NOT FOR PUBLICATION IN WEST'S HAWAI‘I REPORTS AND PACIFIC REPORTER 

NO. CAAP-22-0000732 

IN THE INTERMEDIATE COURT OF APPEALS 

OF THE STATE OF HAWAI‘I 

STATE OF HAWAI‘I, Plaintiff-Appellee, 

v. 

EDDIESON REYES, Defendant-Appellant 

APPEAL FROM THE CIRCUIT COURT OF THE FIRST CIRCUIT 

(CASE NO. 1CPC-21-0000721) 

SUMMARY DISPOSITION ORDER 

(By: Hiraoka, Presiding Judge, Wadsworth and Nakasone, JJ.) 

 Defendant-Appellant Eddieson Reyes (Reyes) appeals 

from the November 16, 2022 Judgment of Conviction and Sentence 

(Judgment), entered by the Circuit Court of the First Circuit 

(Circuit Court).1 Following a jury-waived trial on the charges 

of second-degree murder, first-degree terroristic threatening, 

and firearm-related offenses, Reyes was found guilty as charged, 

1 The Honorable Fa‘auuga L. To‘oto‘o presided. 

Electronically Filed

Intermediate Court of Appeals

CAAP-22-0000732

28-MAR-2024

08:29 AM

Dkt. 60 SO
NOT FOR PUBLICATION IN WEST'S HAWAI‘I REPORTS AND PACIFIC REPORTER 

2 

and was sentenced to a life term of imprisonment without the 

possibility of parole.2

 On appeal, Reyes contends that the Circuit Court erred 

by: (1) denying Reyes's Motion to Dismiss the Indictment, where 

the Plaintiff-Appellee State of Hawai‘i (State) "failed to 

present sufficient evidence to establish probable cause and 

intentionally omitted clearly exculpatory evidence by 

withholding the results of the gunshot residue [(GSR)] test from 

the grand jury"; (2) denying Reyes's Motion to Suppress, where 

it "failed to consider and evaluate the required Kaneaiakala

factors in holding that [an eyewitness]'s identification of 

[Reyes] was 'reliable enough' to be admitted at trial"; and (3) 

denying Reyes's Renewed Motion for Judgment of Acquittal (MJOA), 

where "the State failed to exclude every reasonable inference of 

[Reyes]'s innocence, and thus failed as a matter of law to 

discharge its burden of presenting substantial evidence to 

support [Reyes]'s guilt beyond a reasonable doubt."3

 Upon careful review of the record and the briefs 

submitted by the parties, and having given due consideration to 

the arguments advanced and the issues raised, we resolve Reyes's 

points of error as follows, and affirm. 

The Circuit Court did not err by denying the Motion to 

Dismiss the Indictment. 

 Reyes argues that the State "failed to establish

probable cause" because his arrest was based on two things: (1) 

eyewitness Leon Pacatan's (Pacatan) identification, which did 

not provide probable cause because it was "corrupted and 

unreliable"; and (2) the fact that Reyes was the "registered 

2 The underlying case involved a road rage incident, where Triston 

Billimon (Decedent) was shot and killed by another driver on the Likelike 

Highway off-ramp in Kalihi. 

3 Reyes's points of error have been reordered for clarity. 
NOT FOR PUBLICATION IN WEST'S HAWAI‘I REPORTS AND PACIFIC REPORTER 

3 

owner of the Acura" also did not provide probable cause because 

Reyes had reported "his vehicle was stolen ten minutes prior to 

the shooting" and "it was highly likely [Reyes] did not 

discharge a firearm." The State argues that probable cause was 

established, where Pacatan positively identified Reyes as the 

suspect shooter. 

"[I]n cases involving sufficiency of the evidence to 

support an indictment, this court . . . appl[ies] a de novo 

standard." State v. Taylor, 126 Hawai‘i 205, 214, 269 P.3d 740, 

749 (2011) (citations omitted). 

In reviewing the sufficiency of the evidence to establish 

probable cause before the grand jury, every legitimate 

inference that may be drawn from the evidence must be drawn 

in favor of the indictment and neither the trial court nor 

the appellate court on review may substitute its judgment 

as to the weight of the evidence for that of the Grand 

Jury. The evidence to support an indictment need not be 

sufficient to support a conviction. 

