U.S. Department of Justice

Office of Justice Programs

Office of Juvenile Justice and Delinquency Prevention

Summary

Youth 

Gang Programs

and

Strategies
Research and Program Development Division

develops knowledge on national trends in juvenile

delinquency; supports a program for data collection

and information sharing that incorporates elements

of statistical and systems development; identifies

how delinquency develops and the best methods

for its prevention, intervention, and treatment; and

analyzes practices and trends in the juvenile justice

system.

Training and Technical Assistance Division provides juvenile justice training and technical assistance to Federal, State, and local governments; law

enforcement, judiciary, and corrections personnel;

and private agencies, educational institutions, and

community organizations.

Special Emphasis Division provides discretionary

funds to public and private agencies, organizations,

and individuals to replicate tested approaches to 

delinquency prevention, treatment, and control in

such pertinent areas as chronic juvenile offenders,

community-based sanctions, and the disproportionate representation of minorities in the juvenile

justice system.

State Relations and Assistance Division supports

collaborative efforts by States to carry out the

mandates of the JJDP Act by providing formula

grant funds to States; furnishing technical assistance to States, local governments, and private

agencies; and monitoring State compliance with

the JJDP Act.

Information Dissemination Unit produces and distributes information resources on juvenile justice research,

training, and programs and coordinates the Office’s program planning and competitive award activities. Information that meets the needs of juvenile justice professionals

and policymakers is provided through print and online

publications, videotapes, CD–ROM’s, electronic listservs,

and the Office’s Web site. As part of the program planning and award process, IDU develops priorities,

publishes solicitations and application kits for funding

opportunities, and facilitates the peer review process

for discretionary funding awards.

Concentration of Federal Efforts Program promotes

interagency cooperation and coordination among Federal agencies with responsibilities in the area of juvenile justice. The Program primarily carries out this

responsibility through the Coordinating Council on

Juvenile Justice and Delinquency Prevention, an independent body within the executive branch that was

established by Congress through the JJDP Act.

Child Protection Division administers programs related

to crimes against children and children’s exposure to

violence. The Division provides leadership and funding

to promote effective policies and procedures to address

the problems of missing and exploited children, children

who have been abused or neglected, and children

exposed to domestic or community violence. CPD program activities include conducting research; providing

information, training, and technical assistance on programs to prevent and respond to child victims, witnesses, and their families; developing and demonstrating

effective child protection initiatives; and supporting the

National Center for Missing and Exploited Children.

Office of Juvenile Justice

and Delinquency Prevention

The Office of Juvenile Justice and Delinquency Prevention (OJJDP) was established by the President and Congress through the Juvenile Justice and Delinquency Prevention (JJDP) Act of 1974, Public Law 93–415, as

amended. Located within the Office of Justice Programs of the U.S. Department of Justice, OJJDP’s goal is to

provide national leadership in addressing the issues of juvenile delinquency and improving juvenile justice.

OJJDP sponsors a broad array of research, program, and training initiatives to improve the juvenile justice

system as a whole, as well as to benefit individual youth-serving agencies. These initiatives are carried out by

seven components within OJJDP, described below.

The mission of OJJDP is to provide national leadership, coordination, and resources to prevent and respond to juvenile

offending and child victimization. OJJDP accomplishes its mission by supporting States, local communities, and tribal

jurisdictions in their efforts to develop and implement effective, multidisciplinary prevention and intervention programs

and improve the capacity of the juvenile justice system to protect public safety, hold offenders accountable, and provide treatment and rehabilitative services tailored to the needs of individual juveniles and their families.
Youth Gang Programs

and Strategies

Summary

John J. Wilson, Acting Administrator

Office of Juvenile Justice and Delinquency Prevention

August 2000

James C. Howell

National Youth Gang Center

Institute for Intergovernmental Research
The Office of Juvenile Justice and Delinquency Prevention is a component of the Office of Justice

Programs, which also includes the Bureau of Justice Assistance, the Bureau of Justice Statistics, the

National Institute of Justice, and the Office for Victims of Crime.

U.S. Department of Justice

Office of Justice Programs

Office of Juvenile Justice and Delinquency Prevention

810 Seventh Street NW.

Washington, DC 20531

Janet Reno

Attorney General

Daniel Marcus

Acting Associate Attorney General

Mary Lou Leary

Acting Assistant Attorney General

John J. Wilson

Acting Administrator

Office of Juvenile Justice and Delinquency Prevention

This document was prepared under cooperative agreement number 95–JD–MU–K001 from the Office of

Juvenile Justice and Delinquency Prevention (OJJDP), U.S. Department of Justice.

Points of view or opinions expressed in this document are those of the author and do not necessarily represent

the official position or policies of OJJDP or the U.S. Department of Justice.

Cover photographs clockwise from top left: copyright © 1998 Corbis; copyright © 1998 Boys & Girls Clubs

of America; copyright © 1999 Project BRIDGE; copyright © 1997 PhotoDisc, Inc.
iii

Foreword

The growth of youth gang violence and the proliferation of youth gangs into smaller cities and rural areas in

recent years have focused public attention on the youth gang problem and made it an increasingly significant

social policy issue. The public’s concern is understandable, with more than 800,000 gang members active in

over 3,000 gangs according to the latest National Youth Gang Survey. The Office of Juvenile Justice and

Delinquency Prevention (OJJDP) shares this concern and is addressing it on several fronts, in particular,

through OJJDP’s National Youth Gang Center.

Youth Gang Programs and Strategies draws on more than a half-century of gang program evaluations to summarize what we have learned about:

◆ Prevention programs (including early childhood, school-based, and afterschool initiatives).

◆ Intervention programs (including those that work to create violence-free zones, establish gang summits and

truces, and rehabilitate gang members in juvenile detention and correctional facilities).

◆ Suppression programs (including those focused on prosecution, police response, and geomapping and other

tracking systems).

◆ Strategies using multiple techniques (such as community policing).

◆ Multiagency initiatives (including local, State, and Federal efforts).

◆ Comprehensive approaches to gang problems (such as the Comprehensive Community-Wide Approach to

Gang Prevention, Intervention, and Suppression).

◆ Legislation (at the local, State, and Federal levels).

This Summary also describes an OJJDP-sponsored nationwide assessment of youth gang prevention, intervention, and suppression programs; debunks prevalent stereotypes surrounding youth gang members; and provides

research-based recommendations for enhancing the effectiveness of youth gang programs and strategies.

Youth gangs imperil not only the safety of America’s communities but the future of our Nation’s youth. I trust

that the information provided in these pages will improve our efforts to combat this danger.

John J. Wilson

Acting Administrator

Office of Juvenile Justice and Delinquency Prevention
v

Acknowledgments

A number of people have been instrumental in helping to improve this Summary’s quality and in bringing it to

completion. John J. Wilson, Acting Administrator, Office of Juvenile Justice and Delinquency Prevention

(OJJDP), made very helpful suggestions. Betty Chemers, Deputy Administrator of Discretionary Grants,

OJJDP, played a key role in reconceptualizing its format to facilitate use by practitioners. James Burch,

Program Officer, OJJDP, provided text material describing OJJDP’s five-site Comprehensive CommunityWide Approach to Gang Prevention, Intervention, and Suppression and was especially helpful in improving

the final version of the Summary. Phelan Wyrick served as the Program Officer for the National Youth Gang

Center project, made valuable contributions, and helped expedite its publication. Other OJJDP staff also

made helpful comments. Ellen McLaughlin of the Juvenile Justice Clearinghouse masterfully reorganized and

edited the manuscript and coordinated the production of the Summary.

Several colleagues helped make significant improvements to this Summary. Bruce Buckley, Lee Colwell,

David Curry, Malcolm Klein, Cheryl Maxson, Walter Miller, Joan Moore, John Moore, Jim Short, Jr., and

Barbara Tatem Kelley provided very helpful comments on earlier drafts. The author also is grateful to National Youth Gang Center staff for their helpful review comments. In addition, Rolf Loeber and David

Farrington reviewed and provided very insightful comments on a portion of the material in this Summary in

the course of editing Serious and Violent Juvenile Offenders: Risk Factors and Successful Interventions (Loeber and

Farrington, 1998). The author’s chapter in that publication—which also is in the Final Report of the OJJDP

Study Group on Serious and Violent Juvenile Offenders (Loeber and Farrington, 1997)—contains some of

the material in this Summary (see Howell, 1998a).
vii

Table of Contents

Foreword ............................................................................................................................................................. iii

Acknowledgments ............................................................................................................................................ v

Introduction ........................................................................................................................................................ 1

Programs and Strategies ................................................................................................................................ 5

Prevention Programs ..................................................................................................................................... 5

Community Organization ......................................................................................................................... 5

Improving Conditions and Creating Opportunities ................................................................................. 6

Early Childhood Programs ........................................................................................................................ 7

School-Based Programs ............................................................................................................................. 9

Afterschool Activities ............................................................................................................................... 12

Implications of Risk and Protective Factors ........................................................................................... 13

Intervention Programs ................................................................................................................................. 14

Detached Worker Programs .................................................................................................................... 15

Crisis Intervention .................................................................................................................................... 16

Boys & Girls Clubs ................................................................................................................................... 17

Improving Conditions .............................................................................................................................. 17

Violence-Free Zones................................................................................................................................. 17

Gang Summits and Truces ....................................................................................................................... 19

Emergency Room Intervention and Victim Programs ........................................................................... 19

Gang Members in Juvenile Detention and Correctional Facilities ....................................................... 20

Suppression Programs ................................................................................................................................. 21

Prosecution Programs .............................................................................................................................. 21

Police Response ........................................................................................................................................ 22

Geomapping and Tracking Systems ........................................................................................................ 26

Strategies Using Multiple Techniques ....................................................................................................... 28

Community Policing ................................................................................................................................ 28
viii

Community-University Model for Gang Intervention and Delinquency Prevention

in Small Cities .......................................................................................................................................... 28

Aurora Gang Task Force ......................................................................................................................... 29

Partnership for a Safer Cleveland ........................................................................................................... 29

SARA ........................................................................................................................................................ 29

Multiagency Initiatives ................................................................................................................................ 30

Los Angeles Metropolitan Task Force ................................................................................................... 30

Boston Gun Project ................................................................................................................................. 30

Bureau of Justice Assistance Gang Suppression Prototype ................................................................. 31

Minnesota Statewide Task Force ........................................................................................................... 32

Federal Initiatives .................................................................................................................................... 32

TARGET .................................................................................................................................................. 33

Comprehensive Approaches to Gang Problems ........................................................................................ 33

The Comprehensive Community-Wide Approach to Gang Prevention, Intervention,

and Suppression ...................................................................................................................................... 34

The Gang Violence Reduction Program ................................................................................................ 37

Comprehensive Strategy for Serious, Violent, and Chronic Juvenile Offenders ................................ 38

Legislation ..................................................................................................................................................... 40

Federal and State Legislation ................................................................................................................. 40

City Ordinances and Court Injunctions ................................................................................................. 41

Assessment of Youth Gang Programs .................................................................................................... 45

Stereotypes Versus Modern Youth Gangs .......................................................................................... 49

Recommendations ......................................................................................................................................... 53

Conclusion ....................................................................................................................................................... 55

References ........................................................................................................................................................ 57

Directory of Programs, Strategies, and Organizations .................................................................. 71

Index of Programs, Strategies, and Organizations .......................................................................... 77
ix

Tables and Figures

Tables

Table 1 Selected Gang Program Evaluations, 1936–99 ............................................................................ 3

Table 2 Risk Factors at Ages 10–12 for Subsequent Gang Membership, Seattle, WA ........................... 8

Table 3 Law Enforcement Strategies and Perceived Effectiveness ........................................................ 46

Table 4 Average Year of Gang Problem Onset, by Area Type................................................................ 50

Table 5 Average Year of Gang Problem Onset, by Region ..................................................................... 50

Figures

Figure 1 Percentage of Delinquent Acts Attributable to Gang Members and Prevalence of

Gang Membership, Rochester, NY ............................................................................................. 39

Figure 2 Law Enforcement Agencies’ Perception of Youth Gang Problems, 1998 ................................. 45

Figure 3 Percentage of Jurisdictions Reporting Active Youth Gangs in 1998, by Area Type ................ 51

Figure 4 Race/Ethnicity of Gang Members (Weighted for Number of Gang Members), 1998 ............. 51

Figure 5 Age of Gang Members (Weighted for Number of Gang Members), 1998 ............................... 51
1

Introduction

Youth gang problems have grown significantly in

the past 25 years (Miller, in press). During this

period, both the number of cities with reported

youth gang problems and the number of gang

members have increased nearly 7 times, while the

estimated number of youth gangs has increased

more than 10 times (Miller, 1992; Moore, 1997;

Moore and Terrett, 1998; Office of Juvenile Justice and Delinquency Prevention, 1999; National

Youth Gang Center, 1997). In the past few years,

however, more recent surveys suggest that the percentage of jurisdictions with active youth gangs is

decreasing slightly, from 53 percent in 1996 to 51

percent in 1997 to 48 percent in 1998 (Moore and

Cook, 1999). The estimated number of gangs and

gang members also decreased during this period

(by 7 and 8 percent, respectively).

Without a clear understanding of why and how

youth gangs form, preventing their formation is an

intricate and challenging task. Gangs emerge, grow,

dissolve, and disappear for reasons that are poorly

understood. This lack of understanding impedes

efforts to prevent gang emergence, disrupt existing

gangs, and divert youth from them. Youth gang research must continue to address how gangs form,

how existing gangs can be disrupted, and how youth

can be diverted from joining gangs.

Evaluation of youth gang programs and strategies

is an equally complex undertaking. Their effectiveness must be assessed not only in regard to the

formation and dissolution of gangs and the diversion of youth from gangs, but also in regard to

delinquency and crime prevention or reduction.

Because each youth gang and each community is

unique, finding similar groups and communities

for comparison is difficult. Measurement problems

also plague gang research. Because there is no

commonly accepted definition of “youth gang,”

comparison of study results is problematic. Furthermore, because gang interventions are rarely

based on theoretical assumptions, measurement

of what these programs are attempting to accomplish is difficult. Most important, very few rigorous

scientific evaluations have been undertaken.

Definition of “Youth Gang”

The term “youth gang” is commonly used interchangeably with “street gang,” referring to neighborhood or street-based youth groups that meet

“gang” criteria. However, the lines between youth

gangs, street gangs, and organized criminal enterprises are often blurred (see Klein, 1995a). For the

purposes of this review, Miller’s (1992:21) definition of “youth gang” is applicable: “a self-formed

association of peers, united by mutual interests,

with identifiable leadership and internal organization, who act collectively or as individuals to

achieve specific purposes, including the conduct

of illegal activity and control of a particular territory, facility, or enterprise.” Motorcycle gangs,

prison gangs, racial supremacists, and other hate

groups are excluded. Likewise, gangs whose membership is restricted to adults and that do not have

the characteristics of youth gangs are excluded

(see Curry and Decker, 1998). Unless otherwise

noted, the term “gangs” as used in this Summary

refers to youth gangs.
2

This Summary outlines programs and strategies that

have been and are being used to break the lure and

appeal of gangs and reduce gang crime and violence.

Evaluations and national assessments of some of these

programs are discussed, and an overview of what

practitioners and administrators need to know before

designing and implementing any gang program or

strategy is provided. Although several gang programs

have been evaluated (see table 1), only a few programs are presented here; information on others is

available in Serious and Violent Juvenile Offenders: Risk

Factors and Successful Interventions (Howell, 1998a)

and in the Youth Gang Consortium Survey of Gang

Programs.1

1 This information is available electronically at the National Youth

Gang Center’s (NYGC’s) Web page, which can be accessed at

www.iir.com/nygc/. The consortium consists of Federal, State,

and local agency representatives. This survey, which does not

necessarily list proven programs but ones that some agencies have

implemented in response to gang problems, was conducted by

NYGC on behalf of the Youth Gang Consortium. In addition to a

description of consortium members’ gang-related programs and

funding levels, contact information is provided. Eight other publications are available that detail the history of youth gang programming, including what has not worked and why (Bursik and

Grasmick, 1993; Conly, 1993; Curry and Decker, 1998; Goldstein

and Huff, 1993; Howell, 1998a; Klein, 1995a; Spergel, 1995; and

Needle and Stapleton, 1983).
3

Table 1. Selected Gang Program Evaluations, 1936–99

Program Study Design Type of Intervention Results

New York City Thrasher, 1936 Descriptive and case study Prevention—general Negligible impact

Boys Club* delinquency

Chicago Area Kobrin, 1959; Descriptive and case study Prevention—community Indeterminable

Project (CAP) Schlossman and organization

Sedlak, 1983

Midcity Project Miller, 1962 Field observation and Prevention—community Negligible impact

(Boston) quasi-experimental organization, family service,

and detached worker

Chicago Youth Caplan et al., 1967; Quasi-experimental Prevention—detached No differential

Development Project* Gold and Mattick, community comparison worker and community impact

1974; Mattick and organization

Caplan, 1962

Chicago YMCA Short, 1963; Short and Field observation and Prevention—detached Early results encourProgram for Strodtbeck, 1965 quasi-experimental worker aging; no final results:

Detached Workers* observation evaluation suspended

Group Guidance Klein, 1969, 1971 Quasi-experimental Prevention—detached Significant increase

Project (Los Angeles) worker in gang delinquency

Ladino Hills Klein, 1968 Quasi-experimental Prevention—detached Significant reduction

Project (Los Angeles) worker in gang delinquency

Chicago Community Spergel, 1972; Descriptive statistical Social intervention Ineffective

Action Program Spergel et al., 1969 trends

(Woodlawn Organization)*

Wincroft Youth Smith, Farrant, Quasi-experimental Prevention—detached No differential

Project (U.K.)* and Marchant, 1972 worker impact

Gang Violence Reduction Torres, 1981, 1985 Quasi-experimental Suppression and crisis Declines in gang

Program (California) intervention homicides and

intergang violence

House of Umoja Woodson, 1981, 1986 Descriptive, case study, Prevention, crisis Effected truce among

(Philadelphia) statistical trends intervention, and social warring gangs;

intervention effective sanctuary

Operation Hardcore Dahmann, 1981 Quasi-experimental Suppression (vertical Successful gang

(Los Angeles) prosecution) prosecution process

San Diego Street Pennell, 1983 Quasi-experimental Prevention—detached Indeterminable

Youth Program* community comparison worker

Crisis Intervention Spergel, 1986 Quasi-experimental Crisis intervention and Some reduction in

Services Project community comparison suppression serious and violent

(Chicago) crimes

Broader Urban Involve- Thompson and Jason, Quasi-experimental Prevention—discouraging Marginal reduction

ment and Leadership 1988 school comparison adolescents from joining

Development (Chicago) gangs

continued on next page
4

Table 1. Selected Gang Program Evaluations, 1936–99 (continued)

Program Study Design Type of Intervention Results

Youth Gang Drug Cohen et al., 1994 Quasi-experimental Prevention—discouraging Little or no effect

Prevention Program treatment and control adolescents from joining on gang involve-

(Administration on comparison (multiple gangs; community ment; some delinChildren, Youth, and sites) mobilization quency reduction

Families)*

Aggression Replacement Goldstein and Glick, Quasi-experimental Skills training, anger Preliminary results

Training (Brooklyn) 1994; Goldstein, Glick, treatment and control control, and moral positive with memand Gibbs, 1998 comparison education bers of 10 gangs

Tri-Agency Resource Kent and Smith, 1995; Quasi-experimental Suppression—targeting Successfully targeted

Gang Enforcement Team Kent et al., 2000 gang members for hardcore gang mem-

(TARGET) (Orange prosecution, supervision, bers and showed seCounty, CA) and incarceration rious crime reduction

The Neutral Zone (State Thurman et al., 1996 Direct observation, focus Prevention and alternatives Some positive results

of Washington) group, and crime statistics to gang involvement (but see Fritsch, Caeti,

and Taylor, 1999:26)

Montreal Preventive Tremblay et al., 1996 Longitudinal study from Prevention via skills Reduced delinquency,

Treatment Program kindergarten; random development (in pro- drug use, and gang

assignment social skills and self- involvement

development)

Little Village Gang Spergel and Grossman, Quasi-experimental Social intervention Positive results; best

Violence Reduction 1997; Spergel, community comparison and suppression results with combined

Program (Chicago) Grossman, and Wa, approach

1998

Youth Gang Drug Curry, Williams, and Quasi-experimental Prevention and social Pueblo program

Intervention and Koenemann, 1997 intervention showed positive

Prevention Program results with culturefor Female Adolescents* based programs for

(Pueblo, CO; Boston, Mexican American

MA; and Seattle, WA) females

Gang Resistance Winfree, Esbensen, and Quasi-experimental treat- Prevention—discouraging Modest reductions

Education and Training Osgood, 1996; Esbensen ment and control compar- adolescents from joining in gang affiliation

Program (G.R.E.A.T.) and Osgood, 1997, 1999 ison (multiple sites) gangs and delinquency

Gang Resistance Palumbo and Quasi-experimental and Prevention—discouraging Small effects on

Education and Training Ferguson, 1995 use of a focus group (mul- adolescents from joining attitudes and gang

Program (G.R.E.A.T.) tiple sites, different from gangs resistance

G.R.E.A.T. sites above)

Operation Cul-De-Sac Lasley, 1998 Quasi-experimental before, Suppression—using traffic Gang homicides and

(Los Angeles) during, and after com- barriers to block gang assaults appeared to

parisons with control area mobility be reduced

Antigang Fritsch, Caeti, Quasi-experimental; Suppression—using Aggressive curfew

Initiative (Dallas) and Taylor, 1999 compared target and saturation patrol, curfew, and truancy enforcecontrol areas and truancy enforcement ment appeared to be

effective

* These programs are not described in the main body of the Summary.

Source: Adapted from Loeber and Farrington, 1998.
5

In the sections that follow, gang programs and strategies are described in seven major categories: prevention, intervention, suppression, programs using

multiple techniques, multiagency initiatives, comprehensive approaches to gang problems, and legislative approaches. When available, evaluation results

are presented.

Early in the Nation’s history, youth gang work emphasized prevention. These programs were followed

by interventions designed to reintegrate particular

gangs into conventional society using “detached

workers” (agency representatives dispatched from

their offices to work directly with gangs in the community). Detached workers were sent out in automobiles to intervene in crisis situations. A major

shift then occurred as programs, led by the police,

sought to suppress youth gangs, buttressed by enhanced legislative penalties for gang crime. Currently, a mixture of approaches is being tried across

the Nation; however, programs that integrate prevention, intervention, and suppression activities are

gaining popularity.

This Summary includes multiple techniques that

some jurisdictions use to achieve prevention, intervention, and suppression program goals—such as

providing alternatives to gang involvement while

employing suppression to make gang life unattractive.

Other jurisdictions incorporate multiagency suppression initiatives involving several law enforcement

agencies, perhaps in multiple jurisdictions. Many

jurisdictions are taking a comprehensive approach by

integrating prevention, intervention, and suppression

strategies. Finally, some jurisdictions attempt to suppress gangs by passing legislation or city ordinances

prohibiting gang involvement or directed toward

specific crimes.

Prevention Programs

The history of gang intervention in the United

States shows that early programs emphasized prevention (Shaw, 1930; Shaw and McKay, 1931;

Thrasher, 1927, 1936). Prevention programs typically attempt to prevent youth from joining gangs,

but might also seek to interrupt gang formation. A

variety of strategies have been employed to prevent

youth involvement in gangs, including community

organization, improving conditions for youth, early

childhood programs, school-based programs, and

local clubs and afterschool programs.

Community Organization

The Chicago Area Project (CAP) (Sorrentino, 1959;

Sorrentino and Whittaker, 1994), created in 1934,

was designed to implement “social disorganization”

theories suggesting that community organization

could be a major tool for reducing crime and gang

problems. CAP was designed to involve local community groups in improving neighborhood conditions, such as the lack of supervised recreation and

afterschool programs, that were believed to foster

the formation of youth gangs.

CAP was the first program to initiate use of detached

workers. Program activities included recreation, community self-renewal, mediation, and advocacy before

government agencies and staff, especially school, probation, and parole officials (Schlossman and Sedlak,

1983). Claims of CAP’s success continue to be publicized despite the absence of empirical evaluation results. The program is still operating, a clear indication

of its perceived value among Chicago officials and

community groups.

Programs and Strategies
6

Another community-based gang program that, like

CAP, relies on indigenous community organizations

was established much later. The House of Umoja

began operating in Philadelphia during the 1970’s as a

unique grassroots program initiated by community

residents David and Falaka Fattah (National Center

for Neighborhood Enterprise, 1999; see also Woodson,

1981, 1986, 1998). Using their own resources and

their home as a base of operations, they created this

family-centered community institution that effectively

mediated gang conflicts and came to serve as a source

of counsel and individual development for neighborhood gang and nongang youth. The family model

“provides a sense of belonging, identity, and self-worth

that was previously sought through gang membership” (National Center for Neighborhood Enterprise,

1999:59). Through reparenting2

 and providing role

models, the House of Umoja has “successfully transformed more than five hundred frightened, frustrated,

and alienated young minority males into self-assured,

competent, concerned, and productive citizens” (National Center for Neighborhood Enterprise, 1999:16).

