Filed 6/30/22 Ransford v. So. Cal. Permanente Medical Group CA2/4

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IN THE COURT OF APPEAL OF THE STATE OF CALIFORNIA

SECOND APPELLATE DISTRICT

DIVISION FOUR

CARRIE RANSFORD,

Plaintiff and Appellant,

v.

SOUTHERN CALIFORNIA 

PERMANENTE MEDICAL GROUP,

Defendant and Respondent.

 B309713

 (Los Angeles County

 Super. Ct. No.19LBCV00325)

APPEAL from a judgment of the Superior Court of 

Los Angeles County, Michael P. Vicencia, Judge. Affirmed.

Law Offices of Gavril T. Gabriel and Gavril T. Gabriel for 

Plaintiff and Appellant.

Cole Pedroza, Kenneth R. Pedroza and Amy E. Rankin for 

Defendant and Respondent.
2

INTRODUCTION

Carrie Ransford sued her former employer, Southern 

California Permanente Medical Group (SCPMG), for wrongful 

termination and other claims. Ransford alleged that SCPMG 

discriminated against her due to a disability and for taking 

medical leave. SCPMG moved for summary judgment, 

presenting evidence that Ransford was terminated as a result of 

a long history of unsatisfactory job performance, including 

communication problems with patients and staff. The trial court 

granted SCPMG’s motion.

We affirm. The evidence Ransford presented did not meet 

her burden to show that SCPMG acted with discriminatory 

animus or that the reasons for her termination were pretextual.

FACTUAL AND PROCEDURAL BACKGROUND

A. Complaint

Ransford filed a complaint alleging causes of action for

wrongful termination, intentional infliction of emotional distress, 

negligent infliction of emotional distress, failure to pay wages due 

upon termination (Lab. Code, § 201), and waiting time penalties 

for failure to pay wages due upon discharge (Lab. Code, § 203).

1

Ransford alleged she began working for SCPMG in September 

1999 as a licensed vocational nurse (LVN). She was on medical 

leave on the following dates: July 21, 2015 to August 8, 2015; 

September 14, 2015 to October 18, 2015; November 19, 2015 to 

December 16, 2015; December 28, 2015 to August 22, 2016; and 

August 31, 2016 to January 22, 2017. Ransford alleged that on 

January 26, 2017, she received a “Corrective Action Level 4 

1 Ransford also alleged a cause of action for unfair business 

practices (Bus. & Prof. Code, § 17200, et seq.), but she later 

abandoned that claim. 
3

write-up” that included allegations dating back to 2015. On 

February 10, 2017, she was suspended following an incident in 

which she relayed medication instructions to a patient, and was 

later accused of giving incorrect information to the patient. 

Ransford remained suspended until her employment was

terminated on May 24, 2017. 

Ransford alleged that her disability and time on medical 

leave were substantial motivating reasons for her termination, 

and that she was terminated “because of her disability.” She also 

contended that although she took three days of bereavement 

leave in August 2016, she was only paid for one day. She prayed 

for compensatory damages, punitive damages, penalties, costs, 

and attorney fees. 

B. Motion for summary judgment

1. Motion

SCPMG moved for summary judgment. (Code Civ. Proc, 

§ 437c.) It stated that Ransford began working as an LVN with 

SCPMG in 1999. In January 2015, she transferred to the 

Healthy Heart Clinic (HHC) at the South Bay Medical Center, 

which treats patients with a history of heart failure. Ransford’s 

job duties included addressing and monitoring patients’ 

conditions, and notifying health care professionals for disposition; 

“rooming” patients on arrival, which consists of taking patients to 

examination rooms and taking their vitals; providing medical 

information and education to patients; and “performing other 

duties as directed by medical providers.” Ransford’s supervisors 

were Ruthie Goldberg and Demetria Flores. SCPMG asserted 

that the following incidents occurred while Ransford was working 

at the Healthy Heart Clinic. 
4

In April 2015, a patient’s spouse reported to Ransford that 

the patient was suicidal. Ransford conveyed the message to the 

medical care provider, but she did not mark the message urgent, 

as she was expected to do. 

