### IN THE COURT OF APP EALS OF TENNESS EE AT NAS HVILLE A pr il 16, 200 4 S es sio n
I N RE 

### ESTAT E OF EDW ARD LOUIS GREENAMYRE
Appeal f romthe Chancer y Court for P utnam C ounty No. 2002-76 Ve rnon Neal, Chancellor

No. M2003- 00964-COA-R 3-CV 

### - F ile d D ec em be r 7, 200 5

F RAN K G. C L EME NT , J R ., J., c on c ur ri ng a nddis se nti ng , inpa rt

. The majority has provided a well rea soned opinion, based upon a strict interpre tation of In
re Estate of Hume , 984 S.W .2d 602, 605 (1999), concluding that the sale and reor g anization of other assets and bank acc ounts by the court appointed conse rvator e ffe cted an ademption by exti nction of
sever al of Mr. Gree namy re’ s testamentary

bequests. I , however, s u b m i t a strict interpr etation of Hume is not required.

Be ing fully awa

re of the s trictures of the long standing doctrine of sta re de c isi s e t no n q uie ta
mo v e re embodied in Payne v. Johnson , 2 Tenn. Cas. (Shannon) 543, 543 (1877), I am of the opinion the material fac ts of t h i s ca s e an d t hose of In re Estate of Hume areso dis pa rate the y pe rm it this
c ou rt to s te p b e y on d th e sh a do w o f thein fl e xible“ in s pe c ie ” do c trineby dis tin g uis hin g thefa c ts. Doing so is not an uncommon prac tice. Tenne ssee’ s ademption l andsca pe is rich with rulings based upon the well rec og nized protocol of “disting uishing the f acts” of ea ch ca se. See R hodes v. Kebke , 167 S.W .2d 345, 349-50 (Tenn. 1943) (holding an ademption had not occurre d based upon a finding that althoug h the testator no long er ha d a leg al intere st in specifica lly bequeathed share s of stock at his de a th, he ha d an e qu ita bleint e re st the re in w hic h “ ou g ht t o p a ss t o th e be ne fi c iary un de r thete rm s of thewi ll” ); W

ig g in s v
. Che atham, 225 S.W . 1040, 1042 (Tenn. 1920) (holding the beque st of a liquor business had not been adee med, s tating: “the fact that the testator w as not ac tually eng ag ed in b us ine ss at th e tim e of

his de a th d id n ot d e str oy

the sp e c if

ic c ha ra c te r of the pr op e rty int e nd e d to be be qu e a the d inhis wi ll .

. . ” be c aus e it “ wa s su bje c t to ide nti fi c a tio n. ” ); Baldwin v. Davidson, 267 S.W .2d 756, 759 (Tenn. Ct. App. 1954) ( holding there was no ademption due to the chang e of the subject of the be quest from a partne rship to a cor

poration whe re the will bequeathe d the testator’ s interest in the partnership, noting “ the identity of the thing g iven, the subjec t of the leg acy , has bee n su bs ta nti a lly

pr e se rv e d” ); Bedford v. Be dford, 274 S.W .2d 528 (Tenn. Ct. App. 1954) (holding that
on ly a pa rtia l a de mptionha d o c c ur re d w he rethede c e a se d d e vis e d li fe e state s in sp e c if ic pr op e rty to three be nefic iaries and there afte r dee ded to one of the beneficiaries a part of the land; finding that thede e d r e su lte d ina

pa rtia l a de mptionby

satis fa c tio n (di sti ng uis he d fr om extin c tio n) of thede vis e to the de vis e e wh o re c e ive d the de e d, bu t did not a de e m the de vis e of the re maind e r of thela ndto the other de visees).T h i s c ou r t r e a s on e d i t w a s i n s u f f i c i e n t t o c on t e n d t h a t t h e a bs e n c e of t h e ob j e c t of a s pe c i f

i c be qu e s t f

r om a 1
t es t at or' s es t at e – t he di amo nd r i ng , di nn er r i ng , s i l ver s er vi ce and h ous ehol d i t ems – by wh at eve r means , cons t i t ut es a n a d e m p tio n
. R u tled g e , 19 86 W L 60 63 , at * 4. Speci f i cal l y , we hel d “ t he abs enc e of t he t hi ng f

r om t he es t at e m u st
r es ul tf r om an ac tof

t he t es t at or or ot herpe r s on ac t i n g w i t h t he knowl edge and c ons entof t he t es t at or .” (e m p h a sis ad d ed ) Id