The National Center for Neighborhood Enterprise

(NCNE) has identified eight characteristics associated with the House of Umoja’s success (National

Center for Neighborhood Enterprise, 1999):

◆ A family-centered organization that acts as youth’s

primary human support system and is based on a

participatory model of decisionmaking.

◆ A process of socialization in which at-risk youth

develop strong, healthy identities and may even

earn the name Fattah, after the House of Umoja’s

initiators.

◆ The Adella, a mechanism for conflict resolution

and problem solving that requires full participation of all members.

◆ Individual learning to organize personal time

and space.

◆ An emphasis on the importance of work and a

redefinition of the meaning of work associated

with virtue.

◆ An emphasis on service to others.

◆ A spiritual or ideological context expressed in

common familial rituals.

◆ Leadership training and development.

Improving Conditions and Creating

Opportunities

Efforts to prevent youth gang involvement have

long been part of community-based youth service

programs. Albuquerque’s Youth Development, Inc.

(YDI), provides comprehensive services for at-risk

youth and others involved in the juvenile justice

system (Carnegie Council on Adolescent Development, 1994). YDI’s Gang Prevention and Intervention Program is directed toward preventing initial

gang involvement among younger teenagers and

providing constructive, nonviolent activities for current gang members. In a structured 7-week program,

gang members become involved in community service, learn nonviolent conflict resolution skills, obtain employment and legal assistance, and receive

counseling with family members.

Inner-City Games (ICG) is another urban program

that provides alternatives to gang life (Gates, 1998).

Licensed by the National Inner-City Games Foundation and chaired by Arnold Schwarzenegger, ICG

provides opportunities for inner-city youth to participate in athletic, educational, cultural, and communityenrichment programs. The program enables youth to

build confidence and self-esteem and encourages

them to say “no” to gangs, drugs, and violence and

“yes” to hope, learning, and life. Originally assisting

youth only in East Los Angeles, ICG now operates in

12 cities, serving more than 1 million young people.

Other programs for improving economic conditions

and individual opportunities in gang-ridden neighborhoods include community reconstruction (Eisenhower

Foundation, 1990), Empowerment Zones (revitalizing

communities through economic and social services),

and Enterprise Communities (promoting physical and

human development). Supported by the U.S. Department of Housing and Urban Development (HUD),

Empowerment Zones and Enterprise Communities are

large-scale programs that seek to reconstruct selected

inner-city areas (Office of Juvenile Justice and Delinquency Prevention, 1995b). 2

 Reparenting involves adults who act as parents, giving youth unconditional love, clear standards of behavior, and constant availability.
7

The following are descriptions of three programs

designed to prevent gang problems in particularly

low-income areas and public housing projects:

◆ The Beethoven Project in Chicago’s Robert Taylor Homes (Center for Successful Child Development, 1993) was designed to ensure a head start

for mothers and their infants by providing a variety of health and social services, mainly through a

family drop-in center (Short, 1996).

◆ The Neutral Zone (Thurman et al., 1996), a

recreation/services facility operating in several

communities in the State of Washington, offers

high-risk youth, many of whom may be involved in

gangs, a safe alternative to being out on the streets

late at night.

◆ The Community Outreach Program (Kodluboy

and Evenrud, 1993), a St. Paul, MN, Police Department program, includes prompt diversion of

first-time offenders and school liaison work in the

city’s Southeast Asian community, which has become affected by gangs.

The neighborhood block watch also appears to be a

useful community crime prevention technique for public housing projects and other neighborhoods (Lindsay

and McGillis, 1986; Rosenbaum, Lewis, and Grant,

1986). Other community-based initiatives that help

prevent gang involvement include manhood development (culturally specific mentoring that matches youth

with adult role models) (Watts, 1991), neighborhood

youth centers (e.g., Nuestro Centro, see Office of

Juvenile Justice and Delinquency Prevention, 1995a),

the use of gang members in outreach efforts (e.g.,

Comin’ Up, City of Fort Worth, TX, 1996; see Curry,

1995), and the Community Reclamation Project

(1990), which demonstrated how to establish an

ongoing, integrated network of community-based

organizations, agencies, and citizens that would effectively combat emerging gang problems.

Early Childhood Programs

Battin-Pearson and colleagues (1999:20) concluded

that “once in a gang, those youths who are most behaviorally and socially maladjusted in childhood are

most likely to remain in a gang for multiple years.”

The Seattle study (Hill et al., 1999) identified a variety of childhood risk factors that, if present between

the ages of 10 and 12, are predictive of gang membership during adolescence (see table 2). Clearly, prevention efforts should begin early.

The Montreal Preventive Treatment Program

(Tremblay et al., 1996) illustrates how multiplecomponent prevention programs can effectively

address early childhood risk factors for gang involvement. This program was designed to prevent

antisocial behavior among boys of low socioeconomic

status who displayed disruptive problem behavior in

kindergarten. By incorporating an approach focused

on risk and protective factors, it demonstrated that a

combination of parent training and childhood skills

development can steer antisocial children away from

gangs. Parent training was combined with individual

social skills training for boys ages 7 to 9. Parents received an average of 17 training sessions that focused

on monitoring their children’s behavior, giving positive reinforcement for prosocial behavior, using punishment effectively, and managing family crises. The

boys received 19 training sessions to improve prosocial skills and self-control. The training was implemented in small groups containing both disruptive

and nondisruptive boys and used coaching, peer modeling, self-instruction, reinforcement contingencies,

and role-playing to build skills. An evaluation of the

program showed both short- and long-term gains,

including less delinquency, substance use, and gang

involvement at age 15 (Tremblay et al., 1996).

Other early childhood development programs combined with parent training have proven effective in

preventing involvement in delinquency and crime into

early adulthood, although they were not tested for the

prevention of gang involvement. The High/Scope

Perry Preschool Project (Schweinhart, Barnes, and

Weikart, 1993) and the Syracuse University Family

Development Research Project (Lally, Mangione,

and Honig, 1988) have been shown to be effective in

reducing severe and chronic delinquency in long-term

followups, although High/Scope was far more cost

effective (Aos et al., 1999). High/Scope sought to

prevent school failure in poor, African American 3-

and 4-year-olds. Children were enrolled in preschool,

and their teachers conducted home visits to inform

parents of the child’s activities and to promote parental involvement in his or her educational experience.
8

Table 2. Risk Factors at Ages 10–12 for Subsequent Gang Membership, Seattle, WA

Potential Childhood Risk Factor Membership Prevalence* Odds Ratio for Those at High Risk

Neighborhood

Availability of marijuana 30% 3.6

Neighborhood youth in trouble 26 3.0

Low neighborhood attachment 20 1.5

Family

Poverty (low household income) 23% 2.1

One parent in home 21 2.4

One parent and other adults in home 25 3.0

No parents in home 24 2.9

Parental alcohol intake 15 1.0

Sibling antisocial behavior 22 1.9

Poor family management 21 1.7

Parental proviolent attitudes 26 2.3

Low attachment to parents 20 1.5

School

Low academic aspirations 20% 1.6

Low school commitment 21 1.8

Low school attachment 23 2.0

Low academic achievement in

elementary school 28 3.1

Identified as learning disabled 36 3.6

Peer

Association with peers who

engage in problem behaviors 26% 2.0

Individual

Low religious service attendance 15% 1.0

Antisocial beliefs 23 2.0

Respondent drinking 20 1.6

Respondent marijuana initiation 37 3.7

Violence 28 3.1

Personality/Individual Difference

Externalizing 26% 2.6

Internalizing 19 1.4

Hyperactivity 21 1.7

Poor refusal skills 23 1.8

* For each risk factor, this column shows gang membership prevalence (the percentage of youth joining a gang) among youth who had scored in the

worst quarter on the risk factor at ages 10–12.

Source: Hill et al., 1999.
9

In addition, parental support and information exchange services were made available. The Syracuse

University project delivered services (including educational, nutritional, health, safety, and human service

resources) to pregnant mothers and to mothers with

children who had not yet reached elementary school

(children under age 5). Childcare was provided while

trained home visitors made weekly visits.

School-Based Programs

Gang presence in schools is increasing. Students

bring preexisting gang conflicts to the school setting,

and new conflicts are created when opposing gang

members come into contact with one another. Two

nationwide student surveys show that between 1989

and 1995, the proportion of students reporting that

street gangs were present in their schools nearly

doubled (Chandler et al., 1998). More than a third

(37 percent) reported gang presence in their schools

in 1995 (Howell and Lynch, in press).

Goldstein and Kodluboy (1998) suggest that programs

in school settings must, at a minimum, include three

types of strategies:

◆ In-school safety and control procedures (see also

Trump, 1998).

◆ In-school enrichment procedures that make the

school experience more meaningful, effective, and

enjoyable (see also Howell and Hawkins, 1998).

◆ Formal links to community-based programs.

Goldstein and Kodluboy (1998) also assert that gang

initiatives in schools should be research based, data

driven, and outcome focused. A comprehensive assessment of school-related gang problems and school

safety issues should be made in conjunction with an

assessment of risk factors for gang involvement and

delinquency in the surrounding community. Communities should not move into the program development

stage before these important steps are completed,

because a sound base of research and data are needed

for effective program development. Kodluboy and

Evenrud (1993) suggest that school-focused gang

programs be developed in collaboration with community agencies. These programs should:

◆ Share the common mission and objectives of the

school and school district.

Examples of School-Based Programs

Goldstein and Kodluboy (1998) describe a number of programs with which schools might develop links:

◆ Academy High School (Patterson, NJ).

◆ Big Brothers/Big Sisters of America (New

Jersey’s School-Based Youth Services

Program).

◆ Broader Urban Involvement and Leadership

Development (Chicago, IL).

◆ The City of Fort Worth’s Comin’ Up Program

(Boys & Girls Clubs of America).

◆ Collaborative Intensive Community Treatment

Program (Erie, PA).

◆ Communities In Schools (Alexandria, VA).

◆ El Puente (“The Bridge,” Brooklyn, NY).

◆ Gang Peace/First (Roxbury, MA).

◆ Golden Eagles (Phillips Community American

Indian Center, Minneapolis, MN).

◆ Gulf Coast Trades Center (New Waverly, TX).

◆ The Neutral Zone (Mountainlake Terrace, WA).

◆ Project RAISE (Baltimore, MD).

◆ Project Save-A-Youth (Anaheim, CA).

◆ Youth Works (Louisville, KY).
10

◆ Be public and accountable.

◆ Be based on the established standards of the

profession or social service agency involved.

◆ Have specific, written projected outcomes.

◆ Have reasonable timelines for attaining the

projected outcomes and meeting commitments.

◆ Monitor progress toward individual agency

objectives, using simple, direct measures.

◆ Be subject to external review.

◆ Demonstrate social validity through broad-based

community involvement of all interested parties,

such as businesses, neighborhood representatives,

and others.

◆ Be free of cultural bias and consistent with prevailing prosocial community goals and norms.

Coordinated efforts that link school, police, probation, and other agencies also need to be attentive to

restrictions on information sharing and exceptions

to those restrictions under the Family Educational

Rights and Privacy Act (20 U.S.C. § 1232g). This

Federal law governs the disclosure of information

from education records.3

The following paragraphs describe a variety of

promising school-based gang prevention programs.

PASSPORT. A unique program designed to protect

children from gangs, Parents and Schools Succeeding

in Providing Organized Routes to Travel (PASSPORT) is a joint effort of the Visalia, CA, school district, the police department, parents, and community

organizations (Arnette and Walsleben, 1998). Students use supervised routes when traveling to and

from school in high-crime or gang-oriented areas.

Parents are provided with maps designating these

recommended routes. Police routinely patrol—and

school administrators and the safe school coordinator

also monitor and walk—PASSPORT communities

and routes. Parent volunteers stand in front of their

homes and “just watch” during specified hours.

Fights, intimidating behaviors, and unsafe activities

are immediately reported to the nearest school or to

other appropriate agencies. Media publicity about

PASSPORT encourages all citizens to watch over

schoolchildren to ensure their safe passage to and

from school. The program depends on cooperative

volunteer efforts. Actual dollar costs are minimal.

Antibullying programs. Bullying at school may be a

contributor to joining gangs. The need for protection

is a major reason gang members cite for joining a

gang (Decker and Van Winkle, 1996). Students who

report the presence of gangs and weapons in school

are about twice as likely to report having been victims

of a violent crime (e.g., physical attack, robbery, or

bullying) (Chandler et al., 1998). Antibullying school

programs may have the added benefit of preventing

gang victimization. Olweus (1992) conducted a successful school antibullying program in Bergen, Norway, that consisted of four program components:

◆ A booklet for school personnel was distributed to

all Bergen comprehensive schools (grades 1 to 9).

It described bully/victim problems, provided suggestions about what teachers and the school could

do to counteract and prevent such problems, and

dispelled myths about the nature and causes of

bullying.

◆ An information packet was distributed to all families in Bergen with school-age children. It contained information on bullying and advice for

parents on how to address it.

◆ A videocassette that depicted episodes from the

daily lives of two early adolescent bullying victims

was made available for purchase or rent at a subsidized price.

◆ A brief anonymous questionnaire about bullying

problems was administered to students in all comprehensive schools, the results of which were

used to inform school and family interventions.

An evaluation of the Bergen program showed that

the prevalence of bullying victims decreased substantially (Olweus, 1991, 1992). In 1992, Smith and

Sharp (1994) implemented a similar program for

3 Sharing Information: A Guide to the Family Educational Rights and

Privacy Act and Participation in Juvenile Justice Programs (Medaris,

Campbell, and James, 1997), a detailed guide to the Act, assists

schools and other agencies in developing records systems and

establishing information-sharing protocols. It is available free

from the Juvenile Justice Clearinghouse (800–638–8736).
11

schools in Sheffield, England. The core program

involved establishing an antibullying policy for the

entire school, increasing awareness, and clearly defining roles and responsibilities of teachers and students, so that everyone knew what bullying was

and what they should do about it. Evaluation proved

the program to be successful in reducing bullying

among young children; the program had relatively

small effects on older children. However, an adaptation of the Olweus model for use in rural middle

schools in South Carolina did not significantly

decrease the rate of bullying (Melton et al., 1998).

Se Puede. The Se Puede (“You Can”) program in

San Juan, TX, operates in a tricity area (Alamo,

Pharr, and San Juan) that has about 5,000 gang

members (Office of Juvenile Justice and Delinquency Prevention, 1999). It seeks to prevent at-risk

middle school youth from becoming involved with

gangs, gun violence, and drugs and to improve their

academic performance by providing:

◆ Individual and group counseling.

◆ Positive alternatives and role models in a voluntary 1-year program.

◆ A curriculum component, Project Hart, that combines principles and skills for preventing substance abuse and violence in weekly culturally

sensitive lessons.

◆ Monthly weekend camping experiences in which

small groups of students learn survival skills and

develop relationships with mentors.

An evaluation of the Se Peude program showed a

decrease in gang involvement among participating

students despite an increase in the number of gangs

in the tricity area during the program period. In

addition, Se Puede program participants showed a

decrease on several measures of crime involvement

and improved individual skills and school performance (Office of Juvenile Justice and Delinquency

Prevention, 1999).

Gang Resistance Is Paramount. In an attempt to

curb gang membership and discourage future gang

involvement, the city of Paramount, CA, initiated the

Gang Resistance Is Paramount (G.R.I.P.) program

(Arnette and Walsleben, 1998). The program includes three major components. The first involves

neighborhood meetings that provide parents with

support, assistance, and resources as they try to prevent their children from joining gangs. The second

component comprises a 15-week course for fifth

grade students and a 10-week course for second

grade students. The lessons deal with graffiti, peer

pressure, tattoos, the impact of gang activity on family members, drug abuse, and alternative activities

and opportunities. Finally, a school-based followup

program is implemented at the ninth grade level to

reinforce what children learned in the elementary

grades. The program is designed to build self-esteem

and also focuses on the consequences of a criminal

lifestyle, the benefits of higher education, and future

career opportunities. Three studies conducted by

Paramount’s Community Services and Recreation

department show significant program effects in terms

of youth developing negative attitudes toward gangs

and staying out of them. In a long-term followup,

96 percent of more than 3,000 program participants

were not identified as gang members in police records

(Arnette and Walsleben, 1998).

Gang Resistance Education and Training Program.

Discouraging children and young adolescents from

joining gangs may be the most cost-effective approach

to reducing serious youth and adult gang crime (National Drug Intelligence Center, 1994). Evaluation

of the Bureau of Alcohol, Tobacco and Firearms’

(ATF’s) Gang Resistance Education and Training

(G.R.E.A.T.) Program curriculum has shown positive preliminary results in this regard (Esbensen and

Osgood, 1997). G.R.E.A.T. is “built on the strategy

of delivering a simple, low-intensity program to as

large a population as possible” (Esbensen and

Osgood, 1999:218). The G.R.E.A.T. curriculum is

administered in a school-based program in which

uniformed law enforcement officers teach a 9-week

course to middle school students (Esbensen and

Osgood, 1997, 1999; Lesce, 1993). The curriculum

includes the following components:

◆ Introduction—students are introduced to

G.R.E.A.T. and the presenting officer.

◆ Crime/Victims and Your Rights—students learn

about crimes, their victims, and their impact on

the school and neighborhood.
12

◆ Cultural Sensitivity/Prejudice—students are

taught how cultural differences affect their school

and neighborhood.

◆ Conflict Resolution—students learn how to create

an atmosphere of understanding that will enable

all parties to better address interpersonal problems and work together on solutions.

◆ Meeting Basic Needs—students are taught how

to satisfy their basic social needs without joining

a gang.

◆ Drugs/Neighborhoods—students learn how

drugs affect their school and neighborhood.

◆ Responsibility—students learn about the diverse

responsibilities of people in their school and

neighborhood.

◆ Goal Setting—students are taught the need for

personal goal setting and ways to establish shortand long-term goals.

In followup surveys conducted between 12 and 18

months after completion of the program, students

reported lower levels than before of gang affiliation

and delinquency, including drug use, minor offending, property crimes, and crimes against persons

(Esbensen and Osgood, 1997, 1999). Compared

with the control group, the treatment group reported fewer delinquent friends, more positive attitudes toward the police, more negative attitudes

about gangs, more friends involved in prosocial activities, greater commitment to peers promoting

prosocial behavior, higher self-esteem, more commitment to success at school, higher levels of attachment to both mothers and fathers, and less

likelihood of acting impulsively. The authors of the

study cautioned that the positive program results

were modest: “Clearly, this program is not a ‘silver

bullet’ or a panacea for gang violence” (Esbensen

and Osgood, 1999:217). A longitudinal evaluation

that will assess long-term effects of the program is

under way. Because of the limited positive effects,

ATF is redesigning the G.R.E.A.T. curriculum to

make it more effective.

The effectiveness of prevention curriculums might be

enhanced by combining them with an afterschool

program such as Nuestro Centro (a community-run

youth center that provides an afterschool program

for youth affected by drugs, gangs, and delinquency)

(Office of Juvenile Justice and Delinquency Prevention, 1995a) or an antibullying program (Olweus,

1992). School-based programs should include a gang

intervention component because gang-related crime

has been shown to escalate and peak earlier in the

school day than other violent juvenile crime (Wiebe,

Meeker, and Vila, in press).

Evaluation of school-based programs. An OJJDPfunded National Study of School-Based Gang Prevention and Intervention Programs is in progress. It

builds on a large-scale National Study of Delinquency

Prevention in Schools (Gottfredson and Gottfredson,

1996). The OJJDP study makes use of a nationally

representative sample of 1,287 schools surveyed in

the national prevention study. Two-thirds of the

schools (66 percent) provided information on gang

prevention and intervention programs in categories

supplied by the researchers (e.g., prevention curriculum, mentoring, tutoring) (Gottfredson and

Gottfredson, 1999). School “activity coordinators”

were asked for more detailed information on school

gang programs. Current school programs will be

compared with “best practices.” Teachers and students also were surveyed to obtain reports of problem

behavior and participation in gang prevention and

intervention programs. These data are being analyzed

and reports are forthcoming. The Centers for Disease

Control and Prevention (CDC) is supporting the

implementation and evaluation of 13 violence prevention programs, many of which are based in school and

some of which address gang violence (Powell and

Hawkins, 1996).

Afterschool Activities

Gang Prevention Through Targeted Outreach, operated by Boys & Girls Clubs of America (BGCA), is

a communitywide gang prevention program that

incorporates four objectives: community mobilization, recruitment, mainstreaming/programming, and

case management.

Local implementation of this program, which has

been described as a promising prevention initiative

(Thornberry and Burch, 1997), begins with mobilizing community leaders and club staff, who discuss

local gang issues and clarify their roles as they design
13

a strategy to prevent gangs and offer youth alternatives to the gang lifestyle. Police departments,

schools, social service agencies, and community organizations recruit at-risk youth into club programs

in a nonstigmatizing way through direct outreach

efforts and a referral network that links local clubs

with courts. In the Boys & Girls Club, youth participate in programs based on their individual interests

and needs. Programs are offered in five core areas:

character and leadership development; education

and career development; health and life skills; the

arts; and sports, fitness, and recreation.

Case management is an integral part of the program.

Staff document monthly progress on specific goals

in the following areas: academic performance, involvement in the juvenile justice system, program

participation, and family involvement.

In the early 1990’s, an initial evaluation reported that

once enrolled in Boys & Girls Clubs of America, as

many as 48 percent of the youth showed improvement in the academic arena (Feyerherm, Pope, and

Lovell, 1992). Specifically, more than 33 percent of

the youth showed improved grades, and as many as

33 percent had better school attendance. OJJDP

is currently funding an outcome evaluation of the

Gang Prevention Through Targeted Outreach

strategy, which will be completed in 2000.

The prevention component of Broader Urban Involvement and Leadership Development (BUILD)

(Brewer et al., 1995; Ribisl and Davidson, 1993),

developed in the mid-1980’s and still operating, consists of a gang prevention curriculum and an afterschool program. Thompson and Jason’s (1988)

evaluation of the program showed that youth in

BUILD were less likely to join a gang than youth in

the comparison group, but the difference was only

marginally statistically significant. The evaluation

was limited by a short-term followup period and a

relatively small sample size.

Implications of Risk and Protective

Factors

Youth gang involvement is preventable. For reasons

that are not well understood, gangs have become a

very popular adolescent peer group, one of many

peer groups that youth try out during their adolescent years (Fleisher, 1998). Most adolescents who

join a gang do not remain long—at least in newer

gang problem cities. Studies in Denver, CO; Rochester, NY; and Seattle, WA (Thornberry, 1998),

showed that from one-half to two-thirds stayed in a

gang for 1 year or less; one-third or more belonged

for multiple years.

These longitudinal studies of large samples of urban

adolescents have examined risk factors for gang membership (see Hill et al., 1999, for a summary).4

 Risk

factors for multiple-year membership have been examined in the Seattle study. In the Rochester study,

part of the OJJDP-funded Program of Research on

the Causes and Correlates of Delinquency, Bjerregaard

and Smith (1993) found that similar factors predicted

gang membership among both males and females,

including delinquent peers and early sexual activity.5

In Denver, another site in the Causes and Correlates

program, Esbensen and colleagues (1993) found that

higher commitment to delinquent peers, lower commitment to positive peers, more negative labeling by

teachers, and higher peer tolerance for criminal activity were risk factors for gang membership.

In the Seattle study, which was supported by OJJDP

and several other organizations, Hill and colleagues

(1999) examined risk factors in childhood (ages 10–12)

for adolescent gang membership (age 13 and beyond)

(see table 2, page 8). They found that risk factors

span all major risk factor domains: community, family, school, peer group, and individual characteristics.

The most important community factor is growing up

in neighborhoods in which drugs are readily available. Several family variables are important: family

instability, extreme economic deprivation, low attachment to the mother, family management problems,

4

 Howell (1998b) reviewed risk factors for gang membership

that have been identified in cross-sectional studies. These studies are not as reliable as longitudinal studies for identifying risk

factors because cross-sectional studies measure both risk factors

and outcomes in the same time period; thus, a predictor could

well be an outcome of gang involvement.

5

 Gang prevention programs should target females in addition

to males. Analyses of data collected in the National Evaluation

of the G.R.E.A.T. curriculum show that females are wellrepresented in gangs and that the overwhelming majority of

youth gangs have female members (Deschenes and Esbensen,

1999; Esbensen and Deschenes, 1998; Esbensen, Deschenes,

and Winfree, 1999; Esbensen and Winfree, 1998).
14

family conflict, parent proviolent attitudes, and sibling antisocial behavior. Numerous school factors

are very important, including low educational aspiration, low commitment and attachment to school,

high levels of antisocial behavior, low achievement

test scores, identification as being learning disabled,

and low grades. The most important peer group

factor is associating with “bad” peers; conversely,

high attachment to conventional peers decreases the

probability of joining gangs. Individual risk factors

include early involvement in antisocial behavior,

hyperactivity, externalizing behaviors, alcohol consumption, lack of social competence, and early

sexual activity. This study also found that the odds

of joining a gang increase greatly when multiple risk

factors are present in childhood.

