UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT 

NORTHERN DISTRICT OF FLORIDA 

PENSACOLA DIVISION 

IN RE SKANSKA USA CIVIL 

SOUTHEAST INC. AND 

SKANSKA USA, INC. AS 

OWNERS OF THE BARGE KS 

5531, PRAYING FOR 

EXONERATION FROM OR 

LIMITATION OF LIABILITY 

FIRST AMENDED MASTER 

CLAIM OF DIRECT 

PROPERTY DAMAGE 

ADMIRALTY RULE 9(H)

CIVIL ACTION NO.

3:20-CV-05980 – RV / MJF

SENIOR DISTRICT JUDGE 

LACEY COLLIER

CLAIMANTS.

FIRST AMENDED MASTER CLAIM OF DIRECT PROPERTY DAMAGE

WITH RESERVATION OF RIGHTS TO PROCEED IN STATE COURT

COME NOW, Claimants who specifically reserve all rights to pursue all 

available claims in state court for resolution of any and all issues beyond the

exclusive jurisdiction of this Honorable Court in admiralty, and for their Claims

against a Construction Barge1 or Barges and the alleged owner of the purported 

1 The specific barge or barges that impacted Claimants’ property is/are identified in 

each subsequently filed Claimant’s Short Form Joinder. Paragraph 10, below, lists 

those construction barges identified by Skanska. This First Amended Master Claim 

contains an amended table which adds those barges that were made the subject of

Skanska’s March 26, 2021 filings in 3:21-CV-0521, 3:21-CV-0523, 3:21-CV0524, 3:21-CV-0525, 3:21-CV-0526 and 3:21-CV-0527. 

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vessels, Skanska USA Civil Southeast, Inc., and Skanska USA, Inc., hereinafter 

(“Skanska”) and aver: 

FIRST AMENDED MASTER CLAIM

AND NOW, specifically reserving all defenses asserted herein, including, 

without limitation, Claimants’ rights to pursue their claims in state court pursuant to 

the Savings to Suitors Clause, 28 U.S.C. §1333, and/or all state law remedies, 

Claimants file these Claims in the Consolidated action for Exoneration from and/or 

Limitation of Liability, and states the following:

Introduction

1. This is a First Amended Master Claim that incorporates by reference 

the individual Short Form Joinder filings made by each Claimant or Claimants. 

Those details set forth in the Short Form Joinder are incorporated herein by reference 

as if set forth in full in this First Amended Master Claim. This First Amended Master

Claim, because it will be joined by multiple Claimants, will refer to Claimants, 

plural, even where the Short Form Joinder may be filed by a single Claimant. This 

First Amended Master Claim adopts and incorporates all those short form joinder 

forms filed on behalf of direct property damage claimants.

2. This Claim is filed by property owners whose property was impacted 

and damaged by Skanska’s un-crewed and unpowered construction barges. These 

construction barges, owned and used by Skanska for the sole purpose of constructing 

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the new Pensacola Bay Bridge, were allowed to remain exposed to a slow moving 

but strong hurricane despite Skanska’s obligation to secure its construction barges. 

Of the 55 total un-crewed and unpowered construction barges staged around this 

construction site, at least 28 broke free and 23 were pushed by the forces of wind 

and waves to all points around the compass from the bridge construction sites and 

either struck structures or ultimately ran aground in the Pensacola and Escambia Bay 

area2

. Six barges were not identified originally as having been involved in any claim, 

however, since the consolidation of this matter under the lead case, 3:20-CV-5980, 

Skanska has identified additional barges that were driven from where they were 

located before the storm. These additional barges, M8030, M8015, KS1451, M8034, 

450020 and 471206, were made the subject of six additional complaints filed as 

made the subject of Skanska’s March 26, 2021 filings in 3:21-CV-0521, 3:21-CV0523, 3:21-CV-0524, 3:21-CV-0525, 3:21-CV-0526 and 3:21-CV-0527 

respectively. Although Skanska has not made any assertion that these barges left the 

vicinity of the bridge or the fishing pier these are incorporated in this First Amended 

Master Complaint in the event that later revealed facts establish a direct property 

damage connection. Of the total 28 barges, one or more of these construction barges, 

rammed into and damaged the claimants’ property. Claimants seek compensation 

2 [Doc 59-2] Emergency Field Authorization, Field Authorization Number: 

0324977-014-EE/17, October 20, 2020.

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from Skanska for that damage. Skanska seeks to avoid or limit their liability by 

taking refuge in a provision of Admiralty law that would exonerate their clear 

liability or limit the claimants’ recovery. Claimants assert that Skanska was so 

directly involved in the negligence and conscious disregard and inaction that caused 

Claimants’ damage that Skanska is not entitled to the exoneration and limitation they 

seek and Skanska must wholly compensate Claimants for the damages they have 

suffered. 

3. The Pensacola area has been battered by tropical weather since its 

founding. On September 19, 1559, just weeks after Don Tristan de Luna y Arellano 

established Pensacola as the first European settlement in the continental United 

States, a hurricane decimated his settlement. Since the advent of named tropical 

storms and hurricanes, Pensacola has found itself within or affected by the following 

storms: Baker, Florence, Flossy, Debbie, Irene, Hilda, Ethel, Eloise, Frederic, Elena, 

Juan, Alberto, Erin, Opal, Danny, Helene, Barry, Hanna, Ivan, Arlene, Dennis, Ida, 

Cindy, Nate, Gordon, Michael, and Cristobal. Don Tristan de Luna did not have 

access to modern weather forecasting; Skanska did, yet they chose to ignore it. 461 

years after the hurricane that destroyed de Luna’s settlement, and exactly 16 years 

after Hurricane Ivan, Hurricane Sally brought yet another wave of destruction to 

Pensacola. However, this time, the destructive forces of the September 16, 2020, 

Hurricane Sally were exacerbated by the negligence and gross negligence of 

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Skanska. Now Skanska seeks exoneration from the consequences of, and limitation 

to their own liability and the damages associated with their own corporate negligence

and gross negligence. The Claimants oppose Skanska’s attempts and make these 

claims to recover the full measure of their own economic damages. 

4. Claimants own property located on Pensacola Bay, Escambia Bay, or 

surrounding waters. This property is located at the address or coordinates described 

and set forth in the Short Form Joinder filed by each Claimant. These claimants have 

suffered direct injury to their property and the improvements thereon. This injury 

has caused them to suffer economic damages including but not limited to, repair 

costs, loss of use, diminution in value and other related consequential damages. 

Claimants have submitted short form joinders into the Court’s master docket (3:20-

CV-05980 – RV / MJF), wherein each claimant sets forth specific information about 

their respective losses due to the impact on Claimant’s property of Skanska’s 

runaway construction barge and associated equipment. 