. O b vi o usl y , a st ri ct i nt erpret at i o n o f t he “ i n s p eci e” d o ct ri ne ad o p t ed by t he Sup rem e C o urt i n In re E sta te of F ore s tH um e i n 19 9 9 wo ul d requi re a di f ferent holdi ng by t hi s co urt t o d ay. T he o t her i ss ue i n Rut l edge i nvo l ved t he sal e o f pro p ert y by t he t est at ri x. W e af f i rme d t he f

i nd i ng of an ad em p t i o n as t o pro p ert y t hat was sol d b y t he t est at ri x. R u tled g e , 1986 W L 6063, a t * 4.
-2- An oth e r e xamp le of

dis tin g uis hin g thefa c ts i s In re Estate of Rutledge , No.85-338-II , 1986 WL 6063 (Tenn. Ct. App. May 29, 1986), wher ein the court was prese nted with two ademption issues. One pe rtained to rea l p ro p er ty devised in the will, which ha d been disposed of by the testatrix. The other pertained to per sonalty disposed of by

the conse rvator f

or t he testatrix without the knowledg e or c onsent of the testatrix . The Rutledge c o u rttr e a t e d t h e d i s p o s i t i o n s d i f f e r e n t l y, ho ldi ng that th e a c ts b y

thete statrix caus e d an a de mption , y e t th e a c ts b y thec on se rv a tor

didno t.
T h e r e l e v a n t p r o v i s i o n s o f th e R u t l e d g e w i l l d i r e c t e dth e E x e c u tri x t o s e l l a l l r e a l p r o p e rt y, a nda ft e r the pay me nt o f expe ns e s, g ive the re sid ue of the pr oc e e ds to n a me d b e ne fi c iari e s. Th e wi ll also specif

ically bequeathed per sonal property – diamond ring , dinner

rin g , s il v er

s erv ice, c ertificates of deposit, household furnishings, etc . – to other name d benef iciarie s. As the petition to c onstrue the Rutledg e will reve aled, all of the property bequeathed or devised in the will had been sold prior to the testatrix’ death. As a c onsequenc e, the e state consisted of cash and certificates of deposit. The trial court f

ound the testatrix sol d her r eal pr operty and transfer

red money

from beque athed desig nated bank acc ounts to other inv es t m en t i nstruments. It also found the conse rvator sold the diamond ring , the dinner ring, thesterling silver servic e, and thehousehold furnishing s bequeathed in the will. Base d upon these finding s, the trial court held an ade mption had o cc u rr ed as to the property disposed of by

the testatrix, but t he transactions by the conse rv at o r d i d not causean a de mption . A s a

c on se qu e nc e of

the se fi nd ing s andho ldi ng , the tria l cou rt or de re d the e xec utrix to pay the re sp e c tiv e le g a te e s the a mou nt fo r wh ic h th e pe rs on a lty wa s so ld, wh ic h w a s a ff

irme d b y thi s court. Rutledge, 1986 WL 6063, at * 3. 1

Ba sed upon the re cog nized pr actice of distinguishing the fac ts in ademption case s, we may dis tin g uis h th e sig nif

ic a nt fa c tual dif

fe re nc e s b e tw e e n M r. Hu me ’s a ndMr . Gre e namy re ’s e state s. Un lik e Mr . Gre e namy

re , M r. Hu me wa s su i juris at all times. Additionally , the ade mption in t he Hume estate was a d i re ct result of an act and omissions by Mr. Hume. Thedevised prope rty was vo lun tari ly

e nc umb e re d b y

Mr . H umewh ilehe wa s su i ju ris , the def ault on the note sec ured by the pr op e rty oc c ur re d w hil e he wa s su i ju ris , the fo re c los ur e oc c ur re d w hil e Mr . H umewa s su i ju ris , and he re mained su i ju ris until his death.