Battin-Pearson and colleagues (1999) examined risk

factors for sustained (multiple-year) gang membership, comparing these with predictors or risk factors

for nonmembership and transitory (single-year)

membership. The strongest predictors of sustained

membership versus nonmembership are having

learning disabilities; interacting with antisocial peers

and not much with prosocial peers; and exhibiting

low social competence, low academic achievement,

early antisocial behavior, early violence, early marijuana use, high internalization, and high externalizing behavior. The strongest predictors of sustained

membership versus single-year membership are high

interaction with antisocial peers and low interaction

with prosocial peers, early antisocial behavior, high

internalization, and high externalizing behavior. A

survey designed to help identify risk factors for

gang membership will be available from the National Youth Gang Center.6

Few studies have addressed protective (resilience)

factors that buffer children and adolescents from

gang involvement. Thus, research is needed in this

area. Although some protective factors are the converse of risk factors (e.g., early academic achievement, the antithesis of low school performance, can

be expected to protect children from gang involvement), other protective factors may reside in mental

and social development processes that are not linked

to risk factors (Rutter, Giller, and Hagell, 1998).

Maxson and colleagues (1998) suggest several protective factors that might buffer adolescents from

gang involvement (e.g., counseling for youth who

experience multiple stressful events).7

One study examined risk factors for gang membership among a sample of Asian adolescents in

Westminster, CA (Wyrick, 2000), and also identified possible protective factors against gang involvement. Surprisingly, this study found that

Vietnamese youth who reject their Asian identity

and find it difficult to adopt an American identity

are not more likely than other Vietnamese youth

to join gangs. Rather, researchers identified two

main factors that predict Vietnamese youth gang

involvement: progang attitudes and exposure to

gangs in the neighborhood. Four predictors were

found to influence the development of progang

attitudes: negative school attitude, family conflict,

poor social integration (i.e., a generalized sense of

alienation), and perceived benefits of gang membership. As for protective factors, the researchers

suggested that while services focusing solely on

cultural identity issues may have benefits, they

will not be effective in preventing or reducing

gang involvement by Vietnamese youth. Instead,

services should focus on improving youth attitudes about school, reducing feelings of alienation, and modifying perceptions that gangs are

beneficial to their members. Furthermore, the

researchers suggested that services might prevent

gang involvement if they address family conflict

and buffer the influences of neighborhood gangs

(Wyrick, 2000).

Intervention Programs

Intervention programs seek to reduce the criminal

activities of gangs by coaxing youth away from

gangs and reducing criminality among gang members. These programs, examples of which follow,

provide alternative opportunities for youth and

apply rehabilitation measures.

7

 This was a cross-sectional study. Longitudinal research designs

are stronger for determining protective factors that serve as

buffers from gang involvement at a later point in adolescence. 6

 For more information, call the Institute for Intergovernmental

Research’s National Youth Gang Center at 800–446–0912.
15

Detached Worker Programs

A significant shift in youth gang program approaches,

from prevention by means of community organization

to interventions relying almost exclusively on detached

workers, occurred in the 1940’s with the establishment

of the New York City Youth Board (1960). Created

to combat the city’s growing number of fighting gangs,

this city-run program relied on detached workers to

transform youth gangs from fighting groups into prosocial ones. Most of the transformation was to be

accomplished in the streets where gangs met, played,

and hung out. Worker activities included securing

health care for gang members, providing employment

counseling, doing advocacy work with the police and

courts, and taking almost any other action that might

transform gang values or lure juveniles away from

them (Geis, 1965). Although the program was never

evaluated, it served as a forerunner of later detached

worker programs.

The Boston detached worker program, a communitywide project, consisted of three major program components: community organization, family service,

and gang work. For 3 years, staff in the Midcity

Project—established in the Roxbury section of

Boston in 1954—worked with 400 members of 21

street corner gangs. In perhaps the most rigorous

gang program evaluation ever conducted (Miller,

1962), the project proved to be ineffective.

Evaluation of a California detached worker program

brought into even more serious question the value of

this approach (Klein, 1971, 1995a). The Group

Guidance Project, begun in the 1940’s by the Los

Angeles Probation Department, employed group

guidance by street workers in an attempt to intervene in the emergence of African American gangs in

South Central Los Angeles. Group activities, including weekly club meetings, sports activities, tutoring,

individual counseling, and advocacy with community agencies and organizations, were designed to

reunite gang members with their community institutions. Klein (1995a:145) concluded that “increased

group programming leads to increased cohesiveness

(in both gang growth and gang ‘tightness’), and

increased cohesiveness leads to increased gang

crime.” Based on these results, Klein has repeatedly

warned practitioners against any activities that

might contribute to gang cohesion, because these

might increase gang delinquency (Klein, 1995a).

Warning Signs

Identifying bona fide gangs is a difficult task. It is important for communities to recognize the warning signs of

a gang problem. Trump (1998) lists the following gang identifiers for use by schools:

◆ Graffiti. Unusual signs, symbols, or writing on walls, notebooks, class assignments, or gang “literature” books.

◆ Colors. Obvious or subtle colors of clothing, a particular clothing brand, bandannas, jewelry, or haircuts.

◆ Tattoos. Symbols on the body.

◆ Initiations. Suspicious bruises, wounds, or injuries resulting from a “jumping in.” Gang initiations have taken

place in school restrooms, gyms, locker rooms, playgrounds, and even hallways.

◆ Hand signs. Unusual hand signals or handshakes.

◆ Language. Uncommon terms or phrases.

◆ Behavior. Sudden changes in behavior or secret meetings.

It is important to consider multiple factors in assessing whether youth groups are bona fide gangs. Other

researchers and organizations have developed similar indicators that can be used in making a determination of gang formation (Curry and Decker, 1998; National Drug Intelligence Center, 1995).
16

The Ladino Hills Project, created in East Los Angeles

in 1967, was an experiment Klein (1968) designed

to test his hypothesis that if gang cohesiveness could

be reduced through nongroup (i.e., individual) interventions, then gang delinquency would be reduced.

Interventions included job training, tutoring, recreation in established agencies, and individual therapy.

Klein’s evaluation showed that gang cohesiveness

was reduced by about 40 percent, and an overall

reduction of 35 percent in gang member arrests was

observed, although this was attributed mainly to

fewer gang members. However, several years later,

the gang reassumed its preproject character. Klein

(1995a:147) concluded that “we had affected the

[gang members] but not their community. The lesson is both obvious and important. Gangs are byproducts of their communities: They cannot long be

controlled by attacks on symptoms alone; community structure and capacity must also be targeted.”

Although researchers disagree about the effectiveness

of detached worker programs (Bursik and Grasmick,

1993; Goldstein and Glick, 1994), it must be concluded that, as a singular intervention, detached workers

have not conclusively produced positive results. Numerous reasons have been offered to account for the

lack of effectiveness of this strategy. Klein (1971; see

also Spergel, 1966) suggested that it was unclear

whether these programs were designed to control

gangs, treat gang members’ personality problems,

provide access to social and cultural opportunities,

transform values, or prevent delinquency. Conflicting program objectives made evaluation difficult.

Crisis Intervention

In the next “era” of youth gang programming, detached workers were put in vehicles and sent to

“hotspots” of gang activity. Philadelphia’s Crisis

Intervention Network (CIN), established in 1974,

pioneered the assignment of gang workers to work

in specific areas rather than with specific gangs.

They were to patrol hotspots in radio-dispatched

cars, attempting to defuse potentially violent situations. Although CIN was not evaluated, it was declared a success by CIN officials, a claim that has

been subject to challenge (Klein, 1995a; Needle

and Stapleton, 1983; Spergel, 1995).

Despite doubts about the success of Philadelphia’s

CIN, the program was transplanted to Los Angeles

(beginning in 1980–81) and named the Community

Youth Gang Services (CYGS) program. Like CIN,

CYGS used suppression tactics (e.g., dispatching

patrol teams in specially marked cars), social intervention efforts, group programming and outings for

gang members, and truce meetings (Klein, 1995a).

According to Klein, implementation of the program

was not successful.

Spergel (1986) evaluated the Crisis Intervention

Services Project (see also Ribisl and Davidson,

1993), which was implemented in the mid-1980’s

in a gang-ridden section of Chicago. Spergel

(1995:255) described the program as a “mixed social

intervention or crisis intervention approach, with

strong deterrent and community involvement characteristics.” Staff patrolled areas where gang violence was likely to erupt during evening and

late-night hours, attempting to mediate conflicts.

Intensive counseling was provided to gang youth

referred by the juvenile court and to their families.

Local neighborhood groups were mobilized and

involved in the project. Spergel’s evaluation (1986)

showed that the program appeared to reduce the

most serious and violent crimes, but not overall

crime levels. Nevertheless, these were the most encouraging gang intervention results up to that time.

Crisis intervention programming as a singular approach using detached workers in an attempt to

defuse gang conflicts does not have a stellar performance record. Spergel (1995) contended that a detached worker strategy by itself is inadequate to deal

with complex challenges such as remedial education,

job preparation and development, and community

issues. Thus, the detached worker concept has been

expanded over the past 30 years to incorporate other

roles (Spergel and Curry, 1990). Most recently, in

the Little Village Gang Violence Reduction Program,

detached workers were redefined as “community

youth workers,” who “not only had to develop new

quasi-professional skills related to referrals of gang

youths to agency services or job placement, but [who]

also had to learn to collaborate with police and

probation officers in such a way that gang conflict

was prevented or at least controlled” (Spergel and

Grossman, 1997:462). This broader role appeared
17

to contribute significantly to an overall coordinated

program approach (see pages 37–38 for further information on this project).

Boys & Girls Clubs

In addition to the Gang Prevention Through Targeted Outreach program described on pages 12–13,

Boys & Girls Clubs of America supports another

youth gang program. Comin’ Up, located in Fort

Worth, TX, is a youth gang intervention program

developed out of training provided by Boys & Girls

Clubs (Boys & Girls Clubs of Greater Fort Worth,

1996; City of Fort Worth, 1996) and is based on a

Boys & Girls Clubs’ gang intervention strategy. All

program youth are identified gang members. Needs

assessments are made on all referrals by a team comprising project staff, school officials, parents, police,

probation officers, and others. In addition to providing alternatives to gang life (especially education and

employment) and providing life-skills development,

the program works to establish truces among rival

gangs and to reduce the incidence of gang violence.

One of the program’s unique features is the employment of successful clients as outreach workers. Criminal arrest data reported to the Federal Bureau of

Investigation (FBI) indicate a significant decrease in

violence in the area served by the project (Parks and

Community Services Department, 1997). The program has not yet received an independent evaluation.

Improving Conditions

Homeboy Industries and Jobs for a Future—grassroots projects supported by the Dolores Mission in

Boyle Heights, Los Angeles, CA (Gaouette, 1997)—

provide alternatives to gang life for gang members:

jobs that can give them an escape from gangs. Jobs for

a Future places some 200 gang members in jobs in the

community each year. Homeboy Industries merchandises T-shirts and silkscreens and operates Homeboy

Bakeries, which sells baked bread to a commercial

baker. Both enterprises successfully employ rival gang

members. Proceeds from these ventures fund a daycare

center, a homeless shelter, an alternative school for

gang members, and a tattoo-removal service.

Providing jobs appears to be an effective intervention.

In a survey of incarcerated adolescent and adult gang

members across the country, Houston (1996) found

that gang members viewed job training and jobs positively. Huff’s (1998) study revealed that many gang

members and nongang at-risk youth who sell drugs

would give up selling for reasonable wages (less than

$15 per hour), and many indicated that “they would

accept far lower wages—not much more than is currently being paid in fast-food restaurants—if they

could obtain a sufficient number of hours per week”

(Huff, 1998:7). NCNE (1999:62) contends that “the

belief that young people will not accept an entry-level

job is a false and debilitating myth.” Moore and Vigil

(1993:43) reported that job programs in East Los

Angeles gang areas that were provided in the 1960’s

through the war on poverty “without question” reduced gang violence. Once the programs were dismantled, gang violence increased. In his Kansas City

study of “dead-end” gang members, Fleisher (1998:214)

concluded that the “unlawful-to-lawful shift in income

production . . . results in less crime and less serious

crime.” This conclusion is supported by a detailed

review of programs for serious and violent juvenile

offenders. Lipsey and Wilson (1998) found that paid

employment reduces recidivism among offenders who

are not incarcerated.

Violence-Free Zones

NCNE has developed Violence-Free Zones, a

grassroots community intervention for youth and

gang-related violence. The Violence-Free Zone

model is based on the premise that the breakdown

of the family structure is a key risk factor for gang

involvement and a major contributor to destructive

behavior. In many cases, gang members come from

fatherless homes in which mothers struggle to meet

the economic and individual needs of their children.

Consequently, they find it difficult to provide the

necessary guidance. Violence-Free Zone implementers

fill this void, taking on the role of mentor and engaging in reparenting. Job training and work opportunities also are provided for youth’s social, personal,

and economic development to help them make the

transition from gang life and criminality to violencefree lives and productive citizenship. Successful

youth are given the opportunity to collaborate with

youth in other communities and cities to develop

and expand Violence-Free Zones.
18

This replicable model is based on the House of

Umoja program and the success of similarly designed neighborhood initiatives in other cities (National Center for Neighborhood Enterprise, 1999).

In Washington, DC, the faith-based Alliance for

Concerned Men, a grassroots organization, was

instrumental in establishing a Violence-Free Zone in

the Benning Terrace public housing project with

assistance from NCNE and the DC Housing Authority. Each of these three components contributed

to the effort—NCNE provided technical assistance;

the alliance carried out grassroots intervention in

gang conflicts; and the Housing Authority provided

job opportunities such as refurbishing the neighborhood, removing graffiti, and landscaping. Together

they constitute the necessary structure for implementing a Violence-Free Zone. HUD and OJJDP

are supporting the establishment of Violence-Free

Zones in cities such as Dallas, TX; Indianapolis, IN;

and Los Angeles, CA.

In 1998, NCNE convened representatives of successful grassroots initiatives to identify effective strategies

and key elements of community-centered approaches.

Entitled “best practices,” these are described in detail

in an NCNE (1999) publication, which also outlines

practical steps in implementing the Violence-Free

Zone model, under the following headings:

Social Intervention

Fleisher’s (1998) study of the two most notorious gangs in Kansas City, MO (the Fremont Hustlers and Northeast Gangsters), provided the basis for his proposed program solution for gang-involved youth: if gang members can be shifted from unlawful to lawful income production, they will eventually experience an underlying

moral shift in lifestyle orientations.

Gang life is predicated on immediate economic gain from drug and other crime profits and social gain from

the agency of rulelessness. Mainstream life is oriented toward the future, and social and material gains are

slower but steadier, more reliable, and less risky. . . . [S]uccessful gang intervention depends on offering

gang kids the unlawful-to-lawful socioeconomic trade by showing them exactly what they have to gain. . . .

The answer is simple: immediate material gain, including money, food, clothes, and shelter. Improvements

these kids can see, touch and possess will pull them off the streets (Fleisher, 1998:214–215).

“Gangs like the Fremont Hustlers and Northeast Gangsters are monuments to economic failure in households,

neighborhoods, and communities,” but community development projects are needed that make sense to

neighborhood residents (Fleisher, 1998:208).

Fleisher proposes a social intervention approach modeled after OJJDP’s Comprehensive, Community-Wide Approach to Gang Prevention, Intervention, and Suppression model. He (1998:211) suggests that there is “a discontinuity between the actual problems in gang-affiliated adolescents’ lives and the remedies offered by social and law

enforcement agencies. Simply put, the local juvenile justice system doesn’t give [gang] kids what they need . . .

when they need it.” Moreover, he argues, social service or law enforcement agencies “cannot intervene effectively

in socioeconomic processes embedded in a family’s transgenerational history.” The program needs of gang girls are

particularly acute. Fleisher therefore suggests creation of adult-supervised residential centers for adolescent girls

who are affiliated with gangs. These centers would focus on three specific objectives: “(1) to shelter and protect

girls; (2) to provide education, job training, and job placement; and (3) to ensure a healthy start for gang girls’

children” (Fleisher, 1998:219; see pages 218–225 for detailed descriptions of how the centers could be designed

to achieve these objectives). These residential centers should be located outside high-crime inner cities but close

to high schools, community colleges, and jobs. Such decentralized centers would have advantages for gang youth

over traditional centralized service delivery systems: “[C]entralized services are ineffective with gang kids, because

they don’t have cars to go downtown; they don’t take buses; they don’t go” (Fleisher, 1998:210).
19

◆ Agents of effective youth intervention.

◆ Methods of intervention.

◆ Attitudes and premises of successful outreach.

◆ Collaborative efforts and sustainable youth intervention: the role of the public sector, private sector, and mutual support.

Gang Summits and Truces

Preventing gang wars by means of truces is an intervention that has not been systematically evaluated.

Reports indicate that some truces have been successful but others have failed (Spergel, 1995). Gang homicides in Los Angeles were said to have dropped in

1994, presumably because of a truce between warring

African American gangs that began in 1992 (Cotton,

1992). Klein (1995a) noted numerous instances in

which adult-sponsored truce meetings backfired,

reinforcing rivalries, increasing gang cohesion, and

solidifying gang leadership.

Gang summits and truces negotiated by local residents

may be more effective than those brought about in

other ways. In the District of Columbia, members

of the Alliance for Concerned Men negotiated a

truce among warring gangs that had been terrorizing

Benning Terrace. In January 1997, with the help of

NCNE (1999), which assisted in strategic planning

and provided a neutral meeting location, the alliance

stepped in after a period of escalating violence. Six

homicides had occurred in Benning Terrace in 1996.

Following the alliance’s intervention, there were no

homicides from January 1997 to August 1998 (National Center for Neighborhood Enterprise, 1999).

Emergency Room Intervention and

Victim Programs

The hospital emergency room is a promising arena for

intervening in gang violence, including homicide.8

Hutson and colleagues (1995) suggest that an emergency room intervention program for injured victims

could help to break the cycle of gang violence. Others

have proposed counseling for victims of drive-by

shootings to reduce the traumatic effects of victimization and discourage retaliation (Groves et al., 1993;

Hutson, Anglin, and Pratts, 1994; Pynoos and Nader,

1988). One example of an emergency room program,

the Partnership for a Safer Cleveland, provides gang

recognition seminars for hospital emergency room

staff. As a result, gang-involved youth are referred

elsewhere for medical and psychological services

(Walker and Schmidt, 1996).

Teens on Target (TNT), administered by Youth

Alive!, a nonprofit agency in Oakland, CA, seeks to

reduce youth injuries and death from gang-related

and other gun violence through peer education, intervention, mentoring, and leadership development

(Office of Juvenile Justice and Delinquency Prevention, 1999). TNT leaders—many of them violence victims—developed a training curriculum to

address the relationship between violence and family

contexts, guns, gangs, and drugs; the causes and

effects of violence; and advocacy skills necessary to

stop such violence. The leaders conduct student

workshops, mediate conflicts between rival racial

groups, and run a peer visitation program for hospitalized adolescents recovering from serious injuries

to dissuade them and their friends from retaliation.

A sister initiative operates in Los Angeles, CA.

Together, the two TNT programs have won many

awards for their work, including the California

Peace Prize.

Intervention with victims of gang violence can also

be accomplished outside hospital emergency rooms.

The Child Development-Community Policing

(CD–CP) model in New Haven, CT, is an excellent

example (see Marans and Berkman, 1997). In this

program, police refer victims of violent crimes, including victims of gang violence, to the CD–CP

program for counseling. The Gang Victim Services

Program, Orange County, CA, offers a full range of

services and multilingual, multicultural support (Office for Victims of Crime, 1996). It also is important

to protect victims and witnesses from gang intimidation (see Finn and Healey, 1996, for procedures and

protections). Gang intimidation is but one problem

that Miethe and McCorkle (1997a) found among

many obstacles to effective prosecution of gang

members in Las Vegas, NV.

8

 See Howell, 1998a:308–310, for a comprehensive approach to

preventing and reducing gang homicide that integrates several

program components.
20

Gang Members in Juvenile Detention and

Correctional Facilities

Confinement in a juvenile correctional facility is a

strong predictor of adult prison gang membership

(Ralph et al., 1996). Prison gang members, in turn,

contribute to the growth of youth gangs. In Chicago,

prison gangs were said to exert considerable control

over and have influence on street gangs (Decker,

Bynum, and Weisel, 1998). “Prison gangs such as

the Aryan Brotherhood, Mexican Mafia, and Texas

Syndicate originated in prison and now have members on the street. Conversely, most street gangs

now have members in prison” (Fleisher, 1995:131).

In some cities, local gang activity is being orchestrated from the prisons (National Center for Neighborhood Enterprise, 1999). This development makes

intervention in the resulting stronger “new breed of

gangs” all the more difficult. Older gang members

from juvenile correctional facilities and prisons who

return to the street “align with neighborhood teenage gang members who are on the street, and form a

larger, potentially more dangerous street gang”

(Fleisher, 1995:152). Involvement of ex-convicts in

youth gangs increases the life of the gangs and their

level of violent crime, in part because of ex-convicts’

increased proclivity to violence following imprisonment and the visibility and history they contribute to

youth gangs (Moore, 1978).

Little treatment programming has been developed for

gang members in juvenile detention and correctional

facilities. Interpersonal skills training appears promising for improving social skills and reducing anger

and, possibly, violence among street gang youth in

institutionalized populations (Goldstein, 1993). The

Aggression Replacement Training (ART) model

teaches gang members anger control and other skills

and has produced promising results with gangs in

Brooklyn, NY, communities (Goldstein and Glick,

1994; Goldstein, Glick, and Gibbs, 1998). The model

is being implemented in probation departments and

detention centers in 28 counties throughout the State

of Washington, in a number of juvenile institutions in

the State of New York, and in the Texas Department

of Youth (corrections). ART also has been used in

community-based programs, such as the Mesa Gang

Intervention Project, which is described on page 35.

A variety of gang awareness curriculums are used to

help youth avoid gang involvement while they are

incarcerated. One of these, Gang Awareness Necessary for Growth in Society, is used in California

Youth Authority facilities (Duxbury, 1993). This

curriculum has several elements: orientation; program overview; parole and the gang-active person;

effects of gang violence; legal aspects of gang involvement; coping, responsibility, and accountability; and family, community, peer, cultural, and

individual expectations.

Gang problems, correctional agencies’ use of risk

and needs assessments, and specialized programs to

address gang problems in juvenile detention and

correctional facilities are being assessed in an

OJJDP-funded national survey conducted by the

National Juvenile Detention Association. The initial

report based on this survey (Howell et al., in press)

covers gang problems and interventions in detention

centers. Nearly 9 in 10 detention centers reported

gang members among their residents. Almost half of

the detention centers said that one-third or more of

their inmates belonged to a gang. Slightly more than

half of the detention centers reported gang-related

assaults, almost half reported problems with gangs

recruiting members, nearly one-third reported

threats or intimidation of staff, and one-fourth reported threats or intimidation of nongang members.

Fifteen percent of the detention centers that were

surveyed reported that they used no assessment procedures to identify gang members. Less than 2 percent performed a formal risk assessment, screened for

classification, or used formal procedures for determination and management of security risk groups. Just

1 in 10 detention centers reported gearing certain

programs toward gang members. Slightly more than

2 in 10 centers provided aftercare monitoring and

support services for gang members. Aftercare is very

important because of the high likelihood that these

youth will return to active gang involvement in their

communities, perhaps with their reputations enhanced by having served time in confinement.

Few of the programs geared toward gang members

were deemed effective. On average, only 14 percent

of respondents rated their programs “very effective”

and less than half rated them “somewhat effective.”
21

The most promising programs emphasized correction of educational deficiencies, vocational skills

development (apprenticeships), drug abuse/use values and behavior change and treatment, and interpersonal and social skills development.

To deal more effectively with gang problems in facilities, juvenile detention and correctional facilities

need to use risk assessments at intake, identify gang

members, and properly classify offenders for security purposes. Better screening and risk classification of gang members would help protect staff and

fellow inmates by giving correctional staff reliable

information to classify gang members. Similarly, to

achieve the best match between their treatment

needs and available interventions, needs assessments

should be made for all inmates. Finally, more program development is needed to prevent gang formation, help separate offenders from gangs, diminish

the effectiveness of their recruitment efforts in detention centers, and prevent and reduce victimization of staff and fellow inmates. Progress in these

areas should help break the cycle of gang members

moving from detention centers and correctional facilities to prisons to communities.

