IN THE COURT OF APPEALS OF IOWA

No. 17-1623

Filed June 6, 2018

MICHAEL YOUNG,

Applicant-Appellant,

vs.

STATE OF IOWA,

Respondent-Appellee.

________________________________________________________________

Appeal from the Iowa District Court for Marshall County, Timothy J. Finn, 

Judge.

The applicant, Michael Young, appeals the dismissal of his applications for 

postconviction relief based on statute of limitations. AFFIRMED. 

Michael Young, Cody, Wyoming, pro se appellant.

Thomas J. Miller, Attorney General, and Louis S. Sloven, Assistant Attorney 

General, for appellee State.

Considered by Potterfield, P.J., Tabor, J., and Blane, S.J.*

*Senior judge assigned by order pursuant to Iowa Code section 602.9206 (2018).
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BLANE, Senior Judge.

Michael Young appeals the dismissal of his four applications for 

postconviction relief. Because we agree with the district court that Young’s 

applications were filed beyond the statute of limitations, we affirm.

I. Factual and Procedural Background.

On February 6, 2013, Young was stopped by an officer and charged with 

four separate motor vehicle violations.1 Following a trial before a magistrate, he 

was convicted and sentenced on October 23, 2013. Young timely filed a notice of 

appeal. As these were simple misdemeanors, the appeal was to the district court 

and assigned to a district associate judge. See Iowa R. Crim. P. 2.73(3). By 

written ruling filed on November 27, 2013, the appeals were denied and the 

convictions and sentences were affirmed.

Young then filed with the Iowa Supreme Court an application for 

discretionary review of the district associate court’s appeal ruling affirming his 

convictions. The application was denied on January 31, 2014, by order signed by 

a single justice. On February 11, 2014, Young filed a petition for rehearing 

pursuant to Iowa Rule of Appellate Procedure 6.1205(1). On February 17, 2014, 

procedendo issued as to the four cases. On May 8, 2014, three justices of the 

supreme court addressed Young’s petition for rehearing and issued an order, 

which stated: “This court treats the petition for rehearing as a motion to review the 

ruling of a single justice under Iowa Rule of Appellate Procedure 6.1002(5) (2009).” 

 

1 Marshall County Nos. NTA0033107 (driving under suspension); STA0033108 (failure to 

have proof of insurance); STA0033109 (operating an unregistered vehicle) and 

STA003310 (obstructed windshield/window).
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The order then stated: “[T]he order denying the application for discretionary review 

is confirmed as the order of this court.” Young did not challenge the issuance or 

timeliness of the procedendo in the criminal proceedings or request that it be 

recalled.

On May 4, 2017, Young filed four separate applications for postconviction 

relief, one as to each of the four separate convictions.2 On July 21, 2017, the State 

filed its answer to Young’s four applications. In the answer, the State raised the 

affirmative defense of the statute of limitations found in Iowa Code section 822.3

(2017). The State also filed a motion for summary disposition and a motion to 

dismiss the applications based upon statute-of-limitations grounds. On July 31, 

Young filed his resistance to the State’s motion to dismiss, asserting that the 

procedendo in his criminal appeals was erroneously issued by the Clerk of the 

Supreme Court.

On August 28, 2017, the district court held a hearing on Young’s 

applications as well as the State’s motion to dismiss, where Young personally 

appeared pro se. On September 14, the district court issued its ruling and 

determined that Young had not established an exception to the statute of limitation 

and that the State’s motion to dismiss should be granted. The court then went on 

to address the State’s motion for summary disposition and Young’s postconviction 

applications on their merits, deciding that the applications should be denied as 

being without merit. Young appeals.

 

2

 PCCI009453; PCCI009454; PCCI009455, and PCCI009456.
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II. Discussion.

On appeal, Young again contends that the Clerk of the Supreme Court erred 

in issuing the procedendo and that his applications for postconviction relief were 

therefore timely filed. Postconviction relief proceedings are actions at law and 

review of proceedings is for correction of errors at law. Lado v. State, 804 N.W. 

2d 248, 250 (Iowa 2011).

As to applications for postconviction relief, Iowa Code section 822.3 

provides in pertinent part: “Applications must be filed within three years from the 

date the conviction or decision is final or, in the event of an appeal, from the date 

the writ of procedendo is issued.” Any postconviction application filed outside of 

the applicable three-year limitations period “is time barred unless an exception 

applies.” Harrington v. State, 659 N.W.2d 509, 520 (Iowa 2003). It is uncontested 

that the clerk issued the procedendo on February 17, 2014. It is further 

uncontested that Young filed his applications for postconviction relief on May 4, 

2017, more than three years after the procedendo issued. In an attempt to escape 

this inevitable conclusion, Young argues that the supreme court clerk erroneously 

issued the procedendo and therefore the February 17, 2014 date cannot be 

considered in calculating the three-year statute of limitation.