5. Skanska USA Civil Southeast Inc. (“Skanska Southeast”) has its 

headquarters at 295 Bendix Rd., Suite 400, Virginia Beach, VA 23452, with its 

principal place of business located at 2600 Maitland Center Parkway, Suite 250, 

Maitland, Florida 32751. It is registered to do business in the state of Florida, and its 

registered agent is located at Corporation Service Company, 1201 Hays Street, 

Tallahassee, Florida 32301.

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6. Skanska USA, Inc., owns 100% of the stock of Skanska USA Civil, 

Inc., Skanska USA Civil Inc., owns 100% of the stock of Skanska USA Civil 

Southeast Inc. (collectively “Skanska”). 

7. At the time of the incident, Skanska was engaged in the construction of 

the Pensacola Bay Bridge. The construction barges that caused the damage to 

Claimants’ Property were owned by Skanska and were being used by Skanska in 

connection with the construction of the Pensacola Bay Bridge. 

8. Skanska regularly conducts business within Florida, and is engaged in 

substantial activity within Florida, including the design and construction of the 

Pensacola Bay Bridge.

The Construction Barges

9. Skanska owns multiple, unpowered and un-crewed construction barges 

used solely or repurposed as work platforms used for construction-related purposes 

on the Pensacola Bay Bridge Project, including the construction bargesthat damaged 

the Claimants’ property. Skanska used these construction barges as work platforms 

to stage construction equipment and to support construction tasks on the bridge 

project. These construction barge work platforms were not “vessels” as that term 

applies to 46 USC § 30505 of the Limitation of Shipowners’ Liability Act and 

Supplemental Rule F. 

10. Skanska, as the owner, has identified, through the filing of several

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Complaints for Exoneration from or Limitation of Liability, 28 construction barges 

that were used in the Pensacola Bay Bridge construction project and that were then 

involved in allisions with the Pensacola Bay Bridge, Escambia County Fishing Pier

and surrounding public, private and Federal property. These construction barges and 

their associated original Skanska Exoneration and Limitation filing are listed below:

Type of Claim Barge # Case

Bridge KS 5531 3:20-cv-5980

Bridge 460007 3:20-CV-5981

Bridge CBR 758 3:20-RV-5982

Bridge KS 6011 3:20-CV-5983

Unknown3 450020 3:21-CV-00526

Direct KS 6010 3:20-CV-5984

Direct 470037 3:21-CV-0044

Direct M 8026 3:21-CV-0045

Direct KS 1453 3:21-CV-0047

Direct KS 4004 3:21-CV-0048

Direct KS 4015 3:21-CV-0050

Direct KS 5533 3:21-CV-0051

Direct 460005 3:21-CV-0052

Direct 470027 3:21-CV-0053

Direct KS 6013 3:21-CV-0054

Direct 471205 3:21-CV-0055

3 The March 26, 2021 Exoneration and Limitation Complaints by Skanska [Cases 

521-527] were not originally consolidated under the lead case, 3:21-CV-5980, 

pursuant to this Court’s Order consolidating all claims. This First Amended 

Master Claim of Direct Property Damage is filed, in part, to incorporate the claims 

of any claimants who may assert a claim based on damage arising from those 

barges listed in those subsequently filed complaints. Upon information and belief 

these barges are believed to have caused damage to the fishing pier and the bridge. 

However, Skanska has not identified any specific point of impact, notice or 

claimants. 

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Direct M8002 3:21-CV-00564

Direct M 8021 3:21-CV-00575

Direct U 1511 3:21-CV-0058

Direct U 1506 3:21-CV-0060

Direct U 1505 3:21-CV-0061

Direct M 8033 3:21-CV-00626

Direct MCD 360 3:21-CV-0063

Unknown M8030 3:21-CV-0521

Unknown M8015 3:21-CV-0523

Unknown KS 1451 3:21-CV-0524

Unknown M8034 3:21-CV-0525

Unknown 471206 3:21-CV-0527

The Construction Project to Replace the Pensacola Bay Bridge

11. United States Route 98 (US 98), the longest US road in Florida, is an 

east-west United States highway that was originally established in 1933 as a route 

between Pensacola and Apalachicola, Florida. Since 1933 it has been extended 

significantly. At the time of these events, US 98 extended from Meadville, 

Mississippi in the west, to Palm Beach, Florida in the east. The overwhelming 

majority of the 964-mile-long US 98 is built on dry land. 

4 The Skanska Exoneration and Limitation Complaint at 3:21-CV-00056 [Doc. 1] 

lists Barge KS 6013, however, the three attachments [Doc. 1-1, 1-2 and 1-3] 

concern Barge M 8002. 

5 The Skanska Exoneration and Limitation Complaint at 3:21-CV-00057 omits 

Brown and Adams as potential claimants impacted by Barge M 8021, however, it 

is believed the Brown and Adams claimants were impacted by Barge M8021.

6 The Skanska Exoneration and Limitation Complaint at 3:21-CV-00062 includes 

Brown and Adams as potential claimants impacted by Barge M 8033, however, it 

is believed the Brown and Adams claimants were impacted by Barge M8021.

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12. Approximately 3 miles of US 98 (concurrently known as State Road 

289) traverses Pensacola Bay between Bayfront Parkway in Pensacola, Florida and 

FairPoint Peninsula in Gulf Breeze, Florida. US 98 is the sole, direct connection for 

traffic between the cities of Pensacola and Gulf Breeze. 

13. Before 1931 there was no bridge connecting Pensacola and Gulf 

Breeze. The original three-mile Thomas A Johnson Bridge, a narrow, two lane 

structure, was opened on June 13, 1931. This bridge was replaced by the Sen. Phillip 

D. Beall, Sr., Bridge, a single, wider, four lane structure on October 31, 1960. This 

bridge carried four lanes of US 98 motor vehicle traffic across Pensacola Bay for six 

decades.

14. At the time of these events, Skanska was engaged in a construction 

project to replace this three-mile bridge and had, in fact, opened a new, single span 

containing 4 lanes of two-way motor vehicle traffic and one pedestrian/bicycle path. 

Skanska then began the demolition of the sixty-year-old Beall bridge and all direct 

traffic between Pensacola and Gulf Breeze became dependent upon this newly built 

span. 

15. This bridge replacement project was undertaken to maintain the free 

flow of motor vehicle, pedestrian and bicycle traffic between Pensacola and Gulf 

Breeze. Skanska used construction barges to support the construction and 

demolition activities required by the bridge replacement construction project and the 

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use of these construction barges bears no relationship to traditional maritime activity. 

When referring to Skanska’s loose construction barges impacting private property, 

FDOT’s engineer explained:

This would have been the result of barges from an active construction 

project. I’m copying the construction project team so they can address 

with the citizen. 