In an earlier review of correctional programs for

gang members, Duxbury (1993) made the following

recommendations:

◆ Correctional policies and programs directed toward youth gangs and gang members should be

coordinated with those of organizations engaged

in prevention and suppression within a community or governmental jurisdiction.

◆ More systematic research should be conducted

on correctional interventions with youth gang

members.

◆ Individual correctional interventions should be

based on objective classification of the gang members’ risks and needs, including those related to

gang participation.

◆ Institutional policies should create a climate in

which youth feel sufficient safety to relinquish or

refuse gang membership.

◆ Institutional programs should offer youth opportunities to develop their skills and knowledge so

that, upon release, they will have the tools and

self-esteem to choose activities other than illegal

gang activities.

◆ Field supervision programs (parole/aftercare)

should provide transitional services and, when

appropriate, adequate surveillance to increase the

likelihood that the released youth will make socially responsible choices.

One aftercare program for high-risk juveniles has been

shown to produce very positive short-term effects

(Josi and Sechrest, 1999). The Lifeskills ’95 program,

in San Bernardino and Riverside Counties, CA, serves

youthful offenders released from the California Youth

Authority. In addition to other impressive results,

Lifeskills ’95 reduced frequent gang contact. Only 8

percent of the Lifeskills ’95 youth had frequent gang

contact (versus 27 percent for the control group).

Suppression Programs

Intervention and suppression programs share the

common goal of reducing criminal activities of

gangs. Suppression programs use the full force of

the law, generally through a combination of police,

prosecution, and incarceration to deter the criminal

activities of entire gangs, dissolve them, and remove

individual gang members from them by means of

prosecution and incarceration.

Following the use of gang suppression techniques in

the Philadelphia CIN program, California criminal

justice officials soon expanded the concept to prosecution and police programs (Klein, 1995a).

Prosecution Programs

Operation Hardcore, a prosecutorial gang suppression program, was created by the Los Angeles District Attorney’s Office in 1979 and still operates

under the office’s Hardcore Gang Division (Genelin,

1993). It was the first prosecution program to target

serious and violent juvenile gang-related offenses

(Klein, Maxson, and Miller, 1995). Its distinctive

features include vertical prosecution,9

 reduced

9

 The prosecutor who files a case remains responsible for it

throughout the prosecution process.
22

caseloads, additional investigative support, and resources for assisting victims.

An independent evaluation of Operation Hardcore

(Dahmann, 1981) showed that fewer dismissals;

more convictions/adjudications, including more

convictions/adjudications on the most serious charge;

and a higher rate of State prison commitments/secure

confinement dispositions were achieved for cases

subject to the program than for cases undergoing the

normal prosecutorial process. Dahmann concluded

that “these results suggest that selective prosecution

has been an effective strategy in Los Angeles and that

the Operation Hardcore program has obtained demonstrable improvements in the criminal justice handling of gang defendants and their cases” (Dahmann,

1981:303). Operation Hardcore remains a highly

regarded program.

Police Response

Police gang suppression programs for youth and

adults (Klein, 1995a) drew impetus from the apparent

growth of youth and adult gang problems in the

Southwest in the early 1980’s. Gang units were created in law enforcement departments to carry out

gang intelligence, investigation, suppression, and

prevention functions (Jackson and McBride, 1985;

Klein, 1995a). Suppression tactics employed by the

Los Angeles Police Department’s (LAPD’s) Community Resources Against Street Hoodlums (CRASH)

operations, begun in the early 1980’s, took the form of

gang sweeps, hotspot targeting, and intensified patrols to apply pressure on gangs. Other terms used to

characterize police suppression tactics include “saturation” of an area with police, “special surveillance”

using modern technology, “zero tolerance,” and

“caravanning” (cruising neighborhoods in a caravan

of patrol cars) (Klein, 1995a).

The most notorious gang sweep, Operation Hammer, was an LAPD CRASH operation launched in

South Central Los Angeles in 1988 (Klein, 1995a).

One thousand police officers swept through the area

on a Friday night and again on Saturday, arresting

likely gang members for a wide variety of offenses,

including already-existing warrants, new traffic citations, curfew violations, gang-related behaviors, and

observed criminal activities. All of those arrested

(1,453 persons) were taken to a mobile booking

operation adjacent to Memorial Coliseum. Most of

the arrested youth were released without charges.

Slightly more than half were gang members. There

were only 60 felony arrests, and charges were filed in

only 32 instances. “This remarkably inefficient process was repeated many times, although with smaller

forces—more typically one hundred or two hundred

officers” (Klein, 1995a:162).

Recent police gang suppression strategies have been

more innovative. In response to high levels of violence, the Baltimore City Police Department created

a Violent Crimes Division that has several units, two

of which are the Handgun Recovery Squad and the

Youth Violence Strike Force. Violent gang members

age 24 and under are targeted because analysis of

internal police data on shootings reveals that more

than half of victims and suspects are in this age category. Initially, the Handgun Recovery Squad seized

guns from all over the city. “This proved ineffective,

however, since seizing guns had no noticeable impact

on crime” (Office of Juvenile Justice and Delinquency

Prevention, 1999:98). Consequently, the squad limited its activities to targeting gangs in two hotspot

areas, producing a marked decrease in handgunrelated violence as evidenced by internal data collection. Handgun Recovery Squad efforts are buttressed

by the Youth Violence Strike Force, which aggressively seeks to apprehend and incarcerate violent

gang members by working closely with other Federal,

State, and local agencies and in a team effort among

police, parole, and probation officers. This initiative

has not been evaluated.

St. Louis, MO, officials developed effective Consent

to Search and Seize protocols in conjunction with its

Firearm Suppression Program (FSP), which began

in 1994 (Rosenfeld and Decker, 1996). Residential

searches can be initiated by citizen requests for police service, reports from other police units, or by

information gained from other investigations. Once

the unit receives a report, two officers visit the residence in question, speak with an adult resident, and

request permission to search the home for illegal

weapons. Residents are informed that they will not

be charged with the illegal possession of a firearm if

they sign the Consent to Search and Seize form. In

1997, FSP was incorporated into a broader law enforcement initiative called Cease Fire (modeled after

Boston’s Operation Ceasefire) (Office of Juvenile
23

Justice and Delinquency Prevention, 1999). The

St. Louis Cease Fire operation is coordinated across

several law enforcement agencies and comprises

three strategies:

◆ A crackdown on illicit gun trafficking through

ATF’s gun-tracing program.

◆ Swift response to acts of gang violence through

intensive surveillance, youth outreach streetworkers, and social service interventions.

◆ Operation Night Light (modeled after Boston’s

program, see page 30), which teams police with

probation officers in visits to the homes of youth on

probation to ensure compliance with the terms of

their probation. (Probation officers have the authority to enter the homes of probationers unannounced while police must have search warrants.)

One Cease Fire component, the Gang Outreach program, was launched in 1998 by the St. Louis Police

Department. This effort is part of St. Louis’ attempt

to implement the Comprehensive Community-Wide

Approach to Gang Prevention, Intervention, and

Suppression program through OJJDP’s SafeFutures

Program.10 When a gang-involved youth is shot,

counseling professionals discourage the victim from

retaliating and encourage him or her to leave the

gang. While the counselor is working with the victim,

police make contact with the parent and, using the

Consent to Search and Seize protocols, obtain permission to search the youth’s home for weapons and

other contraband. These new St. Louis components

have not yet been evaluated.

The Los Angeles Police Department’s Operation Cul

de Sac (OCDS), launched in 1990, erected traffic

barriers in neighborhoods in which gangs and accompanying gang crime “had spiraled out of control”

(Lasley, 1998:1). OCDS was an experiment to determine whether traffic barriers could be used effectively

to “design out” crime by reducing the opportunities to

commit crime. The assumption underlying the experiment was that gang violence, including homicide, is

partly the result of criminal opportunity. OCDS postulated that violent gang crime could be deterred

because the opportunities—in this case, major roadways that facilitate entrance to and exit from highcrime neighborhoods—could be controlled. Thus,

traffic barriers were used to decrease the mobility of

rival gangs traveling to and from gang crime hotspots

in a 10-block area. Police closed all major roads leading to and from the identified hotspots by placing

freeway dividers at the end of the streets that led directly to the hotspots. This reconfiguration essentially

created cul-de-sacs, which could hamper “hit-andrun” crimes such as drive-by shootings.

Lasley (1998) compared crime levels in the OCDS

area before, during, and after its 2 years of operation

with crime levels in a site in which OCDS did not

operate. The study found that gang-related homicides and assaults in the OCDS area fell significantly during program operation and rose in the

year after program cessation. Crime levels remained

constant in the comparison area. It did not appear

that OCDS displaced gang crime to contiguous

neighborhoods. The program did not seem to have

any effect on property crimes. Because this program

was conducted in only one site, Lasley cautioned

that these results could not be guaranteed in other

communities and that further evaluations were

needed to confirm the effectiveness of traffic barriers in reducing serious gang crime. A longer evaluation period is advisable because studies show that

peaks and valleys in violent gang-related crimes

occur at different times in different communities

(Block and Block, 1993; Decker, 1996; Howell,

1999; Howell and Decker, 1999; Klein, 1995b).

Several researchers have noted that youth and adult

gang problems have not decreased appreciably for a

significant period of time in areas where only suppression programs have been implemented (Klein,

1995a; Moore, 1978, 1991; Spergel, 1995) and that

the effectiveness of police crackdowns generally has

been short-lived (Sherman, 1990).

One of the most respected law enforcement gang

suppression programs for youth and adults, the Los

Angeles County Sheriff Department’s Operation

Safe Streets (OSS), began in 1979 with the assignment of teams of gang investigators to four sheriff’s

10 For more information on the Comprehensive CommunityWide Approach, see pages 34–37. The SafeFutures Program

assists six different communities, St. Louis among them, with

“existing collaboration efforts to reduce youth violence and

delinquency . . . [and] also seeks to improve the service delivery

system by creating a continuum of care responsive to the needs

of youth and their families” (Kracke, 1996).
24

station areas that were combating a tremendous

amount of youth and adult gang violence (McBride,

1993). Each team identified and investigated the

most active gang in its geographical area, concentrating law enforcement resources exclusively on the

targeted gang and its members. These suppression

activities were combined with vertical prosecution

and intensive probation supervision. McBride

(1993) suggested that, apart from the combination

of these three elements, a key to the success of the

program was the personal rapport investigators established with gang members by maintaining regular

contact with them. This helped penetrate the cloak

of personal anonymity, which typically helps gang

members terrorize communities. At the same time,

this rapport led investigators to begin seeking educational, job placement, and family counseling programs for the youth gang members. As McBride

(1993:413) observed, “The investigators found that,

as they applied firm but fair law enforcement and

used their personal knowledge of the gang members,

backed by a demonstrated humanitarian concern

for the status of the individual, violence within the

targeted gangs began to decline.” Jackson and

McBride (1985) referred to this approach as “working” gangs using traditional investigation techniques.

Soon, communities in the targeted areas began to

respond positively to OSS operations. McBride

(1993) reported a 50-percent decrease in youth and

adult gang activity.

Five gang-related programs supported by the Office

of Community Oriented Policing Services (COPS)

have shown promising results: the Antigang Initiative in Dallas, TX, and the Youth Firearms Violence

Initiatives (YFVI’s) in Inglewood, CA; Milwaukee,

WI; Salinas, CA; and Seattle, WA. Because the last

four of these programs targeted youth gun use, they

have the potential to reduce gang homicide.

Antigang Initiative, Dallas, TX. In 1996 and 1997,

this COPS initiative targeted five geographical areas

that were home to seven of the city’s most violent

gangs. Three main suppression strategies were

employed:

◆ Saturation patrols/high-visibility patrols in target

areas. These patrols stopped and frisked suspected

gang members and made appropriate arrests.

◆ Aggressive curfew enforcement. Ordinances were

strictly enforced whenever suspected gang members were encountered.

◆ Aggressive enforcement of truancy laws and

regulations. Police worked in conjunction with

school districts to curb truancy.

Gang unit officers teamed with community policing

officers to carry out selected strategies in each of the

five geographical areas.

By examining weekly and monthly police reports that

documented overtime-funded activities, evaluators

determined which of the three suppression strategies

various Dallas police teams mainly used (Fritsch,

Caeti, and Taylor, 1999). Patrol beats that had a similar number of gang-related violent offenses in a 1-year

period prior to the antigang initiative were selected for

comparative evaluation purposes. Gang-related violent offenses reported to the police before and during

the initiative were analyzed in both target and control

areas. The analysis showed that gang-related violence

decreased significantly during 1996–97 in both target

and control areas; however, the decrease was more

substantial in targeted areas (57 percent versus 37

percent). The larger decrease in gang-related violence

in targeted areas was attributed to the use of two combined strategies: aggressive enforcement of curfew,

and truancy laws and regulations. Traditional (undirected) saturation patrol did not produce significant

reductions when used as the main suppression strategy. The authors advise that these “results must be

interpreted with caution and replicated across and

within several jurisdictions before broad and definitive conclusions can be drawn about the usefulness

of a particular strategy” (Fritsch, Caeti, and Taylor,

1999:129–130).

Youth Firearms Violence Initiative, Inglewood,

CA. This COPS initiative sought to reduce handgun

violence through the disruption of the activities of

two gangs—the Crenshaw Mafia Gang and the Family Gangster Bloods—in a public housing area of

West Central Los Angeles, known as “the Bottoms”

(Office of Juvenile Justice and Delinquency Prevention, 1999). A mentoring program, Rights of Passage,

was implemented to fill the gap in afterschool activities from 3 to 6 p.m. Strategies Against Gang
25

Environments (SAGE), which comprised police

officers, a deputy district attorney, and a deputy probation officer, conducted saturation patrols in the

target area. Buttressed by an antiloitering civil injunction against the Crenshaw Mafia Gang, SAGE officers were able to implement a proactive approach

rather than wait for a crime to occur. Although the

SAGE unit disbanded after YFVI funding was exhausted, the injunction against the Crenshaw Mafia

Gang remains in place and is enforced through routine patrols and the police department’s gang component. The police department reports that the

Crenshaw Mafia Gang “has ceased to exist as an organized entity as a direct result of the civil action” and

effective police enforcement (Office of Juvenile Justice and Delinquency Prevention, 1999).

Youth Firearms Violence Initiative, Milwaukee,

WI. This COPS initiative sought to deter gun carrying in high-crime hotspots (Office of Juvenile

Justice and Delinquency Prevention, 1999). Suppression components included strengthening the

police department’s gang crimes/intelligence unit,

enhancing curfew activities, and deploying saturation patrols in high crime areas. Target areas were

determined by geographic information system data

that indicated a high incidence of juvenile handgun

violence. Decreases in firearm-related offenses,

including violent firearm offenses, have been attributed to the YFVI initiative (Office of Juvenile

Justice and Delinquency Prevention, 1999).

Youth Firearms Violence Initiative, Salinas, CA.

This COPS initiative targets gang members under

age 25 (Office of Juvenile Justice and Delinquency

Prevention, 1999). Its primary component is a violence suppression unit, a team of 15 police officers

who use aggressive patrol strategies, including periodic surveillance, probation/patrol services, traffic

stops, raids, and search warrants to recover illegal

firearms used in crimes. YFVI operations are supported by a database that geographically tracks gangrelated activity and firearm use. This database allows

police officers to respond to inquiries regarding the

location of firearm seizures, violent crimes, and gang

incidents near school zones. Decreases in gun-related

and violent crimes and gang presence have been attributed to YFVI operations (Office of Juvenile Justice and Delinquency Prevention, 1999).

Youth Firearms Violence Initiative, Seattle, WA.

The overall goal of this COPS initiative was to reduce

youth firearm violence through targeted and focused

enforcement efforts (Office of Juvenile Justice and

Delinquency Prevention, 1999). This YFVI comprised several components: the Seattle Team for

Youth, which is still in existence, provides intensive

services for youth who were in gangs or were otherwise at risk of gang involvement; deployment of

school-emphasis patrol officers to work in various

prevention, intervention, and school safety projects;

and school enforcement teams of officers who worked

closely with school administrators to reduce youth

firearm violence. A key component of the Seattle

YFVI was the creation of a system for tracking the

city’s 50 most violent juveniles, many of whom were

affiliated with gangs. Police and probation officers

were paired to increase surveillance of these juveniles

and to enforce probation conditions. In addition, enhanced prosecution was instituted. An overall increase in arrests for weapons violations and a decline

in weapons violations in the Seattle schools during

the life of the program have been reported (Office of

Juvenile Justice and Delinquency Prevention, 1999).

Weisel and Painter (1997) have provided detailed

case studies of police responses to youth and adult

gang problems in Austin, TX; Chicago, IL; Kansas

City, MO; Metro Dade County, FL; and San Diego,

CA. These sites were selected for the severity of

their youth and adult gang and drug problems, for

regional diversity, for ethnic variation in gang problems, and for variations in their approaches to local

gang problems. These case studies are unique in

their long-term perspective, providing a view of how

each police department’s approach changed over a

5-year period, from 1991–92 to 1996. Three issues

guided the studies: events that stimulated each police department to respond to existing youth and

adult gang problems, key aspects of each police

department’s strategic response, and outcomes in

each jurisdiction.

Several conclusions can be drawn from the Weisel

and Painter case studies with respect to youth and

adult gangs:

◆ Ethnic variation in gang membership was a distinguishing characteristic in all of the studied sites.

Although a particular ethnic group predominated
26

in most gangs, the observed trend was toward

racially mixed gangs.

◆ The types of criminal activity varied widely from

gang to gang and from one site to another. According to the authors, “In some places, gang

activity, drug activity and weapons violations are

nearly synonymous terms; in other areas of the

same city, the nexus may be much looser, with

drug activity peripheral to other criminal activity.

In other areas, drug usage is merely a recreational

activity of gang members” (Weisel and Painter,

1997:77).

◆ Police in the five sites consistently reported gangs

to be less structured and organized than they had

previously believed. Those Chicago gangs that are

highly structured and extensively involved in

drug trafficking are the exception, not the rule.

◆ Police responses varied as much as the nature of

gang problems. Their responses also changed:

from an approach emphasizing suppression, intelligence gathering, and investigation in 1991 to a

more comprehensive approach in 1996 that integrated investigations, intelligence gathering, prevention, community policing, and enforcement

activities in a collaborative effort with community

organizations.

◆ With notable exceptions, most patrol officers had

received no training in how to identify gang activity. Consequently, their reports yielded inconsistent and unreliable data. Differences in reporting

guidelines and disparity in gang definitions also

produced wide variations in the quality of reporting on gang incidents.

◆ The police departments studied lacked uniform

methods for determining the effectiveness of their

antigang efforts. Despite the absence of evidence

regarding effectiveness, however, “it appears that

specific strategies used by police agencies work

best when targeted at specific behaviors, locations,

and individuals” (Weisel and Painter, 1997:89).

Geomapping and Tracking Systems

Recent technological advances in police tracking and

management of gang crime include computer mapping, object-oriented databases, management information systems, and offender identification and tracking (Fritsch, Caeti, and Taylor, 1999). The mayor of

Houston, TX, instituted an Anti-Gang Office and

Task Force in the early 1990’s that developed a computerized gang geomapping and tracking system to

identify the location of gangs and gang-related gun

violence and the location of existing youth program

resources (Office of Juvenile Justice and Delinquency Prevention, 1999). Hotspots of gang activity

and necessary youth services are linked through this

information system. The Gang Education Awareness

Resistance program, a partnership between the AntiGang Office, the school district, and two police departments, helps schools with gang-related security

problems. The Gang Prevention Program of the Association for the Advancement of Mexican Americans

provides legal education and a wide range of services

for at-risk youth. A regional gang-related information

tracking system is serving more than 50 Houstonarea law enforcement agencies. Although it has not

been evaluated, the Anti-Gang Office and Task Force

is a promising city-level management initiative.

The Chicago, IL, Police Department has constructed one of the most accessible and easy-to-use

tracking programs in the Nation. Called the Information Collection for Automated Mapping (ICAM)

program, it uses computerized mapping to help police track criminal activity in neighborhoods. Combined with geocoding (which verifies addresses and

links to other geographic information), computer

mapping software can combine data sets to provide

a multidimensional view of gang crime and its potential contributing factors (see Block and Block, 1993,

for illustrations of the kind of information that can

be compiled with this system).

The Orange County, CA, Gang Incident Tracking

System (GITS) is another type of gang information

system that supports not only intelligence and gang

crime reporting functions, but also evaluation of

community interventions (Vila and Meeker, 1997).

Twenty-two independent cities and the Orange

County Sheriff-Coroner’s Department report to a

centralized database. Geographical information software is used to analyze the GITS data, generating

geomaps of gang crimes and the residency of gang

members. An analysis of more than 7,500 arrests
27

from 1995 to 1998 showed that adults were involved

in 46 percent more violent arrests than juveniles and

that a much larger proportion of adult arrests were

for a violent crime (Wiebe, Meeker, and Vila, in

press). The researchers concluded that adult gangs

in Orange County committed more serious crime

than juvenile gangs.

Recently, gang suppression tactics have been expanded in three directions: (1) collaborative approaches that tie together all sectors of the community; (2) State laws that increase criminal sanctions

for gang crime and gang involvement, and local

ordinances and enforcement of specific criminal

codes that restrict gang activities; and (3) multiagency and multijurisdictional approaches that

bring together several law enforcement agencies.

These strategies are discussed in the sections that

follow.

Identification of Gang Members

Determining a particular individual’s gang involvement is as difficult as identifying true youth gangs. In many

instances, a youth may associate occasionally with a gang, participate episodically in the activities of a gang,

or desire gang membership without actually being a member. Likewise, many youth leave gangs by drifting

out, gradually dissociating themselves. Because severe criminal sanctions can be applied to gang membership

in certain jurisdictions, a valid determination is important. The National Drug Intelligence Center (1995) recommended that investigators use these criteria (any one of which qualifies the individual) for determining

whether a youth is a gang member:

◆ The individual admits membership in a gang (i.e., self-reported).

◆ A law enforcement agency or reliable informant identifies an individual as a gang member.

◆ An informant of previously untested reliability identifies an individual as a gang member, and this information is corroborated by an independent source.

◆ The individual resides in or frequents a particular gang’s area and adopts its style of dress, use of hand signs,

symbols, or tattoos; maintains ongoing relationships with known gang members; and has been arrested several times in the company of identified gang members for offenses consistent with usual gang activity.

◆ There is reasonable suspicion that the individual is involved in a gang-related criminal activity or enterprise.

Determining gang membership of youth brought into the juvenile justice system may be more problematic

because of a lack of information in their official records. In a national assessment, Spergel and Curry (1993)

surveyed juvenile justice and social service agencies to identify the criteria used to distinguish between gang

and nongang members. Agencies used nine different methods that fell into two categories (the percentage

of respondents using each criterion is indicated in parentheses):

Direct Observation or Agency Information

◆ Symbols/symbolic behavior (51 percent).

◆ Self-admission (47 percent).

◆ Association with gang members (39 percent).

◆ Type of criminal behavior (34 percent).

◆ Location or residence (14 percent).

Reports of Membership From Other

Agencies or Individuals

◆ Police identification (42 percent).

◆ Informant identification (40 percent).

◆ Other legal identification (19 percent).

◆ Other institutional identification (16 percent).
28

Strategies Using Multiple

Techniques

A number of communities have developed gang

strategies that integrate two or more techniques.

Such communities typically are guided by a local

task force formed to curb gang involvement and

violence. Community policing also is often used

with other techniques.

Community Policing

Community policing programs appear to have realized

some success in dealing with youth gang problems.

Cronin (1994) describes the Norfolk Police Assisted

Community Enforcement program, which has a gang

component and is focused in low-income housing areas. A second community policing model that targets

youth gangs is a Reno, NV, program (Weston, 1995).

Through the formation of a Community Action Team

(CAT), the Reno Police Department involves representatives from minority neighborhoods, officials from

community service agencies, and political leaders in

a community solution to the city’s serious youth gang

problem (Weston, 1995). The CAT program has two

strategies: (1) creation of a highly specialized team

of officers to target the top 5 percent of violent gang

members in a repeat offender program and (2) a prevention and early intervention program that targets an

estimated 80 percent of Reno’s gang members who

are not considered to be hardcore. Neighborhood

advisory groups provide feedback from community

residents, and an interagency group coordinates prevention and intervention resources. Although the

program has not been independently evaluated, local

officials are convinced it is effective and continue to

support its operations (Weston, 1995). A third community policing model, in the Redlands, CA, Police

Department, incorporates a new scientific approach: “risk-focused policing” (Rich, 1999). The

model is based on the extensive research literature

on risk and protective factors. Data related to these

factors, adolescent problem behaviors, and existing

programs are entered into a database. Mapping

software displays the results by census block. To

prevent delinquency and gang involvement more

effectively, the police department focuses its resources on areas that most need risk reduction

and protection enhancement.

