Federal Research and Technology for

Aviation

September 1994

OTA-ETI-610

NTIS order #PB95-109195

GPO stock #052-003-01391-6
Recommended Citation: U.S. Congress, Office of Technology Assessment, Federal

Research and Technology for Aviation, OTA–ETI-61O (Washington, DC: U.S.

Government Printing Office, September 1994).

For sale by the US. Government Printing Office

Superintendent of Documenta, Mail Stop: SSOP, Washington, DC 20402-9328
Foreword

w

ithin the United States, only the federal government has the resources to support large-scale, applied research and development programs for aviation safety and infrastructure. Federally

sponsored aviation research has received considerable congressional attention in the last decade due to the need to modernize and expand

the U.S. airspace system, address aircraft safety and environmental issues,

and respond to terrorism threats against air travelers. The House Committee

on Science, Space, and Technology and its Subcommittee on Competitiveness and Technology (now the Subcommittee on Technology, Environment

and Aviation) asked the Office of Technolog y Assessment to take a comprehensive look at the federal R&D that underpins the Federal Aviation Administration’s technology and regulatory development programs. Longterm research efforts and airline economics were special concerns. The

study was also endorsed by the House Subcommittee on Aviation of the

Committee on Public Works and Transportation, and the House Subcommittee on Government Activities and Transportation of the Committee on

Government Operations.

This report focuses on research and technology policy issues for aviation

operations: safety, security, environmental protection, and the air traffic

system. Achievements in science and technology have helped make the

U.S. air transportation system the safest and most efficient in the world, but

the system could be improved further. However, operational success in the

complex aviation system depends on more than technological advances. If

technological solutions are to be more timely and useful, federal aviation

R&D programs will need more effective approaches to priority setting and

analysis, and more active participation by operational” experts. This is crucial for the air traffic system, where technology decisions have not always

meshed with operational requirements. In this report, OTA identifies various initiatives that Congress and federal agencies could consider in setting

the national aviation R&D agenda, restructuring the management process

for air traffic system R&D, and clarifying FAA’s role in long-term research

and in international standards development for an increasingly global aviation system.

OTA appreciates the invaluable advice and assistance of the many

people who contributed to this project, including the advisory panel, contractors, and reviewers.

ROGER C. HERDMAN

Director

,,,

Ill
Najeeb E. Halaby, Chairman

Chairman

Safair International

Robert W. Baker

Executive Vice President,

Operations

American Airlines, Inc.

William F. Ball ha us, Jr.

President

Martin Marietta Aero & Naval

Systems

Robert A. Davis

Vice President, Engineering

Boeing Commercial Airplane

Group

Donald D. Engen

President

AOPA Air Safety Foundation

Edmund S. Greenslet

President

ESG Aviation Services

David Haase

Executive Central Air Safety

Chairman

Air Line Pilots Association

Jonathan Howe

Attorney

Zuckert, Scoutt & Rasenberger

Noreene Koan

Chairperson, National Air Safety

Committee

Association of Flight Attendants

Richard Livingston

Consultant

T. Al Ian McArtor

President

FEDEX Aeronautics Corp.

Clinton V. Oster, Jr.

Professor

School of Public and

Environmental Affairs

Indiana University

Willard G. Plentl, Jr.

Director

Division of Aviation for North

Carolina

Robert W. Simpson

Director

Flight Transportation Laboratory

Massachusetts Institute of

Technology

Richard Swauger

Air Traffic Consultant

Patricia F. Wailer

Director

Transportation Research Institute

University of Michigan

Note: OTA appreciates and is grateful for the valuable assistance and thoughtful critiques provided by the advisory panel members.

The panel does not, however, necessarily approve, disapprove, or endorse this report. OTA- assumes fuII responsibility for the report

and the accuracy of its contents.
Peter Blair1

Assistant Director

Industry, Commerce, and

International Security Division

John Andelin2

Assistant Director

Science, Information, and

Natural Resources Division

Emilia L. Govan

Program Director

Energy, Transportation, and

Infrastructure

PRINCIPAL STAFF

KEVIN DOPART

Project Director

Kelley Scott

Principal Analyst

Daniel Cohen

Analyst

Gregory Wallace

Research Analyst

CONTRIBUTING STAFF

Elizabeth Sheley

In-House Contractor

Jeanne Olivier

Detailee, Port Authority of

New York and New Jersey

CONTRACTORS

Dale Atkinson

Consultant

Andrew Pickens

AVCOMM, Inc.

Richard Golaszewski

Gellman Research

Associates. Inc.

Global Aviation

Associates, Ltd.

J. Lynn Helms

International Consultants, Ltd.

Michael J. Prather

Department of Geosciences

University of California,

Preject Staff

ADMINISTRATIVE STAFF

Marsha Fenn

Editor

Lillian Chapman

Division Administrator

Gay Jackson

PC Specialist

Tina Aikens

Administrative Secretary

Tamara Kowalski

Secretary

John Rhea

Consultant

Robert W. Simpson

Flight Transportation Laboratory

Massachusetts Institute of Technology

Rokaya A. A1-Ayat

Institute of Transportation Studies

University of California, Berkeley

Irvine

1 After Augu\t 1993.

2 Through Au.gu\t 1993.
Reviewers

Thomas Accardi

Federal Aviation Administration

Jim Bryson

U.S. Environmental Protection

Agency

Frank J. Colson

Department of Defense

William B. Cotton

United Airlines, Inc.

James L. Crook

Air Traffic Control Association

Jack Durham

U.S. Environmental Protection

Agency

John Fearnsides

The Mitre Corp.

John Fischer

Congressional Research Service

Richard Golaszewski

Gellman Research Associates,

Inc.

Ed Hazelwood

ATC Market Report

Terry Hertz

National Aeronautics and Space

Administration

Mark Hofmann

Federal Aviation Administration

Herbert Jasper

McManus Associates, Inc.

Nicholas Krull

Federal Aviation Administration

Mary Ann Kruslicky

U.S. General Accounting Office

Paul Larson

Federal Aviation Administration

Alfred W. Lindsey

U.S. Environmental Protection

Agency

David Lockwood

Global Aviation Associates, Ltd.

John McLucas

Aerospace Consultant

David Morrissey

Federal Aviation Administration

John O’Brien

Air Line Pilots Association

Paul Polski

Federal Aviation Administration

Martin Pozesky

Federal Aviation Administration

Robert Rovinsky

Federal Aviation Administration

Constantine Sarkos

Federal Aviation Administration

Arthur Shrantz

National Center for

Research

David Swierenga

Atmospheric

Air Transport Association of

America

Maris Vikmanis

Wright-Patterson Air Force Base

Stein Weissenberger

Lawrence Livermore National

Laboratory

Robert Whitehead

National Aeronautics and Space

Administration

Carlton Wine

Federal Aviation Administration
1

2

3

4

5

Summary and Policy Conclusions 1

Findings 9

Policy Conclusions 2 5

Conclusion 3 2

Institutional and Management Issues

for Civil Aviation Research and

Technology 35

Organizational Framework 3 5

Interagency Coordination on Aviation R&D 4 6

Technology Development and Implementation for

ATC 5 2

Conclusions 69

Data and Analysis for Aviation R&D 73

Historical Payoffs of Aviation R&D 7 4

Weighing Current Issues 82

Issues in Setting Priorities 95

Predicting Future Problems 101

Federal Aviation Data and Assessment Resources 103

Conclusions 116

Research and Technology Issues 117

Crosscutting Research Issues 118

New Functions and Technology Options 130

Conclusions 156

Economic Issues for Aviation

Operations 157

The U.S. Airline Industry 157

Air Traffic Control Equipment Manufacturing 172

Conclusions 174

APPENDIXES

A Abbreviations 177

B Workshop Participants 181

INDEX 185

contents

vii
Summary

and

Policy

Conclusions 1

A

mericans have extremely high, and often conflicting, expectations for air transportation. We want plenty of flights

to many destinations, but have little tolerance for aircraft

noise above our homes; we insist that airlines be as safe as

possible, but demand ever lower ticket prices; and many of us

want to leave or arrive at similar times, but are annoyed by congested roads and terminals and delayed flights.

Compared with aviation systems around the world, U.S. air

transportation comes closest to meeting this wide range of exacting standards (see figure 1-l). Benefiting from decades of public

and private research and technology investment, passengers and

freight can travel by air across the United States today more safely, for less cost, and with less environmental impact than ever before (see figure 1-2). Research and technology development have

contributed to these positive results and now promise further

gains. However, to better anticipate new safety and efficiency

challenges to the aviation system and to promptly modernize

the U.S. air traffic control (ATC) system federal aviation research and development (R&D) must encompass more than

technology. The early and continuing advice of operational experts must be part of this process, and operational issues, as well

as technological ones, must be within its scope.

The Federal Aviation Administration (FAA) plays a pivotal

role in improving the performance of the aviation system. FAA’s

11
2 I Federal Research and Technology for Aviation

United States3

Fatal accident record by region

(Scheduled passenger flights, 1977-89)

30

T_

North America

Latin America

Western Europe

Eastern Europe

Asia

Africa

Middle East

II

O 2 4 6 8 10 12 14 16

Fatal accidents/million departures

Airline noise abatement technology

by region (1993)b

1

Asia and Pacific I

Africa I

Middle East I

I I I

o 20 40 60 80 100

Percent of fleet that is Stage 3

a Data for the Umted States includes cargo fllghts

b Data are for western-bu[lt aircraft only

Operating costs for selected airlines (1991 )

■ Swissair

JAL

#

Air France

Lufthansa

Ethiopian

■ British Airways

USAir / S. African

,+<varig ■

American Singapore

Southwest Continental

0 500 1000 1500 2000 2500

Average stage length (miles)

A = U.S. airlines ■ = Foreign airlines

—

c By law, U S airl[ne fleets must be all ‘Stage 3 by the year 2004, I e meeting the most stringent noise requirements

d Does not Include members of the Commonwealth of Independent States

NOTE Curved Ime [n “operating costs” graph IS a best flt plot for U S alrlmes only

SOURCE Off Ice of Technology Assessment, 1994, based on accident data from CllntonOster, Why A@anes Crash (New York, NY Oxford Unwerslty Press, 1992), Federal AvlattonAdmlnlstratlon, and National Transportation Safety Board, noise abatement data from Boeing and alrllneoperatlng

cost data from Global Avlahon Associates, Ltd International Alr Transport Assoclatlon, and Alr Transport Assoclatlon of America
Chapter 1 Summary and Policy Conclusions 13

missions to promote safety and foster air commerce

] are incorporated in three key areas: 1 ) regulation, 2) infrastructure development, and 3)

ATC operations. These missions are highly technical, and research and technology development

are important to each. Federal R&D related to

these missions occurs not only at FAA but at other

agencies, including the National Aeronautics and

Space Administration (NASA), the Department

of Defense (DOD), the Department of Energy

(DOE), and the Department of Commerce.

As regulator and ATC operator, FAA has ties to

all segments of the aviation community. FAA’s

foremost obligation for aviation research and

technology is to identify the long-term operational requirements for the aviation system. In carrying out this responsibility, it is especially important for FAA to work with other federal

agencies conducting research to ensure that the

specific needs of aviation are addressed within

other research programs.

Federal aviation R&D programs are mostly

technology-driven, and scientists and engineers at

the federal laboratories have contributed to many

critical elements of the modern aviation system,

including radar, avionics, and advanced materials.

However, policy makers expect more from these

types of R&D programs than the programs alone

can deliver in the regulatory and operational arenas. Policy and management decisions to improve

aviation safety or air traffic operations that depend

primarily on technology-driven R&D often fall

short of objectives. Aviation safety and efficiency

are system attributes, and a detailed understanding of how the aviation system operates on a day-

(o-day basis is crucial to targeting R&D efforts

and implementing the new technologies. The scientists, engineers, and administrators who staff federal research institutions rarely have this expertise.

The aviation system relies on a range of R&D

efforts—from collecting safety inspection data

and developing air traffic procedures, to scientific

research and technology-centered projects. In addition, for both today’s and future systems, a clear

understanding of the problems that are to be addressed with R&D is essential; it is here that

FAA’s role is most critical and in most need of

strengthening. The R&D process would be more

effective if it drew more upon the diverse skills

and experience of aircraft crews, air traffic controllers, technicians, manufacturers, and others.

This is especially true for ATC system development. The ATC system is not just equipment, but

operating standards and procedures—the rules of

the game, so to speak. And both parts of the system must be developed in concert. More so than in

other fields, it is necessary to know clearly what

the equipment is supposed to do before building it.

To accomplish this, experienced operational personnel must also be an integral part of the technol -

‘ Section 103 of the Federal Aviation Act (Public Law 85-726, Aug. 23, 1958) provides [he declaration of policy that states.

In the exercise and performance of his powers and duties under this Act, the Administrator shall consider the following, among o[hcr

thmg~, a~ being in the public interest:

( I ) The regulation of air commerce in such manner as to best promote development and safety and fulfill the requirements of national

defense:

(2) TTIe promotion, encouragement, and development of civil aeronautics;

(3) The control of the use of the navigable airspace of the United States and the regulation of bo[h civil and military operations in $uch

airspace in the interest of the safety and efficiency of both;

(4) The con~olidation of research and development with respect to air navigation facilities, as well as the installtition and operation

thereof:

(5) The development and operation of a common system of air traffic control and navigation for both militar} and civil aircraft,
4 I Federal Research and Technology for Aviation

Safety: fatalities per passenger trip

1-

0.8-

0.6-

0.4-

0.2-

0

Fuel efficiency: energy use per passenger-mile

.— —.

1-

0.8-

0.6-

0.4-

0.2-

0

Average ticket price: inflation-adjusted dollars per mile

0.8

0.6

1

0.4

0.2

0

L

1971-75 1976-80 1981-85 1986-90

NOTE Calculations are for five-year averages, normalized to the

1971-75 data

SOURCE Off Ice of Technology Assessment, 1994, based on. Safety

data from the Federal Awatlon Admmlstratlon and the National Transportation Safety Board fuel effmency data from the Department of Energy Energy information Off Ice, and ticket price data from Boeing,

1993 Current Market Outlook

ogy development and engineering process. In addition, the research and engineering methodologies commonly used in developing technologies must be used in analyzing and advancing the

operational standards, practices, and procedures

for ATC systems. However, that generally has not

been the case. Modernization efforts have most

often been held up by inadequate understanding of operational and procedural issues, rather than by insufficient technological expertise.

Other challenges for the U.S. aviation system

are international in nature. Advances in aviation

technology and less restrictive trade policies

around the world are forcing globalization of

aviation industries and infrastructure. As the

aviation industry becomes global, its operations

will benefit from more uniform safety, environmental, and operating standards worldwide. But

the current international framework for handling

aviation technical issues is inadequate. While aircraft and ATC technologies can span oceans and

continents, the institutions that regulate and operate the international air transportation system do

not have the same reach.

The opportunity now exists for the United

States to provide world leadership in the technical

areas of aviation operations. U.S. expertise in aviation safety, environmental effects, and air traffic

systems can be decisive factors in the deliberations of multinational aviation organizations.

FAA is the agency best positioned to meet this

global challenge, but needs a clear mandate to step

up its efforts in the international arena.

Most important, satellite systems and digital

communications will likely form the backbone of

air traffic communications, navigation, and surveillance (CNS) systems in the near future. FAA’s

current efforts to implement such CNS systems

for U.S. operations could potentially form the basis for an efficient international system.

Moreover, new technologies provide the opportunity for private or other nonfederal organizations to own and operate key elements of the CNS

infrastructure. FAA will thus face new challenges

in fulfilling its safety oversight responsibilities.

Such opportunities and FAA challenges will exist
Chapter 1 Summary and Policy Conclusions 15

R&D Important to FAA's rnissions IS also conducted at other

federal agencies

regardless of the outcome of the Clinton Administration’s proposal to establish a federal corporation to operate, maintain, and modernize the nation’s ATC system (see box 1-1 ).

I Congressional Interest and

Scope of Study

Federally sponsored aviation research has received considerable congressional attention in the

last decade due to the need to modernize and expand the U.S. airspace system. address aircraft

safety and environmental issues. and respond to

terrorism threats against air travelers. Congressional appropriations for R&D directed at these

responsibilities go primarily to FAA and NASA,

and grew from $82 million in fiscal year 1980 to

$352 million in fiscal year 1994 (see table 1-1).

For FAA. these funds were appropriated to the

agency’s Research. Engineering and Development (RE&D) account. The term RE&D is used in

FAA legislation, budget. and planning documents. In this report, the Office of Technology As-

~Publlc la\+ 97-24/! (-!9 11s(’ 2201 ).

sessment (OTA) uses RE&D only when referring

to specific FAA accounts, programs, or organizations that use the term in their designations. OTA

uses R&D to refer generally to scientific and technological research and development conducted at

FAA or elsewhere. This distinction is important,

since some FAA R&D is conducted outside the

RE&D program.

Major increases for FAA R&D were provided

under the Airport and Airway Improvement Act of

1982,2 which authorized funding for the National

Airspace System Plan to modernize the ATC system. Additionally, substantial amounts of ATC

R&D ($555 million in fiscal year 1993)3 

are supported with FAA’s facilities and equipment (F&E)

account.

The achievements of the federal aviation research and technology programs have received

mixed reviews. While FAA has been criticized by

some for not being sufficiently proactive in uncovering safety deficiencies, the agency has a successful record of developing technological, procedural, or operational solutions once a safety problem

is clearly defined. On the other hand, FAA has had

a history of troubles in introducing complex

technologies into the operational system.

Previous OTA studies have pointed to deficiencies in FAA’s research agenda, especially the lack

of attention to human factors and other long-term

issues 4 

. . . . Legislation enacted since 1988 addressed

these and other concerns. The Aviation Safety Research Act of 19885 required FAA to spend at

least 15 percent of its R&D budget on long-term

issues, specified human factors as part of FAA research, and created an agency advisory committee

for R&D. This FAA RE&D Advisory Committee

has taken an active role in reviewing FAA’s R&D

plans and has increased the visibility of research at
6 I Federal Research and Technology for Aviation

In May 1994, the Clinton Administration proposed shifting U.S. air traffic control responsibillities from

the Federal Aviation Administration to a wholly owned government corporation that would be a financialIy and operationally Independent organization within the Department of Transportation (DOT),l Concluding that “ATC IS the kind of service best delivered by a businesslike entity, ” the Executive Oversight

Committee established by the Secretary of Transportation to study ATC restructuring options recommended that a U S Air Traffic Services (USATS) Corporation be created to operate, maintain, and modernize the ATC system. The USATS proposal IS generally consistent with the recommendations of the

National Performance Review and the Airline Commission, 2 and draws on examples of ATC corporations In other countries3 as well as U.S. government corporations In other fields.4

The USATS would be a not-for-profit corporation funded by user fees and debt financing, with general aviation and public users permanently exempted from the user charges. The corporation would be

governed by an 11-member board of directors, composed of a chief executive officer, the Secretary of

Transportation, the Secretary of Defense, and eight Individuals from the aviation community, appointed

by the President and confirmed by the Senate. Additionally, the Secretary of Transportation would have

direct power to disapprove the level of user fees and borrowing. However, national security policy for air

traffic services, Including joint civil-military use of the airspace system, would stay unchanged,

The USATS would be responsible for the day-to-day operations and long-term development of the

U S ATC system, but would be subject to FAA safety oversight (see figure). FAA would retain responsibilities for safety regulation and certification, safety and environmental research, and airport development programs, as well as continue its current relationships with Congress, DOT, the Department of

Defense, and other federal entities. Approximately two-thirds of FAA's budget supports ATC, FAA funding could be reduced by more than $6 billion once a USATS was in place,5

There are a number of issues yet to be resolved for the USATS proposal. The USATS study points to

federal budget and procurement constraints as the primary causes of slow ATC modernization, and

concludes that a corporation freed from these restrictions could accelerate ATC system modernization 6

However, the General Accounting Office (GAO) analyses do not support this concluslon,7 GAO points

to other technical and managerial factors, such as FAA’s underestimating the complexity of system development, as the key causes of implementation delays, Furthermore, GAO states that " . among the

financing issues raised by the [USATS] proposal, revenue and expenditure assumptions deserve a

closer look, and close scrutiny of how safety wiII be ensured IS warranted. ”8

‘ U S Department of Transportation, AM Tw%c Cor?tro/ Corporation Sfudy, Report of the Executwe Oversight Committee to the

Secretary of Transportahon (Washington DC May 1994), p 5

2 Natlona[ per form[lnce Review, From Red Tape (O Results Creat/ng a Government That Works Better& COSfs Less (Washington

DC Off Ice of the Vice President, September 1993), and Nat{onal Commlsslon To Ensure a Strong Compehtlve Alrllne Industry

Change, Challenge, and Compet/t/on A Reporl to fhe Pres/derrt and Congress (Washington DC U S Government PrlntlngOffice,

August 1993)

3 United Kingdom, New Zealand Australla, and Germany U S Department of Transportation, Op Clt fOOtnOte 1, P 141

4 Examples Include St Lawrence Seaway Development Corporation, Amtrak, and the U S Postal Serwce Ibid p 147

5FOr fiscal year 1993, $63 bllllon of FAAs $91 bllllon total funding was allocated to ATC U S Department of Transportation. A/r

Traff/c Confro/ Ana/ys/s of///ustratwe Corporate Fmanc/a/ Scenarios techrucal report prepared by the Corporation Assessment Task

Force for the Executive Oversight Committee (Washington, DC May 1994) p 10

6 u s Department of Transportation OP Cf , footnote 1, P 9

7 U S Congress General Accounting Off Ice, Air Traffic Control Observations on Proposed Corporation, testimony at hearings

before the Senate Comrnttee on Approprlatlons, Subcommltteeon Transportation and Related Agencies GAOT-RCED-94-21O, May

12, 1994, p 1

8 Ibid p 2
Chapter 1 Summary and Policy Conclusions 17

Federal Framework for Aviation With a USATS Corporation

➤ -- –.. 1 User charge and debt oversight

I Secretary of Transportation F ‘- - -

L.......~

1

Federal Aviation Administration

Leadership: Administrator

Key responsibilities:

m Regulation and certification for

aviation safety, security,

and environmental protection

Q Airport development

Funding:

■ Airport and Airway Trust Fund

● General Fund

—

1

, Safety oversight

-4

-%--.-—. -----

Air Traffic Services Corporation T

. .

Leadership: Board of Directorsa “

Key responsibilities:

I Air navigation, air traffic control, and

I flight planning and advisory services I

■ Air traffic system research,

development, and implementation

Funding:

~ User charges

■ Debt financing

aThe 11 members of the board, who are appointed by the President, wou Id Include a ch[ef execut we officer the Secretary of Transportation, the Secretary of Defense, and eight Indwlduals from the avlatlon communlfy

SOURCE Office of Technology Assessment, 1994, based on the U S Department of Transportation, Ar Tratf/c Contro/

Corporation Study. Repofl of the Executwe Overs/ght Comm/ttee to the Secretary of Transporta[lon (Washington, DC

May 1994)

FY 1992 FY 1993 FY 1994a

(real-year dollars in millions)

Aviation category FAAb NASA F AA

b NASA FAAb NASA .—— —

Air traffic system 1013 185 1031 31-9 1172 506 “

-

Safety 6 4 7 15.4 71 8 193 7 3 3 2 2 2

Environrnent c

4.0 170 4 8 193 5 4 4 7 0

Security 3 1 9 0 0 3 5 9 0 0 3 5 9 0 0

Subtotal 201 9 5 0 9 215 6 7 0 5 2318 1198

Total 252.8 286.1 351.6 — — a Budget request

b FAA figures are for the agency’s Research, Englneenng and Development program, except management and lnnOvatlve/Cooperative research

Ime Items that are not Included Addmonally, R&D funded out of FAAs faclllles and equipment account IS not Included

c NASA high-speed commercial transport enwronmental R&D not included ($76 4 mllllon m FY 1992 $1058 mllllon In FY 1993 $1346 mtlllon In FY

1 994)

SOURCE OffIce of Technology Assessment, 1994, based on NASA and FAA da?a
8 I Federal Research and Technology for Aviation

Safety

Security

Environment

Issue Potential improvements

Airspace efficiency Increased capacity and less delay without diminished safety by:

● Enhancing communications, navigation, and surveillance technologies and procedures to permit closer spacing between aircraft and increased aircraft arrival and

departure rates at airports

■ Augmenting airport surface traffic management capabilities, especially in low-visibility conditions

 Improving the reliability and accuracy of weather forecasts

Fewer and less severe accidents by:

■ Improving the reliability of engines, avionics, and other aircraft systems

■ Enhancing aircraft crew and controller awareness of aircraft situation in all conditions.

■ Reducing personnel fatigue and stress

● Reducing fire threat,

● Enabling better crew communication and coordination,

■ Enhancing structural airworthiness and crashworthiness.

Threat deterrence and mitigation by:

■ Enhancing explosives and weapons detection capabilities.

● Increasing aircraft resilience to explosions,

● Improving passenger and cargo screening methods and airport security systems,

■ Ensuring secure air traffic control system design and operation,

Less environmental impact from aviation by:

■ Reducing aircraft noise emissions in order to lower or maintain community noise

levels as operations increase,

■ Minimizing engine emissions and increased fuel efficiency,

■ Improving management of existing deicing and firefighting compounds and

Introducing new, more environmentally benign materials,

■ Improving aircraft cabin air quality

SOURCE Office of Technology Assessment, 1994

the agency. Aviation security and aging aircraft issues were addressed in subsequent legislation.6

Reiterating that a safe, efficient, and environmentally sound air transportation system is crucial to the national economy and the future of the

aviation industry, Congress asked OTA to take a

comprehensive look at the federal research and

technology efforts that underpin this system. The

effects of FAA’s technology and regulatory activities on airline economics and international competitiveness were special concerns.

This study focuses on research and technology

policy issues for aviation operations: safety, security, environmental protection, and the air traffic

system (see table 1-2). Other aviation technology

policy issues, such as manufacturing competitiveness, national security, and training and education, are beyond the scope of this study.

 Background

Aviation draws the persistent attention of policymakers, and few enterprises in the United States

are subject to greater federal involvement. With

the creation of the National Advisory Committee

for Aeronautics in 1915, aeronautical research became the first segment of civil aviation to be addressed by federal policy. Through the following

decades, the federal government has continued to

c~bllc Law 101-604, NOV. 16, 1990; and Public Law 101-508, Sec. 9208, NOV. 5, 1990.
Chapter 1 Summary and Policy Conclusions 19

be a major supporter of aeronautical and related

aviation research and technology development.

Federal responsibilities for aviation technology

have steadily expanded to encompass safety and

environmental regulation, infrastructure development, and ATC operations (see box 1-2). Each

new generation of technology and operating procedures has brought performance advances to air

transportation.

U.S. aviation industries have historically generated high-quality, well-paying jobs and produced technologically and economically superior

equipment and services (see table 1-3). However,

in recent years, aviation in the United States and

Europe has suffered financially. No domestic carrier—with the notable exception of Southwest

Airlines—was unscathed by the economic recession of the early 1990s. U.S. airlines lost $12.8

billion from 1990 to 1993,7 three airlines ceased

operations,8 and three others filed for Chapter 11

bankruptcy (see chapter 5). That recession caused

heavier than usual reductions in high-yield business travel, possibly indicating a systemic change

in the demand for such travel.

The cost of implementing additional technical

requirements was relatively minor while the aviation industry-and its productivity—grew rapidly, But times have changed. Benefits from future

technical initiatives in aviation safety, security,

and environment will likely be both small and relatively costly since the performance of the existing system is quite good.9 U.S. aviation industries

are likely to grow more slowly than in previous

decades, and the challenge now is to increase the

economic performance of the system while maintaining—and improving when feasible—its high

level of safety, security, and environmental performance.

Air traffic infrastructure issues are somewhat

different in that failure to improve system performance can have a severe economic penalty. The

U.S. ATC system, while safer and more efficient

than any other in the world, still uses equipment

and procedures that fall far short of what are technologically possible. While upgrades to the current ATC system will not come cheaply, small advances in system capacity and efficiency can mean

large savings in time and money to aircraft operators and the traveling public. For example, OTA

calculates that a 1-percent reduction in flight time

due to more efficient flight paths would yield U.S.

airline industry savings of approximately $250

million a year in lower direct operating costs.

Therefore, FAA’s regulatory and operational

responsibilities may be more important to industry growth now than in the early days of aviation.

Safety remains the top priority at FAA. Any lapse

in maintaining safety could prove economically

disastrous to aviation operators, not to mention

the potential human cost. This is an especially important concern for the rapidly growing commuter

airline segment of the industry, as highlighted by

the convening of a National Transportation Safety

Board (NTSB) special board of inquiry on commuter airline safety in June 1994.

But FAA’s mandate is also to foster air commerce. While trade, finance, and other economic

policies outside the scope of FAA’s authority are

generally more critical to aviation economics,

FAA technical regulations and air traffic system

management have substantial economic consequences. Without diminishing the agency’s safety

mission, FAA’s capability for bolstering aircraft

operating economics for all segments of the aviation community needs to be encouraged and

strengthened.

FINDINGS

OTA findings on federal aviation research and

technology development focus on aviation operational issues—safety, security, environmental

70f ~e ~lr]lnej ~el ].ss in ] 992, ~pproximate]y $2 bij]l~n was due t. accounting adjustments re]ated [O retiree benefits (see ch. 5).

xEastem Air Lines, pan Am World Airways, and Midway Airlines.

9~e largest ~afe[y and env ironmenta] problems in av iation operations pale in comparison to difficulties in ofier Sectors of modem s~ietY.
10 I Federal Research and Technology for Aviation

What Is “Research and Development”?

The meaning of research and development (R&D) varies throughout government and Industry. Using National

Science Foundation (NSF) nomenclature, the objective of basic research is to better understand fundamental concepts and observations without specific applications in mind. Applied research seeks to gain such knowledge or

understanding to determine how to meet a defined need. Exploring or solving problems in a specific context is

therefore targeted, or applied, research. Development, in turn, is the systematic use of research results, directed

toward the production of materials, devices, systems, or methods. Feasibility demonstration IS another component

of development, as is engineering (see figure)

The National Aeronautics and Space Administration (NASA) conducts applied research to support its own

space and aeronautics program goals, as well as other federal R&D needs. The programs that the Federal Aviation Administration calls Research, Engineering and Development (RE&D) generally correspond to what NSF

would call development, focused on integrating new or upgraded technologies into an operational framework

What Is Aviation R&D?

Aviation R&D encompasses the science and technology of air transportation and systems of aircraft operations Two broad categories of aviation R&D correspond to FAA’s key missions: regulatory (safety, security, and

environment) and operational (air traffic control). Aeronautics, a fundamental field underlying aviation, addresses

the design and performance of individual aircraft—aerodynamics, structures, propulsion, and control systems

NASA conducts both aeronautical and aviation R&D; FAA’s R&D focuses on aviation, where it provides and

uses research results FAA’s responsibility for technology development differs for its regulatory and operational

missions FAA advances its R&D corresponding to safety, security, and environmental regulatory inltiatives to the

feasibility demonstration or pre-production stage For the ATC system, however, FAA’s role continues through procurement and implementation.

Federal Research and Technology Programs and Terminology

I National Science Foundation Classifications I

Basic research Applied research Development Production

I Federal Aviation Administration I

Research, Engineering Facilities and Equipment

National Science Foundation

I

and Development

I University grants I

r NASA 1

1

Aeronautics

I

I Department of Defense I

6.1 – Research 6.2 – Exploratory 6.3-6.6 – Advanced, Procurement

development engineering and

operational development

SOURCE Off Ice of Technology Assessment, 1994
Chapter 1 Summary and Policy Conclusions 111

Long-Term Research and Technology Issues Differ for Each of FAA’s Missions

Long-term research (from the Aviation Safety Research Act of 1988) “. means a research project which IS

Identified as a discrete project in the aviation research plan required by section 31 2(d)(1) of the Federal Aviation

Act of 1958 and which IS unlikely to result in a final rulemaking action within 5 years, or in initial installation of operational equipment within 10 years, after the date of the commencement of such project ‘ Research IS not defined

in the act

Long-term research issues for aviation safety, security, and environment are primarily scientific or analytic—

seeking better understanding of the ‘(problem “ (See the table below, which Iists particular areas of aviation R&D

and the responsible federal organizations ) The long-term needs for FAA’s other mlsslon-developing and operating the National Airspace System—are primarily planning and system engineering. Long-term research on new air

traffic system concepts and functions IS essential,

Federal Aviation R&D Responsibilities

R&D mission area R&D conducted R&D conducted within other

within FAA agencies or organizations

Safety

Human factors Somea NASA, DOD

Aeromedical Yes NASA, DOD

Aircraft safety (e g materials, Yes b NASA, NIST, DOD, DOE labs, industry

fire, aging aircraft cabin safety,

catastrophic failure prevention)

Weather N o

c NOAA, NSF (NCAR)

Environment N o

d NASA, NSF, DOE, EPA, industry

Security

Explosives detection and mitigation Yes DOD, DOE labs, FBI, DOE, ICAO,

Industry

Aviation security (e g , detectors, Yes DNA, DOD, DOE labs, CIA, FBI,

sensors, profiling) industry

Airports and air traffic control Somee

Industry, NASA, DOD labs

Environment

Environment Somef

lndustry l NASA, DOD

Weather N 0

g

Industry NASA, NCAR, NOAA, DOD

a FAA conducts some human factors research at the Techmcal Center and funds more extenswe research at NASA

h FM conducts fire safety research at CAM I and the Technical Center, FAA funds NASA and Industry malerlals research

and has funded NIST fire research

‘: ho in house research conducted FAA funds awatlon weather research at NCAR and has joint programs with NOAA

c FM funds noise recluctton research W NASA

“ Lmted In-house development effort, FAA sponsors work by the Mltre Corp Lincoln Labs, and industry

f FAA develops noise Impact and ground-level emlsslons dispersion models

~ FAA funds nex! generahon weather radar (N EXRAD) system development with NOAA and DOD, and NASA sensor development

KEY CAMI FAA CIVII Aeromedlcal Instltufe, Oklahoma City, ClA=Central Intelligence Agency, DNA = Defense

Nuclear Agency, DOD= Department of Defense, DOE= Department of Energy, EPA= Environmental ProtectIon

Agency FA/- Federal Aviation Admmlstratlon, FBl=Federal Bureau of Investlgatlon, ICAO=lnternatlonal CIVII AvIa!lon Organ[zabon, NASA= National Aeronautics and Space Admln[stratlon, NCAR=Natlonal Center for Atmospheric Research NIST=Natlonal Instltu:e of Standards and Technology, NOAA= National Oceanographic and Atmospheric Admlnlstratlon, NSF =Natlonal Science Foundation

SOURCE Off Ice of Technology Assessment 1994
12 I Federal Research and Technology for Aviation

Revenue U.S. balance of payments Employment

Industry -- ($ billions) ($ billions) (thousands)

Civil aircraft manufacturinga

$30 7 $19.5 133,4

Air traffic control equipment 1 5 0.4 4 4

manufacturing

Airline service 77.9 6.4 C

5404 — aRevenue, market share, and balance of payments calculations based on the value of CIVII transports, rotorcraft, and general

awatlonalrcraft delwered by U S manufacturers In 1992 Excludes figures for separate engines and parts and produchonby

foreign license

bAl[ figures based on OTA survey of U S air traffic control equipment manufacturers, 1993

cBalance of payments for International alr service represents the ddference between airfares paid to U S carriers by international vmtors traveling to the United States and fares paid to foreign carriers by Americans traveling abroad

SOURCES Off Ice of Technology Assessment, 1994, based on data compiled from Aerospace Industries

Assoclahon of America, Aerospace /ndustry Rev/ew, Alr Transport Assoclatlon of America, ATC Market Report,

Bell Helicopter Textron, Boeing, Bureau of Economic Analysis, General Aviation Manufacturers Association, /nteravla Aerospace Wor/d, International CIVII Aviahon Orgamzatlon,Office of Management and Budget, U S Travel

and Tourism Admmlstratlon, and World Jet Atrplane Inventory

Small Improvements in airspace system capacity can mean large savings in time and money,
Chapter 1 Summary and Policy Conclusions 113

protection, and the air traffic system. These findings arc presented in four categories: 1 ) technical

standards for international aviation, 2) ATC modernization in the United States, 3) research for aviation safety and environmental protection, and 4)

interagency coordination on aviation R&D.

I Technical Standards for

International Aviation

Commercial jets have made much of the world accessible within one day of travel. Now aviation industries, institutions, and technologies themselves arc becoming global in scale. This will have

profound implications for U.S. regulatory, infrastructure, and other transportation policies. Many

of the world’s airlines are expanding—via strategic alliances, marketing agreements, or route acquisitions-in an attempt to offer passengers the

most extensive route systems. Commercial aircraft manufacturers increasingly rely on international cooperation to help spread development

costs for new-generation jets and to gain footholds

in foreign markets. Developments in satellite

CNS technology make “seamless” global ATC

possible for every nation.

The future of U.S. aviation is global, lnternational safety and environmental regulations and

ATC standards and operational procedures are becoming increasingly important to U. S aviation industry

economics.

The International Civil Aviation Organization

(ICAO) sets standards for international aviation-for safety, environment, and infrastructure

(ATC and airports). However, ICAO safety standards are the lowest common denominator, and

are far below those acceptable to industrialized

countries. Many nations have their own civil aviation administrations (CA AS) to promulgate safety regulations, which meet or exceed ICAO standards and recommended practices. Other

countries follow the standards of a major nation,

usually the United States.

International differences in commercial aircraft

and airline regulations impose a cost burden on

U.S. industries. Aircraft manufacturers estimate

they could save between $800 million and $1 billion between 1992 and 2002 if international differences in airworthiness standards and their interpretations and duplicate certification tests were

eliminated. 10 These additional costs are passed to

the airlines. Further, FAA estimates that international differences in operating regulations are

more costly than disparities in airworthiness rules,

and the economic burden falls mostly on the airlines. 11

Complete harmonization of U. S., Canadian,

and European Joint Aviation Authorities (JAA)

airworthiness regulations is achievable in the next

few years. However, agreement will be more difficult on common airline operational regulations.

Foreign airlines flying into the United States do

not have to meet the same standards FAA imposes

on U.S. carriers, although most adhere to comparable standards. With FAA’s input, JAA is attempting to harmonize its members’ aircraft operating and maintenance regulations, which will

likely provide for levels of safety consistent with

U.S. rules and requirements. One expert believes

that the harmonization efforts between FAA and

JAA will provide the basis for real international

standards. 12

However, with regard to operating regulations,

European nations tend to favor detailed technical

requirements, while the United States prefers performance standards. As a result, it is unlikely that

FAA and JAA operating regulations will be harmonized completely in the foreseeable future.

But it is the air traffic system that is in greatest

need of a more efficient international process for

I I ~j,)thorl} Brodcrlck. FAA Aijociatc Admini\lr~[or for Regulation and Certification, comment at OTA ~or~shopt June ~. 199~.

] ‘John 0’ Ilrien, Alr l-me Pilot\ A\\ociation, personal communication, June 26, 1994.
14 I Federal Research and Technology for Aviation

developing and implementing standards. Global

standards are critical to ensure interoperability

and stringent performance, integrity, and system

availability requirements essential to air traffic

systems. During the past decade, ICAO has studied technical options for future air traffic management and control systems, and has recommended that satellites become the core

infrastructure for CNS systems (see box 1-3). Neither the U.S. Global Positioning System (GPS)

nor any other satellite system can become operational for international air navigation until sufficiently detailed performance specifications are

approved by ICAO. In part due to its large, diverse

membership, however, ICAO has a poor record of

efficiently planning and developing system standards even in the absence of any political controversy.

OTA concludes that institutional relationships for harmonizing international technical

standards for aviation must be strengthened.

Global agreement is crucial to aviation industry

planning and technology decisions, and swift international consensus on system specifications

and operational implementation of satellite systems is essential. A more effective process for

developing and implementing international

ATC infrastructure standards is strongly

needed.

In late 1993, the ICAO Air Navigation Commission (ANC) appointed a panel of technical experts to develop performance capability envelopes for different global navigation satellite

system (GNSS) applications and relate them to required navigation performance criteria.13 However, some international aviation experts believe

that technical standards for GNSS are a long way

off, especially at ICAO’s current pace. 14

FAA could play an important role in accelerating this process. The United States is well positioned to lead in international technical standards

for aviation. FAA is considered the technical leader among many of the world’s aviation agencies,

although other countries and regional blocs are

pushing for preeminence. Among government

agencies worldwide, FAA is now the strongest

supporter of datalink and satellite-based CNS.

FAA could be an effective advocate for U.S. aviation standards and procedures by sponsoring

seminars and providing technical assistance.

In addition, increased involvement of senior

U.S. officials at ICAO and other international aviation sessions may be necessary. Raising the visibility of international standards, regulations, and

infrastructure in U.S. aviation policy decisions in

other federal agencies may also be necessary.

New air traffic technologies, such as

navigation satellites and digital communication networks, can provide enhanced capabilities and economic benefits to the operators of aircraft and ATC systems. Full implementation of these technologies will

require new institutional frameworks here and abroad.

New CNS infrastructure, combined with traffic

management computers and advanced airborne

sensors, should maintain or improve safety while

increasing controller productivity, permitting

closer spacing between aircraft and more efficient

routes, and enabling flights to continue at

maximum traffic rates in all but the most severe

1 ~~cse ~riteria form (he basis for proposed standards that must be validated and approved b~r ANC.

Iqpe(er In~]eton, Technical Dirc~tor, International Air Transport Association (IATA), and David Fischer, IATA repre~entative to ICAO

FANS committee, Persontil communications, Sept. 3, 1993.
Chapter 1 Summary and Policy Conclusions 115

In 1983, the International CiViI Aviation Organization (ICAO) established a special committee on the

Future Air Navigation System (FANS), and charged it with examining the existing air navigation systems

1

and developing recommendations for the coordinated, evolutionary development of air navigation into

the next century 1 The FANS committee completed its task in 1988, and attributed the system’s limitations to three factors

● Iimits Imposed by Ilne-of-sight systems and by variable propagation characteristics of high-frequency

and other communications systems in use,

■ the difficulty of Installing communications, navigation, and surveillance networks in a consistent manner in large areas of the world and

■ Iimitations of voice communicatlon, and the lack of digital air-ground data Interchange systems to support modern automated procedures 2

The goals of the FANS concept are to 1 ) increase air transport capacity, 2) increase capacity for

enhanced air traffic control automation and general air-to-ground data transmission needs, 3) Improve

systems Integration, and 4) Improve organizational coordination.3 ICAO views satellite systems, along

with datalink capabiIities as essential to achieving these objectives The FANS concept also relies on

Required Navigation Performance Capability (RNPC), a performance-driven standard for new technology RNPC relieves operators of the burden of Installing specific avionics to meet requirements, rather, a

performance standard (e g , 100 meters accuracy for the Global Positioning System—GPS) IS effected

In September 1991, the 10th Air Navigation Committee of ICAO voted to adopt the recommendations of the FANS committee for a global aeronautical telecommunications network (ATN). The committee articulated the goal of a seamless, interoperable global data communicahons Infrastructure 4 ATN IS

intended to Integrate data communications among aircraft, ATC centers, and air earner facilities by enabling data to be transmitted by any of three paths Mode-S transponder, airline VHF, or satellite Iink

The network and onboard avionics wiII select the optimum path

Under the topic of communications, the committee recommended the introduction of a global satellite system for voice and digital communication between aircraft and the ground, and the launch of two

types of datalink (VHF and Mode-S) in non-oceanic areas For navigation, the committee recommended

the Implementation of the global navigation satellite system (GNSS) and the eventual phaseout of existing Ilne-of-sight radionavigation systems currently in use. The committee made three recommendations

regarding surveillance make primary radar optional and rely on secondary surveillance radar, including

Mode-S, in busy airspace, Introduce satellite-based automatic dependent surveillance for less busy airspace, and Implement some form of airborne collislon avoidance As a technology-based group, the

FANS committee did not address operational procedures to be derived from the new capabilities. Rather this was left to subsequent discussion by ICAO and member nations 5

GNSS as defined by ICAO, IS a worldwide position and time-determination system that includes one

or more satellite constellations, end-user equipment, and a system Integrity monitoring function The

U S GPS wiII be one element for GNSS in the United States at least Other proposed supplemental or

stand-alone elements of GNSS Include Inmarsat satellites, Russia’s GLONASS, other government-sponsored satellite systems, and various low-Earth-orbit satellite systems for mobile communications

1 Fufure A/r PJawgaflon System, September 1991, p 1 publlshed by members and observers of the FANS committee

2 Olwer Sutlon “FANS To Rescue 21st Century Alr Trathc, ” hferawa Aerospace Review, December 1989, pp 1171-1174

3 Don Fuqua, “Meeting the Needs of ATM “ AIA Newsletter May 1992, p 3

4 Lllllan Zarrelll Ryals The Mltre Corp “A New Publlc/Prwate Investment Model for the Aeronautical Telecommunications Network (ATN) n d p 2

5 Robert W Simpson Using ATC Operational Requirements To Gu[de FAA R&D and Procurement Actlwtles OTA contractor

report June 1993 p 3

—
16 I Federal Research and Technology for Aviation

Satellite systems and digital communications wiII likely form

the backbone of air traffic communications, navigation, and

surveillance systems in the near future

weather conditions. 15 If satellite navigation and

communications technologies along with an advanced traffic management system were fully implemented, U.S. airlines could save $3.5 billion

per year.

16

Satellite navigation and digital networks

make possible fundamental changes in how

and where ATC services are provided, and

raise difficult policy questions regarding infrastructure sovereignty and security. With these

networks, top-notch air traffic services-equal to

or better than the capabilities of the current U.S.

domestic airspace system-could become practical anywhere in the world. 17 It is not financially or

politically feasible for a single CAA to independently develop, build, and operate all of the elements comprising such a future ATC system.

Thus, nations would have to work together more

effectively than at present to implement such a

system on a global basis.

Today, however, air navigation and traffic control is the responsibility of each nation under its

agreement with ICAO. National governments finance, own, and oversee virtually all of the facilities and equipment necessary to control traffic in

their airspace.

18 Globe-spanning systems will ultimately make these national systems obsolete.

Although geographic or airspace sovereignty will

not be altered if satellite systems become the basis

for air navigation, many-or possibly all-could

lose direct control of at least part of their domestic

air traffic infrastructure.19 Furthermore, components of these systems, such as satellite platforms

and communications networks, may be privately

owned and serve nonaviation applications as well.

Consequently, serious issues regarding safety certification, liability, system integration, and overall management of aviation CNS infrastructure

need to be addressed by all nations.

In the United States, aircraft operators, airports,

and other transportation organizations are already

using non-FAA communications and information

systems to support flight operations. Private

datalinks run by Aeronautical Radio, Inc.20 

provide some enhanced air traffic safety and commercial services, such as real-time monitoring of airIsThere are ]Imits t. how much more capacity and efficiency can be squeezed out of the airspace system with new ATC technologies. FAA

and others estimate that all feasible ATC technological advances combined would be able to meet at most 10 to 15 percent of projected shortfall

in peak-hour capacity in the next 25 years. lf the demand materializes as forecasted, more runways and demand management techniques will be

necessary to minimize system delays. (See figure 3-9 in ch. 3.)

l~Air Transpofl Association, “AirTraffic Management in the Future Air Navigation System,” unpublished white paper, June 16, 1994. The

International Air Transport Association estimates that the world’s airlines would save at least $5 billion per year.

ITMuch of tie world’s airspace is characterized present]y by poor navigation and communications services, re]ative tO what k StWKk’d

across the United States. For example, even parts of Western Europe lack radar coverage of overland commercial airways.

18Airc~aft must have Complemental instmmentation and equipment instal]ed in order to use tie airspace infrastructure, Some nations have

private or public corporations to operate their ATC systems.

19A Sa,e]]ite-based navigation system requires centralized Contro]. Consequently, most nations tiat could use the system would have no

direct authority over day-to-day operating decisions for the system.

zoAeronautica] Radio, Inc. is owned by airlines and provides telecommunications SNViCt?S fOr diem.
Chapter 1 Summary and Policy Conclusions 117

craft engines and other equipment to improve

maintenance, relay of en route flight status (for

readying airport gates), and ground-to-air weather

information. 21 FAA has approved the U.S. military’s satellite-based GPS for some air navigation

applications in the United States. Presently, these

systems supplement, but do not replace, essential

services and infrastructure provided by FAA.

There is a strong need now for swift international consensus on global navigation system

specifications if GPS or other satellite systems

are to provide international service in the next

five to 10 years. Global agreement is crucial to

aviation industry planning and technology decisions. GPS can provide the earliest operational capability for the GNSS concept proposed by ICAO

(see box 1-3 again). The full constellation of GPS

satellites became operationally ready in December 1993. As long as supplemental navigation aids

are available, FAA now permits GPS use for domestic and oceanic en route flight navigation and

for nonprecision approaches. FAA’s goal is that

the international community develop systems that

are compatible with GPS, whether or not it

chooses to rely on GPS for GNSS services in the

future .22

Although most international aviation agencies

would welcome the potential savings and enhanced capabilities from GNSS, some have expressed concern that initially, at least, the system

would remain under U.S. military control. They

worry that the system could be denied or degraded

at any time for U.S. security reasons .23 Other concerns include the potential for intentional or inadvertent jamming of GPS signals. The technical

hurdles that remain for new navigation and communications systems to become operational seem

surmountable. Resolving the more difficult

institutional issues of system ownership, operation, and control must become a national

aviation priority if satellite CNS systems are to

deliver significantly improved air traffic management worldwide and help reduce costs to

aircraft operators.

I ATC Modernization in the United States

The U.S. ATC system represents both the success

and failure of FAA. More than a million people fly

in the United States every day and our airspace

system is safer, far more efficient, and technologically superior to any other in the world. However,

current ATC procedures do not support flight

management capabilities of new aircraft, and ATC

technologies lag behind comparable telecommunications, computing, and information systems

used in other fields.

ATC system development and implementation are chronically delayed, in large part due to

shortcomings in analyzing and establishing operational requirements.

FAA-managed ATC projects often move slowly—to go from concept to operation can take 15

years or longer. Consequently, Congress hears perennial calls to boost FAA R&D spending and

make ATC more independent of federal personnel

and procurement rules. Budget autonomy and

procurement reform are two cornerstones of FAA

reorganization proposals in the Clinton Administration’s “National Performance Review” (NPR)

and “Air Traffic Control Corporation Study,” as

well as in the recommendations of the National

2‘ In Januq 1979, when senrices began, there were approximately 500.000 contacts made per month using voice radio. Message exchange

u\ing datal ink has grown to nearly 8 million messages per month while voice contacts hay c fallen to 25,000 per month. John Sul I i van, Vice

President of Quulity Control, Aeronautical Radio, Inc., personal communication, Nov. 25, 1993.

~2Mikc Shuw, Satellite S)’stem Manager, FAA Satellite CNS Program, per~onal cc~rlll~~lll~ic:l(i(~n. Dec. 9, 1993.

2~The Secretaries of Defense and Transportation requested the formation of a task force to discuss iisues of sy stem management, operation,

and long -tcrrn sustainment. Theta+ force released a report on its activities and recoll~r~lcnci:itl[~l~~ in December 1993. Sce Joint DOD, DOT Task

Force, “The Global Positioning Sy ftem: Management and Operation of a Dual Uw S) stcm,” A Report to the Secretaries\ of Defcnw and Transpor-tation, unpublished document, December 1993.
18 I Federal Research and Technology for Aviation

Commission To Ensure a Strong and Competitive

Airline Industry. 24 However, those issues are Peripheral to the ATC modernization problem.

With regard to spending levels, FAA R&D for

ATC (including R&D spending outside of the

RE&D account) is 10.4 percent of FAA’s total

annual budget for ATC.25 This level of R&D investment compares favorably with figures for

high-tech industries such as telecommunications

and software production. Regarding procurement

reform, changes in federal rules would do little to

resolve ATC operational planning and development problems or otherwise speed up significantly the acquisition of complex, safety-critical systems. While the competitive procurement system

causes delays and added expense, the resulting

time lag seems to be roughly one year at most.26

The General Accounting Office has studied this

issue and concluded that government procurement policies and regulations are not the key impediment to ATC system development by FAA.27

OTA’s analyses indicate that, while increased

spending and easier procurement with respect

to technology R&D could help speed ATC

modernization, major improvements to the air

traffic system will require fundamental changes

in the overall development process at FAA.

The combination of high safety standards, continuous operations, large scale, and complexity

make the ATC system unlike any other technological system. Within this system, technology opportunities, rather than operational analyses, have

driven specific ATC programs. Operational and

procedural issues such as human factors, not basic

technologies, most often have been the key

hurdles to timely system implementation.

Time and again, ATC technologies reach the

advanced stage of development before those who

are to install or use them discover that what was

developed is not what was needed. In many cases,

operational problems have remained undetected

until after a prototype ATC system has been completed and procurement is imminent or under way.

For example, FAA committed to the development

and production of the Advanced Automation System before fundamental operational issues were

resolved, including how controllers would use the

new equipment and how existing ATC facilities

would be consolidated.

Better systems engineering could help, and

FAA has strengthened its systems engineering capabilities in recent years. However, aviation systems engineering must be more than making

technologies work together. It must get people, organizations, procedures, and technologies to work

together. If longstanding ATC modernization

problems are to be resolved, research, development, and engineering of operational requirements and procedures must be strengthened and

made into an integral part of FAA’s ATC system

development process. Three key steps are needed:

1 ) involve suitably experienced operational personnel closely in the planning and prototype development process; 2) conduct operational analyses and develop operational procedures for new

system concepts early enough to affect the

technology development process; and 3) use realtime, dynamic ATC simulations as “operational

2’$Na(i~na] per formallce Review, [-r(jm Re(i Tape 10 Results: Creu[ing u Go\ernmen[ That Works Belter & COSI.5 Le.s.\ (Washington, DC:

Office of the Vice President, September 1993); U.S. Department of Transportation, Air Trafic Control Corporation SfId}I: Repot-r of rhe E.tecu -

~i~’e Oersigh( Commiffee 10 [he Secremrj’ oj_Trunsporfafion (Washington, DC: May 1994); and National Commission To I%ure a Strong Competitive Airline Industry, Chmge, Chullenge, and Cornpcrit/on: A Report to rhe Presidenf and Congre.s.\ (Washington, DC: U.S. Government

Printing Office, August 1993).

25Sec table 2-3 inch. 2.

‘hJohn Turner, FAA Associate Administrator for National Airspace System Development, personal communication, Oct. 21, 1992; and

James L. Crook, Vice President for Operations, Air Traffic Control Association, Inc., personal communication, June 30, 1994.

ZTU,5, Congress, Genera] Accounting Office, “Air Traffic Control: Observations on Proposed Corporation,” testimony at hearing~ before

the Senate Committee on Appropriations, Subcommittee on Transportation and Related Agencies, May 12, 1994.
Chapter 1 Summary and Policy Conclusions 119

I Operational development 1

System operations

analysis and

planning

System

goals

Technology development

I

I

I Operational k

Potential technology capabilities — 4

Technology I

I I

I

1 I

Desired I Desired

operational

I

technology

objectives capabilities

I I

I

v

r I I

Prototype system development v

Operational

k--- ~

Proposed tech specs – —-–- ---- --– – Technology ~–

procedures prototype I

development Proposed ops specs — 4

development 1

v I v

Operational Technical

specifications specifications

—

a For Federa IAvat ~n Adml n s[ra[ Ion orders and regu Iatlons ATC handbook and other gJdance

b For hard h are an c~ software

SOURCE 0’4 ce of Technology Assessment 1994

development” as well as “technology develop- ment efforts However, the agency lacks institutional inment” tools. Figure 1-3 presents one model for in- centives to ensure consistent operational guidance for

tegrated operation] and technological develop- ATC system development and implementation

ment of ATC systems. In many ways, FAA is in transition. FAA has

recognized some of the operational development

FM has taken steps to incorporate op- problems mentioned above and is making efforts

erational expertise into its ATC technology develop- to resolve them. Almost all agency operating units
20 I Federal Research and Technology for Aviation

report improved relations with FAA’s R&D division, and the general feeling is that technology

R&D is more targeted than in the past to the needs

of the operating units.

Acquiring user input is an essential step in

identifying operational requirements. For the development of the new 777 aircraft, Boeing used

this approach and met with success. Likewise,

FAA increasingly welcomes industry into its fold.

In 1991, FAA established operational implementation teams for satellite navigation and for

communications and surveillance. Sponsored by

the Flight Standards and Air Traffic Control organizations within FAA, the teams work closely

with industry and representatives of the various

FAA organizations to improve the process for developing performance standards and requirements. 28

ATC system development issues are as much

cultural as they are managerial. Air traffic controllers, equipment technicians, pilots, engineers, and

managers are vital to ATC system development

and operation. Each group has strengths and shortcomings, and communication across these cultural gaps can be difficult. Inadequate coordination

between the operational sections and the technology developers is a longstanding problem at

FAA.29 Moreover, these cultural differences may

lead to conflicting messages to policymakers—

each group may have a different priority or perspective on ATC problems. Safety and efficiency

are the primary purposes for ATC operations, but

rarely is there agreement on what levels of safety

and efficiency are acceptable or how they can be

measured. However, the current U.S. ATC system

is remarkably safe as measured by accident risk,

and no safety crisis exists. Unresolved concerns

about new risks slow the ATC development process. Moreover, operational efficiency gains and

development costs suffer to a much greater extent

than safety by delays in implementation.

FAA does incorporate operational expertise

into parts of its ATC technology development efforts, but it is unlikely that, on its own, FAA can

take all the steps necessary to resolve internal

management and cultural impediments to improving the ATC system development process. In the

course of its research, OTA heard 1ittle confidence

expressed in FAA’s ability to plan for and

introduce new ATC systems effectively without

some change in institutional structures and incentives. FAA has claimed to have overcome system

development and acquisition hurdles a number of

times during the past decade, but has failed to do

so. As long as technology development remains

the dominant culture in FAA system development programs, however, implementation

problems will persist.

I Research for Aviation Safety and

Environmental Protection

Safety requirements, environmental protection,

and economics are closely intertwined for aviation. FAA and the aviation community have endeavored to make safety preeminent; the U.S.

safety record attests to their success. But there are

tradeoffs. For example, special flight paths designed by airports to reduce the impact of aircraft

noise on nearby communities proliferated in the

1980s. Pilots and airline management considered

some of these noise abatement procedures to be

less safe (but not necessarily unsafe) than more

z8Jim Crowling, chai~~, FAA satellite Operational Implementation Team, persona] Communication, June 14, ] 993.

29~e problem has not ken confined t. the ATC Wor]d. In we late 1980s, coordination was weak between FAA’s aviation security regulation section and the agency’s security R&D branch at the Technical Center. For more information, see U.S. Congress, Office Of Technologyr

Assessment, Technology Againsf Terrorism: Sfrucfuring Securify, OTA-ISC-5 11 (Washington, DC: U.S. Government Printing Office, January

1992).
Chapter 1 Summary and Policy Conclusions 121

standard routes. 30 Airlines and the public accept

this extra risk for the benefit of flying to those airports and for relatively less noise on the ground.

Critics and champions of the present aviation

system agree that it is possible to make the system

safer still and continue to reduce the environmental impact. However. disagreement is intense on

the value and economic consequences of possible

technological and procedural options and what

new problems will emerge in the future. Federal

safety, environmental, and infrastructure decisions are important factors in the financial health

of the aviation industry. Less costly choices are

desirable, and supporting the search for them is an

appropriate role for federal aviation R&D programs.

Federal R&D efforts for aviation often

lack explicit priorities and objectives, better data

collection and analyses of the aviation system could

help guide federal R&D Investment decisions.

Federal budget limitations and the potential, at

best, for only incremental improvements in certain areas of aviation call for clearer statements of

aviation problems and priorities. Although FAA,

other agencies, and industry collect and use a wide

range of data on the safety, operations, and environmental effects of the aviation system, little has

been done to set priorities and measurable objectives for R&D in those aviation fields. FAA uses

the available databases primarily to support its

day-to-day decisions on operations and regulation, but the data have not been systematically

used to direct R&D.

Although data quality and analytic resources

differ for aviation safety, environment, and operations, many of the problems that R&D could address are measurable. For example, aviation accidents are investigated in extraordinary detail by

Aircraft evacuation IS one area of aviatlon safety research

federal, industry, and labor professionals; this information provides benchmarks of overall safety

and specific safety problems, and can suggest the

potential value and effectiveness of technological

and other prescriptions.

Ultimately, an assessment of R&D objectives

and priorities must consider not only the size of

any problem and value of possible solutions stemming from R&D, but also the probability and cost

of achieving the solution and the potential for new

or growing problems. In addition, the system consequences of introducing new technologies must

be understood. The early and continuing advice

of operational experts is imperative to setting

priorities and objectives for federal aviation

~~ )~~t ~)nc [l,lle the John w’a~ ne Alrpon in orange county, California, required that piiot$ “power (]OW [1” their air~r~f[ UJ)OI1 r~a~hln: 5[J~J f~e[

:iltltudc In order [o reduce t~he(~ff noi~e. The .AIr Lme Pilot\ A\soc i:i[ion (ALP/\ ) con~ldcrcd [hc Or:ingr County proccdurei to be :i ‘“. big vifcty

problcm, h,cauw [the pilot Is] too close to the ground (o react \hould there be a mishtip. ” Capt. DICK Dced~, AL PA, perwn:il communicfit Ion,

Sept. 7.1993, FAA conducted a study of the marginol bencfit~ of different depw-ture profilc~ :md III 199 I rcconlmcndcd thiit ~iirports use either

ot IW o ~t:mdurd nolfe abatement procedure. Both procedures have a minimum thruit rcduct ion altltudr of 800” feet tibo~c Field cleiatlon. See

f:/l,\ Ad\ lwlry Circular ‘) I -53a.
22 I Federal Research and Technology for Aviation

R&D and ensuring that new technological systems bring the greatest safety, environmental,

and airspace benefits.

In 1991, the FAA RE&D Advisory Committee

called for the agency to establish a comprehensive

approach for evaluating research and development programs. 31 FAA has since investigated at

least two methods for quantifying the contributions of individual research programs.32 However, FAA has yet to publicly measure or rank aviation research objectives or R&D programs.33

Better information and analyses may

now be more important than new technologies for continued long-term gains in aviation safety

Unquestionably, a diverse technology base is

essential for future aviation safety gains. FAA,

NASA, and DOD are investigating numerous aircraft technologies that promise new levels of safety performance-cabin water spray, fire-resistant

materials, explosive-resistant aircraft systems,

and advanced sensors, to name a few. Most of

these technologies are still too expensive to install

in their current forms.

Historically, once an aviation problem became

known and understood, actions could be taken to

greatly reduce the risk-often before (or without)

a technological response. For example, the meteorological conditions associated with low-level

windshear were not widely recognized until the

early 1980s. The U.S. accident rate from windshear plummeted after a nationwide pilot training

and education effort was implemented. This occurred well before new windshear warning devices were installed on many aircraft.

The biggest safety problems today and the

greatest risks in the future will likely come from

areas where we lack fundamental knowledge rather than technological expertise. Human performance is the leading example of a field where basic and applied research is the key to better safety.

Human error is implicated in two-thirds of aviation accidents; there are currently no clear technological or operational options, regardless of

cost, that would go very far to address this problem, since we do not yet know enough about human cognitive processes.

Based on aviation accident trends, there is little

reason to believe that any of the previously encountered safety problems will significantly escalate in the future. However, there are scenarios

where new, substantial threats could emerge. Research and risk assessments to identify and quantify such problems are essential to any long-term

aviation research program. However, risk analyses are not yet a prominent part of FAA’s RE&D

efforts.

In addition, there are new technologies on the

forefront for gathering, processing, and relaying

weather data, but critical information needs remain and long-term, fundamental science is required to address them. Basic research in mesoscale meteorology, for example, is essential to

understanding the development and behavior of

many atmospheric phenomena that preclude efficient use of the airspace. In recent years, little or

none of FAA’s R&D budget has been allocated for

3 I FAA Research, J2ngine~r1n~ ~d ~ve]opment Advisory committee, R&D plan Review panel, Re},ie}i, of f)re FAA Reseurfh, fi’n~~?~cf>r;n~

and De\’elopment Program (Washington, DC: November 199 1), pp. 3 I -32.

32 CoSt-~nefit analysis has ~Come an integral pafi of FAA’s regula(o~ decisions and tie agency’s budget process for the capita] Investment Plan for ATC equipment projects. However, cost-benefit analysis does not appear to be an appropriate tool for setting priorities among

individual research projects. Among the difficulties with R&D cost-benefit analyses are estimating the probability of “success” w well as the

costs of the necessary production and implementation following R&D that would be required to generate benefits. Furthermore, the data are

often insufficient to reliably calculate potential benefits.

33~e Mi(re Cowratlon is developing base]ine ]evels and metrics (o measure prqqess of tie entire RE&D program for FAA’s Rcwarch and

Development Service. Some of Mitre’s measures were used to assess the RE&D goals listed in chapter one of the 1993 Federul A\iuIIon Admrn -

isrrufion Plan for Research, Engineering and Development. Tony Dundzila, Member of Technical Staff, Mitre Corp., personal communication,

Dec. I 4, 1993.
Chapter 1 Summary and Policy Conclusions 123

this type of weather research, despite the potential

safety and operating cost savings associated with

real-t i me forecasts of adverse or hazardous weather.

Environmental research for subsonic

aviation IS fragmented, and there IS no clear federal

policy guidance or support,

Environmental challenges are expected to be a

key constraint on aviation industry growth during

the next decade.34 As with safety issues, effective

response to environmental problems requires adequate data and analytic capability to understand

the extent of problems and optimize mitigation

options. For aviation environmental policy, unlike aviation security and safety, no one federal

agency has the leadership role.