On April 22, 2015, a patient presented with a low blood 

oxygen saturation level. Ransford did not immediately inform 

any medical provider of the patient’s blood oxygen saturation 

level. 

On May 1, 2015, a patient complained to Ransford about 

chest pains. Ransford sent a message conveying the patient’s 

complaint, but did not mark the message urgent as she was 

expected to do. 

On May 15, 2015, nurse practitioner Linda Bojorquez 

reduced a patient’s dosage of furosemide to one 20-milligram 

tablet per day. When the patient’s wife called on May 18 to 

inquire about the correct dosage, Ransford incorrectly told the 

patient to take two 20-milligram tablets per day. 

In May 2015, Bojorquez asked Ransford to cancel one 

patient’s appointment and move another patient’s appointment. 

Ransford complied, but failed to notify the patients of the 

changes. When one patient arrived for the originally scheduled 

appointment, the patient was upset about not being informed 

about the change. 

On June 4, 2015, Bojorquez asked Ransford for information 

about a patient, and Ransford refused to relay the information, 

saying it was written down in another room. 

In June 2015, Goldberg noticed that Ransford was rooming 

patients at a low rate. Goldberg stated in a declaration that some

patients “were roomed by HHC medical providers themselves. 

HHC medical providers should not have to take the time to room 
5

their own patients, as it takes time away from the higher level 

scope of their job duties.” 

On July 1, 2015, Bojorquez asked Ransford to follow up 

regarding a patient. Ransford replied in a disrespectful manner 

that it was not her responsibility. 

On July 2, 2015, Flores asked Ransford to document which 

phone numbers she used to make follow-up calls. Ransford 

“rolled her eyes” and complained “in an adamant and defensive 

manner” that she was being micromanaged. Flores also stated in 

her declaration that Ransford often rolled her eyes when she was 

told to do something she did not want to do. 

On July 17, 2015, Ransford, Flores, Goldberg, and a union 

representative met to discuss these complaints against Ransford, 

and to tell Ransford that management expected to see 

improvement. Goldberg stated in her declaration that additional 

meetings with Ransford were scheduled for July 23 and 30. 

However, Ransford took medical leave from approximately July 

21, 2015 to August 2, 2015 and from September 14, 2015 to 

October 18, 2015. Goldberg stated that because of Ransford’s 

leaves, the scheduled meetings never took place. 

On November 9, 2015, Bojorquez asked Ransford to room a 

patient, and Ransford did not do it. 

On November 10, 2015, Ransford messaged Bojorquez to 

take a phone call from a doctor. Bojorquez, who was on another 

phone call with a doctor, messaged back to ask for clarification as 

to whether the caller was a patient; Ransford responded that it 

was a doctor. While Bojorquez was on the phone, Ransford 

entered the room and said to her, “You really make me look 

stupid. What part of doctor do you not understand?” 
6

Ransford took leave from November 19 to December 16, 

2015, from December 28, 2015 to August 22, 2016, and from 

August 29, 2016 to January 21, 2017. On March 9, 2016, while 

on leave, Ransford went to the HHC to visit with coworkers, 

bringing what she claimed was a service dog. A department 

administrator, Hector Garcia, questioned why Ransford was in 

the back office with a dog. Garcia threatened to call security, and 

Ransford left.

On January 27, 2017, Ransford received a Level 4 

Corrective Action concerning the complaints dating back to 2015. 

Goldberg stated in her declaration that a meeting regarding this 

corrective action was not held earlier due to Ransford’s extended

leaves and Goldberg’s inability “to coordinate my schedule and 

the schedule of Human Resources and union representation to 

proceed appropriately with the corrective action process.” On 

January 31, Ransford signed a related “last chance agreement” 

stating that she would complete tasks as assigned, use good 

communication skills, and not act inappropriately. 

On February 7, 2017, pharmacist Leslie Idos left a message 

for a patient to discontinue taking furosemide for three days. 

Idos stated in her declaration, “I was nearby when the patient’s 

wife called back and spoke to Ms. Ransford. . . . I heard Ms. 