Th e fa c ts o f M r. Gr e e namy re ’s c a se aree nti re ly

dif fe re nt. Mr . G re e namy

rewa s n ot su i ju ris
a t an y tim e mate ri a l to theiss ue s. Mo st s ig nif ic a ntl y , h e wa s a

wa rdof a c on se rv a tor sh ip f

or his person and property when the disputed transac tions took pl ace . Moreove r, Mr. Gr eenamyre ha d no involvement, direc t or indirect, in thetransac tions. All sales and transfe rs of the a ssets at issue wer eN o one co nt end s t he co nser vat o r act ed i m p rop erl y , and no i m p rop ri et y s ho ul d be i nferred f rom t hi s o p i ni o n. 2 T o the c o n tra ry, it a p p e a rs the c o n se rv a to r’s a c tio n s w e re w e ll inte n d e d

.

P r i or t o t he adop t i on of t he “ i n s peci e” do ct r i ne by t he Hu me cou r t , ade mpt i on was ba s ed u pon t h e doi n g of 3

so m e a c t b y the tes ta to r. P R I T C HA R D ON W I L L S A ND A D M I N I ST R A TI O N O F E STAT ES , whi ch i s r ecogn i zed by probat e j udges and pr act i t i oner s as t he l eadi ng aut hor i t y on probat e mat t er s and t he adm i ni s t r at i on of es t at es i n T enn es s ee, provi des t hat
a n a d e m p tio n is “th e e x tinc tio n , alie n a tio n , w ithd ra w a l, o r sa tisfa c tio n o f t h e leg a c y by s om e actof t he t es t at or by w hi ch
an i nt ent i on t o r evoke i s i nd i cat ed ; t he d o i ng of som e a ct wi t h regard t o t he subject m at t er whi ch i nt erf eres wi t h t he
o p erat i o n of t he wi l l

. (emp hasi s ad d ed ) P R I T C HA R D ON W I L L S A ND A D M I N I ST R A TI O N O F E STAT ES , § 486 (J ACK W. R OB I NS ON , S R

. & J EFF M O BL EY , 5 ed

. 19 9 4 )( ci t i ng W i ggi ns v
. Cheat ham , 2 2 5 S .W

. 1 0 4 0 (T e n n . 1 9 2 0 ); A m erica n T ru st th & Banki ng Co. v
. Bal

f our , 19 8 S.W

. 70 (T enn. 19 1 7 ))

.
In S t a t e o

f Te n n e s s e e , Dep a r t me n to f C hi l dr e n ' s S e r v s
. v
. B. F. , N o. E2004- 00338- CO A- R3- PT , 2004 W L 4 2 7 5 2 8 0 8 , * 4 (T enn. C t

. A p p
. O ct

. 2 , 2 0 0 4 ), D C S co nt end ed t hat i n St at e v
. H aynes , N o. 01C01- 9611- CC

- 00494, 1998 W L 307949 ( T en n
. Cr i m. App. J u n e 12, 1998) t h e T en n es s ee Cour t of Cr i mi n al Appea l s r u l ed “ t h er e i s n o di s t i n ct i on i n t h e bu s i n es s r ec or ds h ea r s ay e x ce pt i on be t we en a dmi s s i on of t h e ac t u al r ec or ds a n d a dmi s s i on of t es t i mon y ba s ed on t he reco rds. " T hi s co urt i n B .F

. conc l uded t he H aynes cour t ha d not addres s ed t he meri t s of t he bus i nes s r ecor ds i s s ue; t her efore, any co mm ent s i t m ade i n t hat r ega r d wer e o b i t e r d i c t u m and a s s uch , di d not cons t i t ut e bi ndi ng pre ceden t i al
a u tho rity. Id