FAA has responsibility y for setting aircraft noise

standards and for assisting communities in assessing and abating airport noise. NASA has been the

lead agency for aviation noise research. Despite

decades of noise R&D to enable quieter aircraft to

meet stringent noise limits and decreased national

impact, continued growth in operations will undercut the progress made to date. Finding ways to

further reduce noise remains a high priority for the

industry, public, and FAA. With FAA and industry support, NASA has incorporated challenging

noise reduction goals into its newly launched Advanced Subsonic Technology initiative.35

But aircraft noise is no longer the sole environmental liability, and many issues today threaten to

constrain operations and increase costs. The unified regulatory-R&D approach enjoyed by the

noise effort, in which FAA works closely with

NASA to plan R&D and shape technical requirements, has rarely been applied to other environmental issues such as air quality. The Environmental Protection Agency (EPA) has broad

Research and technology development are essential in

meeting environmental challenges Microphones mounted on

the side of a NASA wind tunnel measure fan noise from an

advanced ducted propeller engine

regulatory authority over many environmental issues but has devoted few of its analytic or research

resources to aviation-specific problems. 36 Without its own regulatory authority in these areas and

no explicit mandate to support environmental research beyond noise, FAA has difficult y in formulating a comprehensive aviation environmental

research agenda or sponsoring such research.

When addressing broad issues such as climate

change or air and water quality, a comprehensive

understanding of aviation’s impact on the environment, particularly relative to other sources of

pollution, is needed. Furthermore, FAA requires

such an assessment in order to evaluate the costs

and benefits of control measures and to draft technical and operational requirements. OTA finds

such data are not always readily available, and the

lack of an explicit mandate to address non-noise

related issues, combined with FAA’s small environmental R&D budget limit the agency ability

to move quickly on emerging issues. There are

“~Natl Onti] Research Council. Tran\~~~[ion Resewch Board, Future A}iufion Acti~[rie.s EI~}?[h /n[crn(if/ona/ workshop, Tran\portatlon

Research Circular Number 425 (Washington, DC: ,May 1994), p. 57.

~~NAS}q defined ~ I ~.decl~] reduc(lon re]a[it e 10 ] 9$)2 (echno]ogy by the end of the centurj. The reductions are WUiCiptitedfrom ch:mge~

to engine\, airframes, and operational procedures.

~~T() ~~tllll:ite total CIY i] ~lrcraft enllssions, in fact, EpA relies on FAA e$timate~ of aircraft Oper:l[lon\ ~Tld ellli~$ion Indicei.
24 I Federal Research and Technology for Aviation

few staff to devote to environmental issues other

than noise, and FAA must rely on NASA and other

federal agencies to perform scientific work and

technology development.

While FAA and EPA share some aviation emissions data and analyses, the record of coordination

and cooperation is spotty in other areas. For example, EPA’s proposal to include airport deicing operations in the national water pollutant discharge 37 which is required of many permitting process,

other “industrial” activities, left airport operators

scrambling to find and use acceptable deicing materials in the face of more stringent reporting and

disposal regulations. According to an FAA official, the agency was not advised of the proposed

rule change and did not learn of it until the comment period had nearly expired.38 A more recent

issue relates to stringent air pollutant emissions

standards EPA has proposed for some regions in

California, and their potential economic impact

on aviation operations.39 Airlines are concerned

that extensive improvements in engine technology are required to meet the proposed standards.

According to FAA, the two agencies intend to designate points of contact for cooperative discussion. 40

Another problem relates to the effects of subsonic emissions on the atmosphere, especially at

higher altitudes. Little attention was paid to their

potential role in climate change, in part because

conventional aircraft contribute so little to the pollutant budget relative to other transportation

sources and because EPA’s purview over emissions in the lower atmosphere does not extend up

to aircraft cruise altitudes.41 In December 1991,

however, the ICAO Committee on Aviation Envi -

ronmental Policy heard calls for increasing the

stringency of emission standards beyond what

current aircraft engines can meet. European research organizations quickly established supporting R&D programs. But reliance on European efforts to improve understanding of the impact of

current air traffic on the atmosphere and to develop low-nitrogen oxides emission combustors

leaves the United States ill-placed to dispute or

validate proposed international rules on engine

emissions or aircraft operations. Nearly two years

later than European agencies, NASA incorporated

the issue into the Advanced Subsonic Technology

program and provided $25 million in fiscal year

1994 for studying subsonic aircraft impacts and

developing next-generation combustors.

As with aviation noise, the United States has

the expertise to address the other aviation environmental issues. However, a comprehensive R&D

agenda has not been established and no mechanism yet exists for ensuring and integrating input

from the appropriate agencies. The lack of an integrated U.S. approach to defining environmental

risks from aviation and the commensurate level of

regulatory and R&D attention are hampering a

timely, effective response to environmental challenges that confront the industry. This piecemeal

approach may undermine U.S. leadership in setting aviation environmental standards and result

in environmental policy decisions that inadequately consider the aviation safety and performance implications of new technology or operating mandates. At a minimum, the sharing of

existing data and impact assessments among federal agencies is needed, along with cooperative

evaluation of emerging issues.

3?Thi~ program is known as National po]lutant Discharge Elimination System (N PDES). In 1990, EPA included airport mnoff in the category of industrial operations affected by the NPDES program. 55 Federal Regis/er 48066 (Nov. 16, 1990).

38George Leg~eta, FAA Office of Airport Safety and Standards, personal communication, NOV. 2, 1993.

Sgsee 59 Federal Register 23264-23605 (May 5, 1994).

~Loulse Maillet, Director, FAA Offlce of Environment and Energy, cited in Paul Page, “Airlines preparing TO Fight ‘Draconian proposed

California Emissions Rules,” Transport World, June 27, 1994, p. 46.

d] EpA’s duty t. protect [he public health and welfare has been focused on impacts in the mixing iayer, the portion of the atmosphere nearest

the ground.
Chapter 1 Summary and Policy Conclusions 125

I Interagency Coordination on

Aviation R&D

The budget deficit and defense conversion are

among the factors that have led to increased congressional interest in cooperation among federal

agencies conducting aviation R&D. The primary

advantages of interagency R&D programs include

economies of scale, elimination of redundant efforts, and more rapid technology development

and deployment,

Coordination and cooperation for aviation research and technology programs among federal agencies have improved in recent years, but these

efforts could be stronger still,

Recognizing that FAA’s level of in-house R&D

capabilities cannot address all aviation research

challenges, Congress included provisions to encourage work with NASA, DOD, and other agencies in the Aviation Safety Research Act of 1988

and the Catastrophic Failure Prevention Research

Program. FAA has increased the number and dollar amount of interagency R&D efforts since this

legislation was enacted.

Long-term research integral to FAA’s missions,

such as human factors, is also important to many

other federal agencies. Substantial federal research efforts are under way in areas significant to

aviation operations. For example, defense programs have been the source of many fundamental

technologies for civil aviation, such as radar, computers, datalinks. and satellite-based navigation.

Moreover, for aviation environment and security,

FAA must depend on other agencies’ research to

characterize and assess risks.

Among its R&D relationships with other federal agencies, FAA’s ties are strongest to NASA. Although NASA and FAA have worked together

since their inception, it was not until 1990 that the

FAA and NASA Administrators took personal

and administrative actions to bolster the ties between their agencies. The agencies now coordinate aviation research programs and planning

through a joint committee and have established

Memoranda of Understanding (MOU) in more

than a dozen science and technology areas. NASA

supplies most of the research personnel and facilit y support, and contributes about $40 million beyond what is explicitly counted in interagency

fund transfers. FAA has small field offices at

NASA’s Ames and Langley research centers to

help coordinate these efforts.

FAA has made efforts to involve the national

laboratories in aviation R&D programs within

their areas of expertise. Many of these facilities.

especially the Air Force labs. have capabilities directly relevant to FAA’s missions. R&D conducted for DOD’s diverse aircraft inventory. such

as the use of composite materials for aircraft primary structures, has applications in civil aviation.

POLICY CONCLUSIONS

Aviation safety and efficiency-the primary missions of FAA-depend strongly on advanced

technologies and the people who use them. Many

improvements in these areas stem from core

technologies derived from federal research programs.

But “technology push” rather than “operational

demand” has driven some aviation research and

technology programs in the past. This bottomup

model of developing technology linearly from the

lab to the field will not be effective for improving

aviation safety and air traffic operations significantly in the future. Operational success in the

complex aviation system depends on more than

practical technologies. Technology must be

Effective research for aviation security depends on

coordination and cooperation among federal agencies
26 I Federal Research and Technology for Aviation

adaptable to system requirements, rather than the

other way around. It must assist pilots, air traffic

controllers, and security screeners instead of

creating new, complex tasks. Superb technology

is of little use if those responsible for installing

and operating it do not see a need for it.

91 Research and Technology Priorities:

Better Guidance Needed for and by FAA

FAA can contribute the most to aviation R&D by

providing an important operational perspective—

whether or not it conducts or funds the R&D. FAA

is in a strong position to be the catalyst and clearinghouse for technological advances vital to aviation progress; it alone has the breadth of expertise

and connections across the aviation community to

provide this service.

FAA’s Role in Setting the

National Aviation R&D Agenda

If FAA is to have an effective voice in national research decisions, the agency must develop a detailed blueprint for future safety, environmental,

and air traffic operational objectives. Aviation

R&D should be closely linked to these objectives,

and priorities developed to carry them out. More

effective approaches to priority-setting and analysis are required, and a means must be found to

guarantee that all parties who will be part of solving a problem—including those from other agencies conducting aviation research—are considered in devising the solution.

FAA has taken some steps in setting R&D objectives and assessing R&D programs, but still

has a way to go. The agency’s goals for its R&D

efforts now are better linked to research or

technology advances. However, the contribution

of FAA RE&D programs will be difficult to measure since most of these goals are still broadly defined. For example, attaining FAA’s RE&D goal

to “. . . reduce accident and incident rates attributable to controller, flightcrew, and maintenance

crew human error. . .“42 will depend strongly on

R&D, but will also require the efforts of FAA’s

regulation and certification divisions, the airlines,

and aircraft manufacturers. To help ensure effective use of federal aviation R&D resources and

emphasize the importance of FAA’s needs, Congress could consider having FAA testify at

NASA, DOD, and other agency authorization and

appropriations hearings; NASA, DOD, and other

agencies have testified at FAA-related hearings in

the past.

The Role of Outside Advice in

Setting FAA’s R&D Agenda

Essential to the process of setting priorities for

aviation is to incorporate, on a continuing basis,

the advice of pilots, controllers, technicians, and

industry experts. Congress may consider giving

advisory committees that include these experts a

stronger role in this process. Possibilities include

revising the charter of the FAA RE&D Advisory

Committee, combining FAA and NASA advisory

committees, or creating an independent advisory

committee similar to the former National Advisory Committee for Aeronautics (NACA).

Advisory committees are effective only to the

extent the agency takes their advice into account

when making decisions. Congress may wish to

give FAA advisory committees more accountabil -

ity, such as requiring that FAA formally respond

to official recommendations by advisory committees.

While not a panacea, federal advisory committees have provided valuable operational perspectives, technical expertise, and political balance to

aviation programs at FAA and NASA. The congressionally chartered FAA RE&D Advisory

Committee has provided sound recommendations

for strengthening FAA R&D endeavors and has

helped FAA better focus its R&D plans while encouraging the agency to pursue new research and

technology directions. But most aviation research

plans to support FAA missions must be tied to reg-
Chapter 1 Summary and Policy Conclusions 127

ulatory, infrastructure, and operating procedure

goals. FAA needs guidance and assistance in planning and coordinating objectives across these

areas. Although the RE&D Advisory Committee

has provided such assistance at times (e.g., for satellite navigation implementation), the charter of

this committee is too narrow to serve the larger

purpose.

If Congress wishes to provide FAA with more

comprehensive guidance, it could consider either

broadening the charter and membership of the

RE&D Advisory Committee or forming a new

group that would consider regulatory, operational,

infrastructure, and R&D issues in total. This b’Avi -

ation System” Advisory Committee would have

primary advisory responsibility for FAA prioritysetting, including R&D, This committee could

help FAA look at the aviation system as a whole

and determine what goals are most important.

Only then can tradeoffs be made on the technological, procedural, and regulatory paths to take to

meet those goals.

FAA has taken promising steps to improve

communication and coordination for aviation—

internally, with other government agencies, and

with private industry. Noteworthy are FAA’s recent efforts to institute better operational planning

and to encourage public-private partnerships for

technology development. An Aviation Systems

Advisory Committee could be complementary to

those efforts.

FAA will continue to need expert guidance on

research methodology and management, and new

developments in other fields, agencies, and industries. With an Aviation System Advisory Committee in place, the membership of an R&D Advisory

Group (an Aviation System subcommittee or independent committee) could be composed primarily of individuals with expertise in the conduct

or management of scientific research or technology development programs. They could focus on

ensuring that FAA R&D plans and the conduct of

R&D programs reflect the long-term needs and

objectives of the aviation system and could help

coordinate FAA in-house research with that of

other federal, private, and international research

programs.

Another option Congress may wish to consider

is recreating a group similar to the former NACA.

a prestigious group of individuals who would advise on aviation priorities across agencies and improve the visibility of aviation R&D in general.

Many of the issues such a group would address—

the U.S. aviation technology base, research and

manufacturing competitiveness, and dual use

technologies—go beyond the scope of this report.

However, civil aviation safety, environmental

protection, and air traffic operations as well as

FAA research and technology programs could be a

subset of such a group’s charter.

I ATC System Development: Providing

New Management for New Technologies

As discussed above, advisory groups can help research agencies set priorities and objectives.

However, more than better advice is needed to improve ATC system development and implementation. OTA finds that delays in ATC modernization usually stem from inadequately addressing

operational issues throughout the stages of system planning and development at FAA. To address this fundamental flaw in the ATC R&D

process, new management methods and organizations are also needed.

Reform is most needed in ATC system development management and philosophy rather than

in the procurement rules and funding for fully developed equipment. FAA acquisition policy43 focuses on technology development and products.

which is what the federal government purchases

from contractors. Consequently. federal acquisition policy does not make the development process for operational requirements and procedures a

clear priority. For ATC, operational products are

not equipment or software, but are requirements

~~OkfB Circular A.] 09 and F,+fA Order i 81 (). ] F for EKqlll$itlon POlic}
28 I Federal Research and Technology for Aviation

and procedures generated primarily within FAA.

Congress may wish to ensure that guidance for future ATC system development and acquisition explicitly addresses operational procedures as well

as equipment.

This does not necessarily require a major reorganization of FAA or a change in its institutional

status. However, neither does it preclude such actions. OTA concludes that key criteria necessary for more effective ATC system development include stable leadership within the

organization, multidisciplinary development

teams that cross organizational and publicprivate boundaries, and a commitment and

understanding throughout the organization

that ATC system development must be more

operationally driven than technology driven.

The following section examines how these criteria

could be applied w i thin the present FAA organization and in a new institutional framework.

Improving ATC R&D Within the

Present FAA Organization

In the current internal structure of FAA, two

executive directors, and eight organizations under

them, 44 have important technical responsibilities

for ATC system development (see figure 1-4).

Presently, however, no one below the Administrator has the authority or the mandate to effectively

bridge the operational and technology directorates

of FAA. Moreover, long-term system development requires long-term leadership, but the aver-

,——— – 1

I Administrator I I -- –- –———–!

I Deputy Administrator I

1 –—:– -– , ----- - J

Establish operational requirements and

develop operational procedures

I

I

1

Executive Director

for

System Development

I

Associate Associate FAA

Administrator Administrator Technical

for NAS for System Center

Development Engineering

and

Development

SOURCE Off Ice of Technology Assessment 1994

—

1

Executive Director

I for Acquisition

! and Safety Oversight

I —

Associate Office of

Administrator Acquisition

for Aviation I Policy and

Safety ~ ‘ Oversight

-L—

Establish technical requirements and

develop hardware and software

MA ir Tr~ftj~, Airway ~aclll[les, Regul~[i~n and certifica[i~n, Aviation Standards. and S)s[em Capac ity w]d Rcquircmcnts ~ ithin the SYstems Operations Directorate; and System Engineering and Detclopment, National Air\pace Symm De\ elopmtmt, amf the Techmcal Center

within the Systcmj Det elopnwnt Directorate.
Chapter 1 Summary and Policy Conclusions 129

age tenure of an FAA Administrator is far shorter

than the development cycle of most ATC systems.

Within the present FAA framework, one option

is for Congress to create a new, fixed-term position at the Deputy Administrator level with responsibilities for system development oversight

and coordination within FAA.

The new position would be subordinate only to

the FAA Administrator. This person would be

provided with a clear mandate to integrate operational and technological development processes,

would have the authority to form teams from

across the agency, and would maintain a core staff

(o administer teams. He or she would also have adequate resources to conduct operational analyses

and procedure development, including dynamic

ATC simulations, and have a voice in the system

acquisition and procurement process. In essence,

this person would be responsible for the actual

direction of entire projects and would have sufficient status to make things work, Presumably such

a position would be created in a way that would allow the hiring and transfer of people of excellent

managerial and technical quality and ensure adequate tenure to get the job done.

OTA believes it is necessary that these functions be performed regardless of whether Congress considers establishing a fixed term for the

FAA Administrator.45 Many aviation issues and

immediate crises other than system development

vie for the Administrator attention: a fixed-term

Administrator. like the Administrator in the present FAA. would need subordinate executives to

manage and oversee ATC development.

In addition to or in lieu of the option above,

Congress may also wish to consider changes in

funding procedures to strengthen ATC system development. For example. ATC R&D is presently

funded out of two FAA budget accounts (RE&D

and Facilities and Equipment). Congress may

wish to more closely delineate RE&D and F&E

accounts to match the actual phase of system development, such as defined in the Office of Management and Budget’s and FAA’s acquisition

guidelines. This could possibly entail raising

RE&D authorization levels and reducing those in

the F&E account, whether or not there is an overall change in FAA’s authorized budget.

Improving ATC R&D Through

Major Reorganization of FAA

To help speed ATC modernization in the United

States, and for other objectives, various options to

restructure FAA have been presented to Congress

during the past decade.46 These proposals generally involve making either FAA or some subset of

the agency more independent of federal budget,

personnel, and procurement constraints, and of

bureaucratic controls. The latest alternative is the

U.S. Air Traffic Services Corporation (USATS)

proposed by the Clinton Administration in May

1994. These options raise significant issues that

require serious discussion but are outside the

scope of this study. Based on its analyses in this

and past studies, however, OTA has identified certain ATC R&D issues that Congress may wish to

consider in the context of possible FAA restructuring.

If Congress considers a major restructuring of

the federal ATC system, it is important to ensure

that any institutional changes directly address the

problems in the system development process, and

not only budget, procurement, and personnel issues. The criteria discussed earlier—stable leadership; ability to bridge cultural gaps among operational, technical, and management groups; and

sufficient attention to operational issues in the development process—are critical to improving the

‘

i

’ O[hcr propowlj” prcwmtcd in the literature Include mtihing FAA an independent agency or authority: combining FAA and NASA into an

lndc[x>ndcnt agency, c(~n} ~’rt lng 1;\,+\ into ii got m-nmcnt corporation;” establishing the ATC portion of FAA a~ :in independent agency. authority.

or S(J; clnmcnt corpt~ratlon,” In t~r {Jut\Idc of DOT, and prli atlzing all or part of FAA,
30 I Federal Research and Technology for Aviation

air traffic system. While most FAA reorganization

proposals address the stable leadership issue, to

date none has made explicit how the ATC R&D

process would be improved.

For example, the USATS proposal does not

contain specific measures to provide better coordination for ATC R&D among operational, regulatory, and technology organizations, as well as

with the private sector, or for a stronger operational focus for system development. While the

USATS would develop air traffic rules and procedures, which has the benefit of keeping operational and technological development in the same organization, those procedures would require the

approval of the FAA Administrator to be implemented. It is unclear how the early and continuing

advice of operational and safety experts, especially FAA certification staff, would be incorporated

into this process. It will be important to address

these issues if the USATS or other proposals reach

the congressional agenda.

Improving ATC With New CNS

Infrastructure and Institutions

Satellite-based communications, navigation, and

surveillance technologies are becoming part of the

ATC system in the United States. For the next decade or longer. the federal government will likely

continue to own and operate all essential U.S. air

traffic system infrastructure, However, economics

and international politics dictate that this must

eventually change. For example, advanced ATC

over the oceans requires satellite systems, and it

is unlikely that the U.S. government will or should

be the sole entity to provide those satellites. Ultimately, nonfederal entities such as private companies or multinational organizations will own and

operate some communications satellites, digital

networks, and other key elements of the CNS infrastructure. Congress must ensure that whichever

institution is responsible for U.S. ATC has the authority to address, on an international basis, the liability, ownership, and control issues that these

systems raise.

Whether or not a USATS is created, FAA priorities and responsibilities for system development, operation, and oversight will have to

change if digital communications networks

and satellite systems are to become the primary

air navigation infrastructure for the United

States. FAA has the statutory authority to certify

air navigation facilities for use by U.S. flyers,

whether or not the federal government owns or operates those facilities.

47 FAA’s ultimate responsibility for safety need not and most likely should

not change. However, Congress may wish to authorize additional FAA staff and analytic resources to certify and regulate these facilities and

the organizations that build and operate them.

New operational and economic benefits must be

balanced against possible reliability and security

risks, and international and public-private cooperation and coordination for air traffic system development and operation will need to be strengthened substantially. If Congress becomes confident

that FAA has the resources and capability to ensure the safety and economic benefits of such systems, it may wish to encourage FAA to pursue

more private sector and international collaboration for CNS infrastructure development and implementation. Moreover, the agency’s research

and system development efforts may need to adjust, and possibly expand, to apply and integrate

these new systems into the National Airspace System.

Furthermore, the United States must focus

more on international issues for ATC system

implementation. Congress could encourage the

Department of Transportation and the State Department to take one or more steps to help speed

international acceptance of satellite navigation

standards and systems. One possibility is to bolster FAA’s technical support for ICAO panels, especially by accelerating the development of de-

~~-$!) U. S.(-. I 426
Chapter 1 Summary and Policy Conclusions 131

tailed operational procedures for satellite-based

CNS. Another possible step is to negotiate, outside of ICAO, bilateral or multilateral agreements

for CNS standards compatible with the ICAO Future Air Navigation System concept. This could

be accomplished much sooner than through ICAO

negotiations and would result in earlier economic

benefits and wider operational expertise to U.S.

aircraft operators. Yet another approach is to develop and support internationally acceptable institutions to control and operate these systems. It is

important for Congress to determine what aviation leadership role it desires for the United

States and to encourage international alliances

that foster those interests.

 Long-Term Research: Providing FAA

With a Clearer Mandate

To address fundamental research concerns for aviation safety, environment, and operations, Congress included provisions in the Aviation Safety

Research Act of 1988 to make FAA R&D more

“future-oriented.” One intent of Congress was that

long-term safety research at FAA generate better

48 As a result of this legislation, hu- information.

man factors first became an explicit FAA research

field. In subsequent legislation, Congress mandated additional analytic research tasks for FAA,

including assessing the risk of aging aircraft and

catastrophic engine failures. In other areas. however. it appears that FAA research to identify and

assess emerging problems has not increased, in

part because the statutory definition of “long-term

research” 49 in the Aviation Safety Act of 1988

does not distinguish between technology development and more fundamental research and analy -

sis. OTA finds that less than 5 percent of FAA’s

safety R&D may be aimed at identifying or understanding future problems.

Congress may wish to encourage more fundamental research rather than technology development within FAA’s long-term R&D programs. A greater emphasis on a process (possibly

quantitative risk assessment) that identifies prior50 ity problems could be part of this effort. - Safety

technology development resources become more

valuable when they can be directed at the most important problems. What has been missing so far is

a more unified effort across disciplines. Scientific,

operational, and technology development data are

all essential to this effort; such information is not

now being combined systematically.

Interagency Coordination and Cooperation

Coordination and cooperation depend on personalities at all levels, and temporarily transferring

NASA, DOD, and other personnel to FAA facilities could be effective ways of fostering crossagency links. Congress may also wish to have

FAA establish field offices at DOD labs similar to

the ones at NASA research centers. For example,

an FAA field office at Wright-Patterson Air Force

Base could have access to both vehicle-related research at Wright Laboratory and human factors

expertise at Armstrong Laboratory.

Although FAA has relatively little to offer as a

supplier of scientific R&D in interagency programs, certain technological systems developed

and engineered in FAA programs, such as those

for explosives detection or ATC, are useful to other agencies. For example, DOD plans to install in

its domestic control facilities the same air traffic

WA ~orc of ..[ong-[em, generic research pr~.gram~” was the intended goal of the 15-percent R&D funding requirement. U.S. Congress,

Houw Committee on Science, Space, and Technology, “A\ iation Safety Rewarch Act of 1988,” H. Rept. 100-894, Sept. 8, 1988, p. 18.

Wln ~rtifting [he 1988 act the Hou\e Cc}rllllll[[ee on Science, SpaCC, and Technology’ characterized a long-term research project as ‘)ne *at

unlikel> to rc~ult In a fin;il rulemahing xtion within fi~ c y wrs or in initial in~tal Iation of operational equipment within 10 years after the project

ha~ commenced. lbld., p. 27.

~[l~e} jou~ high-l c~el federal ~ttcntlon t. F}~fq rljk a\\e$\l,lcnt h:i~ becrl dlrect~d, with ]imited ~uc~~~s, at near. ternl products bj the FAA

rc.gulutory tind operating wc(ion~. In 1988, FAA establiihcd a \afcty indicutori progrtirn to provide nlarliigcr~lcnt with relitiblc, rapid displays of

the \tate of at iation sifct) and ~upportirrg dcci~ionmaking tool~. Progre\\ 1+ a~ ~low in defining the indicators and de~ eloping the analytic tool;

in the early 1990s, the project w us wrapped and replaced ulth the ~>itcm indicator~ program. Scc ch. 3.
32 I Federal Research and Technology for Aviation

systems as FAA. Additionally, FAA research facilities for aviation security, fire safety, and ATC

simulation are national resources that could be

useful to other agencies. While some interagency

research projects are under way at the FAA Technical Center, FAA research programs and facilities have offered few research opportunities for

NASA, DOD, and other researchers. Congress

could consider making interagency and crossdiscipline research an explicit goal for certain

FAA research facilities and technology programs.

Congress might also wish to implement more

thorough procedures to account for the true

costs of an agency’s cooperative research. Research conducted for other agencies, such as FAA,

is sometimes implicitly subsidized. If these costs

were fully recognized, the “host” agencies might

be more willing to emphasize cooperative research.

Aviation Environmental Research

Environmental research is underway at many federal agencies, as well as in academia and industry.

However, there has not been a comprehensive environmental research plan for aviation. To increase emphasis in this critical area, Congress

might wish to designate explicit agency responsibilities for domestic and international aviation environmental issues and bolster aviation environment research resources.

Regulatory responsibility is a key forcing

mechanism for environmental research. Congress

may wish to consider reexamining and clarifying

the current division of regulatory responsibilities

in light of the expanding number and complexity

of environmental issues confronting aviation.

One option is to request that FAA prepare a “hotlist” of regulatory issues and outline the areas of

data collection, analysis, and extramural research

needed to address them.

Whether or not the current lines of authority are

changed, Congress may wish to explore means of

closer coordination between EPA and FAA in order to ensure continuous and open communication

in areas critical to aviation operations. These

could include joint reporting of air- and waterquality guidance activities related to airports, integrated databases on engine emissions, and participation in an interagency working committee or

group on aviation environmental issues. The latter

should include NASA and the defense agencies.

Furthermore, FAA needs greater in-house expertise and the capability to provide stronger technical support at international meetings. Currently,

FAA lacks this expertise to deal with some atmospheric and water-quality issues associated with

the existing aircraft fleet-issues that will become

more challenging in the future. FAA, with its understanding of aviation operational issues, could

play a larger role in setting federal environmental

research goals. Should Congress choose to expand FAA’s environmental role, however, it will

need to consider that the agency lacks the resources to coordinate across many of the key

fields and agencies. Congress might consider increasing funding for FAA environment programs

to allow additional technical specialists in the

areas of emissions and climate. This would mean

an approximately 10-percent increase ($500,000)

in the current FAA environmental R&D budget.

Expanding FAA-NASA coordination of environmental R&D beyond the problem of aircraft noise

could be one objective of this enhanced responsibility.

CONCLUSION

Research and technology development for aviation has served the United States well as the aviation community grew and commerce expanded.

To continue to serve the national aviation needs

well in the next decades, changes will be required.

More effective approaches to priority-setting

and analysis need to be developed, and the means

must be found to ensure that all parties who will be

part of solving a problem are considered in formulating the solution. This is especially important

for air traffic system development, where technology decisions have not always meshed with operational requirements.
Chapter 1 Summary and Policy Conclusions 133

Moreover, this country and much of the world traffic system infrastructure will require new instiare relying on post-World War II institutions for tutional relationships among national airspace auaviation that have not been able to transform thorities and also between public and private prothemselves as needed to accommodate changes in viders of aviation communications and navigation

technology, a global economy, and more modern systems.

forms of management. New technologies for air
Institutional and

I

Management Issues

for Civil Aviation

Research and

Technology 2

T

he federal government is involved in most aspects of a

typical aircraft flight in the United States. The aircraft design, its flight and maintenance crew, and the public airport it operates out of must all be certified by the Federal

Aviation Administration (FAA), under the U.S. Department of

Transportation (DOT). On the infrastructure side, most of the

pavement, lights, and navigation devices at the airport are financed with federal funds, and air traffic control (ATC) and airspace systems through which the aircraft flies are owned and operated by FAA.

The tremendous size of the air transportation system and its

importance to the U.S. economy, the federal responsibility for

ATC, and the lack of commercial market or profit potential for

certain safety, environmental, and air traffic management research have propelled the federal government into the role of major provider of aviation research and development (R&D). Within

the United States, only the federal government has the resources

to support large-scale, applied R&D programs for aviation safety

and infrastructure. This chapter describes the present organizational framework for aviation R&D and discusses management

and technology issues of concern to Congress.

ORGANIZATIONAL FRAMEWORK

Federal involvement in aviation began shortly after the inception

of powered flight. At the end of World War I, Congress created the

National Advisory Committee for Aeronautics (NACA) as an advisory group for aviation research, thus intertwining the federal

government’s interest in aviation for military and civil purposes

from early on.
36 I Federal Research and Technology for Aviation

Many organizations hold prominent roles in

U.S. civil aviation, especially in the areas of

policy, regulation, and research and technology.

This section looks at the roles of FAA, the National Aeronautics and Space Administration

(NASA), and other organizations in providing the

technical underpinnings for civil aviation.

 Federal Aviation Administration

FAA promotes safety and fosters air commerce in

three key areas—safety regulation, infrastructure

development, and ATC system operation—and in

the research and technology development to support them. FAA’s regulatory authority covers

virtually every aspect of aviation, from airports

and airways to aircraft and the people who work

in and around them. The agency is responsible for

the nation’s ATC system, a complex amalgam of

people and equipment that must run 24 hours a

day, every day of the year, in numerous locations

across the United States and its territories.

Aviation R&D important to FAA is primarily

mission-oriented; its key purpose is problem solving rather than other policy purposes such as technical leadership, competitiveness, educating scientists, or national security. Much of the

fundamental research and core technology development for aviation is conducted outside of FAA.

FAA’s legislative mandate for R&D is found in

sections 312 and 316 of the Federal Aviation Act

of 1958.1 The act directs the Administrator to

make long-range plans for developing airspace

and landing areas, airways, radar installations,

and other systems. It empowers the Administrator

to develop improvements for aircraft and engines;

to develop systems, procedures, and facilities for

safe and efficient navigation and ATC; and to proThe Federal Aviation Agency was created in 1958

tect against terrorism. Although the language is

broad, it supports R&D related to ATC.2

Congress passed the Aviation Safety Research

Act of 19883

“. . . to add additional topics (structures, fire safety, human factors, and ATC computer simulation) to those on which FAA performs re -

search. ”4 Under the 1988 act, FAA must each year

prepare an Aviation Research Plan. The act further

required the FAA Civil Aeromedical Institute

(CAMI) to conduct medical research, established

an FAA Research Advisory Committee, and increased authorized funds.

The 1988 act also supported an expanded research program by directing FAA to create more

“visibility and structure“ in its research. Another

aim of the legislation was for FAA to develop expertise in each of the new research areas and to

have a closer working relationship between FAA

R&D staff and the portions of the agency that implement the results, Congress designated 15 percent of the FAA research, engineering, and development budget for long-term research and also

I ~b]ic Law 85-726, Aug. 23, 1958.

~U.S. Congress, House of Representatives, A\’iation Safety Research Act of )988, To Accompan) H.R. 4686, H. Rpt. 100-894 (Washington.

DC: U.S. Government Printing Office, 1988), pp. 5-6.

~~b]ic Law I ()()-59], NOV. 3, 1988.

1 }]~use Of Represen[a[ives, op. cit., fOotnote 2, p. 5.
Chapter 2 Institutional and Management Issues for Civil Aviation Research and Technology 137

emphasized closer coordination with NASA’s research program.5

Some of FAA’s R&D is conducted in-house,

primarily at the Technical Center in New Jersey

and at CAMI in Oklahoma City. (Organizations

within FAA that fund or conduct scientific or technological R&D are highlighted in figure 2- 1.)

FAA also does cooperative research with NASA,

the Department of Defense (DOD), the Department of Commerce, and other federal agencies.

 National Aeronautics and Space

Administration

Although it is sometimes difficult to draw a precise line between NASA activities that support

military aviation and those supporting the civil

side, commercial aircraft manufacturing is one of

the few industries for which the U.S. government

routinely funds R&D. The traditional rationale for

this support is that it compensates for the tendency

of the manufacturers to do less than the “socially

optimal” levels of research .

6 NASA is the key

agency conducting aeronautical research, and has

the third largest federal research budget, although

most of that is for space-related activities. NASA

aeronautical research and technology activities

support both military and civil aviation.

Following a June 1993 reorganization, NASA

has two offices as its focal points for aviation: the

Office of Advanced Concepts and Technologies

and the Office of Aeronautics. NASA’s aeronautics research is almost all basic and applied. Although the Associate Administrator makes most

decisions about the direction of the research, the

process is relatively open. with ample opportunity

for those outside NASA to comment.

In the early 1990s, NASA’s aeronautics program had six key areas:

■

■

●

■

■

●

subsonic transport, for technology directed toward U.S. commercial transport aircraft:

high-speed transportation, to resolve critical

environmental issues and lay the foundation for

economical, supersonic air transportation:

high-performance aircraft, oriented toward military applications;

hypersonic and trans-atmospheric flight research;

critical disciplines, with emphasis on basic

sciences: and

critical national facilities, to modernize and refurbish the NASA wind tunnels and other research facilities.7

The NASA laboratories use about 50 percent of

the aeronautics R&D funds, another 30 percent

goes tO contracts with industry, and the remainder

is designated for university research.8 Each

NASA lab maintains unique facilities and areas of

staff expertise. The Ames Research Center, at

Moffett Field. California, has special capabilities

in computational fluid dynamics and computer

applications, along with facilities for aerodynamic testing and flight simulations. NASA is recognized as a world leader in human factors research,

and Ames is the key research center in this effort.

NASA Ames also conducts research in areas such

as ATC, flight dynamics, and guidance and digital

controls.

Among the other NASA centers, the Dryden

Flight Research Facility at Edwards Air Force

Base, California, focuses on aeronautical research

and flight testing. while the Lewis Research Cen-

‘I bid,. pp. 15. 18

‘ In the c~w of tilrcratt nmnutxtureri. the amount of money required to \upport some of the necesw} research is \o great that It ii highly

unlikely th:i[ ;m ind] \ dual m:mufacturer would e}er capture a return on its in} cstmenl. U.S. Congress, Office of Technology .Awc\wwnt. Conperln<~ /;( ot~oni{c$” .lmcrIcd, F.’uropc, atdrhe P(J(’/jc~ivr,oT}\-[T~;-498 (Washington, DC. U.S. Gowmmcnl Printing Office. October 199 I ), p.

344,
38 I Federal Research and Technology for Aviation

r mm

Wm!iIl

L J

I

I I

I I II II ❑ ID•1w m

————

— L- J

I 1 ——

, t 1 m 1 1 mmmm I 1 I 1 TmEmL

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—
Chapter 2 institutional and Management lssues for Civil Aviation Research and Technology 139

The National Advisory Committee for Aeronautics conducted aeronautics research for civiI and military applications, as NASA

does now

ter in Cleveland is a center for propulsion

research. Finally, Langley Research Center, in

Hampton, Virginia, has expertise in areas such as

fundamental aerodynamics and fluid mechanics.

computer science, unsteady aerodynamics, human factors, and aeroelasticity. Additional work

at this NASA lab involves structures and material,

flight control, windshear technologies, noise reduction, and simulations of advanced systems.

NASA labs conduct R&D of importance to

FAA. Ames and Langley have worked with FAA

on cockpit resource management, fatigue, information transfer. and ATC human-factors studies. Ames is the lead research facility for development of the Center-TRACON Automation

System (CTAS, part of FAA’s Terminal ATC Automation-or TATCA—system), which projects

where aircraft are likely to go on final approach

and creates an arrival plan for the controllers.

Langley is the center for development of airborne

windshear technology, which provides early

warnings of hazardous windshear that may cross

an aircraft’s flight path.

 State Authorities and Airport Operators

New air navigation technologies. environmental

policies, and intermodal demands affect more

than FAA research and technology decisions. Private companies, states, airport authorities, and

other nonfederal organizations are now planning

and installing air navigation and communication

systems that could supplement, enhance, or replace existing or proposed federal ATC infrastructure (see box 2-1 for one example). Additionally,

some airports are investigating and implementing

technologies to address environmental and other

challenges without FAA guidance or support.9

@TA win q of airport operiitors :ind state av]atmn authori[ics. conducted by Jeanne Oli\ ier, Port Authority of New }’orh ind New Jersey,

on detail to OT}\, Jmu[iry-,lpril 1993.
40 I Federal Research and Technology for Aviation

In the absence of timely federal support, states themselves often fund and oversee aviation research

and development projects. In 1993, Virginia funded an engineering effort to take advantage of new

technology to improve weather service for general aviation and business pilots using Virginia airports

While applying a new technology, the Virginia effort also relies heavily on the existing aviation weather

communication Infrastructure.

Weather is a critical factor in flight operations. Of both air carrier and general aviation accidents between 1983 and 1987, 25 percent were due, at least in part, to weather conditions.1 The Federal Aviation Administration provides weather briefings to pilots through its Flight Service Stations and its computerized Direct User Access Terminal Service as part of the National Airspace Data Interchange

Network (NADIN) This information, Including wind speed and direction, precipitation, barometric pressure, and cloud height, comes from manned weather stations and Automated Weather Observation

Systems (AWOS) located at airports across the country. It is accessible on the ground for preflight planning as well as en route for in-flight adjustments to flight plans,

Pilots find it particularly useful to have advance information on the weather conditions at the specific

airport where they will be taking off or Ianding so that they may make adjustments to avoid hazardous

weather patterns. For this reason, in addition to the weather stations at major commercial airports, FAA

has installed automated weather observation stations at 170 air taxi and commuter airports and at general aviation airports that are considered important to the national air system. (FAA is in the process of

installing 30 additional sites ) Still, many small airports do not have onsite weather observation systems

Pilots using these airports must rely on weather reports from neighboring airports or other observation

stations for their flight judgments Due to the variability of weather, this reformation is less reliable than

onsite reports To improve the weather service for their customers, some sponsors of small airports

have independently installed AWOS at their airports after FAA declined to do so Ninety percent of the

cost of Independent AWOS may come from Airport Improvement Program grants, for those airports that

qualify FAA maintains only AWOS that it installs; the airport sponsor must maintain those systems that it

installs Independently

1 National Transportation Safety Board, “Annual Review of Aircraft Accident Data U S Au Carrier Operations, Calendar Year

1988,’’Apr 8, 1991, p 31 and National Transporfatlon Safety Board, “Annual Review of Aircraft Accident Data U S General Avlatlon,

Calendar Year 1988, ” Mar 27, 1991, p 20

Airport operators note that federal aviation

R&D focuses more on aircraft, ATC technology,

and large airports, thus neglecting the interests of

smaller airports. For example, noise reduction and

capacity expansion research primarily benefits

large airports, not general aviation airports, for

which these issues are rarely problems. Large and

small airports stand together in their position that

there are not enough funds applied to airport research, but some state and local agencies have

sought their own answers to pressing research and

technology issues.

States generally do not have much money for

research, although a number do fund and oversee

testing and evaluation. For example, California

funds several aviation research projects at the Air

Transportation Research Center of the Institute of

Transportation Studies (part of University of

California, Berkeley). These include airport landside analysis for off-airport terminals, and the ap-
Chapter 2 Institutional and Management Issues for Civil Aviation Research and Technology 141

Until Virginia’s recent initiative few nonfederal AWOS have been Iinked to FAA's NADIN system due

to financial and technological barriers 2 A pilot could get the information only by contacting the airport

directly by phone or through a very-high-frequency radio broadcast accessible only in close proximity

to the airport This access constraint Iimited the use of the data to local departure and Ianding approach aids and excluded pilots’ use en route to these airports Those federal AWOS installations Iinked

to NADIN are connected by telecommunication land Iines at a monthly cost to FAA of $800 per AWOS 3

This high cost deterred FAA from assuming the expense for Iinkage of Independent AWOS to NADIN

and similarly discouraged state aviation authorities from financing the connection

Working with a private contractor, the Virginia Department of Aviation has supported the development of a satellite-based Iinkage of AWOS to FAA's NADIN system, which obviates the need for expensive land Iine connections Virginia’s contractor wiII use efficient communication bands of satellite

technology to transmit weather data from 23 AWOS in Virginia to a collection point in Minnesota From

this point the Information will be entered into NADIN for dissemination to FAA Flight Service Stations

and the Direct User Access Terminal Service, FAA 604 service (venue for private vendors), and the

National Weather Service Pilots nationwide wiII have access to weather Information for many of Virginia’s general aviation airports and wiII be able to radio a flight service station en route to find out the

weather at the airport where they wiII be landing, or any number of airports along their flight path The

five-year cost for this system, including equipment, maintenance, and operation, iS expected to be

about $400,000 Officials of the Virginia Department of Aviation project that this wiII be one-third the cost

of providing the same Information via land telephone Iines

FAA iS now Iooking into the Innovative work of Virginia in satellite linkage of AWOS and NADIN because of the dramatic operational cost advantages for its own AWOS data dissemination Other state

aviation authorities have also expressed interest in providing this service

2 The stale of Mlnnesola provides land hne hnkage of some AWOS In that state to tNADIN Due to the favorable cost of the satelhte

Ilnkage demonstrated by Vlrglnla Minnesota w(II soon convert these land Ilne connections to satelllte hnkage

3 Ken Krous Federal Avlatton Admlnlstratron perSOnal CoMMunlCatlOn Apr 7 1993

plication of artificial intelligence to airport ground For example, LaGuardia (New York) Airport’s

transportation systems. 10 occasionally, locally two runways each have one end that extends over

funded or state-funded projects 11 address a prob- water, and the other end of one runway terminates

lem that the local agency has had trouble drawing at a dike adjacent to Flushing Bay. Faced with an

to FAA’s attention; they may also aim to counter FAA requirement to extend the emergency overFAA standards that do not consider the unique run areas of runways to a length of 1,000 feet—

physical constraints of certain airports. and resistance from nearby communities to do

IOIbid.

I I ~“hat nlonlc~ ~ilrw~$ ha~ e f(>r R&D ujua]]y COInC from st~tc or airport re~cnucs. not federal funds. (See box ~-I again. )
42 I Federal Research and Technology for Aviation

this 12 *—the Port Authority of New York and New

Jersey conducted independent research on passive

in-ground arrestors that could safely stop an aircraft in a relatively short distance during an emergency.

13 If the in-ground arrestors are validated

and become available, the Port Authority would

likely put the arrestors at all four runway ends; the

installation and maintenance would be much less

costly than further extending overrun areas. 14

Some states have universities with transportation research centers that conduct aviation research. These centers receive both state and federal funding and provide a useful supplement to the

states’ resources. An FAA initiative for pooling

research resources with state agencies may become another way to expand available resources

and to focus on projects important to state authorities.

For example, the “Minnesota Partnership” is an

FAA experiment in cooperation on 10 research

projects. Among these projects is an FAA study of

pavement under cold region conditions using a

Minnesota Department of Transportation test facility consisting of a 3-mile strip of instrumented

pavement. However, there are usually administrative impediments to FAA’s contracting out work

to states. Principal among these impediments is

the rigid federal procurement system for contract

services. 15

Airport operators often claim to have unmet research needs, but few can specify what these are.

However, state aviation officials, industry analysts, and FAA managers concerned with airports

maintain that this inability to articulate specifics

does not belie the need; what may be necessary

first is a mechanism for identifying research requirements. At issue, too, is the fact that airport

managers claim to be restricted in their ability to

share research conducted by consultants, even

though the results might prove useful to other airports, obviating additional expense. States and

airport authorities seldom share information

about work that might benefit others. Of the several states conducting pavement research, for example, most are unaware of the projects of their counterparts. 16

 Public-Private Partnerships

The potentially increasing role of commercial

communications in the air traffic system infrastructure makes public-private partnerships an attractive option for speeding technology development and implementation. Federal law permits

and encourages agency participation in cooperative R&D agreements. 17 FAA has recently teamed

with private industry to develop and test some

commercial technologies for ATC functions. Examples include ATC pre-departure clearance delivery via the commercial ARINC Communications and Reporting System (ACARS) datalink

and automatic dependent surveillance of oceanic

flights by United Airlines through INMARSAT

communciation links. Participants at an Office of

Technology Assessment (OTA) workshop observed that such partnerships are most successful

when the major customer for the technology is the

] z~e pon Au~orjtY required approval from Wveral city and state agencies in New York, along witi FAA ~d tie ArmY COrPS of Engineers,

to make changes to the runways. Perceiving that any extension of the landing and takeoff surfaces would lead to the use of larger planes and

higher levels of activity at the airport, many communities actively opposed increasing the length of the overrun area. Steven Smolenski, Manager, Airport Facilities Division, LaGuardia Airport, Port Authority of New York and New Jersey, personal communication, July 20, 1994.

I ~The testing program evo]ved into a cooperative effort with FAA to further study foam-based arrestors at the FAA Technical Center.

14smolenSkj, op. cit., fOOtIIOtL? 12.

15 Patrjcja Haynes, Fe(jera] Aviation Administration, persona] communication, Mar. 16, 1993.

l@TA suwey of aj~~ o~ra[ors and state aviation authorities, op. cit., footnote 9.

ITFrom ] 980 t. ] 989, Congress passed several major laws that directed federal agencies and the labs 10 transfer technologies to State and

local governments and the private sector. See Office of Technology Assessment, Defense Conversion: Redirecflng R&D, OTA- ITE-552 (Washington, DC: U.S. Government Printing Office, May 1993 ), p. 86.
Chapter 2 Institutional and Management issues for Civil Aviation Research and Technology 143

private sector, not the federal government (and

where both need the technology at the same

time). 18

In 1992, FAA announced support for a costshared, public-private partnership with the airline

community. Its objective was to enable FAA to enter into a cooperative agreement with an industry

consortium to develop, test, and build the first

Aeronautical Telecommunications Network

(ATN)19 components, taking advantage of “good

commercial contracting practices.”20 FAA’s contributions would include contract resources, test

facilities and aircraft, expedited avionics certification, and accelerated procedures and standards development.

By the summer of 1993, nine airlines had formally indicated their willingness to conduct the

work and had tentatively elected to have the consortium assume a full corporate identity.21 The

Mitre Corporation will likely continue to have a

significant role in supporting the efforts of the

ATN Consortium;22 DOD intends to participate in

the project.23 Remaining issues include speeding

the certification of commercial off-the-shelf software and operational system software.

One development that has boosted government-industry cooperation is the increased use of

cooperative research and development agreements (CRADAs). Designed to promote technology transfer, they allow federal labs and private

companies to share R&D projects; the Clinton

Administration would like to see the national labs

devote up to 20 percent of their budgets to these

partnerships. While facing resistance from some

government scientists who, up until now, have

considered commercialization of technology a

low priority, managers at the national labs realize

that the labs’ very existence may depend on how

useful they can be to the private sector. The Air

Force has therefore participated in CRADAs that

could ultimately benefit commercial aviation.

Like DOD, FAA is using CRADAs as a means

to work more closely with industry. As of July

1993, FAA had 50 CRADAs in place, although

with eight completed and 31 still in the administrative process, only 11 could be considered active. Almost one-half (22) of the total were in the

area of aircraft and airport safety; security and air

traffic control split another 20 CRADAs between

them. 24

 International Civil Aviation Organization

The International Civil Aviation Organization

(ICAO), founded in 1944 and now part of the

United Nations, had 182 signatory nations as of

November 1993. These nations have agreed to

adopt minimum standards regarding aircraft,

ATC, pilot qualifications, and other areas of civil

l~Remark\ at OTA workshop, February 1993

lgln 199~ the fvli[re Cowratlon ~gan a voluntary government-industry program known as the Aeronautical Telecommunications Network (ATN ) Project, to build an initial version of ATN components. ATN is intended to support user-transparent data transfer between aircraft

and ground systems using any combination of datalink media. Also participating in the ATN Project were FAA, vendors (IBM, Honeywell,

Rockwell-Collins, and Teledyne), and air-ground communication network service providers, including ARINC, the Communications Satellite

Corporation (CONLSAT), and the lntemational Society of Aeronautical Telecommunications (S ITA). Due primarily to resource constraints, the

project is no longer active and will be subsumed by the ATN Consortium. See Lillian Z. Ryals, The Mitre Corporation “Development and implementation of the Aeronautical Telecommunication Network (ATN), briefing for OTA, Mar. 13, 1992.

2(’John Feamsides, General Manager and Senior Vice President, The Mitre Corporation, personal communication, Apr. 21, 1994.

~ 1 Hal Lud~ ig, FAA Liaison to the ATN Consortium, persona] Communication, Aug. 5, 1993.

‘q[’rank Col\on, Executive Director, DOD Policy Board on Federal Aviation, personal communication, June 29, 1994.

~JU,S. Department of Transportation, Federal Aviation Administration, Reporf (o Congress: .Sur\’e}’ ojRe.search, br~ineer[n,g, and De\e/-

oprnen[ Re\eurc}l Fuci//f~e.r (Washington, DC: July 1993), p. B-1.
44 I Federal Research and Technology for Aviation

aviation. The standards provide member nations

with a baseline level of safety in international aviation operations.25

ICAO’s authority on such topics as communication and navigation standards and air travel

over the high seas is essentially absolute. For their

respective territories, implementation is up to individual countries, which reserve the right to differ from ICAO standards. While the United States

generally has no difficulty with compliance, other

nations sometimes do.

ICAO has certain limitations. It lacks inspection capability and conducts no enforcement activities. Its standards tend to be the lowest common

denominator, the result of many members trying

to reach consensus. Although there has been some

success, such as the significant progress made in

determining the direction of air navigation development, ICAO can be slow to act. For example,

despite pressure from industry groups eager to use

the Global Positioning System (GPS) of satellite

navigation, ICAO is powerless to establish an

agency to oversee implementation of satellite

communications, navigation, and surveillance

systems. 26

ICAO’s ineffectiveness can have adverse effects on U.S. interests. For example, ICAO has

worked since 1981 to establish guidelines for the

use of the Traffic Alert and Collision Avoidance

System (TCAS). So little progress has been made,

however, that the panel chairman compared himself to “a rat on a treadmill,” and speculated

whether some ICAO members used the organization as a shield to avoid making decisions.27

Meanwhile, the three companies that manufacture

TCAS equipment—all of them American—wait

for the impasse on this $350-mi

break. 28 However, one expert

lion market to

believes that

ICAO’s ineffectiveness stems from poor leadership by the United States in ICAO forums.29

Although FAA, through the Department of

Transportation, attends ICAO meetings, all official U.S. positions are cleared through the Interagency Group on International Aviation (IGIA),

which includes the U.S. Departments of Transportation, Commerce, Defense, Labor, and State,

as well as NASA, the National Transportation

Safety Board (NTSB), and the Federal Communications Commission (FCC). IGIA must also be

informed when FAA negotiates or amends bilateral airworthiness agreements .30

Bilateral airworthiness agreements exist in part

because FAA does not regard all ICAO airworthiness standards to be adequate and therefore holds

some imports of aeronautical products to higher

standards. U.S. bilateral agreements predate

ICAO; the first was negotiated with Canada in

1929. The United States and selected countries negotiate these agreements, which may facilitate export of aviation items or may obligate the parties

to treat each other’s civil aeronautical products as

equally airworthy, provided they have been certified through acceptable methods by the home

country’s aviation authorities.3

1 (Table 2-1 lists

the countries with which the United States had bilateral airworthiness agreements in place in 1993.)

 European Aviation Organizations

Despite the growing influence of the European

Union (EU) and the European Free Trade Association (EFTA), European aviation organizations remain primarily advisory. But as European unity

~5George A. Berman, Regulutor-y Coopcru[ion With Counterpart Agencies Abroad: The FM’s Airct-uf; Cerl!jlculion E.rper[ence (Washington, DC: Administrative Conference of the United States, 1992), p. 82.

‘c ‘.lATA Fails To Persuade ICAO To Set Up Special Agency for GPS,” Atiafion Daily, vol. 312, No. 64, June 30, 1993, p. 503.

27Lisa Burgess, “TCAS Rules: The Devil Is in the Details,” Commercial A\iation News, vol. 1, No. 33, Sept. 13, 1993, p. 4.

~81bid.

29 Robert Simpson, Massachusetts Institute of Technology, personal communication, June 23, 1994.

~(~Berrllan, op. cit., footnote 25, pp. I I ~- 120

3 I Ibid., pp. 87-88.
Chapter 2 Institutional and Management Issues for Civil Aviation Research and Technology 145

Joint Aviation Authority Non-Joint Aviation

member countries Authority countries

Austria Argentina

Belgium Austria

Denmark Brazil

Finland Canada

France China

Germany Czech Republic

Italy Indonesia

Net her lands Israel

Norway Japan

Spain New Zealand

Sweden Poland

Switzerland Romania

United Kingdom SIngapore

Slovakia

South Africa . —

SOURCE Federa Avlatlon Adrrlnis’ration 1993

moves from concept to reality, a number of aviation organizations have taken on more prominent

roles. (For membership of these groups and those

discussed below, see figure 2-2, ) The EU, for example, has a number of programs underway to determine specifications for common ATC equipment and facilities.

The Joint Airworthiness Authorities (JAA), established in 1970, is not a formal political body,

although it could become the basis for a pan-European civil aviation authority. While largely driven

by the demands of the EU and, to a lesser extent,

EFTA, the organization does attempt to set common aviation standards for European nations.

Like ICAO, however. JAA has no enforcement

authority. J AA member nations jointly certificate

air-craft. but the ICAO treaty and national laws require that national authorities remain responsible

for actual certification in their own countries.32

One of the stated goals of JAA is to have Joint

Airworthiness Regulations (JARs) that are similar

to the FAA’s Federal Aviation Regulations, although sometimes this involves JAA trying to

persuade FAA to change. JAA and FAA hold joint

policy meetings on a regular basis and working

group sessions as needed.33 JARs developed thus

far cover certification of aircraft design and production; pending JARs will deal with maintenance, repair, and overhaul activities.

The European Civil Aviation Conference

(ECAC), which has 31 member countries, was

founded in 1955 to review the development of European air policies and promote coordination.

Like the other international organizations, ECAC

is a consultative body; political power rests with

transport ministers of member nations. ECAC’s

ability to speak through the Ministers of Transport

gives it some of the effectiveness that other groups

seem to lack. It now also represents nations beyond Western Europe.

Eurocontrol, an air traffic management organization founded in 1960, aims to provide air traffic services for 15 European nations (see figure

2-2 again). Eurocontrol faces the massive task of

harmonizing and integrating 31 different European ATC systems, most of which are incompatible with each other. This task is complicated by

sovereignty issues.

With ECAC member nations likely to spend

more than $3 billion on new ATC equipment by

the end of the century, it is possible that some new

systems could meet Eurocontrol specifications, or

at least help speed the integration process. For Eurocontrol, this would be a strong and long overdue

step. However, Eurocontrol’s objectives cannot

be met until there is continuous radar coverage

across Europe. 34 There are areas of Europe where

aircraft separations from 5 to 20 nautical miles are

currently applied due to varying radar coverage.

Eurocontrol undertook a study of the ATC systems of the 23 nations that were ECAC members

~JJl>ld , pp. 1 [x) 102. In ocrtjbcr 1993, F’AA and JAA conducted the first sirnult:meous U.S. and European certification ofajct tran}por-t, the

AIItw\ A33( ). “Ncu ~ Ilrc;ih\, “ ,.!l /(1[/())1 \\~cJA & .Si)a(C TIvhnok)~-y, Yol. 139, No. 17, Oct. 25, 1993. p. 17.

1 ~IJcrnl,ln, op. CI[.. footnote 25, p, I 07.

‘J(’tlr]s }rCitc\, “~lurocontro]” Conle) ot’ Age, ” June’s .41rpor~ Rc\/c\*, Yol. 4, No. 3, April 1992, p. 42.
46 I Federal Research and Technology for Aviation

L

1

ECAC (31) ~

aim--;------- ‘

r

EUROCONTROL(15)

—— . . . EU (12)

EFTA (6) -----------------

1

1

Finland Austria !

Iceland Switzerland ~ Norway I

I

1

Sweden I

I

I4

.- ——. -—- —————— —-— ( Luxembourg

Netherlands

Portugal

United Kingdom

J

----------------------------------------

Bulgaria Hungary Cyprus Croatia Czech Republic

Slovakia Malta Lithuania Monaco

Romania Turkey Slovenia Poland

L

KEY ECAC = European CIVII Aviation Conference JAA = Joint AwatlonAuthorltles, EU = European Union, EFTA= European Free Trade Association,

EUROCONTROL = European Organlzatlon for the Safety of Air Navigation

SOURCE Federal Avlat[onAdmlmstratlon and /nteravia Aerospace Wor/d, 1993

in 1988, as part of the European Air Traffic Control Harmonisation and Integration Programme

(EATCHIP). The goal of EATCHIP is to make the

different national systems work together so well

as to be virtually transparent to pilots.35 Its focus

is primarily on en route airspace. The United

States and Canada have observer status for

EATCHIP and the Airport./Air Traffic Systems Interface. Another Eurocontrol project, the ATC Radar Tracker and Server program, has the goal of

harmonizing data from multiple radar systems.

INTERAGENCY COORDINATION ON

AVIATION R&D

The budget deficit and defense conversion are

among the factors that have led to increased congressional interest in cooperation among federal

agencies conducting aviation R&D. The primary

advantages of interagency R&D programs include

economies of scale, elimination of redundant efforts, and more rapid technology development

and deployment. Such programs should reflect

one or more of these benefits, as cooperation con-

~5B~~~ks Ti~ner, “TWO Plans, One GO~l: Align Elrro~’s ATC,” Commercial A}iulion News, Ju1)’ 12-18, 1993, P. 10.
Chapter 2 Institutional and Management Issues for Civil Aviation Research and Technology 147

ducted for its own sake is seldom enough to justify

the time and resources involved. And some agencies can benefit from access to the expertise of the

in-house staff of other federal entities and also to

the private sector research firms that work with

those entities.sh

Congressional actions affect the interests of

cooperative research. When Congress passed the

Aviation Safety Act of 1988 and the Catastrophic

Failure Prevention Research Program,37 both recognized that FAA’s level of in-house expertise

might be less than optimal, and so encouraged

work with NASA, DOD, and other sources by

providing enabling authority. By contrast, when

Congress directs money for specific projects to

specific institutions, problems may result from

the recipient’s lack of understanding of aviation

needs. For example, one Federally Funded Research and Development Corporation (FFRDC)

directed to address aviation security problems applied nuclear plant security systems without fully

accounting for the dynamic needs of airports.38

 Interagency Coordination at FAA Today

Coordination among federal agencies occurs at

two levels: the agency program level and the researcher level. Agency advisory committees often

promote agency-level coordination; coordination

at the researcher level occurs through meetings

and other activities.~~ And, as one FAA manager

pointed out, when scientists learn of a project in

their area, they often contact the funding source on

their own. As he put it: “Resources draw others to

the doorstep. others who want a piece of the funding and the action and who try to get involved.”40

The number of FAA interagency agreements for

R&D grew rapidly in the late 1980s (see figure

2-3).

In 1991, the FAA Research. Engineering, and

Development (RE&D) Committee advised that

innovative and cooperative research be emphasized throughout the entire FAA RE&D Plan. A

1992 General Accounting Office report also recommended cooperative programs, with special

emphasis on NASA and DOD in-house capabilities as a cost-effective alternative to private contractors and FFRDCS.

41

Some of FAA’s long-term research needs, such

as human factors. are common to many other federal agencies. FAA conducts little basic or fundamental scientific research; its efforts are mostly

systems development and engineering. However,

there are substantial federal research efforts under

way in areas important to aviation operations. For

example, defense programs have been the source

of many fundamental technologies for civil aviation—radar, computers, datalink, and satellitebased navigation, to name a few. Moreover, for

aviation environmental and security issues, FAA

must depend on other agencies research and data

to characterize and assess risks.

Two examples of cooperative R&D efforts for

aviation are aging aircraft and weather research. In

the National Aging Aircraft Research Program,

FAA’s long-term goal of developing a corrosioncontrol management plan for aircraft is being met

with the help of other government agencies, industry, and academia. One organization involved

in this program is the Center for Aviation Systems

Reliability, a consortium of institutions based at

Iowa State University, which is charged with studying several aspects of corrosion control and re-

~(’(icllm:m Rcwwch A\\f~ciutc~, “Coopcra[ion und Coordimition in Federal A; iation Rcvmrch,” OTA contractor report. Dec. 30, 1992,

pp. I -2.

37 Puhl IL 1.:IW I () I -50X. wct]on 9208, Nov. 5, 1990.

~k(;cllnum Rcwarch A\wxi:itc\, op. cit., footnote 36. pp. 30-31.
48 I Federal Research and Technology for Aviation

55

T“-

50-

45{

I

I

15

1

10

5

0

1984 1985 1986 1987 1988 1989 1990 1991 1992

SOURCE Off Ice of Technology Assessment, 1994, based on Federal Aviation Administration data

lated human factors for maintenance and inspection. Another aging aircraft consortium is

centered at DOE’s Sandia National Laboratory;

participants include the DOD’s Naval Air Warfare

Center, Air Force Flight Dynamics Laboratory

and Wright Laboratory, NASA, the United Kingdom and Netherlands Civil Aviation Authorities,

and various industry groups.42

Similarly, weather research involves multiple

agencies. While the Terminal Doppler Weather

Radar project is a well-run cooperative program,

communication in the Automated Weather Observing System program has been spotty at best.43

The differing needs of the participants in weather

research may result in a fuzzy focus and difficulty

in establishing common ground. Sometimes, too,

the large number of participants-up to 13 in

some cases—makes coordination an issue in itself.

FAA and NASA

Among its R&D relationships with other federal

agencies, FAA’s ties are strongest to NASA. Although NASA and FAA have worked together

since their inception in 1958, it was not until 1990

that FAA and NASA Administrators took personal and administrative actions to bolster the ties between the two agencies. The agencies now coordinate aviation research programs and planning

through a joint committee, and have established

six Memoranda of Understanding (MOU) in areas

of mutual interest—ATC-cockpit integration, human factors, severe weather, airworthiness, environmental issues, and “program support.”44

FAA has field offices at NASA’s Ames and

Langley Research Centers to monitor joint programs and to provide FAA with a close look at

NASA’s aeronautics work. This cooperation al421 bid., pp. 15-19.

431 bid., pp. 23-24.

au s ~pa~mnt OfTranSpofiatiOn, Fe&ra] Aviation Administration, The Federal At*iaricm Adminis(ra[ion Planfor Research, Engineer- . .

ing and Development—1994: Final Drajl (Washington, DC: September 1993), p. A-3.
Chapter 2 Institutional and Management issues for Civil Aviation Research and Technology 149

lows a thorough understanding of mutual interests, reduces duplication of effort, and helps conserve scarce resources. 45 Typically, FAA

identifies its needs and NASA determines the feasibility of providing the necessary support. Field

office projects have dealt with such areas as simulation capabilities, human factors, windshear, microwave landing systems, and GPS.46

FAA and NASA also have a Joint University

Program for air transportation research, in which

university research supports national airspace system activities. FAA and NASA Langley Research

Center sponsor annual grants to the Massachusetts

Institute of Technology, Ohio State University,

and Princeton University to work on topics suggested by the two agencies and related to their

long-term needs.47

Joint FAA/NASA research and development

activities typically occur under MOUs, Memoranda of Agreement (MOA), and Interagency Agreements for the Transfer of Funds (IAA/TOF). An

MOU defines a broad area of interest between two

or more federal agencies. These are usually arranged at high levels, with approval of both Administrators. NASA supplies most of the research

personnel and facility support and contributes

about $40 million beyond what is explicitly

counted in interagency fund transfers.48 Within

MOUs, MOAs specify actual R&D activities to be

undertaken and the resources to be committed by

both agencies. MOAs are in effect for five years49

and can be planned at lower managerial levels

within the two agencies. Finally, the IAA/TOF is

the budget transfer to NASA; it functions like a

contract.so

‘

s Ibid.

*Gc]]mtirl Rejear~h A\wciates, op. cit., footnote 36, p. 28.