Ransford say, ‘He is due for his evening dose of Furosemide a half 

of a tablet tonight?’ [Ransford] then said: ‘He can take his half 

tablet dose of Furosemide this evening. Hold the Furosemide on 

Wednesday and Thursday.’ This instruction contradicted my 

message to the patient and placed the patient at risk of serious 

harm from kidney damage.” Idos called the patient back and 

instructed that he should not take the furosemide for three days. 

When Idos confronted Ransford an hour after the call, Ransford 
7

became defensive and claimed she did not recall what she told 

the patient, which Idos found “not credible.” 

The following day, Idos told Goldberg and Flores that she 

“could not trust Ms. Ransford to convey messages, and that her 

actions demonstrated a lack of competency and ability to be 

cognizant of what Ms. Ransford was telling patients.” Goldberg 

stated in her declaration that when she discussed the issue with 

Ransford a week later, she also found Ransford’s lack of memory 

about the incident not credible. Ransford was suspended with 

pay on February 10, 2017. Goldberg stated in her declaration, 

“Ms. Ransford’s error could have resulted in severe harm to the 

patient. I also determined that Ms. Ransford’s actions violated 

her last chance agreement. Considering the severity of Ms. 

Ransford’s conduct and her continued pattern of lack of good 

judgment, I decided to terminate Ms. Ransford’s employment.” 

Ransford’s employment was terminated on May 24, 2017. 

SCPMG argued that Ransford could not establish that 

discrimination was a substantial motivating factor for SCPMG’s 

actions. SCPMG pointed out that when Ransford was asked in 

her deposition, “Do you believe that you had a medical condition 

that people used to treat you differently?” she answered, “No.” 

Ransford also testified, “I don’t believe they terminated me 

because they didn’t like me or like the way I worked. I believe 

they terminated me for accusing me of a mistake, a medication 

error, and putting a patient at risk, and I don’t feel I’m a risk to 

patients whatsoever and I don’t agree that that happened.” 

SCPMG argued that Ransford was not performing her duties 

competently, it had legitimate business reasons for terminating 

her, and she could not demonstrate that SCPMG’s reasons were 

pretextual. SCPMG further asserted Ransford could not 
8

establish the intentional and negligent infliction of emotional 

distress causes of action for the same reasons, and that those 

causes of action were barred by workers’ compensation 

exclusivity. 

Regarding Ransford’s wage claims, SCPMG asserted that 

Ransford’s employment was governed by the collective bargaining 

agreement (CBA) between SCPMG and the United Healthcare 

Workers union. SCPMG argued that Ransford was required to 

comply with the terms of the CBA regarding wage claims, which 

required her to file a grievance for “any dispute concerning 

wages.” The CBA stated that a grievance “shall be initiated . . . 

by the submittal of a grievance form from the union to facility 

human resources and copied to the involved supervisor.” A 

declaration from the human resources consultant for the Healthy 

Heart Clinic stated that Ransford never filed a grievance for 

unpaid wages or bereavement leave. SCPMG asserted that 

Ransford’s failure to follow CBA procedures was fatal to her 

claims for unpaid wages. 

2. Opposition

In Ransford’s opposition, she asserted that “none of the 

incidents listed on the Level 4 occurred as SCPMG alleges.”

Ransford stated that although she met with Flores, Goldberg,

and a union representative in July 2015, the supervisors “told me 

generally that there had been complaints about my work, but 

they did not describe any specific incidents or particular 

patients.” Ransford said she left the short meeting “with the 

impression that they wanted to see improvement, but not that 

they were considering any serious corrective action.” 

Ransford explained that she took leave after she injured 

her back at work. She tried to return to work several times, but 
9

bending, twisting, and lifting were “still causing tremendous 

pain.” Ransford stated that during the times she was working 

between leaves from August 2015 to August 2016, no one told 

Ransford they wanted to meet with her again regarding her work 

performance. It was only after she returned from leave in 

January 2017 that her supervisors said they wanted to discuss

her work performance. 