Community-University Model for Gang

Intervention and Delinquency Prevention

in Small Cities

Takata and Tyler (1994) assisted Racine, WI

(population, 84,298), in developing the CommunityUniversity Model for Gang Intervention and Delinquency Prevention in Small Cities, which also

can be adapted for larger cities. This team model

consists of six major steps that communities experiencing an emerging gang problem can take:

◆ A genuine commitment to youth. This can be

demonstrated by working directly with youth,

developing an understanding of their problems and

concerns, building trust, and empowering them to

solve problems. The team must demonstrate a commitment to resolving local issues (e.g., the need for

recreational facilities in minority neighborhoods)

and develop a thorough understanding of the city’s

social, political, and economic context, especially

race and ethnic relations.

◆ Gang problem assessment. The team will need to

investigate, observe, and document the developing

gang problem while learning from neighboring

jurisdictions through the exchange of information.

The team must understand the basis for initial denial of gang problems by some groups, agencies,

and individuals. Meetings with community leaders

and individuals must be organized. In all likelihood, a catalyzing event will occur, if it has not

already, that forces recognition of the problem.

◆ Initial networking. A task force should be

formed to collaborate on possible solutions. Its

work includes organizing community meetings

and neighborhood hearings to identify solutions

and develop a collaborative response to gangs.

◆ Local study of the gang situation. The task force

should identify a local college, university, or other

community resource that can study the local gang

problem. This study would provide the documentation necessary to secure external funding for the

programs the task force identifies. Initial funding

might be sought to implement one or two of the

task force’s recommendations (e.g., community

collaboration). The task force should be alert to

politicization of its work by opposition parties.
29

◆ Timeout. In this stage, the task force should publish and disseminate research findings, expand its

network via conferences and other communication

outlets, identify funding sources, establish political

foundations for funding, and prepare grant/contract

applications for the second set of awards.

◆ Development of new programs. The final stage

is program development and implementation. The

overall plan should include long-term goals and a

master plan. New programs should be implemented through continued collaborative efforts.

Research and program development would continue during the implementation of the program.

Other communities have organized their gang assessment, planning, and program development initiatives in similar steps.

Aurora Gang Task Force

Aurora, CO, formed the all-volunteer Aurora Gang

Task Force (AGTF) in 1989 (Atkinson, 1996). The

members of AGTF come from volunteer organizations, churches, social services, government agencies,

the military, the media, and businesses. AGTF promotes programs for at-risk youth, lobbies for legislation to better control youth and adult gang-related

behavior, advocates tougher prosecution and sentencing for youth and adult gang-related crime, and disseminates information about youth and adult gangs to

the media, other interested agencies, the public, and

community groups. AGTF also supports other city

initiatives. One of these, the High Intensity Community Oriented Policing program, uses gang sweeps to

control youth and adult gang-related drug trafficking

and police area representatives assigned to assist citizens in keeping gang crime out of their neighborhoods.

Aurora was honored by the National Conference of

Mayors’ 1992 City Livability Awards program for

its efforts to mobilize an effective response to youth

and adult gangs. Gang-related statistics compiled by

the Aurora Police Department show mixed results.

Although youth and adult gang arrests dropped,

drug trafficking involving gangs increased, and “a

conclusive solution to the gang problem remained

frustratingly elusive” (Atkinson, 1996:261). Nevertheless, AGTF is considered a broad-based model

for dealing with youth and adult gangs (Bureau of

Justice Assistance, 1997b), with community policing

serving as a key component.

Partnership for a Safer Cleveland

Cleveland’s Task Force on Violent Crime (now

called the Partnership for a Safer Cleveland) was

formed in 1981 and enjoyed early success in dealing

with gangs (Trump, 1996; Walker and Schmidt,

1996). Until 1989, however, city officials denied that

the city had a gang problem. They then began to

respond to Huff’s (1989) research on Cleveland

youth and adult gangs. The task force recommended

that the Cleveland Police Department form a youth

gang unit. Numerous other recommendations for the

creation and expansion of programs and collaborative efforts were made and acted upon, and some of

this work is still ongoing. A key feature of the task

force’s approach was its scope: the city’s gang problem was assessed and responded to in the context of

broader juvenile crime and drug problems.

The task force and the police department’s youth gang

unit concentrated part of their efforts on decreasing

the presence of gangs in Cleveland’s schools. This

work paid off (Trump, 1996). School gang incidents

decreased 39 percent citywide in just 2 years through

the following integrated activities: prioritized enforcement, investigation, and intervention in school gangrelated incidents citywide; staff, parent, and student

antigang education; a truancy program; and a variety

of coordinated programs designed to reduce gang

activity and provide alternatives to gang involvement.

SARA

Another model for engaging communities in a gang

problem-solving process, called SARA for each of its

sequential steps—scanning, analysis, response, and

assessment—is used by the Bureau of Justice Assistance (1997a) in the development of citywide and

multijurisdictional enforcement strategies to investigate

and prosecute drug distribution and related crimes

committed by urban (mainly adult) street gangs.

SARA is based on the principles of problem-oriented

policing—proactively identifying problems, understanding the underlying causes of those problems, and

developing interventions to address them (Goldstein,

1979, 1990).
30

Multiagency Initiatives

Many cities and counties claim success in pooling resources with Federal and State agencies to combat

youth and adult gangs and related violence.11 Multiagency initiatives generally are of two types. The most

common type is Federal, State, and local law enforcement collaboration across jurisdictional boundaries. In

other instances, crime control agencies (e.g., police,

prosecutors, courts) collaborate in targeting gangs.

Los Angeles Metropolitan Task Force

California has become a leader in designing and

implementing multiagency initiatives that draw on

both Federal and local resources (National Criminal

Justice Association, 1997). One of the most successful antigang initiatives, the Los Angeles Metropolitan

Task Force, grew out of the city’s 1992 riots, in which

youth and adult gangs were blamed for much of the

damage. Its original mission was to identify and prosecute individuals responsible for the riots (U.S. General Accounting Office, 1996). Led by the FBI, in

collaboration with local police, the Los Angeles task

force was assisted by ATF. This assistance included

the use of Federal laws and authority (e.g., with prosecution, wiretapping, and witness security); money

to purchase firearms undercover and pay informants;

and logistical support. More than 2,000 arrests were

made between February 1992 and September 1995,

of which nearly 1,000 were for violent crimes (U.S.

General Accounting Office, 1996). Nearly 300 Federal and State convictions resulted from these arrests,

more than three-fourths of which were for violent

crime charges.

Some Federal and local officials interviewed by U.S.

General Accounting Office staff in 1995 and 1996

credited the Los Angeles task force with reducing

crime rates in some neighborhoods and making it safe

for children to play outside again. As a general assessment, most line officers mentioned “long-term, proactive investigations of entire gangs as an advantageous

element differentiating the federal task force approach to violent crime from the local law enforcement approach, which generally involves short-term,

reactive investigations of individual gang members”

(U.S. General Accounting Office, 1996:3). The U.S.

Department of Justice (1996) has noted the success

of the task force.

Boston Gun Project

The Boston Gun Project is a suppression program

that targets youth and adult gang members in a

multiagency effort (Clark, 1997).12 It is based on an

analysis of homicide among Boston’s youth (age 21

and under) that determined that this violence is gang

centered, neighborhood based, and concentrated in

a small number of repeat-offending, gang-involved

youth. The program was initiated in individual

neighborhoods with an explicit communication campaign. This campaign begins with an orientation for

community groups and is then often carried out faceto-face with gang members, who are given the message that gang violence has provoked a zero tolerance

approach and that only an end to gang violence will

stop new gang-focused suppression activities. The

long sentences that offenders receive are publicized in

high-crime neighborhoods. The program components

described above build upon and integrate the efforts

of grassroots organizations and the faith community.

A multiagency, coordinated task force of 45 full-time

Boston police officers and others from outside agencies suppresses youth and adult gang violence and

gun use (Kennedy, Piehl, and Braga, 1996). Suppression tactics include “pulling levers” to impose

costs on offenders related to their chronic offending

by serving warrants, enforcing probation restrictions, and deploying Federal enforcement powers

(Kennedy, 1997).

Under another component of the program—Operation

Night Light—police and probation officers, working

in teams, make nightly visits to the homes of youth

on probation to ensure that they are complying with

the terms and conditions of their probation. This helps

11 Many of the programs and strategies reviewed in the remainder of this Summary are used to target adult criminal

organizations, which sometimes are called “gangs,” and

purely drug-trafficking gangs, which are not normally considered youth gangs (Klein, 1995a). Unfortunately, research

and practice to date do not permit distinguishing which interventions are most likely to work best with youth gangs versus

other (mainly adult) criminal groups that are also called gangs.

12 Gangs were defined here as a “self-identified group of kids

who act corporately (at least sometimes) and violently (at least

sometimes)” (Kennedy, Piehl, and Braga, 1996:158).
31

target tough enforcement efforts against gang leaders.

City “streetworkers” (gang prevention and mediation specialists) also work in tandem with police and

probation officers, helping resolve conflicts and

linking youth who want help with needed services.

Simultaneously, the Boston Gun Project seeks to

interrupt the self-sustaining cycle of fear, weapon use,

and violence that appears to be driving youth violence

in the city by reducing use of guns with a “coerced

use-reduction” strategy and reducing access to firearms (Kennedy, Piehl, and Braga, 1996). To carry out

this deterrence strategy, gang mediation specialists

are deployed to gang hotspots, which are generally

already known through mapping that shows gang

overlap, intergang conflicts, and gun-related crime.

Heightened surveillance for shootings, assaults, and

other selected incidents triggers deployment of interagency crisis intervention teams with “swift and comprehensive attention.” After this “calming” operation,

patrol officers continue to monitor the hotspot for

reoccurrence of gun violence.

The strategy that reduces access to firearms, using

gun-tracing capabilities of the Boston Police Department and ATF, seeks to disrupt the illicit gun market. The rationale supporting the supply-reduction

strategy is that disruption of the illicit market will

interrupt fear-driven gun acquisition and use, thereby

reducing gang violence in Boston. Using Federal

firearm laws, the project “makes the market much

less hospitable by strategically removing the most

dangerous gang and drug offenders from the

streets, and stemming the flow of firearms into

Massachusetts” (Kennedy, Piehl, and Braga, 1996:5).

Evaluation results are not yet available, although

gun homicide victimization among 14- to 24-yearolds in Boston is reported to have fallen by twothirds since the project began (Kennedy, 1997).

Because homicides were dropping nationwide

among this age group during the project period, the

evaluation will compare Boston’s homicide trends to

trends in a sample of other cities (Kennedy, 1997).

Bureau of Justice Assistance Gang

Suppression Prototype

The Bureau of Justice Assistance (BJA) (1997a,

1997b) has developed a suppression prototype for

drug-trafficking youth and adult gangs that focuses

almost exclusively on law enforcement and prosecution strategies (see also Kelling et al., 1998, for information on BJA’s comprehensive community programs

that target youth and adult gangs). It is modeled after

BJA’s Urban Street Gang Program and is composed

of projects in seven demonstration sites, some of

which are administered by police departments, others

by prosecutors’ offices. The prototype consists of six

key program elements: planning and analysis, gang

information and intelligence systems, gang suppression strategies and tactics, interagency cooperation

and collaboration, use of legal mechanisms, and evaluation of operations. The BJA Report Urban Street

Gang Involvement provides detailed information on

each of these elements. Gang suppression strategies

and tactics in the BJA prototype include:13

◆ Confidential informants and undercover officers.

◆ Surveillance/arrest, buy/bust, and reverse sting

operations.

◆ Interdiction, barriers, sweeps, and warrant

execution.

◆ Other investigative approaches, such as surveillance, followup investigations, and multijurisdictional task forces.

◆ Suppression through patrol, including directed

patrol and community oriented policing.

◆ Suppression through enforcement of health,

building, and zoning codes and nuisance abatement ordinances.

Descriptions of two examples of multiagency strategies that are consistent with the BJA prototype follow.

A small multiagency task force successfully dismantled

New York City’s Puerto Rican Black Park Gang,

13 See Bureau of Justice Assistance (1997b:62–72) for detailed

descriptions of these suppression tactics.
32

so named because it shot out lights surrounding its

base of operations in a park to avoid police detection

(Bureau of Justice Assistance, 1997b). It was a very

violent drug gang—believed to be responsible for

15 murders—that trafficked in drugs and used the

proceeds to buy legitimate businesses through which

it laundered drug profits. The investigation was led

by the homicide investigation unit of the New York

County (Manhattan) District Attorney’s Office and

joined by the New York City Police Department,

other New York agencies, and several Federal agencies, including the FBI, the Drug Enforcement

Administration, and ATF.

Tactics used included intensive study and initial

surveillance, infiltration of the gang by undercover

officers, cultivation and use of confidential informants, electronic surveillance, cooperation with

probation and parole officers, and asset forfeiture.

The success of the effort resulted in initiating recreation programs in the park sponsored by the Police

Athletic League and renaming it White Light Park

because lighting had been restored (Bureau of Justice Assistance, 1997b).

The Jurisdictions United for Drug Gang Enforcement (JUDGE) program in San Diego coordinates

investigations, prosecutions, and the sanctioning of

criminal youth and adult gang members (Bureau of

Justice Assistance, 1997b). This suppression program, headed by the district attorney’s gang unit,

targets violent members of drug-trafficking gangs.

Several elements are deemed critical to its success: a

motivated and reliable informant; a vertical prosecution team that works with investigators from the

operation’s beginning; a principal prosecutor freed

from responsibility for other cases; videotape corroboration of drug transactions using paid informants; coordination with judges; and coordination

with the jail before a sweep to allow preparation for

the increased number of detainees. Still in operation,

JUDGE also enforces conditions of probation and

drug laws and provides vertical prosecution for probation violations and new offenses involving targeted offenders. The JUDGE strategy has been

replicated in Oceanside, CA, and in Seattle, WA.

Minnesota Statewide Task Force

Minnesota created a statewide gang task force, composed of 40 members from local, county, and State

police agencies, enabling law enforcement to collaborate effectively across jurisdictions (Office of

Juvenile Justice and Delinquency Prevention,

1999). Members are deputized, have statewide

power, and conduct long-term investigations using

a gang database. This task force grew out of Minnesota HEALS (Hope, Education, and Law and

Safety), a public-private partnership initiated by

Honeywell, Inc., that has more than 60 members,

including several other corporations, State and local

law enforcement agencies, and a wide variety of

other representatives. Gang suppression activities

are concentrated in the Minneapolis Anti-Violence

Initiative, which employs police-probation teams

modeled after Boston’s Operation Night Light program (described on page 30; see also Corbet, 1998;

Corbet, Fitzgerald, and Jordan, 1996). These teams

target gang members who possess weapons and are

multiple offenders. Suppression strategies include

saturation patrols, rapid response teams to prevent

retaliation, gun tracing, Federal prosecution in cases

involving guns, and vertical prosecution. Decreases

in gang-related serious and violent crimes have been

attributed to the Minneapolis HEALS partnership

(Office of Juvenile Justice and Delinquency Prevention, 1999).

Federal Initiatives

Violent and drug-trafficking gangs are targeted in the

Clinton Administration’s Anti-Violent Crime Initiative

through the use of Federal, State, and local interjurisdictional task forces (Office of the Attorney

General, 1995; U.S. General Accounting Office,

1996). The Attorney General (1995) reported that

the Drug Enforcement Administration uses Mobile

Enforcement Teams (MET’s) that work with State

and local law enforcement authorities to dismantle

drug organizations. The Houston, TX, MET was

deployed in Galveston, where a high rate of juvenile homicides was attributed to drug-trafficking

problems caused by three street gangs. MET made

17 arrests of gang members, 13 of whom were

charged with violent crimes.
33

TARGET

The Tri-Agency Resource Gang Enforcement Team

(TARGET) integrates and coordinates the work of

the Orange County, CA, police and sheriff’s departments, the Orange County District Attorney, and

the Orange County Probation Department (Capizzi,

Cook, and Schumacher, 1995). Its aim is to reduce

gang crime by selectively incarcerating the most

violent and repeat gang offenders (based on their

criminal records) in the most violent gangs in Orange County. Once identified, these offenders are

monitored closely for new offenses and undergo

intensive supervision when on probation for violation of probation terms and conditions. TARGET

ensures close collaboration among law enforcement

staff, probation officers, and prosecutors by housing

TARGET teams in police and sheriff’s departments.

Each team consists of police officers who serve as

gang investigators, a probation officer, a deputy

district attorney, and a district attorney investigator.

The TARGET process “involves quickly identifying

the leaders of gangs, concentrating on them (targeting) for enforcement efforts, conducting searches,

and making arrests” (Rackauckas, 1999:9). Police

gang investigators are well trained to deal with hostile witnesses, and deputy district attorneys and district attorney investigators are experienced in the

vertical prosecution of cases through the court system, which appears to be a key element in program

success. Begun in Westminster in 1992, TARGET

has been replicated in six additional areas within

Orange County. Currently, 12 TARGET teams are

operating in 8 cities in the county and in the South

Orange Sheriff’s Department.

The effectiveness of the TARGET teams is impressive. During its first 2 years of operation, TARGET

teams identified and verified 647 individual gang

members, 77 of whom were targeted as high-rate

offenders and gang leaders. Two-thirds of them

were placed in custody while awaiting trial, and a

99-percent conviction rate was achieved along with

a 62-percent decrease in serious gang-related crime

(Kent and Smith, 1995). This level of success has

continued with TARGET’s subsequent expansion.

In 1998, there were 3,475 filings of criminal charges

against gang members, which included more than

2,600 Street Terrorism Enforcement and Prevention (STEP) Act charges and/or enhancements

(Rackauckas, 1999). All types of criminal incidents—

except for drug-related offenses, which do not constitute a major gang activity in Orange County—have

dropped steadily since 1994, including a 57-percent

drop in gang homicides since 1993 (Rackauckas,

1999). An evaluation of the program showed a sharp

increase in incarceration of gang members (in juvenile

detention and correctional facilities, jails, the California Youth Authority, and State prisons) and a cumulative 47-percent decrease in gang crime over a

7-year period (Kent et al., 2000). In one case, the

Costa Mesa TARGET team dismantled a gang by

convicting and incarcerating the gang’s leaders and

placing on restrictive probation gang members not

sent to prison (Orange County Chiefs’ and Sheriff’s

Association, 1999). In another initiative, the Santa

Ana TARGET team—the Street Terrorism Offender

Project (STOP)—set out to reduce violence between

two rival gangs and other gang crime in the hotspot

area in which they operated. An evaluation using

Gang Incident Tracking System (a database of gang

crime incidents and arrests in Orange County) data

showed that after an initial increase in arrest incidents

involving the two gangs (as a direct result of STOP

actions), crimes involving the two gangs and the

overall level of gang crime in the targeted hotspot

decreased significantly over the next 2 years to near

zero (Wiebe, 1998).

Klein and colleagues (1995:292) suggested that “focused efforts of this type can produce positive effects

in smaller gang cities.” TARGET won the National

League of Cities 1993 award for Exemplary Local

Government Criminal Justice Programs.

Comprehensive Approaches to

Gang Problems

Klein (1995a:153) makes the case that communities

need to organize themselves to deal with youth gangs:

Street gangs are by-products of partially incapacitated communities. Until we dedicate the

state and federal resources necessary to alter

these community structures, gangs will continue

to emerge despite value transformation, suppression, or other community efforts. I’m talking

about the most obvious resources—jobs, better

schools, social services, health programs, family
34

support, training in community organization

skills, and support for resident empowerment.

That’s easy to say but obviously not easy to do.

A more comprehensive approach, combining program

elements such as social services, crisis intervention,

gang suppression, and community involvement,

might be more effective than a one-dimensional

approach. For evaluation results that suggest this,

see Spergel and Grossman (1997) and Spergel,

Grossman, and Wa (1998). Three communitybased and coordinated approaches designed to

deal comprehensively with the youth gang problem

are detailed here.

The Comprehensive Community-Wide

Approach to Gang Prevention,

Intervention, and Suppression

OJJDP’s Comprehensive Community-Wide Approach to Gang Prevention, Intervention, and Suppression program is designed to implement and test a

comprehensive model for reducing youth gang violence. In 1999, after funding the demonstration and

testing sites for 4 years, OJJDP decided to continue

supporting two of the five sites based on their strong

prospects for sustaining the approach, program performance, preliminary evaluation data, and evidence

of the development of promising strategies. Although

Bloomington, IL; Tucson, AZ; and San Antonio, TX,

served as promising demonstration sites, Riverside,

CA, and Mesa, AZ, were chosen to receive the additional support. The program utilizes the OJJDP

Comprehensive Gang Model, or the Spergel

model, as it is often called, to engage communities

in a systematic gang assessment, consensus building, and program development process. The model

involves delivering the following five core strategies through an integrated and team-oriented

problem-solving approach:14

◆ Community mobilization, including citizens,

youth, community groups, and agencies.

◆ Provision of academic, economic, and social

opportunities. Special school training and job

programs are especially critical for older gang

members who are not in school but may be ready

to leave the gang or decrease participation in

criminal gang activity for many reasons, including

maturation and the need to provide for family.

◆ Social intervention, using street outreach workers to engage gang-involved youth.

◆ Gang suppression, including formal and informal

social control procedures of the juvenile and

criminal justice systems and community agencies

and groups. Community-based agencies and local

groups must collaborate with juvenile and criminal justice agencies in the surveillance and sharing of information under conditions that protect

the community and the civil liberties of youth.

◆ Organizational change and development, that

is, the appropriate organization and integration of

the above strategies and potential reallocation of

resources among involved agencies.

Technical assistance manuals (Spergel et al., 1992b)

that guide implementation of each of these components are available.15 The model and its strategies

should be designed and targeted based on a strategic

problem assessment and implemented through a

sequenced, empirically driven process. A steering

committee comprising key community leaders and

agency staff must provide overall direction and support for the implementation of the five strategies.

The OJJDP Comprehensive Gang Model embraces

the concept of effective use of the social controls

inherent in various social institutions. As part of this

approach, individuals, families, the community as a

whole, agencies, and organizations—both formal

and informal—are reminded that they have a stake

in supporting positive behaviors and in taking a firm

stance against illegal activities, including gang crime

and violence, substance abuse, and illegitimate behaviors. In practice, this means that family members, adolescents, community residents, and agency

workers (including police and probation officers)

must work collaboratively while carrying out their

distinctive functions to ensure positive adolescent

14 See Spergel et al., 1992a; Spergel et al., 1992b; Spergel,

Chance, et al., 1994; Spergel, Curry, et al., 1994; see also

Spergel and Curry, 1990, 1993.

15 These manuals are available from the Juvenile Justice Clearinghouse by calling 800–638–8736.
35

behaviors. A summary of the five demonstration

sites originally chosen to implement the model follows (Burch and Kane, 1999).

The Mesa Gang Intervention Project (Mesa, AZ).

The target area for the Mesa Gang Intervention

Project (MGIP) is an area of the city served by

Mesa and Powell Junior High Schools. Within the

target area, 18 gangs with an estimated 650 members have been identified by the Mesa Police Department. The project has targeted 125 youth who

are involved in gangs or at high risk for gang involvement and who either reside in or are known to

be active within the target area. Key collaborators in

the project, which is overseen by a steering committee made up of agency and grassroots executives, are

the city of Mesa, the Mesa Police Department,

Maricopa County Adult and Juvenile Probation

Departments, Prehab of Arizona, the Mesa Boys &

Girls Club, Arizona State University, the United

Way, and others.

A team of two gang detectives, one adult and two juvenile probation officers, a youth intervention specialist,

and two full-time and two part-time street outreach

workers works with and monitors the youth on a daily

basis. The team is located in a storefront office within

the target community. The MGIP gang detectives and

probation officers provide monitoring and surveillance

of youth in the program while supporting street outreach workers and staff from other community-based

agencies. These staff ensure delivery of necessary services such as counseling, job referrals, drug and alcohol

treatment, and other social services. The MGIP team

uses a team problem-solving approach to ensure that

progress is made with each youth in the program. The

team also provides community assistance, including

educating residents about local gang problems and

hearing their concerns regarding the neighborhood.

Gang education is also provided to community members through various professional, neighborhood, and

civic groups within the target area.

A computer literacy lab was recently added to the

MGIP office, through the support of the Arizona

Superior Court. The State of Arizona recently provided additional support to the city of Mesa and

MGIP for a mentoring component, and MGIP is

supporting a Gang Prevention Through Targeted

Outreach program at the Mesa Boys & Girls Club.

Other services provided include a cognitive restructuring class for gang-involved youth; parenting

classes; services for gang-involved girls; an arts program; summer camp programming focusing on cultural diversity; and tattoo removal services following

community service, an educational session, and an

agreement not to get any new tattoos for 2 years.

Looking toward the prospect of sustaining local

support for project activities, the Mesa Police Department has shifted administrative oversight of the

project to the police department’s gang unit.