~~Federal ~~t iatlon Adminis[ratl~n, Op. cit., foo~ote ‘, P ‘-2

~~GellI1lan Rejcarch Associate\. op. cit., footnote 36, p. 3~.

~OFxtcn~ionf arc p~f~lblc. :

s(lGell,~lan Research Assocl~te\, op. cit., footnote 36, p. 25.

f 1 lb]d., p, ~~.

Some tension exists between FAA and NASA

regarding the financing of cooperative programs.

FAA’s contributions are explicit, for they require

a transfer of funds. NASA, however, provides facilities and other institutional capabilities that are

not delineated by a specified dollar amount. As a

result of this technically unacknowledged contribution, NASA might be somewhat less enthusiastic than desired in pursuing cooperative ventures with FAA. More accurate accounting

procedures that consider NASA’s true costs might

encourage NASA to pursue additional cooperative ventures.51

A potential handicap for FAA/NASA joint research is budget review. Different divisions of the

Office of Management and Budget review the

FAA and NASA budgets, leading to possible difficulties in pushing through joint projects. Similarly, separate congressional committees approve

funding for FAA and NASA. This, too, can impede joint research. Similar situations exist for

joint aviation research with DOD.

FAA and Defense Laboratories

FAA has made efforts to involve the national laboratories in aviation R&D programs within their

areas of expertise. Many of these facilities, especially the Air Force labs, have capabilities of direct relevance to FAA. For example, the effect of

high-intensity radiation on aircraft electronics is

a certification issue for FAA, and is an area where

DOD has expertise and research and test capabilities. R&D conducted for DOD’s diverse aircraft

inventory, such as the use of composite materials

for aircraft primary structures, has applications in
50 I Federal Research and Technology for Aviation

civil aviation. Although some basic technologies

can be applied in both civilian and military projects, most high-performance systems produced to

meet military needs are not relevant to civilian

aviation.

Military R&D has had a positive effect on the

U.S. commercial aviation industry. There have

been a few cases of entire systems developed for

the military becoming integral to commercial application, reducing R&D costs. Military development programs often assume the risks of proving

advanced technologies, and this has helped the

U.S. commercial aircraft industry to achieve its

current prominence. However, the increasing divergence in the interests of military and civil aviation applications means that such advantages

will occur less frequently.52 Meanwhile, civilian

applications of new technologies are of growing

importance to the military, because some commercial products can be five or more years ahead

of military development.53 The current DOD industrial base policy calls for more DOD reliance

on the civil sector, especially in areas of rapidly

changing technology and a large civilian demand

base, such as avionics and communications.54

FAA has had long-term cooperative programs

with two DOD laboratories under the Army Corps

of Engineers: the Cold Regions Research and Engineering Laboratory (CRREL) in Hanover, New

Hampshire; and the Construction Engineering

Research Laboratory (CERL) in Urbana, Illinois.

CRREL, as its name indicates, concentrates on the

cold weather-related problems such as stresses on

pavement and metals, as well as ice-related problems. CERL emphasizes environmentally benign

construction quality and energy efficiency. Included among its programs are projects on nondestructive testing, corrosion prevention, materials,

and information systems.55

Unlike NASA, the DOE and DOD national labs

thus far do not have funds of their own to put toward FAA research projects.56 While NASA can

provide additional facilities and staff to an FAA

project, the DOD and DOE labs can contribute

only what FAA is willing to pay for. From the perspective of FAA and airspace users, limited FAA

research dollars for cooperative programs might

be stretched the most through joint efforts with

NASA. 57 However, a broad, multiagency view

should not be ignored. The DOD/Air Force facilities have extensive backgrounds in military aviation R&D. Whether this can be applied effectively to civil aviation R&D is open to question, but

it bears investigation. FAA had agreements with

36 government labs (including NASA’s) as of July

1993. The total dollar commitment exceeded $56

million, the largest single agreement being over

$16 million with DOD’s Lincoln Labs for ATC research (see table 2-2).

 Barriers to Coordination

Although OTA has found that many cooperative

activities are taking place, there are some funding

and bureaucratic constraints that may prevent successful coordination. These constraints include

administrative requirements and conflicting

agency roles and responsibilities, as well as the

s~offic. of Technology Assessment, op. ~i[., footnote 6, P 345”

53u s Conoress, office of Te~hn~l~g~ A~~eSSmen[, T}I(~ Dpfon.\c Tccllnolog)t Ilase: In(rod[ict[m (1?1(/ ~lterl /c~%’-A .\pccllll R~’port. OTAISC-374 (Wash~ng(on, DC: U.S. Government Printing Office, March 1988), p.-42.

s~colson, op. cit., footnote 23.

‘5U .S. Congress, Office of Technologyr Assessment, Delii’cring the Go[d.~: Public W)rlc\ T2chnologic.\ , ,\ f(lfl(J,~(’f?l(’ ~lt, (In(i b’inuncinq.

OTA-SET-477 (Washington, DC: U.S. Gmcmment Printing Office, April 1991), p. 215.

s6Th1s ~ou]d change as tie rc)]es ~md o~ratlng nlode~ of the nation;i] ]ab~ will ] i~e]y ~~~lp[ to acconlmo&i{e [hc R&f) IleL?d\ Of )klllCrlCil !.

post-Cold Wm. Office of Technolog) Assessment, op. cit., footnote 17, p. 39.

57Ge]lnlan Research A\\ociate\, ~)p, ~1[,, foo[no[e 36, p. 26. There 1$ ~]~o [he ~i fficu](.(o.qu~nti fy ~ncfi[ of NASA’S :rCatCr cxpcricnc’c \\ I[h

FAA R&D projects.
Chapter 2 Institutional and Management Issues for Civil Aviation Research and Technology 151

Number of federal facilities with FAA agreements

Total by

FAA research area DOD NASA DOE Other a

research area

Aviation security 7 0 3 1 11

Aircraft safety 8 2 2 0 12

Air traffic control 2 2 1 5 10

Airports 3 0 0 0 3

Total by facility 20 4 6 6 36

FAA funding commitment $250 $ 7 4 $ 8 4 $15 6 $56 3

($ millions)

a Primar[ly weather research

—

NOTE Dollar totals may be different :han sums due to roundlncj

KEY DOD - Department of Defense DOE = Department of Energy NASA = Na:lonal Aeronautics and Space

Admlmstratlon

SOURCE Off Ice of Technology Assessment 1994 based on Federal Awatlon Admlnlstratlon Report to Congress

(pursuanl to Publlc Law 102-388) July 1993 p 3 and app C

budget approval process and funding issues discussed earlier.

During the course of this study, OTA heard

from many members of the aviation community

familiar with civilian aviation R&D who generally gave NASA high marks for interagency communication, including its various efforts with

FAA. Some have noted, however. that while the

FAA/NASA Coordinating Committee and other

mechanisms might be the right methods for ensuring interagency coordination, they are not working as well as they should.

One former government manager felt that

while coordination was good at the staff level, it

was generally inadequate for policy and planning.

He blamed this on what he saw as a fundamental

incompatibility between FAA and NASA: NASA

prefers to look at the development of new aeronautical technologies, while FAA gives more

attention to the actual implementation of systems

using new or existing technologies.

Better interagency coordination and cooperat ion for aviation R&D is more than a NASA/FAA

issue. While DOD helped FAA and NASA develop the National Plan for Aviation Human Factors,

and FAA and NASA human factors programs are

coordinated and linked to the National Plan, there

is no formal agreement between FAA and DOD.

However, closer involvement by DOD could be

beneficial to civil aviation. FAA has established

cooperative agreements with DOD laboratories.

For example, Wright Laboratory is performing

aircraft-hardening R&D in support of FAA’s security program.

Furthermore, current FAA cooperative agreements do not adequately a11OW for basic research

and independent R&D. A small pool of unallocated funds might help foster creativity and innovation within broader R&D objectives, although such funds are the most vulnerable to

budget cuts.58 An attempt to address this need is

found in FAA’s Innovation Development and Engineering Applications program, which “.. . will

provide the FAA with a formal structure to ensure

that novel ideas for innovative RE&D projects

.,. will be evaluated and, if feasible, sponsored. ”59
52 I Federal Research and Technology for Aviation

Another issue is related to the overlap between

some agency roles and responsibilities. For example, the Environmental Protection Agency (EPA)

and FAA have shared responsibility for establishing aircraft noise standards, although aircraft

noise is currently under FAA’s domain.60 But EPA

has sole authority over other environmental issues

that increasingly affect aviation and the air transportation industry, and explicit guidance for cooperation between the two agencies on these issues

has not been provided.

The current basis for regulating upper atmospheric (i.e., stratospheric) pollution by aircraft is

in international treaty, and EPA has authority to

regulate materials and activities that contribute to

the depletion of the ozone layer.6l These include

halons, used extensively in aviation for fire suppression. In addition, EPA sets standards for polluted stormwater runoff, engine emissions, and

other sources of ground-level environmental

problems. FAA, on the other hand, is charged with

developing guidance for airport operators for facilities design and maintenance practices, imposing

engine certification and aircraft equipment requirements, and regulating aircraft operations.

This division of regulatory responsibility leaves

open the possibility of ambiguity and even conflict over aviation environmental issues. Furthermore, neither agency conducts much related research. NASA conducts the lion’s share of

aviation environmental R&D, although the majority of this is focused on global atmospheric

questions.

Finally, there is the possibility of competition

between NASA and the national labs for FAA

R&D funds. This may become acute as the national labs strive to demonstrate their versatility by

moving beyond defense projects.62

TECHNOLOGY DEVELOPMENT AND

IMPLEMENTATION FOR ATC

The following section focuses on ATC system development difficulties, an area where institutional

and management issues are crucial. (ATC technologies are addressed in more detail in chapter 4.)

FAA-managed ATC projects often move slowly—to go from concept to operation can take 15

years or longer. As a result, Congress hears perennial calls to boost FAA R&D spending and make

the agency more independent of federal personnel

and procurement rules. Most recently, the Clinton

Administration’s “National Performance Review” and “Air Traffic Control Corporation

Study,” as well as the National Commission To

Ensure a Strong and Competitive Airline Industry

(known as the Airline Commission) have proFor ATC, operational procedures and technologies have

always been closely linked

60 FAA’s statutory au~ority on noise issues is discussed in chapter 3.

blsee section ~)4 of tie Clean Air Act Amendments of 1990, Public Law No. 101-549.

bzcellman Research Associates, op. cit., footnote 36, p. 32.
Chapter 2 Institutional and Management Issues for Civil Aviation Research and Technology 153

posed reorganizing FAA in order to improve ATC

operations, finances, and modernization efforts.63

The combination of extreme safety requirements, continuous operations, large scale, and

complexity make the ATC system unlike any other technological system (see box 2-2 and chapter

4, box 4-3). ATC technology is not just equipment, but operating standards and procedures—

the rules of the game, so to speak. And both parts

of the system must be developed in concert. More

so than in other fields, it is necessary to know

clearly what the equipment is supposed to do before building it. However, that is not what has

been done.

While more technology R&D and easier procurement could help, major improvements will require fundamental changes in the system development process at FAA. Operational and procedural

issues for ATC, not basic technologies, most often

have been the critical hurdles to timely system implementation. ATC technologies frequently reach

an advanced stage of development before those

who are to install or use them discover that what

was developed is not what was needed.

Better systems engineering could help, and

FAA has strengthened its systems engineering capabilities in recent years. However, aviation systems engineering must be more than making

technologies work together. It must get people,

organizations, procedures, and technologies to

work together. Unless this happens, improvements to safety. efficiency, and airspace capacity

will continue to be prolonged.

I Problems in System Development

and Acquisition

Examples of FAA’s slow implementation of aviation technology abound and are often mentioned

in analyses of U.S. civil aviation. Most prominent

is the National Airspace System plan, a multibillion dollar program to update FAA’s ATC technology, whose elements have drastically fallen behind schedule. Similar situations prevail for

software, weather, and radar systems, and other

products that FAA must acquire and activate.

Frustration with the habitual delays extends to all

corners; even the most enthusiastic air traffic controller interviewed for this report lamented that for

once he would like to use equipment that was

state-of-the-art instead of two or three generations

behind.

At the core of this problem is that FAA has set

technical requirements for systems without adequately studying and developing operational procedures the systems are to support. In many cases.

operational problems have remained undetected

until after a prototype ATC system has been completed and procurement is imminent or under way.

For example, FAA committed to the development

and production of the Advanced Automation System (AAS) before fundamental operational issues

—

f5~~at101)aj per for,,lullce Revi~~, ~’ronl f/e~! T[~pe tO R6-.\1t/[~: C’reut/rr<q u Goierrrnlenr T}MI W’ork.f Better & C().~t~ LCY~ (w’a~hington. DC”.

Offrce ot’ the Vice Pre\idtmt. September 1993); U.S. Department of Tranyxm-tation. A/r 7}[//7lc C(mtrd Corporar/(m .$rud}: Report {~ffhc Fl!ecw

(i~’e O\er.\/,qhf Cmnrn[tfec fc) the .Secretaty of Transporfatim ( Washington. DC, Nla) 1994); and h’ationa] (’omission To En\ure:] Strong C(Jnpetlti} c Alrllrre lndu~tr~, Ch(JnKe. Challenge, and Cornpef/t/on: A Reporf to lhe Presi(fent [infi Con{fres.! (Washington, DC: U.S. Goy crnmcnt

Pr]nting OtF~ce, Augu\t 1 993).

The Aidme Commljwon rcc(~rl~rncnclation$ are unclear as to the ultimate status of FAA. Tbc,1 irllnc Cornrniis]on cal Is for FAA to be e\tabll~hed as tin Independent gokcrnrncnt corporation (on page 8) but tilfo recomrnend~ that onl) AT~’ :ind rcl:itcd function~ be pliiced in the corporation (page 9). According to the commi~~ion cha]rman, th if incon~]sterrt language \tcn~nwd from the tnabllrty of [he con]nli~~lon to rc:ich con-

~en~us. See al~o H. Ja\pcr, “Vrhtit Could Be Better Than an Air Tr;iffic Control Corpor:itlon’)” .47-(”, ln( orpor(lre(l:” The (’orl)or(lrl:(i[[orl (!fA/r

7r~{fl;c C(mtro/, I.cs B]attner C[ al. (cds. ) (New Yorh, NY: McGra\\ Hill, June 1994).
54 I Federal Research and Technology for Aviation

The federally operated ATC system, established principally for flight safety and efficiency, coordinates and directs all flights to and from U.S. airports, and comprises one of the most complex transportation systems in the world.1 The routes and airspace that Iink airports are defined electronically and

procedurally, not by physical structures, Assisted by ground- and cockpit-based navigation systems,

pilots fly along paths prescribed by air traffic rules and instructions While modern electronics make

such a complex system possible, its ultimate success depends primarily on human capabilities—monitoring, decisionmaking, and communicating

For air traffic control (ATC) purposes, the airspace above the United States and its territories IS partitioned according to airport Iocations and the amount of traffic into three broad categories terminal, en

route, and oceanic airspace Terminal airspace surrounds airports and is characterized by aircraft

changing speed, direction, and altitude as they maneuver after taking off or before landing The airways

connecting airports make up the en route airspace, while oceanic airspace begins over International

waters, with much of it lying beyond sight of land

The ATC system provides three basic services navigation aid, flight planning and advisory information, and traffic control Ground-based, line-of-sight radio navigation facilities define airways and approach paths to airports Satellite-based radio navigation will Iikely become the primary air navigation

system in the next decade or so.

FAA, in conjunction with the National Oceanic and Atmospheric Administration, provides weather

and other flight planning and advisory information to pilots, and publishes aeronautical charts and related documents Timely and accurate weather information is critical to all aspects of flight planning

and operations, including whether the flight must be conducted under instrument flight rules (IFR) or

visual flight rules (VFR) The IFR/VFR distinction governs the structure of the airspace and the corresponding pilot qualifications and the aircraft equipment required to operate in it.

The key aspect of traffic control is separation assurance, where ground controllers use surveillance

radars to track aircraft and to detect and resolve conflicts. Controllers in the field and at the FM’s System Command Center* also use flight plans, weather data, and airport and facility status reformation to

anticipate potential flight conflicts Takeoffs are metered and flights are rerouted to avoid hazardous situations and to reduce congestion and delay.

I Information m this box is drawn from U S Congress, Off Ice of Technology Assessment, De/wermg the Goods l%bhc Works

Techno/ogles,Managementandf mance, OTA-SET-477 (Washington, DC U S Government Prmtmg Office, April 1991 ), p 118 and

U S Congress, Off Ice of Technology Assessment, A/rportan~Av Traff/c ConVo/Systern, OTA-STI-1 75 (Washington, DC U S Government Prlnllng Ofhce, January 1982), pp 28-68

2 Formerly called the Central Flow Control Faclllty
Chapter 2 Institutional and Management issues for Civil Aviation Research and Technology 155

were resolved, including how controllers would

use the new equipment and how present ATC facilities would be consolidated.64 Underestimating

the technical complexity of the systems has led to

promises of overly optimistic delivery dates.65 Ineffective management procedures and a rigid procurement process also contribute to these delays. 66

Failure of FAA System Operations and System

Development Directorates (see figure 2-1 again

for FAA organizational chart) to emphasize and

clearly establish operational requirements has resulted in some FAA R&D programs being driven

by “technology push” rather than “operational

needs.” For ATC, the primary objective of new

technologies is to allow a significant improvement in both the cost of providing air traffic services and the efficiency of aircraft operations .67 A

suggested iterative process for the engineering of

ATC systems entails (see also figure 2-4):

■ creating a set of operational concepts, based on

using new technologies for communications,

navigation, and surveillance (CNS), that allow

the subsequent creation of detailed, safe, and

efficient operational procedures acceptable to

pilots, controllers, and other airspace users and

operators; and

■ using the defined procedures to generate both

operational specifications for new air traffic

management procedures and the technical

specifications for supporting CNS equipment. 68

Some Examples

The usual practice has been for FAA to develop

technical specifications and proceed directly into

a development contract for prototype systems.

System needs and required modifications become

apparent as procurement becomes imminent and

years of development activities have taken

place. 69 Examples of where this approach was

used include FAA’s Wake Vortex Advisory System (WVAS), Microwave Landing System (MLS),

and Precision Runway Monitor programs.

The WVAS program was under development

for several years before controllers and pilots began to ask pointed questions about how the system

was expected to operate. WVAS was to advise

controllers whenever local meteorological conditions were such that an aircraft’s trailing vortices

would persist and pose a hazard to a following aircraft on final approach. Tested in 1979 and 1980

at Chicago’s O’Hare International Airport, the

project was deemed “. . . a technical success but

an operational failure. ”70 It became clear that vortex monitoring needed greater coverage, and that

a complementary system for local area meteorological measurements and forecasting was needed. In this instance, the operational requirements

~~At ~ ei[lma[ed co~[ of $5,9 bi]] ion, A AS was intended [o be the heart of FAA’\ ATC modernization effort. It was designed to replace tie

ex i \ting computer systems, including workstations. used by controllers at FAA facilities, and to increa~e controllers protiuctiv ity through new

software function~, AAS has had major cost and schedule problems since its start in 1988. See U.S. Congress, General Accounting Office, “Ad-

~ anced Automation Systcm: Imp] ica[ions of Problems and Recent Changes,” GAO’T-RCED-94- 188, unpublished document. Apr. 13, 1994;

and LI, S. Congre\\, General Accounting OffIce, A/r Traffic Cfm/ro/: Stu/u.\ of F)IA’s ,i~odcrni:atlon Program, GAO’ RCED-94- 167FS (Washington, DC: Apr. 15, 1994). In June 1994, FAA was in the process of modifying, including canceling some parts, of AAS.

~SNa[lona] Research council, Tran\poflation Re~earch Board, W’ind.f of chunge: Domc.\/Ic A/r Trumport S/nCe ~creguidflon (Washington,

DC: 1991 ), Pp. 257-258.

~~Jamei 1., crook, vice pre$ident for operations, Air Traffic Control Association, Inc., persona] communication, June ~(). 1994.

67Ro~n w. SlmpsOn, “L\ing ATC Operational Requirements To Guide FAA R&D and procurement Activities, ” OTA contractor repoti,

June 1993, p. 2.

bxlbid,

691 bid,, p. 3.

70 Ro&rt Macho], FAA Chief Scientij[, ptmonal Conlnlunicatlon, Aug. ~(). 1993
56 I Federal Research and Technology for Aviation

Federal acquisition

guidelines

‘

Phase 1:

Determine mission

needs

-.--J--

Phase 2:

Identify and

explore alternative

design concepts

!

I

I

v

1

Phase 3:

Demonstrate

alternative

design concepts

(normally involves

a prototype)

I

I

Phase 4:

Full-scale development

and limited production

Phase 5: Production

I

\

I

I

I

I

I

I

I

I

I

I

I

I

I

I

I

I

I

I

I

I

I

I

I

I

I —I

Model for a concurrent development of ATC systems

Operational development Technology development

System

operations

analysis and

planning

I

System

goals

&

Desired I

Desired

operational technology

objectives capabilities

I I

Prototype system development 11

@i--

I I

Operational Technical

specifications specifications

Draft technical Operational <— materials Full-scale software

procedures and hardware

promulgation development

Draft operation

by FAA procedures +

Production

FAA orders, rules, ATC Production

handbook, and other guidelines equipment

Deploy, operate, and maintain system

a From Off Ice of Management and Budget Circular A-109

SOURCE Office of Technology Assessment, 1994
Chapter 2 Institutional and Management Issues for Civil Aviation Research and Technology 157

were not studied, so technical requirements were

inadequate. 71 Related R&D started again in the

late 1980s, and by 1993 NASA had become the

lead agency of a much larger effort designated

Wake Vortex Systems Research, which is part of

the NASA Terminal Area Productivity Program.

Operational procedures and specifications

should be regularly revisited over the life of a program as the environment changes. In the 1960s,

deficiencies in the existing instrument landing

system (ILS) and the U.S. airlines’ goal of allweather automatic landings prompted the development of MLS; the airlines renounced the goal in

the 1970s as not economically feasible. No studies

of the continuing need for MLS were launched.

Similarly, ILS has since been upgraded but no new

operational need studies for MLS were initiated

until the early 1990s.

By 2008, FAA had planned to acquire 1,280

MLS units at an estimated cost of $2.6 billion.72

FAA canceled the MLS program in favor of using

GPS-based systems to meet some (and possibly

all) future instrument approach needs.73 Curved

final approaches using MLS (or GPS) have been

promoted as a means of providing better approach

and landing capacity at major airports in instrument flight rules conditions. To date, no detailed

study of the operational procedures required for

certificating curved approaches has been made.74

The issues of obstacle clearance, missed approach

paths, safe approach speeds, maximum bank

angles, and maximum allowable windspeeds have

yet to be considered for curved approaches.

The Precision Runway Monitor program is

another example of an inverted development process. FAA did not begin conducting dynamic simulations involving real pilots and controllers until

the two prototype technology development projects were completed. The results of these simulations have raised serious questions about test and

evaluation criteria for PRM, and whether emergency procedures are adequate for all airports that

could use the system.75

The agency’s own RE&D Advisory Committee

pointed out some of these problems in 1991:

The nature of system enhancements and the

advent of new technology now make it possible

to manage FAA research and development as a

process of innovation, which stresses prudent

overlap in concept formulation, development

and implementation, rather than a purely sequential process that begins with invention and

postpones subsequent programmatic decisions

until total demonstration of each facet of the

concept and technology. . . . [A]n important

part of developing new technologies is concurrently developing certification standards, protocols, operating procedures and the like. These

processes are critical in bringing new technologies on line.76

71simp\~n, op. cit., footnote 67. p. 3.

7~U. S. Congre\ ~, General Accounting Office, Air Tru@c Control: Status ofF~ ‘.s Modcrniza(ion Program, GAO~RCED-93- 12 I F-S (K’a\h -

ington, DC: April 1993), p. 45.

T\,, FAA cancels MLS in Favor of Gps,” A\ia//on w~ek & space Techrrologj, June 13, 1994, p. 33; and “Europe Still plans TO ImPlenlent

MLS,” A\/uf/on Da//j, June 14, 1994, p. 419.

T~Simp~on, Op, Ci[., footnote 67! PP. 3-4

75The key issue is when an alrcraf[ approaching one of the parallel runways deviates off-course (or “’blunders”) toward the approach path of

the other runway. In this situation, the “nonblundering” aircraft would have to be redirected laterally away from the conflicting aircraft, but

wme airports do not have wfficient obstacle clearances to the sides of approach paths to permit this maneuver. Typical “miswd approach”

procedures for mglc or widely spaced runways usually require an aircraft to immediately begin a climb. Howe\er, this is not possible m this

“’blunder scenario,” \ince it could be unclear which aircraft i~ above the other (aircraft altimeter measurement errors could be larger than the

octual altitude difference between the two aircraft).

7~FAA Rc\earch< ~nglneerlng and Development Ad\ isor-y Cornrni[kx, R&D Plan Review Panel, Ret’iew of lh(’ FAA Rc.$earC”h, E’n:lne(’rin,?

and Development Pro~ram (Washington, DC: November 1991 ), pp. 32-33.
58 I Federal Research and Technology for Aviation

I Current Federal Policy for System

Development and Acquisition

Critics point to a slow, cumbersome FAA procurement process as the cause of slippage and cost escalation of ATC milestones. While some institutional reforms may help improve the ATC system,

few specifics have been given on how a new ATC

entity, such as a U.S. Air Traffic Services Corporation. or changes in procurement rules would resolve ATC operational planning and development

problems discussed above or otherwise significantly speed up the acquisition of complex, safety-critical systems.

The U.S. General Accounting Office has studied this issue and concluded that for FAA, government procurement policies and regulations are

not the key snag. The central problem for the past

decade, according to GAO, is that FAA did not

follow federal acquisition guidelines for project

development—specifically, OMB Circular A- 109

for planning and management oversight (see figure 2-4, again), and OMB Circular A- 11 for budget oversight.

OTA spoke with companies handling FAA contracts for new ATC systems, and common among

these manufacturers was frustration with the

agency for constantly changing criteria, adding

“bells and whistles” (or, more accurately and most

often, software) that were never mentioned at the

time of contract bidding.

The Federal Acquisition/

OMB Circular A 109 Process

In 1986, in testimony before Congress, GAO

stated that it”. ., would expect a major system acquisition program with significant technical, operational, and economic risks to require strict adherence to the phasing and extended competition

principles fundamental to Office of Management

and Budget Circular A- 109.”77 Unlike the fourphase process called out in A- 109, FAA’s existing

procurement strategy incorporated only one decision point before committing to a combined development, test, and production phase. Neither

FAA nor the contractors planned to validate the

contractors’ models of the Advanced Automation

System to ensure the proposed systems performed

as required before the production commitment

was made.

None of the 11 major system projects contained

within AAS was subjected to the sequential A- 109

process; instead, FAA submitted all for DOT’s acquisition approval at either of the final two phases

of the process called out in A-109, that is, fullscale development and full production (see figure

2-4, again).78 Between 1983 and 1991, the average delay for first-site implementation of these

projects grew to five years.79 Modernization costs

continue to escalate.

FAA did not follow the A-109 process for other

major programs. In February 1983, FAA submitted the MLS program for production approval,

bypassing the first three key decision points in

A- 109.80 As with other FAA projects that circumvented the Office of Management and Budget

(OMB) process, the MLS project met schedule delays and cost overruns. 81 Even though the

$353-million Terminal Doppler Weather Radar

program was ahead of schedule, FAA committed

to production before operationally testing the deliverable design. The prototype software that had

been tested was not the same—nor was the comTTCar] R, pti]lllcr, As\(]~i~te Dir~~(or, 1llforlnil[ion Mtintigerncn[ and Technology Division, U.S. General Accounting office, testllllony at

hearingj before the House Committee on Appropriations. Subcommittee on Transportation, Aviation, and Material\, Apr. 16, 1986, p. 7.

7~US congre~~, General Ac~ountlng of’ficc. ~}ltltlon Acq///.sirion: lnlpr{)\’ef/Pr{)te.\.\ Needs 7i) Be Followed, GAO RCED-87-8 (Washington, DC: L~,S, Government Printing Ofilcc, March 1987), p, 20.

W~I s, corlgres~, Gcncr:il A~~ountln,, office, ,~lr Tr{/fj( C{jrl[rfJ/: SIatu\ o~E4A’.s ,Wodern/:al/on Ptwgrwn, G.AO ‘RcE~-9~- 136BR (Washington, DC: U.S. Gotemmcnt Printing ~fticc, April 1992), pp. 26-27.

XflGellertil Accc)ull[ing offi~~. op. cit., footnote 7~, P. 26.

X IThe$~ pr~bl~nl~ were with the program for Category 1 $Ystems, The development programs for more precise category 2 and 3 sy~tenls

M cre on schedule when kmninatcd in favor of CJPS. Crooh, op. cit., footnote 66.
Chapter 2 institutional and Management lssues for Civil Aviation Research and Technology | 59

puter system—as what would ultimately go into

the field.82

But there have been positive changes at FAA.

An FAA directive issued in March 199383 revises

FAA procurement guidelines to require mission

need statements and key decision points, closely

following the A-109 process.84 Moreover, FAA

cites more adherence to the A-109 process in the

early 1990s, even before this guidance was issued.

Today, mission needs are reviewed by its acquisition review committee before the first decision

point. FAA’s Office of Acquisition Policy and

Oversight staff provide guidance to programs developing mission need statements, and have “inserted some discipline into the process” of approving program justifications.85

FAA already has seen success with the approach. For example, acquisition of a new voice

switch for control towers “hit all the key decision

points” and met both schedule and budget goals.86

However, FAA’s latest acquisition policy still

does not emphasize operational procedure development. Furthermore, FAA has yet to fully make

the cultural transition to a more demanding acquisition policy. The requirement for more quantitative justification for new programs and an exacting compliance atmosphere have generated some

controversy; some program offices have not

warmed to the stricter process .87

The Budget Process

OMB Circular A- 11 provides guidelines for federal agencies in preparing annual budgets. For

R&D, A-1 1 calls for the following budget categories: basic research, applied research, and development. For major system development and acquisition, the budget criteria in A-11 parallel the

acquisition phases in A-109. As GAO put it in a

recent report, “[h]owever, FAA has repeatedly ignored these criteria by budgeting development activities in its F&E account.”88 DOD organizes its

R&D closer to OMB criteria than FAA. For example, DOD R&D categories 6.1 (basic research)

through 6.5 (management and support) roughly

correspond to A-109 milestones.89

Development work done under

two budget accounts

FAA’s budget criteria require facilities and equipment (F&E) funding for programs beginning at

full-scale development, then limited and full production. Projects that require R&D are first budgeted in the RE&D appropriation account. According to GAO, however, some RE&D projects,

such as Terminal Air Traffic Control Automation,

receive both RE&D and F&E funds.90 FAA routinely budgets substantial amounts of R&D work

into its F&E account. For example, much of FAA

support for weather R&D comes out of F&E

8ZU.S Congress, Genera] Ac~ounling office, Ai,iurian Acquisition: Further Chunge.s Needed in FAA’s Management and Bldd~erln~ pracrices, GAO/RCED-91 -159 (Washington, DC: July 1991), p. 6.

83u,s. ~p~ment of Transportation, Federal Aviation Administation, “Acquisition Policy Handbook,” Order 1810. I F, Mar. 19, 1993.

84 David Morri\sey, Director, FAA office of Acquisition policy and Oversight, persona] COIIMIWICatlOn, May 1 T, 1993.

8SDav1d Morrissey, Director, FAA office of Acquisition Policy and Oversight, personal Communication, Apr. 15, 1994.

8bIbid.

871bid.

88Genera] Accounting Office, op. cit., footnote 82, p. 2.

891 bid., p. 26.

90u.s, congress, General Accounting Office, “FAA Reauthorization: Opportunity Exi\ts To Address Safety, Capacity, and Efficiency issue,” GAO/T-RCED-93-75, Sept. 28, 1993.
60 I Federal Research and Technology for Aviation

funds. In a recent Office of Science and Technology Policy overview of U.S. weather research programs,

91 all weather-related R&D funding by

FAA came from the F&E account.92

Including development and engineering tasks

under F&E contracts accounts for the impression

of delay in procurement, if the F&E account is

viewed primarily for production. The reason for

this budgeting oddity has to do with authorization

levels for the RE&D account; if the development

work in F&E were moved under RE&D, the latter

account would exceed its authorization.93

This budget confusion has led some in the aviation community to conclude that FAA under-invests in technology R&D, and that this is a key

source of ATC system modernization problems. It

is true that the fraction of FAA’s total budget designated as RE&D is small, especially when

compared with R&D investments at other federal

agencies and high-tech industries (see figure 2-5).

However, FAA funds about five times as much air

traffic control R&D in its F&E account than in its

RE&D program. Consequently, FAA R&D for air

traffic control, including the R&D spending outside of the RE&D account, was 10.5 percent of

FAA’s total annual budget for ATC in 1993 (see

table 2-3). This level of R&D investment

compares favorably with figures for high-tech industries such as telecommunications and computer software. Insufficient funding for research and

technology development is not a major source of

FAA’s ATC modernization difficulties.

Limitations of current procurement rules

Although the implementation delays caused by

the federal procurement rules should not be overemphasized, they do slow the purchase of what

should be readily available equipment. These

laws “. . . place heavy reliance on competition.

They give losing bidders multiple opportunities to

protest, thereby delaying decisions for long periods.”94 This often prevents FAA from simply returning to a proven supplier, requiring instead a

virtual repetition of the process for the initial procurement. “Procurement officers’ emphasis on

awarding a contract to the lowest bidder, despite

significant quality advantages with other bidders,

is one example of how procurement and program

objectives often clash.”95

Others have expressed similar views, that the

competitive procurement system causes delays

and added expense, although the resulting time

lag seems to be roughly one year at most.96 “An

FAA study identified 250 government documents

that levied requirements on acquisition officials,

140 of which were FAA generated . . . and included 4,500 citations that were identified as ‘required activities. FAA has reduced these to 1,400

action steps.”97

Purchase of off-the-shelf equipment, such as

personal computers and radar display screens,

would be most affected by any move to exempt

FAA from federal procurement rules. By contrast,

procurement of the large ATC systems unique to

FAA is likely to be affected much less by such an

9 10ffice of Science and Technology Policy, Federal Coordinating Council for Sciences, Engineering, and Technology, Committee on Earth

and Environmental Sciences, Subcommittee on Atmospheric Research, “Predicting Our Weather: A Strategic Plan for the U.S. Weather Research Program,” July 1992.

‘)zlbid.. p. 33. The $ 18.4million listed under DOT for fiscal year 199 I is all from FAA’s F&E budget. Greg Geifler, Office of Budget, Federal

Aviation Administration, personal communication, June 22, 1994.

‘)@eneral Accounting Office, op. cit.. footnote 82, p. 8.

‘)~N:l[loIlal Research Counc i] TraIl\P)r[ll[ ic)[l Re\ear~h Boar(i, }\~/)/(/,\ ~J~C)lUnqC,. f)~lnl[~,$~l( A /r T).(//7 tpf)rr .\/r]([~ /)[,rc,q///orl/orl ( Wash illgton,

DC: 1991 ), p. 329.

951 bid., p. 330.

‘)6John Turner, FAA Associate Administrator for National Airspace System Development, per~onal communication, Oct. 21. 1992; and

Crook, op. cit., footnote 66.

‘)7Thc National Commission To Ensure a Strong Competitive Airline Industry, op. cit., footnote 63, p. 10.
Chapter 2 Institutional and Management Issues for Civil Aviation Research and Technology 161

Electric power utilities

Telecommunications

Aerospace

Instruments

Electronics

Computers

Semiconductors

Pharmaceuticals

—

1

1

1 —-——.———

...——–-– ~

I

1

Computer communications

DOD

Software

DOE

NASA

I1

t

I

/

(33.2)

/

7 (56.6) I

1 I I

o 5 10 15

R&D expenditures as a percentage of total sales or budget authority

a See table 2 3 for ATC R&D budget data

NOTES Values for Indlvldual federal agencies are for fiscal year 1993, values for Industries are for 1990

KEY FAA ATC Federal Awatlon Admlmstratlon air traffic control-related R&D spending as a percent of total FAA spending on ATC

DOD Department of Defense DOE = Department of Energy, NASA = National Aeronautics and Space Admmlstratlon

SOURCE Off Ice of Technology Assessment, 1994 based on Aerospace Industries Assoclahon, “R&D Stahstlcs, ” Elusvness Week/

Qual/ty 1991, p 214 Department of Energy Energy Information Admlnlstratlon, Fmanc/a/ Sfatwt/cs of Major Investor-owned Ut///eses

1991 Office of Managermenl and Budget

exemption, although relief from the multiple re- bidder when others may offer superior quality

views and challenges by losing bidders would and value; prohibitions on working with conhave some impact. According to the Transporta- tractors during the specification of follow-on

(ion Research Board: procurements; and complex, time-consuming

procedural requirements, including those af-

. . . no matter how much better the FAA plans fording allegedly aggrieved, unsuccessful bidits procurements, there are statutory impedi- ders the right to multiple and protracted apments prescribing policies and practices, which peals.98

give rise to many of the difficulties. Prominent

among these are insistence on advertising and The Federal Acquisition Streamlining Act of

competition, even if only one or a few bidders 1994 would make it easier for federal agencies to

are qualified: emphasis on choosing the lowest purchase off-the-shelf products and technologies.

9XTran\portation Re\earch Board, op. cit., footnote 94, pp. 336-337.
62 I Federal Research and Technology for Aviation

FY 1993 actual FY 1994 request

Accounts and calculations ($ millions) ($ millions)

FAA:

— —

RE&D account

(1) ATC portion $ 98 8 $ 1126

F&E account

(2) EDT&E 555.2 549 2

(3) DT&E 1 6 0 1 0 6

(4) Non-ATC procurement 5 9 6 1272

(5) Total 2,4650 2,524.0

Operations account

(6) ATC programs 3,480.9 3,522.9

(7) Overhead (ATC portion)a

423 6 415 7

(8) Total ATC-related R&D spending= (l)+(2)+(3) 670 0 672 4

(9) Total FAA spending on ATC =

(l)+(5)-(4)+(6)+(7) 6,4087 6,4480

FAA ATC-related R&D spending as a percentage of total 10.5% 10.4%

FAA spending on ATC = (8)/(9)—

NASA:

—

ATC portion of aeronautics R&D 3 1 9 50.6

Total NASA and FAA ATC-related R&D spending: 701.9 723.0

a Off Ice of Technology Assessment estimate Overhead spending was prorated according to the ratio of ATC programs to non-ATC programs in

— —

the operations account

KEY DT&E = development test, and evaluation, EDT&E = engineering, development, test, and evaluation; F&E = facdltles and equipment, RE&D = research, englneermg, and development

SOURCES Off Ice of Technology Assessment, 1994, based on Budget of the United States Government, Fiscal Year 1994, Federal

Avlahon Admlntstrtlon budget documents, National Aeronautics and Space Admlnlstratlon

While this legislation is aimed largely at DOD, if

enacted it will apply to other federal agencies, including FAA.99

I The System Development

Process at FAA

In many cases, complying with A-109 (or FAA’s

own acquisition policy, which expands on A- 109)

could have helped FAA identify, and possibly resolve, operational and procedural problems before committing to expensive technology development. However, while OMB guidelines

provide a foundation for proper system development oversight, they cannot alone ensure fast and

successful ATC system development and implementation. What is also needed is a change in ATC

system development philosophy that places a

much stronger emphasis on operational concept

and procedure development.

Previous studies have concluded that stable

leadership is needed at FAA to improve the system development and acquisition process.100 The

gg~e ]egls]a[ion was in (he conference committee as this report went to publication.

1OOsome examp]es in~]ude Aviation safety Commission, Volume 1: Final Report and Recommendations (Washington, DC: April 1988);

U.S. Congress, Office of Technology Assessment, Su~e Skies for Tomortw$: Atiufion Safety in a Competitive Environment, OTA-SET-38 I

(Washington, DC: U.S. Government Printing Office, July 1988); and Transportation Research Board, op. cit., footnote 66.
Chapter 2 Institutional and Management Issues for Civil Aviation Research and Technology 163

average tenure of FAA Administrators (around

two and one-half years during the past two decades) is far shorter than the development cycle of

most ATC systems. And presently, no one below

the Administrator has the authority to effectively

bridge the operational and technological divisions

of FAA. This means that ATC system development programs have had neither the mandate nor

the leadership to ensure that operational and technological goals are continually coordinated and

validated.

Technology development is the dominant culture in FAA system development programs. Technological improvements, rather than operational

advances, become the focus of many projects.

Furthermore, FAA technology development projects sometimes take on a life of their own. For example, the primary justification for MLS was

changed or superseded by other technologies 101 at

least three times in the project's history—yet the

project stayed alive for three decades. Scrutiny by

operational experts can threaten such projects and

is rarely sought by technologists until absolutely

necessary. Controllers and pilots are the ultimate

users of the system and want to prevent new safety

flaws from being introduced—implementation

delays do not hurt that goal. Whether pilots and

controllers are consulted early or late, their assessments have major impacts on new systems (see

box 2-3 for one example).

Good acquisition policies alone are no panacea

for FAA. One reason is that ATC system development issues are as much cultural as they are managerial. Air traffic controllers, equipment technicians, pilots, engineers, administrators, and

managers are vital to ATC system development

and operation. Each group has strengths and shortcomings, and communication across these cultural gaps can be difficult-inadequate coordination

between the operational sections and the technology developers is a longstanding problem at

FAA.102 One former Administrator believes that

the most critical challenge is to get the “Air Traffic. Flight Standards. and R&D parts of FAA to

work as a team. It has never happened.” 103

Moreover, these cultural differences may send

conflicting messages to policymakers: each group

may have a different priority or perspective on

ATC problems. Safety and efficiency are the primary purposes for ATC, but rarely is there agreement on what levels of safety and efficiency are

acceptable or how they can be measured. However, current U.S. ATC is remarkably safe as measured by accident risk, and no safety crisis exists.

Unresolved concerns about new risks slow the

ATC development process. The tradeoff is that

once the new ATC system safety concerns are satisfactorily addressed, the actual safety increase

realized will likely be too small to measure, but

the increase in efficiency could be substantial— l04 

worth billions of dollars per year. Consequent1y, it is important to tackle safety concerns as early

and openly as possible to minimize the costs of

delayed operating efficiency benefits.

The View From Inside

OTA talked to mid- and low-level FAA managers

about the agency culture for research and system

1(~zThe problem htii not been confined [o the ATC arena. In the late 1980s, coordination was weak between FAA’s a~iation wcurity regulation wction and the agency’~ wcurit) R&D branch at the Technical Center. For more information, wc U.S. Congres\, Office of Technology

t!iief~n~cnt. 7iI( )~n~~lc~,q } ,4,gc//~~ \ ( Term-i\ VI ,“ .Srrucfur/ng Sccurlf)’. OTA-1 SC -51 I ( Wa\hing ton, DC: U.S. ~J()\ cmment Printing Ofl; cc, Junuar>

1 992),
64 I Federal Research and Technology for Aviation

In 1988, the Federal Aviation Administration’s Air Traffic Service asked the Research and Development Service to help determine if multiple simultaneous parallel instrument approaches (to three- and

four-runway configurations, referred to as triples and quads) were feasible using existing radar and

monitoring equipment, Managers from the air traffic division created the Multiple Parallel Approach Program (MPAP) to conduct these studies, and formed a Technical Working Group (TWG) from representatives of interested FAA offices to design and evaluate the necessary simulations.

During its first few years, members described TWG as a successful group in which all participants

understood and addressed not only their own needs, but those of the other members as well. 1 In the

opinion of one participant, the mutual understanding was so strong that the team came to consensus

about 99 percent of the time,2 According to another TWG member, “ [a]t FAA, much of what works occurs when the key players enter early and are included for the duration of the process, ”

TWG met several times to develop test criteria before beginning simulations. Among the criteria

agreed on in July 1989 were aircraft airspeeds of 150 to 180 nautical miles per hour and flight path

“blunders’” of up to 30 degrees as the deviation the controllers and pilots in the test must successfully

overcome. 3

Competing Technologies

Evaluations began in 1990 with human-in-the-loop simulations of the radar and display indicators 4

currently in use at U.S. airports. This equipment passed tests of triples spaced at 5,000 feet apart. But

with a 4,300-foot separation1

5 this combination failed the test, largely because of the poor resolution

provided by the displays,6

TWG then brought in the Final Monitor Aid (FMA), a 20- by 20-inch, high-resolution color display with

new features. The FMA had been developed as part of the Precision Runway Monitor (PRM) radar system but was separable, which allowed TWG to pair it with the Mode-S monopulse radar system.7 The

Mode-S/FMA combination passed the tests of triples at 4,300 feet, With the faster PRM radar, the FMA

would Iikely perform even better.8 FM documents from 1990 through mid-1 992, along with Off Ice of

Technology Assessment interviews, indicated across-the-board acceptance-even enthusiasm—for the

FMA,

The Turning Point

In summer 1992, a controversy began brewing concerning runway separations at the Denver lnternational Airport (DIA), then under construction. FM had assured Denver officials that the airport

would have independent triple Instrument flight rules capability on opening day, g and at first glance, the

(continued)

I lnte~lews with various FAA personnel

2 Intewlew with manager In the Off Ice of System CaPaCltY

3 A “blunder” IS when an alrcraff established on Its final approach path to a runway deviates frOm ltS Intended course

4 These are the ASR-9 radar and the ARTS IllA/Data Entry and Display Subsystem (DEDS)

5 Independent instrument fllght rules approaches to dual parallel runways separated by at least 4,300 feet have been authorized

without incident since 1974 The closest spacing m actual operation IS at Atlanta Hartsfleld International Airport, where the runway

centerlines are separated by a Ilttle over 4,400 feet Notably, however, before setting this standard, FAA had not run simulations for

parallel runways closer than 5,000 feet

6 FAA Contract Report, Cornparlson of Controller Performance Using the Final Momtor A/d and the ARTS/DEDS Display SYSterns, ” Alr Trafhc Control S{mulahon Contract No DTFA03-89-C-OO023, Sept 29, 1992, pp I-6--4-8

7 The Mode-s system hasthe same one mllllradlan radar accuracy at PRM, but a slower update rate (4 8 seconds for Mode-s, 1 0

seconds for PRM)

8 The PRM radar was only tested for 3,000- and 3,400-foot runway separations In the MPAP simulations However, controllers

Indicated that the faster update rate slgmflcantly Improved their performance CTA, Inc , “Test Report, Phases V b 1 & V b 2, Evaluahon of Dual and Triple Simultaneous Parallel ILS Approaches Spaced 3,000 Feet Apart Using the Preclson Runway Monitor System

Wlfh a Simulated 10 Second Radar Update Rate, ” Engneemg Research Psychology Services Contract No DTFA03-89-C-OO023,

CDRL Item 002, June 16, 1992, p x

9 City and County of Denver, ‘ FAA Affirms Triple .!3mulfaneous Landings at DIA, ” press release, Feb 26, 1993
Chapter 2 institutional and Management Issues for Civil Aviation Research and Technology 165

test results discussed above supported this claim The first three DIA parallel runways built are separated by 5,280 feet and 7,600 feet—greater than the 5,000 feet previously tested However, FAA had

not adequately considered the effects of thinner air at higher altitudes in its tests on triples—without

changing other aerodynamic parameters, an aircraft files faster as the air becomes thinner Consequently, for the same level of safety, parallel runways would need to be farther apart at Denver elevations than at sea level sites because of greater aircraft speeds,

Several members of TWG recommended testing to see if there might be a problem with DIA’s runway

configuration, and if so, whether there might be a technology solution. Despite strong sentiment by

some FAA offices against running new simulations, TWG received senior management approval and

conducted tests of high-alhtude runway configurations

The first simulation scenario strongly resembled DIA, though it was not explicitly designated Conducted in September 1992 and using previous test criteria, current radar and displays (ASR-9/DEDS

combination) proved Inadequate in these simulations It was at this point that TWG became fractious,

and research objectivity fell by the wayside Personnel from Air Traffic Service and FAA's Northwest

Mountain Region (NWM) protested that the test criteria, which they had accepted in previous simulations, were the reason for the equipment’s failure to pass the tests They Insisted that blunders did not

happen and that the aircraft approach speeds were too high Project participants from FAA's regulatory

and standards divisions and the Air Line Pilots Association held that the agreed-on criteria were necessary to the tests. Also, the original project manager from the Off Ice of System Capacity was replaced by

someone from the Research and Development Service

At a TWG meeting a month later, the new project manager announced that these simulation data

would not be used in the TWG analyses Instead, new simulations would be conducted, called the DIA

simulations, which would replace the current controller displays with an upgrade, the Full Dlgital Automated Radar Terminal System Display System (FDADS) At the Insistence of NWM, and over the protests of others, TWG recommended that the simulation airspeeds be changed 10 The meeting minutes

show that in the future only the TWG chairperson, not Individual members, would speak for the team

when discussing the simulations11

The DIA simulations took place in November 1992 Even though the upgraded displays were supposed to provide better Information, the results of the first two days of testing appeared similar to those

of the previous simulations. After much discussion. the FMA displays were used for the remainder of the

simulation and were successful When the working group met again in January 1993, the MPAP manager stated that the data from the September 1992 simulations would remain archived and that there

would be no mention of the aborted test of the upgraded display (FDADS) in the DIA report 12 However,

all data were published in that report

(continued)

IIJ These airspeeds are dlfferert than those used n any Slmblatlon we have observed thus far The twm-engine piston aircraft

normally fly at 120 knots, the turboprop at 150 knots, and the turbojets at 180 knots until the final approach flx Rasmg the speed of

piston and turboprop aircraft and Iowerlng the speeds of turbojets to the point where both types of a!rcraft are operat lng outside of

their normal fllght envelopes IS not a reallstlc solutlon to reducing the potential blunder situations Alr Line Pilots Assoclatlon, letter to

the Federal Avlatlon Adminlstratlon, Dec 17, 1992

11 MUlllple parallel Approach Program (MPAP) Technical Work Group (TWG) Meeting Minutes, ’ Washington, DC Oct 6-8 1992

~2Therewas no consensus amorg TWG memberson these decls.ons Further ‘ [t]hls rlrec?ve IS apparently cOmlngfrOm ah\gheT

authority than the program manager No FAA person WIII name that a~thorlty National Alr Traffic Controllers Assoclatlon Internal

memorand~m Mar 22 1993

—
66 I Federal Research and Technology for Aviation

Based on measurement of controller performance, the FMA performed 13,5 times better than

FDADS, 13 and it appears to be no more costly.14 Yet some factions within the Federal Aviation Administration tried hard to make FDADS pass, although it IS unclear why. However, FAA ultimately decided that

FMAs wiII be used at DIA.

Conclusions

Fundamental data from the field are essential Everyone agrees that testing against blunders can

be helpful in developing and validating new air traffic system technologies and procedures. As stated

by FAA’s Chief Scientist ‘(

[i]f the system is shown to be safe even with extreme assumptions such as the

30-degree blunder, then the most reluctant doubters are easily convinced. But when such a model

shows the system to be unsafe, we have learned nothing, and should not assume that it is really unsafe.’” 15

At issue, then, iS how often blunders actually happen and what criteria should be used in certifying

new systems for actual operation. Although the 30-degree blunder criterion has been used by FAA

since 1974, it was not until the status quo was challenged that individuals at FAA began to state that

blunders are so rare that they should not be part of the tests. However, FAA has lacked the empirical

data to support changing this criterion.

According to Flight Standards, “[t]he remaining issue is what should we be protecting against? .,,

Deviations are rare events, but when one does occur, does the FAA have the capability to detect/recognize the deviation, alert the controller, and have the controller resolve the conflict?”16 Over the years,

FAA has Invested a great deal of resources and research into the development of PRM, FMA, new controller positions, and new safety procedures for simultaneous parallel approaches. All these efforts have

been for the purpose of detecting and resolving the unlikely event of an aircraft deviating off the approach path, But better system data are needed. As the Director of Flight Standards stated, “[t]o date,

no formal FAA data collection effort has been in place to capture the events of aircraft deviations and

the degree of deviations systemwide.17

Intra-agency teams are valuable, but are difficult to manage under the current FAA organizational structure. There iS an Inherent tension between system evaluation and implementation. Yet,

many of the same groups—pilots, controllers, technologists—must have effective roles from start to finish in both the evaluation process and in system development and implementation, Close coordination

among these groups is needed to establish the underlying operational objectives, criteria, and procedures essential to make both the evaluation and implementation processes more timely and effective. It

is Important to note that top managers from FAA's different organizations participated in the MPAP discussions, the crosscutting team approach of TWG was quite successful at identifying potential problems early and figuring out ways to evaluate them.

(continued)

13“[T]he acceptable rate for the FMA IS about 13 St[mes larger than the acceptable rate for the FDADS, thus md~catmg that the use

of the FMAwIII result man operation with far less risk than the FDADS “ Federal AwatlonAdmln[stratton,“FDADS S[mulahon at Denver, ”

draft Internal memorandum, n d

14 Federa\Avlatlon Admlnlstratlon Msslon Needs Statement, “High-Resolution D[splay Requirements for Final Monitor Aid, MNS

Number 225, sechon 11 (d), Feb 9, 1994

15 Robefl Macho/, FAA Chief Sclentlst, internal memorandum, Jan 4, 1993

16 Thomas c Accardl, Director, Fltght Standards Sef’vice, FAA Internal memorandum, Apr 71993

17 [b(d

—
Chapter 2 Institutional and Management Issues for Civil Aviation Research and Technology 167

However, such crosscutting teams face a dilemma Involving the power of each member A strong

voice for each IS essential, but too much Influence on the decision process leads to problems, According to the National Air Traffic Controllers Association and others, in the past FAA has had working

groups do retests, with the aim of validating favored technologies or procedures.18 One option to address this problem IS that when a team IS created, the boundaries of authority and the levels of required

management review must be clearly identified, This did not happen for TWG. Another option is to place

evaluation teams such as TWG under the authority of a high-level, Independent arbiter who understands operational development issues as well as technology concerns Currently, FAA has the organizational structure to Independently evaluate major system acquisitions, but not the operational procedures and criteria the systems are to support.

18 Repre~entatlves of National Air Trafllc Controllers Assoclahon, personal communlcatlon, Aug 11.1993

development. 105 While much positive was discovered, also unearthed were signs of a few

pitched battles within the Systems Operations Directorate. 106 These conflicts placed the Air Traffic

and System Capacity divisions on one side, and

the Regulation and Certification division on the

other. And the regulatory division did not always

win. Some Air Traffic personnel have been quoted

as saying that their job was not to improve safety

but to increase capacity—as though the two were

mutually exclusive. 107

During its investigations, OTA found that

FAA’s upper management was attempting to

change the culture of the agency by creating a research orientation and encouraging employees to

think long term. The managers interviewed were

aware of this effort and applauded it, though not

all predicted success. Many felt FAA had a number of significant internal problems to address in

order to reach its goal of well-coordinated research, technology development, and implementation. They emphasized the disparate relationships the offices within the System Operations

Directorate have with those in the System Development Directorate.

FAA now emphasizes continual review of

R&D projects by managers from the System Operations Directorate, which in turn requires good

relationships between the Directorates and their

respective divisions and offices. With all the talk

of improved communications, however, the System Engineering and Development division

(called the “R&D division” below) still seems to

have a different relationship with each System

Operations division. This may be only logical in

light of the diverse natures of these divisions, it

may be a function of an agency in transition, or it

may be a remnant from the past. It is here that differences in agency culture remain an unresolved

issue.

I050TA staff spoke t. more ~an 30 low- and mid-level managers in order to get the perspective of those charged with actual implementation

of upper management’s plans.

l~[n his re~~, sections of FAA managed by Executive Directors are referred to as direc(orutcs and those managed by Associate Administrators or Assistant Administrators as dit’isiom. These terms are not used by or have different meaiiings within FAA.

107The case histo~ concerning paral]el mnways at Denver, presented in box 2-3, also involved animosity among participants. Those wanting to keep the more stringent test criteria claimed to be doing so in the name of safety, while those seeking new criteria cited the need for increased capacity and tended to come from ATC-related divisions of FAA.
68 I Federal Research and Technology for Aviation

One often-cited problem from the recent past

was lack of communication between R&D personnel and the operating divisions, resulting in

unwanted or unusable R&D. Therefore, when

seeking solutions to this problem, FAA management first turned to improving relationships between R&D and the operating divisions. In some

cases, “improving relationships” meant increasing the flow of current communications; in other

cases, the managers involved started virtually

from scratch.

More than one operating division manager has

accused the R&D division of politicizing its priority-setting process to favor some operating divisions at the expense of others. Conversely, other

division managers believe they have an advantage

in their rapport with key individuals in the R&D

division, but they also worry about what would

happen to their projects if these persons were to

leave. Maintaining continuity over long-term

projects is a common concern.

Some parts of the System Operations Directorate, such as the Flight Standards Service, have

specific branches to deal with the R&D division.

Not every operating group at FAA is large enough

to afford such units; indeed, the technical programs section within Flight Standards has more

branches than some entire offices or services elsewhere in the agency. Furthermore, where some offices within the System Operation Directorate

have a history of cooperation with the R&D division, others have a background of far less cordial

relationships.

Within the offices under the Assistant Administrator for Airports (which is separate from the

Directorates mentioned above), there have been

discussions of a periodic review of R&D projects.

There remains some concern within this group

that the improved relationships with the R&D division are based on having “nice guys in charge;”

they would like to see any new procedures forrnal-

—

ized so that success in accomplishing their R&D

goals is less dependent on having a good rapport

with a particular individual. A Flight Standards

manager maintained that R&D programs go most

smoothly when the R&D program manager seeks

the help and input of the operating divisions, and

the operating divisions have and take advantage of

opportunities to outline their needs. The air traffic

division uses quality action teams 108 to review the

processes used to determine R&D (and other)

projects, thus ensuring that Air Traffic’s policies

and technology needs are taken into account in the

R&D decisionmaking process.

Another office that depends on the R&D division, the Office of Environment and Energy (under the Associate Administrator for Policy, Planning, and International Aviation), also has had

improved cooperation with the R&D division.

They have seen a major change in how the R&D

division involves Environment and Energy

people in the process. Although the planning and

coordination process for R&D takes longer, Environment and Energy has found that it works better.

They submit proposals and justifications for the

following five years, which are then reviewed at

several levels. The office is pleased with this procedure. According to one manager: “[t]he decisionmaking process is now on the table instead of

in the back room.”

Many FAA R&D projects involve or interest

more than one operating office or division. For

such projects, good communications require that

multiple groups cooperate with one another.

While the accusation has been made in the past

that the different divisions had tunnel vision, not

seeing past their own concerns, there is increased

emphasis on ensuring that each relevant division

be represented in the R&D decisionmaking process.

One R&D division manager likes to see the operating divisions making a strong commitment to

lo~~ese ~re pan of total qua]lty management (TQM) Irnplernen(adon. TQM is a concept that encourages team-building, increaxd communication, employee input, and continuing review as away of meeting a defined mission. A number of companies and government agencies now

rely on TQM.
Chapter 2 Institutional and Management Issues for Civil Aviation Research and Technology | 69

their projects. His feeling is that this has not always been the case. but that participation has improved and is now more active. He recalled that in

the past, operations managers were sometimes

passive and behaved “like judges of something

other people were doing,” rather than as integral

members of a system development (earn. He prefers the increased number of R&D projects he is

seeing in which the operations representatives

“are more like team players. ”

Positive Steps

In many ways. FAA is in transition. FAA has recognized some of the operational development

problems discussed earlier and is making efforts

to resolve them. Almost all agency operating units

report improved relations with FAA’s R&D division, and the general feeling is that technology

R&D is more targeted than in the past to the needs

of the operating units.

As mentioned above, acquiring user input is an

essential step in identifying operational requirements. For the development of the new 777 aircraft, Boeing has used this approach and met with

success. Likewise, FAA increasingly welcomes

industry into its fold. In 1991. FAA established

operational implementation teams for satellite

navigation and for satellite communications and

surveillance. The teams have worked closely with

representatives of the various FAA organizations,

as well as with other parts of the aviation communit y. to improve the process for developing performance standards and requirements. 109

The Satellite Operational Implementation

Team (SOIT) was established to help speed the

introduction of satellite navigation functions into

the U.S. air traffic system. Sponsored by FAA’s

Flight Standards Service. SOIT serves as the

single focal point for the review and approval of

all operational implementation requirements: the

team includes representatives of all the functional

entities involved in implementing satellite

technology. Industry. academia, and other advisory groups are also involved in certain SOIT activities, at the invitation of FAA. But by law, FAA

must exclude industry from those sessions that involve rulemaking. 110 However, some industry

representatives consider these prohibitions to be

excessive—industry is now excluded from all

meetings of the navigation portion of SOIT. 111

SOIT provides guidance and direction to program offices responsible for research, development, operation, and acquisition of satellite navigation technologies. For example, SOIT consulted

with the R&D division to develop the mission

needs statement for GPS (i.e., for the first key decision point in the A 109 process) prior to the program’s budgeting. In addition, SO IT is authorized

to task member organizations to support agreedOn activities. 112 In 1993, FAA separately chartered a Communications/Surveillance Operational Implementation Team (C/SOIT) from a working

group formerly based within SOIT. C/SOIT is focusing on the early operational implementation of

satellite communications, surface movement surveillance systems, and datalink technologies.

CONCLUSIONS

Aviation research and technology development

are performed by various public and private institutions in the United States and across the globe.

The U.S. federal government is the major provider

of R&D for aviation safety, security, environmental protection. and the airspace system. Such research is vital to FAA’s regulatory and operating

missions, and FAA is both a customer and supplier of R&D products in these areas.

FAA depends on other agencies for most basic

research such as human factors and environmental

science. To the extent that such research is
70 I Federal Research and Technology for Aviation

■ Involve suitably experienced operational personnel in the planning and prototype development

process. Effective system development requires a balance of operational and technical views, and neither should dominate, The planning, analyses, and experience of operating organizations, at the Federal Aviation Administration and across the aviation community, are critical to properly matching technological options to safety and operational initiatives “Too little, too late” has usually described the

Involvement of operational experts in air traffic control (ATC) development

■ Conduct operational analyses and develop operational procedures for new system concepts early enough to affect the technology development process. Proposed operational procedures must

be developed in sufficient detail that controllers, pilots, and other groups can understand and draw conclusions on the safety and operational implications Moreover, the operational and technical components of each ATC system must be developed concurrently, and must include frequent feedback from

the aviation community (see figure 2-4),

● Use dynamic ATC simulations as “operational development” as well as “technology development” tools. Dynamic ATC simulation resources, capable of including real controllers and pilots, are

essential to rapidly develop and test new ATC system concepts and procedures Operational issues

such as human-machine Interface and airspace configurations can be studied before the technology

iS fully mature Proposed operational procedures and technological concepts can be criticized

constructively with dynamic simulations, provided that both operational and technical experts are closely involved in the process When used in the past, dynamic simulations have focused primarily on validating and fine-tuning technological concepts

SOURCE Off Ice of Technology Assessment, 1994

conducted within federal programs, coordination Although FAA has relatively little to offer as

and cooperation for aviation R&D among federal

agencies have improved in recent years, although

it could be stronger still.

For its part, FAA’s foremost responsibility for

interagency research and technology is to identify

the long-term operational needs and objectives for

the aviation system. It is especially important

for FAA to confer with federal agencies conducting research to ensure that the specific

needs of civil aviation, especially as they relate

to U.S. policy in international standards-setting, are addressed within other research programs. FAA can contribute the most to aviation

R&D by providing an important operational perspective—whether or not it conducts or funds the

R&D. FAA is in a strong position to be the catalyst

and clearinghouse for technological advances vital to aviation progress; the agency alone has the

breadth of expertise and connections across the

aviation community to provide this service.

a supplier of scientific R&D in interagency

programs, certain technological systems developed and engineered in FAA programs, such as

those for explosives detection or air traffic control, are useful to other agencies. For example,

DOD plans to install the same air traffic equipment as FAA in its domestic control facilities. Additionally, FAA research facilities for aviation securit y, fire safety, and ATC simulation are national

resources that could be useful to other agencies.

While some interagency research projects are under way at the FAA Technical Center, FAA research programs and facilities have offered few research opportunities for NASA, DOD, and other

researchers.

However, it is the system development programs at FAA that need the most improvement. ATC system development and implementation are chronically delayed, in large part due to

shortcomings in analyzing and establishing op-
Chapter 2 Institutional and Management Issues for Civil Aviation Research and Technology 171

erational requirements, Reform is most needed in

ATC system development management rather

than procurement rules. If longstanding ATC

modernization problems are to be resolved, research and development of operational requirements and procedures must be strengthened and made into an integral part of FAA’s

ATC system development process. Box 2-4

presents three critical steps that could be part of an

improved ATC system development process,

FAA does incorporate operational expertise

into parts of its ATC technology development efforts, but it is unlikely that, on its own, FAA can

take all the steps necessary to resolve internal

management and cultural impediments to improving the ATC system development process. In the

course of its research, however, OTA heard

little confidence expressed in FAA’s ability to

plan for and introduce new ATC systems effectively without some change in institutional

structures and incentives. FAA has claimed, and

then failed. to have overcome system development and acquisition hurdles a number of times

during the past decade. As long as technology development remains the dominant culture in

FAA system development programs, however,

implementation problems will persist.
Data and

Analysis for

Aviation

R&D 3

“/ find it very difficult to make a choice between an aggressive

R&D program on aging aircraft, non-destructive testing, terrorism, runway incursions, [or] collision avoidance. I don ‘t know how one says that

one IS more important than the other We try to do them all. We try to do

them all with what we have to work with.”1

R

esources for aviation research and development (R&D)

are limited. Deciding how to allocate these resources

among competing areas of interest and obl igation is made

even more difficult by the lack of assurance that the R&D

effort will yield a usable product. Furthermore, tension exists between committing resources to immediate problem solving and

longer term problem identification efforts, whether for continuing challenges or emerging issues. There is growing emphasis on

understanding the economic effects of technology implementation (through regulatory or infrastructure decisions), given a financially strapped aviation industry that in the best of times only

produces razor-thin profit margins. But not all problems or potential solutions can be quantified easily in terms of financial impact,

and standard cost-benefit analyses are of limited use in planning

R&D.