Id. at 215, 269 P.3d at 750 (quoting State v. Ganal, 81 Hawai‘i 

358, 367, 917 P.2d 370, 379 (1996)). "A grand jury indictment 

must be based on probable cause. 'Probable cause' has been 

defined as a state of facts as would lead a person of ordinary 

caution or prudence to believe and conscientiously entertain a 

strong suspicion of the guilt of the accused." Id. at 218, 269 

P.3d at 753 (cleaned up). To support an indictment, "the 

prosecution must provide evidence of each essential element of 

the charged offense to the grand jury." Id. (citation omitted). 

 Here, the evidence presented to the grand jury 

sufficiently established probable cause for the charges in the 

Indictment. Pacatan gave eyewitness testimony about seeing an 

Acura and a BMW speeding on the freeway on June 18, 2021, at 

11:00 p.m.; and he testified that when the vehicles were 

stopped, the driver of the Acura got out, went to the driver's 

side window of the BMW, and shot through the window. Pacatan 
NOT FOR PUBLICATION IN WEST'S HAWAI‘I REPORTS AND PACIFIC REPORTER 

4 

gave a description to the police of the suspect shooter, the 

license plate of the shooter's vehicle, and later identified 

Reyes to the police as the shooter. A second witness testified 

to hearing a gunshot after he passed by two stopped vehicles at 

the scene, and provided "a partial of the license plate number" 

of the vehicle that sped away. Decedent's wife and BMW 

passenger, Jannine Billimon (Jannine) testified to a 

confrontation between the vehicles on June 18, 2021 at 11:00 

p.m. while Decedent was attempting to pass; she saw the Acura 

driver point a gun at her; the Acura driver moved his vehicle in 

a manner to force their BMW to take the off-ramp and end up 

hitting the Acura; Jannine hid under the BMW dashboard and heard 

a gunshot; Jannine then saw a hole in the BMW, and Decedent was 

bleeding. The medical examiner testified that Decedent died of 

a gunshot wound to the chest. Police officer witnesses 

testified to their pursuit of a suspect matching the description 

in the area of the scene; that Reyes reported his vehicle stolen 

at 11:16 p.m.; that the vehicle Reyes reported as stolen matched 

the description and license plate of the suspect shooter's 

vehicle; that Reyes looked like he had "just gotten out of the 

shower" when he went to the Kalihi Police Station to report the 

stolen vehicle; and that Pacatan identified Reyes at the Kalihi 

Police Station as the suspect but with a different shirt on. 

The evidence above established "probable cause," as it 

"would lead a person of ordinary caution or prudence to believe 

and conscientiously entertain a strong suspicion of the guilt 

of" Reyes for the offenses he was charged with. See Taylor, 126 

Hawai‘i at 218, 269 P.3d at 753 (cleaned up). Reyes's arguments 

on appeal go to the weight of the evidence, which may be at 

issue at trial, but are inappropriate for review of evidentiary 

sufficiency for a probable cause determination. See id. at 215, 

269 P.3d at 750 ("[E]very legitimate inference that may be drawn 
NOT FOR PUBLICATION IN WEST'S HAWAI‘I REPORTS AND PACIFIC REPORTER 

5 

from the evidence must be drawn in favor of the indictment and 

neither the trial court nor the appellate court on review may 

substitute its judgment as to the weight of the evidence for 

that of the Grand Jury." (emphases added) (citation omitted)). 

The Circuit Court did not err in denying the motion to dismiss 

the Indictment based on insufficient evidence. See id. at 214-

15, 269 P.3d at 749-50. 

Reyes's second argument for dismissal of the 

Indictment is that the State "intentionally omitted the results 

of the [GSR] test before the grand jury—clearly exculpatory 

evidence which the prosecution was obligated to present." This 

argument lacks merit.

"Where evidence of a clearly exculpatory nature is 

known to the prosecution, such evidence must be presented to the 

grand jury." State v. Pitts, 146 Hawai‘i 120, 138, 456 P.3d 484, 

502 (2019) (brackets omitted) (quoting State v. Bell, 60 Haw. 