See Sept. 17, 2020 Email from FDOT to Project CEI, ex. 1 to Claimants’ Reply in 

Support of Motion to Dismiss. [Doc. 51-1, pg. 2-3] 

Claim Synopsis

16. Claimants suffered direct property damage after Claimants’ property 

was struck by one or more of Skanska’s unpowered construction barges. Skanska’s 

negligence in failing to remove and/or secure its construction barges prior to the 

arrival of the storm conditions associated with Hurricane Sally caused this injury. At 

all material times, Skanska knew or should have known that failing to secure or 

move its construction barges from the Pensacola Bay Bridge construction site before 

Hurricane Sally approached the local coastline and ultimately made landfall on 

September 16, 2020 posed an unreasonable risk of damage and destruction to the 

surrounding communities, governments and citizens of Escambia and Santa Rosa 

County, Florida, and the United States of America including Claimants.

17. Claimants seek recovery for all damages recoverable under applicable 

law, including but not limited to repair costs, loss of use, diminution in value and 

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other related consequential damage and incidental expenses they otherwise would 

not have incurred. Claimants also seek attorney’s fees and costs.

18. Florida law applies to this case. Under Florida’s “significant 

relationship test,” courts apply the tort law of the state that has the most significant 

relationship to the cause of action. In this case, the cause of action arose in, and 

Claimants are citizens of, the state of Florida. Skanska’s conduct at the center of 

Claimants’ cause of action relates to the construction of a new bridge and the 

destruction of an existing bridge comprising the central transportation artery and 

hurricane route for the Pensacola, Florida region that was built pursuant to a contract 

between a Florida-based construction firm and a Florida agency.

COMMON FACTUAL ALLEGATIONS

The Construction Project and Skanska’s Duty

19. The Florida Department of Transportation, FDOT, oversees, among 

other things, the construction of roads and bridges in the state of Florida.

20. On July 29, 2016, Skanska was awarded the construction contract by 

FDOT to build and design the new bridge over Pensacola Bay. The project consists 

of two separate bridge spans standing side by side. 

21. Skanska began construction on the bridge project on or about 

September 19, 2016. The project site was not limited to the portion of the Pensacola 

Bay Bridge over the bay. In fact, the project site traversed over land across portions 

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of Gregory Street, Bayfront Parkway, and 17th Avenue in Pensacola as well as Gulf 

Breeze Parkway in Gulf Breeze.

22. FDOT entrusted Skanska with every aspect of this project. As set forth 

in the Design Build Specifications, published on March 8, 2016, pg. 74-75, Skanska, 

as the contractor, agreed to take charge and custody of the work, and take every 

necessary precaution against damage to the work, by the action of the elements or 

from any other cause whatsoever, until the Department’s final acceptance of the 

work. Skanska contracted to rebuild, repair, restore, and make good, all damage to 

any portion of the work occasioned by any of the above causes before final 

acceptance of the Contract.

23. Skanska agreed to:

. . . provide all safeguards, safety devises, and protective equipment and 

take any other needed actions as it determines, or as the contracting 

officer may determine, to be reasonably necessary to protect the life and 

health of employees on the job and the safety of the public and to protect 

property in connection with the performance of the work covered by 

the contract.

See Executed FDOT Contract at pg. 76, ex. 4 to Claimants’ Reply in Support of 

Motion to Dismiss, [Doc. 51-5, p. 77] 

24. In or around September 2019, Skanska completed the western 

(“southbound”) segment of the bridge project and two lanes of traffic were able to 

move across the bridge heading both north and south by sharing this segment. 

25. Upon completion and activation of the western segment in a temporary 

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two-way configuration, Skanska began demolishing the existing, and up until that 

instant, operational, Pensacola Bay Bridge in order to build the new eastern 

(“northbound”) segment. 

26. To facilitate demolishing the old bridge and building the eastern 

(“northbound”) segment of the bridge, Skanska utilized approximately 55 floating 

work platforms to hold equipment and materials for construction. These included 

the Skanska owned construction barge or barges listed in Paragraph 10 above and 

that are separately set forth in Claimant’s Short Form Joinder.

27. The Final Request for Proposal, at p. 63, from FDOT required the

Design-Build Firm, here Skanska, to submit an Incident Management Plan that 

included “emergency preparedness and recovery plans as well as traffic management 

and evacuation due to hurricanes, tropical storms, fires, winter/ice system and other 

events.” Skanska prepared an incident management plan required by FDOT that 

was specific to tropical weather systems, like the one that became Hurricane Sally, 

which Skanska titled “Hurricane Preparedness Work Plan.” [Doc. 16-1, pp. 2-16]

28. The Hurricane Preparedness Work Plan included the construction 

barges that Skanska was using as floating work platforms from which Skanska and 

its employees and/or contract workers conducted construction activities. The Plan 

required Skanska personnel to secure the project site that is, the Pensacola Bay 

Bridge, and secure all marine based equipment, including the construction barges,

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to safe harbor.

29. Under the Plan, there were four conditions that required different 

actions to be taken by Skanska personnel in the event of a tropical weather system. 

As Hurricane Sally approached, Condition Three became the applicable condition. 

Under Condition Three (which is specified as sustained winds of 50 knots or 58 mph 

or greater expected within 72 hours/3 days), Skanska was to cease all routine 

activities which might interfere with securing operations, commence securing and 

stow all gear and portable equipment, begin to secure any cranes on site, and move 

all construction barge mounted cranes and material barges to the East Bay. No part 

of the Plan called for the construction barges to be secured near the construction site. 

As Hurricane Sally approached Pensacola, Skanska failed to follow this Plan,

choosing instead to continue working as late as Monday, September 14, 2020.

30. Skanska kept its construction barges on site during this time to allow it 

to continue the bridge construction work. Skanska made the decision not to navigate 

these construction barges upon the navigable waters of Pensacola and Escambia Bay 

to a safe site for securing despite the requirements of the Hurricane Preparedness 

Plan.

The Evolution of Tropical Storm and Hurricane Sally

31. A tropical wave/disturbance organized into Tropical Depression 19 

over the extreme northwest Bahamas about 80 miles east-southeast of Miami during 

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the late afternoon of Friday, September 11th, 2020. The system then crossed the 

extreme southern end of the Florida Peninsula Friday night (across the Everglades) 

emerging into the Gulf of Mexico around Marco Island, FL early Saturday morning 

September 12, 2020. By 2:00 PM EDT that afternoon the depression was upgraded 

to Tropical Storm Sally. Computer models were already indicating Sally would 

intensify into a significant hurricane and pose a major threat to the northern Gulf of 

Mexico. A Hurricane Watch was issued at 5:00 PM Saturday by the National 

Hurricane Center (NHC) for a swath of the Gulf Coast from southeast Louisiana to 

the Florida Panhandle.

7

 

32. Upon discovering a tropical depression or tropical storm, the NHC 

issues public advisories every three hours throughout each 24-hour period. 

33. On the afternoon of Friday, September 11th, the NHC published a 

model of potential paths then-Tropical Depression Nineteen could take. Nearly 

every potential path would have subjected Pensacola to at least some level of 

tropical-storm winds. 