Criteria for selecting federal research projects include scientific merit (i.e., does it complement or deepen existing knowledge),

program or mission relevance, technology-base expansion, balance between large and small, and enhancement of human re1 Joseph Del Balzo, Executive Director for System Development, Federal A\ iation

Administration, testimony at hearings before the House Committee on Space, Science,

and Technolog}, Subcommittee on Transportation, Aviation, and Materials, Mar. 6, 1990.

I 73
74 I Federal Research and Technology for Aviation

sources and education.2 For civil aviation, many

of these criteria are less important than solving

pressing operational problems, primarily through

targeted R&D efforts. Selecting options for applied R&D resources suggests different criteria:

size of problem, feasibility and net cost of solutions, and level of understanding of the problem.

Where the last is low, gauging size is difficult, in

turn affecting one’s ability to develop potential

solutions and estimate their benefits; more data

and R&D are needed (e.g., on human performance, complex systems, or new materials).

Table 3-1 summarizes the performance objectives for R&D, along with technology options and

their limitations, in four areas. This chapter outlines the historical benefits of aviation R&D and

provides a framework for analyzing the potential

payoff of R&D efforts across as well as within the

Federal Aviation Administration (FAA) missions.

It also discusses the usefulness of cost-benefit calculations for setting R&D priorities and delineates further data or analyses needs—information

to support both continued problem-solving activities and improved problem prediction efforts.

HISTORICAL PAYOFFS OF AVIATION R&D

In examining the potential payoffs of R&D, the

Office of Technology Assessment (OTA) first

looked to how well-known problems have been

addressed or resolved in the past. The key concerns of the aviation community in the 1970s included mid-air collisions, noise and fuel efficiency, and hijacking. By the early 1980s, new issues

emerged—safety oversight, traffic improvements, and aircraft bombings—and noise abatement continued to be a concern.

I Safety

Major accident data for Part 121 carriers reveal

that safety has improved dramatically over the

lifetime of the industry (figure 3-1 ).3 The reduced

accident rates for Parts 121 and 135 operations,

shown in figure 3-2, resulted from repeated

introduction of safety technologies and procedures, many based on federal R&D conducted

through the years. For fire safety in particular, the

federal government spent nearly a decade devising appropriate test scenarios, evaluating safety

improvements provided by fire retardant materials, developing test methodologies for materials

selection, and initiating rulemaking. 4 In the public’s eyes, however, more remains to be done with

cabin safety, which requires further study of the

basic mechanisms of fire development. Also, because cabin interior materials technology is stateof-the art and because additional fire sources exist

(e.g., jet fuel, cargo and luggage, and carry-on

items), FAA is looking toward other means of fire

New technologies have helped to improve aircraft tire safefy

and reduce tire-re/ated fatalities, however postcrash, fuel-fed

fires remain a threat

2 See discussion of prioritization in science in U.S. Congress, Office of Technology Assessment, l“cderully Funded Re.seurch: Dc(i.\/on.s f[~r

a Decade, OTA-SET-490 (Washington, DC: U.S. Government Printing Office, May 1991 ).

3 A major accident involves fatalities and or substantial aircraft damage. Parts 12 I and 135 refer to the major commercial carriers and commuter airlines, respectively.

4 See U.S. Congress, Office of Technology Awes\ merit, ‘“Aircraft Evacuation Testing: Research and Tcchnolog~ Issues,” Background Paper, OTA-SET-BP- 121, September 1993.
Issue Potential improvements

Airspace Closer spacing between aircraft and inand airport creased aircraft arrival and departure rates

efficiency at airports without increased risk of collision Augmented airport surface traffic

management capabilities, especially in

low-visibilty conditions

Technology options Limitations

Enhanced communications, navigation, and

surveillance technologies and procedures, including the global navigation satellite system,

advanced traffic management tools, wake vortex detection

Technologies are site-speclflc, and for many, complex procedures

must be revised or adapted for their use While use of new ATC and

weather technologies can reduce airline operating costs and infrastructure expenditures, this technology wiII meet but a small percentage of projected demand in coming decades Demand management

options discounted by industry

Oceanic separations equivalent to those in

domestic airspace

Satellite-based communications, navigation,

and surveillance systems, automatic dependent surveillance via datalink

Procedures subject to lengthy validation and International agreement

process Initial benefits to airlines small until fleet-wide implementation

IS accomplished Ground-based monitoring equipment required before automatic dependent surveillance can begin

Advanced weather detection and analysis systems, cockpit display of aviation weather products (e g , Icing at given altitudes or jet stream

location)

Human/machine interface must be considered, and Increased amount

of information must not overwhelm pilot or controller

Improved reliability and accuracy of weather forecasts

Minimal runway downtime

Reduced apron and gate occupancy times

Enhanced pavement construction and maintenance techniques

Pavement design and evaluation methods require Improvement

High-speed tugs, advanced docking technologies, automated gate assignment techniques,

integrated passenger, baggage, crew, and vehicle information systems

Divisions between airport and airline authority Onerous retrofit costs

for communication systems, and terminal and airside access facilities

Safety Enhanced pilot and controller awareness of

aircraft situation in all conditions Reduced

personnel fatigue and stress Improved

crew communication and coordination improved reliabilty of engines, avionics, and

other aircraft systems Reduced fire threat

Enhanced structural airworthiness and

crashworthiness

Enhanced training methods and facilties Advanced inspection tools and techniques New

materials Predictive hazardous weather sensors and severe storm forecasting

Dimmishing returns—fewer lives to be saved even with exhaustive

effort Overall risk may be increased by adopting new technologies or

procedures

Ca

Security Minimized risk of explosives and other

weapons being brought onboard aircraft

Enhanced aircraft resilience to explosions

Reduced threat to ATC and airports Optimized costs of screening technologies and

airport security service costs

Passenger profiling, explosives detection systems, other weapons detectors, aircraft and

ATC system hardening human factors analy -

sis

No single technology exists for preventing all acts of terrorism or mayhem Threat cannot be quantified Screening methods are costly and

time consuming, and access control and hardening techniques costly

Q’

Environment Minimum community noise exposure maintamed as operations increase Minimized

engine emissions and increased fuel efficiency Reduced environmental impact of

deicing and fire fighting compounds

Additional noise cancel lation and community

noise abatement methods, low-emissions combustors, reclamation of glycol-based fluids and

replacement with non-glycol deicers, halon

conservation and halon-system replacement

Except for improved fuel performance, any economic benefits accrue

to society rather than to airlines Scientific understanding Iacking in

some areas, problem not quantified

Improved cabin environment

KEY ATC = alr traffic control

SOURCE Off Ice of Technology Assessment, 1994
76 I Federal Research and Technology for Aviation

60+

/

40-

1

20” I

o~i - 1 1 1 , 1 1 1 I I

1930 1940 1950 1960 1970 1980 199(

1960 1965 1970 1975 1980 1985 1990

NOTE Security-related fatallhes and sulcldes are not Included

SOURCE Off Ice of Technology Assessment, 1994, based on CIVII Aeronautics Board, Federal Aviation Admlrustrahon, and National

Transportation Safety Board data

suppression to extend survivable conditions within a cabin threatened by in-flight or postcrash fuel

fires. (See cabin safety section in chapter 4.)

In some cases, a relatively low-technology

solution is appropriate once the nature of a problem is known. During the period 1975 to 1985,

windshear was a factor in accidents resulting in 50

percent of U.S. accident fatalities. After the phenomenon was widely recognized and better understood, FAA and industry were able to quickly put

together a new training program for pilots to increase their awareness of the problem and provide

them with better response capability. Although

there have been close calls for commercial transports since then, no windshear-related passenger

fatalities occurred in the United States after 1985,

when the training aid was disseminated.5

 Environment

The National Aeronautics and Space Administration (NASA) research during the 1960s and 1970s

greatly aided fuel conservation efforts by developing highly efficient engines. In 1975, NASA’s Aircraft Energy Efficiency (ACEE) program identified turboprops, along with laminar flow, active

controls, and composite structures, as areas for

5 AS tie understanding ~)f ~indshear fa~(ors and phenomena has increased, new sensors allowing earlier warning of the hazard have become

possible (see technology section inch. 4). Windshear may have been a causal factor in the July 1994 USAir crash in Charlotte, NC; determination of the probable cause of the accident will take many months.
Chapter 3 Data and Analysis for Aviation R&D 177

0 ’ ‘\ 0

0

0- 0

—

1 –*- Part 121 + Part 135

L

1978 1980 1982 1984 1986 1988 1990 1992

— —

~--’––– . -– ---

~

+ Part 121 A Part 135

L———. -- - —

1979 1981 1983 1985 1987 1989 1991

NOTE Part 121 of :he Federal Avlatlon Regulations IS typically associated with the major alrllnes and Part 135 wch commuter alrcrafl

with fewer than 30 seats

SOURCE Off Ice of Technology Assessment based on 1989 and 1993 National Transportation Safety Board data

Visible wlndshear indicators observed near Denver Stapleton Airport
78 I Federal Research and Technology for Aviation

Turbojet

h18?40 Low bypass

ratio turbofans

+ --

/\

200/0

w

High bypass ratio

?

turbofans

v

‘

2

’

0 ,.,O$ ’- =

10%0 $

m

Advanced ducted

propeller

Propfan

+

1950 1960 1970 1980 1990 2000

—

SOURCE Off Ice of Technology Assessment, 1994, based on 1993 Pratt & Whitney mformatlon

major advances in fuel efficiency.6 The ACEE

program included the Engine Component Improvement (ECI) and Energy Efficient Engine

( E

3

) projects. ECI was designed to develop co m -

ponents to reduce fuel consumption for three engine designs in use at the time. E3 consisted of

long-term research for new engine development;

demonstration engines achieved a fuel consumption reduction of 18 percent and an improvement

indirect operating costs of 5 to 10 percent, exceeding the project’s original goals.7 The results are illustrated in figure 3-3.

NASA’s clean, quiet engine programs also permitted engine manufacturers to reduce emissions

of combustion products and noise in response to

federal regulatory initiatives. In 1968, Congress

authorized FAA to regulate aircraft noise emissions. 8 Under that statutory authority, FAA

adopted Part 36 of the Federal Aviation Regulations (FAR) in 1969, prohibiting the further es6 Johns. L~gford 111, The NASA E.’.xpeitncece in Aeronuuticul R&D: Three Ca~e Studies With Anul}sis, IDA Report R-3 ! 9 (Alexandria, VA:

Institute for Defense Anal)ses, March 1989), p. 112.

7 George Eberstadt, “Govemnlent Support of the Large Commercial Aircraft Industries of Japan, Europe, and the United States,” OTA contractor report, Ma} 1991, pp. 75-76.

s Public Law 90-411, 82 Stat. 395 ( 1968).
Chapter 3 Data and Analysis for Aviation R&D 179

calation of aircraft noise levels in subsonic civil

turbojet and transport category airplanes and prescribing noise measurement, evaluation, and level

requirements for new aircraft types.9 In 1977,

FAA amended Part 36 to provide for three stages

of aircraft noise levels. 10

Through the Aviation Noise and Capacity Act

of 1990, Congress directed the elimination of

Stage 2 operations by the end of the century. 11 In

September 1991, FAA promulgated a final rule

amending FAR Part 91 to require the phased transition to all Stage 3 commercial aircraft operations

by December31, 1999. The Stage 3 technology

provides improvements of as much as 25 decibels

over first-generation Stage 1 aircraft models, or

over 80-percent reduction in perceived loudness. 13 Figure 3-4 shows one result of a drop in

noise output normalized to thrust (i.e., the relative

footprints of Boeing 727 and 737 aircraft).

The Environmental Protection Agency (EPA)

data indicate the quantity of air pollutant emissions has remained fairly constant over more than

two decades despite continued growth in operations (see figure 3-5). However, FAA estimates

that hydrocarbon (HC) and carbon monoxide

(CO) emissions have dropped 65 to 70 percent

since 1984, when emission standards were

introduced. 14 This reduction more than offsets increases in total fuel consumption. The disparity in

estimates may stem from differences in the agenB737-300 model (Stage 3)

5,000 m

5,000 m

B727-200 model (Stage 2)

SOURCE Ofhce of Technology Assessment, 1994 based on Wdham

Green et al Modem CornrnercW A/rcrafi (New York NY Portland

House 1987)

cies’ databases and changes in analytic methodologies (see section on Environmental Assessment).

EPA regulates only HC emissions: the International Civil Aviation Organization (ICAO) has

standards for CO and oxides of nitrogen (NOX) as

well as HC. 15 In the past. emissions from highly

efficient engines have easily met the international

minimums. Beginning in 1996, however, new engine designs must meet the 20-percent reduced

NOX standard; by 2000, all newly manufactured

engines must meet the more stringent standard. 16

In addition, some locations in the United States

9 Part 36 noise limitations, based on gross weight, are measured at three specific points: under the takeoff path, on the sideline from the

extended center] ine of the runw a), and under the approach path. At each of these point~, the effective perceived noise level takes into account

loudne~s, discrete tones, and noise event duration. FAA developed the standards in concert with the Environmental Protection Agency.

1~1 xz F’(,(/C,r[J/ R[,X,,~fer 12360 (Mar 3, 1977). Stage I is the noisiest; Stage ~ iS the quietest to date.

I I 45 Ft,(/(ru/ Re<q($[er 79302 (Nov. 28, 1980).

I ~ f~ ~’<(/tr(l/ R~,~{\l~r 48627 (Sept. 25, 1991 ). Some exemptions are possible Until z~)l.

I ~ us, Dcpti~nlent of Tran\porta[i~n, Federal Aviation Administration, “Alternatives Available To Accelerate Commercial Aircraft Fleet

Modemi/;it Ion.” Report of the Fec!cral Aviation Administration to the Senate and House Appropriations Committee~ Pmuant (o House Report

99-256 on the Dcp:irtmcnt of Transpmtation and Related Agencies Appropriation Bill for FY 1986, Apr. 11, 1986, p. 13.

I ~ NT(jk elllli~lon~ have rerll:lined nearly cons[an[. Nicholas Krull, FAA Office of Environment and Energy, perwmd CO1lllllUniCatiOn, Apr.

28, I 994,

I ~ Jlrll ~rl SO1l, E.pA Office of Mobile Sources, personal communication, Apr. 7. 1994.

.

I (~ A~{)pte~ in March 1993. Ib]d.
80 I Federal Research and Technology for Aviation

Total aircraft emissions

1200 , I I

1000 1

1986 1987 1988 1989 1990 1991 1992

Share of all U.S. transportation emissions

+ co +-- VOC -o- NOX

1986 1987 1988 1989 1990 1991 1992

NOTE lnthemld-1980s, changes occurred mthe methodology for estlmatmg emlsslons.

KEY CO= carbon monoxide, VOC = volatlle organic compounds (e g ,

hydrocarbons); NO. = oxides of nitrogen.

SOURCE Office of Technology Assessment, 1994, based on U S Environmental ProtectIon Agency, rVat/ona/ A/r Po//utant Errv.worr Trends,

1990-1992 (Research Triangle Park, NC October 1993)

may require total airport “bubble” emissions to

stabilize or even be reduced. 17 Much of this can be

accomplished through modifications to groundassist equipment, reduced taxi/idle time, or the

use of high-speed towing equipment, but reduced

aircraft engine emissions may also be necessary

eventually. 18

 Security

As federal intervention (i.e., increased vigilance

and the implementation of improved weapons

detection technologies) reduced the hijacking

threat, terrorists moved their attention to bombing

high-capacity aircraft. The nature of the security

problem is such that R&D may yield tools to reduce risk of given types, but a new threat is likely

to crop up elsewhere. Defining a security threat as

one would the risk of engine failure is not possible—it constantly changes as political winds

shift and deterrence efforts force terrorists or criminals to think up new ways of doing harm.

As a result, the federal aviation security R&D

effort is evolving toward an integrated system of

threat detection and mitigation methods. The scope

of the FAA’s program has changed dramatically in

the 1990s, expanding beyond a concentration in

weapons and explosives detection technology test

and evaluation to a broader R&D effort-one that

includes human factors, hardening aircraft to sabotage, and security system integration.

 Capacity and Air Traffic Management

Despite increases in scheduled airline traffic (see

figure 3-6), FAA-measured delays 19 on flights

through the busiest airports decreased over 40 percent between 1988 and 1992.20 With the current

reporting system, however, FAA is unable to estimate the total amount of delay experienced by airlines and other users of the air traffic control

17 Bubb/e refers to a specific portion of the atmosphere surrounding one or more airports.

18 BVson, op. Cit., foo~ote 15”

19 Bax.on1993 dam from tie FAA office of Air Traffic system M~agement, NAS Analysis ROgram, OTA calculated that the number of

operations delayed per thousand operations dropped 44 percent.

20 Total o~rations at aiwotis with FAA-o~rated air traffic control towers have remained steady in the late 1980s and early 1990S, in large

part due to declining general aviation operations.
Chapter 3 Data and Analysis for Aviation R&D 181

(ATC) system, nor can the agency precisely determine the cause of the delays.21 Changes in airline

scheduling practices in response to the Department of Transportation (DOT) publication of

delay data further undermine trend analysis.22 In

short, what is known about delay is limited, and

this lack of information affects both the planning

and operation of the ATC system.

In addition, the area in which managing and

fielding the results of aviation R&D has been most

troublesome is capacity and delay. The focus of

this R&D effort has been on tools to increase the

efficiency of the ATC system in the face of increasing constraints on airport construction or expansion. Despite the availability of innovative

technologies, new ATC systems implementation

has been stymied from lengthy development

cycles and reluctance on the part of controllers to

accept some new products (see discussion of implementation issues in chapter 2).

As a result, the process of controlling (i.e.,

maintaining separation between) aircraft has

changed little in decades, perpetuating costly inefficiencies. With the current ground-based surveillance system, aircraft fly from ATC sector to sector at select altitudes; route optimization for fuel

consumption and minimum time is rarely facilitated. Over the oceans, beyond the range of radar

surveillance, separations between aircraft are

even greater and user-preferred routing nearly impossible to obtain.

The flight management capabilities of new aircraft greatly surpass those of ground infrastructure, which cannot support their use.23 Some ATC

automation has been introduced to help maximize

the arrival and departure rates at airports, but no

data have been assembled to assess any changes in

~ Military/general aviation

m Air taxi

_ Air carrier

mm

1978 1980 1982 1984 1986 1988 1990 1992

NOTE Departures calculated from operations at airports with FAA-operated control towers

SOURCE Off Ice of Technology Assessment, 1994, based on data from

the FAA Off Ice of Avlatlon Policy, Plans, and Management Analys[s

performance.

24 Airspace and airfield capacity remains open to enhancement through new management methods and supporting technologies. Essential to the latter’s development are models of

the National Airspace System (NAS) and its major elements (see later section on Delay and Air

Traffic Analysis). In addition, reliable, timely

weather data are required, along with effective

means of disseminating this and other information. Many of the advances proposed for the ATC

system hinge on this capability.

21 FAA delay data reflect only delays of 15 minutes or more in any flight segment (i.e., takeoff, en route, or arrival) experienced by aircraft

under FAA control. Thi\ reporting method precludes identification of all delays in system (see data and analysis section).

22 John J. Feamsides, General Manager and Senior Vice President, The Mitre Corp., personal communication, Apr. 19, 1994.

27 For ~xample the automatedflight Mmagement systems onboard aircraft permit “four-dimensional” flight planning, but his advanced

programming of aircraft po~ition at a given time does not mesh with FAA’s arrival queuing methods.

24 See U.S. Congres\, General Accounting Office, Air Trafic Control: Jusrijca(ionsfor Capital Int’estmenrs Need Strerrglhening GAO/

RCED-93-55 (Washington, DC: U.S. Government Printing Office, January 1993), pp. 9-1 I.
82 I Federal Research and Technology for Aviation

Safety

Accidents Accident Investigation database

Incidents Near mid-air collisions

Inspection Service Difficulty Reporting

System (SDRS)

Other NASA Aviation Safety Reporting System

Capacity and air traffic management

Delay Air Traffic Operations Management System (ATOMS)a

Capacity mode/s SIMMOD (trademark name

for airport and airspace simulation model)

Pavement wear National Airport Pavement

Registration and Demonstration Program

Environment

Noise National Noise Impact Model (NANIM)

Emissions/air Aircraft Engine Emissions

quality Database (FAEED)

NTSB accident database

Pilot deviations

Safety Performance

Analysis System (SPAS)

System Indicators Program

DOT Airline Service

Quality Performance

(ASQP)

National Airspace System Performance Analy -

SIS Capability (NASPAC)

Integrated Noise Model

(lNM)

FAA/USAF Emissions

and Dispersion Model

(EDM)

Manufacturers

Operational errors Runway incursions

Program Tracking and Reporting Subsystem (PTRS)

RSPA database DOD Air Carrier

Analysis System

Consolidated Operations and Delay Analy -

SiS System (CODAS)

EPA emissions inventories

— —— a ATOMS stores flight and delay data retrieved from the Operational Performance System Network (OPSNET)

KEY NTSB = National Transportation Safety Board, RSPA = DOT’s Research and Special Programs Admlmstratlon, USAF = U S Alr Force

NOTE All databases or sources belong to FAA unless otherwse noted

SOURCE Off Ice of Technology Assessment, 1994

WEIGHING CURRENT ISSUES

This section relies on operational federal aviation

databases, summarized in table 3-2, to illustrate

what is known about the areas of greatest risk,

least efficiency, or highest cost for the air transportation system. A more detailed discussion of

the databases and analytical tools follows later in

this chapter.

 Safety and Security

The aggregate accident data show safety has improved dramatically since the introduction of

commercial airlines (see figure 3-1, again). However, there are varying levels of safety (i.e., numbers of accidents and fatalities) for air carrier and

general aviation operations (see table 3-3). For example, while the general aviation fatal accident

rate declined almost 25 percent between 1982 and

1992, the rate and total number of fatalities remain

high compared with the other aviation categories.

Part 121 aircraft, while having the fewest accidents, on average experience the second largest

number of fatalities. Aircraft operations data reveal that large commercial jets carry about 94 percent of all passengers and account for about 99

percent of passenger-miles. 25 Reducing the risk Of

25 Da[a for scheduled pan 12 I earners. U.S. Depatiment of Transportation, Federal Aviation Administration, FAA S/a/i.S/icul Handbook of

A\iarion (Washington, DC: 1991), p. 5-15.
Chapter 3 Data and Analysis for Aviation R&D 183

Major airlines Commuter Air taxi General aviationb

— —— — —

Total accidents 387 428 2,026 45,320

Fatal accidents 69 108 497 8,329

Total fatalities 1,948 558 1,199 16,048

- .

~ 1993 data preliminary

b) US .registered civilI aircraft not operated under 14 CFR 121 or 14 CFR 135

SOURCE Off Ice of Technology Assessment, based on January 1989 and January 1994 National Transportation

Safety Board data

fatalities aboard large air transports therefore

minimizes the safety threat for the greatest share

of the traveling public.

Relative to other transportation modes, however. aviation is an extremely safe industry. In

1992, highway-related deaths accounted for 94

percent of all transportation fatalities. Aviation

fatalities numbered 1,103, or less than 3 percent of

the total. General aviation and airlines experienced 874 and 33 fatalities, respectively.26

A small number of air carrier accidents are not

survivable due to the extreme forces of impact.27

Fatality rates in the remainder can potentially be

reduced through implementation of advanced fire

safety and crashworthiness technologies. Thus, a

two-pronged safety effort is required: 1 ) preventing or reducing the chance an accident will occur

in the first place, and 2) mitigating the effects. In

order to derive possible solutions through operational and/or technology solutions, the primary

and contributing causes of the accidents must be

identified. The National Transportation Safety

Board (NTSB) has primary responsibility for this

ongoing effort.

Overall, the federal R&D programs directed at

air transportation problems have had mixed success—the best results were obtained in areas

where the problem was well characterized and the

objectives clearly defined. Successful safety examples include reductions in the fire-related death

rate among cabin occupants, mid-air collisions,

and controlled flight into terrain. In addition,

noise, engine emissions, and fuel consumption

were reduced at the same time engines became

more powerful and reliable.

OTA reviewed NTSB Part 121 accident briefs

for the years 1985 through 1992 and found that human error (i.e., by pilots and other personnel) was

an initiating factor in nearly 60 percent of total accidents. 28 Aircraft or component failure was the

second-most frequent initiating factor; hazardous

weather and other miscellaneous factors precipitated the remainder of the accidents evaluated (see

table 3-4). A review of NTSB broad cause/factor

assignments for all Part 121 accidents from 1975

through 1989 showed that rates for accidents related to aircraft malfunction or failure were nearly

constant during this period: OTA noted several of

26 National Tran\portatlon Safety Board, “Transportation Deaths Drop 4.9 Percent in 1992,” SB 93-16, press release, July 1, 1993. AlwJ fee

U.S. Congress, General Accounting Office, “Transportation Safety: Opportunities for Enhancing Safet} Across Modes,” testimony at hearing~

before the Houw Committee on Public Works and Transportation, Subcommittee on investigation and O~ersight, Feb. 10, 1994.

27 Gellman Research As~ociates. Inc., “Benefit Estimates of the FAA’s Aircruft Safety Reiearch Program: 1992-2001 ,“ prepared for the

Federal AJ Iatlon Admlnlitratlon, July 10, 1992. Gellman figurc$ for J ear~ 1964 to 1988 ~howed that 12 of 624 uccidents (2 percent) were nonsurv!t able.

2X For this review, OTA identified the tw o mo~t significant ~equentiidcauwd et ent~ for e:ich a~cident. Initiating c;iusal factor i$ not the same

:i~ flr$t occurrence; e.g., a paisenger refu~al to obey seat belt ~ ign~ after the I ihel lhood of ie~’ere turbu]encc w’a$ announced-not the pre~ence

of wetither-related turbulence—would be the initiating factor should he or ~he be injured in a subwquent h)unce. M’eather w ,>uld be included in

a tally of all cauial factors.
84 I Federal Research and Technology for Aviation

Initiating causal factor

Pilot

ATC personnel

Other personnel

Weather

Aircraft/component

Miscellaneous b

All causal factors

Pilot

ATC personnel

Other personnel

Weather

Aircraft/component

Miscellaneous

Total accidents

Scheduled

passenger

45

5

19

27

30

4

52

10

24

53

31

4

130

Scheduled Nonscheduled Nonscheduled

cargo passenger cargo

16 1 5

0 0 0

1 0 2

0 0 0

3 1 4

0 0 0

16 1 8

2 0 0

3 1 2

4 0 2

3 1 6

0 0 0

20 2 11

Total a

Total (by percent)

67 41%

5 3

22 14

27 17

38 23

4 3

77 47

12 7

30 18

59 36

41 25

4 3

163

a Sum of percentages of loltlatlng causal factors do not total 100 percent due to rounding For all causal factors, numbers do not total 100 percent

because most accidents revolve multlple causes

b Mlscel{aneous Comprised of two blrdstrlkes, one unauthorized evacuation, and runway Colllslon with pedestrian

NOTE Part 121 refers to alrlme operations using aircraft having 30 or more seats or payload capacity greater than 7,500 pounds The

category does not Include alr taxis or general avlatlon, nor typically commuter airlines Accidents Involwng sabotage or non-operational events are not ln(:luded

SOURCE Off Ice of Technology Assessment, 1994, based on Nat!onal Transportahon Safety Board data

these were linked to human error or poor manage- rious injuries occurred during precautionary

ment policies. 29 The data alSO showed a drop in uations.

weather-related causal rates (see figure 3-7). Over this same eight-year period, a total

evacOf 33

Fire occurred in 37 of these accidents (28 percent). Of the four fires that occurred in flight, only

one, an engine fire, was the initiating cause of the

accident; none developed in the cabin. In 41 of the

130 accidents. weather-related or clear air turbulence was a factor: one fatal and 57 serious injuries

to passengers and crew occurred but, typically,

little or no aircraft damage.30 In a dozen cases, sefatal accidents occurred involving U.S. cargo and

passenger carriers.31 Table 3-5 shows the breakdown of initiating and all significant causal factors for the 31 accidents for which NTSB had provided accident briefs.

Despite the high number of fatalities (148)

associated with two recent controlled flight into

terrain (CFIT) accidents,32 fatal accidents caused

29 Exumplcs of the ltitter Include inadequate surveillance of operations by FAA and the failure of o~rators or companies to follow maintenance and inspection guidance.

N OTA found th:lt human emor, 01) the pafl of pi]ots, flight attendants, or passengers, was the initiating faCtOr in almOSt 40 percent of the

accidents involl ing turbulence. The one fatality, in 1990, stemmed from a combination of errors: the pilot flew through the overhang of a thunderstorm, contrary to company procedures; the flight attendants failed to enforce the seat belt instructions; and the passenger did not comply

with the instruction~.

s I 1nc]udcd iil t]lls (OIJ1 are [W() ~lccldents for Which NTSB did not determine probable cause. Both accidents, involving controlled flight into

ter-min, occurred outside the l_rnited States; NTSB was not required to participate in the investigation. Not included were four securitj incidents

that resulted in ftitalitics.

32 Both accidents occurred in Februw-) 1989. The first, involving a charter passenger flight, took place in the Azores, Portugal. The wcond

CFIT-related iic~id~nt occurred in Kuala Lumpur, Malaysia, during a scheduled cargo flight.
-. — —

Chapter 3 Data and Analysis for Aviation R&D 185

by CFIT have decreased significantly since

ground proximity warning systems were introduced

onto large U.S. carriers in the mid-1970s. Based

on this success, commuter aircraft are to be

equipped by April 1994.33 A recurring problem

has been that some pilots, annoyed by prior false

alarms, have turned off or ignored the system. Investigators suspect that this occurred in one of the

most recent accidents.34 Latest generation warning equipment presents far less of a false alarm

problem, but proper pilot training is still required.

Loss of control related to aircraft malfunction

or weather has been the primary factor in other accidents with high fatalities. Also, while runway

incursions and collisions on the airport surface

typically effect little damage or injury, the potential for catastrophic loss of life remains—recall

the Tenerife collision and the 1991 accident at the

Los Angeles International Airport involving an air

transport and commuter aircraft. One of the most

frightening images of aviation accidents is the

mid-air collision. The last mid-air collision involving a large civil air transport over the United

States occurred in 1986.35

The threat of an aircraft and its contents being

quickly consumed by fire is equally horrifying.

OTA estimates that approximately 13 percent of

total fatalities in accidents involving U.S. commercial carriers during this period were due to

fire. 36 This is down from earlier FAA estimates,

using data from the 1960s through the 1970s, indi1 1

1

I -i-El

1975-77 1978-80 1981-83 1984-86 1987-89

— .

NOTE 1989 data were the last analyzed by the National Transportation

Safety Board as of 1993

SOURCE Off Ice of Technology Assessment, 1994, based on National

Transportation Safety Board data

eating that 15 to 20 percent of total fatalities was

due to fire.37 At about that same time, FAA

estimated that 40 percent of fatal i ties in survivable

accidents (e.g., where the fatalities from an accident in which no one could survive the forces of

34 ~nNelson Senior Engineer, Boeing Airplane Safety, personal Communication, NOV. 1, 1993. Worldwide, not all aircraft have been

equipped with ground proximity warning systems. ICAO reports that 638 people were killed in 1992 in 26 CFIT accidents, which include two

craslm of A irbus aircraft at Katmandu, Nepal. “Brief s,” Trafic World, Jan. 4, 1993, p. 23.

35 me accident ini o]~ed the co]] i~ion of an Aeromexico aircraft and a general aviation aircraft; the CO]] if ion took p]aCe over ce~itos,

California. There have been $everal mid-air collisions involving commuter aircraft, but the last one invol~ ing a major scheduled U.S. carrier In

U.S. air~pace happened in 1978 over San Diego (Pacific Southwest Airlines). Wanda Glenn, National Transportation Safety Board, psonal

communication, July 29, 1994.

M me Cencral Accounting office ci[ed ] w fire-rela(ed fatalities for the period 1985 through 199 I: in 1992. none of the 3 I fatalities ~ as

caufed bj fire or lt~ effects. Total fatalities for the period 1985 through 1992, excluding death~ due to criminal or [errorist acts, numbered 1,049.

National Tran~portation Safet} Board, presi release, Jan. 15, 1993; and U.S. Congres~, General Accounting Office, AtIat/on Sajet]: SIOM! Prf)~-

res \ In Mukinx Aircraft Cut)/n /n(er/w.r F/reprmj GAO,’ RCED-93-37 (Washington. DC: U.S. Government Printing Office, J:inuar] 1993 ),

p. 11.

37 Con\tantlne sar~oj, Manager, Fire Safe[y Branch, FAA Technical Center, personal communication, Maj I I , 1994.
86 I Federal Research and Technology for Aviation

Scheduled Scheduled Nonscheduled Nonscheduled Total a

passenger cargo passenger cargo Total (by percent)

Initiating causal factor

Pilot 10 5 1 3 19 61 %

ATC personnel 2 0 0 0 2 7

Other personnel 2 1 0 0 3 10

Weather 1 0 0 0 1 3

Aircraft/component 4 1 0 0 5 16

Miscellaneous b

1 0 0 0 1 3

All causal factors

Pilot 11 5 1 3 20 65

ATC personnel 4 0 0 0 4 13

Other personnel 10 1 1 0 12 39

Weather 5 1 0 1 7 23

Aircraft/component 4 1 0 0 5 16

Miscellaneous 1 0 0 0 1 3

Total accidents 20 7 1 3 31

a sum of percentages of lnltlatlng ca—usal factors may not total 100 percent due to rounding For all causal factors, numbers do not total 100 Percent

because most accidents revolve multiple causes

b Miscellaneous comprised of runway collrwon with Pedestrian

NOTE Part 121 refers to alrlme operations using aircraft having 30 or more seats or payload capacity greater than 7,500 pounds. The

category does not include alr tam or general avlatlon, nor typically commuter airlines Accidents mvolvmg sabotage or non-operational events are not Included

SOURCE Office of Technology Assessment, 1994, based on National Transportation Safety Board data

impact are excluded) were fire-related.38 Neither

FAA nor NTSB has more recently published data

on this percentage.

In addition to the hazard of accidental injury,

fatality, or damage to aircraft, the possibility of

intentional harm requires FAA and the industry to

preclude the introduction of weapons or explosives aboard aircraft.39 Figure 3-8 shows the escalation in terrorist threat to aircraft since the

1950s. Although the hijacking threat diminished

in the 1980s, high-capacity aircraft became a favorite target of terrorist bombs, expanding the

death toll and galvanizing public attention to the

problem of aviation security (see box 3-1 ). Worldwide, the number of persons killed by bombings

in general between 1980 and 1989 was approximately 1 ,020.40

Three catastrophic acts of sabotage involving

U.S. airlines have occurred since the early 1970s.

The estimated cost of the 1988 Pan Am bombing

ranges between $411 million and $520 million.41

According to FAA, the estimated direct cost of

another such incident is $600 million—$150 million for the wide-body aircraft and $450 million

for passenger lives.42

As access control and screening measures become more stringent, the threat of large amounts

of common explosives being placed aboard air38 Ibid.

39 Hostage-taking, aircraft Piracy ~dhijacking, Sabotage, and indiscriminate bombings and shootings are examples of he manY risks.

40 Stefmie Stauffer, ~anager, Svateglc Inte]]igence E)ivisim, FAA OffIce of Aviation Security Intelligence, Personal communication, MaY

29, 1994.

4154 Federal Register 28987 (July IO, 1989).

42 see uos. ~paflment of Transpo~ation, Federal Aviation Administration, The 1993 Federal Avia/ion Adminiwation pianfor Research

Engineering and Deteloprnent (Washington, DC: February 1994), p. 7-1.
Chapter 3 Data and Analysis for Aviation R&D 187

1.5 ,

I

0 \

1950-59 1960-69 1970-79

\

1980-89

SOURCE Off Ice of Technology Assessment 1994 based on 1993 FAA

data

craft or in airports is reduced. However, new types

of explosives may be introduced that can more

easily elude detection: in addition, another type of

risk has arisen—more than 100 countries possess

some version of shoulder-launched heat-seeking

missiles. 43

Comparing R&D Funding to Risk

Table 3-6 shows the categories of accident types

or factors and the applicable FAA R&D program

area, along with the percentage of fatal accidents,

fatalities, and program funding. For the period

1985 to 1992, the two most prevalent factors in fatal airline accidents were human error and fire: security was third.

When fatalities are considered, however,

another ranking emerges. While human error was

again predominant, comparable percentages of fa1982

1985

1986

1988

NOTE

Mid-air explosion on a Pan Am jet bound for

Hawaii from Tokyo, kiIlng a Japanese boy and

injuring 15 other passengers

Hijacking of TWA Flight 847 by Shi’ite terrorists, Iasting 17 days, with the torture and kllling of a U S Navy diver

Hijacking of Pan Am Flight 73 in Karachi, killing two U S citizens Bombing of TWA Flight

840 en route from Rome to Athens, killing four

Americans

Destruction of Pan Am Flight 103 over Lockerbie, Scotland, by an onboard explosive device, killing 271 people in the aircraft and on

the ground

In 1987 a Catastrophic nonlerrorlst Secuntv lncldent occurred a recently dlsmlssed Paclflc Southwest Alrllnes (PSA)

employee boarded a PSA fl cjht and, en route shot the plot and

copilot The plane crashed as a result kllllng all 43 passengers

and crew aboard

SOURCE U S Congress Off Ice of Technology Assessment

Technology Aga/nst Terror/sin Structuring Secur/ty OTAISC-51 1 (Washington DC U S Government Prlntlng Off Ice,

January 1992) pp 24-25

talities were attributed to security incidents and

factors FAA includes in its Flight Safety R&D

program area (i.e., ground icing, encounters with

hazardous weather, and CFIT). The smallest share

of fatalities was related to structural failures.

As shown in table 3-6, the greatest share of

FAA’s safety-related Research, Engineering and

Development (RE&D) budget in fiscal year 1994

(33 percent) is directed at security. Nearly 21 percent of the 1994 RE&D budget is directed at aging

aircraft, although the risk of fatality is minimal

compared with that associated with human error,

which receives 25 percent. These figures indicate

that funding does not correlate with such measures of the safety problem.

43 f%] Ilp J Kki\\, “Hardened Contti]ners Umkr Dcvelopnwrt,” A\ Iut[(m k$;(’k & .YIMIIc T@c}mdoqy, No\, ?3, I ~~3, pp. !X)-g 1. A]~O see

h!iir~ m B. Schaffer, “C’onccrn\ About Terrorltt~ Wrlth Mmport~blc SAM S,” RAND P-7833, paper prepared for the Tr:inspor-t Aircraft Survitabi II ty Syrn~)i ium and Exh ibitlon Se~SIon on “NcJ\ ~ind or LImquc Thrctit C’hallcrl:cj, ” St. Lour\, hlo. oct. 12-21, 1993.
88 I Federal Research and Technology for Aviation

.

Percent of fatal Percent of Percent of

Accident factor accidents fatalities FAA RE&D Program total budgetb

Security

Human factorsc d

Structural

Aging aircraft

Other airframe failure or malfunction

Subtotal

Engine or fuel system

Propulsion and fuel system

reliability

Catastrophic engine failure

Subtotal.

11%

75

3

6

9

3

3

6

28%

60

<1

<1

1

3

12

Systems Security

Human Factors and

Aviation Medicine

Aging Aircraft

Crashworthiness/Structural

Airworthiness

Propulsion and Fuel

Systems

Catastrophic Failure

Prevention

33%

25

21

4

25

3

3

5

Flight safety hazards

Icing, snow 11 5 Flight Safety/Atmospheric 5

Other weather 8 14 Hazards and Weather

Controlled flight into terrain 6 13

Subtotal. 25 32 5

Fired,e - Aircraft Systems Fire Safety 5

In-flight fire 3 0

On-ground fire 47 12

Surface collisions 14 4 Airport Safety Technology 3

a percent of 36 fatal accidents and sabotage events for Part 121 aircraft from 1985 to 1992 (excludes 1990 COlllSIOn with pedestrian on runwaY)

Total fatalities were 1,146

b Totaj FAA safety/secur,ty R&D funds requested for fiscal year 1994 were $1 ~ 2 mllllon

c LOSS of control or use of Improper procedures—not mcludmg controlled flight Into !erraln

d Some accidents counted ~lce

e National Transpofiatlon Safety Board, press release, Jan 15, 1993, and U S Congress, General Accounting Ofllce, Avlatlon Safefy S/OW Pfo9-

ress m Making Arrcrafi Cab/n /nferlors fveproo~, GAO/RCED-93-37 (Washington, DC U S Government Prmtmg Off Ice, January 1993)

NOTE Percentages may not add due to rounding

SOURCE Office of Technology Assessment, 1994, based on Boeing and National Transportahon Safety Board data

However, safety and security R&D budget allocations cannot be decided based on U.S. fatality

or fatal accident rates alone. Major accidents involving non-U.S. carriers help to focus FAA’s

attention, as does security intelligence. In addition, economic and other factors contribute to the

potential escalation of some hazards.

In 1990, roughly 46 percent of the U.S. commercial air transport fleet was over 15 years old,

and 26 percent was over 20 years old.44 The number of aircraft with more than 20 years of service

life is expected to double by 2000; given this, it is

possible that the aging aircraft problem will become more significant. Similarly, although the

number of deaths related to terrorism and criminal

acts averages less than accidental fatalities, security threats could be expected to increase greatly

in the absence of a visible, active deterrence

effort (which includes R&D to derive methods

to minimize the risk). Of course, another problematic task is deciding the level of investment for

security program elements, for example, explosives detection, aircraft hardening, or passenger

profiling.

~ National Aeronautics and Space Administration, OffIce of Aeronautics, “Advanced Subsonic Technology Program: Program Summary,” February 1994, p. 8.
Chapter 3 Data and Analysis for Aviation R&D 189

Besides the possibility of risk escalation, other

factors to consider are:

● existing operational or technological options,

even if economically unfavorable:

 secondary effects of possible solutions on other

problems; and

■ timing of realized benefits, improvements, and

the longevity of solution.

Existing Options

Often, several options exist to address current

problems, even though some may be uneconomical. Fatal icing-related airline accidents in 1982,

1987, and again in March 1992 spurred the development of new ground deicing procedures, including wider use of a longer lasting anti-icing

fluid. However, rather than the lack of deicing

technologies, pressure to keep to schedules and

perhaps some pilot hubris were the primary factors in takeoff accidents; closer scrutiny of the aircraft’s control surfaces and application (or reapplication) of existing deicing fluids was needed.

Options for reducing the risk of structural fatigue-related accidents include improved maintenance oversight, less time-consuming and more

effective inspection technologies, and design

changes. Enhanced scientific understanding of

aging aircraft phenomena is a prerequisite. Other

examples of accident prevention options include

more thorough visual screening of passengers and

baggage, and holding aircraft on the ground in bad

weather. Each would exact huge costs.

Detecting and predicting hazardous weather

are benefiting from steady, if relatively little,

R&D attention and a recent confluence of improved communications and display technologies

and advanced sensor and analysis tools. As a result, enhanced situation awareness for pilots and

improved air traffic management capabilities are

feasible; OTA notes this is one area where additional dollars might accelerate benefits across sev -

eral missions (e.g.. the savings resulting from reduced delay, increased safety, and reduced flight

times, fuel use, and engine emissions) .45 The capacity implications and weather R&D and paucity

of long-term weather research are discussed further below.

On the other hand, steady attention to the role of

human factors in causing accidents has not reduced its prevalence. Its constancy suggests there

is no “silver bullet” solution to the multidimensional human factors problem in aviation. Another suggestion is that automation introduced to relieve workload has only shifted problems from

one phase of activity to another. Quantitative evaluation methods are needed; therefore, further

R&D on human performance issues in the aircraft,

the control tower, and on the ground will be required.

Much of FAA accident mitigation R&D focuses on improving fire safety. Developing titanium hulls, for example. is a feasible but inordinate y expens ive method of reduc ing the hazard of

burn-through during postcrash fires. Despite the

relatively few number of fatalities caused by fire

in recent years, if further improving fire safety is

desired, additional R&D will be required to devise

ways of speeding safe evacuation from aircraft

cabins or better detecting and suppressing fire development. For example, if ultra-fire-resistant

materials alone are expected to increase cabin survivability times, then more research into the

mechanisms of fire development is needed (see

chapter 4). Changing passenger demographics

suggest further fireproofing of the cabin and fuselage would be more beneficial than attempting to

increase average evacuation rate. The mean time

required for leaving one’s seat, moving down an

aisle, and exiting through emergency doors tends

to be greater for older passengers; the continued

aging of the flying public, along with increased

flights by persons with disabilities, make it unJS OTA also no[e\ [he po$\ibili[l of [e~hno]ogy Spinoff for avoiding clear air turbulence and [he $ecmin~ly imrw-table\~ d@ ~ one~-rel~(ed

.

problem of ~afely reducing \eparation\ between aircraft.
90 I Federal Research and Technology for Aviation

likely that overall evacuation times can be reduced

without radical (and costly) changes to cabin configurations. 46

Secondary Effects

Because considerable progress has already been

made toward achieving an extremely safe aviation

system, any technological or procedural “improvement” may also have unintended, negative

side-effects. Examples include the overall effect

on pilot workload from the introduction of automation in the cockpit and the wide variety of

complex avionics with which mechanics must familiarize themselves.

“Risk/risk” analyses of technology or regulatory decisions are increasingly valuable for illuminating the interactive effects of changes to the system. The results are sometimes controversial,

especially when they prevent a safety initiative.

For example, FAA concluded in the late 1980s

that using portable breathing equipment (PBE) in

transport aircraft emergencies could result in more

deaths, rather than fewer, and support for mandating passenger PBE onboard commercial aircraft

diminished.47

Timing of Costs and Realized Benefits

Another factor to be weighed in selecting areas of

applied R&D is the length of time required to realize benefits from development efforts (just as the

impact of attempting to accelerate implementation of new designs or components must be considered in imposing regulatory requirements). For

example, should new materials be developed to

augment an aircraft hull’s resistance to explosion

or fire, the costs of retrofitting entire fleets preclude their immediate introduction. While effective near-term enhancement to cabin safety is possible with speedier installation of new seat designs

and interior materials technology, the costs are

substantial and, when compared with the economic value of lives saved, the effort is not cost-effective. 48

Over the long term, though, there are many potential safety and security enhancements that

could be attained for new generations of aircraft

and the future air traffic management system.

These include enhanced situation awareness, improved selection and training methods for airline

and FAA personnel, aviation weather “nowcasts,” fire-proofed cabins, and airframes hardened against explosives of minimal strengths (all

described in the subsequent chapter on crosscutting research and innovative technologies).

 Capacity and Traffic Management

FAA’s delay data show that, while the number and

cumulative amount of delays have decreased in

previous years, congestion remains a problem at

many major airports. Using 20,000 hours of annual aircraft delay as the indicator of congestion,

FAA identified 23 airports as congested in 1991.49

FAA data indicated that approximately one-third

of delays resulted from peak demands that exceeded the capacity of ATC and runways.so Bad

weather was a factor in approximately two-thirds

46 see Office of Technology Assessment, op. cit., foo~ote 4, ch. 2; and J.G. Blethrow et al., Civil Aeromedical Institute, The .EnlergencV

Escape of }{un~/i({J/~pc}~iAir Trat’elers, FAA-AM-77- 11 (Washington, DC: Federal Aviation Administration, July 1977).

J7 FAA found that, Whl]e devices such as smokehoods would reduce passenger incapacitation from toxic fUmeS during a fire, donning the

hoods would lengthen the time it takes to evacuate the aircraft, the most critical factor in postcrash survivability. See E.A. Higgins, Summary

t h Repoi-1 History e uruiE\’ents Pe r

(Washington, DC: U.S. Department of Transportation, Federal Aviation Administration, June 1987); and Garnet A. McLean et al., The Efiict.r of

Wi’uring P(l.$\enger Prote( ti~e Breulhing Equipment on E\’ucuati(m i%ne Through T)pe 111 and Tipe IV Emergency Aircraft E.titsIn Clear Air

~Jnd Smoke, Final Report, DOT FA.4 AM-89/ 12 (Washington, DC: U.S. Department of Transportation, November 1989).

~ see C,encral A~~ounting Office, op. cit., foomote 36.

.W Frank Soloninku Office of system capacity and Requirements, Federal Aviation Administration, persOnal comn~unication, ‘ay 19,

I 993.

50 u s Departrllent of TransWflation, Federa] Aviation Administration, /99.7 A~,iut]On S},slem CuPu~i/},P/un, DOT/ FAA,/ASC-93- ] (Wash-

. .

ington, DC: 1993), p. I -15.
Chapter 3 Data and Analysis for Aviation R&D 191

of reported delays—largely because corresponding instrument flight rules, although in effect less

than 10 percent of the time, require greater separation between aircraft in controlled airspace. This

contrasts greatly with the situation in Europe,

where ATC and airports account for nearly twothirds of delay and bad weather for much less than

one-third. 5

1

Other measures of capacity (i.e., airspace efficiency and flexibility) include traffic volume and

rate and deviations from preferred routes, and the

resulting extra fuel and maintenance penalty. In

general, airlines desire routes optimized for distance and favorable winds in order to reduce crew

time and maintenance costs and to minimize fuel

consumption. The current ATC system rarely can

accommodate user-preferred routes. In addition,

there is a fuel bum penalty for flying extra distances around storms; more accurate weather data

could be used to optimize paths.

For air carriers, the impact of insufficient airport or en route capacity is measured in additional

operating costs, including extra fuel required by

inefficient routing, and passenger time due to delays. According to the Air Transport Association,

member airlines are losing $3.5 billion per year

because of ATC system limitations.52

Because of political and economic factors, it is

increasingly difficult to derive additional system

capacity from new airport construction or expansion. New technology is expected to provide a

small fraction of the capacity needed to meet projected demand in coming years (see figure 3-9);

other alternatives will be essential to making up

some of the shortfall.53 However, measurable,

near-term improvements are achievable.

Long spacings between alrcraft on approach and takeoff,

designed to mitigate the hazard posed by wingtip vortices,

exacerbate capacity constraints m the terminal area

Innovative technology will permit reduced longitudinal separation standards and spacing between aircraft approaching multiple runways, key

sources of additional capacity (see table 3-7).

Models of the National Airspace System. including new simulation capabilities, help FAA to evaluate the interaction of new air traffic management

procedures and their net effect on system performance. The performance of these systems depends greatly on aircraft and ATC capabilities,

whose basic components are described in chapter

4. Also, the ability to better monitor weather along

flight routes will help pilots trim miles, and reduce

fuel consumption, during detours around bad

weather. Based on NASA tests of cockpit weather

5 I Dav]d Henderson, Data Dlvjsion, Associ~tlon of EurO~~n Airlines, personal communication, Mar. 15. 1994. The ATC delay stems in

large part from the more prevalent use of instrument flight rules for governing European air traffic. Feam\ides, op. c]t., footnote 22.

52 Air Tr~spofl Association of America, “Air Traffic Management in the Future Air Navigation System,” white paper, June 16. 1994. p. 1.

53 A( ]east go ~rcent of future dem~d must be addressed by options that are difficult to execute, e.g., demand management and allema(ive

modes of transportation.
92 I Federal Research and Technology for Aviation

120 ‘

- ‘- ‘“” ‘- —

”

– ‘- —-- ‘— —

~ ~1

— ➤ 11 Remaining capacity gap

110 ~ Demand management –- Peak-hour shortfall ---

100 0 Diversion to alternate modes

90. m New runways

_ ATC technology

~ 80

c

o

“E 70-

8

? 60

30

20

10

0

2000 2010

SOURCE Apogee Research, 1992

display systems, the estimated savings in a typical

airline’s operating costs would be $5.9 million

annually .54

However, many weather-related delays result

from not being able to predict the start and end of

instrument meteorological conditions. To illustrate the problem, FAA uses the hypothetical example of morning fog at Chicago’s O’Hare International Airport that halves the potential

acceptance rate for arrival traffic. If the fog 1ifts an

hour earlier than forecast, the pipeline of traffic

will not be filled quickly enough to regain normal

acceptance rates until that hour expires, even if the

2020 2030

ground hold is removed immediately. The inadequate weather information thus results in a loss of

50 percent of capacity for an hour; furthermore,

the loss has a ripple effect throughout the national

system. 55 This points to the need for ceiling and

visibility forecasting methods.

 Environment

Relative to other transportation modes, aviation

pollutant emissions are small. However, the industry’s energy efficiency, measured in energy use

per passenger-mile, is higher than that of other

modes. For example, the respective energy inten5~ Charles H Scan] on, NASA Langley Rese~ch Cen[er, quoted in “’NASA Says Cockpit Weather Display Cuts Fuel Bum, Aids Safety, ’’Air

Line Pilof, December 1993, p. 45.

ss Us D~p~fiment of Tran\pofia[ion, Federal Aviation Administration, A\’/uri~m $~’.s~em Cu]mcit>’ Annual Repor/ (Washington, DC: @tOber 1993), p. 18.
Chapter 3 Data and Analysis for Aviation R&D 193

Capacity increase

Parameter (percent) Comments — .

Visual flight rules

ATC system Improvements 18 to 22a Depends on whether operations are arrivals-only

mixed (e. g., 50/50), or departures-only

Interarrival time variability 17 to 18 Arrivals-only operations—assumes 50 percent reduction in interarrival time variability. Negligible capacity

Increase for mixed operations

Interarrival separation

Departure separation

Runway occupancy time

7

3 to 18

0 to 9

Arrivals-only operations

Function of share of departures

Reductions m other parameters have Iittle or no effect

on mixed operations unless there are corresponding

reductions in runway occupancy time (mean and

variability),

Instrument flight rules

System variabilities 13 to 16 May be technologically difficult to achieve reductions

in interarrival time variability.

Longitudinal separations 4 to 6

Multlple-independent 31 to 100b Function of runway configurations

approaches

Separations for multlple- 25 Reduction in diagonal separation requirements

dependent approaches

Runway occupancy time — Insignificant limitation in Instrument flight rules

a Potent!al capacity Increases are nonaddltlve and assume approximately 50-percent reduction In varlab[lltles

b Instrument fllght rules base capacl~ IS 75 to 90 percent of wsual fllght rules base capacky fOr the same runwaY conf19~raflon However use of

converging and multlple parallel runways IS restricted under Instrument fllght rules, Imposing a significant capacity penalty at many airports

SOURCE The Mltre Corporation, 1987 and 1994 data

sities for Part 121 aircraft and automobiles in 1990

were 4,811 and 3,739 Btu per passenger-mile.56

While commercial aviation’s energy efficiency

has improved (see figure 3-10), the drive for energy efficiency continues because a significant portion of airline operating costs relate to fuel use,57

and increased fuel use resulting from more operations or longer flights generates more emissions of

combustion byproducts.58 For some general aviation aircraft, replacement—not reduced use—of

leaded aviation gasolines is being sought: small

aircraft are the largest single source of airborne

lead particles.

Reducing engine exhaust impacts, along with

aircraft noise, requires further attention because:

1) U.S. and international communities will permit

little or no backsliding even as the industry continues to grow; 2) there is a push for increased stringency; and 3) with existing technology, these improvements cannot be attained for the current

56 See Center for Transpo~a[ion Analysis, Energy Division, Transpor(arion Energy Data Book: Edit/on 13, ORNL-6743 (Otik Ridge, TN:

Oak Ridge National Laboratory, March 1993), table 2.13, p. 2-24.

57 According [. Boeing, for ~ typical aircraft, fuel expenses are roughly 50 percent of the cash direct operating cO$t$ (i.e., for fuel. fli~ht ~rC\$,

and maintenance), and 33 percent of all cash airplane-related operating costs. Calv in Watson, Boeing Commercial Airplane Group, pmontil

communication, Aug. 17, 1994. Actual fuel costs depend heavily on world market price.

5X In the Prior decade C,g, ak,iation’s share of the total U.S. demand for petroleum rose to 10.2 frOm 8.2 percent :Uld fuel ~on~uJllPtion ‘()~c

,,

41 percent to 414 million barrels. Frank A. Smith, Tran.$pm-rar/on in America, 10th Ed. (Waldorf, MD: Eno Transportation Foundat](~n. Inc.,

October 1992), pp. 56-57.
94 I Federal Research and Technology for Aviation

3.5

3

2.5

2

1.5

1

Energy use

0.5

0! I 1 I I I 1 1 I 1 1 1 I I I 1 1 1 1

1970 1972 1974 1976 1978 1980 1982 1984 1986 1988 1990

SOURCE Office of Technology Assessment, 1994, based on 1993 Energy Information Admmlstrahon data

fleet. In addition, the scientific understanding of industry of compliance with emissions, noise, or

potential problems with high-altitude subsonic stormwater runoff regulations can be more easily

aircraft emissions is limited. Before an extensive quantified. The Albany (New York) Airport, for

effort to design improved combustors and evalu- example, spent over $13 million for a recovery

ate their performance in terms of safety and cost- and treatment system to preclude runoff from coneffectiveness is undertaken, increased knowledge laminating the local drinking water supply.61 Airof the effects of engine emissions on the atmos- craft modifications necessary to meet Stage 3

phere is needed.59

Where only scanty or inexact measures of the

noise abatement requirements could mean spending $1.5 million to $3 million per aircraft for hush- environmental effects are available, the indirect kits or $10 million to $12 million per aircraft for economic costs of environmental degradation are

difficult to assess.

60 However, the direct cost to re-engining.62

59 Some of (he ground-level impact can be derived from information contained in EPA databases, but data from the upper tqmphere and

stratosphere are missing.

m For example, tie cost to society of increasing airport noise by 1 decibel is relative to the ambient noise level in a given neighborhood.

Furthermore, even when the amount of pollution or other impact can be quantified, there is little agreement on how to calculate the costs of such

impacts.

61 ‘*A1w~~ Tack]e Ricing concerns,” Aviarion Week & SPace Technology, Jan. 11, 1993, P. 43.

62 Stm}ey w. Kmde~, “Hushklts Gain Favor in poor Economy,” A\/u//on Week & space Technology, NOV. 23, ] 992, p. 83.
— —

Chapter 3 Data and Analysis for Aviation R&D 195

Other examples of imposed costs are the impact

of the mandated phase-out of leaded gasoline on

general aviation fuel price and availability63 and

the pollution-reduction expenses incurred in areas

of nonattainment with respect to air quality standards. Also, there are capacity constraints

associated with noise, air-, and water-quality impacts. The aviation industry is capital-intensive

with long development horizons. Because airports and aircraft have long lives, the timing and

feasibility of environmental requirements are increasingly important.

In general, the impetus for environmental R&D

typically comes less from concern over the impact

on the environment (after all, it is often small

compared with other sources) but from the potential effects environmental rulemaking has on air

transportation. The major exceptions to this involve high-altitude atmospheric impacts from

subsonic and supersonic civil aircraft.

The viability of a new generation of supersonic

transports—the proposed high-speed civil transport (HSCT)—hinges on environmental compatibility (i.e., reducing any stratospheric ozone

depletion caused by a large HSCT fleet to acceptable levels). This requires an extensive research

effort in order to quantify the potential impact and

evaluate possible control measures. NASA’s work

in this arena is described in chapter 4.

ISSUES IN SETTING PRIORITIES

There have been periodic attempts to revise FAA’s

R&D priorities and better define its capabilities.

In recent years, Congress and the aviation community have urged greater emphasis on R&D that

is directed at identifying or predicting problems

and focusing on long-term issues. The General

Accounting Office (GAO) has recommended that

FAA develop a mechanism to track long-term or

future-oriented research efforts; FAA is exploring

ways to modify the RE&D information system

and otherwise implement GAO’s recommendation. 64

Legislation enacted in 1988 and 199065 required FAA to expand its R&D focus specifically

to include human factors, aging aircraft, catastrophic failure prevention, simulation, and security. Corresponding changes in program funding

between 1988 and 1994 are shown in table 3-8.

For fiscal year 1993, Congress appropriated $230

million to FAA for R&D. Roughly 45 percent of

these funds went to projects related to system

capacity, approximately 16 percent each to safety

and security, and nearly 12 percent to human factors and aviation medicine.

Mandated area 1988a 1991 1994 b

Human factors and $ 6 2 $17 2 2 7 3

aviation medicine

Simulation modeling 0.8 9. 2

C

11,8

Aircraft structured 1 7 1 7 6 26.8

Fire safety 3 5 4,3 5 7

Total 12.2 48.2 7 1 5

a 

Obl Igahons

b Requested funding for fiscal year 1994

c Includes National Slmu Iation Lab Nat Ional Airspace System Performance Analysls Capablllty simulation model ancdevelopment and

airspace system models

d Includes aging aircraft research

SOURCE Office of Technology Assessment, 1994, based on

General Accounting Off Ice analysls of Federal Avlahon Admlmstrahon data

63 Sectlonj -220 and 226 of ~e C]ean Air Act Amendments of 1990, Public Law 10 I -549, Nov. 15, 1990, prohibit the manufacture or sale of

new lead-burning enginc$ after model year 1992 and the sale of leaded fuel for use in motor vehicles by 1996. Although general a~ iation aircraft

were exempted from the former provision, general aviation advocates fear that the amendments will make it economically infeasible for fuel

cornpimim to continue to manufacture general aviation fuel in the interim. “Tough Times for the Little People,” lrr[eru~lu Aerospace Re\ie\t,

March 1991, pp. 3 I -32.

6-I Allen 1-1, Asfocla[e Director, Tran~~~ation Issues, Resources, Community, and F~onomic De~e]Opmen[ Division, U.S. General Accounting Office, tc~timony at hearings before the Senate Committee on Appropriations, Subcommittee on Transportation and Related Agencies, May 20. ] 993, p. 7.

65 A\l:i~lon Safely, Re~carch Act of 19~g, ~bllc Law 100-59 I , Nov. 3, ] 9~8; catastrophic Failure prevention Act Of I 990, Public bW

I () 1 -50K. No\. 5, 1990; and A\ iation Security Improvement Act of 1990. Public Law 10 I -604, Nov. 18, 1990.
96 I Federal Research and Technology for Aviation

The 1988 Aviation Safety Research Act also

mandated establishment of an advisory committee to assist FAA in evaluating its research effort.

Comprised of experts drawn from all aspects of air

transportation, the FAA Research, Engineering

and Development Advisory Committee meets

quarterly to discuss the status of individual R&D

programs and their progress relative to agency objectives. Similarly, the 1990 Aviation Security

Improvement Act directed the formation of the

Aviation Security Research and Development

Scientific Advisory Panel, constituted under the

auspices of the committee.

In 1991, at the request of the FAA Administrator, the FAA RE&D Advisory Committee established a panel (often called the Augustine Panel)66

to review FAA’s plan for R&D. The panel found

that “. . . no factor poses more severe potential

limits of future air transportation than . . . system

capacity.”67 The panel also stated that the application of new technology will be a large part of the

solution to the air traffic saturation problem and

recommended that FAA be provided with additional financial and human resources to accomplish its objectives. Other recommendations included strengthening FAA’s systems engineering

methodology, expediting funding and use of the

national simulation capability, and giving increased attention to the application of space-based

communications, navigation, and traffic surveillance system elements. The review panel also suggested that FAA adopt a matrix-based approach

for comparing and quantifying the estimated contributions of individual research projects to FAA

goals. 68

However, a 1992 GAO assessment of the FAA

RE&D plan found that the RE&D program alone

could not achieve all the goals set out in the plan .69

GAO indicated that FAA could strengthen its plan

by delineating staffing and resource requirements,

and by incorporating the RE&D goals into the rest

of the organization.

The Augustine Panel updated its recommendations in 1993, documenting the need for a concentrated effort in the FAA RE&D program to establish more specific goals to help the agency manage

congestion problems (among other issues), and to

present a coordinated program for consideration

by the agency as a whole.70

In its 1992 assessment, GAO also recommended that FAA take this type of systems approach to its multifaceted mandate, citing a special relationship between developing specific

ATC and security technologies and understanding

how various technologies interact.71 For example,

an aircraft’s ability to withstand a blast must be

considered when developing requirements for explosives detection system designs. Understanding

aircraft hardening limitations thus influences the

operation of security screening systems.

I Cost-Benefit Analysis

To improve its methods of setting R&D priorities,

FAA is also using cost-benefit analysis (CBA),

66 Named for its Chairman, Norman Augustine.

67 FAA ReWarch, Engineering ~d Dev~l~pmen[ Advisory Commi[[ee, R&D p]an Review panel, f?ek,Icw’ of (he FAA Research, Engineering

and Development Program (Washington, DC: November 199 I), p. 1.

68 ibid., pp. 1, 31-32, 36-38.

69 U.S. congress, General Accounting of fIce, Ai,iarlOn Research: FM I“ou/d Enhance ];.T Program To Meet current and Future Challenges, GAO/RCED-92-180 (Washington, DC: U.S. Government Printing Office, June 1992), p. 2.

To Feamsides, op. Ci[., foomote 22. See FAA Research, Engineering and Development Advisory Committee, R&D PlaII Review panel, U.S.

Leadership in Air Traflc Ser~’ices: An Update of the Earlier Re\’ien’ of the FM Research, Engineering and De~elopment Program (Washington,

DC: January 1993).