241, 245, 589 P.2d 517, 520 (1978)). "In cases involving 

allegations of prosecutorial abuse or misconduct, this court has 

applied an abuse of discretion standard when reviewing a motion 

to dismiss an indictment." Taylor, 126 Hawai‘i at 214, 269 P.3d 

at 749 (citation omitted). "Dismissal of an indictment is 

required only in flagrant cases in which the grand jury has been 

overreached or deceived in some significant way." State v. 

Borge, 152 Hawai‘i 458, 464, 526 P.3d 435, 441 (2023) (cleaned 

up). 

Here, the State presented evidence at the hearing on 

the Motion to Dismiss that the lack of GSR was not "clearly 

exculpatory" evidence that the State was required to present to 

the grand jury. See Pitts, 146 Hawai‘i at 138, 456 P.3d at 502 

(citation omitted). Expert Kenton Wong testified that the lack 

of GSR could have been caused by a person washing their hands or 
NOT FOR PUBLICATION IN WEST'S HAWAI‘I REPORTS AND PACIFIC REPORTER 

6 

GSR falling off. Expert Kaleo Kaluhiokalani also testified that 

the lack of GSR can be from wearing gloves, a person washing 

their hands, or that GSR was not collected or detected due to 

too little GSR being deposited or other foreign materials 

covering the GSR. Thus, the fact that there was no GSR on 

Reyes's hands did not conclusively establish that Reyes was not 

the suspect shooter, and the negative GSR test result was not 

"clearly exculpatory[.]" See id. (emphasis added) (citation 

omitted). The Circuit Court did not abuse its discretion when 

it found and concluded that the GSR result did not "constitute 

[] clearly exculpatory evidence and therefore it was within 

[the] prosecution['s] discretion whether to bring it in at the 

grand jury." See Taylor, 126 Hawai‘i at 214, 269 P.3d at 749; 

Borge, 152 Hawai‘i at 464, 526 P.3d at 441. Thus, the Circuit 

Court did not err when it denied the Motion to Dismiss the 

Indictment on this basis. 

The Circuit Court did not err when it denied the 

Motion to Suppress. 

Reyes argues that the Circuit Court erred in admitting 

Pactan's identification of Reyes because the field show-up was 

"unnecessarily suggestive and conducive to irreparable mistaken 

identification." Reyes argues that the Circuit Court abused its 

discretion when it found that Pacatan's identification "was 

'reliable enough' under the totality of the circumstances 

without even considering all of the relevant factors it was 

obligated to consider under Kaneaiakala." Reyes does not 

specifically challenge any of the Circuit Court's findings in 

its suppression order, and appears to challenge the Circuit 

Court's oral ruling at the suppression hearing. Thus, the 

Circuit Court's FOFs are binding, and support its conclusion 

that Pacatan's identification was reliable. See State v. 
NOT FOR PUBLICATION IN WEST'S HAWAI‘I REPORTS AND PACIFIC REPORTER 

7 

Rodrigues, 145 Hawai‘i 487, 497, 454 P.3d 428, 438 (2019) 

("[U]nchallenged findings of fact are binding upon appellate 

courts." (citations omitted)). 

In reviewing whether an eyewitness identification 

should be suppressed, "questions of suggestiveness and 

reliability are questions of law that are freely reviewable on 

appeal." State v. Kaneaiakala, 145 Hawai‘i 231, 240, 450 P.3d 

761, 770 (2019) (citation omitted). The supreme court in 

Kaneaiakala recognized that show-up identifications are 

inherently suggestive, and prospectively held that trial courts 

must "consider any relevant factors" set forth in Hawai‘i 

Standard Jury Instruction Criminal (HAWJIC) 3.19.4 145 Hawai‘i 

at 242-43, 247, 450 P.3d at 772-73, 777. Trial courts must also 

consider the "effect of suggestiveness on the reliability of the 

identification . . . ." Id. at 248, 450 P.3d at 778. "The 

identification must be suppressed only if the impermissibly 

suggestive procedure used created a very substantial likelihood 

of misidentification." Id. at 241, 450 P.3d at 771 (citation 

omitted). 