34. At or around 11:00 p.m. on Friday, September 11th, the NHC issued a 

storm track projection showing that Tropical Depression Nineteen could impact a 

7 The weather forecast information contained in this and subsequent paragraphs was 

obtained from the National Hurricane Center with the National Oceanic and 

Atmospheric Administration (“NOAA”), located at 

https://www.nhc.noaa.gov/archive/2020/SALLY.shtml. 

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portion of the Florida Panhandle. Skanska knew or should have known of this 

forecast. 

35. As of 2:00 p.m. on Saturday, September 12th, Tropical Depression 

Nineteen had strengthened into Tropical Storm Sally—the eighteenth named storm 

of the 2020 hurricane season. At that time, Tropical Storm Sally was located 

approximately 35 miles southeast of Naples, Florida. 

36. As of 5:00 p.m. on Saturday, September 12th, a tropical storm watch 

was extended westward from the Okaloosa/Walton County Line to the 

Alabama/Florida Border.

37. As of 2:00 p.m. on Sunday, September 13th, Skanska had knowledge 

of the likelihood of hurricane-force winds that would impact the northern Gulf Coast 

region, including the Florida Panhandle. Skanska took no action to secure its 

construction barges, and it even continued working on the Pensacola Bay Bridge. 

38. At or around 10:08 p.m. on Sunday, September 13th, the NHC released 

a model showing the projected path Tropical Storm Sally was likely to take. This 

model showed Pensacola, Florida within the cone of uncertainty.

39. As Tropical Storm Sally moved westward across the very warm waters 

of the Gulf of Mexico it slowly gathered additional organization and intensity 

Saturday and Sunday, becoming Hurricane Sally at 11:00 AM the morning of 

Monday, September 14th about 175 miles southwest of Pensacola. It then meandered 

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erratically over the next 24 hours in the Gulf waters southeast of the mouth of the 

Mississippi River (south of Mobile, AL) before settling on a track to the northeast 

heading toward the coastline between Mobile Bay and Pensacola. Computer models 

had anticipated this turn to the right and a Hurricane Warning was issued for the 

Pensacola area, including all of Pensacola Bay, at 4:00 PM CDT Monday afternoon.

40. Hurricane Sally intensified to Category Two status with peak sustained 

winds of 100 MPH at 4:00 PM Monday. The storm fluctuated in intensity (dropping 

back to Cat 1 strength at 1:00 AM Tuesday morning September 15 and weakening 

down to 80 MPH peak sustained winds by the afternoon) while meandering 

erratically (moving at 3 MPH or less) Monday evening and through the morning of 

Tuesday September 15th before making a final turn to the right in the early afternoon 

and settling on a very slow (2 MPH) northeasterly track toward the coast by 4:00 

PM on Tuesday afternoon. In spite of the erratic movement, computer model forecast 

guidance remained consistent in predicting landfall just west of Pensacola and NHC 

kept Pensacola within the Hurricane Warning the entire time.

41. As of 4:00 p.m. on Monday, September 14th, the NHC issued a public 

advisory notification, stating that Hurricane Sally had strengthened, and that lifethreatening storm surge, hurricane-force winds, and flash flooding was likely along 

portions of the northern Gulf Coast starting Monday evening and continuing 

Tuesday.

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Skanska’s Senior Executives Failed to Appropriately Respond to the Danger

42. Notwithstanding these warnings, and in direct violation of the guidance 

and direction set forth in the Hurricane Preparedness Work Plan, on Sunday,

September 13th Skanska continued to work on the bridge from 7:30 a.m. to 2:49 

p.m.

43. As of 2:00 p.m. on Sunday, September 13th, Tropical Storm Sally had 

traveled north, and the NHC advised that life-threatening storm surge, hurricaneforce winds, and heavy rainfall [was] expected along portions of the northern Gulf 

Coast starting on Monday. The next day, on September 14, 2020, Skanska Project 

Executive, Thomas J. DeMarco, wrote in a letter [Doc. 16-2, p. 2] to Brett Pielstick, 

P.E. of Eisman & Russo, that on September 13th, 2020, the National Weather Service 

issued a Tropical Storm Warning for the project area due to potential Tropical Storm 

Sally. The Skanska Project Executive’s letter was sent in order to serve as Skanska’s

preliminary request for an extension of Contract Time and additional compensation 

for additional costs incurred due to the expected delay that was sure to result from 

the anticipated impact of the storm. Despite acknowledging in this letter that any 

time the Project is within the potential path of a tropical storm, advance preparations 

are required in order to secure material and equipment, Skanska failed to take the 

necessary and mandated actions necessary to secure that same material and 

equipment. By Skanska’s own Project Executive’s account, written before the storm, 

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the responsibility, duty, and subsequent failure, to secure the bridge construction 

equipment always fell within Skanska’s knowledge and privity. In other words, 

while Skanska’s leadership found the time to request additional money and time to 

prepare for Hurricane Sally, they failed to undertake that necessary preparation. 

44. The decision not to move the construction barges was made by 

Skanska’s shoreside senior executives. 

45. FDOT instructed Skanska to shut down and prepare for Hurricane Sally 

more than three days before the storm made landfall, an instruction that Skanska

failed to adhere to adequately or at all. 

46. Throughout the weekend of Friday, September 12th and up to the 

morning of Monday, September 14th, Skanska conducted business as usual 

construction operations on the Pensacola Bay Bridge. Despite its Hurricane 

Preparedness Plan, Skanska had not initiated the action necessary to relocate any of 

its 55 construction barges from the construction site. These un-crewed and 

unpowered construction barges were left in place as Hurricane Sally crawled 

westward, deeper into the Gulf of Mexico and toward Pensacola.

Skanska Knew or Reasonably Should Have Known of the Danger

47. Skanska’s own Hurricane Preparedness Work Plan [Doc. 16-1, p. 3] 

provided a recitation of general hurricane information including: “Beyond the eye, 

counterclockwise winds bring destruction to coastlines and islands in their erratic 

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path. The position of the storm given by the National Hurricane Center is always the 

eye of the storm. High winds and heavy rain may extend up to 200 miles from the 

eye. Hazardous conditions may arrive 6-10 hours before the eye makes landfall.” 

48. Skanska’s own Hurricane Preparedness Work Plan [Doc. 16-1, p. 7] 

expressly addressed “Cranes Barges / Material Barges and Heavy Weather 

Mooring.” This plan addressed the “time needed to move major barges” and 

emphasized that “30 hours at a minimum needs to be dedicated to moving the 

material barges and crane barges to the hurricane location in the East Bay” and 

provided a chart that described the number of tugboats and time needed to move 

specific types of construction barges. 