71 Genera] Accounting office, op. cit., footnote 69, p. IO.
Chapter 3 Data and Analysis for Aviation R&D 197

which FAA successfully employed for the Capital

Investment Plan (CIP) budgeting process.72 (See

box 3-2.) Paralleling the CIP effort, CBA for individual RE&D projects is used to support mission

needs statements as part of a multiphase decision

process similar to A- 109.73 The projected benefits

are based on the operational savings associated

with the implementation of the systems and

technologies that might be derived from the

RE&D program.

According to a Volpe National Transportation

Systems Center (VNTSC) assessment of ATC and

capacity projects, the benefits to be realized from

the RE&D program are: for FAA, increased controller and maintenance staff productivity and cost

savings in operations; and for air carriers, reduced

The Federal Aviation Administration’s use of cost-benefit analysis (CBA) goes back at least to the

1970s Early examples include facility establishment criteria for control towers, airport surveillance radar, and Instrument Ianding systems The acquisition of major new systems, such as the upgraded

third-generahon ATC system, was evaluated with CBA. 1 When FAA formulated the Capital Investment

Plan (CIP) In 1981, CBA continued as an Integral part of the process More recently, it has been applied

to elements of FAA's Research, Engineering and Development program

The Off Ice of Aviation Policy, Plans, and Management Analysis sets agency standards for CBA, performs regulatory analyses, and conducts CBA for terminal area facilities such as ATC towers and airport surveillance radar The Operations Research Service (AOR) performs analyses for facilities and

equipment Investment projects contained in the CIP and for technological program-level decisions 2

The Office of Management and Budget (OMB) requires major system acquisitions to have a CBA

justificatlon Specifically, this analysis supports the mission needs statement, which iS the first phase of

the OMB A-109 “Major System Acquisition Process. ” AOR’s work has several other applications in addition to supporting mission needs statements One application has been to develop the CIP baseline, a

summation of the estimated benefits for all projects in the CIP AOR’s analyses have also improved FAA

program offices’ understanding of CIP benefits Under contract to FAA, Martin Marietta Information Systems Group performs much of the analysis and data collection required for this effort Martin Marietta

also maintains the database of results for each of the CIP projects

(continued)

1 Carlton W[ne, Manager Information Systems, F/V4 Off Ice of Avlatlon Policy Plans and Management Analysls, personal communlca[!on June 17 1994

2 Ib[d

I

72 FAA’S Offjce of Oyratlons Rc~carch ~taff informed OTA, during personal communications, that the results of the analyses performed for

the CIP have been used by FAA project offices, the FAA budget office, and by the Office of Management and Budget.

73 FAA’S office of o~ratloni ReSC~Ch ~lanages thi~ program with primarj analytical support from DOT’S VOIPC National Transportation

Systems Center (VNTSC). Although VNTSC is reyxmsible for an overall evaluation of the RE&D program. (he FAA Technical Center maxages the work for the aircraft safety, airport technology’, and system ~ecurity program~. For e~arnple, one recent effort at the Technical Center

compared the potential benefits from different arcai of aircraft safety research (flight wlfet~’, ag ing aircraft. structural safet>, and aircraft sy stems

fire safety ).
98 I Federal Research and Technology for Aviation

Analytical Methodology

For the CIP, the two major categories of benefits are the cost savings for FAA and for aviation system

users. FAA benefits Include personnel cost reduction resulting from increased air traffic controller productivity and reduced maintenance needs. AOR’s analysis indicates that FAA wiII realize additional operational savings in nonlabor areas such as leased communications costs, rents, and utilities. User

benefits consist of systemwide delay reductions, availability of more efficient routings, and the reduced

risk of accidents. The first two of these benefits are quantified by counting the savings derived from

decreased aircraft direct operating costs and passenger travel time. In determining costs, only future

expenditures are included. Sunk costs (those amounts that have already been spent) are excluded from

the analysis.

Reduction in Delays

The amount of time by which delays wiII be reduced is estimated by combining forecasts of the

growth in air travel with forecasts of the length of delay per aircraft operation. However, FAA’s long-term

traffic forecast does not allow for the effect of airport congestion on traffic demand. Basing projections

of flight delays on the difference between the unconstrained air traffic forecast and actual airport capacity, then, results in an overstatement of predicted delays. Air carrier operating practices would probably change if the cost of delays becomes prohibitive. For example, the use of larger aircraft might

alleviate the peak-hour delays at the busiest airports. 3 In addition, community opposition to aircraft

noise may reduce some of the forecast growth in aircraft operations. In fact, while FAA’s airport delay

forecasts have shown increasing congestion until recently, FAA’s current data have shown reductions in

delays (see figure). The estimate of the length of reduced delays forms the basis for 60 percent of total

CIP benefits. Thus a significant portion of the CIP benefits projected by FAA are open to question.

60

(n

a)3

r

a

3 40

~

aU) 3

2

$Q_ 20

rfl

(%’ T)

n

o

198801989 1990 1991 1992

Delays of 15 minutes or more at

55 major airports in the United States.

Passenger Time Savings

The value of passenger time savings represents the gain to travelers resulting from

decreased time in the air and more reliable

airline schedules. AOR’s analysis uses a value recommended by FAA’s Off Ice of Aviation

Policy, Plans, and Management Analysis,4

However, because of the range of reported

results, an estimate of the value of travel

time for air travel cannot be considered an

exact value.5 Thus, the CIP benefits attributed to passenger time savings, which represent more than one-half of total benefits,

should be recognized as Imprecise.

(continued)

3 U S Congress, Off Ice of Technology Assessment, New Ways. Tiltrotor Aircraft and Magnetically Levitated Veh{cles, OTASET-507 (Washington DC. U S Government Prmtmg Off Ice, October 1991), p. 45

4 The amount used E $4050 per hour Based on a rewew of theoretical and empmcal studies This value represents a weighted

average for both business and nonbusiness travel and for the ddferent types of alr travel (e g , domestic alr carrier, International a:r

earner, commuter) In general, the value of travel time saved for business trips IS the typical traveler’s hourly earnings rate, for

nonbusiness travel, II IS 1 5 times the wage rate

5 U S Department of Transportation, Federal AvtatlonAdmmMatlon, Econorrvc Va/ues for Eva/uatlon of Federa/AviatlonAdrnmfstratjon /rwestment and Regulatory Programs (Washington, DC October 1989), pp 1-12
Chapter 3 Data and Analysis for Aviation R&D 199

Timing of Benefits

Benefits realized before the current

date are categorized as “actual, ” “Accruing” benefits occur over the CIP planning

horizon—to be realized as a result of projects that have been Implemented before

the current date—and are considered future benefits. Only future benefits figure

into a project’s cost-benefit ratio.

Several changes have been made in

the methodology used to calculate the

CIP benefits since analyses were first

done for the National Airspace System

Plan in 1981 Prior to 1986, benefits to

aviation system users were not part of the

analysis, The planning horizon for counting benefits was expanded from the year

2000 to include a project’s entire life

cycle, a timeframe from 1991 to 2025,

FAA's economic analysis of the 1991

CIP yielded a present value of $55.1 bilIion in future benefits,6 $16,2 billion in future costs, and a benefit to cost ratio of

347 (See table 1 for relative shares of

the benefits by category for both FAA

and aviation system users. ) However, if

delays are not as bad as predicted and

benefits to passengers are only 20 percent of the total benefits, for example, this

cost-benefit ratio could be less than 1.

An alternate method of describing the

benefits realized by users is to break

them down by how they are calculated:

57 percent of total CIP benefits are passenger time savings and 24 percent are

due to aircraft direct operating cost savings The SIX CIP projects that make the

largest contribution to total benefits are

Iisted in table 2.

6 The values In this secflon are m 1991 dollars

TABLE 1: FAA Estimates of Future

Capital Investment Plan Benefits

Percent of

Category future benefitsa

FAA

Air traffic controller productivity gains

Maintenance personnel savings

Nonlabor-related operational savings

Total for FAA

Users

Reduced delays

Increased availability of more efficient

routes

Avionics cost savings

Reduced risk of accidents

Total for users

Total

5 3%

2 7

4 4

12.4

6 0 7

20.7

2 6

3.6

87.6

100.0

a In 1991 dollars, the estimated value of ur?d/scour?fed future beneflls

between 1992 and 2025 IS $2579 bllllon Total projected discounted

benefits of FAAs 1991 Capital Investment Plan are $551 bllllon

SOURCE Office of Technology Assessment, based on 1992

Federal Avlahon Admmistrahon data

TABLE 2: 1991 Capital Investment Plan Projects With

Largest Estimated Future Benefits

Percentage of total

CIP benefitsa

Project name User FAA

Advanced Automation Programb32,2% 3.7%o

Global Positioning System Monitors 18,8 0.5

Microwave Landing System 10.4 0.2

Central Weather Processor 7,1 0 0

Terminal ATC Automation 5.6 0.0

Traffic Management System 2,2 1.9

Total for top six projects 76.3 6.4

a In 1991 dollars, the estimated value of urxlscour?fecf future benefits

between 1992 and 2025 E $2133 for the top SIX projects and

$2579 bllhon total The total prolected discounted beneflfs of FAAs

1991 Capital Investment Plan are $551 bllllon Totals may not add

due to rounding

b Includes 10 separate projects For a descrptlon of these Prolects

see U S Department of Transportation, Federal AvlatlonAdmlnistratlon, Capita/ /nvestrnertt Han (Washington, DC December 1990)

SOURCE Off Ice of Technoloav Assessment based on 1992

Federal Aviation Admmlstratlo~’ data

7 Federal Avlatlon Admlnlstratlon, “An Economic Analysls of the 1991 Capital Investment Plan “ unpublished document,

1992

May
100 I Federal Research and Technology for Aviation

delay and increased safety.74 In 1991 dollars, the

estimated benefits for a subset of the RE&D program are $31.3 billion.75 Table 3-9 presents the

relative shares of these benefits broken down by

category and by how the benefit was quantified.

Benefit grouping Percent of benefits

By benefit category

Improved system capacity and 91 .4%

reduced delays

Cost savings, Improved efficiency of 8.6

operations, and Improved safety

and security

Total 100.0

By how benefit was quantified

Passenger time savings 4 7 0

Reduced aircraft operating costs 43.8

Increased controller productivity

and other savings 9.3

Total- 100.0

NOTE Projected benefits are the operational benefits for the systems

and technologies that might be derived from the RE&D program, and

are associated with the Implementation of a subset of the projects included [n the 1991 RE&D pIan Benefits are calculated for the period

1992 through 2105 Total prolected discounted benefits (In 1991 dollars) for thrs subset of RE&D plan projects are $31 3 bllhon

SOURCE Volpe National Transportation Systems Center, 1992

Limitations to Cost-Benefit Analysis for R&D

FAA faces some obstacles in adapting CBA for

analyzing its R&D priorities. For example, it is

not entirely appropriate to attribute the benefits

from a future operating system in the field to a particular RE&D program. Because the benefits of

the program are realized far in the future (perhaps

15 to 30 years), it is difficult to predict whether the

RE&D program will result in new systems that

can be implemented as part of the National Airspace System. The nature of R&D is such that

only a fraction of the research undertaken results

in the development of beneficial technologies.

Those new technologies will only yield benefits if

they can be successfully integrated and operated

within the NAS. Recently, FAA has taken steps to

define clearly the linkage between RE&D initiatives and broader agency objectives .76 Also, with

assistance from the federal Center for Advanced

Aviation System Development, FAA’s Research

and Development Service is attempting to develop ways to measure achievement of its R&D

goals.77

Another limitation of R&D cost-benefit analysis is that data are often not sufficiently robust to

allow reliable calculations of potential benefits.

Projected benefits occur in the distant future and

depend on a multiple-step process: successful research resulting in new technologies; fielding of

new technologies; and, finally, benefits being

realized from operation of the new system. In the

case of capacity-related projects, delay forecasts

are problematic—lending uncertainty to the baseline costs and projected net benefits to be derived

from airspace capacity and efficiency enhancements. Better delay data and improved models of

airspace and air traffic could reduce some of the

uncertainty (see Delay and Air Traffic Analysis

section below).

A third difficulty is reliably calculating the

costs of conducting RE&D projects and implementing the resulting technologies. In particular,

given the uncertainty of projecting 15 to 30 years

into the future the costs of implementing and operating systems that do not currently exist, estimates

of these costs would be subject to error.78

TJ VOIP N~tiOn~l TranSpofi~tiOn systems center, “Benefits Evaluation of the FAA’s Research, Engineering & DevelOpment %ogram,”

project nwmorandum, Jan. 14, 1992.

75 Ibid.

T~ See Federa] Aviation Administration, op. cit., footnote 42, pp. 1 -7—1 -13.

77 Tony Dundzila and Sanl Bowden, The Mice COr-p., Center for Advanced Aviation System Development, “Baseline Measures for Goals in .

the R,EtlD Plan,” draft working paper, November 1993.

7R VNTSC, in its 1992 assessment, did not include the costs of individual programs needed tO yield benefitS.
Chapter 3 Data and Analysis for Aviation R&D 1101

According to FAA, the purpose of CBA is to allow the comparison of net benefits from disparate

79 OTA finds, however, that CBA sorts of projects.

has not matured (o the point that it is effective for

comparing R&D projects in different missions.

When probable risk cannot be determined, as in

security, the difficulties in estimating benefits and

costs of R&D programs are compounded. This

undermines direct comparison of investment

benefits, e.g., between security and capacity or

safety projects. Furthermore, within a program

area, while a dollar value can be assigned to minimizing safety hazards or economic penalt ies (e.g.,

those asso-ciated with glycol disposal or recycling costs), not all benefits of improvements

sought through R&D can be quantified. Examples

include the value of “peace and quiet” and fewer

emissions.

It is also doubtful that CBA can be effective in

gauging the value of risk assessment efforts or

more basic research, for example, long-term

weather research. Improved understanding of

weather phenomena through mesoscale meteorology research is integral to: defining usable airspace through understanding the behavior of thunderstorms and related hazardous weather

phenomena: identifying regions of clear air turbulence and icing; predicting short-term changes in

ceiling and visibility at airports; and understanding the meteorological elements that sustain wake

vortex turbulence.

80 Yet FAA's RE&D budget

contains no funding for this type of research,81 and

its weather R&D effort is focused primarily on

new tools for processing and displaying increasing amounts of weather information generated by

a modernized weather service.82

Neither the magnitude of a problem nor potential savings can be the sole determinant of the level

of support required to devise solutions for any of

the mission areas. In some cases, the technology

base (including personnel and facilities) already

exists upon which new or enhanced options can be

constructed (e.g., cockpit weather displays). Other questions or difficulties (e.g., atmospheric science for environmental protection or weather

forecasting) require more extensive effort before

sufficient data can be gathered and assessed and

options presented. Assessing the myriad human

performance issues requires that measurement

methods be developed and validated.

A broad portfolio of aviation R&D is therefore

necessary, with research and technology needs

derived from user input, analysis of performance

trends, expert review, and breakthroughs in related areas of study. Many R&D investment planning decisions must still transcend the CBA methodology described above. For example, a more

appropriate quantitative method for setting capacity-related research priorities may be a “needs”

analysis that allows decisionmakers to focus on

the operational systems required for the NAS in

the future rather than the potential operational

benefits that will result from the successful development of projects currently in the RE&D plan.

PREDICTING FUTURE PROBLEMS

The phrase “tombstone technology” is used. often

disparagingly, to describe safety measures developed after an accident or series of accidents has

occurred. But pursuing a focused development

program before an accident occurs is risky and

may divert precious funds from areas where prob79 c:irllc~n ~, W’lne ~f:in:igcr In f{)rlll:ltlt)nSi s(cmf, FAA Office of A~ ia[ion Pol icj, plans, and ~anagenlent Analy ~i~, per\(Jn~l coT1lfllurlica-

,. ,

tion, June 17, 1994.

~~1 Arthur A, shr~lt~, }k~iocia[~ Direc[or. Research App] ication~ Program, National Center for’ Atmospheric Rwmrch, perW1lal c(~nlnlunication, Apr. 6, 1994.

X I Of FAA’J $z5(J rl~l] I ion fiicd] ~eilr I ~~-1 rcqueit for RE&[> funding, $1.9 million i$ included for w cather R&D: all of this is dt~ ~~[ed to [be

integrated airborne w ind~heiir research progriim, a primarily technolog~ -oriented effort.

xl see ~i~cu~fion of FA}\’~ A~i:Ition W’etit}ler Development program in ch ~
102 I Federal Research and Technology for Aviation

lems may crop up sooner. For example, even if

FAA or other agencies had supported more extensive materials science R&D in the late 1970s or

early 1980s, it is not known whether the aging aircraft problem could have been averted before the

Aloha accident occurred, nor is it clear that the expenditures in time and money (and opportunity

costs) would have been fitting in light of the few

fatalities to date.

In addition to aging aircraft and terrorist

threats, other risks arise from an evolving industry, including highly complex software, the susceptibility of new avionics and digital systems to

electromagnetic fields, increased use of composite materials, changes in aviation fuels and engine

designs, and replacement of halons in fire extinguishing systems. 83 Other new issues relate to

demographics, aviation’s role in global climate

change, and operation of the proposed very large

commercial transports.

Based on FAA estimates that approximately 80

percent of its safety R&D has near-term applications, OTA calculates that less than 5 percent of

the safety effort is longer term, generic knowledge

gathering. 84 However, one future catastrophic accident that arises from anew mode of failure could

cause as much damage and loss of life as many of

the problems known to date. Predicting potential

catastrophic problems requires a combination of improved data collection and analysis and generic research in order to confidently identify performance trends and derive a basic understanding of

the elements (e.g., materials behavior and cognitive

skills) that could contribute to such an accident.

Rather than focusing nearly all resources on

specific problems, greater emphasis on operations

research or analysis and risk assessment may be

appropriate. The object of this activity is to examine elements of the aviation system for sensitivity to changes in technology or procedures, for

example, the impact of deregulation and resultant

shift to hub-and-spoke operations on capacity and

safety.

Furthermore, this capability could be useful in

better defining, prior to establishing requirements, the objectives of any technology development program. Key parts of this approach are integrated databases and assessment tools to support

timely analysis of the state of the airspace system,

and validated, appropriately scaled models for estimating traffic, environmental impact, and

weather.

Additional cooperation with other federal

agencies to leverage R&D dollars could be helpful. For example, the Department of Defense

(DOD) national laboratories have an extensive

background in aviation R&D and much of their

work applies to FAA missions.85 In 1993, in response to congressional direction, FAA performed a survey of external laboratory capabilities

and identified 128 facilities whose work could

benefit FAA; working agreements had already

been established with 36 of these, but FAA found

the capabilities of some of the remaining labs were

too narrow in scope or had less than substantial

relevance.86 FAA plans to conduct further assessments of the advantages of fuller participation

with certain DOD laboratories.

83 U.S. Depaflment of Transpoflati~n, Federal Aviation Adminis[ra[ion, ]993 Federa/ A\iuf/on Adminisrrafion plan for Research, Engineering and De}elopmenr, Report of the Federal Aviation Administration to the U.S. Congress pursuant to Section 4 of the Aviation Safety

Research Act, Public Law 100-591 (Washington, DC: February 1994), p. 6-1.

w me remainder is dire~tcd at long-term technology developmentPrograms.

85 Ge]lman Research Associates, “cooperation and Coordination in Federal Aviation Research,” OTA contractor report, Dec. 30, 1992, p.

39.

86 us~pafiment of Transpofiation, Fe&-a] Aviation Adminis~ation, ~url,ey Of Research, Engineering, und Det’elopmenr Research Facilities, Report of the Federal Aviation Administration pursuant to House Report 102-639 on the DOT Appropriations Act for FY 1993, Public

Law 102-388 (Washington, DC: July 1993), p. 4.
Chapter 3 Data and Analysis for Aviation R&D 1103

Congress, in the 1990 Catastrophic Failure Prevention Act, also enabled FAA to provide grants

to universities for exploring long-term R&D

questions. In May 1992, the first recipient was selected; by July 1993, 58 grants totaling in excess

of $32 million had been awarded.87 Research

areas include ATC automation. artificial intelligence, human factors. simulation, airport planning and design, aviation security, and aviation

safety.88

FEDERAL AVIATION DATA AND

ASSESSMENT RESOURCES

There are a variety of federal resources and efforts

to gather information for determining the state of

the aviation system (e.g., number of delays, operations, passengers), assessing or predicting potential problems (e.g., accident risk or security threat,

environmental impact, capacity shortfall), and

identifying technology and operational improvements to the system. In addition, performance data

and analyses arc useful for developing R&D program goals and gauging the progress of those

problem-solving efforts. While the current datagathering effort sheds light on the issues confronting the industry, some key information is lacking.

This section describes the primary resources

for each of the key mission areas and identifies

further data and assessment tools needed to improve both the understanding of operational issues

and R&D decisionmaking.

I Capacity-Related Data and Analysis

Information needs for airspace capacity assessment and air traffic management include:

■

w

■

sources and characteristic lengths of delays, in

order to support operational decisions and forecasts of activity and delay:

improved short-term predictions of weather,

which are essential to more efficient use of airspace as well as flight safety; and

performance characteristics and longevity of

critical infrastructure, for example, runways

and other airport surfaces.

Delay and Air Traffic Data

The two primary delay reporting systems in use

today are maintained by DOT and by FAA’s Office

of Air Traffic System Management.

DOT’s Airline Service Quality Performance

(ASQP) system stores data submitted by major

airlines with service at the nation's top 100 airports. Actual departure time, flight duration, and

arrival time are recorded and compared with the

equivalent data published in the Official Airline

Guide and listed in the computerized reservation

system. Under the NAS Analysis Program, FAA

collects data from 55 major airports and all 20 air

route traffic control centers within the continental

United States to track the number and length of delays (of 15 minutes or more) at airports or within

ATC sectors. Each night, controllers relay delay

information noted on flight strips89 via the Operational Performance System Network (OPSNET)

computer to FAA headquarters, where the data are

compiled for the next day’s status briefings. OPSNET also supports the compilation of statistics

for a biennial report to Congress on NAS performance.

90

OPSNET and related databases have some

drawbacks. Chief among them are that the quality

and completeness of controller reports vary with

‘)” Pat Beam, Manager, NAS An:ily$i$ Program, Federal A~iation Adminii[ration. Perw)nal c(>rllr~~llnic:i[i(~ll. Aug. 6. 1993.
104 I Federal Research and Technology for Aviation

workload; and only delays of a minimum magni- Models and Analytical Tools

tude are reported, distorting the estimate of aver- Today, capacity analysis uses a full spectrum of

age and overall delay.91 Unlike ASQP, OPSNET models in three key areas—policy analysis, dedoes not reflect airline-related delays, because tailed design, and operations support—to assess

the system records delay from the point an aircraft activities on different scales in order to determine

enters the takeoff queue. ASQP, OPSNET, and where the bottlenecks are and under what condiother sources of airline delay data are outlined in (ions. The object is to revise operations and procebox 3-3. dures as needed and to predict air traffic manageACARS

ARTS

ASQP

ATA

CATER

CODAS

ETMS

OPSNET

Aeronautica/Radio, Inc. (ARINC) Communications and Reporting System provides data (i.e., when

the cabin IS pressurized and the aircraft leaves the gate, wheels fold into wells, wheels lowered, and

aircraft stopped at arrival gate and cabin depressurized) to track flights for the approximately

3,500 ACARS-equipped aircraft

Automated Radar Terminal System provides runway use data, instrument flight rules (IFR) and

visual flight rules airport operations data, and airline, flight number, and aircraft Information,

Airline Service Quality Performance provides comparison of actual versus scheduled flight times

for airlines with 1 percent or more of enplanements

Air Transport Association provides a monthly report to the Federal Aviation Administration on

delays by phase of flight, derived from ACARS messages,

Collection & Analysis of Termlnal Records (managed by Aviation Data Systems) gives flight strip

and airport configuration data, along with winds/celllng data for the few airports served by CATER,

Does not provide flight plan data

Consolidated Operations and Delay Analysis System uses ETMS (see below) data (indicatlng when

centers takeup and give away flights to approximate takeoff and touchdown times) to supplement

ASQP Information, the goal iS monthly reporting of statistical delay data, Does not reflect causes

of delay.

Enhanced Traffic Management System utilizes host computers for providing flight plan versus

actual flight data, but does not reflect ground Information. Includes only IFR flights.

Operational Performance System Network includes delays of 15 minutes or more in departure and

arrival queues and en route. Includes general aviation, air taxi, and military flights, but cause of

delay identified only when workload permits, (OPSNET iS a subsystem of FAA's Air Traffic Operations Management System—ATOMS)

SOURCE Federal Aviation Admlmstration, Off Ice of AwahonPohcy, Plans, and Management Analysls, 1993

~1 These problems g. b~~k to the early 1980s. haddition, all databases measure delay against the Oficial Air/ine Guide times, Which may

have resulted in overestimates and underestimates of delay at different airports due to differences in typical taxing and queuing times and the

inflation of schedules to improve on-time performance. See U.S. Congress, Office of Technology Assessment, Airpor~ Sys(em De\e/oprrten/,

OTA-STI-23 1 (Washington, DC: U.S. Government Printing Office, 1984), p. 50.
Chapter 3 Data and Analysis for Aviation R&D 1105

ment and infrastructure environments of the

future.

9 2

Operational models

FAA’s Air Traffic Control

Center, responsible for daily

Systems Command

traffic control planning, uses both real-time. interactive analyses and

offline analyses after the fact (see table 3-10). To

enable controllers in centers to similarly respond

to changing traffic conditions, computer-based

decision aids with electronic databases are being

developed.

Design models

Anal yses of ATC system configurate ion and the environmental impact of changes to the system rely

on detailed models of air traffic, which also support airspace and airport design. SIMMOD93 is

the best known of these and is used to simulate

how airplanes interact in different regions, including detailed airport operations.94 The Sector Design analysis tool, in trial use at three sites, is intended to allow ATC to redesign sectors to increase

capacity and balance workload. FAA also is using

the Graphical Airspace Design Environment

(GRADE) computer graphics tool. Incorporating

radar data, airspace geometries, and geographical

information, GRADE analyzes and displays the

effects of airspace modifications and changes in

flight procedures. 95 FAA is seeking to adapt this

visualization tool, with the support of its vendor,

to permit concurrent analysis of noise impacts.96

Model

NASSIM

FLOWSIM

SMARTFLO

OPTIFLOW

Planned arrival and departure system (PADS)

High-alt\tude route system (HARS)

Daily decision analysis system

(DDAS)

SOURCE Off Ice of Technology Assessment,

Purpose Description

Strategy evaluation ‘Detailed National Airspace System-wide traffic

prediction and simulation

Strategy evaluation Daily flow simulation for fast-time national major

airport traffic.

Strategy generation Planning for quick-response flow advisories using expert systems,

Strategy generation Optimized flow planning for dynamic national

traffic flow simulation.

Strategy generation Real-time development of optimal arrival and

departure scheduling plans

Strategy generation Enables optimized, fuel-efficient jet routes

Information and Automation tools to allow quick analysis of airanalysis support Iine schedule change Impacts.

1994, based on the 1993 FAA Research, Engineering and Development Plan.

‘)? Poilc} anti]) ws modcl~ tire characterized by their approximate, macroscopic nature; detailed design or planning models are highly accurate and uw ilmulations extensit cl}; operation~ support models lend to be very fast, accurate, and microscopic, but those used for offline, post

anal} ws need not be real -t]mc. See Amadco O&m i, hlassachuwtts Institute of Technology, Trunsporfurion Modeling Needs. A/rporfs und Airfp[~( c ( C;imbndgc. hl~l. LI. S, Dcp:irtmcnt of Transportation, Volpc !Vatlorml Transportation S} stems Center, July 1991 ). p. 8; and Saul I. Gass,

IJnli cr~lt~ of Nliiryl:ind, “I~Y alu:ition of Alr Tr:if!lc Modellng Toolj: ir~illdation and Review of Results and Documentation,” paper prepared for

the I:edcr:il ,A} l,itlon ~ici[~lirli~[r:iti(>rl, Oct. 16, 1992, p. 91,

‘

) 

~ A tr:idemiirh n:imc (or an :iirpor-t and :iir~p:ice ~imulation model.

‘)J SIhl NIOD l\ a stochaitlc model; multiple iimula[ion runs mu~t be performed to lend results any stati~tical significance. The model now

c:in be dlrcctcd to perform iterations until a specified contlkncc lmel i~ whie~ cd.

‘)f I;cderal Aviation ~!drtlirll~trtitiorl, op. cit., footnote 50, p. 5-19.

‘)(’ (;R,ID[l li a prii atcly owned, proprietary tool. As of August 1994, contract negoti~ition~ [ire under way to merge the tool with FAA’s

lntc~ra[ccl NoI\c Model (we ~cct]on on cn\ ironmcntalii\\c\\mcnt ); the combined function i\ expected by the end of fiscal year 1995. FAA also

hope~ [() flirther Integrate wkcr;il of ]t~ c;ip:icit~ modcl~ into the rc~ ]wd tool. which could m-ve tis the parent program for rapid analysis and

Y isli:il i~iit]on 01 lntcrrcliitcd chtingcs In traftic, no iw ] mp:ict, :ind :i iripace design. “’In thii case, a picture’s worth a billion w orals.” Richard Nell,

hl;in;igcr. ,,ilr~p;icc Dc~ign 1~1 \I\IOIl, FAA office of System C:ip;ici[} ;ind Rcquiremcnt~, personal communication, Aug. 4, 1994.
106 I Federal Research and Technology for Aviation

FAA’s National Airspace System Performance

Analysis Capability (NASPAC), which is

"

. . . essentially the first effort to develop a system-wide model of airport and ATC activities,”97

has had several applications.98 A second network

model used to evaluate the national system is

AIRNET. Intended for policy analysis, AIRNET

has the advantage of being much faster, but does

not have the same level of detail and does not reflect changes in airspace configuration.99

Model limitations and data requirements

A basic requirement for all models is that they cor100 For example, the results of ana- rectly interact.

lyzing a problem situation using a network model

must be consistent with results from a regional or

airport model. However, the data reporting shortcomings limit FAA’s ability to accurately model

the airspace/airport operations. For example, the

various data gathering systems have used different

definitions of delay. 101 An unambiguous definition of delay, in the context of flight routes and

airport configurations, accepted by both airlines and FAA is needed. Comprehensive analysis of the potential benefits of technology and procedure changes to the airspace system hinges on

this capability. Furthermore, the National Simulation Capability102 under development requires a

baseline against which future performance of the

National Airspace System can be evaluated.

Three divisions within FAA are exploring ways

to consolidate data systems and enhance analytical capabilities. The Office of Operations Research (A OR) is developing CONDAT, a central

memory bank for its suite of operational analysis

tools (see table 3-10 again); CONDAT will permit

AOR models to share data and analysis results.

In response to a congressional request for ATC

performance assessment, FAA’s Office of Air

Traffic System Management conducted a study of

NAS data for one day’s activities to better understand issues affecting en route sector throughput.

The initial study recommended an extended collection of operational data, including ground activity

data from airlines, to support further analyses of

NAS performance, trends, and throughput. 103

FAA’s Air Traffic System Management Office

went on to establish a national flights database required for the broader assessment and a system for

further automating and integrating delay information reports and improving ATC performance

analysis. The project’s objectives included a reusable product, one based on government and commercial off-the-shelf systems, and adaptability.

With assistance from the Department of Energy’s

Oak Ridge National Laboratory, the Center for

Naval Analysis, and Martin Marietta’s Energy

Systems, Inc., FAA developed the methodology

to gather and integrate data from airlines and

FAA’s ATC facilities in order to represent an air97 Odani, op. cit., footnote 92, p. 63.

9R Although undergoing further development. NASPAC has been used for several years at the Center for Advanced Aviation System Development and the FAA Techmcal Center, and w as used to ussess the nationwide and local impacts of the proposed Denver International Airport. It

has been adapted for analysis of European airspace issues. Feamsides, op. cit., footnote 22.

99 Alan Breitler and Carl ton Wine, FAA Office of Policy, Plans and Management Analysis, Planning Analysis Division, personal communication, Jan. 26, 1993.

1~ Gass, Op. cit., footnote 92. p. 118.

1(JI ~ani, Op. cit., footnote 92, P. 75.

I(JZ The National Simulation cap~bi]ity if comprised of: a simulation system at FAA’s Technical Center; several laboratories engaged in

National Airspace System R&D; and the Integration and Interaction Laboratory, a proof-of-concept demonstrator developed by the Mitre Corporation. The systcm i$ intended to integrute various RE&D program elements across the NAS environment, permitting early requirements

validation, problem identification, solutions development, and system capability demonstration. U.S. Department of Transportation, Federal

Aviation Administration, A/rport Tc~chnolo,q) Prf~,qrum Plan (Atlantic City, NJ: Federal Aviation Administration Technical Center, November

1991 ), p. 2-66.

103 Lee Berry, et a],, Oak Ridge National l.abor~tor~, An Anu/}.\i\ of /he Nutionul Air.spucc Cupaciry, report prepared for the Federal Aviation

Administration. Office of Air Traffic Management, K’DSRD- 1098 (Oak Ridge, TN: Martin Marietta Energy Systems, Inc., Sept. 29, 1992). p. 7.
Chapter 3 Data and Analysis for Aviation R&D 1107

craft flight from gate to gate and calculate delays

within any flight leg. 104 As yet, however, it cannot

develop “what if’ scenarios on a national scale.

The Office of Aviation Policy, Plans, and Management Analysis is developing the Consolidated

Operations and Delay Analysis System (CODAS), which combines host computers, ASQP,

and the National Oceanographic and Atmospheric

Administration (NOAA) weather information

(when available) and calculates delay by phase of

flight for instrument flight rules operations from

all airports. The intended product is a reliable statistical database from which definitions for delays

can be standardized (e.g., average delay between

city pairs for specific airports/runway configurations). 105 According to FAA, the flights represented by CODAS account for roughly 95 percent

of system delays. 106

Rather than daily assessments of traffic conditions (e.g., for central flow control), CODAS will

support non-real-time analyses and projections of

delays in future scenarios. Retrieval of key information for CODAS, i.e., runway configuration

data, has yet to be finalized; a “patch” on Automated Radar Terminal System computers is the

likely mechanism for automated collection of this

data. 107 In addition, there is a rule in progress for

airlines to report, via the ARINC Communications and Reporting System, the exact times on

takeoff and touchdown.

Weather Data

In the past, an insufficiently dense weather observation network made it impossible to resolve

weather phenomena on space and time scales necessary for aviation operations. 108 Next-generation

weather radar (NEXRAD) and the Automated

Surface Observing System (ASOS) are two elements of a broad weather service modernization

program being conducted jointly by FAA,

NOAA, and DOD to meet this data need. NEXRAD utilizes Doppler radar technology to provide

improved estimates of precipitation amounts, detect the transition between rain and snow, track

storm movement and intensity, and allow for earlier detection of the precursors of thunderstorm

development and other important weather phenomena. ASOS provides the basic ground-level

data required for severe weather forecasting and

for support of aviation operations. 109

Satellite-based observation platforms (e.g., the

Geostationary Operational Environmental Satellite) provide images of clouds and precise atmospheric soundings, additional data that are required for accurate and timely warnings of severe

weather. By 1995, daily weather observations using these and other measurement systems are expected to increase 30-fold relative to 1985 levels,

significantly enhancing the understanding of the

state of the atmosphere. 110 The ability to process

these data and present results in useful formats to

the aviation community rests on advances in computing, communications, and display technologies (see chapter 4).

Runway Pavement Performance Data

Pavement requires regular maintenance in order to

seal cracks and repair damage, and major rehabilitation is usually required every 15 to 20 years to

correct the effects of age and exposure. Pavement

1134 The system reflec[s activity over the entire NAS for selected periods in late 1991 ~d early 1992.

10S Alan Briet]er, FAA Office of Aviation Policy, Plans, and Management Analysis, presentation to the Transportation Research Board, Jan.

12, 1994.

1~ Briet]er and Wine, op. cit., footnote 99.

107 Ibid.

108 u S Dep~ment of Trmsp~ation, Federal Aviation Administration, A WeU/her V;.$ion To Supporf ]mpro]’ed capdC/f}l, ~~ffi{’;[’n[’}t, and . .

Qjery of /he Air Space Sys/em in rhe Tttenty-jir.r; Cenlury (Washington, DC: April 1992), p. 4.

109 National Research council, Commission on Engineering and Technical systems, committee on National Weather Service Modernization, Toward u New Nafional Weather Ser\’ice, Second Report (Washington, DC: National Academy Press, March 1992), p. 33.

110 Federal Aviation Administration, op. cit., fOOtnOte 108, p. 4.
108 I Federal Research and Technology for Aviation

Gradual wear and loss of serviceability are the most common airport pavement issues, although catastrophic pavement failure

can occur

wear is a factor of aircraft axle weight distribution

(determined by the type and weight of aircraft),

moisture (usually from rainfall or melting snow),

temperature, fuel spillage, and construction and

maintenance,l11 Neglected pavement can lead to

foreign objects on the airport surface, which can

damage propellers, turbines, and landing gear.

The advent of new landing gear and tire configurations, faster landing speeds (e.g., those

associated with the proposed HSCT), and potential ultra-high-capacity aircraft with weights exceeding 1.3 million pounds require that new design methodology for runway pavements be

developed. 112 FAA is planning a long-term data

collection effort for assessing pavement performance. The National Airport Pavement Registration and Demonstration Program will use sensors

imbedded in the new Denver International Airport

runways to provide data for validating pavement

design theory. Modeled after the Strategic Highway Research Program, it will annually identify

new airport construction to determine pavement

life-cycle costs and other performance factors. 113

 Safety Factors

Fatality and accident rates are the primary measure of safety. Safety factors are derived from

events or procedures related to passenger fatalities.114 NTSB maintains the largest collection of

accident data and, with assistance from FAA and

aircraft manufacturers, determines probable

cause. Boeing and McDonnell Douglas also have

extensive accident databases and analytic staffs.

In addition to accident-incident data and causal

factors, there are secondary and tertiary factors

with which changes in safety can be measured or

forecasted. These include airline operating, maintenance, and personnel practices and federal ATC

management practices. Also, regulatory and corporate policies influence these practices.

While studies of aggregate accident data are

useful in identifying and understanding existing

I 11 me spread of the ~ejght over tie ~e~s and tires is more lm~rtan( than total weight; e.g., a 727 can cause more pavement wear than a

heavier aircraft that distributes its weight over a greater number of tires.

112 Cument ajwofl pa~,enlen[ design methods evolved from highway design theory developed in the ] $)20s and applied to aviation in the

1940s and 1950s, Further design standards were established between 1968 and 1970 through research on two- and four-wheel landing gear, as

used on narrow-body aircraft (200,000 to 400,000 pounds). The design theory was successfully extended for 747s, but the pavement loading

characteristics of newer heavy aircraft, such as the B-777 and the proposed MD-12, are not well understood, nor have they been tested.

11 ~ Federal Aviation Administration, op. cit., footnOte 83, p. 5-4.

11A See U,S Congress, Offlce of Technology Assessment, Safe Skies fc)r fi~m@ww’: Aviation Safety in a Competit/\e Environment, OTASET-381 (Washington, DC: U.S. Government Printing OffIce, July 1988), p. 69.
Chapter 3 Data and Analysis for Aviation R&D 1109

problems, the infrequency and variability of major accidents limit FAA’s ability to measure aviation safety and estimate short-term changes in

risk. Supplementing the accident data is a host of

federal safety data resources, including operational databases managed by the FAA Associate Administrators for Aviation Standards, Air Traffic,

Regulation and Certification, and Aviation Safety; and specialized data systems kept by NTSB,

DOT’s Research and Special Programs Administration, and DOD’s Air Mobility Command.115

Key difficulties in using federal aviation databases identified in the past include consistency

and availability y of data, accessibility and compatibility of various data systems, and an emphasis on

administrative purposes in the design and use of

databases that makes analysis difficult. 116 These

issues and problems with inaccurate, incomplete

safety and inspection data have prompted FAA to

improve its data collection and assessment capabilities.

Safety Data and Indicators

In 1988, FAA established the Safety Indicators

program to improve its forward-looking ability to

measure and manage aviation safety. Program objectives included both developing and monitoring

key safety indicators, and developing a computer

analysis tool. The latter, designated an automated

decision support system, was intended to obtain

information from existing safety databases for sophisticated analysis and presentational But,

FAA’s progress was limited: according to GAO,

the lack of effective user involvement and unclear

management commitment helped to delay development of five categories of safety indicators and

the analysis tool. 118

In 1992, the Associate Administrator for Aviation Safety (ASF) established a high-level task

force to reexamine the indicators effort.119 After

soliciting input from technical staff that use the

various FAA databases. ASF revised the program

to reflect trends in accidents and incidents, measures of efficiency and compliance with FAA regulations, and inspector activity. 120 In addition, the

new Systems Indicators program includes data on

the general operating environment to illustrate potential demands on the aviation system (e.g., gross

domestic product, enplanement forecasts, and

numbers of certificated airports and airmen). 121

FAA has produced quarterly reports on systems

indicators since 1993 for in-house consumption;

an annual report to an external audience is in the

works. 122

In recent years. FAA also has begun to integrate

its safety databases. The first to be integrated were

I I 5 ~qno~cr inlw)flant ~ource of safety data is tie Avia[iOn Safety Repofling System (ASRS), admini~tercd b} NASA, funded main]y by

FAA. and mamtaincd w ith NASA guidance by the Battclle Memorial Institute. Pilots. controllers, and othcrj ~ubmit \ olunttiry and confidential

ticcounti of safety -related lncldents to the system. This and other safety databases are described in more detail in OTA’\ 1988 report, Suj2 Skie\

@ 7?mlcJrrow. See ibid,, p. H5,

1‘h Ibid., p. 77,

I I 7 U q [’ongre~j Clerler;il Ac~oun[ing Office, A~,iutlOn Safctl: pr~~ress on FAA safer~, ]n(~i(-(~lor,f pr(><yr(lf?l .Y]ohj (Jnd C}IOll(III<q(S Ren~a\n,

. .

GAO INITEC-92-57 (W:i~hington. DC: August 1992), pp. 2-3. -

.

11x ~e c:llcgorle~ are ~lr traffjc, flight operations, aircraft certification, airports, and security. I bid., p. 6.

119 Steve Cohen, SatctJ Information and indicators Division, OffIce of the Associate Administrator for Al iation Stifety. personal communlcalion. May 6. 1994. Scc U.S. Department of Transportation, Federal Aviation Administration. “FAA Syftcm indicators Program Repofi,”

July 15, 1992.
110 I Federal Research and Technology for Aviation

incident databases directly managed by ASF. 123

Currently, ASF has ready access to NTSB accident databases and FAA’s Accident Investigation

Data System, along with earlier systems. As a result, FAA can quickly gather information from a

variety of sources on a particular category of operations and prepare material for analysis by users

inside or outside FAA. 12

working toward integrat

tive safety databases.

4 Additionally, FAA is

on of some administraInspection and Maintenance Data

Also useful for pointing out potential safety problems are data gathered by FAA’s airworthiness and

operations inspectors, and provided by the airlines

and aircraft manufacturers. FAA’s Flight Standards Service, under the Associate Administrator

for Regulation and Certification, has attempted to

improve the collection of these data and target personnel more effectively. 125 These efforts have had

mixed success. A familiar contributing factor to

the difficulties in upgrading the databases is

FAA’s failure to fully flesh out the requirements

for the new databases and tools in advance of their

development (see Problems in System Development and Acquisition in chapter 2).

According to GAO, inadequate oversight by regional and district office managers of safety inspection policies and omissions and errors in the

entry of inspection data contributed to shortcomings in a previous automated program for tracking

air carrier inspections, the Work Program Management Subsystem (WPMS). 126 The incomplete

nature of the required inspections and reporting

affected the data’s consistency and limited the

program’s utility in safety analysis. In fiscal year

1990, FAA replaced the WPMS with the Program

Tracking and Reporting Subsystem. 127

In March 1990, FAA announced the launch of

two new initiatives intended to improve air safety,

the self-audit program and the voluntary disclosure program.

128 AS they were originally designed,

FAA could use data from both programs to target

inspections and make for efficient use of inspector

time. According to GAO, FAA did not clearly articulate basic implementation issues, provide convincing arguments on the merits of the programs,

or adequately train its inspectors in the programs’

benefits and execution; the result has been limited

airline participation in the programs. 129

In 1991, GAO found that the Service Difficulty

Reporting System database, intended to allow

123 ~ese four are OPra[ional Error, pi]o[ Deviation, Vehicle, and Pedestrian, from which the Runway Incursion database is compiled.

Charles Huettner, Deputy Associate Administrator for Aviation Safety, Federal Aviation Administration, personal communication, July 22,

1993.

124 Ro~~ Mathews, Special Assis[ant to FAA Associate Administrator for Aviation Safety, personal communication, May lo, 1994.

125 According t. GAO, [here has been a shofiage of fully trained inspectors for assessing compliance with both Operations and airworthiness

requirements. U.S. Congress, General Accounting OffIce, A\’iurion Training: FM A\’iarion Safety Inspectors Are NOI Recei~’ing Needed Training, GAO RCED-89- 168 (Washington, DC: U.S. Government Printing Office, September 1989), pp. I -2.

‘26 U.S. Congress,General Accounting Office, A}iurion Safer)’: ln~pection Management System Lucks Adequare O~ersighl, GAO/

RCED-90-36 (Washington, DC: U.S. Government Printing Office, November 1989), pp. 4-6.

127 John LaPin[e, FAA Aircraft Safety program, personal communication, Apr. 19! 1994.

12X Under [he se] f.audi[ Program, air]incs are to: develop clearly defined safety evaluation organizations and ensure their independence;

report cvflluation results directly to [he pre~ident or other top managers to ensure their involvement in resolving safety problems; conduct continuing, indep(h analyses of iuch problems; and cievclop w ritten uudit schedules, corrective action plans, and complete records. The voluntary

diwlo~urc program was drafted to encour-age airlinm to report safety violations by extending amnesty for any fines or penalties if the airlines

take corrcctiy c actions approved by FAA, LI.S. Congresi, ~JcnCrd Accounting Office, A\’iafion Safety: Progress Limifed With Self-Aud// and

SajcI)I k’iol(lfion Rcp{~r//ng Prc~<sram.\. GAORCED-92-8S (Washington, DC: U.S. Government Printing Office, March 1992), p. 3.
Chapter 3 Data and Analysis for Aviation R&D 1111

identification of trends in serious aircraft malfunctions, was also plagued with inconsistent, incomplete, and outdated data. 130 Since then, FAA

has enabled airlines to enter data directly into the

system and accelerated dissemination of the data

by providing FAA’s Flight Standards Service district offices with direct access to the database.

FAA staff also attribute some improvements to the

additional field experience many airworthiness

inspectors now have when hired. 131

Other FAA initiatives have had more success at

the outset. With funding from the aging aircraft

program, the Flight Standards Service established

a research effort in 1990 to assist in monitoring the

performance of FAA certificate holders (e.g., air

operators. air agencies, and aircraft types). Like

the original safety indicator program described

above, the Safety Performance Analysis System

(SPAS) initiative includes the development of an

analytical tool, complete with performance indicators and supporting data. 132 However, there are

key differences. SPAS metrics are more specific

and are intended to help direct the agency’s inspector workforce toward areas determined from

statistical analysis of a wide array of performance

data. 133 In effect, SPAS is an analytic engine that

sits atop the Flight Standards Service’s databases

and monitors financial, maintenance, and operational trends. Data are updated every 24 hours and,

using algorithms developed for FAA by the Volpe

National Transportation Systems Center, SPAS

generates statistical indicators for analysis of anomalies within 1ike groups of aircraft or operators.

Phase 1 of SPAS addresses large airlines and regional commuters, which correspond to roughly

90 percent of the flying public. By 1994, the first

phase of SPAS has been established at 17 sites for

test and evaluation; a production model is expected, on schedule and under budget, in January

1995. FAA staff attributed the success of the program to learning from prior mistakes in developing analytic tools; and, more importantly, relying

on an expert panel to establish system requirements and developing the system with early and

frequent input from the project’s primary users,

FAA inspectors. ] 34

 Security Data

For security, relying on past threats as indicators

of problems allows FAA to attempt to prevent

similar incidents, but leaves the agency one or two

steps behind in identifying new concerns. In turn,

this makes the task of devising effective methods

of countering a threat more onerous. Thus, FAA

needs a constant flow of intelligence data. To support the intelligence requirements of the aviation

security program, the Aviation Security Improvement Act of 1990 created new high-level security

positions within DOT and FAA.135 Figure 3-11

shows the positions and duties of these personnel

and their relationship to one another.

The second key area of data needs relates to

how deterrence technologies perform. Once a security technology is in the field, operational problems may and do arise. FAA regularly sends staff

to the field to evaluate FAA- or airport-installed

1 ~f) ~- s ~c)ngrcj,, c~n~r~] ,Aamurl[ing Office, A\Iu[/())~ SUf2r}: ., Chungcs Needed in FM’.\ Ser\/ce Dlfficulry ftepm-~ln,q Progrurn, GAO/

RCE1)-’9 I -24 (Washington, DC: U.S. Government Printing Office, March 1991).

I 7 I Harldn Hillcr,, ~-~,~ Office of F]igh[ Standard\, RCgUIMOI-y Support Division, personal comnlunic~[ion$Mw 6, 1994

[ 1~ ~ ~p(~inl~, op. c 1/., footnote 127

1 ~~ Fl~t\ ~n~yctc)ri< ~lpprc)xlrnate]y 2,(No of [hem, are sent out to survey aircraft operations and maintenance acti~ ities. They Iog their ob-

\er\ a[ions und repor-ts on the Performance Tracking and Recording System. Other data of interest are drawn from service difficulty reports,

incldcnt rcp)rri. :ind DOT financial information. Becau~e only the largest carriers are represented in the latter data. FAA is looking to glean

tirranc Ial d:ita on the other opcrator~ to $upport analysis of that risk factor, Frederick Leonelli, Manager, Aircr:ift Maintenance Division, FAA

Flight Standards Ser~ ice, permniil comrnunicution, Apr. 29, 1994.

] ~J Iblcl.

I JS ~Jb] ic IJaW 1 () I .604, Not. I ~, 1990, See U.S. Depar[nlen( of Transportation, Federal AV iation ,Adminiitr:ition, A)lurron Seclirir)’ Rc-

.seun h (Jn(l I)et eloptnent Plan (Atlantic City. NJ: Federal Al iation Administration Technical Center, Mtirch 1992). p. 5.
112 I Federal Research and Technology for Aviation

Office of Secretary of Transportation

Director of

Intelligence and Security

serve as primary liaison of the Secretary to

the intelligence and law enforcement

communities;

receive, assess, and distribute intelligence

relative to long-term transportation security;

- develop policies, strategies, and plans for

dealing with threats to transportation security

( >

Federal Aviation Administration

Associate Administrator for

Civil Aviation Security

assess threats to civil aviation;

manage and guide FAA field security resources;

- enforce security-related requirements;

identify related R&D requirements

I

-J 1

Federal security manager Foreign security officer

- designated focal point for - assigned to each airport outside the

federal aviation security activities United States at which extraordinary

at each Category X airporta

security measures are required

a Categov x alrpo~s (19) typically have a large number of passenger enplanements per year, along with departing international fllghts

SOURCE Office of Technology Assessment, 1994, based on FAA Aviation Security Research and Development Plan, March 1992

equipment and procedures. According to GAO, shape R&D plans and implementation methodolhowever, the Civil Aviation Security Information ogies.

System (CASIS) that FAA uses to record the results of its inspections has several drawbacks. For Environmental Assessment

example, GAO found that CASIS does not in- As concern over environmental degradation has

elude information on the severity of a deficiency grown in the United States and elsewhere, avior how it relates to airport security as a whole. Nor ation’s role has come under increased scrutiny.

can CASIS be used to determine whether unsatis- Ground-level emissions from aircraft and airport

factory conditions reflect individuals’ careless- sources contribute to local air pollution (e.g.,

ness or the existence of systemic problems.136 A ozone formation). Aircraft emissions at higher almore robust analytical approach would assist in titudes are circulated and dispersed over much

evaluating security system strengths to further larger areas; although not unimportant or insignif1S6 us. &ne~l Accounting Off]ce, Avia(;on security: AalfitionalActions Needed To Meet Domestic andlnternational Challenge~, GAOI

RCED-94-38 (Washington, DC: U.S. Government Printing OftIce, January 1994), pp. 42-45.
Chapter 3 Data and Analysis for Aviation R&D 1113

icant, they do not directly affect the immediate

area of the release. It is difficult to quantify these

emissions and determine their effects. ] 37

Federal responsibility for aviation environmental issues is divided between EPA and FAA.

The burden of collecting data for assessing environmental impact of aircraft and airport operations typically falls onto FAA’s shoulders. For example, EPA’s listing of all transportation emission

sources uses data from FAA aircraft engine emission inventories. The listing, however, reflects

only ground-level operations; the levels of engine

emissions at cruise altitudes remain unknown.

Neither agency maintains databases of other impacts on the environment (e.g., local air pollution,

airports’ use of deicing materials and their effects

on water quality, and other substances that affect

air or water quality).

Aircraft Noise Assessment and Modeling

No real-time monitoring of noise effects takes

place on a national scale. Instead, FAA uses models to estimate the impact of aircraft noise on communities. The two most commonly used are the

Integrated Noise Model (INM) and the National

Noise Impact Model (NANIM).l38

The Transportation Research Board (TRB) has

suggested that these models could be enhanced

considerably by combining the sound level estimates with population distribution and land use

information.

139 Further improvements include incorporating the effects of local topography and

meteorology on sound propagation, and verifying

whether or not the models are valid at distances

from the airport where climb-to-cruise noise may

be the dominant noise source.

The Community Noise sub-element of NASA’s

Advanced Subsonic Technology (AST) Noise Reduction program is incorporating population density into noise impact models. l40 For FAA, DOT’s

Volpe National Transportation Systems Center is

evaluating whether topography effects on sound

propagation should be considered for the agency’s

models. In December 1993, FAA released a new

version of INM that addresses nonstandard atmospheric conditions for prediction of takeoff-related noise. A second enhancement, expected to

be released in January 1995, will include basic topography and demographic data (from geographical information systems) to refine calculations of

community noise exposures. 141

VNTSC has also developed software additions

to INM to support analysis of noise impact of operations in transitional airspace (i.e., up to 18,000

feet altitude). This would support analyses of proposed flight plan modifications like those made

for the Expanded East Coast Plan. 142 In addition,

impact modeling efforts will be expanded to integrate aircraft noise certification and airport planning requirements (Federal Aviation Regulations

Parts 36 and 150), along with flight operations

data to enable air transportation system noise impact prediction.

Noise metric

In 1992, the Federal Interagency Committee on

Noise (FICON) reaffirmed the adequacy of the

current noise metric, the average sound level desI 37 Bv~On, op. cit., footnote 15“

I ~~ me INM enab]e~ FAA t. predict tie distribution of areasadjacentto an airpofl ~a[experience noise exceeding the levels recommended

by EPA for residential neighborhoods. The Air Force uses a similar model called NOISEMAP for assessment of the impact of military operation~. NAN’IM e$timates the total U.S. population exposure.

1 w Trm~Wflation Research ‘oardt “Environmental Research Needs in Transportation,” Transportation Research Circular Number 389,

March 1992, p, 30.

140 Temcnce J, He~z, M~ager, Advanced subsonic Technology, OffIce of Aeronautics, National Aeronautics ~d s~acc AdminiS~atiOn~

personal communication, Apr. 26, 1994.

141 ~omas Connor, FAA Office of Environment ~d Energy, ~rsona] communications, Oct. 18, 1993 and July 26, 1994.

I-IZ 1n the late 19~os, FAA ~gan implementation of its Expanded East Coast Plan in order to reduce air traffic delays at tie New York CitY

area airports. The changes to the distribution of traffic resulted in many complaints about aircraft-related noise.
114 I Federal Research and Technology for Aviation

ignated as DNL, as the principal means for describing long-term noise exposure for civil (and

military) aircraft operations. 143 However, FICON

also recommended that the federal government increase R&D on: the “masking” effects of various

types of nonaircraft noise when compared with

aircraft noise; and including ambient noise in the

current assessment methodology.144 Furthermore, the introduction of engines with higher bypass ratios has shifted the dominant frequency in

aircraft noise—a new metric may be required to

reflect corresponding changes in perceived noise

impact. ]45

TRB also recommended evaluation of supplementary noise metrics, because the existing DNL

metric may not be sufficient in other situations.

Three areas in which community response (i.e.,

expression of annoyance) to aircraft noise exceeds

that expected using the DNL metric are:

■

m

m

near small and mid-sized airports where the average impact of single aircraft overflights within a given DNL contour is much greater than the

corresponding impact near a large airport,

at points distant from airports where new air

traffic patterns have introduced recognizable

aircraft noise into regions that rarely experienced such noise events previously, and

near airports where there has been a discontinuous increase in air traffic or a dramatic change

in air traffic patterns. 146

Air Quality and Global Climate Change

Aviation can affect the atmosphere on both local

and global scales. For example, aircraft and airport-related operations have an impact on the attainment of regional ozone standards, air toxics

levels, and smog. 147 Estimating the total quantity

of pollutants and their impact on local air quality

requires knowledge of specific pollutant emissions and their behavior in the atmosphere. In addition, subsonic aircraft engine emissions are suspected to contribute to global climate change

(e.g., through nitrogen oxide and water vapor

emissions at high altitudes).

In the United States, EPA calculates average

emission factors for various types of aircraft and,

using FAA-supplied operations data (i.e., the

number of takeoffs and landings), estimates nationwide aircraft emissions. 148 Data on key pollutant emissions from other transportation sources

are gathered from a variety of federal, state, and

regional sources, and assembled for inclusion in

EPA’s annual national emission estimates document.

In most areas, the data indicate that air transportation-related contributions are small or insignificant when compared with other sources. However, because the methodologies for estimating

emissions and assessing their air quality impacts

have changed over the last decade, comparison of

trends for source categories is suspect.149 Addi143 Federal Interagency Commi(tec on Noise, Federa/Agency Re\’iew’ of Selecred Airporr Noise Analysis I.SSU(]S (Washington, DC: August

1992), p. 3-1.

la Ibid., p. 3-11,

145 Higher frequency noise generated by ultra-high-bypass engine fan blades can cause more annoyance or discomfort.

l% TranSpofiation Research Board, op. cit., footnote 139. p. 29.

147 Alfred W. Lindsey, Director, EPA office of Environmental Engineering and Technology Demonstration, persona] communication, Apr.

18, 1994. Related activities include transportation to and from the airport, fueling, maintenance, and other surface operations.

la Es[ima[es do no[ reflec[ activities above 3,000 feet. U.S. Environmental Protection Agency, Nufional Air Pollutanl Emi.\.\/on ~~end.j,

1900-1992, EPA-454’ R-93-032 (Washington, DC: October 1993), p. 5-4.

] 49 See ibid., ch. 5.
Chapter 3 Data and Analysis for Aviation R&D I 115

tionall y, EPA estimates of aircraft contributions to

pollutant emissions may suffer from use of dated

information. The agency‘s comprehensive catalog

of emission indices, designated AP-42, includes

aircraft data from 1980.150 While new EPA guidance material 151 now reflects FAA’s existing data,

the AP-42 information pertaining to aircraft predates almost all of FAA’s data and the promulgation of hydrocarbon standards in 1984. 152

The capability of analyzing local impacts is improving. In 1993, FAA and the U.S. Air Force

jointly issued an updated Emissions and Dispersion Modeling System to assess air quality around

airports. FAA also established and released the

Aircraft Engine Emissions Database for use in calculating the emissions impacts of specific aircraft/

engine combinations. 153 Over the long term, FAA

and EPA may need to address emissions of air tox -

ics from aircraft in addition to the nontoxic pollutants already included in the databases. 54

An understanding of aviation’s historical global air pollution impact is lacking, thus additional

data gathering and atmospheric modeling efforts

to support assessment of upper atmospheric issues

are required. A major unknown is the emission

factors of engines at cruise altitude. ’55 In June

1992, in preparation for the third meeting of the

ICAO Committee on Aviation Environmental

Protection, an emissions inventory subgroup initiated a study of global pollution from aircraft

emissions.

v- -,,. p

Condensation trails (contrails) left in well-traveled flight

corridors over central Europe Contra//s and related clouds

may have an effect on the Earth's surface temperature and

climate, under certain atmospheric conditions, they can

persist for many hours

Because the sizable modeling effort in place for

NASA’s supersonic research program did not address subsonic aircraft effects on the upper troposphere, in April 1993 NASA established a Atmospheric Effects of Aviation Project. In addition to

the continuing Atmospheric Effects of Stratospheric Aircraft element of the High-Speed Research Program, the new effort includes a subsonic assessment focused on defining the issues

related to quantifying the impact of current and fu150 ~’ s En~ironmental pro[ectlon Agency, C{)nlpl/utlon ofAir Pollutunt Erni\ $r(m h-uitor~, i))lunlc 1[: ,il(d)il(’ Source.$, AP-42 (Ann Arbor, . .

MI: 1985). Aircraft data from 1980.

IS 1 U,S, Eny ironn~en[a] Protection Agency. “Procedures for Emission Inventory Preparation.” Enli\iions From Aircraft, Chapter 5: draft,

Nov. 1, 1991.

1~~ A P]:inned rcl ision of AP-42 is on hold. KIuII, Op. Cit., fOOmOte 14. .

1‘$ Jack Durham, Director, EPA Office of En~ironmental processes and Effccti Rewarch, personal communication, Apr. 18, 1994.
116 I Federal Research and Technology for Aviation

ture subsonic fleet emissions in both the upper troposphere and stratosphere. 156

CONCLUSIONS

Despite significant advances in safety, airspace

and airport capacity, and environmental protection, U.S. air transportation system problems remain. There are few, if any, easy solutions to human error and hazardous weather, costly delays

from congestion and poor weather, and public displeasure and concern over aviation environmental

impacts. Furthermore, defining the problems

themselves is often an arduous task.

Consequently, the data collection and analysis

requirements for aviation are daunting; for example, not only must the causes of accidents or delays be determined, but also the efficacy of R&D

programs established to mitigate them. While new

tools and methods of assessment are being developed to aid in this process, quantitative measures

of performance or success are still lacking in some

areas. Another limitation is that many R&D projects depend on broader FAA or federal activities

for success. For example, the goal of introducing

satellite-based nonprecision approaches into most

U.S. airports by 1996157 is one that can be attained

only with a cooperative effort by FAA’s R&D,

safety, ATC, and airport divisions, along with airline operators and avionics manufacturers. Estimating the time and expense required to complete

such an effort is problematic, making it difficult to

compare the anticipated benefits of this type of

R&D program with others. However, FAA is

making progress in this endeavor and in its efforts

to improve related databases and models.

Perhaps an even more difficult task for the

agency has been establishing a more forwardlooking analysis capability. OTA finds that a

greater emphasis on assessing emerging risks—

likely to arise in areas where we lack fundamental

knowledge—is still needed. New security risks

are examples, along with human performance in

an increasingly complex system. FAA has upgraded its databases and developed new analytical

tools for illustrating trends and assessing multiple

safety, security, and environmental factors. With

careful attention to the input and results, FAA will

be better prepared to identify emerging problems.

In addition to ongoing analysis of system activities and trends, long-term research is essential to

continued gains in safety and security and mitigating the environmental impacts of aviation.

As the agency with responsibility for regulating many facets of the industry and operating the

extensive ATC system, FAA is constantly faced

with many challenges—all of them seeming to demand immediate attention and concerted effort.

However, FAA’s resources, like those of the federal government as a whole, are limited. Not all

problems can be addressed at the same time or to

the degree desired by the public, other members of

the aviation community, or the government itself.

FAA and its partners in aviation R&D must learn

where their resources can be applied most effectively and conduct data collection and analysis to

support priority efforts.

156 National Aeronautics and space Administration, Office of Aeronautics, “Atmospheric Effects of Aviation Project Flyer,” March 1994,

p. 7.

157 Fed~ra] Aviation ,Adrninistration, op. cit., foo~ote 42. p. 1-13.
Research

and

Technology

Issues 4

I

n December 1903, the Wright brothers conducted the first

controlled, powered flight of an airplane near Kitty Hawk,

North Carolina. This event heralded a new age of adventure

and service, and decades of aviation research and development (R&D) have since fostered the growth of an extensive industry. An example of the degree of change witnessed in aviation

is that a Boeing 747 aircraft fuselage could contain not only the

Wright brothers’ plane but its entire fright path. More important

than the dramatic growth in aircraft size is that federal research

and technology efforts have helped to make aircraft operation safer, more economical, and quieter.

Innovations in technology also have provided for effective and

efficient methods of managing air traffic in congested airspace

and on crowded airport surfaces; reliable, rapid means of communication over vast distances; advanced warning of hazardous

weather; improved air- and crashworthiness; reduced security

threats; and enhanced training methods for personnel throughout

the industry. However, a broad array of basic science, risk assessment, technology development, and test and evaluation efforts is

needed to improve existing technologies and add new functions

to the air transportation system, strengthen analytic capabilities in

order to identify and clarify emerging issues, and develop

technology or procedural options to unresolved problems.

As both the regulatory agency for civil aviation and the operator of the nation’s air traffic control system, the Federal Aviation

‘ Rc]gcr E. 1311stein. Orders t{ Magrutude: A Hi.\tor? of the ,NACA and iVASA,

19/5-1990, NASA SP-44M (Wra$hington, DC: National Aeronautic and Space AcIministration, 1 989), p. 2.I 117
118 I Federal Research and Technology for Aviation

Administration (FAA) has a central role in defining aviation R&D priorities. FAA supports R&D

in three areas: capacity and airspace efficiency,

safety and security, and aviation environment

protection. The National Aeronautics and Space

Administration (NASA) and the Department of

Defense (DOD), however, are the primary contributors to the research and technology base from

which solutions to many aviation problems are

drawn.

