1 The district court had subject matter jurisdiction pursuant

to 28 U.S.C. § 1331.

In the

United States Court of Appeals

For the Seventh Circuit ____________

No. 07-1751

MILDRED MACLIN,

Plaintiff-Appellant,

v.

SBC AMERITECH,

Defendant-Appellee.

____________

Appeal from the United States District Court

for the Northern District of Illinois, Eastern Division.

No. 05 C 2517—Amy J. St. Eve, Judge.

____________

ARGUED FEBRUARY 14, 2008—DECIDED APRIL 1, 2008

____________

Before RIPPLE, SYKES and TINDER, Circuit Judges.

RIPPLE, Circuit Judge. Mildred Maclin brought this

action against her employer, Ameritech, alleging discrimination on the basis of disability, race and gender.1

After discovery, the parties filed cross-motions for summary judgment. The district court granted Ameritech’s

motion in its entirety. Ms. Maclin then appealed to this
2 No. 07-1751

2 We have subject matter jurisdiction pursuant to 28 U.S.C.

§ 1291.

court.2 For the reasons stated in this opinion, we affirm

the judgment of the district court.

I

BACKGROUND

A.

Ms. Maclin began working for Ameritech in 1994. By

June 2001, she had been promoted to area manager, a

second-level management position that has a salary and

bonus potential in what Ameritech refers to as the MT

market zone. In January or February of 2003, Ms. Maclin

accepted a demotion in lieu of being laid off; she became

a first-level manager with a salary and bonus potential

in the MU market zone. At Ameritech, an employee’s

salary and bonus potential is determined by her pay

grade, not her title. The MU market zone is one step below

the MT pay grade; accordingly, it has a lower salary

range and a smaller potential bonus.

In fall 2003, Ms. Maclin participated in developing what

later became known as Bid Central, a new group at

Ameritech. While Bid Central was being developed, it

called its MU-level employees implementation engineers.

Later, once the group became formalized, employees in

the MU pay grade at Bid Central became known as complex bids managers. When Ms. Maclin was transferred to

Bid Central, she remained a first-level manager with a

salary in the MU market zone.
No. 07-1751 3

3 Each of Ms. Maclin’s coworkers at Bid Central who were

deposed had referred to her as area manager at some point

during her tenure as team lead. Gregory testified that she

had that title, but that she was not “really” an area manager

because she was not in the MT market zone. Nevertheless,

the record contains an e-mail in which he notes that another

employee would be acting as an interim area manager during

her absence.

4 Gregory and other employees at Ameritech referred to

Gentilini as an interim area manager during the first few

months that he took over for Ms. Maclin. Later, when he

permanently took over the position, Gentilini’s title officially

became team lead.

Bruce Gregory became Ms. Maclin’s supervisor around

October 2003. Gregory assigned Ms. Maclin to the team

lead role in the group. On October 16, 2003, Ms. Maclin’s

official title at Bid Central became area manager of complex bids.3

 This assignment as team lead and the change

in title did not change her salary or bonus potential; she

remained in the MU market zone. Although Ms. Maclin

was not second-level management and was not in the

MT market zone when she was team lead, she did have

administrative and supervisory duties that other complex bids managers in the MU market zone at Bid Central

did not have.

Ms. Maclin was injured in a car accident in December 2003. She took a medical leave of absence that began

on December 17, 2003, approximately two months after

she became the team lead at Bid Central. On December 23,

2003, Gregory appointed Dave Gentilini, a white male,

as interim team lead in Ms. Maclin’s absence.4

 While

Ms. Maclin was still on medical leave, however, Gregory
4 No. 07-1751

decided to make Gentilini the permanent team lead. In

discussions with the human resources department, he

stated that he had seen performance problems with her

work, including incomplete or incorrectly performed

assignments and mishandled projects. He also stated that

Gentilini had performed exceptionally well in the position

and that, by the time Ms. Maclin returned to work,

Gentilini had held the position more than twice as long

as she had held it.

