Illinois Official Reports 

Appellate Court

Korner v. Madigan, 2016 IL App (1st) 153366

Appellate Court 

Caption

LINDY KORNER, Plaintiff-Appellant, v. LISA MADIGAN, in Her 

Official Capacity as Attorney General of Illinois; MANUEL

FLORES, in His Official Capacity as Acting Secretary of the Illinois 

Department of Financial and Professional Regulation; JAY

STEWART, in His Official Capacity as Division Director of the 

Illinois Department of Professional Regulation; and SARAH PRATT,

in Her Official Capacity as Public Access Counselor for the Illinois 

Attorney General’s Office, Defendants-Appellees.

District & No. First District, Second Division

Docket No. 1-15-3366

Filed

Rehearing denied

December 20, 2016

February 21, 2017

Decision Under 

Review

Appeal from the Circuit Court of Cook County, No. 14-CH-3223; the 

Hon. Mary L. Mikva, Judge, presiding.

Judgment Affirmed.

Counsel on

Appeal

Minelli Law Offices, LLC, of Ottawa (Christopher R. Minelli, of 

counsel), for appellant.

Lisa Madigan, Attorney General, of Chicago (Carolyn E. Shapiro, 

Solicitor General, and Aaron T. Dozeman, Assistant Attorney 

General, of counsel), for appellees.
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Panel JUSTICE NEVILLE delivered the judgment of the court, with 

opinion.

Presiding Justice Hyman and Justice Mason concurred in the 

judgment and opinion.

 OPINION 

¶ 1 Lindy Korner sent the Illinois Department of Financial and Professional Regulation 

(IDFPR) a Freedom of Information Act request for documents in June 2013. After IDFPR 

denied the request, Korner, in February 2014, filed a complaint, naming several individual 

state officials as defendants. The defendants moved to dismiss the complaint on grounds that 

Korner failed to name a public body as a defendant. The trial court denied the motion, but 

entered judgment in favor of the defendants on the basis of a statutory amendment, effective 

December 31, 2013, that instructed IDFPR not to release information of the kind Korner 

sought. Korner claims on appeal that the amendment does not apply to her request.

¶ 2 BACKGROUND 

¶ 3 Korner sent complaints to IDFPR, accusing Michael Podell, William Fischer, and Laurie 

McCauley, all veterinarians, of unprofessional conduct in the course of their treatment of 

Korner’s dog. IDFPR acknowledged receipt of Korner’s complaints in February 2010. On 

April 24, 2012, IDFPR informed Korner that it had dismissed the complaint against Podell. 

¶ 4 On June 24, 2013, Korner sent IDFPR a request under the Freedom of Information Act 

(Illinois FOIA) (5 ILCS 140/1 et seq. (West 2012)) for the “entire investigative file” for the 

proceedings on her complaints. IDFPR denied the request. 

¶ 5 In August 2013, the Illinois General Assembly passed an act that amended the Veterinary 

Medicine and Surgery Practice Act of 2004 (Veterinary Practice Act) (225 ILCS 115/1 

et seq. (West 2014)). The amendment provided: 

“All information collected by the Department in the course of an examination or 

investigation of a licensee or applicant, including, but not limited to, any complaint 

against a licensee filed with the Department and information collected to investigate 

any such complaint, shall be maintained for the confidential use of the Department 

and shall not be disclosed.” Pub. Act 98-33, § 10 (adding 225 ILCS 115/25.2a). 

The amendment made December 31, 2013, its effective date. 

¶ 6 On February 24, 2014, Korner filed a complaint naming as defendants, “LISA 

MADIGAN, in her official capacity as Attorney General of Illinois; MANUEL FLORES, in 

his official capacity as Acting Secretary of the Illinois Department of Financial and 

Professional Regulation; JAY STEWART, in his official capacity as Division Director of the 

Illinois Department of Financial and Professional Regulation; and SARAH PRATT, in her 

official capacity as Public Access Counselor for the Illinois Attorney General’s Office.” 

Korner asked the court to issue a judgment declaring that the defendants violated Korner’s 

rights under the Illinois FOIA by withholding the documents she sought. The defendants 

moved to dismiss the complaint on grounds that the Illinois FOIA applies only to public 

bodies, and not to individual public officers. The trial court denied the motion to dismiss. 
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¶ 7 Korner filed a motion for summary judgment, arguing that under the law in effect when 

she requested the documents from IDFPR, the defendants had a duty to send her the 

documents she sought. The defendants filed a cross-motion for summary judgment, arguing 

that the amended statute applied and validated the denial of Korner’s request. The trial court 

held that the amended version of the Veterinary Practice Act applied to Korner’s request. 

Korner conceded that if the amended statute applied, it required the court to deny her request. 

The trial court granted the defendants’ motion for summary judgment. Korner now appeals.

¶ 8 ANALYSIS 

¶ 9 The appellate court reviews de novo the order granting the defendants’ motion for 

summary judgment. Hall v. Henn, 208 Ill. 2d 325, 328 (2003). Korner argues that the trial 

court should not have applied the amended version of the Veterinary Practice Act to her 

request. The defendants contend that the trial court correctly applied the amendment in force 

at the time of the ruling, and that the trial court should have dismissed the complaint because 

it failed to name any public body as a defendant. 

¶ 10 The Illinois General Assembly patterned the Illinois FOIA after the federal FOIA, and 

Illinois courts use case law construing the federal FOIA for guidance in interpreting the 

Illinois FOIA. Cooper v. Department of the Lottery, 266 Ill. App. 3d 1007, 1012 (1994). 

¶ 11 The Illinois FOIA provides that “[e]ach public body shall make available to any person 

for inspection or copying all public records.” 5 ILCS 140/3(a) (West 2012). Federal courts 

have consistently held that “the Freedom of Information Act authorizes suit against federal 

agencies, not against individuals.” Morpurgo v. Board of Higher Education, 423 F. Supp. 

704, 714 n.26 (S.D.N.Y. 1976); see Petrus v. Bowen, 833 F.2d 581 (5th Cir. 1987); Laughlin 

v. Commissioner, 117 F. Supp. 2d 997, 1000 (S.D. Cal. 2000). Because Korner named as 

defendants only individuals, and not any public body, the trial court should have dismissed 

the complaint on the basis of the failure to name a proper defendant. See Quinn v. Stone, 211 

Ill. App. 3d 809, 811 (1991). Therefore, we hold that the trial court did not err when it 

granted the defendants’ motion to dismiss the complaint.

¶ 12 Affirmed.