Ransford stated in her declaration that in the January 

2017 meeting, the 2015 incidents “occurred such a long time ago 

and were so vaguely drafted that I could not understand what my 

supervisors were referring to.” However, in her opposition 

Ransford asserted that in the April 2015 incident in which the 

patient was suicidal, she immediately verbally informed a 

medical provider about the issue. Ransford also argued that 

comparing the rate at which another employee roomed patients 

was misleading, because the other employee was a medical 

assistant, not a nurse, and had different duties than Ransford. 

Ransford admitted that “she ‘constantly’ rolls her eyes in her 

everyday life as it is a character trait out of her control and which 

runs in her family.” She did not dispute that she told Flores that 

she felt micromanaged, but argued that “[g]iving feedback to 

managers is not a cause for termination.” She stated that she 

signed the Level 4 Corrective Action in January 2017 because she 

felt she had no other choice. Ransford stated that she asked her 

union representative to file a grievance regarding the corrective 

action, but the representative failed to do so. 

Ransford argued that SCPMG “fail[ed] to establish, as a 

matter of law, that [Ransford] ever violated the Last Chance 

Agreement before it terminated her employment.” She stated 

that Idos’s representation of the February 7 incident was false. 
10

Ransford pointed out that Idos’s note regarding the patient’s 

medications stated, “Tentative plan when pt returns call: [¶] 

Hold Lasix and KCI x 2 days 2/8/17 and 2/9/17. [¶] Resume lower 

doses of Lasix . . . and KCI . . . as of 2/10/17.” The message said 

nothing about the patient’s medication dose for February 7. 

Ransford stated that when the patient’s wife called on February 

7, she simply relayed the message that Idos left. Ransford did 

not recall specifically discussing the patient’s dose for February 7, 

but said that if the patient had asked about it, she would have 

documented it. Ransford also stated that employee Myra De 

Vera was sitting next to her during the call, and “Myra would 

have intervened if she believed I made a mistake endangering 

the patient’s health.” Ransford also disputed some details about 

Idos’s version of events, such as whether Idos called the patient 

to correct the error, as opposed to the patient calling the clinic 

again. 

Ransford argued that the delays in discipline for the 2015 

incidents, along with the “flagrant, unexplained inconsistencies 

in SCPMG’s evidence” established a prima facie case for 

disability discrimination. She argued that the inconsistencies in 

Idos’s statements showed that the basis for her termination was 

pretextual. She also argued that her evidence demonstrated a 

triable issue as to SCPMG’s motive. Ransford further asserted 

that she raised triable issues of fact as to her intentional 

infliction of emotional distress claim. She also argued that she 

was entitled to two additional days’ pay for bereavement leave, 

and she was not required to file a grievance under the CBA. 

SCPMG filed a reply in support of its motion, asserting that 

the evidence Ransford presented was insufficient to demonstrate 

a triable issue of fact on any cause of action. 
11

3. Hearing and ruling

At the hearing on the motion, the court announced that its 

tentative ruling was to grant the motion. The court stated that 

SCPMG met its initial burden to show a legitimate basis for 

Ransford’s termination. Addressing the wrongful termination 

cause of action first, the court noted that although there were 

some disputed details about the events of February 7, it was 

undisputed that Idos perceived that Ransford gave a patient 

incorrect medication instructions, and Idos contacted the patient 

again to provide correct instructions. The court stated, “[T]he 

seriousness of what happened and the belief by [SCPMG] given 

[Ransford’s] history that termination was proper can’t be 

disputed simply because [Idos] and [Ransford] disagree as to the 

exact events.” The court also said that the timing of the 

termination following Ransford’s leaves, without more, was 

insufficient to create a triable issue of fact. The court held that 

Ransford’s claims for intentional and negligent infliction of 

emotional distress were derivative of the wrongful termination 

claim, and could not survive for the same reasons. 

Turning to Ransford’s wage-based claims, the court stated 

that Ransford was required to “follow the procedures set forth in 

the collective bargaining agreement before she may maintain” 

these causes of action. The court said SCPMG demonstrated that 

Ransford did not follow those procedures, and therefore the 

motion should be granted on the two wage-based causes of action. 