This chapter describes areas of long-term research that cut across FAA’s operational, regulatory, and infrastructure development missions, and

likely will help fill knowledge gaps and support

aviation technology development in the future. It

also discusses innovative technologies and

technology development efforts currently under

way to improve the performance of the civil aviation system.

CROSSCUTTlNG RESEARCH ISSUES

To lay the groundwork for meeting existing and

future technical challenges, long-term R&D in

several areas is essential. In addition, R&D is required for a clearer understanding of the impact of

aviation on the world around it. Five areas of

study—human factors, atmospheric science,

computing methods, software, and materials—

have benefits that cut across FAA’s missions.

 Human Factors

In 1981, the President’s Task Force on Aircraft

Crew Complement identified the need for FAA

work in a number of research areas related to human factors.2 FAA released its first human factors

research plan in 1985. Believing a new, comprehensive effort in identifying and addressing human factors in aviation was still needed, Congress

identified human factors as a critical research area

in the Aviation Safety Research Act of 1988.3 In

response, FAA established a Human Factors office under the Executive Director of Regulatory

Standards and Compliance and a Human Factors

Coordinating Committee, chaired by the Chief

Scientific and Technical Advisor for Human Factors.

In April 1991, FAA issued the National Plan for

Aviation Human Factors. 5 The plan’s fourfold

purpose is to:

m

●

m

identify the technical efforts necessary to address the most operationally significant human

performance issues in aviation and acquire the

necessary resources to fund these efforts,

efficiently allocate resources by coordinating

various government laboratory programs,

communicate research needs to academic and

industrial “centers of excellence,” and

facilitate the transfer of human factors knowledge to government and industry.6

Since its initial publication, the National Plan

has focused increasing attention on human factors

within FAA; effected increased coordination

among NASA, DOD, and FAA research elements;

and spawned a number of actions directed toward

the application of research products.7

NASA contributes extensively to human factors research for civil aviation. NASA Langley

Research Center and NASA Ames Research Center, historically responsible for the bulk of this

work, investigate physical aspects and psycholog2 The president’s Task Force on Aircraft Crew Complement, “Report of the President’s Task Force on Crew Complement,” unpublished

manuscript, July 2, 1981, pp. 8-12.

3 ~blic Law 100-591”, NOV. 5, 1988.

4 The directorate has since been abolished: tie Human Factors program now falls under the authority of the Executive Director for System

Development.

5 U.S. ~ptiment of TransW~ation, Federa] Aviation Adminis~ation, ~alIo~~~la~forAv,iatiO~ Human Factors (Washington, DC: April

1991).

6 Ibid., vol. 1, p. 1.

7 Mark Hofmann, FAA Chief Scientific and Technical Advisor for Human Factors, personal communication, Apr. 15, 1994.
Chapter 4 Research and Technology issues 1119

ical elements, respectively.8 NASA and FAA

coordination is achieved through the FAA/NASA

Executive Coordinating Committee and guided

by a Memorandum of Understanding (MOU) for

all areas of collaborative research. In addition,

FAA has established a new human factors laboratory at the Technical Center.

Human factors R&D comprises a large part of

DOD’s broad effort in Human Systems Interface

(HSI), which addresses the full spectrum of military systems including aviation and ground-control systems. Funding for HSI, one of DOD’s Key

Technologies, was approximately $170 million

and $131 million in fiscal years 1993 and 1994, respectively.9 An interagency agreement with DOD

similar to the FAA/NASA MOU is still under development—DOD laboratory reorganization and

the lack of a focal point representing all services

contributed to the delay in formalizing a cooperative agency link. *() However, FAA has established

Memoranda of Understanding and Agreement for

joint efforts with individual service laboratories.

Focal points have now been established in the Office of the Secretary of Defense and each of the

three services, supporting formalization of coordination and joint program planning. 11

Automation

The first objective of FAA’s human factors plan

relates to ‘human-centered” automation and the

design of advanced systems that capitalize on the

relative strengths of humans and computer-based

technologies. 12 Much is being done in this area.

but much remains to be done. For example, using

its Human Engineering Methods Laboratory.

NASA Langley researchers study the behavioral

and psychophysiological response of flight deck

crew to assess mental workload demands and

measure their response and awareness in individual performance states. The Ames Research Center

is developing human performance models for the

design, analysis. integration, and prototyping of

human-machine systems. Applications include

aging aircraft inspection, cockpit display. and

electronic checklists. Other intelligent cockpit

aids under evaluation include route replanning,

windshear advising, task-tailored flight information management, and fault monitoring. 13 Studies

of countermeasures to pilot fatigue, effectiveness

of electronic checklists and decision aids in reducing errors, and the suitability of data and graphical

Advanced cockpits, like that designed for the Boeing

747-400 feature electronic, flat panel dlsplays and offer

higher /eve/s of aufomation

~~ L(.s. ~ongrcs~, office of Technology AswSSnlcnl, Stif( Skie\j,r 7jmlorr(nt:A\ I(lti(m SL{fi’t\ In (J (_onlpc!if I\e EtI\ ironm(nr, OTA-SET-38 1

(hrtishington, DC: U.S. GOY cmmcn[ Printing Office. 198X), p. 129.

‘) Mar-is l’lkmtinl$, Office of the Secreta~r of Defense (focal point for HS1 ). pcrwud c(~rllll~unic~lti(~ll, Apr. 18.1994. In Ct)nlpariw)n. fiwtil

j car 1994 funding for human factors R&D at FAA and h’ASA wa~ $27.3 milllon and roughl} $59 million. reyxctlkel}.

lo Hofrl~~nn, op. Cit., fO()[nOIC 7.

I 1 ~’lhn~:inl~< op. cit., footnote 9.

IJ Federal Aviation Administration. op. cit., footnote 5, iol. I, p. 5.

1 ~ pau] C, Schuttc. .Y:~[l(~rla] Acron:lutics and Space Admirliitriit 1011, “Rea-Tinle I;:iult hlonltorlng” f t)r Aircraft Appllcat icln~ ~l~ing Quant i[attk c S[mulatlon and Expert Sy~tcm~.” Pr(xccdlnq{ (~’the ‘th ,4/,4,4 Comi>l(tcrt 1)? Act-c)$po( c (’cJrI/crtII(t’, ,Vl[Jttlcrc\, C(ill~(jrnlll, Oct(dwr 3-5,

1!J89 (W’a+lngton, DC Amcrlcan Inititutc of .Acronautici and Aitronautici, 19S9). pp. 87(1 -XX5.
120 I Federal Research and Technology for Aviation

displays for pilots and controllers are also under

way.

Of key interest is the impact of automation in

the terminal area air traffic control (ATC) environment. The compatibility of aircraft flight management system and ATC capabilities is also of concern. FAA and NASA have established

cooperative projects in their respective Terminal

Air Traffic Control Automation (TATCA) and

Center-TRACON Automation System (CTAS)

programs (see discussion of air traffic management in technology section below). Also, FAA

has continuing efforts with researchers in academia and elsewhere examining automation in aircraft and facilities maintenance. In addition, efforts are being made to assess the organizational

and procedural impacts that can result when tasks

change as a function of automation. 1

4

Training and Selection

FAA is looking at devising new training methods

for controllers and aviators, both to increase the

effectiveness of current programs and to support

the needs of a future, highly automated airspace

system. Future training methods will likely incorporate factors such as psychology, engineering,

human physiology, medicine, sociology, and anthropometry. 15 Important areas of application for

crew resource management (CRM) 16 instruction

include commuter airline, air traffic, and maintenance settings; in addition, CRM should be considered for pilots’ initial as well as aircraft-type

transition training. 17 For the selection process,

personality characteristics of prospective controllers have emerged as another issue to consider. A

major research need for training and selection is to

develop a means of accurately measuring the human behavior element in performance.

14 Hofmm, op. Cit., footnote 7.

Advanced air traffic controller workstations have new fea -

tures—including advanced high-resolution, color displays

and the capability for greater automat/on of tasks and data

reporting-that affect training requirements

Additional Issues

According to industry, FAA’s plan is currently underfunded. In addition, the plan does not address

certain elements of the aviation system. Except for

a brief discussion of passenger education, the plan

makes no reference to human factors related to the

cabin environment. Also missing is aviation security human factors, and nowhere is the potential

impact of changing demographics or issues specific to general aviation explicitly considered. According to FAA, the plan is being updated to address these issues and incorporate modifications

precipitated by changes in technology, insights

from implementation, and maturing relationships

among plan participants. 8

 Atmospheric Science

Knowledge of both the effects of aviation on the

environment and the effects of environmental

phenomena on aircraft and the air transportation

system is dependent on atmospheric science. Two

15 G~ter Endres, “can New Training Curb Pilo[ Error?” Inferu}ia Aerospace Re}’[e)$”, JuI)’ ] ~gz, pp. 35-38.

]6 cockpit or crew reSource mmagement andLine oriented Flight Training (LOFT) are training programs initiated b) ~irlincs to curb Pilol

emor through focusing on communications, interpersonal relationships, and ciecisionma~ing in the cockpit. Ibid., pp. 35-38.

1? Hofmann, op. cit., footnote 7.

18 Ibid.
Chapter 4 Research and Technology issues 1121

key areas of supporting R&D applicable to aviation are global climate change and meteorology.

The federal atmospheric R&D effort has many

participants, including NASA and DOD, the Department of Energy (DOE), the Environmental

Protection Agency (EPA), the National Oceanographic and Atmospheric Administration (NOAA),

FAA, the Department of the Interior (DOI), and

the U.S. Department of Agriculture (USDA). The

National Science Foundation (NSF) supports

work at nongovernmental organizations (e.g., the

National Center for Atmospheric Research—

(NCAR) and universities as well.

Climate Change

A host of measurement technologies, computing

and modeling methods, and graphics systems are

required to determine the current state of the atmosphere and predict its response to numerous

human activities. Complementary research is carried out by DOE. NASA, NOAA, NSF, EPA,

DOI, and USDA under the banner of the U.S.

Global Change Research Program (GCRP) to help

develop sound national and international policies

related to global environmental issues, particularly global climate change. 19 First developed and

coordinated by the Federal Coordinating Council

for Science, Engineering and Technology

(FCCSET), GCRP is now managed by the President’s National Science and Technology Council

Committee on Environment and Natural Resources.

20

For fiscal year 1994, NASA requested nearly

$190 million for its high-speed commercial transport program. According to NASA, over one-half

of this is devoted to the study of potential environmental effects and controls21 (see box 4-1). Little

or none of this effort directly relates to subsonic

The aircraft Industry appears to be confident that high-speed CiviI transports can be designed, and that

these aircraft wiII be economically viable as long as they are also environmentally acceptable 1

Nitrogen oxides (NOX) and other aircraft engine exhaust gases emitted into the stratosphere contribute to catalytic ozone depletion Recent studies of NOX effects have revived concerns that the Earth’s

upper atmosphere may be significantly affected by both conventional aircraft and proposed high-speed

civiI aircraft 2

Such worries about the potential impact of supersonic transport (SST) NOX emissions on the Earth’s

ozone layer led to the derailment of the U S SST program in the 1970s Only 13 Concordes comprise

the current civil supersonic fleet Subject to today’s more rigorous environmental standards, the viability

of the proposed high-speed civiI transport (HSCT) hinges on reducing its ozone-depleting potential to

(continued)

1 Donald J Wuebbles and Douglas E Klnnlson “Sensltwlty of Stratospheric Ozone to Present and Possible Future Amcraft Emlsslons, ” Au Traffic and the Enwronment Background Tendencies and Potential G/oba/ Afmospherlc Effecfs U Schumann (ed )

(Berlin, Germany Sprmger-Verlag, 1990), p 108

2 Robefl A Egll “NltrOgen Oxide Ernlsslons from Alr Traffic, ” C~/~/A, vol 441990 P 370

19 Federa] Coordlnatlng Councl] for Science, Engineering ~d TechnOIOg~, Our changing p/une/: The FY ]993 b’. S. Global change Research Program, A Report by the Committee on Earth and Environmental Sciences, A Supplement to the U.S. President’s Fiscal Year 1993

Budget (Washington, DC: Office of Science and Technology Policy, n.d. ), p. 3.

20 Donna Wle[lng, E~ecu[lve Secretav, Comml[[ee on Environment and Na[ura] Re$ourCes, National science and Technolog> Council,

personal communication, May 3, 1994.

21 However, approximately $go million of thi~ funding relates to providing advanced materials and engine components for tie Propulsion

system, and enhancing aerodynamic performance-actif ritics that NASA w ill continue beyond the close of the en~ ironmental phase of the

High-Speed Research Program.
122 I Federal Research and Technology for Aviation

Funding for Environmental Elements of HSRP, FY 1990-94($ millions)a

FY 90 FY 91 FY 92 FY 93 FY 94a

$245 $44 0 $764 $1058 $1346

a Requested.

SOURCE Office of Technology Assessment, based on National Aeronautics and Space Admimstrahon data,

1994

an acceptable level at the outset, because manufacturers are unlikely to proceed with extraordinarily

costly development without assurance that the product wiII be accepted wholeheartedly 3

But predicting the atmospheric effects of a large fleet (I e , 500 or more) of supersonic vehicles requires extensive computer modeling of the chemistry, physics, and dynamics of the stratosphere, along

with reliable projections of emissions and an improved understanding of their behavior in engine exhaust and aircraft wakes. The current understanding of upper atmospheric chemistry and transport

phenomena, hampered by the lack of data from these altitudes, cannot yet support a reliable impact

assessment

Since 1990, the National Aeronautics and Space Administration (NASA) has funded the High Speed

Research Program (HSRP), one element of that program, the Atmospheric Effects of Stratospheric Aircraft, IS a six-year effort to assess the potential effects of proposed HSCTs on stratospheric ozone, atmospheric chemistry, and climate NASA, with Industry support, also iS investigating mitigation technologies. HSRP funding requested for fiscal year 1994 was approximately $200 million. The table shows

funding levels for the environmental portion of HSRP for its first few years Topics of study Include atmospheric Impact, propulsion emissions and noise reduction (including materials development critical to

Iow-emission combustors and noise-reducing exhaust nozzles), aircraft noise reduction (including some

boom), and environmental research aircraft and remote sensors 4

Unfortunately despite growing interest in addressing the potential Impacts of subsonic aircraft,

much of the HSCT work IS not applicable because

■ different regions with in the atmosphere are affected and data needs are dissimiIar, and

■ tropospheric and tropopausic interactions, including transfers across the boundary between upper

and lower atmosphere, are considerably more complex than those of the relatively tranquil stratosphere, and thus more difficult to assess

Also more iS known about ozone depletion (as a result of a continuing international collaborative effort)

than the radiative forcing (global temperature) issues associated with conventional aircraft emissions

In support of the environmental element of the recently established Advanced Subsonic Technology

program, NASA issued a research announcement in October 1993 soliciting proposals for work directed at understanding and predicting the atmospheric effects of subsonic aviation, in particular, those

related to commercial aircraft at cruise altitudes 5 The primary areas of concern, because of their potential role in global warming, are the effects of emissions on atmospheric water content and on ozone

concentrations in the upper troposphere and lower stratosphere Requested funding for fiscal year

1994 was $85 million

3 Estimated development costs for a 250-seat Mach 2 transport are$1Obllllonto$15 bllllon, direct operating costs could be 40 to

50 percent higher than for current long-range subsonic aircraft Pierre Aparaco and Carole A Shlfr{n, “European Firms Team on

Supersonic Studies Awahon Week& Space Techr?o/ogy Apr 11 1994 p 21

4 Robert Anderson, NASA High Speed Research Dwlston personal commumcatlon, Dec 17, 1993

5 National AeronauIlcs and Space Admlnlstratlon, “Atmospheric Effects of Avlatlon/Subsonlc Assessment Modeling DataAnalySIS and Measurements In Support of the Advanced Subsonic Technology Program “ research announcement NRA 94- OA-01, Oct

15 1993
Chapter 4 Research and Technology issues 1123

aircraft, and expertise in emission control technologies far exceeds our understanding of the impacts

of aircraft engine emissions on the atmosphere

and global climate.

The task of measuring atmospheric constituents in the upper troposphere and modeling their

behavior is daunting. Even the less complex

chemistry and dynamics of the stratosphere are

not well understood, despite years of observation

and calculation. In short, the scientific community

lacks definitive analyses of the behavior of upper

tropospheric elements to either support or refute

assumptions related to aircraft impacts.

At the December 1991 meeting of the International Civil Aviation Organization (ICAO) Committee on Aviation Environmental Protection,

members discussed increasing the stringency of

the existing nitrogen oxides (NOX

) standard and

heard proposals for introducing limits on NOX

emissions at cruise altitudes.22 Consideration of

these limits will likely resume at the next meeting

of the ICAO Committee on Aviation Environmental Protection, scheduled for late 1995 or

1996. Participants at a 1992 Office of Technology

Assessment (OTA) workshop concurred that an

estimated $100 million, spread over a five-year

period, would be needed to support a comprehensive scientific assessment of subsonic aircraft’s

impact on the atmosphere.23

The highly developed general circulation model (GCM) is an important tool in predicting future

climate changes, as is the parametrization of complex, small-scale physical phenomena.24 Both depend on atmospheric measurements for further

validation. Their capabilities also depend on highperformance computing technologies (see below). Major advances in GCMs are needed, especially those related to the representation of ozone

The Perseus IS an example of remotely piloted aircraft developed specifically for high-alhtude atmospheric data collection
124 I Federal Research and Technology for Aviation

formation, cloud formation and dissipation, and

mixing and transport inside and through the tropopause.

25

Weather

Storm research has significant benefits for a r

transportation. In addition to programs for the development of weather observation and data processing systems, a comprehensive federal effort is

under way in more basic weather research. In the

early 1990s, FCCSET steered this effort, designated as the U.S. Weather Research Program. The

program’s goals were to achieve by 2000 operational atmospheric prediction for North America

based on mesoscale observations and model results, and to establish the scientific and technological basis for global atmospheric mesoscale prediction, in order to meet the weather information

demands of the 21st century. 26 Figure 4-1 shows

funding for the four major elements of the U.S.

Weather Research Program budget for fiscal year

1992. The Department of Transportation (DOT)

provided more than one-third of that fiscal year’s

mesoscale weather system budget; the $1 8.4-million funding came from the FAA’s facilities and

engineering budget, not the research, engineering,

and development budget.

DOT/FAA support was directed at enhancing

numerical modeling and numerical weather prediction techniques specific to aviation hazards and

for short-term forecasts (“nowcasts”), sensors and

software algorithms for the detection and measurement of meteorological phenomena hazardous to aviation, and other tools tailored for aviation meteorologists, air traffic controllers, and

60

40

VI c

.-=

“;

m

20

0

52.8

19.5

MWS SIP HML P&Bl

MWS = Mesoscale weather systems

SIP = Scale-interactive processes

HML = Hydro-meteorological linkages

P&Bl = Physical and biogeochemical interactions

SOURCE Ofhce of Technology Assessment, based on FAA National

Science Foundation, and Federal Coordmatmg Council for Science,

Engmeermg, and Technology, Committee for Earth and Environmental

Sciences, 1992

27 For example, commercial and private pilots.

R&D is under way at NCAR using dual-wavelength radar to estimate the rate and characteristics

of precipitation to be able to more effectively

combat icing on the ground. FAA continues to

support algorithm development activities by

NCAR and the National Weather Service Forecast

Systems Laboratory; requested funding for fiscal

year 1994 was $19.36 million.28

25 jack Durham, Dire’ -(or, EpA office of Environmental Processes and Research, perSOna] communication, Apr. 18. i 994.

lb Mesos~a]e refers t. tie intermediate scaie of processes and events-smaller, localized phenomena—that interact with larger and smaller

scale atmospheric procesw~ to produce local and regional weather. Precipitation, for example, is inherently meso~ca!e in nature. Federal Coordinating Council for Science, Engineering and Technologyr

, Committee on Earth and Environmental Sciences, Subcommittee on Atmospheric

Research, Predict/rig Our }~’e~lther: A Str(ite,qic Plunjiv the U.S. Weather Re~eurch Progrurn (Washington, DC: Office of Science and Technology Policy, July 1992), pp. 7,9.

‘7 Ibid., p. 32.

28 Greg Geisler, Analyst, FAA Office of the Budget, personal communication, June 22, 1994.
Chapter 4 Research and Technology issues 1125

The U.S. Weather Research Program no longer

benefits from the visible, high-level coordination

effort it had under the FCCSET Committee on

Earth and Environmental Sciences, Subcommittee on Atmospheric Research. Under the new National Science and Technology Council committee structure, there is no entity charged with

reviewing the multiagency weather research effort, assessing strategies, or developing priorities

and goals.29

The capabilities derived from fundamental

weather science rely in turn on a host of new

technologies to integrate and analyze the data, and

present it in a useful, timely manner. These

technologies, and the corresponding R&D projects, are described in a later section.

 High-Performance Computing

Increasingly, advances in aeronautics are closely

linked to high-speed computing capabilities.

Along with supercomputers, mass data storage capabilities and advanced visualization techniques

are essential to continuing improvements in computational fluid dynamics (CFD) and other numerical analysis methods used in the design of aircraft and support systems. Applications include

three-dimensional fluid mechanics for combustion, high-lift/low-drag design, system noise prediction, and structural assessments. Modeling of

the Earth’s atmosphere and of the behavior of elements within that complex environment also depends heavily on computing capabilities, as does

real-time simulation of ATC or security system

operation.

NASA’s Numerical Aerodynamic Simulation

Program was created to ensure the United States’

continuing leadership in CFD. The program’s

linking of supercomputers for CFD with high-performance workstations enables visualization of

various physical phenomena—such as pressure

fields, combustion, and turbulence-that have application in the design of aircraft and propulsion

devices and modeling the atmosphere and weather

systems.

. .

,:- -:\:

;. ,

CFD visualization of tiltrotor aircraft and complex flow phenomena behind rotors

z>,“

29 See Natlona] Science and Techno]og y Council, Executike Secretariat office, ‘The National Science and Technolog) CTourwll 1;}’95 Prxgram Document,” unpublished document, Mar. 17, 1994.
126 I Federal Research and Technology for Aviation

A combination of private sector development the driving force behind increases in computing

of hardware, university research in computer lan- capabilities for aeronautics. However, a major

guages, and NASA development of application component of theory and tool validation efforts is

codes and communication technologies has been facilities (see box 4-2).

Before advanced computational methods and “virtual” laboratories were a gleam in any researcher’s

eye, a wide array of facilities was constructed to assist in developing theories of flight and aircraft control Beginning with the first National Advisory Committee for Aeronautics (NACA) wind tunnel, these

facilities have been Instrumental in evaluating the performance of scaled models in various flight regimes, gauging the effects of design changes on flow characteristics, allowing designers to optimize

and integrate aircraft components; and making powerplants more resilient to debris, severe weather,

and other hazards to engine Integrity

One of the first major advances in research facilities was the introduction of closed-circuit, pressurized wind tunnels in the early 1920s. This permitted investigators to vary the density of the air in the

tunnel and to extrapolate results expressed in the nondimensional Reynolds number 1 The closed-clrcuit tunnel is one of many types, as summarized in the table

Type

Closed circuit,

continuous

Open circuit

Induction

Intermittent or

blow-down

Types of Wind Tunnels

Description

Air circulates in a closed loop, permitting conditioning (e g., temperature,

pressure, and volumetric flow).

Air is discharged into the atmosphere

after passinng through test section

High-velocity streams of air rejected

into tunnel just downstream of test

section entrain air into tunnel and

establish flow.

Utilizes air supply from a storage tank.

SOURCE Office of Technology Assessment, based on H W. Llepmann and A Roshko, E/emer?fs of Gasdyrrarmcs (New York, NY

John Wiley & Sons, Inc , 1957)

In concert with instrumented full-scale

flight tests, the body of validated aerodynamic data grew steadily; refinement of

wing designs and engine nacelles, and

deeper understanding of many aerodynamic phenomena followed.2 In turn, this

led to increases in aircraft fuel efficiency

and reductions in noise,

Awareness of the wide disparity between theoretical and experimental aeronautics capabilities in Europe and in the

United States at the outset of the first

World War led to the creation of NACA

and establishment of legislative support

for U S. aeronautical research 3 Today,

U.S progress in advancing the caliber of

its wind tunnels again lags behind that of

some European agencies,

(continued)

1 Expre~~ed ~~ Re, the Reynolds number IS a nondimensional parameter representing the relatwe magnitude of vlscosltY effects

m fluld (e g , air) flow By changing the pressure and veloclty of aw wlthm a wmd tunnel, investigators could simulate conditions on a

larger scale of the model being tested

* Roger Bl[steln,orders ofMagn/tude A HLstory of the NACA and NASA, 1915- 19~, NASA SP-4406 Washl@on Dc National

Aeronautics and Space Admrustration, 1989), pp 10-11

3 Ibid , pp 3-4
Chapter 4 Research and Technology issues 1127

Advances in computing speed and data storage mance in response to inservice conditions.30 CST

also have facilitated the development of computa- tools enable treatment of couplings between structional structures technology (CST) a tool for com- tures, aerodynamics, propulsion, and controls in

puter-based mathematical representations and a realistic, reliable manner without resorting to

predictions of various aircraft subsystems’ perfor- 31 CST and the “pa- compromising assumptions. -

The Boeing Commercial Aircraft

Group tests about 12,000 hours per year

in wind tunnels—for a couple of reasons,

about 20 percent of this testing is performed outside the United States (e g , in

France and Russia) 4 First, for the new

aircraft designs, the ability to conduct

tests at the highest Reynolds number

available IS necessary The National

Aeronautics and Space Administration

(NASA) Langley Research Center operates a suitable tunnel, but manufacturers

find its “productivity” iS so low as to be

unusable for aircraft development tests 5

Second, there are no U S alternatives to

the Langley tunnel or European facilities

In addition, the manufacturers face dif -

The frost NACA wind tunnel was completed m 1920 at the

Langley Research Center

ficulties in carrying out programs with less stringent facilities requirements Many of the NASA Ames

Research Center tunnels regularly used by manufacturers are or wiII be shut down for refurbishment

Some military-owned and -operated tunnels are Increasingly available, but scheduling testing periods

in these facilities iS risky, as commercial ventures can be displaced by high-prlorlty defense activities

NASA and Industry are working to develop the requirements and estimated costs for a new high-Reynolds number high-flow quality and productive tunnel complex A broad, multiagency study of national facilities needs has been completed and iS being used as a basis for the NASA-industry study 6 Further advances in the nation’s aerodynamic simulation capability depend in part on enhancements to

aeronautical testing facilities

4 Calvin Watson Boeing Commercial Airplane Group personal communlcatlon, May 5, 1994

5 That ,~ the turnaround time for setting up a test and collecting data Is len9thY

6 Calvln Watson BOeln9cOrnrnerClalAlrplane Group personal commumcatlon Aug 3 1994 and also see National Faclllty Study

Team Naf)ona/Facl/lfles Study Summary Reporl working draft Feb 25, 1994

i
128 I Federal Research and Technology for Aviation

perless” airplane concept used in the development

of the new Boeing 777 aircraft also have potential

for revised certification methods.32

 Complex Software

The development of the Airbus A320 airplane initiated a new era of civil aviation characterized by

increasing dependence on flight-crucial digital

avionics. The fly-by-light technologies featured

in new aircraft depend on complex control systems; this increases the possibility that design

faults will persist and emerge in the final product,

despite rigorous and systematic testing.33 Complex software reliability and certification has

emerged as a long-term research issue. Guaranteeing that millions of lines of software being developed for aircraft management systems (and ATC

systems) are without critical faults may be impossible; FAA may need to determine the level of

complexity that permits validation.

Software Verification and Validation

The 1985 Radio Technical Commission for Aeronautics (RTCA) document RTCA/DO-178A provides guidelines for aviation software certification. The document “. . . explicitly refuses to

mandate quantitative terms or methods for evaluating software reliability.”34 RTCA emphasizes a

disciplined approach to software design over

quantitative methods for error analysis. But conventional testing and evaluation techniques cannot address the two major reliability factors, hardware component failures and software design

errors.

NASA is investigating the software development process called out in the RTCA/DO-178A

guidelines through its Guidance and Control Soft35 A joint NASA Langley R e - ware experiment.

search Center and RTCA project, sponsored in

part by FAA, the GCS experiment is designed to

help characterize the software development process and understand failure behavior. Of particular

significance is whether or not there are any critical

faults 36 latent in the software after it has completed the DO- 178A process.37

Complex control systems incorporating new

digital technologies are also subject to malfunction and damage from electromagnetic field

(EMF) sources. In 1992 and 1993, airlines increasingly chose to restrict the use of certain electronics by passengers during takeoff and landing;

portable radios and cellular phones have been prohibited altogether. Another area of concern is the

increasing complexity of the national ATC system

and its reliance on complex software systems,

which may be subject to the same design and EMF

hazards.

 Materials

A multiyear, multiagency venture is under way to

increase the effectiveness of the federal R&D program in materials science and technology.38 Initially developed and coordinated by FCCSET, the

program is now steered by the NSTC Committee

32 For ~xample, extensive “se of computer-aided design and manufacturing techniques for the 777 drastically revised tie production Process.

33 Bev Littlewood and Lorenzo Striginl,“ ‘The Risks of Software,” Scienli’c Arner/can, November 1992, p. 62.

34 Ibid., p. 66.

35 Anita M. Shagnea, Research Triangle Park, and Kelly J. Hayhurst, NASA Langley Research Center, “An Evaluation of a DO- 178A Software Development Process, ” [EEE, April 1991, pp. 97-102.

36 A Crltica] fault is defined as one that would prevent the safe flight and landing Of the aircraft.

37 Shagnea and Hayhurs[, op. cit., footnote 35, p. 101.

3X Federal Coordinating Councl) for Science, Engineering, and Technology, Committee on Industry and Technology, Ad\wwd Mureriah

and Processing: The Federal Program In Materials Science and Technology, A Report by the FCCSET Committee on Industry and Technology

to Supplement the president-s Fiscal Year 1993 Budget (Washington, DC: Office of Science and Technology Policy, May 1992), p. 8.
Chapter 4 Research and Technology issues 1129

on Civilian Industrial Technology. Materials of

particular interest to the aviation community are

advanced metals and polymer matrix composites

for airframe structures and high-temperature

polymeric, intermetallic, and ceramic matrix

composites for subsonic and supersonic gas-turbine engines. 39 Validating the technical feasibility y

of manufacturing these components and lowering

the cost of engineered materials are challenges

that require sustained effort to achieve.40 Traditionally, these have not been FAA activities: rather, industry and NASA/DOD have taken on such

tasks.

Materials science and technology does have a

critical role in FAA’s R&D programs. For example, airport pavement advances lag behind current

aircraft technologies. Federal R&D addresses

three areas for meeting new pavement requirements: pavement design and evaluation, new materials and construction methods, and repairs and

maintenance techniques. FAA’s primary goal is a

common pavement design theory; there is growing concern that current procedures do not accurately predict the damage to pavements from existing and new aircraft.41

Aircraft

There is already substantial use of composite materials in new subsonic transports, and more is

planned (e.g., for future 737 models and the proposed all-composite civil tiltrotor aircraft). Innovative structural concepts and improved fabrication processes will enable stronger and more

cost-effective primary wing and fuselage structures. 42 This, and advanced engine technologies,

will result in extended range and reduced noise

and emissions. Other applications of advanced

materials are liquid crystal displays, fire- and

smoke-resistant cabin materials, aviation security

technologies, and eventual replacements for

ozone-depleting substances.

To reduce drag and improve fuel savings for future supersonic aircraft, NASA is investigating

laminar flow wing designs and new composite

materials for lighter airframes; advanced ceramic

and other high-temperature materials for engine

cores are also being studied. For example, ceramic-matrix composite materials may be used to reduce the weight and flow requirements of the exhaust and noise-suppression systems for the

high-speed civil transport.

43 Rather than using an

inherently quieter but complex widely variable

engine cycle, a large and effective suppressor can

be attached to a relatively simple engine .44

A key role for FAA is to evaluate the system implications of the use of these new materials, for example, increased susceptibility to lightning and

other flight safety hazards. FAA has requested that

the National Materials Advisory Board (NMAB)

study the effects of new materials on the safety of

future advanced civil aircraft. For the study,

NMAB will identify new candidate materials and

structures for advanced subsonic aircraft and suggest laboratory testing and inservice monitoring

programs; NMAB will also recommend methods

for FAA to enhance coordination with industry

and other government laboratories .45 In addition,

FAA devotes roughly one-third of its aircraft

39 Ibid., p. 32.

w For ~ ~lSCu\jlOn of the major ~aterla]$ techno}~gy drivers expected for the aircraft industries, see National Research Council, National

Materials Adv]\or} Board, ,tlu(eriul~ Reseur(h Agcndu for fhe Aufomori\e und Aircrafl Indu.sfrlc.s, NMAB-468 (Washington. DC: National

Academy Prcs~, 1993).

41 L1 ~, Dep:ifllT1ent of Tran~poflation, Federal Aviation Administration, A/rPorf Pa}ernenfs: &dUtiOn.$ for TOnlOrrfj~t”\ Alrc>r~~fr (Atlantic ,.

City, NJ FAA Technical Center, April 1993), p. 9.

~1 Federal coordinating Council for Science. Engineering and Technology, op. cit., fo~~ote ~~, P 60”

~~ Temer,ce J, Hcfll< Manager, Adv~Ced subsonic Technology. Office of Aeronautics, NASA, pt?r\Ond COmmUnlCatlOIl, Apr. ~~, 1994.

w Bill Sweetman, “’why Composite~ Wait in the Wings,” lnterajiu Atrlj.spuce Re\ie)t, April 1992, p. 53.

45 Natlona] Material J Advljory, Board, Nationa] Research Council, NMAB Ne~\’.\/t’l/er, 1994. p. 7.
130 I Federal Research and Technology for Aviation

crashworthiness/structural airworthiness program

to long-term study of new aircraft issues

($1.4 million of $4.1 million requested for fiscal

year 1994).

Airport Pavement

The existing classes of pavement are: 1) a flexible,

asphaltic concrete layer followed by various layers of sub-base; and 2) a rigid, portland cement

concrete layer followed by various layers of subbase.% Current design methods for rigid and flexible pavements do not allow for valid comparison

between these two types of pavement.

A layered-elastic pavement design theory is the

most likely near-term candidate for permitting

rapid analysis of both pavement types and combinations of types (i.e., a rigid or flexible pavement with a flexible overlay), as well as the use of

different materials and compositions. FAA has

initiated research on this theory and developed a

preliminary computer-based design model. DOD

Waterways Experimental Station (WES) of the

Army Corps of Engineers is also exploring the use

of layered-elastic theory for pavement design;

FAA is coordinating with DOD to avoid duplication. WES has developed a computer model of the

layered-elastic theory for use on a mainframe

computer. The FAA Technical Center is doing

sensitivity analyses and further developing this

code for use on personal computers.47

Alternate pavement materials being investigated for their strengthening and life-lengthening

properties include recycled rubber (for asphalt)

and polymer fibers, grids, and sheets. Remaining

research needs include defining future airport-aircraft compatibility issues, particularly those related to larger and heavier planes (i.e., 1 to 1.5 million pounds). Requested

pavement technology for

spending for airport

fiscal vear 1994 is .

approximately $4 million; FAA staff estimate that

$300,000 of this effort is devoted to long-term research .48

NEW FUNCTIONS AND

TECHNOLOGY OPTIONS

Numerous technologies have been developed to

improve the efficiency of aircraft and the ATC sys -

tem, mitigate hazards to flight, and assist airlines

and airport operators in complying with safety and

environmental requirements. Nevertheless, expanding the technology base will aid in solving

continuing problems. New aviation technologies

include advanced sensors and measurement devices, new materials, satellite-based communications and positioning systems, and automated decisionmaking systems. Few, if any, radical

changes are envisioned for the air transportation

industry; instead, incremental improvements in

capacity, safety, security, and environmental

protection are anticipated from the implementation of these technologies.

 Capacity

The primary components of the nation’s ATC system are described in box 4-3. Enhancements to

airspace and airport capacity are achievable largely through communications, navigation, and surveillance (CNS) improvements, and optimized air

traffic management. Table 4-1 outlines the numerous technology options. In addition, improved

weather technologies, enhanced landside and airside access, and alternative transportation

technologies offer delay reductions and further increases in system capacity.

M Rigid ~avenlcnts use ~ s[lff Uppr ]ayer that deforms only slightly, while flexible pavements use a flexible upper layer [hat distributes

deformation throughout all of the pavement layers.

47 Satlsh Agrawal, Manager, Airpofl Technology Branch, FAA Technical Center, personal communication, Apr. 3~, 1992.

4X John Rj,b~a, FAA R&l_j ~ogrilm Ana]ysls Division, personal communication, NOV. 30, 1993.
Chapter 4 Research and Technology issues 1131

The air traffic control system operates on four levels tower facilities, terminal radar approach control

facilities (TRACONs), air route traffic control centers (ARTCCs), and one central flow control facility, the

ATC System Command Center (ATCSCC), near Washington, DC Unlike other control facilities, CFC assesses airport capacities nationwide using weather information and meters the takeoff of aircraft to reduce delays at destination airports across the country

Air traffic controllers consider their fundamental responsibility to be maintaining safe separation between aircraft In addition to separation assurance and flow control, the ATC system provides weather

and flight information, navigation aids and traffic management, and Ianding services 1 Controllers’ tasks

are made easier by numerous tools (e g , computers and display terminals) and, Increasingly, automation aids

Communications

Today, voice radio over the high frequency and very high frequency (VHF) radio bands remains the

primary medium for communications between pilots and controllers There IS Iimited use of air-ground

digital datalink using the Aeronautical Radio, Inc (ARINC) administrative message system 2 The Federal Aviation Administration is pursuing the transmission of real-time ATC and weather Information using a

mode-select (Mode-S) datalink, which would permit digital messages to be addressed to specific recipients

An aggressive federal-industry effort is under way to develop and implement two-way datalink,

which wiII permit automatic dependent surveillance (ADS)—essentially the frequent, reliable reporting

of aircraft position data obtained from onboard navigation equipment

Navigation and Guidance

CiviI navigation needs spread across the continuum of oceanic, en route, terminal, and airport surface segments; they Include precision and nonprecision approaches and auto-landing 3 FAA iS responsible for the development and Implementation of radionavigation systems to meet the needs of all civiI

and military aviation, except those unique to air warfare 4 Ground-based navigation equipment and airborne receivers currently provide pilots with the aircraft’s position relative to an airspace corridor, airport, or runway 5 In the next century, satellite-based systems are anticipated to be the principal radio

navigation aid used by aircraft in all segments of flight 6

Global Navigation Satellite Systems (GNSS)

GNSS offers the aviation community major Improvements in navigation capability The U S Global

Positioning System (GPS), developed by the military is available free-of-charge for civilian uses for 10

years, beginning in 1993 In June 1993, FAA approved use of basic satellite-based service for supple-

(continued,)

1 u s congre~~, Offlce of Technology Assistance, Arport and Alr Traffic Contro/ System, OTA-STI-I 75 (Washington DC U S

Government PrmhngOffice, January 1982), p 68

2 The system IS deslgna~ed the ARINC Commumcatlons and Reporhng System (ACARS)

3 u s Department of TraflSpOffallOn, Fedefal AVlaf/On AdrnlnlS/rallOn, ~rPOfi Technology Program P/an (Allan/lC C~tY NJ Federal

Aviation Admmlstratlon Techmcal Center, November 1991), p 3-15

4 Ibid p 3-18

5 U s congress Off Ice of T~chnO[~gy Assessment ~rPOfl Sys/em ~eve/opment OTA-STI-2SI ~ashlngton, DC u S Government Prlntlng Off Ice August 1984), p 62

6 u s Department of Transpoflatlon, Federal Avlatlon Adrnlnstratlofl concepts and ~escrlp(lon ot~~e future A/r Tratlc Managment System for the Urvted States (Washington, DC April 1991), p 8
132 I Federal Research and Technology for Aviation

mental en route, terminal area, and nonprecision approach navigation. Research issues include worldwide Integrity, failure warning, and accuracy augmentation systems (e g , differential GPS)

Precision Approach and Landing Technologies

FAA requires Increased separation between aircraft and use of Instrument-aided approaches when

visibilty is minimal 7 Under the current system (instrument landing system—lLS), all aircraft approaching an ILS-equipped runway must merge into a single fixed path that extends 5 to 7 miles from the

runway threshold and descends at a fixed slope (3 degrees or less).8

ILS replacement is scheduled for 1998 under international agreement. In 1978, the International Civil

Aviation Organization (ICAO) selected microwave landing systems (MLS), which overcome many of the

disadvantages of ILS, as the successor to ILS. The projected installation costs for MLS receivers, delays and changes in FAA’s MLS program, and the potential near-term, relatively Inexpensive application

of satellite-based technology have undermined the appeal of MLS. In June 1994, the FAA Administrator

announced the termination of the development program for MLS for the most restrictive categories of

precision Iandings, Category 2 and Category 3. 9 Installation of MLS Category 1 systems at 22 U.S.

airports will be completed as planned.

Surveillance

In domestic airspace, a combination of primary and secondary radar provides controllers with aircraft position data 10 (Air traffic controllers also use surveillance radar to monitor both weather developments in the terminal area and surface traffic movements. ) An automated radar terminal serivce computer system (ARTS II or Ill) combines data from both systems for display

The present oceanic ATC system relies on pilots’ hourly position reports, transmitted over human

factors voice communications Iinks. This procedural operation requires aircraft to follow rigid, fixed

tracks with Iimited flexibilty often necessitating inefficient separations and routes In the future, datalink

and satellite-based navigation systems will permit user-preferred routing.

Weather

Weather service is divided between the Departments of Commerce and Transportation The Federal

Aviation Act of 1958 directed the National Weather Service (NWS) to provide reports, forecasts, and

warnings required for the safe and efficient movement of air commerce; FAA became responsible for

the dissemination of the weather information.11 Over the years, FAA and NWS have established several

joint programs, including the Next Generation Weather Radar (NEXRAD) Program Council. Several of

the technological approaches to expanding airspace capacity hinge on providing improved weather

Information to pilots, flight dispatchers, and controllers.

7 F/@ ~la~~lfle~ the weather Condltlons as category 1, 2, and 3, In order of their severity The least strln9ent of the approaches,

Category 1, establishes a 200-foot celllng and l/z-mile vmbhty requirement

s Off Ice Of Technology Assessment, OP clt , footnote 1 P 92

9 CNS ou~look, VOI 2, No 6, June 151994 P 3

10 The Primary racjar ,~sues radio pulses and estimates an alrcrafi’s distance Using reflected s19nals Secondary surveillance

radar (SSR) uses beacons or transponders, aboard the aircraft totransmlt coded ldentlty, position, and altltude responses to groundbased interrogators The SSR ground equipment and onboard transponders are known collectively as the Air Traffic Control Radio

Beacon System

11 Edwins Harris Jr Associate 

,,

Admmlstrator for Development and Log@cs, FM, testimony at hearings before the House

Commltteeon Science, Space, and Technology, Subcommittee on Transportation, Awatlon, and Materials, Sept 30, 1987, p 59
Chapter 4 Research and Technology issues 1133

Enhancement area

Reduced en route separation

Increased aircraft arrival/

departure rate

Low-visibility surface operations

Minimal runway downtime

Reduced airport surface

congestion

Requirements

Frequent reliable communications,

precise, reliable onboard navigation

Reduced Iongitudinal separation

Reduced arrival time variability

Reduced runway occupancy time

Multiple Independent approaches

Low-visibility Ianding

Less delay due to weather uncertain

ties

Improved ground surveillance

Enhanced situation awareness

Reduced maintenance requirements

night construction techniques

Reduced

Reduced

servicing

gate occupancy time

apron space required for

aircraft

SOURCE Off Ice of Technology Assessment, 1994

Communications, Navigation, and

Surveillance

The primary objectives of CNS R&D are reduced

en route separation requirements and improved

terminal area productivity y (see figure 4-2), but expanded communications capabilities will provide

additional benefits (e.g., from commercial activities such as passenger entertainment and business

communications). The major enabling technologies are:

satellite CNS (removes line-of-sight constraints):

digital data] ink (less congestion, more reliability, and faster transmission of messages); and

precision approach and runway monitoring

techniques (including enhanced vision).

Enabling technologies

Datalink, satellite communications,

navigation, and surveillance-global

navigation satellite system

Wake vortex detection and prediction

Automated sequencing, ATC/aircraft

integration

High-speed exits, advanced Ianding

gear and brake design

Blunder protection precision runway

monitoring

Precision approach aids synthetic

vision

Improved weather detection and forecasting

Runway and taxiway status Iighting

automated detection systems

New pavement design and construction techniques, improved rubber removal technologies

Positive visual guidance aids for aircraft docking pneumatic and electrical systems housed underground or

in passenger Ioading bridges

Satellite CNS and digital datalink

Both satellite navigation and digital communications are key components of the future global airspace system envisioned by FAA and ICAO (see

boxes 1-3 and 4-3). Global Positioning System

(GPS) navigation under visual flight rules was approved June 9, 1993.49 Also in 1993, FAA initiated a phased effort to integrate navigation via the

GPS satellite network into instrument flight operations, as outlined below:

■

■

Phase 1: GPS is permitted as a supplemental

navigation system. (Ground-based navigation

aids must be available as backup. )

Phase 2: GPS is permitted as the primary guidance system. (Ground-based navigation aids
Examples:

Objectives:

■ More operations per runway

● More operating runways per airport

 Minimized delay

~ No diminished safety

Enabling methods and technologies:

Enhanced terminal area air traffic management through

upgraded information requirements, advanced traffic displays,

and automation improvements

Integrated aircraft and ATC systems through augmented

flight facilities and systems sensitivity evaluation

Reduced aircraft separation standards through wake vortex

systems, ATC-compatible cockpit equipment, ready information

for lateral spacing; and requirements development, integration,

and assessment

Enhanced low-visibility landing, runway turnoff, and taxi operations

+

+’

+

=’”;””~”””’””’” ’=$””’’’””””” “’”

=“’”:’’’’’’’’’’’’’”””=’’””””?:::’:””

Reduced longitudinal separation

+

Nontransgression zone

Nontransgression zone

+- +

Simultaneous independent approaches on multiple parallel runways

KEY ATC = air traffic control, CTAS = Center - TRACON (terminal radar approach control) Automation System, FMS = flight management system

g’

SOURCE Office of Technology Assessment, based on National Aeronautics and Space Admmlstrahon, 1994
Chapter 4 Research and Technology issues 1135

are not required at destination or alternative airport. )5o

Each of the phases will be observed for the basic applications: oceanic; en route; and terminal

area through nonprecision and precision approaches. Phase 1 of the instrument flight rules

(IFR) application was enabled when initial operational capability was achieved (i.e., completion of

the GPS satellite constellation, announced by

DOD in December 1993). For phase 1, receiver

autonomous integrity monitoring is required; the

GPS Integrity Broadcast, part of the proposed

Wide Area Augmentation System,5l is expected

to be the primary means of ensuring signal integrity for phase 2.52

While international aviation leaders are convinced of the potential savings satellite navigation

will provide to airlines, some have expressed concern that the system remains under DOD control;

they worry that the system will be turned off at an y

time to preclude precision military attacks against

U.S. troops and facilities. In response, the Secretaries of Defense and Transportation requested the

formation of a task force to discuss issues of system management, operation, and long-term sustainment. The task force released a report on its activities and recommendations in December

1993. 53 In addition, an executive board representing civilian and military interests was established

to ensure that civilian worldwide operations remain feasible.54 Other concerns include the poten -

tial for intentional or inadvertent jamming of the

GPS signals and “spoofing.”55

FAA, in the meantime, is working to obtain international definition and endorsement of a global

navigational satellite system (GNSS) that can be

implemented over the long-term (GPS is perceived as a viable near-term vehicle for satellite

navigation capability). Toward this end, required

navigation performance criteria arc sought. that is,

performance-based standards for supporting

equipment. There is also talk of a civil ian-funded

satellite network for navigation, and hope that the

Global Orbiting Navigation Satellite System

(GLONASS), initiated by the former Soviet

Union, will become operational. Ultimately, GPS

may or may not become part of a broader network

of systems (including Inmarsat, GLONASS. and

state-sponsored satellite systems) that compose

GNSS: at the very least. the United States wishes

to participate in the negotiations over the system’s

structure.56

A concurrent effort aimed at improving airspace efficiency via satellite CNS is under way to

permit automatic dependent surveillance (ADS,

see box 4-4). ADS promises significant fuel savings for flights in oceanic airspace: domestic ADS

is not anticipated until the next century. Until

then, integration of flight management systems

and four-dimensional navigation systems with

ground-based sequencing for user-preferred routing and increased fuel savings is the goal.

S() John J. FCa”l\i&f, senior VICC pre\i~Cnt and General Mmager. The Mitre Crop,, pemoll:ll COmITIUnlCatlOn. Apr. ~t). I ~~~.

s 1 [n June ] ~~~ F,,fA ~nn(>unCcd [he [aunCh of:1 iix-lear program to dei elop the Wide Area Augmentation S}fstem ( W’AAS ). Scheduled tO .

become operational in 1997, WAAS will uw a network of ground itations to enhance the integrit! and a~ailability of GPS signali for supp)r-t Of

all phases Of naf igatlm, The sy ~tcnl al~~ ha$ the potential for usc in C’ateg~r) 1 prec i~ion approtichc~. This last capah i I ity, ~t i 11 under con~idcratlon by a joint DOD DOT task force. hlngcs on the disfcmintition of differential correction sign:il~ b} satell itc. ‘LFA.A launches W’AAS Program,” C,VS Outl{M)k, }01. 2, No, 6, June i 5.1994. p. 1.

s~ ]bjd,

5 ~ see Joint 1]OD DOT Tu~~ ~orcc, “The ~;loba} p~si[i~ning s} item: Management and operation 01” a Dua] ~l~C S} \tclll.” ~1 RCV~rt to the

Secretaries of Dcfen~c and Transportation. unpubll~hed documcn~, December 1993,

54 ~~canl~idc~, op. cit., footnote 50,

55 ~(lnlrll;rlr re]:ltej t. ~1 \loIld] Illtidc Un:iY:ii]:Iblc, a conditi(jn recogni~ed by s} ~tcn] uscr~. Sp(M)/in,q rtfm to the intent Ional iswc Of w CIYOe . .

ncou~ ~lgnal, unhno~~n to an aircraft. (3PS ~1 gnal format ands i~c of the constc] lat ion m:ihc spoofing di f’ficult. although i t pow\ the greater wfcty

ri~h. Jamming, w hllc more technically fca~lble, i~ a r]~k common 10 other na\ igat]on \y items. Loll, op. cit., footno[e 49.

~~ Mich:le[ sh~~, Satc[[ltc Sy$tern \lana:er, FAA Sa(cl]jtc CNS program, pcrwnal Corlllllurlic:ltiorl.” SCPI. ~, I ~C~~.
136 I Federal Research and Technology for Aviation

Automatic dependent surveillance (ADS), which is not yet available, will implement satellite-based

navigation and communications to provide real-time surveillance Information over the ocean and in lowdensity en route airspace. Current voice relay of position reports wiII be replaced with two-way datalink,

which IS essential to full implementation of ADS Also needed are adequate ground-based systems to

display aircraft positions to air traffic controllers

Using datalink, information generated by an aircraft’s onboard navigation system can be automatically related via satellite to air traffic control centers and displayed in a manner similar to radar. Frequent and rapid transmission of accurate aircraft position data, along with quick receipt of ATC instructions, offers reduced separation and optimized flight routes, even over remote areas 1 In addition to

position reports, ADS wiII provide aircraft intention and operational data that support air traffic management and collision avoidance tools.2

U S airlines expect substantial savings of time and fuel over oceanic routes with Implementation of

ADS methods Quickly obtaining clearance to climb to higher altitudes as fuel loads lighten or to

change routing to achieve more favorable wind conditions are the key mechanisms for reducing fuel

burn Today, track systems over the Pacific and North Atlantic Oceans are adjusted twice daily in response to forecasted winds More precise navigation capabilities (such as those possible with the global navigation satellite system) and ADS wiII enable decreased Iongitudinal separation between aircraft,

helping to reduce delays in congested flight tracks particularly over the North Atlantic.

With the Federal Aviation Administration, United Airlines has participated in position reporting trials

over the Pacific Ocean since April 1992 and iS already saving as much as $100,000 in fuel costs per

year for the 747 aircraft Involved 3 Estimated savings are $2 million for 19944

Gwen a 1995 implementation date, United Airlines expects cumulative savings of $200 million in fuel

and direct operating costs for the balance of the decade 5 The airlines are pressing the FAA Administrator to push for the 1995 start date However, FAA does not expect the supporting ground infrastructure to be in place until 19966 Part of the delay relates to FAA’s Oceanic Display and Planning System

(ODAPS), intended to provide controllers with accurate, continuous display of aircraft positions based

on pilot reports; ODAPS has experienced a number of software problems In addition, there are institutional issues to overcome regarding provision of the ground-ground data communications link (i.e., between ATC facilities in different sovereign systems) and validated procedural changes.

1 u s Department of Transpofiatlon, Federal Aviation Admlnlstratton, COnce@s and Descr@lonOff~e Furure Ar Traflic Mana9e

ment System for fhe Umfed States (Washington, DC April 1991), p 9

2 Ollver Sutton FANS To Rescue 21st Century Alr Traffic, ” /nferavla Aerospace Review, December 1989 PP 1171-1174

3 “united Expects $3OO Mllhon in Saving From SATCOM,’ Awaflon Week & Space Technology, Oct 1 * 199*, P 40

4 Scott Stahr, Staff Representatwe, New Technology Engmeermg, United Airhnes, personal commumcatlon, Aug 5, 1993

5 Ibid

6 Joseph Fee, Manager, FAA Oceanic System OfflCe, personal Communlcatlon, SePt 3, 1993
Chapter 4 Research and Technology issues 1137

Message exchange using datalink offers nearterm, systemwide improvements, including relieving overburdened ATC radio frequencies at

many terminals. 57 Unlike conventional voice

communications, datalink offers both textual (i.e..

directed at humans) and machine-to-machine formats.58 A common digital system can support all

basic functions that depend on radio-frequency

propagation (e.g., communications, navigation.

and surveillance) .59 In addition, groups of data

having distinct priorities can be transferred rapidly on common channels. The primary links will

likely be Mode-S, VHF (using commercial communications and reporting systems), and satellites. (See figure 4-3 on datalink connectivity.)

Precision approach and landing

To permit more closely spaced arrivals and departures under IFR conditions, precision navigation,

enhanced vision, and improved surveillance capability are required. A favored but largely unproven

alternative to microwave landing systems is to

augment the accuracy of GPS technologies. FAA

has a cooperative research agreement with NASA

Ames Research Center for evaluating local differential GPS operational performance for precision

approaches, and is coordinating with the ICAO

R&D group for developing GNSS navigation

(FANS IV).6O

To date, FAA has approved one nonprecision

approach using GPS as the primary navigation

aid—at the Steamboat Springs (Colorado) airport,

which began in 1994. FAA is planning to use the

Houston airport as a test bed for studies of local

differential GPS-based precision approaches into

mountain airports. Continental Express is seeking

supplemental type certification for special (i.e.,

single operator, not public) Category 1 approaches

into Steamboat Springs and Aspen. FAA also is

evaluating GPS-based Category 1 approaches in

Juneau. Alaska, and likely will begin testing at the

Dallas-Fort Worth Airport in late 1994.61

Surface guidance, surveillance, and control

Surface traffic procedures at U.S. airports have

changed little in decades. Technologies of various

complexity offer several potential benefits, including improved pilot-controller communication,

reduced controller workload, less time and fuel

spent on taxiways and runways, and less risk of

runway accidents. Closer aircraft spacing will

help to increase the average takeoff and landing

rates.

In 1993, United Airlines and Aeronautical Radio, Inc. (ARINC) began conducting tests of differential GPS and a modified ARINC Communications and Addressing Reporting System

(ACARS) datalink for real-time surface traffic

surveillance at O’Hare International Airport.62

Advancements in airport surface detection equipment (ASDE) will improve display resolution and

weather penetration. Introduction of solid-state

ASDE-3 at 31 domestic airports began in 1992.

These and related technologies are described in

table 4-2.

Lighting and signage changes offer equally

welcome safety and productivity improvements.

At smaller airports, however, the cost of some new

technologies has prompted investigation of alternative means of achieving improved surface guidance. For example, the North Dakota Department

of Aviation tested reflective signs for taxiways

58 Andre\}, plckens< Ay,Com, Inc., “Aeronautical Data I.inks: A Ca\~ stud!.

“ OT”A contractor repot-t. Feb. 28, 1993, p, 2.

“) I bid.. p. 3.

N) LI ~, [>epartrllent of Tran~Wfiation, Federal Aviation Adnuniitration, ‘

ll~p{~~ / Z c /i/i~~/f),~~ Pr{~<<rat?l Plan (Atlantic City, NJ: Federal Aviation Admlnistrution Technical Center, Nof ember 199 I ), p. 3-16,
138 I Federal Research and Technology for Aviation

/ ’

i

VHF

-/A

~

, .

I 1 L-i

\

Satellite

1

SOURCE The Mitre Corp 1992

and runways to demonstrate an alternative to ex- $1,250, compared with an estimated $17,500 for

pensive FAA-mandated internally illuminated electrically illuminated signs required by FAA.63

signs. At one airport in this project, the cost for FAA subsequently placed a moratorium on the

purchase and installation of reflective signs was signage mandate, pending further analysis.64

fJ3 GarY Ness, Director of North Dako(a Aeronautics Commission, persona] Communication, Mar. ] 2, 1993.

64 See Jeanne M, OIivier, “Aviation Research and Technology Needs for Airport Operators and State Aviation Authorities, ” draft OTA background paper, July 1, 1993, pp. 14-15.
Chapter 4 Research and Technology issues 1139

Technology Purpose — Comments

Airport Surface Detection Provide controllers with real-time, highEquipment (ASDE-3) resolution display of ground traffic positions via radar and datalink.

Airport Movement Area Safety Alert controllers to potential runway incurSystem (AMASS) sions using automated radar terminal

system and ASDE data and safety logic

processing,

Airport Surface Traffic Phase 1 Using AMASS, alert controllers

Automation (ASTA) to runway Incursions and reforms pilots of

runway status.

Phase 2 Using Mode-S datalink of differential Global Positioning System position

reports, wiII provide aircraft identification

and Iocation on surface situation display;

also, automatic traffic planning and datalInk of taxi clearance

Runway and taxway status

Iights (e g , stop bars and

takeoff hold Iights)

Smart Iighting

Phase 3. Provide automatic cockpit alerts,

automatic taxi guidance and surveillance,

and transmission of route clearance data.

Stop bars warn pilots not to proceed on

runway until it has been cleared. Takeoff

hold lights Indicate that another aircraft or

ground vehicle has entered runway

Enable control of individual airfield Iights

or groups of lights (e g., for status lighting), control .signals are sent over existing

power cables

SOURCE Off Ice of Technology Assessment, 1994

Air Traffic Management

The heart of FAA’s efforts to both modernize the

national airspace system and meet future air traffic

management needs is the development and use of

automation to reduce controller workload while ■

making critical information more readily available to pilots. In the mid- 1980s, NASA Ames Research Center began to develop a system for the ■

automated management and control of arrival traffic. NASA’s Center-TRACON Automation System-consists of three types of integrated tools:

ASDE-3 to be placed at 37 busiest

domestic airports—first field site iS

Seattle-Tacoma International Airport (Sea-Tac) in 1994

Operational demonstration at San

Francisco International Airport

completed, second demonstration

planned for Boston

In March 1993, Lincoln Labs and

FAA conducted an offline (out-oftower) demonstration of ASTA-1

status Iights at Boston Logan airport

Stop bars tested at Sea-Tac and

John F Kennedy International Airport, automated stop bar system

initiated at Sea-Tac in 1994

Runway status lights, activated by

information from ASDE-3 and

AMASS, are being tested at Boston.

In 1994, completed evaluation of

smart Iighting with stop bar system

at FAA’s Technical Center and

demonstration at Detroit airport

Complete system at Salt Lake City

planned for 1995

Traffic Management Adviser (TMA) sequences and schedules arrival traffic to minimize delays.

Descent adviser provides cruise speed and descent clearances to help aircraft meet TMA’s

schedules with minimum fuel consumption.

Final approach spacing tool (FAST) assists

TRACON controllers in spacing aircraft accurately on final approach.65

65 Heinz Erzberger, NASA Ames Research Center, “CTAS: Computer Intelligence for Air Traffic Control in the Terminal Area,” unpublished document, October 1991, pp. 3-4.
140 I Federal Research and Technology for Aviation

The first major element of CTAS to be evaluated in the field is TMA. FAA selected the Denver

Center as the field site; operational evaluations

began in late 1992. Completion of the prototype

TMA is expected in 1995.66 A real-time simulation evaluation of FAST, continuing since November 1990, exposes FAA operational controllers to a variety of traffic conditions, including

runway capacity-limited arrival rates under IFR

conditions, overcapacity rates, closely spaced parallel runway operations, and multiple missed approaches.67 FAST and descent adviser prototypes

are scheduled to be available in 1996 and 1997, respectively. 68

Automated en route air traffic control

Automated en route air traffic control (AERA) is

designed to assist ATC personnel in predicting

and resolving traffic conflicts (flow control and

traffic management), and to permit more fuel-efficient, user-preferred flight paths. To be implemented in three phases, FAA plans to introduce

AERA 1 in 1997. Full implementation is expected

early in the next century.

Weather Technologies

Another key component of the system is the Advanced Weather Interactive Processing System

and supporting communications systems, without

which the rapid dissemination of weather data is

less feasible.69 Modernization depends on the integration of Next Generation Weather Radar

(NEXRAD), Automated Surface Observing Systems, satellite systems, and supporting mesoscale

Satellite observational systems help to reveal hazardous

weather phenomena, such as the extensive snow system that

disrupted traffic in the eastern United States in March 1993

atmospheric science. The intended result is a significant improvement in forecasting ability,

which in turn will allow better assessment of potential weather-related delays across the nation.

To consolidate data from the enhanced observation systems described above into information that is immediately usable by nonmeteorologists (e.g., controllers, pilots, dispatchers, and

airport operators), FAA is conducting an aviation

weather development program. 70 This program

supports three major capital investment plan initiatives, the Aviation Gridded Forecast System,

the Aviation Weather Products Generator (AWPG),

and the Integrated Terminal Weather System.

@ Barry SCO[[, FAA Li~i~On to NASA Ames Research Center, personal communication, Aug. 1, 1994.

67 Er~berger, op. cit., footnote 65, p. 1 I.

M me Prototyp is tie product of full oFra[lonal testing and evaluation; once his phase has been comp]eted for a CTAS element, it can be

fielded at any FAA developmental site (e.g., Denver and Dallas). According to FAA, the prototypes will likely be fielded first at the Denver site.

Ibid.

w National Research Council CoInml\slOn on Engineering and Technical systems, Committee on National Weather Se~l~e ‘Odemiza-

(ion, 7intwd u N.w) Nuriond/ Weudwr Ser\’ice, Second Report (Washington, DC: National Academy Press, March 1992), p. 35.

7~ David A. s~nke~, FAA Aviation Weather Development Program, “An Overview of FAA-Sponsored Aviation Weather Research and Development,”’ unpublished document, n.d., p. 1.
Chapter 4 Research and Technology issues 1141

Element Purpose

Aviation Gridded Forecast Translate state-of-the-atmosphere data

System (AGFS) into aviatilon impact variables to produce

aviation weather forecasts

Aviation Weather Products Create high-resoluhon displays of hazGenerator (AWPG) ardous conditions and other operationally significant weather

Integrated Terminal Weather Generate four-dimensional estimates of

System (ITWS) current and predicted hazardous weather, datalink to pilots for cockpit display

SOURCE Off Ice of Technology Assessment, 1994

Comments

Receives meteorological data and forecasts from the National Weather Service (NWS) National Meterological

Center

Assembles AGFS data for regional and

national flight planning Information iS

transmitted to en route centers the

central flow control facility, and flight

service stations

Receives gridded observation and

forecast data from NWS every five minutes and combines these with FAA terminal sensor data (I e from Terminal

Doppler Weather Radar and Low-Level

Wlndshear Alert systems)

Being developed for FAA by NCAR, AWPG is the likelihood of accidents and mitigate the efintended to serve both the pre- and en route flight

phases on national and regional scales. Products

under investigation include icing characterization

tools for use in the cockpit, predictive thunderstorm and gustfront forecasting, and turbulence

identification. In 1993, FAA completed preliminary testing of AWPG prototypes at the Denver en

route center, Denver automated flight service station, and FAA Technical Center. FAA is seeking

to transfer further development of AWPG to the

private sector and has established Cooperative

Research and Development Agreements with

commercial weather service providers. FAA facilities and equipment appropriations for fiscal

years 1993 and 1994 were $26.1 million and $36.4

million, respectively, for AWPG.71 Table 4-3

summarizes AWPG and other weather development program elements.

I Safety

Through design certification, maintenance oversight, and the introduction of new safety technologies and procedures, FAA attempts to both reduce

fects. Objectives include improved collision

avoidance, hazardous weather detection, airworthiness of aging and newer aircraft, and optimal

selection and training of controllers, pilots, and

other personnel. Several of the safety concerns

and related technology developments are listed in

table 4-4. Some of these issues are described more

fully below.