Gregory also changed the nature of the team lead role

during Ms. Maclin’s absence. During Ms. Maclin’s tenure

as team lead, Gregory had been working with other

departments at Ameritech to establish Bid Central and

had relied on the team lead to act as a focal point for the

concerns of the other complex bids managers. By the

time Ms. Maclin returned to full-time work in June 2004,

however, Bid Central was no longer in its formative

stages. The team lead role lost its administrative duties and

the other bids managers began reporting directly to

Gregory rather than the team lead. In the modified team

lead position that Gentilini held, none of the other complex bids managers reported to him. He also never performed the administrative duties that Ms. Maclin had

performed before her leave, such as approving time

sheets and reimbursement forms.

Ms. Maclin was not assigned to the modified team lead

role when she returned from her medical leave. About a

month before she returned to full-time work, her title

was changed officially to complex bids manager. The

change did not affect her salary range and bonus potential;

she remained in the MU salary range where she had been

before her leave. She did not possess the additional supervisory and administrative responsibilities she had held
No. 07-1751 5

before her absence, but neither did Gentilini possess

those duties in the modified team lead position.

Ameritech’s compensation guidelines list several factors

that determine whether, and in what amount, a pay

increase will be awarded and the amount of that award.

One factor is the employee’s current salary compared to

that salary grade’s target range. The guide also contains a

matrix for determining the combined salary increase and

bonus payment that an employee may receive. The matrix

considers two factors: (1) current salary relative to that

salary level’s range, and (2) the employee’s performance

evaluation. An employee like Ms. Maclin, with a salary

in the top third of her salary range who met, but did not

exceed, her supervisors’ expectations, may receive a

combined raise and bonus not to exceed two percent of

her salary. An employee like Gentilini, with a salary in

the middle to lower end of the MU range who performed

exceptionally well, qualifies under Ameritech’s system

for a larger combined raise and bonus.

In 2004, Ameritech awarded bonuses and pay raises

based on the employee’s performance in 2003. It awarded

Ms. Maclin a 1.5% pay increase and a 1.5% lump sum

bonus. Her combined pay raise and bonus exceeded the

total that, according to Ameritech’s compensation guidelines, she should have received for that year. Gentilini

received a combined pay increase and bonus of 4% of his

salary, an amount within the range prescribed by

Ameritech’s compensation guidelines for a person with

his salary and performance review. Even after the raises

were given, however, Gentilini was paid less than

Ms. Maclin. He and two other members of Bid Central also

were given an additional discretionary bonus that

Ms. Maclin was not awarded.
6 No. 07-1751

B.

Ms. Maclin brought this action against Ameritech on

April 27, 2005. She claimed that, in violation of the Americans with Disabilities Act (“ADA”), 42 U.S.C. § 12101

et seq., Ameritech had failed to reasonably accommodate her disability. She also claimed that Ameritech had

demoted her from the team lead position because of her

disability, in violation of the ADA, and because of her

race and gender, in violation of Title VII of the Civil

Rights Act of 1964, 42 U.S.C. § 2000e et seq. Finally,

she claimed that Ameritech had discriminated against

her on the basis of her disability, race and gender when

Ameritech set her pay raise and when it denied her a

discretionary bonus. Ms. Maclin did not allege any violation of the Family and Medical Leave Act, 29 U.S.C.

§ 2601 et seq.

After discovery, Ms. Maclin and Ameritech filed crossmotions for summary judgment. The district court granted

summary judgment to Ameritech on each of Ms. Maclin’s

claims. Ms. Maclin timely appealed.

II

DISCUSSION

We review de novo the district court’s decision to

grant summary judgment. Krieg v. Seybold, 481 F.3d 512,

516 (7th Cir. 2007). Summary judgment is appropriate

where the pleadings, depositions, answers to interrogatories, and admissions on file, together with any affidavits,

show that there is no genuine issue of material fact, and the

movant is entitled to judgment as a matter of law. Fed. R.