Tucson Gang Project (OUR Town Family Center,

Tucson, AZ). The Tucson Gang Project focused on

the Vistas neighborhoods on the south side of Tucson,

which have approximately 4 main gangs with an estimated 350 gang members. The project served more

than 100 youth. Its outreach component operated out

of the local Boys & Girls Club in the target area. The

primary partners in the project included the Tucson

Police Department, Pima County juvenile probation

and parole, the Tucson Unified School District, the

Tucson Boys & Girls Club, Quail Enterprises (a research and evaluation firm), and a treatment agency

known as La Fontera. The project collaborated with,

received referrals from, and made referrals to a number of other local agencies. Street outreach workers,

probation officers, a police gang unit officer, and others worked to provide services and opportunities on a

daily basis to youth targeted by the project and held

them accountable for their negative behavior using a

range of graduated sanctions. Weekly staff meetings

with other agency representatives were supplemented

by weekly meetings among project team members to

review client and community progress and needs. A

community mobilizer on the project staff worked with

community agencies and residents of the target neighborhood to keep attention focused on gang issues and

completed a community member survey on the gang

problem. The Gang Prevention Through Targeted

Outreach program was integrated into the project’s

overall strategy and focused on younger at-risk youth.

Where possible, staff from other programs joined

gang project staff meetings to share information and

coordinate efforts. Project staffing was supplemented

by the use of AmeriCorps volunteers.

Although Federal funding for this project has ended,

project partners including OUR Town, Quail Enterprises, and the Pima County Juvenile Probation
36

Department are continuing their collaboration and

are providing services to project youth through local

and other Federal support.

Riverside’s Comprehensive Community-Wide

Approach to Gang Prevention, Intervention, and

Suppression (Riverside, CA, Police Department).

The Riverside project is focused on two communities known to be high gang-crime areas. Twenty-one

gangs with approximately 1,230 members exist in

these communities. Currently, more than 150 ganginvolved and high-risk youth are targeted by the

project. The project is guided by a steering committee comprising local agencies and organizations,

including the Riverside County Juvenile Court, the

Riverside County District Attorney’s Office,16 the

Riverside County and Alvord Unified School Districts, the Youth Service Center, and other agency

and community leaders.

Although the lead agency is the Riverside Police

Department, key support is provided by Riverside

County Probation, the Youth Service Center, the

City of Riverside Human Resources Department,

the University of California at Riverside, and many

other local agencies. Outreach workers and area

social service agencies aid project youth daily, and

police and probation officers work to keep youth

from becoming involved in criminal or delinquent

activities. Outreach workers and other service agencies discuss service needs during weekly meetings,

and area safety, gang activities, and accountability

issues during biweekly meetings with police and

probation officers. Youth are encouraged to attend

these meetings, are supported in attending school,

and are provided job training, opportunities for

regular employment, and social services. Probation

officers and police carry out home visits, area surveillance, arrests, and other controls. The project

has been enhanced by the probation department’s

development of youth accountability boards in Riverside and by a new school-based outreach program

that will provide services to youth at risk of gang

involvement.

The Riverside gang project also involves a job training

component conducted by the city’s Human Resources

Department. If youth cannot be placed immediately

into ongoing employment programs in the city, they

are eligible for the project’s 40-hour job training program. The program consists of job readiness training

(covering issues such as résumé/application writing,

proper attitudes, leadership skills, communication,

and cultural differences) and a job stipend for completing on-the-job training through temporary employment with local agencies and companies. The

program gives youth the skills they need to seek job

opportunities, apply, and be selected. It gives employers a chance to give back to the community while

they gain subsidized staff. The program also works to

place youth into permanent employment and provides

followup once they are employed.

Bloomington/Normal’s Comprehensive CommunityWide Approach to Gang Prevention, Intervention, and Suppression (Project OZ, Inc.,

Bloomington, IL). Although all of Bloomington

and Normal, IL, were included in its target area, in

which 8 gangs with 640 members were known to

exist, this project dealt mainly with youth from the

City of Bloomington. Along with the Bloomington

and Normal Police Departments, the McLean

County Juvenile Court, juvenile probation, the

Bloomington and Normal schools, the Western

Avenue Community Center, the Bloomington Boys

& Girls Club, the McLean County State’s Attorney,

and other agencies focused on gang-involved and atrisk youth in Bloomington and Normal by providing

support, suppression, and intervention services and

opportunities such as job training and placement.

Regular staff meetings for outreach workers were

supplemented with biweekly meetings with the

Bloomington Police Department’s proactive unit,

adult and juvenile probation, juvenile parole, and

a school resource officer to review the progress of

project youth, special problems in the cities, and

overall gang activities. Outreach workers assisted

project youth who were in the community and

project youth who were incarcerated but expected

to be released in the near future. The project was

enhanced by an OJJDP mentoring grant that provided services to community youth at risk of gang

membership and by a local business owned and

operated by the project’s steering committee that

served as a job training site and the project’s job

development office. State Farm Insurance, which is 16 The prosecution component of this program is described in

Johnson, Webster, and Conners, 1995.
37

headquartered in Bloomington, also provided tremendous support to the project, and the Boys &

Girls Clubs’ Gang Prevention Through Targeted Outreach program was integrated into the project and

focused on youth at high risk for gang involvement.

Although OJJDP support has ended, aspects of the

project are continuing through other Federal, State,

and local support.

San Antonio’s Gang Rehabilitation, Assessment,

and Services Program (San Antonio, TX, Police

Department). The Gang Rehabilitation, Assessment,

and Services Program’s (GRAASP’s) target community was located on the southwest side of San Antonio.

The program identified a target population of 100

gang-involved youth from the area’s 15 gangs and

1,664 gang members. In addition to the San Antonio

Police Department, key partners in GRAASP included the Bexar County Department of Probation,

the Texas Youth Commission (TYC), the San Antonio Unified School District, the University of Texas

at San Antonio, Cellular On Patrol (COP—a citizens’

crime watch group), and other community agencies

and grassroots groups. Street-based outreach workers

employed by the city of San Antonio worked together

with other social service agencies, a job developer,

probation officers, city police officers assigned to

community policing and tactical units, TYC staff, and

others. Coordination and case management meetings

were held regularly with outreach workers. Police

and probation officers were included if issues arose,

although communication between police, probation,

and other GRAASP staff also took place outside of

regular meetings. The project coordinator, outreach

staff, and job developer worked together in an office

near the target area. The project supported graffiti

paint-outs (i.e., graffiti cleanup), community health

fairs, recreational opportunities for project youth, and

other community development activities in conjunction

with local neighborhood associations. As OJJDP

funding has ended, local political leaders from the

target area have been working with project agencies

to determine ways of sustaining some of the project’s

strategies and services.

Many lessons have been learned in each of these sites

that are expected to greatly enhance the Nation’s

knowledge about responding to chronic and emerging

youth gang problems in both large and small communities. A University of Chicago evaluation of the demonstration effort is expected to shed light on what did

and did not work in each site. In addition, the evaluation will inform OJJDP and the field as to how

promising the Comprehensive Community-Wide

Approach to Gang Prevention, Intervention, and

Suppression may be in dealing with youth gang crime

and violence. While final results are not expected until

2001, anecdotal and preliminary outcome data suggest

that these projects have been successful in reducing

gang crime and increasing prosocial opportunities

such as special school training and job programs.

The Gang Violence Reduction Program

A variation of the comprehensive model Spergel

and his colleagues designed was implemented in the

Little Village neighborhood of Chicago, a low-income

and working-class community that is approximately

90 percent Mexican American (Spergel and Grossman, 1997). Called the Gang Violence Reduction

Program, it was administered by the Chicago

Police Department. The program targeted mainly

older members (ages 17 to 24) of two of the area’s

most violent Hispanic gangs, the Latin Kings and the

Two Six. It is important to note that the program

targeted and provided services to youth involved with

Ebb and Flow of Gang Violence

Decker (1996) delineates a seven-step process

that accounts for the peaks and valleys in levels

of gang violence. The process begins with a

loosely organized gang:

1. Gang members feel loose bonds to the gang.

2. Gang members collectively perceive a threat from

a rival gang (which increases gang cohesion).

3. A mobilizing event occurs—possibly, but not

necessarily, violent.

4. Activity escalates.

5. One of the gangs lashes out in violence.

6. Violence and activity rapidly deescalate.

7. The other gang retaliates.
38

these two gangs, rather than to the gangs as groups.

These two gangs accounted for about 70 percent of

serious gang violence in the Little Village community.

The Gang Violence Reduction Program consisted

mainly of two coordinated strategies: (1) targeted

control of violent or potentially violent youth gang

offenders in the form of increased supervision and

suppression by the probation department and police

and (2) provision of a wide range of social services

and opportunities for targeted youth to encourage

their transition to legitimate behavior through education, jobs, job training, family support, and brief

counseling. The program was staffed by tactical police officers, probation officers, community youth

workers from the target neighborhood, and workers

in Neighbors Against Gang Violence, a community

organization established to support the project. This

organization was composed of representatives from

local churches, a job placement agency, youth service

agencies, other community groups, the alderman’s

office, and local citizens. The program incorporated a

comprehensive set of integrated and coordinated

strategies: suppression, social intervention, opportunities provision, and community mobilization.

Evaluation results, covering 3 out of 5 years of

program operations, were positive (Spergel and

Grossman, 1997; Spergel, Grossman, and Wa, 1998;

Thornberry and Burch, 1997). Favorable results

included a lower level of serious gang violence

among the targeted gang members than among

members of comparable gangs in the area, who had

been exposed to a traditional approach based mainly

on suppression. Specifically, there were fewer arrests for serious gang crimes (especially aggravated

batteries and aggravated assaults) involving members of targeted gangs in comparison with a control

group of youth from the same gangs and members of

other gangs in Little Village. It appears that the coordinated project approach, using a combination of

various social interventions involving youth outreach workers17 and suppression tactics, was more

effective with more violent youth, while the sole use

of youth workers was more effective with less violent youth. Social interventions included counseling,

crisis intervention, gang homicide intervention, job

placement, and family, school, and special education

programs and services. There also was notable improvement in residents’ perceptions of gang crime

and police effectiveness in dealing with that crime.

The Illinois Criminal Justice Information Authority

(1999:4) concluded that “the project appears to have

been a success” and that “the cohesive team approach was probably at the heart of the project’s

success in reducing gang crime, particularly gang

violence.”

Comprehensive Strategy for Serious,

Violent, and Chronic Juvenile Offenders

Gang membership is one of the strongest predictors of individual violence in adolescence (Hawkins

et al., 1998). In the Rochester site of OJJDP’s

Program of Research on the Causes and Correlates

of Delinquency, gang members committed nearly

twice as many delinquent acts as nonmembers (see

figure 1), and two-thirds of chronic violent offenders were gang members for a time (Thornberry,

Huizinga, and Loeber, 1995). OJJDP’s Comprehensive Strategy for Serious, Violent, and Chronic

Juvenile Offenders (see Wilson and Howell, 1993)

provides a framework for strategic community

planning and program development targeting serious, violent, and chronic juvenile offenders. Given

the overlap of risk factors for gang participation

with those for nongang serious and violent offending (Howell, 1998b), the Comprehensive Strategy

offers an effective community mobilization and

planning model for responding to the problem of

gang activity.18

The OJJDP Comprehensive Strategy organizes

programs in a framework composed of three main

components: prevention, early intervention, and

graduated sanctions. The graduated sanctions component consists of a system of sanctions, including 17 Six requirements guided outreach workers’ daily activities:

operate as part of a team structure, continually assess the gang

and gang member situation in the community, focus on social

intervention and social opportunities provision, work with the

community to achieve gang violence reduction, deal with police

harassment of gang members, and cope with outreach performance tasks (Spergel, 1999).

18 The Guide for Implementing the Comprehensive Strategy for Serious,

Violent, and Chronic Juvenile Offenders (Howell, 1995) is a resource

for carrying out the OJJDP Comprehensive Strategy.
39

0

20

40

60

80

100

Drug Use

Drug Sales

Alcohol Use

Public Disorder

Violent

Property

Minor

Moderate

General

Serious

Percent

General

Delinquency

Seriousness 

Level

Offense 

Type

Substance 

Use

Nonmembers

Gang Members

Prevalence

30

70

Figure 1. Percentage of Delinquent Acts Attributable to Gang Members and Prevalence of

Gang Membership, Rochester, NY

Source: Thornberry and Burch, 1997.

arrest, adjudication, intensive probation, incarceration, and aftercare for juvenile offenders, along with

a continuum of rehabilitation options. One such

option is found in the use of multisystemic therapy,

which has been shown to be highly effective with

serious, violent, and chronic juvenile offenders

(Henggeler, 1997). It is currently being tested in

Galveston, TX, in the Second Chance program,

which targets gang-involved youth (Thomas, 1996).

Two other programs illustrate how graduated sanctions may be effective with gang members. In its Early

Intervention Program, the Orange County (CA) Probation Department targets potential (under age 15)

serious, violent, and chronic offenders, for whom gang

involvement is one risk factor. Preliminary results

show a 50-percent reduction in recidivism as a result

of using probation and other sanctions with a wide

range of treatment interventions for both offenders

and their families (Schumacher and Kurz, 2000).19

Intensive probation and other more restrictive suppression measures, including criminal prosecution, are

used with older, hardcore gang members in the TARGET program described earlier in this Summary. The

Early Intervention Program uses a continuum of

sanctions and service options for the potential serious

and violent offenders it targets.

The Baton Rouge, LA, Partnership for the Prevention of Juvenile Gun Violence (Office of Juvenile

19 The California legislature recently appropriated funds for

replication and testing of the program in six other counties

within the State. In addition, it is being replicated in McLean

County, IL, in a collaborative project involving the Illinois

Attorney General’s Gang Crime Prevention Center and the

county’s Department of Court Services.
40

Justice and Delinquency Prevention, 1999) is an

excellent example of a community-based program

that uses the OJJDP Comprehensive Strategy

framework to prevent and reduce adolescent violence. This strategy quite likely would be effective

in preventing and reducing gang problems as well.

Although gangs were not targeted in this program

(because Baton Rouge did not have a gang problem

at the time of implementation), other communities

that are experiencing gang problems could replicate

the steps taken in Baton Rouge. The partnership

targeted multiple-offender youth up to age 21 from

two high-crime ZIP code areas. The partnership

designed a comprehensive strategy with the following components:

◆ A multiagency law enforcement (suppression)

strategy to reduce gun-related and other violent

crimes by juveniles and older youth (ages 17 to 20).

◆ An intensive intervention program to reduce the

risk factors for the highest risk youth, their families, and the community.

◆ A high-intensity probation and parole program

that targets an identified group of chronic young

violent offenders.

◆ Grassroots community mobilization to address

the problems of hard-to-reach families and the

highest risk youth.

◆ A long-range prevention program that identifies,

links, and strengthens existing resources to serve

youth who may be at risk.

Baton Rouge police arrest data show that the number of juveniles arrested for all crimes dropped more

than 27 percent between 1997 and 1998 and there

was a 21-percent decline in the number arrested for

violent crimes or drug offenses.20

Legislation

Federal and State Legislation

Arrest for the commission of substantive criminal

offenses, defined by Federal or State statute, is the

main mechanism used by law enforcement to prosecute youth and adult gangs (Bureau of Justice

Assistance, 1997b). Innovative penalty enhancement

provisions that complement substantive criminal code

provisions have been developed for use against gang

members. They provide enhanced punishment for

crimes that are often gang related, although they are

not limited in application to gang members. These

laws not only enhance penalties against principals

charged with offenses such as drug trafficking, homicide, assault with a weapon, robbery, home invasion,

arson, extortion, and auto theft, but also against accomplices charged with such offenses as conspiracy to

commit a crime and aiding and abetting overt criminal acts (Bureau of Justice Assistance, 1997b).

The Racketeer Influenced and Corrupt Organizations (RICO) Act (18 U.S.C. 1961 et seq.) “has

emerged as one of law enforcement’s most effective

tools for combating organized criminal activity”

(Johnson, Webster, and Connors, 1995:7). Used most

often as a Federal prosecutorial weapon against highranking criminal group members, RICO has been used

against youth and adult gang members by 17 percent of local prosecutors in large counties and less

than 10 percent of prosecutors in small counties.

The Institute for Law and Justice (ILJ) survey of

local prosecutors’ approaches to youth and adult

gang prosecution revealed that “traditional criminal

law can reach most gang crime. Existing laws in most

jurisdictions also may allow more options for prosecution than statutes specifically aimed at gang members and crimes” (Johnson, Webster, and Connors,

1995:7). In 14 States, prosecutors reported charging

street gangs with violations of new, specialized gang

offenses. Prosecutors in the other 36 States indicated that they had filed charges against street gangs

under existing substantive provisions of their criminal codes. However, some common gang offenses,

such as defacing property with graffiti, are often not

addressed by State criminal codes, but rather by

municipal ordinances.

20 Yvonne L. Day, Baton Rouge Partnership for the Prevention of Juvenile Gun Violence, personal communication,

October 15, 1999.
41

Some jurisdictions charge youth and adult gang

leaders involved in criminal enterprises (e.g., crack

cocaine networks) with aiding and abetting (Bureau

of Justice Assistance, 1997b). Thus, a gang leader

convicted of aiding and abetting may be punished

as a principal in the criminal enterprise. Similarly,

when gang members participate in the preliminary

stages of a crime (e.g., riding in a car to the crime

scene), but do not actually participate in the crime

itself, they increase the likelihood of being convicted

of aiding and abetting.

The ILJ survey (Johnson, Webster, and Connors,

1995), as discussed earlier, found that 14 States have

recently enacted new code provisions addressing

youth and adult gangs. California, Florida, Georgia,

Illinois, Louisiana, and Nevada have enhanced penalties for crimes carried out in participation with or

at the direction of gangs. The California Street Terrorism, Enforcement, and Prevention (STEP) Act of

1988 (California Penal Code § 186.22) has served as

a model emulated by Florida, Georgia, Illinois, Louisiana, and other jurisdictions. A unique notification

process is used to inform persons that they can be

prosecuted under STEP (Klein, 1995a). Police and/

or prosecutors gather evidence that a targeted gang

fits the STEP Act’s definition. This information is

presented to the court, resulting in a judicial order.

Gang members are then notified in writing that they

are known members of such a group. Following

such notice, the Act can then be applied to these

members, enhancing penalties for subsequent offenses because of the commission of crimes while

involved in a gang. Some law enforcement sources

indicate that these provisions may be partly responsible for the recent trend of gang members concealing their membership status, thus making it more

difficult to identify or “certify” their status for purposes of these provisions.

Although suppression has been a predominant theme

in new gang legislation over the past few years, a

number of States have enacted new youth gang prevention measures (Hunzeker, 1993; see also Johnson,

Webster, and Connors, 1995). For example, the State

of Washington enacted a Youth Gang Reduction Act

in 1991 that seeks to prevent elementary and secondary students from joining gangs.

Hawaii has created a new program that combines

suppression and prevention strategies. Hardcore

gang criminals are prosecuted, whereas the growth

of gangs is addressed through prevention and education efforts focused on younger juveniles. The results of a process evaluation of Hawaii’s Youth Gang

Response System have been consistently positive

(Chesney-Lind et al., 1992, 1995a, 1995b, 1999).

City Ordinances and Court Injunctions

Cities have enacted a number of measures that restrict or prohibit youth and adult gang activities, such

as banning gang member use of public parks that

have been gang confrontation sites and prohibiting

cruising and numerous forms of belligerent public

behavior (National Crime Prevention Council, 1996;

Pyle, 1995). Other cities have attempted to discourage

gang membership by prohibiting behavior that manifests gang membership, including wearing gang colors,

flashing gang signs, and communicating gang membership or insults to other gangs. Housing authorities are

authorized by HUD to evict gang members caught

possessing or using guns (National Crime Prevention

Council, 1996). In one case, the Chicago Housing

Authority (CHA), in conjunction with the Chicago

Police Department, implemented a program called

Operation Clean Sweep (OCS) that gained temporary

control of numerous buildings (Bureau of Justice Assistance, 1997b). The facilities were then secured by

CHA. In the next phase, property management was

improved and, following an assessment, social services

were provided to residents who needed them. HUD is

studying the benefits of the OCS approach.

Unlike nuisance abatement laws under which local

jurisdictions seek court injunctions against continuing nuisances on behalf of the public, private nuisance actions are initiated by the aggrieved party to

obtain specific individual relief from gang activities

(Bureau of Justice Assistance, 1998). Some cities

have expanded their use of nuisance abatement

laws to restrict youth and adult gang member activities (Bureau of Justice Assistance, 1997b; Los

Angeles City Attorney Gang Prosecution Section,

1995). If property is involved, nuisance abatement

relief ranges from stopping gangs from using
42

particular properties in criminal activity to providing for forfeiture of property used in criminal activity. For example, a Colorado law permits forfeiture

of cars used in drive-by shootings (Bureau of Justice Assistance, 1997b). Civil remedies also have

been used to deal with gang and drug situations.21

In 1992, Chicago, IL, officials adopted the Gang

Congregation Ordinance, an antiloitering law targeted at street gangs. It reads in part: “Whenever a

police officer observes a person whom he reasonably

believes to be a criminal street gang member loitering in any public place with one or more other persons, he shall order all such persons to disperse and

remove themselves from the area. Any person who

does not promptly obey such an order is in violation

of this order.” 22

In 1993, Jesus Morales and other individuals were

charged with violating the Chicago ordinance. They

petitioned Cook County Circuit Court to dismiss the

charges, arguing that the Gang Congregation Ordinance is unconstitutional and violates their rights

under the 1st, 4th, and 14th amendments of the U.S.

Constitution. The circuit court granted their motion

and dismissed the charges. The city appealed. An

Illinois appellate court upheld the circuit court ruling

and the State Supreme Court affirmed, saying that

the Gang Congregation Ordinance was vague, discriminatory, and a violation of the right to free assembly. In 1998, the City of Chicago appealed to the U.S.

Supreme Court, which affirmed the original ruling23

that found the ordinance to be unconstitutional. This

decision has caused other jurisdictions with similar

laws to reconsider. In one Chicago suburb, the city

has instead adopted an ordinance that allows police

to confiscate the vehicles of persons in violation of a

city-imposed curfew. This ordinance may also face

judicial scrutiny.

Also in 1993, the Los Angeles County District Attorney sought (and was granted) an injunction to ban

the Blythe Street Gang from congregating in public areas (American Civil Liberties Union, 1997;

Hoffman and Silverstein, 1995). The district attorney

asserted that this Hispanic gang, some 500 strong,

had virtually transformed a quiet San Fernando Valley neighborhood into an occupied zone. Innocent

residents were said to be held captive in their own

apartments. Since 1993, about a dozen California

cities have requested or received similar court injunctions. In 1997, the California Supreme Court upheld

this gang suppression tactic. However, an evaluation

by the American Civil Liberties Union of the impact

of the Blythe Street Gang injunction questioned its

effectiveness, finding that violent crime and drug

trafficking actually increased following the injunction

(American Civil Liberties Union, 1997).

Juvenile curfew. Curfew ordinances also are being

used to thwart gang activity. Long Beach, CA, officials established a 10 p.m. to 6 a.m. curfew ordinance directed at gang members. Although city

officials acknowledge the possible displacement of

offenses outside the curfew period, a significant reduction in gang-related crimes during the curfew

period has been observed (Pratcher, 1994).

Even though curfew laws are not new, they have

come to be seen as an ideal means of dealing with

youth gangs and violent juvenile crime (Hemmens

and Bennett, 1999). One review found that 59 out

of 77 cities with populations in excess of 200,000

had juvenile curfew ordinances by 1994 (Ruefle and

Reynolds, 1995), and approximately 1,000 local

curfew ordinances have been adopted since 1990

(Shepherd, 1996). Curfew ordinances have been

challenged on constitutional grounds, including the

rights to free assembly; equal protection against

unreasonable stopping and detainment; due process;

privacy, including the right to family autonomy; and

to not be deprived of liberty without due process

(LeBoeuf, 1996). The main objections, however, are

on the grounds that curfews violate the equal protection clause of the fourth amendment “by setting

up a suspect classification based on age, and that

they result in selective enforcement to the detriment

of minority youth” (Ruefle and Reynolds, 1995:349).

To pass constitutional muster, laws that impinge on

fundamental constitutional rights undergo strict

scrutiny. Jurisdictions must (1) demonstrate

21 See Bureau of Justice Assistance (1998), pp. 174–182, for

examples in Berkeley, CA; Joliet, IL; and San Diego, CA.