Ransford’s counsel argued there were discrepancies in the 

evidence about what happened on February 7. The court 

suggested that no matter which side was right about the details, 

SCPMG could “look at the incident generally and say enough is 

enough, we’re going to terminate her even if it turns out that 
12

factually they’re wrong,” in which case the termination would be 

unrelated to any perceived disability. Ransford’s counsel 

asserted that such a situation would offer a mixed motive, with 

both legitimate reasons and discriminatory reasons for the 

employment action. Counsel for SCPMG argued that the timing 

of Ransford’s discipline did not suggest discrimination, noting 

that Goldberg stated in her declaration that a discipline meeting 

was not held earlier due the inability to schedule a union 

representative for a meeting earlier during the short periods 

Ransford was not on leave. Ransford’s counsel also argued that 

Ransford was entitled to bereavement leave pay, but 

acknowledged that she did not file a grievance. The court stated 

that it was not persuaded to change its ruling. 

The court therefore granted the motion for summary 

judgment. In the order prepared by SCPMG’s counsel and signed 

by the court, the court stated that Ransford did not show a triable 

issue of fact for her cause of action for wrongful termination. The 

court stated that Ransford’s causes of action for intentional and 

negligent infliction of emotional distress failed “because they are 

based on wrongful termination and are also barred by workers’ 

compensation exclusivity.” Regarding the wage claims, the court 

stated that Ransford was required to “follow the procedures” of 

the CBA, but she did not do so “because she did not file a 

grievance for unpaid wages.” The court entered judgment in 

favor of SCPMG. Ransford timely appealed. 

DISCUSSION

Ransford asserts that the summary judgment motion 

should have been denied because she raised triable issues of fact. 

SCPMG asserts that the motion was properly granted. 
13

Summary judgment is appropriate when “all the papers 

submitted show that there is no triable issue as to any material 

fact and that the moving party is entitled to a judgment as a 

matter of law.” (Code Civ. Proc., § 437c, subd. (c).) A defendant 

may establish that a cause of action has no merit by 

demonstrating that there is a complete defense to that cause of 

action. (Id., subd. (p)(2).) “We review the trial court’s grant of 

summary judgment de novo and decide independently whether 

the parties have met their respective burdens and whether facts 

not subject to triable dispute warrant judgment for the moving 

party as a matter of law.” (Jessen v. Mentor Corp. (2008) 158 

Cal.App.4th 1480, 1484.) “[A] trial court judgment is ordinarily 

presumed to be correct and the burden is on an appellant to 

demonstrate, on the basis of the record presented to the appellate 

court, that the trial court committed an error that justifies 

reversal of the judgment.” (Jameson v. Desta (2018) 5 Cal.5th 

594, 608-609.)

A. Wrongful termination

1. Legal standards

“‘The elements of a claim for wrongful discharge in 

violation of public policy are (1) an employer-employee 

relationship, (2) the employer terminated the plaintiff’s 

employment, (3) the termination was substantially motivated by 

a violation of public policy, and (4) the discharge caused the 

plaintiff harm.’” (Nosal-Tabor v. Sharp Chula Vista Medical 

Center (2015) 239 Cal.App.4th 1224, 1234-1235.) Here, Ransford 

alleged that “disability [and] her time on medical leave were 

substantial motivating reasons for [SCPMG’s] decision” to 

terminate her employment. 
14

To evaluate discrimination and retaliation claims, 

California uses the three-part burden-shifting framework laid out

in McDonnell Douglas Corp. v. Green (1973) 411 U.S. 792 

(McDonnell Douglas). (See Guz v. Bechtel Nat. Inc. (2000) 24 

Cal.4th 317, 354 (Guz); Lawson v. PPG Architectural Finishes, 

Inc. (2022) 12 Cal.5th 703, 708.) “Under that approach, the 

employee must establish a prima facie case of unlawful 

discrimination or retaliation. (McDonnell Douglas, [411 U.S.] at 

p. 802.) Next, the employer bears the burden of articulating a 

legitimate reason for taking the challenged adverse employment 

action. (Ibid.) Finally, the burden shifts back to the employee to 

demonstrate that the employer’s proffered legitimate reason is a 

pretext for discrimination or retaliation. (Id. at p. 804.)” 