Civ. P. 56(c); Krieg, 481 F.3d at 516. When considering
No. 07-1751 7

5 A person also may qualify as disabled under the ADA if she

 has a record of an impairment that limits a major life activity

(continued...)

cross-motions for summary judgment, the court must

construe all inferences in favor of the party against whom

the particular motion is made. Krieg, 481 F.3d at 516. The

nonmoving party cannot succeed by resting on its pleadings; it must provide evidence on which a jury reasonably could find in its favor. Squibb v. Mem’l Med. Ctr.,

497 F.3d 775, 780 (7th Cir. 2007). “We may affirm a summary judgment on any ground that finds support in the

record where the ground has been adequately presented

in the trial court so that the non-moving party had an

opportunity to submit affidavits or other evidence and

contest the issue.” Lawshe v. Simpson, 16 F.3d 1475, 1483

(7th Cir. 1994) (internal quotation marks omitted).

A. ADA Claims

Ms. Maclin contends that she is disabled and that

Ameritech discriminated against her on the basis of this

disability. The district court determined that Ms. Maclin

was not disabled as that term is defined by the ADA.

Because a “plaintiff seeking to avoid summary judgment

must demonstrate that there is at least a genuine issue

of material fact as to whether [she] is disabled,” Squibb,

497 F.3d at 780, the court granted summary judgment to

Ameritech on all of Ms. Maclin’s ADA claims.

The ADA prohibits discrimination against a “qualified

individual with a disability.” 42 U.S.C. § 12112(a). It

defines a disability as “a physical or mental impairment

that substantially limits one or more . . . major life activities.”5 Id. § 12102(2)(A). An employee is disabled if
8 No. 07-1751

5 (...continued)

or is regarded as having such an impairment, but Ms. Maclin

has not contended that she is disabled under either of these

definitions. 42 U.S.C. § 12102(2)(b), (c).

she “is unable to perform [a major life] activity or is

‘significantly restricted as to the condition, manner or

duration under which’ she can perform it, as compared to

an average person in the general population.” Squibb,

497 F.3d at 781 (quoting 29 C.F.R. § 1630.2(j)(1)) (alteration

omitted). “Whether a particular impairment substantially limits a major life activity is a case-specific, individualized inquiry.” Id.

Ms. Maclin submits that she is limited in the major

life activity of sitting because she cannot sit for more

than two hours at a time without severe pain. We have held

that a more serious restriction on sitting, one that prevents

a person from sitting more than thirty minutes at a time,

does not qualify as a disability under the ADA. Id. at 784-

85. Even taking at face value Ms. Maclin’s contentions

regarding her ability to sit, her assertion that she must take

breaks from sitting every two hours “does not compare to

the claims this court has held should survive summary

judgment.” Id. at 785. The district court therefore properly

granted summary judgment for Ameritech on all of Ms.

Maclin’s ADA claims because she has not established that

she has an ADA-cognizable disability. Id. at 786 (“Because

we have concluded that [the plaintiff] is not disabled

within the meaning of the [ADA], she is not protected by

its substantive anti-discrimination provisions. We need not

examine her [ADA] claims further.”).
No. 07-1751 9

6 Under this method of proof, the burden shifts to Ameritech to

“articulate some legitimate, nondiscriminatory reason” for its

actions only if Ms. Maclin establishes all four elements of her

prima facie case. Raymond v. Ameritech Corp., 442 F.3d 600,

610 (7th Cir. 2006) (citation omitted). In that event, Ms. Maclin

would have the burden to show that Ameritech’s justification

is pretextual. Id.

B. Race and Gender Discrimination Claims

Ms. Maclin also contends that Ameritech discriminated

against her on the basis of her race and gender. Ms. Maclin

attempts to support her Title VII claims using the indirect, burden-shifting method of proof set forth in McDonnell Douglas Corp. v. Green, 411 U.S. 792 (1973). Under this

method, she must establish a prima facie case of intentional discrimination by showing that: (1) she is a member of a protected class; (2) she reasonably performed to

Ameritech’s legitimate job expectations; (3) she suffered a

materially adverse employment action; and (4) Ameritech

treated her differently than a similarly situated employee outside her protected class. Raymond v. Ameritech

Corp., 442 F.3d 600, 610 (7th Cir. 2006). Ms. Maclin’s

claims necessarily fail if she cannot establish these four

elements.6 See id.