Enhanced Situation Awareness

Negotiating through crowded skies, adverse

weather. or atmospheric hazards. a pilot relies on

many observational tools. Perhaps the most significant change in avionics since the introduction

of glass cockpits will be ascribed to a more comprehensive situation awareness system intended

to place the pilot in a visual flight rule-like situation at all times. 72 In 1992, Boeing and United

Airlines jointly launched the Enhanced Situational Awareness System project, intended to include

the following capabilities:

■ collision avoidance and techniques for avoiding flight into terrain or obstacles:
142 I Federal Research and Technology for Aviation

Enhancement area

Aircraft, component

reliability

Detection, prediction of

hazardous weather

Human performance

Fire suppression

Impact survivability

Inflight collisions, runway

collisions

Cabin air quality

Limitations

Lengthy, tiring inspections

Harsh operating environments,

Long service lives

Measurement and forecasting

Inadequacies, equipment

obsolescence

Fatigue, boredom, hubris, injury

Fuel flammability, inaccessibility

of some inflight fires, distance to

accident site

Weight, bulk of materials

Congestion, poor visibility, pilot

error, air traffic control error,

mechanical failure

Enabling technologies

Fail-soft a technologies, nondestructive

Inspection/evaluation technologies,

anticorrosion applications

Integrated ground-based sensors, predictive

algorithms, airborne detection systems

Realistic simulators, enhanced humanmachine Interfaces, crew coordination, protective equipment,

Onboard extinguishing systems, fire-retardant

materials, airport rescue and fire fighting

services (Iow-visibility operations, penetrating

nozzles for cabin fires)

Impact-resistant designs (seats and fuselage),

‘(hardened” evacuation systems

Collision avoidance, ground-proximity warning,

and enhanced situational awareness systems,

surface control and guidance

Fuel efficiency goals and available Filters.

bleed air from engines

a Fad-sott refers to warning of degraded performance

SOURCE Off Ice of Technology Assessment, 1994

m

●

■

■

takeoff and landing performance monitoring;

improved weather radar, turbulence detection,

and predictive windshear sensors;

headup display; and

enhanced vision for takeoff, approach, and

landing.

These technologies have varying degrees of

readiness. As of December 30, 1993, all of the Part

121 fleet is required to be equipped with the version of the airborne Traffic Alert and Collision

Avoidance Advisory System (TCAS) that detects

and displays range, bearing, and altitude of transponder-equipped aircraft within 4 nautical miles,

alerts pilots to aircraft within approximately 40

seconds of closest approach, and advises pilots to

climb or descend when intruding aircraft is

equipped with altitude-encoding transponders.73

Pending certification by FAA, United Airlines

plans to implement in 1994 predictive or “forward-looking” windshear detection systems on its

A320 aircraft. This technology was the subject of

a widely appreciated joint FAA/NASA research

and development effort, considered to be “. . . independent verification that the [predictive]

technology works and is certifiable.”74 Enhanced

vision and other landing aids that allow operation

in all but the worst weather would provide significant economic returns to the airlines, but difficult

technology development and certification challenges lie ahead.

7355 ~

-

(

,(/era/ ReglY(er 13247 (Apr, 9, [ 99(.)). By February 9, 1995, a]] Part 135 aircraft with 10 to 30 passenger-seats must be equipped witi

the version of TCAS that only protidcs pilots with traflic advisories. 54 FederalRegiwr951 (Jan. 10, 1989).

TJ Jerry Aubrey, Lead Engineer, uni[e~ Airlines New Technology Engineering group, Pt?rsona] COItlITIUnlCNIOll, Aug. 5, 1993.
Chapter 4 Research and Technology issues 1143

Icing anti Hazardous Atmospheric Conditions

Airlines combat the icing threat by applying (hot)

deicing or anti-icing fluids to wings and critical

surfaces exposed to freezing precipitation. Varying weather conditions, poor visibility, and gate

and runway delays compound the problem of

assessing the degree of icing hazard. The effectiveness of deicing and anti-icing techniques varies for different airplane types and precipitation

conditions. Most ground deicing operations are

done at the gate; few U.S. airports have incorporated runway deicing facilities. Should the pilot

determine ice removal is warranted, significant

time penalties can result from returning to gate,

awaiting a second deicing, and re-queuing for

takeoff. Because ice contamination was suspected

as the primary cause of the March 1992 crash of

USAir Flight 405, considerable public attention

focused on FAA’s ground deicing regulations. At

the time of the accident, FAA rules prohibited

takeoff if ice, snow, or frost was adhering to critical surfaces, but no procedures for determining

these conditions were delineated.

Under regulations effective November 1, 1992.

pilots retain the ultimate responsibility for verifying that the plane’s wings are free of ice.75 

HOWever, programs have been established for airline

operators and pilots to increase their awareness of

the hazard. In addition, specific procedures stipulating how and when to check for and remove ice

during ground operations have been added to the

regulations. 76 Holdover time, the estimated time

before ice accretion begins after a surface has been

treated with Type I or Type II fluids, now determines the window of opportunity for takeoff,

inspection. and reapplication of fluids.

In 1992. FAA initiated efforts to assess the

holdover time of deicing and anti-icing fluids, and

conducted a survey of aircraft ice detectors for

T

Commercial transport aircraft undergoing wing deicing

both inflight and onground applications. Results

of this survey indicated that technology for inflight ice detectors was adequate, and in most

cases appropriate inflight ice detectors were available from sensor manufacturers. However, FAA

noted a void in available on ground aircraft surface

ice detectors, and the need for development of new

sensor capabilities .77

The FAA Technical Center issued a Broad

Agency Announcement in February 1993 to facilitate technological developments in this area. Several contracts with industry and grants with academia have been awarded; they will continue over

several years. The new technologies typically use

some form of video, laser, radar, or other broad

coverage technology as opposed to spot sensors

that cover only a local area of an aircraft .78 In addition to R&D in atmospheric icing characterization

and the detection of freezing precipitation, FAA is

supporting the study of advanced wing and engine

deicing concepts, methodologies for their certification, and computer modeling.
144 I Federal Research and Technology for Aviation

The FAA/NASA Integrated Wind Shear Program, begun in 1986, focuses on detection, avoidance, and survival of severe windshear conditions,

with a goal of at least 30 seconds warning. In

1990, NASA Langley conducted computer and

pilot simulations of airplane recoveries from microbursts, evaluating both the recovery procedure

and the point at which it was initiated. The latter

proved most effective in simulation. Completed in

1993, NASA’s research program included windshear phenomena characterization, forward-looking avoidance capability, and flight management

system concepts that promote risk-reduction piloting. 79 FAA is in turn developing the related

performance standards.80 The fundamental requirement, according to NASA, for a forwardlooking system is: 1 ) real-time remote sensing,

and 2) the ability to reliably measure line-of-sight

and vertical components of wind velocity and

alert crew to an approaching windshear hazard.81

Several advanced technologies offer predictive, forward-looking windshear detection capabilities. These include passive infrared technology, Doppler radar, and light detection and ranging

(LIDAR) devices.82 Passive infrared systems

monitor shifts in temperature to identify the cold

cores of microbursts. Using microwaves, weather

radar gauges windshear patterns by tracking water

droplets. LIDAR detects air motion by tracking

the movement of dry particles.83 Other applications of passive infrared technology include detecting clear air turbulence, volcanic ash, wake

vortices, and the location of the jet stream.84

NASA has been testing all three systems aboard

its Transport Systems Research Vehicle, a 737

outfitted with both conventional and research

flight decks that enable investigation of innovations in cockpit display formats, contents, and inaircraft operations.85 These tools can be integrated with enhanced vision or situation awareness systems, along with severe weather displays

being developed under the AWPG program.

Aging Aircraft

The key safety objectives for aircraft with long

service histories are detecting and arresting any

fatigue-initiated structural damage before multiple site damage occurs. Box 4-5 summarizes the

primary technical issues. Ultrasonic scanning,

eddy-current probing, and other existing inspection technologies require trained technicians and

are very tedious. Wider use of some nondestructive evaluation (NDE) technologies has been

constrained by equipment cost.86 New technologies are being sought to improve the speed and

reliability of aircraft inspection techniques.

FAA’s aging aircraft program includes extramural exploratory research to determine the effects of corrosion on crack growth rates and an

evaluation of boredom, fatigue, and tedium expe79 ROwlmd L. B~w]es, ‘“Reducing windshe~r Risk Through Airborne Systems Technology,” paper presented at tie 17~ Congress of tie

International Council of the Aeronautical Sciences, Stockholm, Sweden, Sept. 9-14, 1990, p. 1; and Hertz, op. cit., footnote 41.

so ~ster Reingo]d, “waging War on Wind Shear,” Air Transport World, March 1992, p. 70.

81 Russell Targ et al., “Coherent LIDAR Airborne Windshear Sensor: Performance Evaluation,” Applied Opfics, vol. 30, No. 15, May 20,

1991, pp. 2013-2026.

82 JR. Wilson, “Danger Forecast for pilots, “ lnteru~ia Aerospace Re\’iew’, May 1991, pp. 65-66.

~~ Reingold, op. cit., footnote 80, p. 70.

84 Ibid.

85 NASA Lang]ey Research Center, “TransWfi Systems Research Vehicle (TSRV) and TSRV Simulator,” Lungley Aerospace Tesl HighIighfs, NASA Technical Memorandum 104090, 1990, p. 92. As of July 1994, NASA has begun to equip a 757-200 model that is scheduled to

replace the 737 in 1996. Interim projects are planned for both aircraft until the transition is complete. Hugh Bergeron, FAA Liaison to NASA

Langley Research Center, personal communication, July 27, 1994.

86 Alan S. Brown, “Seeing Beneath the Surface With NDE,” Aerospace America, vol. 30, May 1992, p. 28.
Chapter 4 Research and Technology issues | 145

rienced by maintenance personnel during inspection and repair. 87 NASA conducts large-area inspections research and performs other aging

aircraft R&D in cooperation with FAA. One of the

nation’s largest aviation-specific NDE R&D programs is managed by the NASA Langley Research Center.88 In large part, NASA’s structural

analysis activities are aimed at predicting the remaining usable life of aircraft. The FAA-supported Center for Aviation Systems Reliability, a

consortium of institutions based at Iowa State

University’s Institute for Physical Research and

Technology, is developing analytical models for

quantifying inspection effectiveness for various

methods and equipment.89

Cabin Safety

Like aging aircraft, an area of particular importance to Congress is cabin safety. FAA develops,

tests, and evaluates numerous cabin safety

technologies for transport airplanes, rotorcraft,

and general aviation aircraft. The majority of the

work takes place at the Technical Center and the

Civil Aeromedical Institute. FAA also relies on

NASA and the National Institute of Standards and

Technology for contract or cooperative work in

crashworthiness and fire safety, respectively.

Time and the thermo-toxic environment are the

most critical survival factors in aircraft accidents

involving fire. 90 Beginning in the 1980s, several

improvements to the cabin interior have been developed to delay the onset and expansion of

smoke and fire. Also, equipment changes have

been imposed to help speed the exit rate from the

aircraft (e.g., floor-path lighting and dual-lane

A robotic rivet inspection tool under evaluation for use m

aircraft maintenance

slides). However, aircraft evacuation system performance is also highly dependent on its human

elements; the preparedness and performance of

flight attendants factor greatly into the success of

an evacuation. Technologies taking on larger roles

in training flight attendants include motion-based

cabin simulators, full-scale cabin/cockpit evacuation trainers, cabin evacuation simulators, and actual aircraft.91 Some operators also use computer87 U .

s Congress, Genera] AcC~un[lng office, Aging Air<.rafl: FAA NCC(lS Comprehen.sl\e Plan Ti] C(wrdinute Gownmenr and In~iu.~rrY

Actions, GAO RCED-90-75 (Washington, DC: U.S. Government Printing Office, December 1989), pp. 8-9.

~~ Bro~n, op. cit., footnote 86, p. 29.

XY Ge]lman Research ASSocia[ej, “Coordination and Cooperation in Federal Aviation Research.” OTA contractor report, Dec. 30, 1992, p.

16, and ibid., p. 30.

go Game( A. McLean et al., “me Effects of wearing Passenger Protective Breathing Equipment on Evacuation Times Through TYPC III and

Type IV Emergency Aircraft Exits in Clear Air and Smoke,” Final Report, DOT FAA AM-89 12, No\ember 1989, p. 1.

~ 1 Natlona] Tran~pOfi~tiOn Safet) Board, F/i~h/ A//erl{/an/ Train[n~ and perfbrmun(e ~urit?~ ~’nler<~enc?’ S/tlWf/’On.$, special Investigation

Report, NTSB SIR-9202 (Washington, DC: June 9, 1992), p. 18.
146 I Federal Research and Technology for Aviation

Mutiple site damage (MSD), caused by widespread cracking of the structure, leads to degradation

of the aircraft’s residual strength to an unsafe level

Corrosion is a time-dependent process that decreases the size of structural members and leads to

higher stresses and lower structural margins Corrosion has undesirable synergism with the factors that

lead to cracking

Fatigue damage, repeated application of pressure cycles during flight, is the primary cause for fatigue damage to the fuselage, whereas fatigue damage to wings iS caused by ground-air-ground cycle

forces and by pilot-induced maneuvers and turbulence

Nondestructive evacuation (NDE) is Inspection technology central to early detection of corrosion and

fatigue-related damage. No single NDE method successfully identifies all types of damage to all types

of material.

Structural repairs, intended to restore static strength, may not fulfill damage-tolerance and fall-safe

requirements

Terminating actions, in Federal Aviation Administration language, are the structural actions necessary to eliminate MSD Further testing and analysis IS required before the design Iife of the terminating

actions or the inspection Intervals for continued airworthiness can be established,

SOURCE National Research Council, Transportation Research Board, Winds of Change Dornest/c A/r Transport

Since Deregulation, Special Report 230 (Washington, DC 1991)

.assisted instruction.92 However, the training

provided in mockups does not test the flight attendants’ ability to manage passenger flow, which

has become increasingly important as seat density

has increased.93 Computer-based simulations of

emergency evacuation could be useful for displaying the predicted effects of different commands

and situations on passenger behavior and egress.94

FAA is developing a new cabin safety program,

with increased funding for evacuation R&D.

Scheduled to formally begin in fiscal year 1996,

the program, in cooperation with British investigators, will study competitive behavior of passengers and the impact of flight attendants on the

evacuation process.95

Because demographics indicate the average

mobility of passengers will decrease in the future,

efforts toward extending survivable conditions

(beyond the extra time provided by materials improvements) within the aircraft may be more fruitful than attempting to further speed evacuation

rates. Two such concepts are cabin water spray

systems and passenger protective breathing

equipment (smokehoods). Although they are

lightweight, simple to use, and mitigate the effects

of toxic gases and smoke, smokehoods require

time to be donned, possibly delaying passenger

evacuation during the period when conditions permit the fastest egress. FAA concluded that this

92 Ibid., p. 19,

93 Nora Marshall, Senior Accident Investigator, National Transportation Safety Board, personal communication, Nov. 16, 1992.

~~ See u.S. Congress, Office of Technology Assessment, ““Aircraft Evacuation Testing: Research and Technology Issues,” background paper, September 1993, pp. 37-41.

9S Constantine Sarkos, M:lnager, FAA Fire Safety Branch, pmonal communication, May 11, 1994.
Chapter 4 Research and Technology issues 1147

factor reduces their potential to save lives and may

even result in more deaths.96

Water spray, because it works independently of

fire origin, has more potential to delay flashover—the eruption of flames throughout the cabin—under a variety of fire scenarios.97 The benefits of cabin water spray include cooler cabin

temperatures, suppressed ignition of cabin materials, delay of flashover, absorption of combustion

gases, and washout of smoke particles. The possibility of inadvertent system discharge during

flight and the weight/cost and reduced visibility

are key drawbacks that preclude near-term implementation. The concept demonstrated effectiveness in full-scale U.K. and U.S. test beds suggests

further R&D, with the aim of improving the costbenefit ratio, is warranted.

Human Factors

Essential ingredients to safe operation of the aircraft and airspace systems are:

■

■

training for individual technical skills, judgment, and crew communication; and

technology that supports reliable, timely airground communication and improved situation

awareness (e.g., aircraft positions, atmospheric

hazards, and system faults or failures).

The broadest area of technology application to

improve safety is human factors. Employing systems with advanced sensor technologies, communication capabilities, and increased computer involvement are central to a safe (and competitive)

air transportation system. However, the end user

As for other aviation personnel, airport rescue and fireflghting

(RFF) crew capabilities must be developed and exercised

regularly An RFF vehicle IS shown extlngulshing a fuel-fed fire

during a tralning exercise at New York S La Guardia Airport

of these systems and the ultimate responsible

agent for safety is still the human. Therefore, FAA

and the aviation industry are well aware that the

design, introduction, and safe use of these systems

must address the human factor.

Existing training tools, such as crew resource

management, 98 have been greatly aided by new

data and performance assessment methods,99 

as

well as by FAA guidelines. 100 High-fidelity simulation and computer-aided instruction have improved the training capabilities of FAA and airlines alike. NASA and FAA have simulation

capabilities ranging from low-cost, part-task simulators to full-mission simulators. The high-end

aircraft simulators contain full-motion systems

and high-resolution visual generators, as reflected

96 Louise Speitel and Richard G. Hill, “Study of Benefits of Passenger Protective Breathing Equipment From Anul> si~ of Past Accident~,”

Fintil Report, DOT FAA’ CT-88 03 (Atlantic City, NJ: FAA Technical Center, March 1988).

‘

)7 The mandated implementation of state-of-the-art, heat-resistant materials (we 14CFR 25.853) limits the utility of further materials R&D

over the near term. Con~tantine Sarkos, Manager, Fire Safety Branch, FAA Technical Center, personal communication, Apr. 22. 1992.

‘)x See footnote 16.

99 Earl Wieneret al., Cockptl Reiource A4unt/<qcmenf (San Diego, CA Ac~idcnlic Prcs~. 1993 ), And U.S. Department of Transportatlcm, Federal Ak lation Admini~tration, Volpe National Transportation Systemi Center, ‘“Crew Resource Nlanagement: An introductory Handbook,”

DOT-VNTSC-FAA-92 -8, unpublished document, August 1992.

I(KJ u s Department of Tran~pofia[ion, Federal A\ iltion Administration. . . “Cre~ Rcwurcc hlantigcmcnt Training,”’ Adf iior> Circular

] 20.5] A Feb. 10, 1993.
148 I Federal Research and Technology for Aviation

Desk-top computers are increasingly used in pilot training.

in the 747-400 glass cockpit simulator. 101 Beginning-to-end, human-in-the-loop system simulations, complete with air traffic, are possible to establish human factors design and procedure

guidance. 102

In general, the increasing complexity of ATC,

aircraft, and security technologies requires an improved understanding of the human-machine interface in aviation. Any technological aid for improving traffic control or aircraft performance

must not add to controller or pilot workload or

stress, design-induced errors, or loss of situation

awareness. Otherwise, these human factors will

be compounded and overall safety diminished.

 Security

The civil aviation security program is structured

around detecting, deterring, or mitigating the terrorist threat, one defined in terms of small quantities of explosives and personal weapons. FAA’s

R&D effort is directed at both technology development (i.e., developing a suite of security

Ever-changing security threats spur advances in technologies

and methods for screening aircraft passengers, carry-on

luggage, and cargo

technologies, procedures, and certification methods) and program integration and implementation. 103

Its major elements are projects in explosives

and weapons detection, aircraft hardening, airport

security and perimeter control, and the integration

of security systems, including the human elements (see table 4-5). This section discusses the

complementary efforts in explosives detection

and aircraft hardening, and the expanding field of

aviation security human factors.

Explosives and Weapons Detection

Small, concealed explosive devices pose the most

severe threat because they are difficult to detect

and can cause tremendous destruction and loss of

life. 104 While technically feasible, the detection of

all weapons is complicated by many factors, including the range of weapons available, the inverse relationship between detection threshold

and false alarm rates, and the large number of pas11)1 me 747.u) ~irllu]a[or has IXen Opertitional since (lctober 1993. Hertz, op. cit., footnote ~~.

lo~ HOfmann, op. cit., footnote 7.

103 me technc)]ogy de~e][)pment ~onl~nen[ is ]ikened [0 P]acing a num~r Of devices On a She]f, ready for use by FAA, industry, or e~ en

other governments. Paul Poliki, Director, FAA Aviation Security Research and Development Service, personal communication, Apr. 28, 1994.
Chapter 4 Research and Technology issues 1149

Enhancement area Requirements .—

Explosives detection High throughput, low false alarm rate

Less operator fatigue, boredom

High confidence for small quantities

Other weapons

Blast mitigation

Access control

detection High throughput, low false alarm rate

Less operator fatigue, boredom

Recognize new materials

Low weight

Durability

Mimmized retrofit costs

Compatibility with aging aircraft requirements

Compatibility with multitude of airport

configurations, services

Efficiency of movement

ATC system security Reliability, accessibility

SOURCE Off Ice of Technology Assessment, 1994

Enabling technologies

X-ray, nuclear radiation, and electromagnetiC energy detector computerized tomography

Trace detectors, canines

Passenger/baggage matching

Passive and active passenger screening

Inductive metal detectors

Reflectometry, millimeter wave holography

Passive and active passenger screening

Hardened luggage containers

Venting

Cargo Iiners

Powerplant control methods

Entry control

Perimeter surveillance

Baltlmore-Washington International Airport

demonstration project

Complex software verification and validation, telecommunications hardening

sengers and baggage that must be inspected or

screened. 105

The FAA Technical Center is aggressively

working the explosives detection facets of its security program. The R&D program focuses on

two new basic explosives detection system

technologies, bulk detection and trace detection.

Bulk detectors use nuclear radiation, x-ray techniques, or electromagnetic energy to identify explosives based on analysis of their elemental or

structural composition. The limitations of existing concepts include size, shielding requirements,

throughput, and false alarm rate.

Trace detection technologies rely on identifying the presence of explosives by detecting actual

vapor or residual particle contaminants through

sampling the ambient air around the passenger or

baggage, collecting and separating the chemical

compounds of interest, and analyzing the samples

for traces of explosives.

106 Current technical challenges include quickly and reliably obtaining an

appropriate sample.

FAA plans to begin certification testing of explosive detection system in August 1994 using a

protocol developed by the National Research

Council. 107 Airport implementation is pending

the results of this testing and FAA regulation.

Testing protocols for trace detectors are still being developed the first to be completed will apply

to carry-on electronic devices. According to FAA,

protocols for other carry-on items and for passengers are not expected until mid- 1995. For checked

I(]$ lbl~,
150 I Federal Research and Technology for Aviation

baggage, bulk detectors will likely be the primary

screening method; trace detection may be used as

a secondary, confirming device.108

No single detector exists or will likely exist in

the near future that can provide practical, reliable

detection of explosives of the types and quantities

of concern to the aviation community. 109 A National Research Council committee, asked to review issues surrounding the implementation of

the Aviation Security Improvement Act of 1990,

concluded that FAA faces a systems engineering

challenge of combining detection devices and

procedures in a cost-effective manner. The committee recommended that FAA develop simulation tools for analyzing detection device requirements within various operating environments and

make these accessible to the aviation community.l10 In its own review of the security program,

OTA found that the throughput of security checkpoints can be improved by the incorporation of effective profiling techniques, which allow the

elimination of large numbers of passengers from

further screening. 111

Aircraft Hardening

FAA is also seeking ways of making aircraft less

vulnerable to explosions should screening mechanisms fail. Baggage container hardening has become a key aspect of FAA’s security program, and

one intended to yield near-term improvements in

survivability. (Box 4-6 describes the aircraft hardening program.)

Human Factors

A more recent concentration in the security R&D

program is human factors.l12 FAA is focusing on

three areas, the advanced screener checkpoint, domestic passenger profiling, and human systems

integration. Guidelines and standards that are

based on empirical data do not yet exist for the

detection of explosives and weapons, personnel

training, selection, and certification. FAA’s

Screener Proficiency Evaluation and Reporting

System (SPEARS) effort is designed to gather this

data, model and optimize screener performance,

and prepare guidelines and performance criteria.

Work in progress in support of SPEARS includes:

8

9

in-house laboratory and field assessment of the

effectiveness of computer-based training and

evaluation systems for x-ray screeners; and

extramural work to define the abilities and

traits of the “optimal x-ray screener”; the data

are intended for validation of commercial, offthe-shelf tests for screener selection. 113

Projects are also under way in developing and

testing domestic passenger profiling systems, including both passive and active methods. 1

14 FAA

feasibility studies of automated versions are

scheduled to begin in late summer 1994.

Additionally, in 1993, FAA began testing and

evaluation of an enhanced airport security system,

using the Baltimore-Washington International

Airport as the test bed for integration of EDS, acloB p~u] JankOwski, Sys(ems Development, FAA Aviation Security Research and Development Service, personal Communication, Apr. 28.

1994.

109 u s Congress, office of Technology Assessment, Technology Aguins/ Terrorism: SwucWring Security, OTA-ISC-511 (Washington,

. .

DC: U.S. Government Printing Office, January 1992), p. 57.

110 National Materials Advisory Botid, op. cit., footnote 104, p. 5.

1 [ I Offlce of Technology Assessment, op. cit., footnote IW, P. 71.

I I 2 For its security program, FAA considers hum~ factors to include all security system events, activities, and phenomena that signifiC~tly

influence operational human behavior and performance (e.g., selection and training, performance assessment and certification, job design and

workload management, motivation, human-equipment interface, perception, behavioral lapses, and health. Paul A. Polski, “International Aviation Security Research and Development, ’’Journal of Testing and Evaluation, vol. 22, No. 3, May 1994, p. 273.

113 “Aviation Security Human Factors,” FAA fact sheet, n.d.

I I q passive me~ods include tie collection of data from passports and tickets (e.g., flight origin, age, and nationality). Active profiling entails questioning of the passenger.
Chapter 4 Research and Technology issues 1151

In 1988, the Federal Aviation Administration’s security research and development program focused

on weapons detection The 1990 Aviation Security Improvement Act prompted modification and expansion of the program Between 1989 and 1991, overall funding rose approximately 210 percent, most of it

devoted to explosives detection 1

In 1992, the FAA RE&D Advisory Committee Security Subcommittee recommended that funding for

the aircraft hardening portion of FAA’s security effort be Increased “ [the c]ontainer program has the

potential to provide significant near-term payoffs and should receive special emphasis and funding to

ensure its earliest possible deployment “2 In 1993, the newly established hardening program budget

was $449 million, the request for fiscal year 1994 was $78 million

Key Aspects of Hardening Program

FAA's program IS concerned not only with structural sabotage from onboard explosive devices, but

also with spurious electromagnetic security signals that can sabotage or Interfere with the flight controls

of an aircraft 3 In addition, it recognizes the relatively new threat posed by surface-to-air misslles

The hardening program IS cooperative-FAA makes use of the talents at the Air Force’s Wright Laboratory, the Navy’s China Lake facilities, and the assistance of the National Institute of Aerospace Studies

and Services (NIASS) The latter IS an organization that coordinates Industry research and the sharing

of data, much of it proprietary 4 Since fiscal year 1993, Wright Laboratory has been conducting a modeling effort focused on narrow-body aircraft explosions 5 The effort has been augmented with FM monies in fiscal year 1994

For validating blast vulnerability analytical methods and testing potential hardening techniques,

NIASS has proposed use of an “iron bird” test bed, a reusable steel fixture representative of the forward

fuselage of a wide-body aircraft 6 FM expects the test bed to be completed in 19967

In a joint International program, FM iS concentrating on wide-body U.S. aircraft French and British

Investigators are studying the hardening of Airbus and narrow-body U S aircraft, respectively 8

(continued)

1 U S Congress, General Accounting Office, Awa(lon Research /nformatlon on Funding, Staffing, and T/ming of FAAS Research

Projects, GAOIRCED-92-1O8FS (Washington DC U S Government Prlntlng Off Ice, February 1992) p 20

2 Repofl of (he FAA RE&D ,f+dvlsory Conlrnlt(eeAvlatlonSecurlfy Research and Development Subcomrnlttee Sclentlflc Advisory

Panel, June 1992 p 11

3 pau[ A polskl “lnternat[onal ,Avlatlon Security Research and Development “ JOuMa/ of %W7CJ and Eva/uatiOn. vol 22. NO 3.

May 1994 p 271

4 N IASS consists of three teams representing the three U S airframe manufacturers a Memorandum of Understanding

delineates their respective responslbllltles Rokaya A1-Ayat, Aircraft Hardentng Research and Technology Program A Case Study

OTA contractor report August 1992 p 15

5 Major Stephen R Whitehouse U S Alr Force, Wrtght Laboratory Program Manager Commercial Aircraft Hardening Program

personal communtcatlon Mar 11 1993

G John Amalettl Vice President Operations, National Institute for Aerospace Stud(es and SerVICeS, personal Cornmunlcatlon

Feb 8 1993

7 Paul Polskl D[rector FAA Awatlon Security R&D Service personal communication Apr 28, 1994

8 polskl op clf footno[e 3, P 2 7 1
152 I Federal Research and Technology for Aviation

A near-term concept iS the hardened baggage container, to be used aboard wide-body passenger

aircraft Alternative hardening techniques (also required because containers are not useful for narrowbody and cargo aircraft) Include blast channeling and blankets, energy and fragment absorbing panels, and blow-out panels and venting 9

In the coming years, several technologies may be used to harden aircraft and their contents Attention to their Initial cost, weight, and durability is needed, but these are not the only issues for U S airIines For example, redesigning the layout of hydraulic systems to make them more resistant to damage, intentional or accidental, presents a problem to easy maintenance of an aircraft. 10 Because of the

expense of retrofitting the U S commercial fleet, many aircraft hardening elements wiII be Implemented

only in future aircraft designs

To help prevent catastrophic aircraft damage from small explosives, FAA IS investlgating hardened cargo container desIgns Shown iS a prototype container constructed of a highstrength, lightweight composite material

Of key importance iS the promise aircraft

hardening holds for reducing explosives

detection requirements.11 This iS particularly

advantageous in an environment where the

threat IS continually changing and system

security hinges on intelligence data With explosives detection system targeted at higher

explosive mass, expense and the fals e

alarm rate fall and throughput increases

FAA iS putting together an explosive modeling advisory group to delineate the type of

data required and how the data wiII be used

and validated. 12

Also, hardening may benefit from aging

aircraft and catastrophic failure prevention

R&D projects that augment the scientific understanding of aircraft materials In addition,

safety efforts such as propulsion-only control

and the reconfiguration of hydraulic Iines enhances the ability to withstand explosions However, to date, there has been little exchange of lnformation between commercial or military aging aircraft programs and the security program 13

9 A1.Ayat Op Clt footnote 4, p 20

10 polskl, Op clt footnote 7

11 T. ~au~e the same degree of damage to a hardened aircraft requires larger amounts of exploslve, Increasing weight and detectabhty Polskl, op cit , footnote 3 p 269

12 polskl, Op d footnote 7

13 An ,mportarlt Cons[deratlon,sthe charac!erlstlcs of the aging u S fleet and the extent towhlch aircraft hardening recommendations are compatible wlfh requwementsmandaled by the aging aircraft program A1-Ayat, op clt footnote 4, p 30
Chapter 4 Research and Technology issues 1153

cess control and intrusion detection devices, security procedures, and other technologies. 115 The

airport’s Enhanced Security Demonstration project is supported by an interagency agreement with

DOE’s Sandia National Laboratory, a cooperative

R&D agreement with the Maryland Aviation Administration, and a Small Business Administration program contract.

 Environment

R&D can assist in improving the environmental

acceptability of aviation operations while allowing for further growth in the air transportation industry. For years, federal programs in aircraft

noise abatement, engine emissions control, and

fuel conservation have been under way, conducted

primarily at NASA with help from airframe and

engine manufacturers (see discussion in chapter

3), FAA and EPA, along with the U.S. Air Force,

also contribute. Environmentally benign deicing

and anti-icing materials and recycling/replacement of halon are examples of relatively new objectives of the federal aviation environmental

protection effort. Other potential technology applications are listed in table 4-6.

Noise

The federal noise-related R&D program is comprehensive and multifaceted. NASA leads the

most extensive effort, directed at reducing aircraft

noise that propagates to the ground from a variety

of aircraft types—piston-powered, propellerdriven general aviation, business jets. commuters,

rotorcraft and the civil tiltrotor, as well as commercial transports. FAA participates in program

planning and provides a small amount of funding

to NASA ($1.3 million in fiscal year 1994). A

complementary effort focuses on minimizing the

engine noise transmitted to cockpit and cabin. Improvements in engine technology. airframe design

and integration with powerplants, and composites

constitute the means for reducing aircraft noise.

Enhancement area

Aircraft noise

Airport noise

Engine emissions at cruise,

water vapor/contrails

Groundwater contamination,

discharge into bays and lakes

HaIons and other stratospheric

ozone depleting substances

Airport surface traffic,

air pollution

Requirements

Reduce cockpit and cabin

noise, and engine and airframe

noise propagated toward

ground

Reduce community annoyance

Minimize climate Impacts

Reduce toxicity, oxygen

demand, and fertilization

Minimize use and develop

replacements

Reduce impact on local air

quality.

—— a Atrpacks are condmoned air supplles used while on the ground

SOURCE Off Ice of Technology Assessment, 1994

Enabling technologies

Active and passive cancellation devices

Engine/airframe integration high-lift/lowdrag operations

Abatement procedures

Soundproofing

Land use planning

Combustor improvements, alternate flight

procedures

Alternate substances, recovery of glycol

Recovery, recycling

Electric ground vehicles, reduced idling and

taxing times, electric-powered aircraft power unit, supertugs, airpacks a

Unleaded aviation gasoline

Low-emission jet engines — —-

I Is “Enhanced Aipfl Securl[y System: Baltimore-Washing[on International Airport,” FAA fact sheet. n.d
154 I Federal Research and Technology for Aviation

Noise reduction technology

In 1991, the Aircraft Noise Abatement Working

Group, chartered by the FAA Research, Engineering and Development Advisory Committee to review past and present aircraft noise abatement

technology, identified R&D areas that can “. . .

significantly mitigate the [subsonic] aircraft noise

problem to offer the promise of improving airport

capacity enhancement while maintaining envi-

~~116 In turn, NASA proronmental capability.

posed new subsonic noise reduction research in

five areas: engine noise reduction, nacelle aeroacoustics, engine/airframe integration, interior

noise, and community noise. 117 The Advanced

Subsonic Technology program, a multiyear

NASA program initiated in fiscal year 1994, includes these projects.

Higher bypass ratios and swept, lower speed

fan blades will be investigated for minimizing engine noise, along with an integrated approach for

the installation of engines and wing/high-lift systems. Placing adaptive liners in engine nacelles is

another option for damping sound before it is radiated from the nacelle to the ground. NASA also

is investigating new active cancellation technologies for reducing noise in aircraft cockpits and

cabins, and is looking to extend some of these

techniques to reduce engine noise within the nacelle that would otherwise propagate toward the

ground. 118

NASA researchers have demonstrated the active cancellation of interior noise in a one-third

scale model commuter aircraft by changing the

vibration behavior of the structure. 119 Because of

the potential problems this approach poses for

manufacturing and aircraft certification, NASA is

trying this method on the internal fuselage trim

panel.

For engines, one technique relies on microphones, loudspeakers, and electronic processing to

generate sound waves at the appropriate time and

place that cancel the fan noise propagating through

the nacelle before it radiates to the ground. 20 Static

tests with aJT15D engine demonstrated 10 to 20

decibel reductions in fan noise. NASA is also

looking at ways of actively canceling engine noise

at its source (e.g., minimizing the interaction between fan blade wakes and stators). In general,

NASA active cancellation R&D goals are to extend the methods to engine source noise, broader

frequencies, and wider distribution over the aircraft; of key importance is achieving lower lifetime operating costs for noise reduction systems.

Another objective is high-lift, low-drag airframes that will allow the same payload to be

lifted with less power, further reducing engine

noise. Research into integrated wing technology

for efficient high-lift with minimized wake vortices will contribute to efforts to enable shorter

takeoff distances, reduced power requirements,

slower approach speeds, steeper climb-out profiles, and optimal flight path control. 121

Engine Emissions Control

Today’s aircraft engines are highly efficient and

emit extremely low amounts of “pollutants.”

I I 6 Aircr:ift Noise Abatenlcnt Working Group. “Progress in Aircruft Noise Abatement and Recommendations for Future Tcchnolog) Development,” unpublished document, November 1991, p. 1.

I I 7 Hefiz, op. cit., footnote 43.

I IX NASA Langley Research Center, ‘“Research and Technology,” NASA Technical Memorandum 4243, 1990, pp. 54-55.

11~ ~i~ is ~c.o,npli,hed by applying voltage t. (hin composite material attached to the skin Or frame of the fuselage. William ‘itshire~

Advanced Subsonic Technology, Office of Aeronautics, National Aeronautics and Space Administration, personal communication, Apr. 26,

1994.

120 mat is, actuatc)rs ~ause pressure Wa}es that rarefy, or dis~rsc, air molecules at the same instant compression waYe\ reach that ~~>t; the

result is noise cancellation. W]ll i am Wilfhire, Advanced Subsonic Technology, Off]cc of Aeronautics, National Aeronautics and Space Administration, personal communication, May 5, 1994.

11 I Ro~~ Rosen, Dcputv Association Administrator for Aeronautics, Exploration and Technology, National Aeronautics and Space Ad-

.

ministration, testimony at hearings before the House Committee on Science, Space and Technology, Sept. 27, 1990, p. 3.
Chapter 4 Research and Technology issues 1155

Most aircraft can easily attain the NOX reductions

of 20 percent recommended by ICAO, for the

landing and takeoff cycle. While the technology

base exists for further NOX reductions of 30 to 50

percent, reduction technology has yet to be developed for extremely high-pressure, high-temperature advanced engines being considered for nextgeneration transports. In its Advanced Subsonic

Technology program, NASA has included R&D

on emissions control technologies for current and

new-generation subsonic aircraft engines. 122

FAA’s Office of Environment and Energy has

established cooperative research efforts with EPA

and the U.S. Air Force in emissions and dispersion modeling work and in reduced NOX combustor design for the high-speed civil transport with

NASA.

In June 1992, in support of the next (third)

meeting of the ICAO Committee on Aviation Environmental Protection (CAEP), an emissions inventory subgroup initiated study of global pollution from aircraft emissions. FAA and NASA are

seeking to establish an emissions abatement

technology program 1ike the joint venture directed

at aircraft noise. 123 Th e near-term goal is assessment of control technology to support cost analyses of stringency (emissions restrictions) proposals in time for CAEP/3, tentatively scheduled for

1995 or 1996.

One option for attempting to reduce high-altitude emissions until concepts capable of minimizing emissions at both cruise and landing and takeoff operating conditions are developed and

validated is changes in flight procedures (e.g., attempting to fly above or below the tropopause or

seasonal route changes). However, the technical

feasibility of this approach is suspect, again because the relative impacts of different flight patterns are unknown, strategic control of traffic beyond radar range has not been attained, and

significant economic penalties are likely.

Deicing and Anti-icing Methods

Less hazardous alternatives to glycol-based fluids

include solid and liquid forms of sodium and potassium acetate and sodium formate. 124 The costs

(and availability) of the alternatives vary; all are

uniformly more expensive. While effective on airport surfaces, the solid compounds are not feasible

for aircraft deicing and anti-icing.125

NASA Ames researchers, with support from

the U.S. Air Force, are developing a direct substitute for glycol-based aircraft deicing and anti-icing fluids that is intended to be “environmentally

friendly” and cost competitive. 126 Analysis of existing fluids is being performed to confirm the

properties necessary for the new compound. Subsequent test phases will evaluate whether fluid

properties conform with industry standards and

the fluids’ performance under actual weather and

airport conditions. 127 However, for airlines to initiate its use, the NASA/Air Force compound must

also be less toxic and/or harmful to aquatic life

while being equally effective in removing or preventing ice buildup.

If proven to be a successful substitute, it is expected that the new compound will be used first on
156 I Federal Research and Technology for Aviation

runways and other airport surfaces; a lengthy certification process will likely delay use with aircraft. Three of the largest U.S. airlines have offered nonrevenue aircraft for testing.128

CONCLUSIONS

Each element of the air transportation system

benefits from a multilayered federal aviation

R&D effort. Many technologies intended to permit continued advances in aviation already are being designed, tested, and evaluated; they offer new

functions and higher levels of automation and, at

the same time, promise greater reliability.

However, further progress in some areas awaits

better information: quantitative data on the performance of key elements of the aviation system, in

particular, the human element; knowledge of how

the atmosphere behaves and of the impact of aviation operations on the environment; and analysis

of new materials and design methods. The areas of

crosscutting science and applied research described in this chapter will offer insights into both

emerging and longstanding problems, along with

methods for gathering and assessing critical data.

Of vital importance in realizing the benefits of

these research and technology development efforts is effective communication and coordination

among participating agencies and the user community. For the technology programs in particular, the system implications of their use must be

addressed in order to achieve the full measure of

their potential without undue delay, cost, or risk.

The introduction of ultra-high-capacity aircraft, for example, will require extensive infrastructure changes; the proposed fleet of new supersonic transports prompts thorough analysis of

potential atmospheric impacts; and new satellitebased communications and navigation technologies necessitate changes to air traffic management

policies and institutions. In addition, for all sizes

of airport and aircraft operations, further attention

is needed to the affordability of advanced technologies intended to provide higher levels of efficiency, safety, and security, and to better mitigate environmental impacts. Finally, any modification

the aviation system imposes the requirement

consider the human factors of that change.

to

to
Economic

Issues

for

Aviation

Operations 5

B

y many measures, U.S. aviation industries are world leaders, and each industry contributes positively to the U.S.

international balance of payments and has significant

world market shares (see table 5-1 ). However, industry finances, employment, and international competition have become

crucial issues for the future of U.S. aviation. Congress must now,

and in the coming decade, struggle with difficult and often conflicting trade, finance, and other economic policies important to

the long-term fiscal health and competitiveness of U.S. aviation.

U.S. regulatory and infrastructure decisions, and the research programs that underpin them, will likely have growing implications

for U.S. industry economics and competitiveness.

THE U.S. AIRLINE INDUSTRY

The nation’s largest carriers increasingly rely on global markets

to sustain growth in revenue. In an attempt to offer passengers the

most extensive route system, many of the world’s carriers have m

H

been expanding since the late 1980s—via strategic alliances,

marketing agreements, or route acquisitions. The expansion of *

low-cost, short-haul domestic service offered by startup as well as *.

existing carriers is prompting some of the largest U.S. carriers to e

concentrate on serving international and long-haul routes and/or

to restructure their operations in order to compete with the low- . . 4+ m +?

cost carriers.

.

 State of the Industry

-e.. , -

!

International markets have become more and more important to “w4. &

U.S. airlines. Growth in international passenger service by U.S. airlines outpaced both the rise in gross domestic product and the rapid

I 157
158 I Federal Research and Technology for Aviation

U.S. balance of

Revenue U.S. market share payments Employment

Industry ($ billions) (% of world revenue) ($ billions) (thousands)

Civil aircraft manufacturing

Civil transports $288 79% $204 1103

Rotorcraft 0.3b

46C

-01 2.1d

General aviation 1.8 60e -0.8 213

Air traffic control equipmentf1.5 40 0.4 4 4

Airline service 7 7 9 37 6 . 4

g

5404

Air traffic control servlceh

FM air traffic control N A

I

46j NA 319

a Revenue, market share, and balance of payments calculations based on the value of delwered products for 1992 Does not Include figures for

separate engines and parts

b Excludes production by foreign licensees

c Excludes production of piston-powered rotorcraft

d Employment calculated by mulflplylng the total rlurnber of employees for each of the three major U S turbine rotorcraff manufacturers by fhelr

respectwe CWII to total revenue ratios

e Department of Commerce estimate based on Industry data

f AII figures based on OTA survey of U S ATC equipment manufacturers

9 Balance of payments for International alr service represents the difference between airfares paid to U S carriers by mternatlonal wsitors traveling to the United States and fares paid to foreign earners by Americans traveling abroad.

h ATC service IS not a commercial Industry m the United States It IS shown here for comparatwe purposes

1 The cost of developing and operating the U S ATC system was approximately $6 bllllon, based on OTA analysis of the 1992 FAA budget for

ATC operations, facllllles and equipment, and research, engineering, and development

I In 1992, FAA handled about 46 percent of all commercial alrcraff departures In the world, based on FAA and Boeing data

KEY NA = not applicable

SOURCES Data compiled from Aerospace Industries Assoclatlon of America, Aerospace /ndusOy Rewew, Air Transport Assoclatlon

of America, ATC Market Report Bell Helicopter Textron, Boeing, Bureau of Economic Analysts, Federal Awahon Admmlstratlon, General Avlatlon Manufacturers Association, /rrterwla Aerospace Wor/o’, Internahonal CIVII Awatlon Organlzatlon, Off Ice of Management

and Budget, Off Ice of Technology Assessment, U.S Travel and Tourism Admlnlstrahon, and World Jet Airplane Inventory

expansion of U.S. domestic traffic in the decade

following deregulation (1979 to 1989). ] Although

domestic airline traffic increases have slowed

markedly since 1988, the growth in international

markets continues to climb (see figure 5-1).2

Most recent forecasts of the industry’s performance indicate that total U.S. air traffic will continue to grow through 2010, albeit at lower levels

than in the past. Federal Aviation Administration

(FAA) forecasts indicate that passenger traffic

will increase at a 3.5-percent annual pace in domestic markets and a 6.6-percent annual rate on

international routes during the 12 years from 1993

to 2004.3 If this forecast holds, international travel

will account for one-third of U.S. airline passenger-miles by 2004.4

I Intematlonal air travel mar-ke(s remain regu]ated. During this period, average annual growth rates were gross domestic product 2.5 percent,

domestic traffic 4.6 percent, and international traflic 6.8 percent.

21n 1991, however, international traffic suffered a 2 percent drop in growth due (o the U.S. economic recession and the persian Gulf War. The

average annual growth rate for international traffic carried by U.S. airlines since 1987 is 10.3 percent.

~U . .s Depafimen[ of Transpofla[ion, Federal Aviation Administration, FM A\iation Forecasts, Fiscal Years 1993-2004 (Washington, DC

February 1993), pp. III-38 -111-40.

41bid., p. 1X- 12.
Chapter 5 Economic Issues for Aviation Operations 1159

Advances in telecommunications technology especially

satellite and digital communications, permit airlines to offer

new in-flight passenger services

 Carrier Fleet Forecast

The total U.S. air carrier fleet is projected to increase from a 1992 inventory of 4,206 large jets to

more than 5,700 such aircraft in 2004.5 At the

same time, expectations are that the distribution of

the fleet by aircraft type will change significantly

during this period. The category that is forecast to

experience the largest growth in terms of number

of aircraft is two-engine narrow-body aircraft,

growing from 52 percent of the fleet to 67 percent. 6 Two-engine wide-body aircraft are projected to have the fastest annual growth rate, with

flect size more than doubling during this period.7

Due to the Aviation Safety and Capacity Expansion Act of 1990,X Stage 2 aircraft (comprising 41

percent of the U.S. fleet in 1992)9 will be virtually

eliminated by the year 2000.

~ Domestic

_ International r777 V7 EZZlm DB

a) I

1980 1981 1982 1983 1984 1985 1986 1987 1988 1989 1990 1991 1992 1993

SOURCE Off ce of Technology Assessment 1994 Data compiled from the Alr Transport Assoclatlon of America

‘Ibid., p. IX- 17.

(iExample~ of ~wo-crlglne “amow. b{)(j} ~ircr:ift include the B-737, B-757, MD-80, and ~~~~(). Ibid., P III”JI ~

i’Exarmplc~ of two-cllglnc ~l(]e.bo~y alrcraf[ include the B-767 and the A3[X). I bid.. P. IX17

Xpub]ic I.aW ]() ] -~()~.

‘)[:cdcra] A} ia[ion ,\[~llllrli\tr:it](Jrl, op. CI[., footnote 3, pp. 111-40-111-43.
160 I Federal Research and Technology for Aviation

The change in the distribution of the world’s

airline fleet mirrors that of the U.S. fleet. The two

categories that are forecast to grow the fastest in

terms of number of aircraft are those with between

171 and 240 seats, which are expected to increase

from 13 percent of the 1992 fleet to 19 percent of

the 2010 fleet, and aircraft with more than 350

seats, which are forecast to increase from 9 to 19

percent of the world fleet. 10

Airline Competition

Opinions vary about the number of domestic U.S.

airlines that will exist in the 21st century and the

extent to which they will continue to compete.

The passage of the Airline Deregulation Act of

1978 resulted in huge growth in the number of

competing airlines, followed by consolidation

the entire industry. The industry reached a peak

of

of

123 carriers, including cargo and charter airlines,

in February 1984.1] By the end of 1991, however,

there were only 58 U.S. carriers. 12 From 1985 to

1987, there were 12 mergers involving major or

national carriers. This and the large number of airline bankruptcies resulted in fewer firms controlling more of the industry’s traffic than in the period preceding deregulation. The market share in

terms of traffic (by revenue passenger-miles) of

American Airlines, United Airlines, and Delta Air

Lines increased from 34 percent in 1985 to 57 percent in 1993 (see figure 5-2).

The industry can be expected to remain competitive through the foreseeable future, assuming

1980 1981 1982 1983 1984 1985 1986 1987 1988 1989 1990 1991 1992 1993

NOTE Since 1987, American Alrlmes, Umted Alrlmes, and Delta Alr Lines have been the Ieadmg carriers In 1980, United ranked first, American

fourth, and Delta fifth

SOURCE Off Ice of Technoloctv Assessment, 1994 Data COmDlled from the A[r Transr30rfAssoclatlon of America

loBoeing commercial Ai@ane Group, 1993 Currenf Marker Outlook (Seattle, WA: March 1993), p. 3.9-

11 us. Depaflmen( of Transpo~[ion, Federa] Aviation Administration, Fti At’iafion Forecasrs, Fiscal Years 19~-2000 (Washington, Dc:

March 1989), p. 53.

12US. ~pa~ment Of Transpoflation, Federal Aviation Administration, FM A}iufion Forecas[s, Fiscal Years 1992-2003 (Washington, Dc:

February 1992), p. 27.
Chapter 5 Economic issues for Aviation Operations 1161

the current trend toward consolidation does not

change dramatically. The Transportation Research

Board concluded in 1991 that at least five major

carriers would be necessary for a competitive industry .

13 Other economists believe that three to

five major airlines with several regional airlines

would provide a sufficient level of competition .14

The Financial Condition of the Industry

No carrier-with the notable exception of Southwest Airlines—was unscathed by the recession of

the early 1990s. U.S. airlines lost $12.8 billion

from 1990 to 1993, 15 three airlines ceased operations, 16 and three others filed for Chapter 11 bankruptc y

17 (see figure 5-3).

Following two years of profits (1987 and

1988), the industry experienced a downturn in

profitability in the second half of 1989. The slow

growth in both domestic and international air travel during 1990 and 1991—when the U.S. economy entered a recession—and the increase in jet

fuel prices following the Iraqi invasion of Kuwait

1 1 I I 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 I

1980 1981 1982 1983 1984 1985 1986 1987 1988 1989 1990 1991 1992 1993

NOTE Of the airllnes net loss In 1990 and 1991 approximately $2 billlon was recurred by Eastern Alrllnes and Pan Am World A(rways Of the 1992

net loss approximately $2 bllllon was due to accounting adjustments related to retiree benefits

SOURCE Off Ice of Technology Assessment, 1994 Data compiled from the Air Transport Assoctatton of America

] 3Na[10na] Research Counci], Tran~pflation Research Board, wi~s ~fc~~~ge: f)~me.ffi~ Ar’r Transporf Since ~eregu/uf/on, Special Report 230 (Washington, DC: 199 1), p. 3. The Transportation Research Board did not explicitly define competition, beyond indicating that it

meant competition in a domestic context. According to economic theory, the U.S. airline industry, to remain competitive, would require enough

carriers such that no one carrier or coalition of carriers exercises a high degree of market control; i.e., no carrier could dictate fares in any of its

markets without losing passengers to other airlines.

l~peter pas$e]l, ‘waiting out the Airline Shakeout,” The New York fi”me~, May 22, 1992, P. D].

150f tie airlines’ ] 992 net 1.ss, approximately $2 bl]lion was due to accounting adjustments re]ated to retiree benefits

16 Eastern Air Lines, Pan Am World Airways, and Midway Airlines.

1 TCon[lnenta] Airlines, America West Airlines, ~d TWA.
162 I Federal Research and Technology for Aviation

Southwest remained profitable in the ear/y 1990s, whale the

rest 01 the U S airline industry lost over $ 12 billion

in August 1990 were the main factors behind the

industry’s losses during this period. 18 Following

the start of the Persian Gulf War, discounted fares

offered by U.S. airlines caused systemwide yields

to fall, further contributing to the airlines’

losses.

19 The economic recession caused heavier

than usual reductions in high-yield business travel, possibly indicating a systemic change in the

demand for such travel. Airline forecasters believe that increased use of facsimile machines and

videoconferences replaced some business trips

and may cut into future business travel .20

Due to cost and personnel reductions, higher

prices absent the deep discounting of the summer

of 1992, and a gradual increase in economic

growth since 1992, U.S. airlines posted narrower

losses in 1993 than in the previous year. In response to the industry’s losses between 1990 and

1992, airlines engaged in a substantial effort to reVideoconferences may substitute for some growth in future

business travel,

duce costs by closing hubs and the feeder routes

that serve them, negotiating significant wage and

benefit concessions from their unions, and laying

off employees.

Adding to the financial pressure on the largest

airlines is the recent introduction of low-cost,

point-to-point, jet service by new domestic carriers. In the 12-month period preceding July 1993,

over a dozen passenger airlines began operations.

As of 1993 the new startups had less than a 2-percent share of the domestic market, but some analysts forecast that they could reach an 8-percent

share by the end of 1994.21 Southwest Airlines,

which has successfully provided this type of service in the southwestern United States since the

1970s, expanded its service to the east coast in

1993. The major airlines—with higher operating

costs on the short-haul routes—have responded

l~Af[er Erow, ing by 5.9 percent in 1990, t~[al traffic fell by 1.6 percent in 1991. Federal Aviation Administration, op. cit., footnote 3, p.

Ix- I 3.

‘gIbid., pp. 27-58.

‘OJames Ott, “’Modest W’odd Airline Traffic Growh Seen for ’92, Bigger Hike Eyed for ‘93,’ ’A\’wrion Week und Spuce Technoiogj’, Mar. 16,

1992, p. 61.

~ ‘Jwne$ S. Hirsch, “Takeoff Is Bumpy for Start-Up Airlines as They Try To Graba Piece of the Sky,” The Wall Street Journal, July 1, 1993, p.

B].
Chapter 5 Economic

by transferring money-losing routes to their regional affiliates, most of which are not part of the

corporate entity, or by pulling out of markets. Several of the larger carriers-including United, Delta, and USAir—have plans to create low-cost airlines-within-an-airline to compete with the newer

carriers on short-haul routes. 22 Continental Airlines introduced CALite, a low-price, quick turnaround service. in October 1993 to compete with

Southwest.23

Employment

Despite the loss of three carriers and the filing for

Chapter 11 bankruptcy by three others between

1990 and 1992, airline industry employment has

remained fairly steady since peaking in 1990 at

546,00(). 2X Approximately one-half of the employment loss experienced in 1991—2 percent—

was regained

Issues for Aviation Operations I 163

in 1992. In fact, 1991 was the only

year in which employment and air traffic dropped

since 1983. Thus, the loss of an individual airline

will not—in and of itself—result in a decline in

the overall number of jobs in the industry: for the

most part, only a drop in the demand for air travel

will significantly affect employ ment.25 The impact of layoffs, however, should not be minimized; employees who are laid off may be forced

to relocate to find other airline jobs—sometimes

lower paying ones than they held previously.

Capital investment

In such an uncertain economic climate, only the

industry’s healthiest airlines can be assured of obtaining the necessary financing to expand their

fleets and replace their older aircraft with those

that meet Stage 3 noise requirements, the most deSome new commerclal aircraft were stored m desert facilities as financially strapped airlines deferred orders in the ear/y 1990s

221n July 1994. U)ll Corp- (lnittx]’~ parent company —agreed m sell a majoritj stake in the airline (55 percent of its equity) to its machin]its and p]lm un]oni in c~changc for approl inuilcly S4.9 billion in wage and work-rule crrnce~sim~ over \i x )rears. Thi\ tranwtion opens the

w ii) for the air] mc to crcatc a wparate low fare, ihort-hau] curmer. James Ott. “1’ote Sets LIAL on New courw,’’A\iut/m Wick& Spuce Tcchrwl-

{),s}’, Jul} I ~, 19c)~. p. ~[ }.

2~Robert 1., Row and Susiin (’tircy, “The Frugal Skies: Money r-Lo~ing Routcj Prompt Big Carriers To Mull Radical Steps,” The WIJII S(reer

Journal, Oct. 19, 1993. p. ,i 1.

24Air Tran\port A\wclat Ion, ,4 jr Trun, ip[)rt I Y92 ( Waihrngton. DC: June 1992)

‘fin a not unllhcly ~ccn,irlo. the dcm:ind for alr trii\~l could decline durins an cconomlc rccc~~ion. The resulting 10SS rn rek enuc could cause

one or more c:imm [() go bankrupt iind cmployce\ to be l:iid of f. But in thi$ wt of circun~~t:incei, it ii \till the tr;iffic lm-md not the carriers that

ceafed to operate-that L’iiU\Cd mploynmt to drop.
164 I Federal Research and Technology for Aviation

manding ones. To help control costs, airlines are

retiring older planes and deferring new aircraft orders. Each of the nation’s three largest carriers has

cut back its capital spending plans: American by

$8 billion between 1991 and 1995, United by $6.7

billion between 1992 and 1995, and Delta by $6

billion between 1992 and 1995.26 As of June

1993, firm orders for the industry stood at 696 aircraft, requiring an estimated $39 billion.27 Because of the difficulty in raising money through issues of stock, the top three airlines have increased

their amount of long-term debt to finance recent

property and equipment acquisitions.

International Developments

Due to fewer intra-Europe airline flight restrictions and the increasing share of passenger traffic

expected to come from the Pacific Rim, many international airlines are forming (or considering)

alliances large enough to compete on a global

scale. 28 For example, in early 1993, the United

States approved a $300-million investment by

British Airways in USAir and allowed the two airlines to form a code-sharing alliance29 that links

USAir’s domestic service to British Airways’ international destinations.30 This type of agreement—where two airlines offer seamless service

through the sharing of aircraft and crews—is one

type of strategic alliance.31

‘The current limits set by federal law on foreign

investment in U.S. airlines restrict ownership to

25 percent of an airline’s voting stock and require

decisionmaking control to remain in the hands of

the airline’s U.S. owners.32 In 1991, the U.S. Department of Transportation (DOT) announced that

it would interpret this law to allow a foreign investor to hold up to 49 percent of an airline’s total

stock (voting and nonvoting). In addition, DOT

has proposed allowing foreign investments in as

much as 49 percent of a U.S. airline voting stock.

DOT sees this proposal as a way of giving financially troubled U.S. airlines access to needed capi -

tal.33

The 1992 agreement between Northwest Airlines and KLM Royal Dutch Airlines to operate as

one airline (KLM has a 20-percent common stock

investment in Northwest’s parent company,

Wings Holdings) through the joint scheduling of

26 An~ony L. Velocci, Jr., “Big Three Cuts To Reduce Debt Downgrade Effects, ’’A\iur/mr WeeL & .Spuce Technology]’, Mar. 22, 1993, p. 38.

ITR1chard Cmm, Economic and Data Analyst, Air Transpofi Association of America, persona] COnlnllMllcation, NOV. 5, 1993.

l~In June 1992, tie European Community, now tie European Union (IW), approved the third and final package of airline ]ibCrdlZNIOn

measures that went into effect on January 1, 1993, The agreement gives EU airlines freedom to set fares on intra-EU flights; establishes limited

rights of cabotage in which EU airlines will be allowed to pick up passengers and freight in another EU country and continue to another point

within that country with certain restrictions; and sets up common licensing criteria for any airline operating within EU territory, Carol A. Shifrin,

“EC Ministers Approve Liberalization, But ‘Safeguards’ May Slow Competition,” A\ration week & .Ypulc T2chn(~l[)g>, June 29, 1992, pp.

21-22.

Because the European IJnion’s third package of liberalization measures al]owcd nationtil go} emmcnts to retain significant control over

their domestic aviation markets and to restrict competition within their markets at least until 1997. the EU cannot be considered an open air

travel market as of 1993. For more information, see U.S. Congress, General Accounting Office, /ntc’rnatl(mu/ AL/L~I/~m. Mcu.\urc.s b) European

Corrm~uniry Could Lim/( U.S. Air/inc~’ Ahi/~fy 7i) Cornpere Abroad, GAO RCED-93-64 (M’ashington, DC: April 1993), pp. 22-34.

29A Code. sharing alllance is an agreenlcnt between two airlines to use the same code in computer resen tition systems, till~J* Ing them to

jointly serve the same route.

s~e $300-ml] lloll” inve~tment is the fir~[ of three planned $[a~es of investment bv Briti~h Airways that v OUld bring the total investment in

USAir to S750 million after fi~ c years. Bruce Ingersoll. “U.S. Approves British Air Sttihe in LJSAir Chmup,”

.

The }+illl .Ylrecf Journul. Mar. 16,

1993, p. A3.

3 I Ge]]rllan Resemch ASwciiiks, ]llC., “’ Airline Strategic Alliances: Definition and a ca~~ for {’~u[lorl,” ” Tr~lrl,~[~or((tti(jrj i4d\i\or. vol. 3, No.

1, Januur} 1993, pp. 1-4.

32 See U.S. Congress, General Accounting Office, Alr]ine Competition: lrnpucf (~’~hangin,q F-orcign In I<(.jtnIenI und control” Llnlit.j on U.S.

Airline.\, GAO/ RCED-93-7 (Washington. DC: December 1992).

~~As of 1994, the cunellt ~drllinistrtitlorl has under way a complete review of the L’nited s[il[C\’ lntCMatlonal :Ik Iiltlon PO]lCY.
Chapter 5 Economic issues for Aviation Operations 1165

their flights as well as cooperating on pricing, purchasing, and marketing can also be termed a stra34 Other U.S. carriers have estab- tegic alliance. -

lished alliances that are closer to marketing

agreements—the offering of joint services, such

as limited code-sharing, that does not involve the

sharing of assets: United with Lufthansa German

Airlines, Delta with both Swissair and Singapore

Airlines, and Continental Airlines with SAS.35

The deal between British Airways and USAir

could have several consequences for both U.S.

and foreign airlines. It could encourage other foreign airlines to invest in U.S. airlines, which

would provide the investing airline a direct link to

U.S. passengers destined for Europe or Asia while

possibly strengthening the balance sheet of the

U.S. airline. The agreement could also encourage

the liberalization of future bilateral aviation treaties involving the United States. The United

States linked its approval of the investment by

British Airways to the negotiation of a more liberal bilateral agreement with Britain. Because the

agreement between British Airways and USAir

provides British Airways with feeder traffic from

USAir’s routes, other U.S. carriers are demanding

that the bilateral treat y currently under negotiation

between the United States and Britain give them

access to a greater number of British destinations.

A new treaty containing such liberalized provisions could form the basis for other treaties the

United States establishes under DOT’s Open

Skies policy, which is designed to remove many

of the international market and capacity

constraints contained in current bilateral.

Working against the possibility of the opening

of future bilateral treaties is the threat from several

foreign countries to renounce their current pacts

and negotiate more restrictive agreements so that

British Airways has revested in USAir and the services of the

two airlines are coordinated

their carriers will not have to compete to the same

extent against the lower cost U.S. airlines. Both

France and Japan are considering placing more restrictions on the number of routes and flights in

their bilateral agreements with the United States;

the issue of beyond rights—allowing U.S. carriers

to pickup passengers in those countries and fly to

other destinations—is particularly contentious.sb

However, the recently agreed to 1993 aviation

treaty between the United States and Germany

preserves the current liberal agreement in effect,

gradually moves the two countries toward a full

Open Skies regime—allowing unlimited flights

free of government restrictions—in four years,

and allows an increasing number of code-sharing

opportunities between international carriers. 37

 Factors Affecting the International

Success of the U.S. Airline Industry

As the share of air traffic originating in international markets increases, the ability of U.S. carriers to compete in the international arena becomes

~l~e United States ~ran[ed tentative approval t. ~is agreement in November 1992. Brett Pulley and Bruce ln~ersoll, “~’.s. ~I\’es Ten(:l(ivr

Clearance to KLM, Northv+est To Start Integrating Service,” The Wall Streel Journal, Nov. 17, 1992, p. A3.

~sc,e]]nlan Research ,4\sociate\, Inc., op. cit., footnote S 1, pp. 1-4.

~6Bmc. InOcr~ol], .. UIlc]ear f{~r Takeoff, Big U.S. Airlines Fly Into Foreign Barriers Over Expansion plans.

‘“ The }+u1l .$”trc{ t J{ IurtuIl, Ma}

14, 1993, p. A~,

~7Jcffrey Lenoro} it~, “Lufthansa. L’nited To Link Efforts,” Atiation Week & Space Technolo<q), Oct. 4, 1993, pp. 22-23,
166 I Federal Research and Technology for Aviation

more important to their economic growth. Heightened competition with foreign airlines has made

operating under different safety and environmental regulations an issue for U.S. carriers. But while

the absence of common regulations affects the

balance of international competition, it is not an

overriding concern. International trade policy, including bilateral aviation agreements and airport

facilities and service issues38 that influence the

ability of carriers to access foreign markets, is the

most significant factor affecting the international

competitiveness of U.S. airlines, according to industry officials.39 Table 5-2 presents U.S. airline

views on how trade policy, international differences in operating regulations, FAA’s air traffic

system management, technology innovation, and

other federal policies can affect the international

competitiveness of U.S. carriers-both overseas

and in the U.S. market.