49. In terms of track, Sally was a very well forecast hurricane. As early as 

Saturday afternoon September 12th, 84 hours prior to landfall, the Pensacola area 

was either directly adjacent to or within a Tropical Storm Watch or Hurricane Watch 

area. By Monday morning at 10:00 AM, 43 hours prior to landfall, the Watch was 

upgraded to a Hurricane Warning. Forecasters watching the weather system 

consistently predicted that the Sally weather system would, at some point in its 

westward travel, make a turn to the north. As the storm approached the central Gulf 

Coast, its movement slowed to a crawl and became erratic for a time and nearly 

stalled southeast of the mouth of the Mississippi River. On Monday and early 

Tuesday, NHC Forecasters were confident that computer model guidance showing 

Case 3:20-cv-05980-LC-HTC Document 1163 Filed 05/21/21 Page 20 of 40
a turn to the right would occur, moving the storm toward the Alabama coast just 

west of Pensacola. The very slow movement of Sally, less than 3 MPH, for the three 

days prior to landfall provided additional time for residents of the Florida Panhandle 

to prepare. This same preparation time reprieve was afforded Skanska, but 

Skanska’s senior leadership chose to ignore the looming threat in favor of continued 

work and pursuit of profits. 

50. Rather than implement the Hurricane Preparedness Work Plan mandate 

to “secure all marine based equipment to safe harbor [Doc. 16-1, p. 3],” Skanska’s 

senior leadership deliberately chose to leave its construction equipment—including 

55 construction barges—in the vicinity of the Pensacola Bay Bridge prior to and 

during Hurricane Sally. Consequently, Skanska’s construction equipment, including 

construction barges, allided with and damaged the Claimant’s property.

51. Skanska failed to secure its construction barges used in construction of 

the Bay Bridge and 28 of Skanska’s 55 work platforms broke free. All 28 of the 

loose construction barges (over half the number Skanska employed for the project) 

were uncontrolled, unpowered, and propelled by the vagaries of wind and waves 

throughout Pensacola Bay and its environs. The shifting wind direction associated 

with the counterclockwise spin of Hurricane Sally is evident from the aftermath. 

Skanska’s unpowered construction barges were quite literally cast in all directions 

and struck shorelines from Naval Air Station Pensacola, to Warrington, to downtown 

Case 3:20-cv-05980-LC-HTC Document 1163 Filed 05/21/21 Page 21 of 40
Pensacola, to Milton, to Bagdad and to Gulf Breeze. 

52. FDOT has confirmed that Skanska “failed to take adequate precautions 

to prevent the damage that resulted from Hurricane Sally.” [Doc 16-3, p. 2] In fact, 

FDOT stated that Skanska “had advance knowledge of an approaching hurricane . . 

. but did not comply with its own Hurricane Preparedness Plan.”

53. Skanska’s failures occurred at the corporate level. Skanska’s Hurricane 

Preparedness Work Plan is an emergency response plan submitted by Skanska 

Southeast to FDOT as required in the contract between Skanska Southeast and 

FDOT. The decision of Skanska to implement or activate the Hurricane 

Preparedness Plan is made by an officer with responsibility over the project whose 

position is no lower than vice-president level. The Hurricane Preparedness Plan is 

applied project-wide to protect the entire Skanska operation including facilities at 

the base of operations, miles from the bridge, regardless of whether any portion of 

the site is on or around navigable waterways. 

54. Skanska, despite having the opportunity to do so, deliberately chose not 

to adequately secure, let alone move, its construction barges positioned near the 

bridge project. 

55. Skanska had previously moved its construction barges in preparation 

for storm threats. As it had done previously, Skanska could have moved each of its 

construction barges before Hurricane Sally made landfall. Skanska knew of possible 

Case 3:20-cv-05980-LC-HTC Document 1163 Filed 05/21/21 Page 22 of 40
tropical storm-force winds (at minimum) beginning, at the earliest, on September 

11th, yet it chose to do nothing. Skanska’s Hurricane Preparedness Plan provides 

that “each [work platform] only takes two hours to move.” [Doc 16-3, p. 2] Skanska 

had ample notice and time to move all of its work platforms to safe harbor. 

56. Skanska’s own Hurricane Preparedness Work Plan contained plans 

that, if followed, should have avoided the destruction of claimant’s property, 

including securing “loose materials and equipment prior to the hurricane” and “all 

marine based equipment to safe harbor.” [Doc. 16-1, p. 3].

57. Under the Plan, there were four “conditions” that required different 

actions to be taken by Skanska personnel in the event of a tropical weather system. 

As Hurricane Sally approached, Condition Three became the applicable condition. 

Under Condition Three (which is specified as “[s]ustained winds of 50 knots or 58 

mph or greater [winds] expected within 72 hours/3 days”), Skanska was to “[c]ease 

all routine activities which might interfere with securing operations,” “[c]ommence 

securing and stow all gear and portable equipment,” “[b]egin to secure any cranes 

on site,” and for “barge mounted cranes and material barges,” they “will be moved 

to the East Bay.” [Doc. 16-1, p. 7] No part of the Plan called for the construction

barges to be secured near the construction site. 

58. As Hurricane Sally approached Pensacola, Skanska failed to follow this 

Plan. In fact, according to an October 22, 2020 Letter sent from FDOT to Skanska, 

Case 3:20-cv-05980-LC-HTC Document 1163 Filed 05/21/21 Page 23 of 40
the Department stated:

Despite Skanska’s assertions to the contrary, Skanska failed to take 

adequate precautions to prevent the damage that resulted from 

Hurricane Sally, Skanska had advance knowledge of an approaching 

hurricane, but did not comply with its own Hurricane Preparedness 

Plan. The plan provides that each barge only takes 2 hours to move, 

but not all barges were moved or taken to safe harbor after Skanska 

became aware of imminent 58 MPH or greater wind speeds. Records 

from the jobsite show that Skanska was performing work in the area, 

i.e., driving pilings, on Sunday, September 13, 2020 from 7:30 A.M. to 

2:49 P.M. CDT, despite a tropical storm warning being issued that 

morning at 4:00 A.M. Records from the following day show that 

Skanska was finishing work on a footer on State Road 30. [Doc 16-3, 

p. 1]

59. In the same October 22, 2020 FDOT letter quoted above, the 

Department also set forth its own account of Skanska’s activities that “undermines 

Skanska’s assertion that 58 MPH or greater winds were not predicted until 11:11pm 

on Tuesday,” [Doc. 16-3, p. 3] adding:

A review of the advisories show that a tropical storm warning was first 

declared Sunday at 4:00 A.M., with maximum sustained winds of 60 

MPH reported at 10:00 A.M. Instead of moving the barges, Skanska 

chose to continue driving piles and even worked the following day in 

finishing work on a footer on State Road 30. 