4 The thirteen HAWJIC 3.19 factors include: (1) the opportunity of 

the witness to observe the person involved in the alleged criminal act, (2) 

the stress, if any, to which the witness was subject at the time of the 

observation, (3) the witness's ability, following the observation, to provide 

a description of the person, (4) the extent to which the defendant fits or 

does not fit the description of the person previously given by the witness, 

(5) the cross-racial or ethnic nature of the identification, (6) the 

witness's capacity to make an identification, (7) evidence relating to the 

witness's ability to identify other participants in the alleged criminal act, 

(8) whether the witness was able to identify the person in a photographic or 

physical lineup, (9) the period of time between the alleged criminal act and 

the witness's identification, (10) whether the witness had prior contacts 

with the person, (11) the extent to which the witness is either certain or 

uncertain of the identification and whether the witness's assertions 

concerning certainty or uncertainty are well-founded, (12) whether the 

witness's identification is in fact the product of his/her own recollection, 

and (13) any other evidence relating to the witness's ability to make an 

identification. 
NOT FOR PUBLICATION IN WEST'S HAWAI‘I REPORTS AND PACIFIC REPORTER 

8 

 Here, the Circuit Court considered the factors that it 

deemed relevant from HAWJIC 3.19 and determined that Pacatan's 

identification was reliable.5 While the Circuit Court found that 

the field show-up was suggestive under "the totality of the 

circumstances" of Pacatan's identification and the Kaneaiakala 

factors, the Circuit Court concluded that Pacatan's 

identification was nevertheless "reliable" and admissible. FOFs 

42-43. The unchallenged FOFs reflect that the Circuit Court 

found that the circumstances of the suggestive field show-up did 

not influence Pacatan to make an identification of Reyes; that 

Pacatan's identification remained consistent; and that the 

identification was based on Pacatan's own recollection. The 

5 The Circuit Court made the following unchallenged findings: 

 Factor 1: Pacatan had "ample opportunity" to view Reyes with a "high 

degree of attention" at a distance of "less than one and a half car 

length[s]" for "at least 15 or 20 seconds" "under brightly lit street 

lamps." Pacatan's view was "unobstructed." FOFs 10, 13-15 17-18, 20. 

 Factor 2: Pacatan was "not under stress" when he observed Reyes, and 

that "only after some seconds of keen observation" of Reyes's face and 

appearance, did Pacatan realize someone got shot and his stress levels 

rose. FOFs 21-23. 

 Factor 3: Pacatan gave a "detailed and accurate description" of Reyes 

"approximately 20 minutes after the shooting." FOFs 24-25. 

 Factor 4: Reyes fit the "description of a person previously given by 

Pacatan prior to the field show up." FOFs 26-27. 

 Factor 5: Pacatan identified the suspect as a "Micronesian male," and 

Reyes was described as a "Filipino male." FOFs 25, 27. 

 Factor 6: Pacatan had the "capacity to make an identification," where 

he "was not impaired in any way by alcohol or drugs[,]" "not affected 

by any stress," "d[id] not have any visual or auditory disability," and 

"wore glasses for reading." FOFs 29-30. 

 Factor 8: Pacatan "was able to identify" Reyes from a field show-up. 

FOF 31. 

 Factor 9: Pacatan identified Reyes at 1:51am on June 19, 2021 from a 

field show-up, "two hours and 36 minutes" after the time of the 

criminal act. FOFs 33-36. 

 Factor 10: Pacatan "did not have prior contacts" with Reyes. FOF 37. 

 Factor 11: Pacatan was certain of his identification, where he 

immediately identified Reyes as the suspect with different clothes on. 

FOFs 32, 38-40. 

 Factor 12: Pacatan's identification of Reyes was from his own 

recollection, where he observed Reyes commit the criminal act in front 

of him. FOFs 32, 39. 
NOT FOR PUBLICATION IN WEST'S HAWAI‘I REPORTS AND PACIFIC REPORTER 

9 

record also reflects that Pacatan testified that he did not 

overhear anything about the possible suspect and was not 

prompted to identify Reyes. We conclude Reyes's challenge to 

the denial of the Motion to Suppress is without merit. See 

Kaneaiakala, 145 Hawai‘i at 240, 450 P.3d at 770. 

The Circuit Court did not err by denying the Renewed 

MJOA. 