The success of U.S. airlines in international

markets can be measured by a number of different

indicators: the market share of U.S. airlines versus

foreign airlines in overseas markets, the U.S. international balance of payments for airline services, and a comparison of labor productivity between U.S. and foreign carriers.@Reliance on any

single measure can result in an inaccurate assessment of an industry’s competitiveness. For instance,

the U.S. airline industry contributed positively to

the U.S. international balance of payments over

the five years from 1988 through 1992.41 In 1992,

according to the Bureau of Economic Analysis

(BEA), the industry contributed a surplus of $6.4

billion out of a total balance for services of $61

billion (see table 5-3). BEA’s count seems to overstate the balance for air service. It is more likely

that the 1992 U.S. balance was between $2.5 billion and $3 billion.42 However, this trend alone

may not be proof that the U.S. airline industry is

a stronger competitor in international markets

than foreign airlines. One explanation for the

change in the balance of payments for air service

since 1985 is the effect the fall in the value of the

dollar had on the attractiveness of travel to the

United States in general and travel on U.S. airlines

for international travelers. An examination of the

different measures of competitiveness show that

U.S. airlines are strongly positioned to compete in

international markets (see table 5-4).

FAA Safety, Security and

Environmental Regulations

The Federal Aviation Administration is responsible for regulating the operations of commercial

aircraft, including: approving flight procedures,

determining equipment requirements, and overseeing flight crew training.43 Prior to the issuance

of a new safety rule, FAA performs a cost-benefit

analysis to determine if the estimated benefits of

a regulation outweigh its estimated costs. Despite

~g~ese intemationa] access issues inc]ude landing and other user fees, terminal space, passenger and cargo handl ing, and customs ~d visa

requirements. U.S. airline industry concerns are with the unfair or discriminatory practices in certain countries that favor national airlines over

U.S. and other outside earners.

S90TA survey of Seven Senior representatives of U.S. airlines, spring 1993.

40A more comprehensive definition of compe/j(i\,ene.YLr is contained in the 1985 report of the President’s Commission on Indu$[rial Competitiveness: “Competitiveness is the degree to which a nation can, under free and fair market conditions, produce goods and services that meet the

test of international markets while simultaneously maintaining or expanding the real incomes of its citizens.”

41 Balance of ~ayments for intema[lonal air ~ewice represents the ~1 fference between airfares paid to U.S. carriers by international visitors

traveling to the United States and fares paid to foreign carriers by Americans traveling abroad.

lzBased on data from BEA and DOT, and OTA ana]ysis. The Nationa] Research council has raised qUeStiOnS COnCeI?Iing the accuracY of ‘e

passenger survey data on which BEA relies for its estimates of airfares paid by U.S. and foreign travelers. They have suggested that the survey

data be checked for consistency with actual data on airfares. For more information, see National Research Council, Panel on Foreign Trade

Statistics, Committee on National Statistics, Behind the Numbers: U.S. Trude in (he World Economy (Washington, DC: National Academy Press,

1992), pp. ] 4(- 146.

4~For more infomalion on FAA regulation of commercial aircraft, see US. Congress, Office of Technology Assessment, Safe Sk/es for

Tomorro\~: At’iution Safery in a Compefitii’e En\ironmen/, OTA-SET-381 (Washington, DC: U.S. Government Printing Office, July 1988), pp.

56-57.
Chapter 5 Economic issues for Aviation Operations 1167

Factor

1.

2.

International trade policy

Bilateral aviation agreement

Airport facilities and service

issues

FAA operating regulations

3. U.S. tax policy

4.

5.

6.

Non-FAA regulations

Domestic airport and ATC

infrastructure

Commercial technology

Description

Defines the markets and air service constraints in which an air

carrier must operate

Affect the ability of carriers to compete in foreign markets, such as

airport access, ground handling,

and ticket counter space

Complying with FM rules, many of

which do not apply to foreign carriers, can result in higher operating

costs for U.S airlines

Aviation ticket taxes, alternative

minimum tax, lack of Investment

tax credit

Agriculture,

hen, worker

benefits

environment, immigrasafety, and pension

A more efficient system would reduce airline operating costs on domestic legs and generate feed

traffic for international flights

Not a major factor, since in most

cases aircraft, communications,

and cabin service technologies

are available to any airline

Example

Routes, the number of carriers that

may operate each route, the number of

flights, and the method for gaining approval for fare changes

To provide access for foreign earners,

DOT has expropriated slots from U S

carriers at slot-controlled airports Foreign governments rarely help U S carriers obtain airport access

The modification of 14 proposed or existing rules could result in a 3 5-percent increase in enplanements on U S

carriers annually b c

Returning user fees to the levels that

existed prior to the Budget Reconciliation of 1990 could result in a 1 -percent

Increase in enplanements annually b

Fines for inadmissible passengers

(INS), aircraft inspection fees (USDA),

and passenger manifests (DOT, proposed).

United Airlines has estimated it could

save over $600 million per year in lower direct operating costs if an advanced air traffic management system

were fully implemented d

Technologies that are more difficult to

emulate, such as computer reservation

systems and pricing management systems, confer a degree of competitive

advantage for U S carriers

a These conclusions are based on a 1993 survey of senior representatives of U S alrllnes with International serwce, speclflcal Iy five passenger

airllnes one cargo alrlme and an executwe from the Alr Transport Assoclahon

b The WEFA Group ~~e ~o~en~la/ /mpac( Of se/ected A/r/lne Tax and Regu/arory Changes on the U S ECOnOmY submitted to the Alr Transport

Assoclatlon of America, May 1992

C This aggregate result includes fwe non-FAA regulations

d Edwin A Thomas IJnlted Alrllnes personal Communlcatlon, June 29 1994

KEY ATC = alr traffic control, DOT = Department of Transportation FAA = Federal Aviation Admlnlstratlon, INS = Immlgrallon and

Naturallzat[on Serwce, USDA = Department of Agriculture

SOURCE Off Ice of Technology Assessment, 1994

Category 1987 1988 1989 1990 1991 1992 1993

...— —

Merchandise tradea($1 596) ($127 O) ($1 152) ($109 o) ($74 1)

Civilian aircraft, 9 8 133 170 2 1 7

($;: ;) ($1326 )

2 4 9 2 1 4

engines, and parts

Private services 128 197 3 2 9 3 9 0 5 2 5 60.2 591

International air serviceb-- - (0.3) 1.2 – 24 4 8 5 8 6 4 5 1

a Excludes mllltary transfers

b Balance of payments for International a{r service represents the difference between airfares paid to U S carriers by International vlslfors traveling to the United States and fares paid to foreign carriers by Americans travellng abroad

SOURCE U S Department of Commerce, Bureau of Economic Analysls Balance of Payments Dlwslon 1994
168 I Federal Research and Technology for Aviation

British Airways

United

Lufthansa

Northwest

American

Japan

Singapore

Delta

KLM

Qantas

Top 10 airlines by International

revenue passenger-miles, 1992

1

American

Delta

United

USAir

Federal Express

Northwest

Continental

British Airways

Lufthansa

TWA

Fleet size, 1992

[

1 [ I I I 1 I i [

o 1 0 20 30 40 50 0 200 400 600 800

Billion revenue passenger-miles

Market share-international passenger traffic

U S airlines are among the world’s largest airlines in terms of

scheduled passenger traffic carried On international routes,

three U S airlines were ranked in the top five in 1992 When total

traffic (domestic and international) IS counted, U S airlines held

four of the five top slots

The market share (in terms of passengers) of U S carriers for

international travel to and from the United States remained

above 51 percent from 1988 through 1991

Unit costs and productivity

U S carriers’ operating costs are 30 to 50 percent lower than

those of most European and Japanese carriers, according to a

1993 study a Another study concluded that overall productivity

of the European airline industry was 28 percent lower than that of

U S airlines in 1989 The relative productivity levels of the major

personnel functionsb varied from 46 percent lower for marketing

(European versus U S airlines) to 11 percent lower for airport

handling c,d (Labor productivity rates are one of the determinants of unit labor costs, I e , labor costs per available seatmile )

For most of the 1980s, international service has been more profitable for U S airlines than domestic service Since 1989,

though, the annual operating profit marglne for domestic service

has been better f

a Mercer Management Consulting, Inc ,‘ Update on the Global Airllne

Industry, ” unpublished report, Apr 27, 1993, p 21

b Theslxmajor functlonswere cockpltcrew, cabmattendants; alrpOrt

handling, maintenance and overhaul, hcketmg, sales, and promotion, and other personnel

c McKlnsey Global Institute Serwce Sector Productwl~ (Washington,

DC October 1992), pp 2A-4 2A-8

d A host of variables IS considered to he behind the U S advantage [n

umt labor costs, Includ[ng aeregulahon of the market and the relatwe

lack of protective work rules n the Uruted States

Number of aircraft

Fleet size-capacity

U S carriers have the world’s SIX largest fleets Each of the three

largest U S airlmes-American, Delta, and United—has a fleet

more than twice the .size of British Airways’

U S carriers offer almost one-half of the total seating capacity

available in the North Atlantic market In July 1993, four U S airIines were ranked among the top five international airlines by capacity share.

Unit labor costs for selected

international carriers, 1990-91

American

United

Delta

British Airways

Air France

Lufthansa

SAS

KLM

1 I 1 /

o 2 4 6 8

Cents per seat-mile

e Operating profit margin IS defined as operating profit (operating revenues minus operating expenses) as a percentage of operating revenues

f From 1990 to 1992, however, the operating profit margm for domestic servce was negative

KEY BA = Brltwh Airways, JAL = Japan Alr Lines, KLM = Royal Dutch Alrllnes, SAS = ScandlnawanAlrlmes System

SOURCES Off Ice of Technology Assessment, 1994, based on data compiled from Global Avlatlon Associates, Ltd , International

Air Transport Assoclatlon, Air Transport Association of America, U S Travel and Tourism Admlnmtratlon, Volpe National Transportahon Systems Center, and U S General Accounting Off Ice
Chapter 5 Economic issues for Aviation Operations 1169

this analysis and other parts of the federal regulatory review process instituted during the 1980s to

control the burden of regulations, new rules continue to generate opposition from those within industry who question their impact on costs.44

Historically, regulation was concerned with

economic issues, such as entry into markets by individual firms, the prices they charged, and the

selection of products or services offered. Starting

in the 1960s, though, federal regulation broadened

its scope to include social objectives. Social regulation was intended to improve consumer protection, workplace safety, and environmental quality

and to eliminate discrimination.45

The justification used by government for both

social and economic regulation is that it corrects

market failures that occur when either adequate

competition does not exist in an industry, or market forces are not sufficient to allocate social resources efficiently. A typical example of market

failure is externalizing the cost of pollution, or not

accounting for its effect on a community when

pricing transportation equipment or the operation

of stationary pollution sources.

Effect of operating regulations

on airline economics in general

Compliance with a new regulation can affect a

company in several ways. In the case of the airline

industry, each carrier should be able to pass along

part of the resulting cost increase to the consumer

in the form of higher ticket prices. But. because

higher ticket prices will cause aggregate passenger demand to fall, the resulting increase in revenue may not full y offset the increased cost of com46 

plying with a new regulation. Thus profits a r e

likely to drop. Any part of the cost increase not

passed along would most likely result in lower

profits as well.47

There is an extensive literature that attempts to

describe the cost of federal government regulation. One study estimated the cost of regulation to

businesses and individuals for consumer safety

and health (of which FAA regulations are a subset), worker safety, and other nonenvironmental

social regulation at $32 billion in 1990.48

Estimating the cost of implementing a given

regulation is a difficult exercise. Cost estimates

often rely on traffic forecasts, and these are subject

to question. But in addition to the inherent uncertainties in forecasts of changes in airline industry

operations, discrepancies between FAA’s and industry’s estimates arise due to differing economic

assumptions as well as a certain amount of bias.

The airline industry, unlike FAA, does not discount its estimates of future costs. 49 Also, industry factors projected inflation into their cost estimates. FAA, in accordance with guidance from

the Office of Management and Budget, does not

adjust for inflation. The result of these two differences alone is that for a typical regulatory forecast

of costs over a 15-year time horizon, industry es44FOr ~Orc inform~tlon on the FAA rulemaking process, see ibid., PP. 59-6~.

qscongrc~sion~] Qu~rrerly, F[,{][,rcil RC(qUkJ/Ory Direcmry (Washington, ~: 199~), pp. 1-7.

~~e extent t. which re\enue\ri\e af[er ticket prices increase depends on the price elasticity of demand for air transportation. Only in the

unlikely caie in which pasiengcr demand is completely unresponsive to changes in price (i.e., price elasticity of demand equals zero) would

airlines be able to fully recoup the cost of a new regulation through increased fares.

This analyiis aisumci that airline~ will not be able to significantly cut their (flying) operating costs by decreasing capacity in response to the

lower pa~senger demand. Including in the tinalysis any incremental drop in variable labor and passenger service costs associated with lower

demand should not affect the conclusion. In the long run, airlines will ha~e more flexibility to lower their operating costs by decreasing systemwide capacity,

~TOier Ilme, Camicri IIlat ~corlle more efficient a~ they adapt to new requirements. Thus, they maybe able to ab~orb some Of the regulator~’

.

cost increase wi[hou[ attempting to ral~e prices andor suffer a loss in profits.

~Ro~fl w. Hahn w]d Thonui~ ~. Hopkk “Regulation Deregulation: Looking Bachvard Looking Forward.” The ,4ntcr\([in Enlcrprise,

July’ ‘August 1992, p. 72.

~~D1scountlng is an accounting ,Ilethodolog} that accounts for [he time value of money so that expenditure th~lt occur at different ‘imes can

.

be compared.
170 I Federal Research and Technology for Aviation

timates will be approximately two times higher

than FAA’s.50 Because of the political consequences of rulemakings, it is often in the best interest of the airline industry to bias its cost estimates on the high end. FAA is often forced to

balance these high estimates against lower ones

from other industry constituents. For instance, in

estimating the purchase cost of equipment using

newly developed technology, forecasts of costs

from a potential manufacturer will likely be lower

than those provided by the airlines.

Despite industry’s claim that the burden of federal regulation is a significant cause of the airlines’ current financial difficulties, virtually no

analysis on this topic has been done in either the

private sector, the federal government, or academia. The estimate of the cost of FAA-imposed

technical regulations by the National Commission To Ensure a Strong Competitive Airline Industry (Airline Commission) was the first federal

effort to quantify the regulatory burden in a formal

manner.

51

According to the Airline Commission, 16 major aviation safety and security rules have added

$2 billion in total costs to airlines since 1984.521n

addition, other regulatory actions by FAA have

imposed costs on the airlines: between $1.5 billion and $4.5 billion for U.S. airlines to convert to

an all Stage 3 fleet by the end of 1999 in response

to the Aviation Safety and Capacity Expansion

Act of 1990; 53 $900 million to comply with airworthiness directives from 1989 through 1992;

and $200 million for heightened security during

the Persian Gulf crisis. 54

FAA regulations and international

competitiveness

The regulatory burden on the U.S. airline industry

only affects U.S. carriers’ ability to compete internationally when it creates an “unlevel playing

field”; that is, the same rules are not being followed by foreign carriers. Foreign carriers implement a large proportion of U.S. airline safety regulations voluntarily because of safety and

economic considerations, although many of these

safety regulations are not required of foreign carriers under international treat y or U.S. law.55 Representatives of the International Air Transport

Association stated that a comparison of the regulatory operating environment among countries

will show that the similarities greatly outnumber

the differences. Until recently, FAA rules were

implemented by most foreign airlines as if they

were the international standard. Differences in international regulations affect aircraft manufacturers as well. (See box 5-1.)

Nonetheless, according to American Airlines,

rules requiring U.S. carriers to follow FAA security procedures at foreign airports cost the airline

$50 million per year more than foreign carriers are

spending at the same airports .56 Besides the direct

cost associated with these rules, industry representatives say they adversely affect marketing due

to the earlier airport arrival times they require and

sop~ul LWSOn, Ma~~~r, ~~~ul~tlO~ and organizational Analysis Division, Office of Aviation Po]icy, P]ans, and Management Analysis,

Federal Aviation Administration, letter to OTA, Aug. 25, 1993.

5 INa[ional Commission T. Ensure a Smong Comwtitive Airline lndr,ls~y, change, c~//enge and Compefifion, A Report to the President

and Congress (Washington, DC: U.S. Government Printing Office, August 1993), p. 10.

In 1993, an FAA contractor began an effort to create an automated database of costs and benefits of past regulations. Ward Keech, Manager.

Aircraft Regulatory Analysis Branch, Office of Aviation Policy, Plans, and Management Analysis, Federal Aviation Administration, personal

communication, Oct. 28, 1993.

52mis value represents a simple aggregation of FAA’S original cost estimates for individual rules (in cument year dollars).

s~~blic Law 101-508.

sqBaSed on [he Air]ine Commission report and FAA analysis.

55 j 4 cm] 29 is tie federa] safety regulation ~oveming the Opra[lon Within tie United states of foreign air carriers authorized by DOT.

5~Ro~fi W, Baker, Executive Vice ~esident, Operations, American Airlines, comment at OTA advisory pane] meeting, Sept. 15, 1992.
Chapter 5 Economic issues for Aviation Operations 1171

The Federal Aviation Adminstration has established minimum standards for the design and

manufacture of commercial transport aircraft produced in or imported into the United States to certify

them as safe In 1970 a number of European civil aviation authorities created the Joint Aviation Authorities (JAA) to develop common aircraft design regulations. By 1988, JAA had eliminated most of the

differences among its members Although JAA iS not a statutory authority, the European Union required

its member countries, as of 1992, to adopt all of JAA’s existing rules, includlng its certification code

Because a non-uniform system of certifying aircraft designs results in an increase in manufacturers’

costs and an inefficient use of resources FAA and JAA initiated an effort in 1983 to harmonize (resolve)

the differences in their standards, Interpretations, and procedures Over the following nine years, however, Iimited progress was made in eliminating unnecessary duplication on specific certification projects The General Accounting Off Ice (GAO) found that of the 267 differences in either wording or interpretation between the two sets of regulations that existed in 1980, 87 percent still remained in 19922 In

response to aircraft manufacturers’ criticism of their harmonization efforts, FAA and JAA began drafting

a strategic plan in 1992 to eliminate regulatory differences within established time frames Additionally,

the two groups also began working on a proposal for a cooperate and concurrent approach in which

FAA and JAA specialists would work together during the certification process

Differences between FM’s and JAA’s code may continue to arise as the result of the longer timeline

to Implement new rules in the United States, as well as from the possibility of changes being incorporated into a proposed FM rule during the rulemaking process Also, FAAs use of issue papers that

contain new requirements for manufacturers could hinder the harmonization process if they appear late

in the certification process and differ from JAA’s requirements GAO found that FM used issue papers

to impose additional requirements faster than the rulemaking process allows

U S manufacturers supply annually over half of the world

market for large commerclal aircraft

Estimates vary regarding the additional

costs borne by aircraft manufacturers as a

result of inefficiency in the certification process The Aerospace Industries Association

of America estimated that eliminating regulatory differences and duplication of activities

would save U S aircraft manufacturers between $800 million and $1 billion between

1992 and 2002

One source of additional costs are design

changes Imposed by either FAA or JAA late

in the certificatlon process as a result of differences in the Interpretation of Identical regulations To meet more conservative interpretations of rules by JAA concerning.

derivative aircraft and the segregation of

electrical wiring, for example, Boeing created

(continued)

I This box IS based on U S Congress General Accounting Off Ice Aircraft Cer?lllcarlon brnled Progress on Deve/opmg /nternationa/Design Sfar?dards GAO/RCED-92- 179 (Washington, DC August 1992)

2 GAO relled on FAAs determination of the number of differences that exmted In 1980
172 I Federal Research and Technology for Aviation

a second design for the 747-400 and also agreed to retrofit aircraft it had already exported to Europe

These design changes Increased Boeing’s production costs by $60 million to $90 million for the estimated number of 747-400 aircraft they would sell to members of JAA

Another source of added costs are duplicate certification tests (Including flight tests and other analyses) that add little to the safety of the aircraft and waste resources of both the regulating organizations

and the manufacturers Due to its past experience of conducting 90 foreign certification analyses to

export 12 separate aircraft designs, Boeing has budgeted approximately $30 million for JAA certification of the new 777 aircraft after FAA completes its review.

These additional costs are often passed directly to airlines when they purchase new aircraft In addition, airlines must spend millions of dollars modifying aircraft to obtain foreign certifications 3

3 Kenneth M Mead, Director, Transportation Issues, Resources, Community, and Economic Development Dlvlslon, U S General

Accounting Office, State of the Alrllne Industry Strategies for Addressing Financial and Compehtlon Problems, ” testtmony at hearings before the House Committee on Appropnatlons, Subcommittee on Transportation and Related Agencies, Mar 10, 1993

the perception they create that U.S. airlines are U.S. military spending, defense contractors have

more likely than foreign airlines to be targets of

terrorism.57 According to FAA’s Associate Administrator for Regulation and Certification, international differences in operating regulations

are more costly than disparities in airworthiness

rules, and the economic burden falls mostly on the

airlines. 58

AIR TRAFFIC CONTROL EQUIPMENT

MANUFACTURING

The need to replace obsolete equipment in Western Europe, along with likely economic growth in

Eastern Europe and Asia, is expected to result in

a fast-growing worldwide market in air traffic

control (ATC) equipment.59 Due to cutbacks in

entered the marketplace. U.S. companies are well

positioned to compete successfully for a portion

of the ATC equipment market. Airport automation

systems for baggage handling, security, and terminal management are a related and possibly faster

growing market.60

During the next decade, the international market for ATC equipment is expected to expand faster than the markets for air travel and commercial

aircraft combined. Foreign ATC sales are projected to grow at a 10 percent annual rate. Meanwhile, opportunities exist not only for ATC equipment manufacturers, but possibly for providers of

air traffic communications, navigation, and surveillance services.61

STOffice of Te~hno]ogy Assessment, based on a survey of senior representatives of the U.S. airline industry, 1993.

58 Anthony Broderlck, FAA Ass~iate Administrator for Regulation and Certification, comment at OTA workshop, June 9? 1992

5gFor the ~uTose of ~ls section, air trufic control equipmen~ is defined as the various components of ground-based equiPment (radars,

. .

sensors, computer hardware and soft ware, landing systems, and communications equipment) that enable an organization to provide commercial ATC services. This definition excludes onboard aircraft avionics.

60Dav id Hughes, “ATC, Airport Upgrades Poised for New Growth,” Aviation Week & Space Technology, Apr. 5, 1993, pp. 40-43.

~ I ATC sery ice is a ~ovemlnenta] function throughout the world, rather than a commercial industry; FAA is responsible for ATC services for

the United States. One economist estimates that the United States provides ATC services for one-third to one-half less cost than for similar traffic

levels and airsptice coverage than European agencies. Richard Golaszewski, Gellman Research Associates, Inc., “Improving Air Traffic Control in Europe,” 341h Air Truftic Control A.$socia[ion Fail Conference Proceedings, Oct. 30- Nov. 2, 1989 (Arlington, VA: Air Traffic Control

Association, 1989), pp. 508-515.
Chapter 5 Economic Issues for Aviation Operations 1173

The Westinghouse ASR-9 airport surveillance radar developed for FAA IS also sold to foreign countries

 State of the Industry

While hard to estimate, the ATC equipment market—globally and nationally—is only about 1 or

2 percent of the size of the civil aircraft and equipment market. The federal government does not

track trade and production data separately for the

ATC equipment industry; ATC equipment is a

small part of the Department of Commerce’s Standard Industrial Code SIC 3812: search, detection.

navigation, guidance. aeronautical, and nautical

systems instruments and equipment. A study by

the consulting firm DRI/McGraw-Hill calculated

worldwide ATC sales by both U.S. and foreign

companies as $6.3 billion in 1992. projected to

grow at a 9-percent annual rate over the following

decade. 62 Even those ATC manufacturing executives surveyed by OTA63 who thought that DRI/

McGraw-Hill’s estimates were reasonable noted

the uncertain availability of funds in Eastern Europe, the Commonwealth of Independent States,

and China as a factor that could reduce the size of

the market in the future. In addition, the DRI/

McGraw-Hill estimate includes aircraft avionics;

several respondents thought that the DRI/

McGraw-Hill estimate overstated the true size of

the worldwide ATC market by two to five times.

Of the world market (including the United States).

the consensus of the surveyed executives was that

the U.S. share is close to 40 percent, or $2.7 billion

if the DRI/McGraw-Hill estimate was correct.64

OTA’s survey of seven firms in the civil ATC

market can also be used to estimate the size of the

U.S. ATC industry. Total employment was 4,400

in 1992 and revenue was approximately $1.2 billion for the seven firms. OTA estimates that revenue for the entire U.S. ATC industry in 1992 was

between $1.2 billion and $1.9 billion-or slightly

over one-half of the DRI/McGraw-Hill number.65

Based on U.S. firms’ foreign revenues, the United

6~Thc follo~~ ,ng t;rTT1~ ~crc ~urYe}ed: IBM Corp,, wrc~tinghouse Electric Corp., Hughes Aircraft Co., paranlax S] ~tem~ CorP.. R~} theon

Co., Miirtin hl:inctt:i Corp., All Icd S]gn:i] (’0., Textron, Inc., lk’ilcox Electric, Inc., Hazeltinc Corp.. and 1’IT Gilfill:in.

(Ii S1[lLC Ihc ~jrillliirk ‘ U\lolllcr for IITC ~qlliprllcn[ m the llnlted States, FAA, does not purchaw an> foreign -nlade equipment, 1;AA outl~] ~

for /iT(’ cqulpmcn( c:in be uwd :ii a pro~} for the domc~[ic +arc of U.S. indu~try rekenues. In 1992, FAA fpent S 1.6 billion on ATC equipment

and \er\ icc~. }Icrm:in ‘rhiirrington. Spcc iii] ,lislitant to the 1;AA ,\\\ociate Admin i~trator for NAS Dc\ elopnlent, \ eri fied that FAA does no(

purchiiw AT(’ equipment from foreigrl-b:iwd n;~nirtiicturcr~. It ihould be noted thtit ~ome of FAA’s AT(- equipment contrticts are v, ith LJ.S.

iuh~idl:irrcs of (orclgrl-(l\\ ncd ~ c)rpt)rcili(ln~. i c., M’] lcoi I:lcctnc, Inc. iind CJrdion, Inc. The Dcp:irtrncnt of Def’cnw purchaws ii ~m:ill prnount

of ATC- cqurprnen( lci~ than 5 I ()() n~rllit)n pcr > e;ir- for uw in the N:itioniil Airip:icc Sy stem and. occa~ionally. iin ;irrport authori[y w ill ii\

\\ Cll
174 I Federal Research and Technology for Aviation

States had a 1992 balance of trade surplus in ATC

equipment of approximately $300 million to $475

million. 66

Both the DRI/McGraw-Hill study and an independent forecast by Raytheon, an ATC equipment

manufacturer with significant foreign sales, project the international market to grow at almost a

10-percent annual rate.67 However, even if the foreign contracts awarded to U.S. firms grow at this

rate, their profits may not increase as quickly,

since foreign contracts often require firms to subcontract out a significant share of the work to local

firms. Still, industry forecasts project that the

world market for ATC equipment will grow faster

than the markets for commercial aircraft and airline service. According to Boeing, the transport

aircraft market, as measured by the value of annual deliveries, is not expected to grow from 1993

through 2005 while passenger travel will increase

around 5 or 6 percent per year during this period.68

 U.S. Trade Policy for ATC Equipment

To penetrate foreign markets, countries that produce ATC equipment require government attention to a greater extent than even commercial aircraft manufacturers. In virtually all cases, the ATC

equipment is sold to national governments, while

aircraft sales are made to airlines, which may or

may not be government-owned.

In this context, home government subsidies enable foreign ATC manufacturers (some of which

are state-owned) to outbid U.S. companies for

equipment contracts-either through lower

prices, loan guarantees, or other attractive financing, or by selling equipment as part of a foreign aid

package. Unfortunately, the General Agreement

on Tariffs and Trade (GAIT)-under which international ATC equipment sales are covered—

does not effectively deal with government subsidies. Although GATT contains rules regarding

subsidies, they do not directly address a multilateral trading situation (e.g., U.S. and European

firms competing for a contract award from a developing country). If the playing field regarding

subsidies could be leveled for multilateral trade

through GATT-as it is for bilateral trade—U.S.

firms would become stronger competitors in the

global market.

The European Union is defining an ATC

technology plan for Europe with a goal of ensuring that European industry does not fall behind the

United States in this technology area. If Europe

succeeds at consolidating its ATC system and

equipment manufacturing industries, then U.S.

suppliers will have fewer opportunities in Europe

and greater competition in developing-country

markets. 69 Moreover, Eurocontro170 claims not to

be bound by aviation bilateral agreements and

provides favored status to European companies

bidding on its research and development contracts.71

CONCLUSIONS

The future of U.S. aviation is global. U.S. aviation

manufacturers and service providers are strong international competitors. They are world leaders in

660TA’S Surl,e) indicated hat 25 ~rcent Of ATC manufacturers’ revenue was from foreign customers. This figure was used to estimate the

U.S. balance of trade in ATC manufacturing.

6TThe forecast by Ray~eondid no[ S[a[e a Swcific time horizon. See David Hughes, “Raytheon Stresses ATC Oversew Market,” A~)iulion

Week & Spuce Technology, Mar. 1, 1993, p. 54. The surveyed executives were split as to whether DRlfMcGrawHill’s forecast growth for the

entire world market, 9 percent annually, was accurate or too high.

6~Boelng, 199.~ Cl(rrent Market Ou(look (Seattle, WA: 1993), p. 1.5.

@Ge]lman Research Associ:~[es, inc.. ‘bCcmPr~tion and Coordination in Federal Aviation Research,” OTA contractor report, Aug. 27,

1992, p. 34.

70A suprmationa] alr traffic management organization in western EUI’OPC (see ch. z)

71 James L. crook, Vice ~esident for Opera[ions, Air Traffic Control Association, Inc., per~onal Communication, June 30, 1994.
Chapter 5 Economic Issues for Aviation Operations I 175

delivering high value and quality aircraft. ATC

equipment, and airline and ATC services. However. further market opportunities exist, especially in the fast-growing ATC markets. The international market for ATC equipment is expected to

grow at a higher rate than either the market for

commercial aircraft or air travel during the next

decade.

Safety, environmental. and ATC standards are

becoming increasingly important to U.S. aviation

industry economics. International differences in

these regulations impose a cost burden on U.S. industries. While good progress is being made in

harmonizing European and U.S. safety standards

for aircraft design, it will take more than a decade

to completely harmonize operating regulations.
ACAS

ACARS

ACEE

ADP

ADS

AEAP

AERA

AESA

AGFS

AIRNET

ALPA

AMASS

ANC

AOR

APO

ARINC

ARTCC

ARTS

ASDE

ASF

ASOS

airborne collision avoidance system

ARINC Communications and

Reporting System

Aircraft Energy Efficiency program

advanced ducted propeller

automatic dependent surveillance

Atmospheric Effects of Aviation

Project

Automated En Route Air traffic

control

Atmospheric Effects of Supersonic

Aircraft program

Aviation Gridded Forecast System

Airport Network Simulation Model

Air Line Pilots Association

Airport Movement Area Safety

System

Air Navigation Commission

FAA Operations Research Service

FAA Office of Aviation Policy,

Plans, and Management Analysis

Aeronautical Radio, Inc.

air route traffic control center

Automated Radar Terminal System

Airport Surface Detection

Equipment

FAA Associate Administrator for

Aviation Safety

Automated Surface Observing

System

Abbreviations A

ASQP

ASRS

AST

ASTA

ATA

ATC

ATCRBS

ATCSCC

ATM

ATN

ATOMS

AWIPS

AWOS

AWPG

BEA

BWI

CAA

CAEP

CAMI

Airline Service Quality

Performance

Aviation Safety Reporting System

Advanced Subsonic Technology

Airport Surface Traffic Automation

Air Transport Association

air traffic control

Air Traffic Control Radio Beacon

System

Air Traffic Control System

Command Center

air traffic management

Aeronautical Telecommunications

Network

Air Traffic Operations Management

System

Advanced Weather Interactive

Processing System

Automated Weather Observing

System

Aviation Weather Products

Generator

Bureau of Economic Analysis

Baltimore-Washington International

Airport

Civil Aviation Administration

ICAO Committee on Aviation

Environmental Projection

Civil Aeromedical Institute

I 177
178 I Federal Research and Technology for Aviation

CASIS

CASR

CATER

CBA

CD

CERL

CFD

CFIT

CIA

CIP

CNS

co

CODAS

CONDAT

CRADA

CRM

CRREL

CRS

C/SOIT

CST

CTAS

DA

DDAS

DNA

DNL

DOD

DOE

DOI

DOT

DUATS

E

3

EATCHIP

ECAC

Civil Aviation Security Information

System

Center for Aviation Systems

Reliability

Collection & Analysis of Terminal

Records

cost-benefit analysis

compact disc

Construction Engineering Research

Laboratory

computational fluid dynamics

controlled flight into terrain

Central Intelligence Agency

Capital Investment Plan

communications, navigation, and

surveillance

carbon monoxide

Consolidated Operations and Delay

Analysis System

consolidated data system

Cooperative Research and

Development Agreement

crew resource management

Cold Regions Research and

Engineering Laboratory

computerized reservation system

Communications/Surveillance

Operational Implementation Team

computational structures technology

Center-TRACON Automation

System

descent advisor

Daily Decision Analysis System

Defense Nuclear Agency

averaged day-night noise level; also,

Ld n

Department of Defense

Department of Energy

Department of the Interior

Department of Transportation

Direct User Access Terminal

Service

Energy Efficient Engine program

European Air Traffic Control

Harmonisation and Integration

Programme

European Civil Aviation Conference

ECI

EDMS

EDS

EFTA

EMF

EPA

ESAS

ETMS

EU

F&E

FAA

FAEED

FANS

FAR

FAST

FBI

FCCSET

FDADS

FFRDC

FICON

FLOWSIM

FMS

GA

GATT

GCM

GCRP

GCS

GLONASS

GNSS

GOES

GPS

GPWS

GRADE

Engine Component Improvement

program

Emissions and Dispersion Modeling

System

explosives detection system

European Free Trade Association

electromagnetic field

Environmental Protection Agency

Enhanced Situational Awareness

System

Enhanced Traffic Management

System

European Union (formerly

European Community)

facilities and equipment

Federal Aviation Administration

FAA Aircraft Engine Emissions

Database

Future Air Navigation System

Federal Aviation Regulation

final approach spacing tool

Federal Bureau of Investigation

Federal Coordinating Council for

Science, Engineering, and

Technology

Full Digital ARTS Display System

Federally Funded Research and

Development Corporation

Federal Interagency Committee on

Noise

airport traffic flow simulation model

flight management systems

general aviation

General Agreement on Tariffs and

Trade

general circulation model

Global Change Research Program

Guidance and Control Software

Global Orbiting Navigational

Satellite System

global navigation satellite system

Geostationary Operational

Environmental Satellite

Global Positioning System

ground proximity warning system

Graphical Airspace Design

Environment
Appendix A Abbreviations 1179

HARS

HC

HF

HF

HSCT

HSI

HSRP

IAA/TOF

IATA

ICAO

IFR

IGIA

ILS

IMC

INM

ITWS

JAA

JAR

LIDAR

LOFT

LTO

MLS

MOA

Mode-S

MOU

MPAP

MSD

NACA

NADIN

NANIM

NAS

NASA

NASPAC

NASSIM

NATCA

NCAR

high-altitude route system

hydrocarbon

human factors

high frequency

high-speed civil transport

Human Systems Interface

High-Speed Research Program

Interagency Agreements for the

Transfer of Funds

International Air Transport

Association

International Civil Aviation

Organization

instrument flight rules

Interagency Group on International

Aviation

instrument landing system

instrument meteorological

conditions

Integrated Noise Model

Integrated Terminal Weather

System

Joint Aviation Authorities

Joint Airworthiness Regulation

light detection and ranging

Line Oriented Flight Training

landing and takeoff cycle

microwave landing system

Memorandum of Agreement

mode select

Memorandum of Understanding

Multiple Parallel Approach Program

multiple site damage

National Advisory Committee for

Aeronautics

National Airspace Data Interchange

Network

National Noise Impact Model

National Airspace System

National Aeronautics and Space

Administration

National Airspace System

Performance Analysis Capability

NAS traffic simulation model

National Air Traffic Controllers

Association

National Center for Atmospheric

Research

NDE

NEXRAD

NIASS

NIST

NMAB

NOAA

NOX

NPDES

NRC

NSF

NSTC

NTSB

OAG

ODAPS

OMB

OPSNET

OPTIFLOW

PADS

PBE

PRM

PSA

PTRS

R&D

RAIM

RE&D

RF

RNPC

RSPA

RTCA

SDAT

SDRS

nondestructive evaluation

next-generation weather radar

National Institute of Aerospace

Studies and Services

National Institute of Standards and

Technology

National Materials Advisory Board

National Oceanographic and

Atmospheric Administration

nitrogen oxides

National Pollutant Discharge

Elimination System

National Research Council

National Science Foundation

National Science and Technology

Council

National Transportation Safety

Board

Official Airline Guide

Oceanic Display and Planning

System

Office of Management and Budget

Operational Performance System

Network

optimized national traffic flow

planning model

Planned Arrival and Departure

System

portable breathing equipment

Precision Runway Monitor

Pacific Southwest Airlines

Program Tracking and Reporting

Subsystem

research and development

receiver autonomous integrity

monitoring

research, engineering, and

development

radio frequency

required navigation performance

capability

Research and Special Programs

Administration

Radio Technical Commission for

Aeronautics

sector design analysis tool

Service Difficulty Reporting System
180 I Federal Research and Technology for Aviation

SIMMOD

SMARTFLO

SOIT

SPAS

SPEARS

SSR

SST

TATCA

TCAS

TDWR

trademark name for airport and

airspace simulation model

expert system-based flow planning

tool

Satellite Operational

Implementation Team

Safety Performance Analysis

System

Screener Proficiency Evaluation and

Reporting System

secondary surveillance radar

supersonic transport

terminal ATC automation

Traffic Alert and Collision

Avoidance System

terminal Doppler weather radar

TMA

TRACON

TSRV

USAF

USATS

USDA

VFR

VHF

VNTSC

VOC

WES

WPMS

WVAS

Traffic Management Advisor

terminal radar approach control

Transport Systems Research Vehicle

U.S. Air Force

U.S. Air Traffic Services

U.S. Department of Agriculture

visual flight rules

very high frequency

Volpe National Transportation

Systems Center

volatile organic compounds

Waterways Experimental Station

Work Program Management System

Wake Vortex Advisory System
Workshop

Participants B

Jonathan Howe

Workshop Chair

Zuckert, Scoutt & Rasenberger

Joop Amkreutz

Amsterdam Airport Schiphol

L.H.D. Bakker

International Federation of Air Line Pilots

Associations

John L. Bartlett

Wiley, Rein & Fielding

Anthony Broderick

Federal Aviation Administration

Gilbert Dubois

Commission of the European Communities

Najeeb E. Halaby

Safair International

Webster C. Heath

Douglas Aircraft Co.

Chikanori Noda

Japan Airlines

Nicholas Noyes

U.S. Department of State

Robert W. Simpson

Massachusetts Institute of Technology

William Carson R. Stussel

IBM Lufthansa

Guinn Clark Upali K. Wickrama

Thomson-CSF International Civil Aviation Organization

1181
182 I Federal Research and Technology for Aviation

John Enders Harvey B. Safeer

Workshop Chair Federal Aviation Administration Technical Center

Flight Safety Foundation

Barry Scott

Chris Barrett Federal Aviation Administration Liaison Office

Los Alamos National Laboratory NASA Ames Research Center

Frank J. Colson Maris Vikmanis

U.S. Department of Defense Policy Board on Armstrong Laboratory

Federal Aviation Wright–Patterson Air Force Base

Donald D. Engen

AOPA Air Safety Foundation

Richard S. Golaszewski

Gellman Research Associates, Inc.

Jonathan Howe

Zuckert, Scoutt & Rasenberger

Richard R. John

Volpe National Transportation Systems Center

Martin Pozesky

Federal Aviation Administration

Tom Walsh

Federal Aviation Administration Engineering Field

Office

NASA Langley Research Center

Stein Weissenberger

Lawrence Livermore National Laboratory

Robert Whitehead

National Aeronautics and Space Administration

Steve Zaidman

Federal Aviation Administration
Appendix B Workshop Participants 1183

Michael Prather

Workshop Moderator

University of California, Irvine

Tom Boudreau

Federal Aviation Administration

Paul Dykeman

Federal Aviation Administration

Jack Kaye

National Aeronautics and Space Administration

Jarvis Meyers

National Science Foundation

Clinton V. Oster, Jr.

Indiana University

Ari Patrinos

U.S. Department of Energy

Scott Sandgathe

Office of Naval Research

Ulrich Schumann

DLR Institute of Atmospheric Physics

Joseph Sickles

U.S. Environmental Protection Agency

Richard Stolarski

National Aeronautics and Space Administration

Richard Swauger

Air Traffic Consultant

Howard Wesoky

National Aeronautics and Space Administration

Robert Whitehead

National Aeronautics and Space Administration
184 I Federal Research and Technology for Aviation

William W. Hoover

Workshop Chair

Consultant

John Amatetti

Aerospace Industries Association

Sally Bath

U.S. Department of Commerce

Ray Colladay

Martin Marietta

William B. Cotton

United Airlines, Inc.

Robert A. Davis

Boeing Commercial Airplane Group

Donald D. Engen

AOPA Air Safety Foundation

John J. Fearnsides

The Mitre Corp.

William Fife

Port Authority of New York and New Jersey

Najeeb E. Halaby

Safair International

Jonathan Howe

Zuckert, Scoutt & Rasenberger

Daniel Kasper

Harbridge House

Allen Li

U.S. General Accounting Office

Lou Mancini

Northwest Airlines

Julian May

Delta Airlines

Dale E. McDaniel

Federal Aviation Administration

John L. McLucas

Aerospace Consultant

Gary Osborn

Hughes Aircraft Co.

Willard G. Plentl, Jr.

Division of Aviation for North Carolina

Martin T. Pozesky

Federal Aviation Administration

Cecil Rosen

National Aeronautics and Space Administration

Richard Swauger

Air Traffic Consultant
Index

A

AAS. See Advanced Automation System

ACARS. See ARINC Communications and Reporting System

Accident data, 74,76-77,82-89, 108-109, 110

Accident Investigation Data System, 110

Acquisition process. See Federal acquisition process

ADS. See Automatic dependent surveillance

Advanced Automation System, 18,53,55,58

Advanced Subsonic Technology program, 23,24,

113, 154, 155

Advanced Weather Interactive Processing System,

140

AERA. See Automated en route air traffic control

Aeronautical Radio, Inc., 16-17, 137

Aeronautical Telecommunications Network, 43

Aging aircraft, 47-48,87-88,89, 144-145, 146

Air Force, 43,49,50, 115, 155-156

Air quality issues

atmospheric science research, 120-125

emissions standards, 79-80

environmental assessment, 114-116

federal aviation data and assessment resources,

112-113

innovative technologies and development efforts,

24, 154-155

weighing current issues, 93-95

Air traffic control equipment manufacturing, 172,

174-175

Air traffic control system components, 9, 130-132

Air Traffic Control Systems Command Center, 54,

105, 131

Air traffic control systems technology development

and implementation. See also Capacity and air

traffic management issues; Data and analysis

for aviation research and development; Innovative technologies and development efforts

background, 3-5,8-11, 13-17,52-53

federal spending on civil RD&E, 62

MPAP case study, 64-67

public-private partnerships and, 42-43

system development and acquisition policy,

27-28.58-62

system development and acquisition problems,

53-57

system development improvement possibilities,

28-31,70

system development process, 17-20, 32-33,62-68

system overview, 53, 54

Air traffic management issues. See Capacity and air

traffic management issues

Air Traffic Services Corporation, 5,6-7, 17-18,

29-30,52-53

Aircraft certification standards, 170, 171-172

Aircraft Energy Efficiency Program, 76,78

Aircraft Engine Emissions Database, 115

Aircraft hardening, 150, 151-152

Aircraft manufacturing industry, 9, 12, 110-111,

170, 171-172

Aircraft materials research, 129-130

Aircraft Noise Abatement Working Group, 154

Airfield capacity. See Capacity and air traffic management issues

Airline Commission. See National Commission To

Ensure a Strong and Competitive Airline Industry

Airline Deregulation Act of 1978, 160

Airline industry

airline competition, 160-161

background, 9, 12, 157-158

factors affecting international success of, 8,

165-172

financial condition, 161-164

fleet forecast, 159-160

inspection and maintenance data, 110-111

international developments, 164-165

public-private partnerships, 43

Airline Service Quality Performance system,

103-104

AIRNET, 106

Airport and Airway Improvement Act of 1982,5

Airport efficiency. See Capacity and air traffic management issues

Airport operators’ role in civil aviation, 39-42

Airspace and airport efficiency. See Capacity and air

traffic management issues

I 185
186 I Federal Research and Technology for Aviation

Airworthiness agreements. See Bilateral airworthiness agreements

Ames Research Center

ATM research, 139-140

deicing and anti-icing methods, 155-156

FAA interagency coordination of R&D, 48-49

human factors research, 118-120

precision approach and landing research, 137

research capabilities, 37, 39

Analysis for aviation research and development. See

Data and analysis for aviation research and development

AOR. See Office of Operations Research

ARINC Communications and Reporting System,

16-17, 137

ASOS. See Automated Surface Observing System

ASQP. See Airline Service Quality Performance system

Atmospheric Effects of Aviation Project, 115-116

Atmospheric science research, 120-125, 143-144.

See also Environmental issues; Weather research

ATN. See Aeronautical Telecommunications Network

Augustine Panel, 96

Automated en route air traffic control, 140

Automated Surface Observing System, 107

Automated Weather Observing System, 40-41,48

Automatic dependent surveillance, 135, 136

Automation research, 119-120

Aviation agreements, See Bilateral aviation agreements

Aviation Gridded Forecast System, 140-141

Aviation industries. See also Air traffic control

equipment manufacturing; Aircraft manufacturing industry; Airline industry

aviation systems comparison, 1, 2

economic indicators for, 9, 12, 157, 158

Aviation Noise and Capacity Act of 1990,79

Aviation Safety and Capacity Expansion Act of

1990, 159, 170

Aviation Safety Research Act of 1988

budget issues, 5

interagency coordination on aviation R&D, 25, 47

long-term research and, 11,31,36-37,95-96, 118

Aviation Security Improvement Act of 1990,96,

111, 150, 151

Aviation Security Research and Development Scientific Advisory Panel, 96

Aviation standards. See International aviation standards

Aviation Weather Products Generator, 140-141

AWOS. See Automated Weather Observing System

AWPG. See Aviation Weather Products Generator

B

Baggage container hardening, 150, 151-152

Balance of payments for merchandise trade and services, 166, 167

Bilateral airworthiness agreements, 44,45

Bilateral aviation agreements, 31, 165

Boeing, 20,69, 141-142

Bombs, 86-87, 148-150

Budget issues. See also Economic issues for aviation operations

ATC modernization and, 17-20

comparing R&D funding to risk, 87-89

cost-benefit analysis, 96-101

FAA budget accounts, 5,7,29,59-60

OMB Circular A-11 guidelines, 59

procurement rule limitations, 60-62

c

Cabin safety, 74, 76, 145-147

California

aviation research projects funding, 40-41

Canada

bilateral airworthiness agreement with U. S., 44

Capacity and air traffic management issues

ADS implementation, 135, 136

airline delay data sources, 104

ATC components, 9, 130-132

FAA models for traffic flow management and capacity analysis, 105

federal aviation data and assessment resources,

103-108

historical payoffs of aviation R&D, 20,80-81

innovative technologies and development efforts,

3-4,30-31, 130-141

potential airport capacity enhancements, 91,93

summary, 8

weighing current issues, 90-92

Capital investment in airline industry, 163-164

Capital Investment Plan, 97-99

CASIS. See Civil Aviation Security information

System

Catastrophic Failure Prevention Act of 1990, 103

Catastrophic Failure Prevention Research Program,

25,47

CBA. See Cost-benefit analysis

Center for Advanced Aviation System Development,

100

Center for Aviation Systems Reliability, 47-48, 145

Center-TRACON Automation System, 139-140

CERL. See Construction Engineering Research Laboratory

CIP. See Capital Investment Plan
Index I 187

Civil aviation industries, 9, 12, 157, 158. See also

Air traffic control equipment manufacturing; Aircraft manufacturing industry; Airline industry

Civil Aviation Security Information System, 112

Clean, quiet engine programs, 78-79

Climate change. See Global climate change

Clinton Administration FAA reorganization proposal, 5, 6-7, 17-18, 29-30, 52-53

CNS systems. See Communications, navigation, and

surveillance systems

CODAS. See Consolidated Operations and Delay

Analysis System

Cold Regions Research and Engineering Laboratory,

50

Communications, navigation, and surveillance systems. See also datalink; Global Positioning

System; Global navigation satellite system

innovative technologies and development efforts,

130-132, 133-138

summary and conclusions, 3-4, 14-17, 30-31, 69

Competitiveness

airline competition, 160-161

ATC equipment manufacturing industry, 173-174

background, 9, 12

FAA regulations’ effect on, 8, 170-172

U.S. trade policy and, 174

Complex software reliability and certification, 128

Compliance costs for airline industry, 94-95, 166,

169-170

Computational structures technology, 127-128

Computing methods, 125-128

Consolidated Operations and Delay Analysis System, 107

Construction Engineering Research Laboratory, 50

Cooperative research. See Interagency cooperation

on aviation research and development

Cooperative research and development agreements,

43

Cost-benefit analysis, 96-101

CRADAS. See Cooperative research and development agreements

Crosscutting research issues

atmospheric science research, 120-125

background, 117-118

complex software reliability and certification, 128

conclusions, 156

high-performance computing methods, 125-128

human factors research, 118-120

long-term research, 117, 118-130

materials research, 128-130

CRREL. See Cold Regions Research and Engineering Laboratory

CST. See Computational structures technology

CTAS. See Center-TRACON Automation System

D

Data and analysis for aviation research and development

aviation R&D issues and technology options, 75

background, 21-22,73-74

conclusions, 116

federal aviation data and assessment resources,

103-116

historical payoffs of aviation R&D, 20-24,74-81

issues in setting priorities, 26-27, 95-101

major U.S. aviation databases, 82, 104-107

predicting future problems, 101-103

weighing current issues, 82-95

Datalink, 14-17,30, 131, 133, 137

Defense laboratories. See Department of Defense

Deicing and anti-icing technologies, 24,89, 143,

155-156

Delays. See Capacity and air traffic management

issues

Department of Defense

airport pavement research, 130

GPS control, 135

human factors research, 118-119

interagency coordination on aviation R&D, 25,

26,31-32,49-50,51-52, 102, 118

public-private partnerships, 43

Department of Energy, 48,50

Department of Transportation, 81, 103-104, 111,

113, 124

Design models, 105-106

Digital datalink. See Datalink

DOD. See Department of Defense

DOE. See Department of Energy

Dryden Research Facility, 37

E

EATCHIP. See European Air Traffic Control Harmonisation and Integration Programme

ECAC. See European Civil Aviation Conference

Economic issues for aviation operations. See also

Budget issues

conclusions, 174-175

economic indicators for aviation industries, 9, 12,

158

factors affecting the international success of the

U.S. airline industry, 165-172

international harmonization of aircraft certification standards, 170, 171-172

state of the airline industry, 157-165

state of the ATC equipment industry, 174-175

timing of costs and realized benefits of R&D. 90

U.S. balance of payments for merchandise trade

and services, 166, 167
188 I Federal Research and Technology for Aviation

U.S. trade policy for ATC equipment, 174

Efficiency issues. See Capacity and air traffic management issues

Electromagnetic field hazards, 128

Emissions and Dispersion Modeling System, 115

Emissions control and standards. See Air quality

Issues

Employment in airline industry, 163

Energy efficiency, 76,78,92-93

Engine emissions control. See Air quality issues

Enhanced Security Demonstration project, 152-153

Enhanced situation awareness, 141-142

Environmental issues

atmospheric science research, 120-125

federal aviation data and assessment resources,

112-116

historical payoffs of aviation R&D, 23-24,76-80

innovative technologies and development efforts,

153-156

institutional and management issues, 52

weighing current issues, 32, 92-95

Environmental Protection Agency

aviation research, 23, 24, 32, 52

coordination with FAA, 24

emissions standards, 79-80

environmental assessment, 113, 114-115

EPA. See Environmental Protection Agency

Eurocontrol, 45-46

European Air Traffic Control Harmonisation and

Integration Programme, 46

European aviation organizations, 44-46. See also

Joint Aviation Authorities

European Civil Aviation Conference, 45-46

Explosives, 86-87, 148-150

F

FAA. See Federal Aviation Administration

Facilities and equipment account, 5,29,59-60

F&E account. See Facilities and equipment account

Federal acquisition process, 17-18,27-28,58-59,

60-62

Federal Acquisition Streamlining Act of 1994,

61-62

Federal Aviation Act of 1958,36

Federal Aviation Administration

airline industry regulatory burden, 166, 169-172

capacity and air traffic management technology

options, 3-4, 137-141

data and assessment resources, 103-113

delay data, 90-92, 103-104

environmental issues, 32, 113, 115, 153-156

grants to universities for R&D, 103

human factors research, 118-120

interagency coordination today, 25, 47-50, 51,

69-70, 102

international aviation organizations’ relationships

with, 4, 13-14, 17, 44, 45

issues in setting R&D priorities, 3, 5-8, 26-27,

31-32,95-101

materials research, 129-130

MPAP case study, 64-67

noise regulations, 78-79

organizational framework of civil aviation, 1, 3-5,

9,36-37

projected benefits for FAA R&D projects, 100

public-private partnerships, 42-43

safety and security research, 87-90, 141-148,

148-153

system development and acquisition, 17-20,

27-31,53-69,70-71

Virginia’s pilot weather information technology

initiative and, 40-41

Federal aviation data and assessment resources

capacity-related data and analysis, 103-108

environmental assessment, 112-116

safety factors, 108-111

security data, 111-112

Federal Interagency Committee on Noise, 113-114

FICON. See Federal Interagency Committee on

Noise

Fire safety, 74,76,85-86,89-90, 145-147

Fleet forecast for air carriers, 159-160

Flight Standards Service, 110-111

Foreign investment in U.S. airlines, 164-165

Future Air Navigation System, 14, 15

G

GATT. See General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade

GCM. See General circulation model

GCRP. See Global Change Research Program

General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade, 174

General circulation model, 123-124

Global Change Research Program, 121

Global climate change, 114-116, 121-124

Global navigation satellite system, 14, 17, 131, 135

Global Orbiting Navigation Satellite System, 135

Global Positioning System

innovative technologies and development efforts,

133, 135

institutional and management issues, 44, 57

international aviation standards and, 14, 15, 17

precision approach and landing research, 137

GLONASS. See Global Orbiting Navigation Satellite System

GNSS. See Global navigation satellite system

GPS. See Global Positioning System
Index 1189

GRADE. See Graphical Airspace Design Environment computer graphics tool

Graphical Airspace Design Environment computer

graphics tool, 105

Guidance and Control Software experiment, 128

H

Hazardous atmospheric conditions. see Anti-icing

technologies; Deicing technologies; Windshear

factors

High-altitude emissions, 121-122

High-performance computing methods, 125-128

High-speed civil transport, 95, 121-122

High-speed commercial transport, 121-123

HSI. See Human Systems Interface

Human factors

comparing R&D funding to risk, 87

crosscutting research issues, 31, 118-120

safety technology options, 22, 89, 147-148

security technology options, 150, 153

Human Systems Interface, 119

ICAO. See International Civil Aviation Organization

Icing. See Deicing and anti-icing technologies

IGIA. See Interagency Group on International Aviation

ILS. See Instrument landing system

INM. See Integrated Noise Model

Innovation Development and Engineering Applications program, 51

Innovative technologies and development efforts

background, 117-118

capacity and traffic management issues, 130-141

conclusions, 156

environmental issues, 23-24, 153-156

safety issues, 22-23, 141-148

security issues, 148-153

Inspection and maintenance data, 110-111

Institutional and management issues

ATC system overview, 53,54

ATC technology development and implementation, 13-17, 52-69

background, 1,5-8

conclusions, 69-71

interagency coordination on aviation R&D, 25,

26-27,46-52

MPAP case study, 64-67

organization] framework for civil aviation, 3-5,

8-9, 10-11, 35-46

Virginia’s initiative for pilot weather information

technology, 40-41

Instrument landing system, 57, 132

Integrated Noise Model, 113

Integrated Terminal Weather System, 140-141

Integrated Wind Shear Program, 144

Interagency cooperation on aviation research and

development

background, 4,25,26-27,46-48

barriers to coordination, 50-52

crosscutting research issues, 31-32, 117, 118-130

data and analysis for aviation R&D, 102

DOD laboratories and FAA, 49-50

FAA research agreements with other federal facilities, 51

MPAP case study, 64-67

NASA and FAA, 48-49

Interagency Group on International Aviation, 44

International Air Transport Association, 170

International aviation standards

institutional and management issues, 30-31, 43-44

international harmonization of aircraft certification standards, 4, 170, 171-172

summary, 13-17

International Civil Aviation Organization

emissions standards, 24, 79-80, 123, 155

environmental assessment, 115

institutional and management issues, 43-44

international harmonization of aviation standards,

13-14, 15

International competitiveness. See Competitiveness

International concerns over satellite navigation

technology, 135

International markets. See Competitiveness

J

JAA. See Joint Aviation Authorities

Joint Aviation Authorities, 13, 45, 171-172

L

LaGuardia Airport, 41-42

Langley Research Center

aging aircraft research, 145

human factors research, 118-120

interagency coordination of R&D, 48-49

research capabilities, 39

weather research, 144

Lewis Research Center, 37, 39

Long-term research

aviation R&D defined, 9, 10-11

congressional interest and scope of study, 5-8

cost-benefit analysis and, 101

crosscutting research issues, 25, 117, 118-130

data and analysis for aviation R&D, 101-103

issues in setting priorities, 3, 26-27, 31-32,

95-101
190 I Federal Research and Technology for Aviation

M

Maintenance data, 110-111

Materials research, 107-109, 128-130, 150, 151-152

Meteorological research. See Weather research

Microwave Landing System, 55,57,58, 132

Military research and development. See Department

of Defense

Minnesota

FAA partnership with, 42

MLS. See Microwave Landing System

Models and analytical tools, 82, 104-107, 113-114.

See also Crosscutting research issues; specific

models and tools by name

N

NADIN system. See National Airspace Data Interchange Network

NANIM. See National Noise Impact Model

NAS. See National Airspace System

NASA. See National Aeronautics and Space Administration

NASPAC. See National Airspace System Performance Analysis Capability

National Advisory Committee for Aeronautics, 8,35

National Aeronautics and Space Administration. See

also Ames Research Center; Langley Research

Center; Lewis Research Center

aircraft materials research, 129

aviation R&D budget, 5, 7

environmental research and technology options,

76,78-79, 115-116, 153-156

high-performance computing capabilities,

125-126

high-speed commercial transport program,

121-123

interagency coordination on aviation R&D, 25,

26,31-32,48-49,52

noise assessment and modeling, 23,24, 113

organizational framework, 37-39

Wake Vortex Systems Research, 57

National Aeronautics Facilities, 126-127

National Aging Aircraft Research Program, 47-48

National Airport Pavement Registration and Demonstration Program, 108

National Airspace Data Interchange Network, 40-41

National Airspace System

ATM procedure evaluation, 91

capacity and air traffic management issues, 81

cost-benefit analysis and, 100

models and analytical tools, 106

plan background, 5,53

National Airspace System Performance Analysis

Capability, 106

National Commission To Ensure a Strong and Competitive Airline Industry, 17-18,52-53, 170

National laboratories. See Department of Defense;

Department of Energy

National Materials Advisory Board, 129-130

National Noise Impact Model, 113

National Plan for Aviation Human Factors, 118-122

National Simulation Capability, 106

National Transportation Safety Board, 83-84,

108-109, 110

Navigation systems. See Communications, navigation, and surveillance systems; Satellite communications, navigation, and surveillance systems

New Jersey

Port Authority research, 41-42

New York

Albany Airport compliance costs, 94

Port Authority research, 41-42

NEXRAD. See Next-generation weather radar

Next-generation weather radar, 107

Noise issues

historical payoffs of aviation R&D, 78-79

innovative technologies and development efforts,

23-24, 153-154

noise assessment and modeling, 113-114

noise metric, 113

noise reduction technology, 154

weighing current issues, 94

North Dakota

reflective signs testing, 137-138

NTSB. See National Transportation Safety Board

Numerical Aerodynamic Simulation Program, 125

0

Office of Air Traffic System Management, 103,

106-107

Office of Aviation Policy, Plans, and Management

Analysis, 107

Office of Environment and Energy, 68, 155

Office of Operations Research, 98-99, 106

OMB Circular A-11 guidelines, 59

OMB Circular A- 109 process, 58-59,98

Operational models, 105

Operational Performance System Network, 103-104

OPSNET. See Operational Performance System Network

Organizational framework for civil aviation. See

also Institutional and management issues

background, 8-9, 10-11,35-36

European aviation organization roles, 44-46

FAA role, 1,3-5,36-37

ICAO role, 43-44

NASA role, 37-39
Index 1191

public-private partnerships, 42-43

state authorities’ and airport operators’ roles,

39-42

P

Part 121 operations, 74,76,82-87, 142

Part 135 operations, 74,76

Passenger protective breathing equipment, 146-147

Pavement research, 107-109, 129, 130

Personnel training, 120, 147-148

Pilot weather information technology. See Weather

research

Port Authority of New York and New Jersey, 41-42

Precision approach and landing, 132, 137

Precision Runway Monitor program, 55,57

Private sector. See Air traffic control equipment

manufacturing; Aircraft manufacturing industry;

Airline industry; Public-private partnerships for

technology development and implementation

Procurement process. See Federal acquisition process

Public-private partnerships for technology development and implementation, 27, 42-43, 69

R

R&D division. See System Engineering and Development division

RE&D account. See Research, Engineering and Development account

Research, Engineering and Development account, 5,

29,59-60, 87

Research, Engineering and Development Advisory

Committee, 5, 8,26-27,96

Research and technology issues. See Crosscutting

research issues; Innovative technologies and development efforts

Runway pavement research. See Pavement research

s

Safety Indicators program, 109-110

Safety issues

aviation accidents and fatalities by industry segment, 82, 83

comparison of fatal accidents and related safety

R&D spending, 88

federal aviation data and assessment resources,

108-111

historical payoffs of aviation R&D, 20-23,74-76,

77

innovative technologies and development efforts,

22-23, 141-148

Part 121 fatal accidents, 84, 86

Part 121 total accidents, 83, 84

predicting future problems, 101-103

summary, 8, 9

weighing current issues, 82-90

Safety Performance Analysis System, 111

Sandia National Laboratory, 48

Satellite Operational Implementation Team, 69

Satellite-based observation platforms, 107

Screener Proficiency Evaluation and Reporting System, 150

Sector Design analysis tool, 105

Security issues

federal aviation data and assessment resources,

111-112

historical payoffs of aviation R&D, 80

innovative technologies and development efforts,

148-153

significant terrorist incidents in aviation, 87

summary, 8

weighing current issues, 86-90

Selection of controllers, 120

Service Difficulty Reporting System, 110-111

SIMMOD, 105

Situation awareness. See Enhanced situation awareness

Software reliability and certification, 128

SOIT. See Satellite Operational Implementation

Team

Southwest Airlines, 9, 161, 162

SPAS. See Safety Performance Analysis System

SPEARS. See Screener Proficiency Evaluation and

Reporting System

State authorities’ role in civil aviation, 39-42

Subsonic aviation. See Environmental issues; Noise

issues

Supersonic aircraft materials, 129

Surface guidance, surveillance, and control,

137-138, 139

Surveillance systems. See Communications, navigation, and surveillance systems

System Development Directorate, 55,67-69

System Engineering and Development division, 20,

67-69

System Operations Directorate, 55,67-69

T

TCAS. See Traffic Alert and Collision Avoidance

System

Technical standards for international aviation. See

International aviation standards

Technology issues. See Innovative technologies and

development efforts

Terminal Doppler Weather Radar program, 48,

58-59

Terrorist threats. See Security issues
192 I Federal Research and Technology for Aviation

Trade policy for air traffic control equipment, 174

Traffic Alert and Collision Avoidance System, 44,

142

Training methods, 120, 147-148

u

United Airlines, 141-142

United States Air Traffic Services Corporation. See

Air Traffic Services Corporation

United States bilateral airworthiness agreements.

See Bilateral airworthiness agreements

United States bilateral aviation agreements. See Bilateral aviation agreements

USATS. See Air Traffic Services Corporation

v

Virginia

pilot weather information technology initiative,

40-41

Volpe National Transportation Systems Center, 113

w

Wake Vortex Advisory System, 55,57

Wake Vortex Systems Research, 57

Water spray systems, 146-147

Waterways Experimental Station, 130

Weapons detection, 148-150

Weather research. See also Deicing and anti-icing

technologies

cost-benefit analysis and, 101

crosscutting research issues, 124-125

data and analysis for aviation R&D, 107

innovative technologies and development efforts,

22-23,89, 140-141

interagency coordination on aviation R&D, 48

Virginia’s pilot weather information technology

initiative, 40-41

U.S. Weather Research Program, 124-125

Windshear factors, 76, 142, 144

Work Program Management Subsystem, 110

WPMS. See Work Program Management Subsystem

Wright Laboratory, 51

WVAS. See Wake Vortex Advisory System

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