By the time the first barge broke loose Tuesday at 6:00 P.M., fifty-six 

(56) hours had elapsed from the first report of maximum sustained 

winds of 60 MPH; thirty-two (32) hours had elapsed from the 

declaration of a hurricane warning 10 miles west of the bridge; and 

twenty-six (26) hours had elapsed from the bridge being included in the 

hurricane warning. Skanska had ample time to properly safe harbor the 

barges. Its own plan reflected a total of 48 hours to move all the barges, 

which would have been accomplished if the barges were moved upon 

the first report of sustained maximum winds of 60 MPH. [Doc. 16-3, p. 

3-4] 

Case 3:20-cv-05980-LC-HTC Document 1163 Filed 05/21/21 Page 24 of 40
60. The timeline of event reflects that Skanska decided to continue 

construction rather than secure their construction equipment, in blatant disregard of 

their Hurricane Preparedness Work Plan.

61. In doing so, Skanska made a conscious and deliberate decision to

prioritize avoiding liquidated damage penalties from construction delays well above 

ensuring the safety of surrounding property. In fact, Skanska spent preparation time 

seeking additional compensation and time as a result of the very storm for which 

they failed to prepare.

62. Skanska knew or should have known of the crucial need to secure 

Skanska construction barges so as to not jeopardize the bridge itself and surrounding 

property. 

63. This is not Skanska’s first encounter with bad weather while 

constructing bridges, let alone a hurricane, and Skanska knew of and accepted the 

duty and need to take appropriate precautions.

64. On September 10, 2017, Hurricane Irma pounded South Florida as it 

made landfall in the Florida Keys as a category 4 hurricane. Although not projected 

to impact Northwest Florida, Skanska made the decision to move its construction 

barges, cranes, and other equipment from the Pensacola Bay Bridge construction site 

to “safe haven” locations along Bayou Chico and East Bay on September 7, 2017—

three days before Hurricane Irma was projected to make landfall roughly 733 miles 

Case 3:20-cv-05980-LC-HTC Document 1163 Filed 05/21/21 Page 25 of 40
away from Pensacola, Florida.

65. On October 10, 2018, Hurricane Michael made landfall near Panama 

City Beach and Mexico Beach, Florida as a category 5 hurricane. Skanska again 

made the decision to move its equipment from the Pensacola Bay Bridge 

construction site on October 8, 2018 (two days before Hurricane Michael made 

landfall), even despite the fact that Pensacola, Florida was not projected to receive a 

direct hit.

66. These are just two examples of Skanska taking appropriate precautions 

after being notified of a potential threat of tropical storm-force or hurricane-force 

winds and life-threatening storm surges. These instances demonstrate that Skanska 

understood the danger and was more than capable of implementing a hurricane 

preparedness plan that preserves the project asset as well as surrounding properties. 

67. In stark contrast, during Hurricane Sally, Skanska disregarded their 

own hurricane preparedness plan and disregarded the widely known and reported 

probability that Hurricane Sally would, at the very least, deliver tropical-storm force 

winds, if not stronger, to the Florida Panhandle. After all, as early as Friday, 

September 11th, five days before Hurricane Sally was expected to make landfall, 

Skanska had adequate information to make the decision to move its work platforms 

to a “safe-haven,” as it had done in the past. Instead, as a result of Skanska’s

negligence, intentional willful inaction, and deliberate conduct, Claimants’ property 

Case 3:20-cv-05980-LC-HTC Document 1163 Filed 05/21/21 Page 26 of 40
has been damaged. 

68. These instances leave no doubt that Skanska’s compliance with 

FDOT’s mandate to protect the project site and surrounding properties boils down 

not to capability or opportunity, but the exercise of will. 

69. Skanska’s failure to act came from the highest levels of the company 

and demonstrate that Skanska’s shoreside executives, exercising their authority with 

respect to these Skanska-owned construction barges, failed to act reasonably in the 

face of a clear and present danger. 

70. On September 11, 2020, FDOT denied Skanska’s request for additional 

contract time and compensation relative to Hurricane Marco. FDOT had denied 

several previous requests for additional contract time and compensation for past 

storms due to Skanska’s “failure to submit proper notice,” including Sub-Tropical 

Storm Alberto and Tropical Storm Gordon. Skanska’s similar requests relating to 

Hurricane Dorian, and Tropical Storms Nestor, Olga, and Cristobal remained 

pending for months, if not over a year. 

71. Despite the fact that Skanska’s own failures to submit proper notice 

caused the past rejection and delay of its requests for money and time due to past 

storm-related delays, Skanska faced Hurricane Sally with the mindset that it would 

not allow any more storm-related delays to impact its business. Therefore, Skanska

made a conscious decision to forego their hurricane preparedness plan. Skanska 

Case 3:20-cv-05980-LC-HTC Document 1163 Filed 05/21/21 Page 27 of 40
gambled that Hurricane Sally would not significantly impact the region or the project 

site. If the gamble paid off, Skanska would have minimal, if any, expenses, and no 

time lost to preparation that may get denied by FDOT anyway. Skanska’s gamble 

left the bridge, fishing pier, and surrounding property owners, individuals and 

business unprotected from the massive construction barges, cranes and equipment 

left un-crewed at the project site.

72. On Monday September 14th, Skanska finally began moving some of its 

construction barges from the vicinity of the bridge demonstrating that Skanska 

understood, unfortunately too late, the severity of the storm and refuting its claims 

that it did not have enough notice to properly safe harbor the construction barges.

By this time, due in large part to the limited number of tugboats and crews needed 

to move each unpowered and un-crewed construction barge from the construction 

site, along with the worsening weather, this measure was too little, too late. 

Skanska’s Failure to Act Directly Caused Claimants’ Injuries

73. On Tuesday, September 15th, at approximately 6:30 a.m., a construction 

barge that was being used in the construction of the Pensacola Bay Bridge broke free 

from its moorings and struck a fishing pier adjacent to the bridge. A second 

construction barge broke free shortly after.

74. The same day at approximately 7:30 a.m., a third construction barge

struck the bridge and became lodged beneath the structure. The impact caused 

Case 3:20-cv-05980-LC-HTC Document 1163 Filed 05/21/21 Page 28 of 40
visible damage to the concrete beams that support the bridge, leading to the bridge’s 

closure to all traffic. At approximately 4:00 p.m., a fourth construction barge floated 

free and through the bridge. A few hours later, at approximately 6:00 pm, a 

construction barge broke free and became lodged beneath the bridge. Eventually the 

span struck by this platform was lost and fell into the bay.

75. As of 8:00 p.m. on Tuesday, September 15th, Hurricane Sally was 

located approximately 70 miles southwest of Pensacola, Florida, and it was moving 

at a pace of approximately 2 mph.