(Lawson, supra, 12 Cal.5th at p. 708.)

“A defendant employer’s motion for summary judgment 

slightly modifies the order of these showings. If, as here, the 

motion for summary judgment relies in whole or in part on a 

showing of nondiscriminatory reasons for the discharge, the 

employer satisfies its burden as moving party if it presents 

evidence of such nondiscriminatory reasons that would permit a 

trier of fact to find, more likely than not, that they were the basis 

for the termination. [Citations.] To defeat the motion, the 

employee then must adduce or point to evidence raising a triable 

issue, that would permit a trier of fact to find by a preponderance 

that intentional discrimination occurred.” (Kelly v. Stamps.com 

Inc. (2005) 135 Cal.App.4th 1088, 1097-1098; accord, Wilkin v. 

Community Hospital of the Monterey Peninsula (2021) 71 

Cal.App.5th 806, 821-822.)

Thus, the employee must “produce ‘substantial evidence 

that the employer’s stated nondiscriminatory reason for the 
15

adverse action was untrue or pretextual, or evidence the 

employer acted with a discriminatory animus, or a combination of 

the two, such that a reasonable trier of fact could conclude the 

employer engaged in intentional discrimination.’” (Hicks v. 

KNTV Television, Inc. (2008) 160 Cal.App.4th 994, 1003 (Hicks).) 

“The plaintiff must do more than raise the inference that the 

employer’s asserted reason is false. ‘[A] reason cannot be proved 

to be “a pretext for discrimination” unless it is shown both that 

the reason was false, and that discrimination was the real 

reason.’ [Citation.] If plaintiff produces no evidence from which 

a reasonable factfinder could infer that the employer’s true 

reason was discriminatory, the employer is entitled to summary 

judgment.” (Ibid.)

2. No evidence of pretext

Ransford challenges the court’s ruling only as to the final 

step of the analysis. She states, “The issue in this appeal boils 

down to pretext, i.e., was there a legitimate reason for Ms. 

Ransford’s termination, or was her medical condition or use of 

medical leave at least a factor in her termination[?]” Ransford 

argues that pretext may be inferred from (1) factual

inconsistencies regarding the February 7 incident, (2) the 

temporal proximity between her return from medical leave and 

the January 2017 corrective action, and (3) the vague and 

subjective nature of the various criticisms about Ransford’s work 

performance.

The evidence does not support Ransford’s argument. She 

presented no direct evidence that SCPMG’s actions resulted from 

discrimination or retaliation. Indeed, Ransford herself testified 

that she did not feel that she was treated differently because of 

any disability. She also testified, “I don’t believe they terminated 
16

me because they didn’t like me or like the way I worked. I believe 

they terminated me for accusing me of a mistake, a medication 

error, and putting a patient at risk . . . .” 

That Ransford disagrees with Idos’s version of the 

February 7 events does not establish that the incident was 

pretextual. Ransford argues that the February 7 incident as a 

reason for her termination is “simply not supported by the 

evidence.” She asserts that Idos’s instructions said nothing about 

the dose of medication for February 7, and stated only that the 

patient should not take the medication on February 8 and 9; 

Ransford contends that she simply conveyed this information to 

the patient. Ransford also asserts that Idos’s version of events is 

inconsistent about who called the patient and when. 

“In demonstrating that an employer’s proffered 

nondiscriminatory reason is false or pretextual, ‘“[an employee] 

cannot simply show that the employer’s decision was wrong or 

mistaken, since the factual dispute at issue is whether 

discriminatory animus motivated the employer, not whether the 

employer is wise, shrewd, prudent, or competent. . . .”’” (Zamora

v. Security Industry Specialists, Inc. (2021) 71 Cal.App.5th 1, 32; 

see also Guz, supra, 24 Cal.4th at p. 358 [an employer’s 

nondiscriminatory “true reasons” for terminating an employee 

“need not necessarily have been wise or correct”; “the ultimate 

issue is simply whether the employer acted with a motive to 

discriminate illegally”].) Here, inconsistencies in the evidence do 

not support a finding that the basis for termination was 

pretextual. SCPMG submitted evidence that Ransford had a long 

history of concerning behavior, especially surrounding her 

communication with patients and staff. SCPMG asserted that 

beginning in 2015, Ransford did not mark important messages 
17

“urgent,” moved or canceled patient appointments without 

notifying the patients, gave a patient incorrect medication 

instructions, refused to communicate patient information that 

was written down in another room, and failed to meet 

expectations regarding rooming patients. In addition, Ransford

did not dispute that she rolled her eyes at team members who 

gave her instructions, and complained that she was being 

micromanaged when she was asked to better document how she 

reached patients by phone. 