22 Chicago Municipal Code § 8–4–05 (June 17, 1992).

23 City of Chicago v. Morales, 119 S. Ct. 1849 (1999). The U.S.

Supreme Court said such restrictive laws should spell out what

illegal activity would trigger an arrest.
43

that there is a compelling State interest and (2)

narrowly tailor the means to achieve the law’s objective (LeBoeuf, 1996). The Dallas, TX, curfew

ordinance, described in more detail on page 24, has

been held by the Federal court to satisfy these requirements (see LeBoeuf, 1996:4–5, for further

information). However, this ruling neither guarantees protection from future constitutional legal

challenges to the ordinance as violating provisions

of the U.S. Constitution or State constitutions nor

forecloses challenges based on nonconstitutional

grounds (LeBoeuf, 1996; see also Hemmens and

Bennett, 1999, for a review of State and Federal

cases challenging juvenile curfews).

Hemmens and Bennett (1999) observe that “there

is remarkably little empirical research on the impact of curfews on either juvenile crime or the

overall crime rate; thus, it is unclear how effective

they are at reducing crime.” In the single study that

has examined the effectiveness of curfews on gang

crime, an evaluation of the Dallas curfew law

found that police use of aggressive curfew and truancy enforcement in concert appeared to reduce

violent gang crimes (Fritsch, Caeti, and Taylor,

1999). Some displacement of gang crime into areas

of the city with a smaller law enforcement presence

was observed. Researchers concluded, however,

that this displacement appeared to be minimal.

A Detroit curfew study (Hunt and Weiner, 1977)

showed more significant displacement, finding that

in the afternoon, juvenile crime increased by 13

percent during the study period while dropping by

6 percent during curfew hours. Nevertheless, curfew enforcement may be an effective police suppression strategy, particularly if combined with

truancy enforcement and targeting of specific

gangs in small geographic areas.

Further evaluation of curfew enforcement is needed,

especially taking into account possible displacement

effects. Additional research is also needed on police

targeting of particular gangs in specific localities. This

may well have been a key element in the success of

the Dallas antigang initiative (see page 24), given that

seven of the city’s most violent gangs operated in the

target area. Another issue that must be examined is

whether adults or juveniles are responsible for most

violent gang-related crime. The Dallas study did not

examine the extent of the overall drop in reported

violent gang-related crime among juveniles versus

young adults. The 1996 National Youth Gang Survey

revealed that young adult gang members (age 18 and

older) are relatively more prevalent in jurisdictions

that report higher degrees of gang member involvement in violent crimes (aggravated assault and robbery) (National Youth Gang Center, 1999; see also

Wiebe, Meeker, and Vila, in press).
45

In 1988, with OJJDP support, Spergel and his

colleagues conducted a nationwide assessment of

youth gang prevention, intervention, and suppression programs (Spergel, 1995; Spergel and Curry,

1993; Spergel, Curry, et al., 1994). The assessment

included a survey of 254 respondents in 45 communities and 6 special program sites regarding strategies they employed and their perception of which

were the most effective. All surveyed sites had youth

gang problems and organized responses to those

problems. Responses were categorized into the major program types that Spergel (1991) identified in

a literature review of gang programs: community

organization, social intervention, provision of opportunities, and suppression. The survey team added a

fifth response category: organizational change and

development.

Suppression was the most frequently employed strategy (44 percent), followed by social intervention

(31 percent), organizational change and development

(11 percent), community organization (9 percent),

and provision of opportunities (5 percent). Survey

respondents believed different approaches were effective in chronic (longstanding) versus emerging (more

recent) gang problem cities (Spergel and Curry, 1990,

1993). Provision of social opportunities24 was perceived to be more effective in sites with chronic gang

problems. Community organization (mobilization)25

was believed to be an effective strategy, but only

when social opportunities were also provided. In

contrast, respondents in cities with emerging gang

problems saw community organization (mobilization)

as the most effective strategy. Overall, respondents

were not confident that their antigang efforts were

particularly effective in reducing gang problems.

Only 23 percent of the police and 10 percent of all

other respondents believed their community’s gang

situation improved between 1980 and 1987. By 1998,

the National Youth Gang Survey revealed a more

optimistic view among law enforcement agencies

(see figure 2).

Assessments of gang programs by law enforcement

agencies show that suppression programs remain

very popular, but that other approaches are gaining

acceptance. In the course of a national gang migration study (Maxson, Woods, and Klein, 1995), respondents in about one-fourth of the 211 cities

Assessment of Youth Gang Programs

24 This includes job preparation, training, placement, and development and assistance with school problems, tutoring, and

education of youth gang members.

25 This includes involvement of local citizens, including former

gang youth and current gang influentials, community groups,

and agencies and coordination of programs and staff functions

across agencies.

Figure 2. Law Enforcement Agencies’

Perception of Youth Gang

Problems, 1998

Source: Moore and Cook, 1999.

Staying About

the Same

42%

Getting Worse

28%

Getting Better

30%
46

surveyed were asked to assess the use and effectiveness of several gang policies and practices in reducing the volume or negative impact of gang migrants

on their cities (see table 3). Most respondents said

coordination with Federal, State, and local law enforcement agencies was relatively common, but few

law enforcement officers viewed this as effective in

reducing gang migration or illegal activities. Threefourths of the surveyed departments targeted violations of selected laws (e.g., narcotics laws), but only

42 percent of them viewed this strategy as effective.

Enforcement of specific gang laws (e.g., the Street

Terrorism Enforcement Act) was not viewed as a

particularly effective response. About 40 percent of

the surveyed law enforcement agencies used gang

sweeps and other suppression strategies (44 percent),

which were said to be effective by a majority of officers. Almost two-thirds of the surveyed cities employed community collaboration strategies, and more

than half (54 percent) believed these to be effective.

In sum, the strategies perceived to be effective by a

majority of law enforcement respondents were community collaboration (information exchange or gang

awareness education) (54 percent), crime prevention

activities (56 percent), and street sweeps (62 percent)

or other suppression tactics (63 percent).

In addition to conducting a survey, Spergel and colleagues reviewed gang research on a variety of topics, including definitions, the nature and causes of

the gang phenomenon, and the effectiveness of program strategies used by various agencies and organizations in communities. Although conclusive

evaluations of these strategies are still needed, the

following common elements appear to be associated

with a sustained reduction of gang problems:

◆ Community leaders recognize the presence of

gangs and seek to understand the nature and extent of the local gang problem through a comprehensive and systematic assessment of the gang

problem.

◆ The combined leadership of the justice system

and the community focuses on the mobilization of

institutional and community resources to address

gang problems.

Table 3. Law Enforcement Strategies and Perceived Effectiveness*

Strategy Used Judged Effective (if used)

Some or a lot of use

Targeting entry points 14% 17%

Gang laws 40 19

Selected violations 76 42

Out-of-State information exchange 53 16

In-State information exchange 90 17

In-city information exchange 55 18

Federal agency operational coordination 40 16

State agency operational coordination 50 13

Local agency operational coordination 78 16

Community collaboration 64 54

Any use

Street sweeps 40% 62%

Other suppression tactics 44 63

Crime prevention activities 15 56

* Percentage of cities, n=211. The number of cities responding to each question varied slightly.

Source: Maxson, Woods, and Klein, 1995.
47

◆ Those in principal roles develop a consensus—

based on problem assessment rather than

assumptions—on definitions (e.g., gang, gang

incident), specific targets of agency and interagency efforts, and interrelated strategies. Prevention and intervention efforts are focused on

the population and/or community areas in which

youth are at greatest risk for gang membership

and gang violence.

Recent characterizations of gangs and gang members in the National Youth Gang Survey and other

studies (Howell, 2000) suggest that jurisdictions

need to assess very carefully their particular youth

gang problem. Different data sources on gangs

and gang members may produce a different view of

the same gang phenomenon.

Unfortunately, the link between self-reported gang

involvement (using student surveys) and gang membership indicated in police arrest data has not been

clear. Curry (in press) analyzed this link. He used

self-report survey measures of gang involvement

for a population of at-risk Chicago youth in sixth

through eighth grades and delinquency and police

records (covering a 5-year period) to examine the

relationship between self-report survey measures in

early adolescence and subsequent police-recorded

delinquency and gang involvement. Almost twothirds (62 percent) of the sixth through eighth graders self-reported some level of gang involvement.

Among self-reported gang-involved youth, 51 percent were identified by the police as offenders in at

least one delinquent incident, and 20 percent were

identified by police as gang-related offenders.

Among self-identified gang-involved youth who also

were self-identified delinquents, 51 percent were

identified as offenders by police in at least one delinquent incident, and 27 percent were identified by

police as gang-related offenders. Conversely, of the

94 police-identified gang offenders, 56 percent were

self-identified as gang involved and delinquent in the

middle school survey. Thus, the gang problem as it

existed among the 429 Chicago middle-schoolers

was continuous over time. Remarkably, the 189 official delinquent offenders (i.e., those who were arrested for their offenses) (41 percent of the total)

accounted for 72 percent of the total offenses among

the 429 youth. More than half (56 percent) of these

offenders were identified by police as gang members, and they represented 22 percent of those who

self-reported gang involvement.

Curry produced sound evidence that survey research

and analysis of official records can be used to examine

different parts of a comprehensive community gang

problem that may indeed merit comprehensive

communitywide response strategies. He concluded

that although survey responses and official data

sources do not perfectly coincide, together they can

enhance researchers’ understanding of gang activity.

He strongly suggests that gangs and gang members

profiled in student surveys do not represent a gang

problem separate from the one indicated by law enforcement data. Indeed, cumulative arrest data would

tend to profile mainly older, multiple-year gang members (see Battin-Pearson et al., 1999). These findings

support the potential effectiveness of comprehensive

community responses to gang crime problems that

link prevention, intervention, and suppression strategies. Prevention programs could target at-risk youth

(using self-reports), early intervention programs

could target youth in the early stages of gang involvement (using self-reports and official records), and

suppression strategies could target serious, violent,

and chronic offenders who are gang-involved (using

official records).

Any approach must be guided by concern not only

for safeguarding the community against gang crime,

but for providing support and supervision to present

and potential gang members in a way that contributes to their prosocial development (Spergel, Curry

et al., 1994; see also Burch and Chemers, 1997).
49

Youth gang members have long been stereotyped as

young, inner-city, lower-class, ghetto or barrio, minority, sociopathic males (Klein, 1995a; Spergel,

1995). Traditionally, gangs have been viewed as racially and ethnically segregated, somewhat organized,

and authoritatively controlled fighting groups (Miller,

1992). The predominant popular stereotype of youth

gangs was modified significantly by the findings of a

California study (Skolnick et al., 1988) more than a

decade ago (see Klein, 1995a). These researchers

contended that the two major Los Angeles gangs, the

Crips and Bloods, had become highly organized and

entrepreneurial and were expanding their drug trafficking operations to markets in other cities. Where

drug markets appeared, so did violent crime. The

typical gang member came to be viewed as a violent

“superpredator” who repeatedly engaged in random

violence and could not be reformed (DiIulio, 1996).

The distinguishing features of youth gangs and their

members are still characterized mainly by popular

media images based on traditional stereotypes and

by public perceptions of the modern-day gangs conveyed in the California study, rather than by scientific knowledge. Indeed, some jurisdictions may be

adapting a view of well-publicized Los Angeles gang

problems to their own jurisdictions, which may not

apply (Miethe and McCorkle, 1997a). Moreover,

recent studies challenge the stereotypes of gangs and

gang members (see especially, Best and Hutchinson,

1996; Decker, Bynum, and Weisel, 1998; Fleisher,

1995, 1998; Miethe and McCorkle, 1997b).

Gangs typically are not highly organized, at least not

those in cities with emerging gang problems. Decker

and colleagues (1998) compared the two gangs that

police in Chicago, IL, and San Diego, CA, reported

were most highly organized. They found that the

Chicago gangs were far more organized than the

San Diego gangs, but that “levels of organization are

not necessarily linked to increased involvement in

crime” (Decker, Bynum, and Weisel, 1998:408).

Decker and colleagues’ observation that the San

Diego gangs were disorganized mirrored Sanders’

(1994) deduction. The same conclusion was reached

by others who studied gangs in emerging gang cities

such as Denver, CO, and Cleveland and Columbus,

OH (Huff, 1996, 1998); Kansas City, MO (Fleisher,

1998); Milwaukee, WI (Hagedorn, 1988); Pittsburgh, PA (Klein, 1995a); San Francisco, CA

(Waldorf, 1993); Seattle, WA (Fleisher, 1995); and

St. Louis, MO (Decker and Van Winkle, 1996). A

new study also questions the territorial scope of

large gangs in one of the most chronic gang cities.

Even the largest gangs in Chicago are criminally

active in a very small percentage of the city’s geographical area (Block and Jones, 1999).

Other studies, particularly in emerging gang areas,

have produced findings to counter the traditional

stereotypes of youth gangs (Howell, 2000):

◆ The gangs, drugs, and violence connection appears to apply more to adult drug and criminal

gangs than to youth gangs.

◆ The seemingly intractable connection of gangs,

drugs, and violence is not as strong among youth

gangs as suggested by traditional stereotypes.

◆ Relatively more young adult males than juveniles

appear to be involved in the most criminal youth

gangs, and they appear to be disproportionately

involved in serious and violent crimes.

◆ It is not as difficult for adolescents to resist gang

pressures as commonly believed. In most instances, adolescents can refuse to join gangs without reprisal.

Stereotypes Versus Modern Youth Gangs
50

◆ Gang members (especially marginal members)

typically can leave the gang without serious

consequences.

◆ At least in emerging gang areas, most adolescents

do not remain in gangs for long periods of time,

suggesting that members can be drawn away

from gangs with attractive alternatives.

◆ Contemporary legends about gangs, especially

initiation rites,26 are without scientific basis.

◆ Modern gangs make less use of symbols, including

gang names, clothing, and traditional initiation rites,

than gangs of the past, and the meaning of their

graffiti is sometimes murky or unclear (e.g., youth

may use a mixture of different gang symbols).

◆ Modern youth gangs are based less on territory

than gangs of the past.

◆ Drug franchising is not the principal driving

force behind gang migration. The most common

reasons to migrate (movement of members from

one city to another) are social considerations,

including family moves to improve the quality

of life and to be near relatives and friends.

◆ More adolescents were members of gangs in the

1990’s than in the past.

◆ More gangs are in suburban areas, small towns,

and rural areas than in the past (see tables 4 and 5

and figure 3).

◆ There is more gang presence in schools than in

the 1980’s.

◆ There is more gang presence in detention and

correctional facilities than in the past.

◆ Prison gangs have grown over the past two

decades.

Members of modern gangs, especially in emerging

gang areas, also have different characteristics than

members in stereotypical gangs (Howell, 2000):

◆ Many members of modern adolescent gangs

are “good kids” from respectable families with

college-educated parents.

◆ White gang members are more prevalent in adolescent gangs than in the past (see figure 4).

◆ Females are more prevalent in adolescent gangs

than previously reported.

◆ Gangs in suburban, small town, and rural areas

have different characteristics than gangs in large

cities. They include more females, Caucasians,

and younger youth, and more have mixed

membership.

◆ About one-third of all youth gangs have a significant mixture of racial and ethnic groups (see

figure 4 for a breakdown of the race/ethnicity of

gang members).

Table 4. Average Year of Gang Problem

Onset, by Area Type

Average Year

Area Type of Onset

Large city 1989

Suburban county 1990

Small city 1992

Rural county 1993

Source: National Youth Gang Center, 1999.

Table 5. Average Year of Gang Problem

Onset, by Region

Average Year

Region of Onset

West 1986

Midwest 1990

Northeast 1991

South 1991

Source: National Youth Gang Center, 1999. 26 Debunked initiation rites include “the slasher under the car”

(gang initiates hide under cars waiting to attack their victims)

and “flicked headlights” (initiates drive at night without their

headlights on; the first passing vehicle to flash its headlights

becomes the target).
51

15–17 Years

29%

18–24 Years

46%

Under 15 Years

11%

Over 24 Years

14%

Figure 4. Race/Ethnicity of Gang Members

(Weighted for Number of Gang

Members), 1998

Source: Moore and Cook, 1999.

Despite these changes, youth gangs remain dangerous. Their members often engage in violence and

frequently carry weapons. In an 11-city survey of

eighth grade gang members, more than 90 percent

of males and females had engaged in violent behavior (Deschenes and Esbensen, 1999). According to

the 1998 National Youth Gang Survey, 49 percent

of all respondents said that gang members used

firearms in assault crimes either often or sometimes

(Moore and Cook, 1999). Only 15 percent of all

respondents said firearms were not used at all.

Youth gangs also are beginning to age. In 1996, law

enforcement agencies estimated that approximately

half of their gang members were juveniles (under

age 18) and half were young adults (18 and older)

(National Youth Gang Center, 1999). In 1998, approximately 60 percent of the gang members were

estimated to be young adults and only 40 percent

were juveniles (Moore and Cook, 1999) (see figure

5). Should this trend continue, youth gangs could

become more violent because it appears that adult

gang members engage in more serious and violent

crimes than juvenile gang members (Howell and

Gleason, 1999; National Youth Gang Center, in

press; Parsons and Meeker, 1999; Wiebe, Meeker,

and Vila, in press).

African American

34%

Caucasian

12%

Hispanic/

Latino

46%

Asian 6% Other 2%

Figure 5. Age of Gang Members

(Weighted for Number of

Gang Members), 1998

Source: Moore and Cook, 1999.

Figure 3. Percentage of Jurisdictions

Reporting Active Youth Gangs

in 1998, by Area Type

Source: Moore and Cook, 1999.

Large

Cities

Small

Cities

Suburban

Counties

Rural

Counties

0

10

20

30

40

50

60

70

80

Percent
53

The literature and programs reviewed for this Summary (including sources in table 1, pages 3–4) suggest the following principles for effective youth gang

programs and strategies:

◆ Both denial of gang problems and overreaction to

them are detrimental to the development of effective community responses to gangs. Denial that

gang problems exist precludes early intervention

efforts. Overreaction in the form of excessive

police force and publicizing of gangs may inadvertently serve to increase a gang’s cohesion, facilitate its expansion, and lead to more crime.

◆ Community responses to gangs must begin with a

thorough assessment of the specific characteristics of the gangs themselves, crimes they commit,

other problems they present, and localities they

affect. To conduct a thorough assessment, communities should look at community perceptions

and available data. Data from law enforcement

sources such as local gang and general crime data

are critical. Other data should be collected from

probation officers, schools, community-based

youth agencies, prosecutors, and community residents. No assumptions about presumed gang

problems or needed responses should be made

before conducting a careful assessment.

◆ Because gang problems vary from one community

to another, police, courts, corrections, and community agencies often need assistance from gang

experts in assessing their gang problem(s) and in

developing appropriate and measured responses.

◆ Law enforcement agents view suppression tactics

(e.g., street sweeps, intensified surveillance,

hotspot targeting, and caravanning), crime prevention activities, and community collaboration—

Recommendations

in that order—as most effective in preventing and

controlling gang crime. Targeting specific gang

crimes, locations, gangs, and gang members appears to be the most effective suppression tactic;

therefore, police increasingly adhere to the mantra: “Investigate the crime; not the culture.”27

◆ Long-term proactive investigations of entire

gangs are more effective than short-term, reactive

investigations of individual gang members. According to Jackson and McBride (1985:28),

“Gang crimes are viewed by specialists as more

dangerous than other crimes because they are not

isolated acts, but links in a chain of events that

must be broken.”

◆ Each city’s gang program should be supported by

a gang information system that provides sound

and current crime incident data that can be linked

to gang members and used to enhance police and

other agency interventions. At a minimum, law

enforcement agencies must ensure that gang

crimes are coded separately from nongang crimes

so that these events can be tracked, studied, and

analyzed to support more efficient and effective

antigang strategies.

◆ The success of the Gang Violence Reduction Program in Chicago’s Little Village neighborhood has

demonstrated the effectiveness of multiagency

coordination and integration among youth services (including street outreach), police, probation, parole, grassroots organizations, and

corrections in controlling and redirecting serious

and violent gang members. Preliminary positive

27 This principle is attributed to Sergeant David Starbuck, Gang

Squad, Kansas City Police Department, Kansas City, MO.

Personal communication, March 31, 2000.
54

results from other multiagency programs provide

further encouragement that serious and violent

youth gang crime can be controlled, if not reduced. Narrower strategies, such as combining

police and probation surveillance, have also

shown some promise but have not yet been evaluated rigorously.

◆ Systematic assessment of gang problems in the

juvenile and criminal justice systems is needed,

including the connections between prison gangs

and youth gangs. Nearly 9 in 10 juvenile detention

facilities have gang members among their residents

(Howell et al., in press), yet few detention centers

and juvenile correctional facilities screen admissions for gang involvement. The same can be said

for the criminal justice system, with the exception

of scant knowledge of prison gangs. Better screening and risk classification of offenders for gang

involvement in juvenile and adult correctional facilities is imperative. This would help protect the

public by giving correctional staff reliable information to classify gang offenders at the appropriate

level of risk and to match juvenile offenders with

gang treatment programs available in correctional

facilities. Effective programs are needed in these

facilities to prevent gang formation, membership,

and victimization and to break up drug operations

inside prisons.

◆ Programs are needed to break the cycle of gang

members moving from communities to detention

to corrections and prisons and back into communities (Howell and Decker, 1999). Ex-convicts

need marketable job skills and gainful employment opportunities to avoid the lucrative drug

market. Breaking this cycle becomes all the more

important as States are imprisoning younger and

younger offenders who now are returning to the

streets at a younger age than in the past. Making

effective drug treatment programs available,

along with legitimate job opportunities, would

also help break the cycle.

◆ Jurisdictions can control and reduce gang problems by targeting serious, violent, and chronic

juvenile offenders who may not necessarily be

known gang members. In jurisdictions that have

gang problems, these offenders are very likely to

be involved in them. Most gang members are

known to the justice system and local social service agencies at some point in their gang careers.

More effective intervention is needed, using risk

and needs assessment technology, to better protect the public and improve rehabilitation efforts.

◆ Police should not be expected to assume sole

responsibility for youth gang problems. Broadbased community collaboration is essential for

long-term success. Communities that begin with

suppression as their main response generally

discover later that cooperation and collaboration

between public and private community agencies

and citizens are necessary for an effective solution. Considerable advantage accrues from involving the entire community from the outset,

beginning with a comprehensive and systematic

assessment of the presumed youth gang problem. Key community leaders must mobilize the

resources of the entire community, guided by a

consensus on definitions, program targets, and

interrelated strategies. Comprehensive programs

that incorporate prevention, intervention, and

enforcement components are most likely to be

effective.

◆ Preventing children and adolescents from joining

gangs may be the most cost-effective solution, but

little is known about how to do this. Providing

alternatives for potential or current gang members appears to hold promise, particularly if gang

conflicts are mediated at the same time. An

antigang curriculum, especially if combined with

afterschool or antibullying programs, may be

effective. Because predictors for joining a gang

and remaining in a gang span multiple domains—

individual problems, family variables, school

problems, peer group associations, and community conditions—programs that address multiple

components appear to be the most effective.
55

Conclusion

Despite recent progress in preventing involvement in

gangs during childhood and adolescence and in reducing serious and violent gang crime, the complexity

of the youth gang problem defies an easy solution or

single strategy. Current knowledge about which programs are effective in preventing and reducing youth

gang problems is limited. The most effective program

model will likely prove to be a combination of prevention, intervention, and suppression strategies integrated in a collaborative approach, supported by a

management information system, and validated by

rigorous evaluation. Communities across the country

are undertaking collaborative efforts to deal with

youth gangs, but few of these programs and strategies

are being evaluated. State and local governments

must undertake systematic examination of their youth

gang programs and strategies. The knowledge gained

about what is effective and what is not will benefit not

only their own communities, but also communities

across the Nation.
57

American Civil Liberties Union. 1997. False Premise/

False Promise: The Blythe Street Gang Injunction.

Los Angeles, CA: ACLU Foundation of Southern

California.

Aos, S., Phipps, P., Barnoski, R., and Lieb, R. 1999.

The Comparative Costs and Benefits of Programs To

Reduce Crime: A Review of National Research Findings

With Implications for Washington State. Olympia, WA:

Washington State Institute for Public Policy.

Arnette, J.L., and Walsleben, M.C. 1998. Combating

Fear and Restoring Safety in Schools. Bulletin. Washington, DC: U.S. Department of Justice, Office of Justice Programs, Office of Juvenile Justice and

Delinquency Prevention.

Atkinson, W.A. 1996. Organizing the community

response in Aurora, Colorado. In Gangs in America,

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71

The following is a partial list of programs, strategies,

and organizations for which contact information was

confirmed at the time of publication. Those marked

with an asterisk are no longer in operation.