76. Shortly later, at 8:15 p.m., Ed Hudec, a Construction Engineer with the 

FDOT, emailed the following message to several Skanska and FDOT Officials, 

including Don Fusco, Skanska USA Civil, President & CEO; Thomas Fulton, Vice 

President of Operations at Skanska and Project Director for the Pensacola Bay 

Bridge Replacement Project; along with Jason Peters, FDOT Director of 

Transportation Operations; Phillip Gainer, FDOT District 3 Secretary; and Kevin 

Russell, Program Manager, FDOT District 3:

As I’m sure you [sic] aware the bridge has been struck twice 

today and the fishing pier once due to Skanska barges that have 

broken loose of their moorings/spuds.

US 98 has been closed since early this AM due to the first barge 

hit. The extent of damage is as of yet undetermined. We need to 

provide answers to the State Secretary’s Office and the 

Governor’s Office as to when the bridge can be reopened to 

traffic.

Case 3:20-cv-05980-LC-HTC Document 1163 Filed 05/21/21 Page 29 of 40
As of this minute FDOT has received no assistance from the 

Skanska Team-to help determine the structural adequacy of the 

bridge. The problem arose due to Skanska’s inability to 

properly secure barges or move them to a safe haven. The 

first barge that hit the bridge occurred when the local airport 

registered winds of 29 mph, not exactly tropical force winds.

This is totally unacceptable!

FDOT has now paid Skanska for a new bridge but due to 

poor management decisions on Skanska’s part, has a bridge 

with unknown structural deficiencies.

I am asking Skanska to assist in providing answers to the extent 

of damage, repair procedures and most importantly the

structural integrity of the damaged structure.

An expedient answer is of the utmost importance.[Doc. 16-5, p. 

2]

77. Later, after 11:00 p.m., a construction barge with a pile driving rig 

struck both the replacement bridge and the Escambia County Fishing Pier.

78. On Wednesday, September 16th at 4:45 a.m., Hurricane Sally made 

landfall near Gulf Shores, Alabama as a Category 2 hurricane with maximum 

sustained winds of 105 mph.

79. As the center of the storm moved inland across the state line into 

northern Escambia County, passing directly north of Pensacola, then moving again 

into southern Alabama around Flomaton then Brewton, winds over Pensacola Bay 

veered from an east-southeasterly then southeasterly direction before dawn, to 

southerly at landfall and finally to a southwesterly direction.

Case 3:20-cv-05980-LC-HTC Document 1163 Filed 05/21/21 Page 30 of 40
80. At some point during this time, additional construction barges broke 

free from their moorings near the project site and were pushed by the forces of 

Hurricane Sally until they came to strike the Claimants’ property.

81. The Claimants’ property suffered tremendous damage as a direct 

consequence of Skanska’s negligent decision-making in the days before Hurricane 

Sally made landfall. 

82. The damage to the property was extensive. The specific nature of the 

individual Claimant’s property damage as well as the monetary damages flowing 

from that property damage is set forth in Claimants’ Short Form Joinder. 

Skanska’s Failures Continued Even After the Passing of the Storm

83. On October 19, 2020, Skanska Vice President, Thomas J. Fulton,

executed an Emergency Field Authorization (“EFA”). The EFA was necessary

because “Hurricane Sally ran 23 construction barges aground in the Pensacola and 

Escambia Bay area.” That EFA, issued the next day, addressed those areas impacted 

by Skanska’s wayward construction barges and specifically authorized Skanska as 

follows: “The vessels may be recovered, and the impacted areas shall be restored to 

their previous conditions and configurations.”8

 It further addressed the potential 

need to rebuild impacted structures: “Any structure(s) rebuilt pursuant to this 

8 [Doc 59-2] Emergency Field Authorization, Field Authorization Number: 

0324977-014-EE/17, October 20, 2020.

Case 3:20-cv-05980-LC-HTC Document 1163 Filed 05/21/21 Page 31 of 40
Emergency Field Authorization must comply with all applicable local, state, and 

federal building standards, and the requirements of the Federal Emergency 

Management Act (FEMA).” The EFA also contemplated the need for “shoreline 

stabilization” and set forth the specifications for “rip rap” and “filter cloth.” Finally, 

the EFA attached a table listing 23 construction barges and their locations as well as 

color pictures of each of the construction barges at the location they were discovered 

after the passage of Hurricane Sally. 

84. While Skanska has recovered their construction barges, they have 

abandoned their EFA obligation and made no attempt to restore claimant’s impacted 

areas to their previous conditions and configurations, rebuild any structures or even 

conduct necessary and vital shoreline stabilization.

COUNT I

Claim for the Negligence of 

Skanska Within Their Privity and/or Knowledge

85. Claimants hereby adopt and reallege paragraphs 1-84 of this Claim as 

if fully set forth herein.

86. Skanska’s negligence in failing to properly secure or move its 

construction barges from Pensacola Bay to the designated “safe harbor”—as 

provided for in Skanska’s own Hurricane Preparedness Plan—upon being informed 

of Hurricane Sally’s likely path directly and proximately caused Claimants’ injuries.

Case 3:20-cv-05980-LC-HTC Document 1163 Filed 05/21/21 Page 32 of 40
87. Specifically, Skanska negligently failed to secure or remove 

construction barges before Hurricane Sally made landfall. 

88. At all relevant times, Skanska was under a duty to the surrounding 

property owners, including Claimants, to act with reasonable care in maintaining 

safe and proper construction operations and ensuring the security of all equipment.

89. Skanska breached this duty by:

a. Failing to reasonably heed meteorological warnings related to Tropical 

Depression Nineteen, Tropical Storm Sally, and Hurricane Sally;

b. failing to properly secure its construction barges upon learning of 

Tropical Depression 19, Tropical Storm Sally and Hurricane Sally’s 

projected path;

c. placing their own corporate profits over safety and directing its 

employees and agents to continue construction well beyond the time 

required for initiation of the Hurricane Preparedness Plan’s timeline for 

evacuation;

d. instructing their employees and agents to continue construction of the 

bridge well past the reasonable time for initiation of the Hurricane 

Preparedness Plan; 

e. failing to have sufficient corporate resources to accomplish the safe and 

timely activation and completion of the Hurricane Preparedness Plan;

Case 3:20-cv-05980-LC-HTC Document 1163 Filed 05/21/21 Page 33 of 40
f. failing to devote adequate corporate resources to the safe and timely 

activation of the Hurricane Preparedness Plan; 

g. negligent hiring of managers and officers who placed corporate profits 

over safety;

h. negligent supervision of their managers and officers;

i. termination of crucial subcontractors, including but not limited to 

Atlantic Meridian Contractors, who would have otherwise been employed 

to secure these construction barges;

j. negligent retention of managers and officers who placed corporate 

profits over safety;

k. failing to remove its construction barges, including the construction 

barges that struck Claimants’ property, from Pensacola Bay upon learning 

of Tropical Storm Nineteen’s, Tropical Storm Sally’s and Hurricane 

Sally’s projected path;

l. failing to adequately account for the unsecured construction barges, 

including the construction barges that struck Claimants’ property, or 

provide any guidance for how to secure them before causing damage,

m. failing to employ any mitigating efforts after its construction barges, 

including the construction barges that struck Claimants’ property, became 

unsecured;

Case 3:20-cv-05980-LC-HTC Document 1163 Filed 05/21/21 Page 34 of 40
n. failing to prevent foreseeable and preventable damage to the claimant’s 

property;

o. failure to create, implement, or enforce reasonable policies, procedures, 

or practices for securing, moving, or repositioning of its construction 

barges, including the construction barges that struck Claimants’ property, 

before, during, or after dangerous weather conditions; 

p. failing to have reasonably sufficient personnel and equipment to 

properly secure, move, or reposition its construction barges, including the 

construction barges that struck Claimants’ property; and

q. failing to warn third parties, including Claimant, of the dangers of the 

unsecured construction barges, including the construction barges that 

struck Claimants’ property.