Thus, the February 7 incident occurred after concerns had 

already arisen about Ransford’s ability to effectively 

communicate. Idos and Goldberg questioned Ransford’s actions 

that day regardless of the exact medication instructions, what 

Ransford told the patient’s wife, or who called whom. Idos stated 

that when she confronted Ransford about the call an hour after it 

occurred, Ransford became defensive and claimed she did not 

recall what she told the patient, which Idos found “not credible.” 

Goldberg stated in her declaration that when she discussed the 

issue with Ransford a week later, she also found Ransford’s lack 

of memory about the incident not credible. Goldberg stated that 

this was one incident among a “continued pattern of lack of good 

judgment.” “[T]he loss of confidence in an employee . . . is a 

legitimate, nondiscriminatory reason for discharge.” (Arteaga v. 

Brink’s, Inc. (2008) 163 Cal.App.4th 327, 352 (Arteaga).) Thus, 

even assuming Ransford’s version of events was correct, the 

minor inconsistencies in the evidence regarding the events on 

February 7 do not suggest that the basis for Ransford’s 

termination was pretextual or otherwise motivated by 

discriminatory animus.
18

Ransford asserts that the “evidence of pretext is further 

augmented by the temporal proximity (less than a week) between 

Ms. Ransford’s return from medical leave and [the] Level 4 

Corrective Action.” SCPMG points out that Ransford’s claim is 

for wrongful termination—she did not allege in her complaint 

that she was subjected to discriminatory or retaliatory adverse 

employment action other than termination. Thus, the only 

relevant adverse event is Ransford’s termination, not the Level 4 

Corrective Action. 

Even assuming the timing of the Level 4 Corrective Action 

was relevant, however, “temporal proximity alone is not sufficient

to raise a triable issue as to pretext once the employer has offered 

evidence of a legitimate, nondiscriminatory reason for the 

termination.” (Arteaga, supra, 163 Cal.App.4th at p. 353.) The 

Arteaga court continued, “This is not to say that temporal 

proximity is never relevant in the final step of the McDonnell 

Douglas test. In the classic situation where temporal proximity 

is a factor, an employee has worked for the same employer for 

several years, has a good or excellent performance record, and 

then, after engaging in some type of protected activity—

disclosing a disability—is suddenly accused of serious 

performance problems, subjected to derogatory comments about 

the protected activity, and terminated. In those circumstances, 

temporal proximity, together with the other evidence, may be 

sufficient to establish pretext.” (Id. at pp. 353-354.)

Ransford’s situation was not similar. SCPMG’s concerns 

about Ransford’s communication with staff and patients dated 

back to 2015, before she went on leave. Moreover, Ransford did 

not submit any evidence suggesting that SCPMG considered 

Ransford’s leaves or medical issues to be problematic. Temporal 
19

proximity, without more, does not support a finding of pretext or 

discriminatory animus. 

Ransford further contends that because SCPMG’s 

criticisms of her performance were “subjective,” they support an 

inference of pretext. She asserts that “[i]n light of the weakness 

and implausibilities [sic] in SCPMG’s evidence” regarding the 

February 7 incident, “a trier of fact could reasonably infer that 

inclusion of such subjective incidents in the Level 4 Corrective 

Action is also pretextual.” 

Although subjective evaluations are “‘susceptible of abuse 

and more likely to mask pretext’” (Xin Liu v. Amway Corp. (9th 

Cir. 2003) 347 F.3d 1125, 1136), the evidence does not suggest as 

much here. For one thing, Ransford observes in her brief that the 

“subjective” comments were “criticisms of Ms. Ransford prior to 

her taking extended medical leaves.” (Emphasis added.) The 

criticisms therefore could not have been made in retaliation for 

her back injury or medical leaves. Ransford does not dispute that 

that she met with Goldberg and Flores in July 2015—before she 

went on leave—to discuss needed improvements in her work. 

