BANK v. KURTZ

Decision of the Court

2

J O N E S, Judge:

¶1 Evan Kurtz appeals the trial court’s judgment in favor of U.S. 

Bank National Association (the Bank) on its complaint for forcible entry and 

detainer (FED). For the following reasons, we affirm.

FACTS AND PROCEDURAL HISTORY

¶2 In May 2018, the Bank filed a complaint for FED. The Bank 

attached a copy of the trustee’s deed of sale showing it had purchased 

certain real property in Phoenix (the Property) at a trustee’s sale and alleged 

evidence Kurtz refused to vacate the Property after being given notice to do 

so. After hearing evidence and testimony at the July 2018 trial, the trial 

court entered judgment in the Bank’s favor. Kurtz timely appealed, and we 

have jurisdiction pursuant to Arizona Revised Statutes (A.R.S.) §§ 12-

120.21(A)(1)1 and -2101(A)(1).

DISCUSSION

¶3 Kurtz argues the trial court erred in entering judgment 

against him because the Bank was not the original beneficiary of the deed 

of trust and the subsequent assignment to the Bank is invalid. Thus, Kurtz 

contends: (1) the Bank was not the proper plaintiff in the judicial 

foreclosure; and (2) the Bank did not have valid title to the Property when 

it filed its FED complaint.

¶4 We will affirm the trial court’s factual findings unless clearly 

erroneous. Bank of New York Mellon v. Dodev, 246 Ariz. 1, 6, ¶ 15 (App. 2018) 

(citing Ruffino v. Lokosky, 245 Ariz. 165, 168, ¶ 9 (App. 2018), and Duckstein 

v. Wolf, 230 Ariz. 227, 233, ¶ 19 (App. 2012)). Because Kurtz did not provide

a transcript of the proceedings, we “presume the record supports the trial 

court’s rulings.” Kohler v. Kohler, 211 Ariz. 106, 108, ¶ 8 n.1 (App. 2005) 

(citing Baker v. Baker, 183 Ariz. 70, 73 (App. 1995)); see also ARCAP 11(b)-(c)

(stating the appellant is responsible for ensuring “the record on appeal 

contains all transcripts or other documents necessary for us to consider the 

issues raised on appeal”). The interpretation and application of statute 

present questions of law reviewed de novo. Bank of New York Mellon v. De 

Meo, 227 Ariz. 192, 194, ¶ 11 (App. 2011) (citing Kromko v. City of Tucson, 202 

Ariz. 499, 501, ¶ 4 (App. 2002)).

 

1 Absent material changes from the relevant date, we cite the current 

version of rules and statutes.
US BANK v. KURTZ

Decision of the Court

3

¶5 Even were Kurtz able to prove the circumstances alleged, he

fails to establish a basis for relief. First, an FED complaint must be “brought 

in the legal name of the party claiming entitlement to possession of the 

property.” Ariz. R.P. Eviction Act. 5(b)(1).

2 The certified copy of the

trustee’s deed of sale evidences the Bank’s ownership interest and right to 

maintain suit for FED. See A.R.S. § 33-811(E) (“The trustee’s deed shall 

operate to convey to the purchaser the title, interest and claim of the trustee, 

the trustor, the beneficiary, their respective successors in interest and all 

persons claiming the trust property . . . . That conveyance shall be 

absolute.”); see also Carrington Mortg. Servs., L.L.C. v. Woods, 242 Ariz. 455, 

457, ¶ 12 (App. 2017) (finding a certified copy of a trustee’s deed and 

subsequent grant deed to the plaintiff proved the plaintiff’s right to 

possession of the property). The trial court’s determination that the Bank 

had the right to maintain the FED action is therefore not clearly erroneous.

¶6 Second, Kurtz is precluded by statute from litigating the 

validity of title in an action for FED. See A.R.S. § 12-1177(A) (“On trial of an 

action of [FED], the only issue shall be the right of actual possession and the 

merits of title shall not be inquired into.”); see also Curtis v. Morris, 186 Ariz. 

534, 535 (1996) (holding that allowing a person to challenge title in an FED 

action “would convert a forcible detainer action into a quiet title action and 

defeat its purpose as a summary remedy”). Kurtz’s challenge to the 

assignment is therefore outside the scope of an FED action, and we find no 

error.

CONCLUSION

¶7 The trial court’s judgment is affirmed.

 

2 The statute Kurtz relies on, A.R.S. § 33-807(A), describes the proper 

plaintiff to a judicial foreclosure action, and is not applicable here.