90. Skanska, by and through their officers, managers, and supervising 

employees, implemented, condoned, ratified, participated in, and perpetuated these 

negligent acts and omissions.

91. At all relevant times, Skanska’s construction barges, including the 

construction barges that struck Claimants’ property, did not qualify as “seagoing 

vessels.” 

92. Maritime and/or admiralty law does not apply to this action.

93. Skanska’s negligence directly caused Claimants’ injuries. But for 

Case 3:20-cv-05980-LC-HTC Document 1163 Filed 05/21/21 Page 35 of 40
Skanska’s negligence in failing to secure or remove their construction barges, 

including the construction barges that struck Claimants’ property, Claimant’s 

property would not have been damaged, and Claimants would not be subjected to 

this unplanned financial burden. 

94. Skanska’s negligence proximately caused Claimants’ damages, as the 

damages were reasonably foreseeable. 

95. As a direct and proximate result of Skanska’s negligence, Claimants

suffered, and continue to suffer, economic damage including but not limited to loss 

of use, repair costs, costs associated with mitigation, costs of temporary measures to 

prevent further damage, associated incidental expenses and delay costs, diminution 

of value, lost property, and other incidental expenses Claimants otherwise would not 

have incurred.

96. The aforesaid acts of negligence occurred or were occasioned within 

the privity and knowledge of Skanska and their agents, servants, and/or employees.

97. Claimants prays that after due proceedings are had that:

a. The Complaint seeking Exoneration from or Limitation of Liability be 

dismissed and the injunction or restraining order granted in this matter be 

dissolved; 

b. There be judgment rendered herein in favor of Claimants, and against 

Skanska, both jointly and severally, for all damages as are reasonable in 

Case 3:20-cv-05980-LC-HTC Document 1163 Filed 05/21/21 Page 36 of 40
the premises, together with the maximum legal interest thereon from the 

date of the accident until paid and for all costs of this proceeding;

c. Claimants be allowed to proceed and prosecute its claim without 

prepayment of costs; and,

d. For all such other and further relief to which Claimants may be entitled 

under law and in equity.

WHEREFORE, Claimants pray for judgment against Skanska for compensatory 

damages, attorney’s fees, and costs, and for any other relief as this Court deems 

necessary and appropriate under Florida law.

COUNT 2

Gross Negligence 

98. Claimants hereby adopt and reallege paragraphs 1-84 of this Complaint 

as if fully set forth herein.

99. Skanska acted grossly negligent by blatantly jeopardizing the bridge 

and surrounding property by making the conscious decision to take no action to 

properly secure or remove their construction barges. 

100. Skanska acted grossly negligent when they failed to properly prepare 

for Hurricane Sally by securing their construction barges or moving them from 

Pensacola Bay. Skanska’s knew or should have known that their failure to undertake 

reasonable and prudent measures would probably and most likely result in injury to 

Case 3:20-cv-05980-LC-HTC Document 1163 Filed 05/21/21 Page 37 of 40
persons and property.

101. Skanska chose profits over safety by gambling that Hurricane Sally 

would not impact the Pensacola Bay Bridge Site and by choosing to continue to 

engage in construction activities and failing to secure its construction barges.

102. Skanska knew or reasonably should have known that the approach of

Tropical Storm and then Hurricane Sally represented circumstances constituting an 

imminent or clear and present danger amounting to more than normal or usual peril.

103. Skanska’s failure to act evidenced a conscious disregard of the 

consequences. 

104. As a direct and proximate result of Skanska’s gross negligence, 

Claimants suffered physical property damage which resulted in loss of use, repair 

costs, costs associated with mitigation, costs of temporary measures to prevent 

further damage, associated incidental expenses and delay costs, diminution of value, 

lost property, and other incidental expenses Claimants otherwise would not have 

incurred.

105. The aforesaid acts of gross negligence occurred or were occasioned 

within the privity and knowledge of Petitioners and their agents, servants, and/or 

employees.

WHEREFORE, Claimants pray for judgment against Skanska for punitive 

damages, attorney’s fees, and costs, and for any other relief as this Court deems 

Case 3:20-cv-05980-LC-HTC Document 1163 Filed 05/21/21 Page 38 of 40
necessary and appropriate under Florida law. 

RESERVATION OF RIGHT TO JURY TRIAL

Claimants hereby expressly reserve their right to proceed to a trial before a 

jury in a state court action.

/s/ Thomas F. Gonzalez 

THOMAS F. GONZALEZ

FL Bar #173878 

tfg@beggslane.com

J. NIXON DANIEL, III

FL Bar # 228761

jnd@beggslane.com

Beggs & Lane, RLLP

501 Commendencia Street 

Pensacola, Florida 32502

Office: (850) 432-2451

and

/s/ E. Samuel Geisler

BRYAN F. AYLSTOCK, FL Bar # 78263

E. SAMUEL GEISLER, FL Bar # 83817

Aylstock, Witkin, Kreis & Overholtz, PLLC

17 East Main Street, Second floor

Pensacola, Florida 32502

Office: (850) 202-1010

Fax: (850) 916-7449

Email Service: sgeisler@awkolaw.com

 baylstock@awkolaw.com

 sallyteam@awkolaw.com

and

/s/ Brian H. Barr

Brian H. Barr FL Bar 493041

Emmanuella J. Paulos FL Bar 99010

Levin Papantonio Rafferty Proctor 

Case 3:20-cv-05980-LC-HTC Document 1163 Filed 05/21/21 Page 39 of 40
Buchanan O’Brien Barr & Mougey, P.A.

316 S. Baylen Street, Suite 600

Pensacola, FL 32502

Tel.: (850) 435-7000

bbarr@levinlaw.com

epaulos@levinlaw.com

CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE

I HEREBY CERTIFY that on this 18th day of May 2021, I electronically 

filed the foregoing with the Clerk of Court by using the CM/ECF system which will 

send a notice of electronic filing to all attorneys of record. 

/s/ Thomas F. Gonzalez

Case 3:20-cv-05980-LC-HTC Document 1163 Filed 05/21/21 Page 40 of 40