. (ci t i ng Shephe r d Fl ee t s , Inc. v
. O pr yl and U SA , 7 5 9 S .W .2 d 9 1 4 , 9 2 1 (T e n n
. C t. A p p
. 1 9 8 8 )) . S ign ifi c a n tly, t hi s co urt went o n t o o b ser ve t hat t he cases rel i ed o n i n H aynes w e r e fa c t u a l l y di s t i n g u i s h a bl e f r om B. F. Id

. O f

cour s e, we are no t f

ree t o dis regard d i rect i ves when t he Sup rem e C o urt i s speaking d i rect l y on t he m at t er before i t and i s seeki ng to giv e gu id a n c e to the b e n c h a n d b a r. S e e H o ld e r v
. T e n n e ss e e J u d ic ia l S e le c tio n C o m m 'n , 937 S. W

. 2d 877, 881- 82 (T enn. 19 9 6 ).
-3- the ac ts of a court-appointed fiduc iary , a conservator , without the knowledg e or c onsent of Mr. 2 Green am yre
. I n fac t, it was leg ally impossibl e for

Mr. Gre enamy

re to objec t or consent to the t ra n s ac t i ons because Mr. Gr eenamyre w as pre viouslydecla red a disabled per son subject to a
conservatorship.

It is, or should be, of sig nificanc e that the a demption at issue was not the re sult of any act or omission by Mr. Greenamyre. I ndeed, Mr. Gre enamy re’ s only act or omission relevant to the issue 3 was to fall victim to infirmities of age , which necessitated that he be place d in a nursing home and have a conservator a

ppointed to handle all of his leg al and pe rsonal af fairs.
The principle upon whic h the Hume court applied the “in specie ” doctrine was that it matters not that the ademption was a result of an act by the testator. Theademption in Hume was, howe ver, a dire ct re sult of an ac t by Mr. Hume and subsequent omissions by Mr. Hume. The “ac t” was w hen Mr . H ume e nc umb e re d the re a l est a te , whi c h put there su lti ng fo re c los ur e in p lay . T he“ omi ssi on s” include Mr. Hume ’s failure to pay the note sec ured by

the devised p ro p erty

and his subsequent failureto revise the w ill to remedy the ef fec t of the ade mption. Ac co rding ly , the fa cts befor e the Hume court involved a su i ju ris testator who c ommitt ed an a ct and at least two omissions t hat caused the ad em p t i o n
. Acc ording ly , by taking a strict interpr etation of Hume and the doc trine of obiter dictum , it app e ars thea do pti onof

the“ in s pe c ie ” do c trineis obiter dictum , at l east to the extent the te stator wa s n ot su i ju ris when the tr ansac tions occurr ed, b ec au se it was not essential to the determination in Hume

. 4Si nce t he ef fect i ve dat e of

t he l egi s l at i on was su bse quent t o t he deat h of M r
. G r een amy r e, t he l egi s l at i on ca n 5
not be appl i ed r et r oact i vel y t o t hi s es t at e.

T h e re le v a n t p a rts o f the U n ifo rm P ro b a te C o d e a d o p te d b y the G e n e ra l A sse m b ly, w h ic h p e rta in to sp e c ifi c 6 devi s es an d beq ues t s by per s ons wh o s ubs equen t l y become i nca paci t at ed provi de:

(a) A s p eci f

i c l egat ee o r devi see has a ri ght t o t he sp e c ifi c a ll y gi f t ed or d evi sed p rop ert y i n t he t estato r' s estat e a t d ea t h or i f t he p ro p erty ha s b ee n disp o sed o f an d a c o ntrary i nten t i o n is no t m an i fest dur i ng t he t es t at or' s l i fet i me:

(1) A ny ba l ance o f

t he p urchase pri ce, t o get her wi t h any s ecuri t y i nt erest , ow i ng fro m a p u rc h a se r to the tes ta to r a t d e a th b y re a so n o f sale o f t h e p ro p e rty; (2) A ny am o unt of a co nd em nat i o n award fo r t he t aki ng .
. . unpa i d at de at h; (3) A ny pro ceed s unp ai d at de at h on f i re or casual t y i nsur ance o n, or o t her r eco very fo r i njury t o , t he p rop ert y ; and ( 4) P r op er t y owned by t he t es t at or at deat h a nd ac qui r ed as a r es ul t of forec l osu r e, or obt ai ned i n l i eu of

forec l osu r e, of

t he s ecu r i t y i nt er es t for a s peci f i cal l y devi s ed
o b l i gat i o n. ( b) I f s peci f i cal l y devi s ed or beque at hed pr op er t y i s s ol d or mort gag ed by a c ons er vat or or by an a g e n t ac ting w ithin the a u tho rity o f a d u ra b le p o w e r o f a tto rn e y fo r an inc a p a c itate d p rin c ip a l, o r if a condem nat i on a wa r d, i n s u r an ce pr oce eds , or r ec ov er y for i n j u r y t o t h e pr oper t y a r e pai d t o a cons er vat or or t o a n age nt act i ng wi t h t he aut hor i t y of a dur abl e po wer of at t orn ey for an i nca paci t at ed pri nci pal , t he s peci f

i c devi s ee has t he r i gh t t o a gen er al pecun i ar y devi s e equal t o t he net s al e pr i ce, the a m o u n t o f t h e un p a id lo a n , t h e c o n d e m n a tio n a w a rd , t h e insu ra n c e p ro c e e d s, o r th e re c o v e ry. ( c) T he r i gh t of

a s peci f i c l ega t ee or devi s ee un der s ubs ect i on ( b) i s r educe d by any r i gh t t he l ega t ee o r devi see has unde r s ub sect i o n (a)

. (c o n tinu e d ...)
-4- The c ritical distinguishing fac tors prese nt in Hume and not pr esent here are leg al compete ncy a ndthe abil ity or la c k the re of of thete stator

to r e me dy

theimp e nd ing a de mptionby re vis ing thewi ll. Mr. Hume could ha ve but did not remedy the ade mption. Mr. Gree namy re c ould not; in fact, it was a leg al impossibil ity

. Application of the “in specie ” doctrine by the Hume c ou rt

wa s lo g ic a l ande qu ita

ble , b e c aus e M r. Hu m e, b ei n g su i ju ris c ou ld h a ve , b ut d id n ot, re vis e his wi ll af te r thefo re c los ur e . N e ve rthe le ss, I am conf ident the Hume court would not have a pplied the “in spec ie” doc trine to Mr. Gre enamy re’ s set of fa cts. I

submit t he appar ent broad application of the holding in Hume is theun int e nd e d r e su lt of the Hume court painting with too broad a brush. It is for such ar

tistry we have the sa feg uard of obiter dictum

. As thema jority no te d, it is sig nif

ic a nt but no t c on tr oll ing that th e Ge ne ral A sse mbl y re c e ntl y expressed its intention that the harsh “in spec ie” doc trine not apply to persons like Mr. Gr eenamyre. 5 This intent is evide nt f

rom adoption of rele vant parts of the Uniform Probate Code, which favor the

“ int e nti onof

thete stator ” ru le ins te a d of the ha rs h “ in s pe c ie ” ru le wh e n a de vis e or be qu e st i s so ld by a c on se rv a tor

fo r an in c apa c itate d p e rs onwho cann ot a pp ro veor ob je c t to thefi du c iary ’s a c ts. See Te nn . Co de An n. § 3 2- 3- 11 1 ( Sup p. 20 05 ); see also The Unif o rm P ro b at e Code, Sec . 2-606 (ame nded 1997), 8 U.L .A. 37 (Supp. 2002). Moreove r, Tenn. Code Ann. § 32-3- 1 1 1 p rovides g uidelines when spe cifically bequeathed or de vised proper ty has bee n chang ed by

a conse rvator or a tto rn e y -i n- fa c t. Id

. 6(

. . . con t i n u ed) 6

. . . . (e ) F o r th e p u rp o se s o f t h e re fer e n c e s in sub se c tio n (b ) t o a n a g e n t a c ting w ithin the a u tho rity o f a d u ra b le p o w e r o f atto rn e y fo r a n inc a p a c itate d p rin c ip a l:

(1) "Incap aci t at ed pri nci p al " m eans a pri nci p al who i s an i ncap aci t at ed pe rs o n; (2) N o ad

judicat i o n of t he p ri nci p al ' s i ncap aci t y need oc cur before de at h; and (3) T h e ac t s of an ag en t wi t h i n t h e au t h or i t y of a du r abl e powe r of at t o rney are pres umed t o be for an i nca paci t at ed pri nci pal , s uch pre s umpt i on r ebut t abl e by cl ear a n d c o n v inc ing e v id e n c e o f ca p a c ity. T e n n . C o d e A n n . § 3 2 -3 -1 1 1

. -5- Wit h the adoption of the U niform P ro b at e Code, Te nnesseehas joined a numbe r of j u r i s d i c t i o n s th a tap p l y th e l e s s h ar s h “ i n t e n to f th e t e s t a t o r ” d o c tri n e w h e n p r o p e rt y i s s o l db y a gu ar d i an or conse rvator of an inca pacitate d, incompetent or disable d person. I owa, in E s tate of Bierstedt , 1 19 N. W.2 d 2 34 (1 96 3) , r e ve rs e d an e arl ie r r uli ng of tot a l a de mption , andhe ld that a g uardian’s sale of

a testator’ s farm while the testator wa s incompetent did n o t ef fec t a total
a de mption . L abe lin g thi s th e “ int e nti on ” ru le , th e I ow a c ou rt e xplaine d, “ to h oldoth e rw isewo uld allow t he g uardian, either intentionally or unintentionally , to disrupt the disposit ive sche me of the testator as e vidence d by

his last competent act in relation to the specif ic devise.” Bierstedt , 119 N.W.2d at 238. Reversing a decr ee of partial ademption of a devise, which was t h e i n co m p et ent testatrix’ home, California, in Estate of Mason, 397 P.2d 1005 (Cal.1965), rea soned t h at an incompete nt testator lacks intent to adeem and the opportunity to avoid the effect of ademption by
ma k ing a n e w wil l , and that a c ontrary rule would a llow the g uardian, by chang ing t h e fo rm of g uardianship property , to determine the distribution of the estate. “ To pe rmit such ademption,” said thec ou rt , “woul d allow the guardian to destroy his ward’s testamentary plan . . . .” Id . ( e mph a sis added) ; see a lso Matter of Estate of W arren , 344 S.E.2d 795 (N.C. Ct. App. 1986); 84 ALR4th 455 (uphol d in g th e p r o n o u n c e me n t th a t th e p rin c ip leo f a d e mp ti o n d o e s n o t a

p p ly w h e n th e te s tator become s incompetent and the subject matter of a specific bequest or devise is sold by a g uardian or c on se rv a tor ); Le wis v . H

ill , 56 N.E.2d 619, 622 (Ill. 1944) (statin g t h e princ iple arises f rom the
rec og nition that the sale of prope rty by a g uardian or conservator is “ in no sense to bereg arde d as
a convey ance by the testatrix”). Several jurisdictions, per ceiving harshne ss in the strict application of the ruleto such circ umstances, and realiz ing that favoritism or g ree d may be pre sent, haveadopted specia l rules to the ef

fec t that the repr esentative’s conduct does not ne cessa rily or entire ly

adee m the leg acy or beque st. See JeffreyI. Ghe nt, Annotation, Ademption or Revocation of Spec ific Devise or Beque st by Guardian, Committee, Conservator, or Trustee or Mentally or Physic ally Incom petent Testator , 84 A.L .R.4th 462 (1991).

For the re asons stated a

bove, I respe ctfully

dissent from that part of t he majority opinion that upholds the ademption. Wit h that exception, I concur with the majority

.

___________________________________ FRANK G. CLEMENT, JR ., J UDGE