This court has taken a broad view with regard to what

qualifies as an adverse employment action, the third

element of a prima facie case. Nevertheless, an action must

be “significant” to be cognizable as discrimination. Washington v. Ill. Dep’t of Revenue, 420 F.3d 658, 660 (7th

Cir. 2005). The action must involve more than a mere

inconvenience or an alteration of job responsibilities.

Nichols v. S. Ill. Univ.-Edwardsville, 510 F.3d 772, 780 (7th

Cir. 2007). We have articulated three general categories of
10 No. 07-1751

actionable, materially adverse employment actions for the

purposes of Title VII:

(1) cases in which the employee’s compensation,

fringe benefits, or other financial terms of employment

are diminished, including termination; (2) cases in

which a nominally lateral transfer with no change in

financial terms significantly reduces the employee’s

career prospects by preventing her from using her

skills and experience, so that the skills are likely to

atrophy and her career is likely to be stunted; and

(3) cases in which the employee is not moved to a

different job or the skill requirements of her present

job altered, but the conditions in which she works

are changed in a way that subjects her to a humiliating,

degrading, unsafe, unhealthful, or otherwise significantly negative alteration in her workplace environment.

Id. (citing O’Neal v. City of Chicago, 392 F.3d 909, 911

(7th Cir. 2004)). “We have cautioned, however, that cases in

the second category are to be distinguished from cases

involving a purely lateral transfer, that is, a transfer that

does not involve a demotion in form or substance.” Id.

(internal quotation marks omitted). Neither does a “transfer involving no reduction in pay and no more than a

minor change in working conditions” qualify as an adverse employment action. Id. (citation omitted).

Ms. Maclin contends that she suffered an adverse

employment action when she was denied a discretionary

bonus, when she was denied a sufficiently large pay

raise and when her title was changed upon her return to

work. We consider each in turn.
No. 07-1751 11

1. Discretionary Bonus

Ms. Maclin contends that she suffered an adverse

employment action when she was denied a discretionary

bonus. This claim must fail as a matter of law. Farrell v.

Butler Univ., 421 F.3d 609, 614 (7th Cir. 2005); Rabinovitz v.

Pena, 89 F.3d 482, 488 (7th Cir. 1996). Ameritech’s guidelines state that the bonus that Ms. Maclin was denied “is

not an entitlement.” R.69-2, Ex. F at 6. Furthermore, Ms.

Maclin concedes that the bonus she was denied was a

wholly discretionary payment by her employer. The “loss

of a bonus is not an adverse employment action . . . where

the employee is not automatically entitled to the bonus.”

Rabinovitz, 89 F.3d at 488-89; see also Farrell, 421 F.3d at 614.

Additionally, Ms. Maclin has not shown that Ameritech’s

reason for declining to give her a discretionary bonus

was a pretext for discrimination. Ameritech contends

that it did not award her a discretionary bonus because

she only had met—not exceeded—her supervisor’s expectations. Ameritech contends that three Bid Central

employees—a white male, an Asian-American female

and an African-American male—performed exceptionally

well and therefore each was given an individual discretionary award. Ms. Maclin has offered no evidence

that this explanation is a pretext for discrimination. She

therefore has failed to carry her burden, and her claim

must fail. Raymond, 442 F.3d at 610. 

2. Comparatively Small Pay Raise

Ms. Maclin contends that she suffered an adverse

employment action when she was given a smaller pay raise

than Gentilini, her white, male coworker. Because

Ms. Maclin abandoned this claim in the district court, she
12 No. 07-1751

cannot pursue it on appeal. Keck Garrett & Assocs. v. Nextel

Commc’ns, Inc., ___ F.3d ___, No. 07-1350, 2008 WL 451300,

at *9 (7th Cir. Feb. 21, 2008). 

Ameritech moved for summary judgment on

Ms. Maclin’s pay raise claim on two grounds: (1) Ms.

Maclin could not show that anyone outside her protected classes was both similarly situated to her and more

favorably treated, and (2) Ms. Maclin could not show that

Ameritech’s proffered reasons for giving Gentilini a

comparatively larger salary increase were pretextual. In

her response to Ameritech’s motion for summary judgment, Ms. Maclin failed to defend her claim against

these arguments. See id. She therefore abandoned the

claim. Id.