Moreover, the criticisms did not involve amorphous qualities, 

such as whether Ransford was sufficiently “upbeat.” (Xin Liu, 

supra, 347 F.3d at p. 1137.) To the contrary, almost all of the

incidents in the Level 4 Corrective Action related to specific 

interactions involving communication among staff or with 

patients. These criticisms do not suggest pretext. “The fact that 

[an] assessment was based upon subjective criteria does not, by 

itself, demonstrate pretext.” (Hicks, supra, 160 Cal.App.4th at p.

1005.)

Thus, SCPMG established nondiscriminatory reasons for 

Ransford’s discharge, and Ransford did not produce evidence that 
20

would permit a trier of fact to find that intentional discrimination 

occurred. Summary judgment on Ransford’s wrongful 

termination cause of action was appropriately granted. 

B. Emotional distress

Ransford asserts that the court also erred in granting 

summary judgment on her intentional and negligent infliction of 

emotional distress causes of action based on workers’ 

compensation exclusivity. She asserts, “the trial court failed to 

take into consideration the law that a claim for emotional 

distress is not barred where the distress is caused by an 

employer’s illegal discriminatory practices.” 

Generally, when a plaintiff employee alleges infliction of 

emotional distress, and the “alleged wrongful conduct . . . 

occurred at the worksite, in the normal course of the employeremployee relationship, . . . workers’ compensation is [the] 

exclusive remedy for any injury that may have resulted.” 

(Miklosy v. Regents of University of California (2008) 44 Cal.4th 

876, 902.) “However, where a plaintiff can allege that she 

suffered emotional distress because of a pattern of continuing 

violations that were discriminatory, her cause of action for 

infliction of emotional distress will not be barred by the 

exclusivity provisions of workers’ compensation laws.” (Murray v. 

Oceanside Unified School Dist. (2000) 79 Cal.App.4th 1338, 

1363.)

Here, there were no triable issues of material fact as to 

discrimination in relation to Ransford’s wrongful termination 

claim, and the emotional distress causes of action fail for the 

same reasons. Ransford did not show that she suffered emotional 

distress due to a pattern of discriminatory violations. We 

therefore find no error in the trial court’s ruling as to Ransford’s 
21

claims for negligent and intentional infliction of emotional 

distress.

C. Wage claims

Ransford contends the trial court erred in granting 

summary judgment on her wage-based claims on the grounds 

that she failed to comply with the requirements of the CBA. She 

asserts that she “showed that she did initiate the grievance 

process through an informal process, as required by the CBA.” 

However, the CBA requires that a grievance “be initiated . . . by 

the submittal of a grievance form from the union to facility 

human resources and copied to the involved supervisor.”

Ransford only cites evidence that she left voicemails for Flores 

about the issue; there is no evidence that she filed a grievance

form with human resources or her supervisor. Moreover, 

Ransford’s counsel acknowledged at the motion hearing that 

Ransford did not file a grievance. Ransford therefore failed to 

demonstrate that she followed CBA requirements, or that the 

court’s conclusion as to this issue was erroneous.

2

2 The trial court did not hold that Ransford failed to get 

proper approval before she took bereavement leave.

Nevertheless, in her brief Ransford discusses the manner by 

which she initially requested leave (by phone rather than 

through the computer system), and argues this procedure was 

appropriate. These contentions are irrelevant. Ransford's 

counsel asserted for the first time at oral argument that Ransford 

was entitled to bereavement pay pursuant to statute, without 

regard to any CBA requirements. This argument was not 

included in Ransford's briefing, and it has been forfeited.
22

DISPOSITION

The judgment is affirmed. The parties shall bear their own 

costs on appeal. 

NOT TO BE PUBLISHED IN THE OFFICIAL REPORTS

COLLINS, J.

We concur:

MANELLA, P. J.

CURREY, J.