Aggression Replacement Training (ART)

The Department of Services for Children, Youth

 and Their Families

1825 Faulkland Road

Wilmington, DE 19805–1195

302–633–2500

thearn@state.de.us

Anti-Gang Office and Task Force, Houston, TX

Mayor’s Office

P.O. Box 1562

Houston, TX 77251–1562

713–247–2200

The Beethoven Project

Mike Burke

The Ounce of Prevention Fund

122 South Michigan Avenue, Suite 2050

Chicago, IL 60603

312–922–3863

Big Brothers/Big Sisters of America

Bertha Griffin

Big Brothers/Big Sisters of America

 National Headquarters

230 North 13th Street

Philadelphia, PA 19107

215–567–7000

Bloomington/Normal Comprehensive CommunityWide Approach to Gang Prevention, Intervention,

and Suppression*

Patrick Morland, Executive Director

702 South Morris

Bloomington, IL 60701

309–827–8282

Blythe Street Gang Injunction*

American Civil Liberties Union of

 Southern California

1616 Beverly Boulevard

Los Angeles, CA 90026

213–977–9500

Boston Gun Project

Dorchester District Court

510 Washington Street

Dorchester, MA 02124

617–288–9500

Boys & Girls Clubs of America

National Headquarters

1230 West Peachtree Street NW.

Atlanta, GA 30309

404–815–5700

lmclemore@bgca.org

Broader Urban Involvement and Leadership

Development (BUILD)

David Yancy

1223 North Milwaukee Avenue

Chicago, IL 60622

312–227–2880

build@surfnetcorp.net

Directory of Programs, Strategies, and

Organizations
72

Cease Fire

Sergeant Robert Heimberger

St. Louis Metropolitan Police Department

1200 Clark Boulevard

St. Louis, MO 63103

314–444–5681

Chicago Area Project (CAP)

David Whitaker

200 South Michigan Avenue, Suite 1400

Chicago, IL 60604

312–663–3574

Child Development-Community Policing (CD–CP)

Colleen Valdala, Administrative Assistant

Yale Child Study Center

47 College Street, Suite 212

New Haven, CT 06510

203–785–7047

Comin’ Up

Angela Ware, Director

Crime Prevention Resource Center

Boys & Girls Club

605 East Berry Street

Fort Worth, TX 76110

817–923–5472

Collaborative Intensive Community Treatment

Program

Perseus House

1946 West 26th Street

Erie, PA 16508

814–453–7909

perseus@erie.net

Communities In Schools (CIS)

277 South Washington Street, Suite 210

Alexandria, VA 22314–1436

703–519–8999

cis@cisnet.org

Community Action Team (CAT)

Reno (NV) Police Department

455 East Second Street

Reno, NV 89101

775–334–2108

The Community Outreach Program

St. Paul (MN) Police Department

100 East 11th Street

St. Paul, MN 55101

651–291–1111

Community Resources Against Street Hoodlums

(CRASH)*

Career Criminal Apprehension Section

Los Angeles (CA) Police Department

150 North Los Angeles Street

Los Angeles, CA 90012

213–437–8103

Comprehensive Strategy for Serious, Violent, and

Chronic Juvenile Offenders

Mark Matese

Office of Juvenile Justice and

 Delinquency Prevention

810 Seventh Street NW., Third Floor

Washington, DC 20531

202–616–9870

Consent to Search and Seize

Sergeant Robert Heimberger

St. Louis Metropolitan Police Department

1200 Clark Boulevard

St. Louis, MO 63103

314–444–5681

Early Intervention Program

Orange County Probation Department

909 North Main Street

Santa Ana, CA 92701–3511

714–569–2000

El Puente (“The Bridge”)

Ingrid Mateas

211 South 4th Street

Brooklyn, NY 11211

718–387–0404

Empowerment Zones

Community Connections

P.O. Box 7189

Gaithersburg, MD 20898–7189

800–998–9999

800–483–2209 (TDD)

301–519–5027 (fax)

comcon@aspsensys.com
73

Enterprise Communities

Community Connections

P.O. Box 7189

Gaithersburg, MD 20898–7189

800–998–9999

800–483–2209 (TDD)

301–519–5027 (fax)

comcon@aspsensys.com

Firearm Suppression Program (FSP)

Sergeant Robert Heimberger

St. Louis Metropolitan Police Department

1200 Clark Boulevard

St. Louis, MO 63103

314–444–5681

Gang Awareness Necessary for Growth in Society

(GANGS)

California Youth Authority

4241 Williamsbourgh Drive

Sacramento, CA 95823

916–262–1480

Gang Incident Tracking System (GITS)

James Meeker

Criminology, Law and Society

University of California, Irvine

Irvine, CA 92697

949–824–7306

Gang Peace/First

Rodney Dailey

Gang Peace, Inc.

318 Blue Hill Avenue

Roxbury, MA 02121

617–989–1285

Gang Prevention and Intervention Program

Youth Development, Inc.

6301 Central NW.

Albuquerque, NM 87105

505–831–6038

Gang Prevention Through Targeted Outreach,

Boys & Girls Clubs of America

Frank Sanchez, Jr.

Senior Director of Delinquency Prevention

Boys & Girls Clubs of America

1230 West Peachtree Street NW.

Atlanta, GA 30309

404–487–5907

Gang Rehabilitation, Assessment, and Services

Program (GRAASP)*

San Antonio Police Department

214 West Nueva Street

San Antonio, TX 78207

210–207–7615

Gang Resistance Education and Training Program

(G.R.E.A.T.)

Bureau of Alcohol, Tobacco and Firearms

650 Massachusetts Avenue NW.

Washington, DC 20226

800–726–7070

202–927–2160

Gang Resistance Is Paramount (G.R.I.P.)

Tony Ostos

Neighborhood Counseling Manager, G.R.I.P.

16400 Colorado Avenue

Paramount, CA 90723–5050

562–220–2120

Gang Victim Services Program

Lamoreaux Justice Center

341 The City Drive

Orange, CA 92866

714–935–7492

Golden Eagles

Julie Green

Minneapolis American Indian Center

1530 East Franklin Avenue

Minneapolis, MN 55404

612–879–1708

Gulf Coast Trades Center

Oscar Gonzales, Admissions Administrator

Gulf Coast Trades Center

P.O. Box 515

New Waverly, TX 77358

409–344–6677

High/Scope Perry Preschool Project

Lawrence Schweinhart, Ph.D.

600 North River Street

Ypsilanti, MI 48198

734–485–2000
74

Homeboy Industries

Greg Boyle

1848 East First Street

Los Angeles, CA 90033

323–526–1254

House of Umoja

Sister Falaka Fattah

1410 North Frazer Street

Philadelphia, PA 19131

215–473–5893

Information Collection for Automated Mapping

(ICAM)

Chicago Police Department Research and

 Development Division

3510 South Michigan

Chicago, IL 60653

312–747–6204

Inner-City Games (ICG)

Harley Frankel

National Office

1460 4th Street, Suite 300

Santa Monica, CA 90401

310–458–4411

Jobs for a Future

Greg Boyle

1848 East First Street

Los Angeles, CA 90033

323–526–1254

Jurisdictions Unified for Drug Gang

Enforcement (JUDGE)

Robert Amador, Deputy District Attorney

2901 Meadow Lark Drive

San Diego, CA 92123

858–694–4790

Lifeskills ’95

P.O. Box 9490

San Bernardino, CA 92427

909–880–2577

Little Village Gang Violence Reduction Program*

Tracy Hahn

Illinois Criminal Justice Information Authority

120 South Riverside Plaza, Suite 1016

Chicago, IL 60606–3997

312–793–8647

thahn@icjia.state.il.us

Mesa Gang Intervention Project (MGIP)

Kimo Souza

540 West Broadway Road, Suite 108

Mesa, AZ 85210

480–644–4370

Minnesota HEALS (Hope, Education, and Law

and Safety)

Pat Hoven

1621 West 25th Street

Minneapolis, MN 55405

612–374–2589

phovey@earthlink.net

Mobile Enforcement Team (MET)

Drug Enforcement Administration

Information Services Section

700 Army Navy Drive

Arlington, VA 22202

202–307–7977

Neighborhood Watch

P.O. Box 4208

Santa Fe Springs, CA 90670

888–669–4872

The Neutral Zone

5409 228th Street SW.

Mountlake Terrace, WA 98043

425–670–2875

Norfolk Police Assisted Community Enforcement

PACE

Marty Raiss

501 Boush Street

Norfolk, VA 23510

757–441–2400
75

Nuestro Centro*

Texas Youth Commission

4900 North Lamar Boulevard

Austin, TX 78751

Post Office Box 4260

Austin, TX 78765

512–424–6130

Operation Ceasefire

Jim Jordan, Director

Office of Strategic Planning and

 Resource Development

Boston Police Department

1 Schroeder Plaza

Boston, MA 02120

617–343–4507

Operation Hardcore

Hardcore Gang Division

210 West Temple Street, Room 17–1116

Los Angeles, CA 90012

213–974–3903

Operation Night Light

Boston Program

Dorchester District Court

510 Washington Street

Dorchester, MA 02124

617–288–9500

St. Louis Program

Sergeant Robert Heimberger

St. Louis Metropolitan Police Department

1200 Clark Boulevard

St. Louis, MO 63103

314–444–5681

Operation Safe Streets

3010 East Victoria Street

Rancho Dominguez, CA 90221

310–603–3100

Parents and Schools Succeeding in Providing

Organized Routes to Travel (PASSPORT)*

Ralph Lomeli, Safe Schools Coordinator

Visalia Unified School District

315 East Acequia

Visalia, CA 93291

559–730–7579

Partnership for a Safer Cleveland

Michael Walker

614 Superior Avenue West, Suite 1110

Cleveland, OH 44113

216–523–1128

216–523–1823 (fax)

walkerohio@aol.com

Project RAISE

Richard Rowe

Baltimore Mentoring Partnership

605 Eutaw Street

Baltimore, MD 21201

410–685–8316

410–752–5016 (fax)

Project Save-A-Youth

Deborah Moore

Community Services Department

200 South Anaheim Boulevard, Suite 433

Anaheim, CA 92805

714–254–5246

Riverside’s Comprehensive Community-Wide

Approach to Gang Prevention, Intervention,

and Suppression

Riverside (CA) Police Department

4102 Orange Street

Riverside, CA 92501

909–782–5550

Strategies Against Gang Environments (SAGE)*

LA County District Attorney’s Office

Bureau of Crime Prevention

210 West Temple Street, Room 18000

Los Angeles, CA 90012

213–974–3512

Teens on Target (TNT)

3300 Elm Street

Oakland, CA 94609

510–594–2588

510–594–0667 (fax)
76

Tri-Agency Resource Gang Enforcement Team

(TARGET)

Bill Smith

City of Westminster

8200 Westminster Boulevard

Westminster, CA 92683

714–898–3311

Tucson Gang Project*

John Basquez Bedoy

Karen Pugh

OUR Town Family Center

P.O. Box 26665

Tucson, AZ 85726

520–323–1708

520–323–9077 (fax)

Violence-Free Zones

Main and Administrative Office

2908 Madeline Street

Oakland, CA 94602

510–530–1319

510–530–1527 (fax)

Branch Office

P.O. Box 181

Moraga, CA 94556

925–376–3237

925–376–2386 (fax)

Youth Firearms Violence Initiative, Inglewood, CA*

Lieutenant Hampton Cantrell

Inglewood Police Department

1 Manchester Boulevard

Inglewood, CA 90301

310–412–5206

310–412–8798 (fax)

Youth Firearms Violence Initiative, Milwaukee, WI*

Lieutenant James Galezewski

Milwaukee Police Department

749 West State Street

Milwaukee, WI 53233

414–935–7825

Youth Firearms Violence Initiative, Salinas, CA

Sergeant Tracy Molfino

Salinas Police Department

222 Lincoln Avenue

Salinas, CA 93901–2639

831–758–7348

Youth Firearms Violence Initiative, Seattle, WA*

Julie Baker, Grant Coordinator

Community Information and

 Services Bureau

Seattle Police Department

610 Third Avenue

Seattle, WA 98104

206–233–5133

Youth Violence Strike Force, Baltimore, MD

Sergeant William Marcus

Baltimore City Police Department

Violent Crimes Division

601 East Fayette Street, Mezzanine

Baltimore, MD 21202

410–396–2650
77

Academy High School .............................................. 9

Aggression Replacement Training (ART) ......... 4, 20

Alliance for Concerned Men ............................ 18, 19

Antibullying program ....................................... 10–11

Antigang Initiative, Dallas, TX .......................... 4, 24

Anti-Gang Office and Task Force,

Houston, TX ....................................................... 26

Association for the Advancement of

Mexican Americans ............................................ 26

Aurora Gang Task Force........................................ 29

Baton Rouge, LA, Partnership for the

Prevention of Juvenile Gun Violence ......... 39–40

The Beethoven Project ............................................. 7

Big Brothers/Big Sisters of America........................ 9

Bloomington/Normal’s Comprehensive

Community-Wide Approach to Gang

Prevention, Intervention, and

Suppression ................................................... 36–37

Blythe Street Gang injunction ............................... 42

Boston Gun Project .......................................... 30–31

Boys & Girls Clubs of America ............ 12–13, 17, 35

Broader Urban Involvement and Leadership

Development (BUILD) ............................. 3, 9, 13

Cease Fire ......................................................... 22–23

Chicago Area Project (CAP) ............................... 3, 5

Child Development-Community Policing

(CD–CP) ............................................................ 19

City ordinances ................................................. 41–42

Civil remedies ......................................................... 42

Comin’ Up ....................................................... 7, 9, 17

Collaborative Intensive Community Treatment

Program ................................................................ 9

Communities In Schools (CIS) ................................ 9

Community Action Team (CAT) ........................... 28

The Community Outreach Program........................ 7

Community policing ............................................... 28

Community Reclamation Project ............................. 7

Community Resources Against Street Hoodlums

(CRASH) ........................................................... 22

Community-University Model for Gang

Intervention and Delinquency Prevention in

Small Cities ................................................... 28–29

Community Youth Gang Services (CYGS) .......... 16

Comprehensive Community-Wide Approach

to Gang Prevention, Intervention, and

Suppression .................................................. 34–37

Comprehensive Strategy for Serious, Violent, and

Chronic Juvenile Offenders ........................ 38–40

Consent to Search and Seize ............................ 22, 23

Court injunctions .............................................. 41–42

Crisis Intervention Network (CIN) ...................... 16

Index of Programs, Strategies, and

Organizations*

*This index does not include some of the programs in table 1, pages 3–4.
78

Crisis Intervention Services Project .................. 3, 16

Curfew............................................................... 42–43

Early Intervention Program ................................... 39

El Puente (“The Bridge”) ......................................... 9

Empowerment Zones ............................................... 6

Enterprise Communities........................................... 6

Family Educational Rights and Privacy Act ......... 10

Firearm Suppression Program (FSP) ................... 22

Gang Awareness Necessary for

Growth in Society .............................................. 20

Gang Congregation Ordinance, Chicago, IL ........ 42

Gang Education Awareness Resistance ................ 26

Gang Incident Tracking System

(GITS) .................................................... 26–27, 33

Gang Peace/First ...................................................... 9

Gang Prevention and Intervention Program,

Youth Development, Inc. ..................................... 6

Gang Prevention Through Targeted Outreach,

Boys & Girls Clubs of America ....... 12–13, 17, 35

Gang Rehabilitation, Assessment, and Services

Program (GRAASP).......................................... 37

Gang Resistance Education and Training Program

(G.R.E.A.T.) ............................................. 4, 11–12

Gang Resistance Is Paramount (G.R.I.P.) ............ 11

Gang Victim Services Program .............................. 19

Golden Eagles ........................................................... 9

Group Guidance Project .................................... 3, 15

Gulf Coast Trades Center......................................... 9

High Intensity Community Oriented Policing ...... 29

High/Scope Perry Preschool Project ....................... 7

Homeboy Industries ............................................... 17

House of Umoja .............................................. 3, 6, 18

Information Collection for Automated Mapping

(ICAM)............................................................... 26

Inner-City Games (ICG).......................................... 6

Jobs for a Future .................................................... 17

Jurisdictions United for Drug Gang

Enforcement (JUDGE) .................................... 32

Ladino Hills Project ........................................... 3, 16

Lifeskills ’95 ............................................................ 21

Little Village Gang Violence

Reduction Program ................ 4, 16–17, 37–38, 53

Los Angeles Metropolitan Task Force .................. 30

Mesa Gang Intervention Project (MGIP) ............ 35

Midcity Project ................................................... 3, 15

Minneapolis Anti-Violence Initiative ..................... 32

Minnesota HEALS (Hope, Education, and

Law and Safety) ................................................. 32

Mobile Enforcement Team (MET) ....................... 32

Montreal Preventive Treatment Program ........... 4, 7

Neighborhood block watch ...................................... 7

New York City Youth Board ................................. 15

The Neutral Zone ............................................. 4, 7, 9

Norfolk Police Assisted Community

Enforcement ....................................................... 28

Nuestro Centro ......................................................... 7

Operation Clean Sweep (OCS) ............................. 41

Operation Cul de Sac (OCDS) ......................... 4, 23

Operation Hammer ................................................ 22

Operation Hardcore ..................................... 3, 21–22

Operation Night Light ............................... 23, 30–31
79

Operation Safe Streets (OSS) ......................... 23–24

OUR Town Family Center .............................. 35–36

Parents and Schools Succeeding in

Providing Organized Routes to Travel

(PASSPORT) .................................................... 10

Partnership for a Safer Cleveland.................... 19, 29

Project RAISE .......................................................... 9

Project Save-A-Youth............................................... 9

Racketeer Influenced and Corrupt

Organizations (RICO) Act ................................ 40

Rights of Passage .................................................... 24

Risk-focused policing ............................................. 28

Riverside’s Comprehensive Community-Wide

Approach to Gang Prevention, Intervention,

and Suppression ................................................. 36

SARA (scanning, analysis, response,

and assessment) .................................................. 29

Se Puede (“You Can”) ............................................ 11

Strategies Against Gang Environments

(SAGE)......................................................... 24–25

Street Terrorism Enforcement and Prevention

(STEP) Act................................................... 33, 41

Street Terrorism Offender Project (STOP).......... 33

Syracuse University Family Development

Research Project............................................... 7, 9

Teens on Target (TNT) .......................................... 19

Tri-Agency Resource Gang Enforcement

Team (TARGET) ........................................... 4, 33

Tucson Gang Project ........................................ 35–36

Urban Street Gang Program.................................. 31

Violence-Free Zones ......................................... 17–19

Youth Alive! ............................................................ 19

Youth Firearms Violence Initiative,

Inglewood, CA.............................................. 24–25

Youth Firearms Violence Initiative,

Milwaukee, WI................................................... 25

Youth Firearms Violence Initiative,

Salinas, CA ......................................................... 25

Youth Firearms Violence Initiative,

Seattle, WA ......................................................... 25

Youth Violence Strike Force .................................. 22

Youth Works ............................................................. 9
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The following list highlights popular and recently published OJJDP documents and videotapes, grouped by topical areas.

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In addition, the OJJDP Fact Sheet Flier

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Fact Sheets and is available online.

OJJDP also sponsors a teleconference initiative, and a flier (LT116) offers a complete list of

videos available from these broadcasts.

Corrections and Detention

Beyond the Walls: Improving Conditions of

Confinement for Youth in Custody. 1998, 

NCJ 164727 (116 pp.).

Disproportionate Minority Confinement: 1997

Update. 1998, NCJ 170606 (12 pp.).

Disproportionate Minority Confinement:

Lessons Learned From Five States. 1998, 

NCJ 173420 (12 pp.).

Juvenile Arrests 1997. 1999, NCJ 173938 

(12 pp.).

Reintegration, Supervised Release, and Intensive Aftercare. 1999, NCJ 175715 (24 pp.).

Courts

Guide for Implementing the Balanced and Restorative Justice Model. 1998. NCJ 167887

(112 pp.).

Innovative Approaches to Juvenile Indigent

Defense. 1998, NCJ 171151 (8 pp.).

Juvenile Court Statistics 1996. 1999, 

NCJ 168963 (113 pp.).

Offenders in Juvenile Court, 1996. 1999, 

NCJ 175719 (12 pp.).

RESTTA National Directory of Restitution 

and Community Service Programs. 1998, 

NCJ 166365 (500 pp.), $33.50.

Trying Juveniles as Adults in Criminal Court:

An Analysis of State Transfer Provisions. 1998,

NCJ 172836 (112 pp.).

Youth Courts: A National Movement Teleconference (Video). 1998, NCJ 171149 (120 min.), $17.

Delinquency Prevention

1998 Report to Congress: Juvenile Mentoring

Program (JUMP). 1999, NCJ 173424 (65 pp.).

1998 Report to Congress: Title V Incentive

Grants for Local Delinquency Prevention Programs. 1999, NCJ 176342 (58 pp.).

Combating Violence and Delinquency: The

National Juvenile Justice Action Plan (Report).

1996, NCJ 157106 (200 pp.).

Combating Violence and Delinquency: The 

National Juvenile Justice Action Plan

(Summary). 1996, NCJ 157105 (36 pp.).

Effective Family Strengthening Interventions.

1998, NCJ 171121 (16 pp.).

Juvenile Accountability Incentive Block Grants

Strategic Planning Guide. 1999, NCJ 172846

(62 pp.).

Parents Anonymous: Strengthening America’s

Families. 1999, NCJ 171120 (12 pp.).

Prenatal and Early Childhood Nurse Home

Visitation. 1998, NCJ 172875 (8 pp.).

Treatment Foster Care. 1999, NCJ 173421 

(12 pp.).

Gangs 

1996 National Youth Gang Survey. 1999, 

NCJ 173964 (96 pp.).

Gang Members on the Move. 1998, 

NCJ 171153 (12 pp.).

Youth Gangs: An Overview. 1998, NCJ 167249

(20 pp.).

The Youth Gangs, Drugs, and Violence Connection. 1999, NCJ 171152 (12 pp.).

Youth Gangs in America Teleconference 

(Video). 1997, NCJ 164937 (120 min.), $17.

General Juvenile Justice

Comprehensive Juvenile Justice in State 

Legislatures Teleconference (Video). 1998, 

NCJ 169593 (120 min.), $17.

Guidelines for the Screening of Persons Working With Children, the Elderly, and Individuals

With Disabilities in Need of Support. 1998, 

NCJ 167248 (52 pp.).

Juvenile Justice, Volume VII , Number 1. 2000,

NCJ 178256 (40 pp.).

A Juvenile Justice System for the 21st Century.

1998, NCJ 169726 (8 pp.).

Juvenile Offenders and Victims: 1999 National

Report. 1999, NCJ 178257 (232 pp.).

OJJDP Research: Making a Difference for 

Juveniles. 1999, NCJ 177602 (52 pp.).

Promising Strategies To Reduce Gun Violence.

1999, NCJ 173950 (253 pp.).

Sharing Information: A Guide to the Family

Educational Rights and Privacy Act and 

Participation in Juvenile Justice Programs.

1997, NCJ 163705 (52 pp.).

Missing and Exploited Children

Portable Guides to Investigating Child Abuse

(13-title series).

Protecting Children Online Teleconference

(Video). 1998, NCJ 170023 (120 min.), $17.

When Your Child Is Missing: A Family Survival

Guide. 1998, NCJ 170022 (96 pp.).

Substance Abuse

The Coach’s Playbook Against Drugs. 1998, 

NCJ 173393 (20 pp.).

Drug Identification and Testing in the Juvenile

Justice System. 1998, NCJ 167889 (92 pp.).

Preparing for the Drug Free Years. 1999, 

NCJ 173408 (12 pp.).

Violence and Victimization

Combating Fear and Restoring Safety in

Schools. 1998, NCJ 167888 (16 pp.).

Guide for Implementing the Comprehensive

Strategy for Serious, Violent, and Chronic 

Juvenile Offenders. 1995, NCJ 153681 

(255 pp.).

Report to Congress on Juvenile Violence 

Research. 1999, NCJ 176976 (44 pp.)

Serious and Violent Juvenile Offenders. 1998,

NCJ 170027 (8 pp.).

Serious and Violent Juvenile Offenders: Risk

Factors and Successful Interventions Teleconference (Video). 1998, NCJ 171286 (120 min.), $17.

State Legislative Responses to Violent Juvenile

Crime: 1996–97 Update. 1998, NCJ 172835 

(16 pp.).

White House Conference on School Safety:

Causes and Prevention of Youth Violence

Teleconference (Video). 1998, NCJ 173399 

(240 min.), $17.

Youth in Action

Community Cleanup. 1999, NCJ 171690 (6 pp.).

Cross-Age Teaching. 1999, NCJ 171688 (8 pp.).

Make a Friend—Be a Peer Mentor. 1999, 

NCJ 171691 (8 pp.).

Plan A Special Event! 1999, NCJ 171689 

(8 pp.).

Planning a Successful Crime Prevention 

Project. 1998, NCJ 170024 (28 pp.).

Stand Up and Start a School Crime Watch!

1998, NCJ 171123 (8 pp.)

Two Generations—Partners in Prevention.

1999, NCJ 171687 (8 pp.).

Wipe Out Vandalism and Graffiti. 1998, 

NCJ 171122 (8 pp.).

Youth Preventing Drug Abuse. 1998, 

NCJ 171124 (8 pp.).

Revised 6/21/2000
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