Reyes argues that although a single eyewitness 

identification can support a conviction, "Pacatan's testimony 

was directly contradicted by [Marie Botelho (Botelho)], the only 

other eyewitness to the shooting." Reyes argues that Pacatan's 

testimony was also conflicting with his previous testimony, and 

that Pacatan's description of the suspect did not match Reyes. 

According to Reyes, because Pacatan's testimony was unreliable, 

"the remaining evidence at trial left wide open the reasonable 

inference that [Reyes] was not the shooter." 

We employ the same standard that a trial court applies 

when reviewing a motion for judgment of acquittal, namely, 

"whether, upon the evidence viewed in the light most favorable 

to the prosecution and in full recognition of the province of 

the trier of fact, the evidence is sufficient to support a prima 

facie case so that a reasonable mind might fairly conclude guilt 

beyond a reasonable doubt." State v. Angei, 152 Hawai‘i 484, 

492, 526 P.3d 461, 469 (2023) (quoting State v. Jhun, 83 Hawai‘i 

472, 481, 927 P.2d 1355, 1364 (1996)). 

 Here, the main dispute was on identification. "The 

testimony of one percipient witness can provide sufficient 

evidence to support a conviction." State v. Pulse, 83 Hawai‘i 

229, 244, 925 P.d 797, 812 (1996) (citing State v. Eastman, 81 

Hawai‘i 131, 141, 913 P.2d 57, 67 (1996)). Appellate courts 

"give 'full play to the right of the fact finder to determine 
NOT FOR PUBLICATION IN WEST'S HAWAI‘I REPORTS AND PACIFIC REPORTER 

10 

credibility, weigh the evidence, and draw justifiable inferences 

of fact.'" Angei, 152 Hawai‘i at 492, 526 P.3d at 469 (quoting 

State v. Yabusaki, 58 Haw. 404, 411, 570 P.2d 844, 848 (1977)). 

 Pacatan, the only eyewitness who saw the actual 

shooting occur, identified Reyes as the suspect shooter at trial 

and in a field show-up shortly after the incident occurred. The 

Circuit Court found Pacatan credible, and held that he was 

"forthcoming, detailed in his explanation."

 Pacatan's testimony was corroborated by other 

witnesses. Miguel Cadoy (Cadoy) testified that on June 18, 2021 

at 11:14pm, while driving past the off-ramp, he observed a white 

car and a darker-colored car parked on the left side of the offramp, and heard a "gunshot" sound. He later observed the same 

white car on Nalanieha Street. At 11:17pm, Cadoy reported to 

police the white car's location and full license plate. He 

observed two men outside of the car, one with a "white 

undershirt." 

HPD Sergeant Tyler Parson (Sergeant Parson) received 

Cadoy's report and checked the area approximately ten minutes 

after the report, observing two men about a "hundred feet" from 

Nalanieha Street. At around 11:44pm, police dispatch called 

Reyes back regarding his report and Reyes confirmed that he was 

on the way to the Kalihi Police Station. At 11:50pm, upon 

returning to the station, Sergeant Parson testified that he 

observed the "same male" and identified Reyes.

Viewing the evidence in the "light most favorable to 

the prosecution and in full recognition of the province of the 

trier of fact," there was sufficient evidence to support a prima 

facie case so that a reasonable mind might fairly conclude that 

Reyes was guilty beyond a reasonable doubt and the suspect 

shooter in this case. See Angei, 152 Hawai‘i at 492, 526 P.3d at 
NOT FOR PUBLICATION IN WEST'S HAWAI‘I REPORTS AND PACIFIC REPORTER 

11 

469. The Circuit Court's denial of Reyes's Renewed MJOA was not 

erroneous. 

 For the foregoing reasons, the Judgment of Conviction 

and Sentence, filed on November 16, 2022 by the Circuit Court of 

the First Circuit, is affirmed. 

 DATED: Honolulu, Hawai‘i, March 28, 2024. 

On the briefs: 

Kevin A. Yolken, 

for Defendant-Appellant. 

Stephen K. Tsushima, 

Deputy Prosecuting Attorney 

for Plaintiff-Appellee. 

/s/ Keith K. Hiraoka 

Presiding Judge 

/s/ Clyde J. Wadsworth 

Associate Judge 

/s/ Karen T. Nakasone 

Associate Judge