Even if Ms. Maclin had not abandoned her claim, however, summary judgment for Ameritech would be appropriate. As noted by the district court, Ms. Maclin failed

to establish at least one necessary element of her claim:

that she was similarly situated to Gentilini. Raymond,

442 F.3d at 610. Ms. Maclin’s only evidence that she is

similarly situated to Gentilini is her own perceptions

about her work performance, which cannot suffice to

establish this element of her case. See Millbrook v. IBP, Inc.,

280 F.3d 1169, 1181 (7th Cir. 2002). Because she failed to

demonstrate the existence of an issue of material fact on

a necessary element, summary judgment on the pay

raise claim was appropriate.

Moreover, even if Ms. Maclin had succeeded in establishing her prima facie case, she has failed to prove

that Ameritech’s proffered reasons for awarding her a

comparatively small pay raise were a pretext for discrimination. Raymond, 442 F.3d at 610. Ameritech contended that

it had determined Ms. Maclin’s and Gentilini’s raises in
No. 07-1751 13

accordance with the company’s non-discriminatory matrix.

The matrix takes into account two factors, the employee’s

salary relative to her pay range and the employee’s performance review, and, based on those factors, it determines

the total raise and bonus for which the employee qualifies.

Ms. Maclin has offered no evidence that this explanation is

a pretext for discrimination. She therefore has failed to

carry her burden of proving that Ameritech’s justification

for its pay raise was pretextual, and her claim must fail.

See id.

3. Change in Job Title and Duties

Finally, Ms. Maclin submits that she suffered an adverse

employment action when, upon her return from medical

leave, Ameritech refused to reinstate her as the team lead

and changed her title. To survive summary judgment on

this claim, she must establish that the change in job

duties and title constitute an adverse employment action

within the meaning of the statute. Id.

Ms. Maclin and Ameritech agree that she returned to

work at the MU salary grade, the same grade that she had

before her leave of absence. Gentilini, the new team lead,

also had that salary grade. Ameritech contends that,

because Ms. Maclin’s position has the same salary, benefits and opportunities for promotion as the person in the

team lead role, denying her the team lead position was

not an adverse employment action. See Grayson v. City of

Chicago, 317 F.3d 745, 750 (7th Cir. 2003).

Ms. Maclin does not offer any evidence that there is a

difference, significant or otherwise, between her duties as

complex bids manager and the team lead. She contends

only that some time after Gentilini was made team lead,
14 No. 07-1751

Ameritech officially changed her title from area manager

to complex bids manager. Ms. Maclin submits that she

suffered an adverse employment action because that

change in title resulted in a loss of prestige.

This contention fails to establish that Ms. Maclin suffered an adverse employment action. An adverse employment action must involve a material, substantive

change in an employee’s pay and responsibilities. Grayson,

317 F.3d at 750. An employee has not suffered an adverse

employment action if her title changes but her position

remains the same in terms of responsibilities, salary,

benefits and opportunities for promotion. Id. Even a

change in title that deprives an employee of prestige is

insufficient if it lacks more substantive effect. See id.

Ms. Maclin contends only that Ameritech changed

her title after she was placed in Bid Central and in the

MU salary, and that it did so on the basis of her race or

gender. It is undisputed that Ms. Maclin remains in the

same salary grade that she held before her title changed

in 2004 from area manager to complex bids manager. She

has not established that the change had any significant or

material affect on her job or opportunities for advancement.

See id. Ms. Maclin has not shown that, if she had been given

the team lead role upon her return to work, she would have

had better responsibilities, salary, benefits or opportunities

for promotion. Id. In fact, she conceded that the team lead

position as it exists today does not have the responsibilities

that she had as team lead in 2003. At most, Ms. Maclin

contends that she lost prestige when Ameritech changed

her title and began calling her a complex bids manager

instead of an area manager. Therefore, she has failed to

establish that she suffered an adverse employment action;

she consequently cannot state a discrimination claim
No. 07-1751 15

because she failed to establish a necessary element of her

prima facie case. Id.; Raymond, 442 F.3d at 610.

Conclusion

For the foregoing reasons, we affirm the judgment of

the district court.

AFFIRMED

USCA-02-C-0072—4-1-08