Young’s argument is that under Iowa Rule of Appellate Procedure 6.1208, 

no procedendo is to issue while a timely petition or motion is pending. He argues, 

since he had a motion pending, the Clerk of the Iowa Supreme Court erroneously 

issued procedendo on February 17, 2014, and the supreme court retained 

jurisdiction of the case until the order denying the “petition for rehearing,” which 

the supreme court treated as a motion for review, was issued on May 8, 2014. See
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Iowa R. App. P. 6.1002(9). Consequently, he contends the district court incorrectly 

relied upon the procedendo date of February 17, 2014, in determining that the 

three-year statute of limitations in section 822.3 had expired when Young filed his 

applications.

Young’s argument does not withstand legal scrutiny. The district court in 

these postconviction relief actions had no jurisdiction to entertain a collateral 

challenge to the Iowa Supreme Court clerk’s issuance of procedendo on February 

17 in Young’s criminal actions. See In re H.S., 805 N.W.2d 737, 743–44 (Iowa 

2011) (“[O]ur rules seem to contemplate one procedendo per appeal and do not 

appear to envision ‘partial’ procedendos, at least unless ‘otherwise ordered.’”). 

Our supreme court has discussed the purpose and effect of procedendo: 

Once procedendo has issued, the jurisdiction of the supreme court 

ceases. See [State v.] Henderson, 243 N.W. [289,] 290 [(1932)]; 

Iowa Code § 814.25 [(2005)] (providing in reference to criminal 

matters that “[t]he jurisdiction of the appellate court shall cease when 

procedendo is issued”); id. § 631.16(7) (setting forth same principle 

pertaining to discretionary review of small claims actions); see also

Iowa R. App. P. [6.1201(3)] (stating in cases of voluntary dismissal 

of an appeal that “[t]he issuance of procedendo shall constitute a final 

adjudication with prejudice”). Indeed, the entire purpose of a 

procedendo is to notify the lower court that the case is transferred 

back to that court. See [State v.] Banning, 218 N.W. [572,] 574

[(1928)].

In re M.T., 714 N.W.2d 278, 282 (Iowa 2006). The supreme court went on to state 

that it also has authority to recall a procedendo. Id. Under M.T., it appears the 

supreme court was without jurisdiction when it issued its May 8, 2014 order as 

procedendo had already issued, but this is of no consequence since the order 

simply “confirmed” the January 31 order. More important is that Young did not 

request in the criminal-appeal proceedings that the supreme court recall the 
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procedendo. Young cannot litigate the issuance of the procedendo through a 

collateral challenge in these civil postconviction relief proceedings. See Fetters v. 

Degnan, 250 N.W.2d 25, 30 (Iowa 1977). Our prior case law is clear that a 

judgment is not subject to collateral attack “except upon jurisdictional grounds.” Id. 

The issuance of procedendo shall constitute a final adjudication with prejudice 

which equates to a judgment. See id. The procedendo issued on February 17, 

2014, remains viable, and the district court properly relied on it in deciding the 

State’s motion to dismiss based on statute of limitations. 

We also determine that procedendo properly issued. Young filed a petition 

for rehearing pursuant to Iowa Rule of Appellate Procedure 6.1205(1), which can 

only be filed to challenge an opinion issued by the Iowa Supreme Court—not a 

single-justice order. Young could only challenge the January 31, 2014 order by 

filing a motion for three-justice review under Iowa Rule of Appellate Procedure

6.1002(5) (“The action of a single justice or senior judge may be reviewed by the 

supreme court upon its own motion or a motion of a party.”); see also M.T., 714 

N.W.2d at 283 (finding a dismissal order from the supreme court is not an opinion 

under the Iowa Rules of Appellate Procedure such that a petition for rehearing 

should toll or delay issuance of procedendo). Since Young filed an incorrect 

motion under the incorrect rule the clerk properly issued procedendo on February 

17, 2014. See Iowa R. App. P. 6.1208(1)(c).3 

 

3

Iowa Rule of Appellate Procedure 6.1208 provides:

(1). Procedendo from supreme court action. Unless otherwise 

ordered by the supreme court, no procedendo shall issue for:

. . . .
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Iowa Code section 822.3 specifically uses an unequivocal reference to that 

specific event to establish when the statute of limitations begins to run: “in the 

event of an appeal, from the date the writ of procedendo is issued.” See Iowa 

Code § 822.3. The district court was correct in calculating that Young’s 

applications for postconviction relief were filed after the statute of limitations had 

run. The district court properly granted the State’s motion to dismiss Young’s four 

applications for postconviction relief. 

Since we find Young’s applications were correctly dismissed, there is no 

reason for us to review the substantive issues in this appeal.

AFFIRMED.

 

c. Seventeen days after an order dismissing the appeal is filed, nor 

thereafter while a motion requesting that the dismissal be set aside, filed 

according to these rules, is pending. 

(Emphasis added.) Prior to March 1, 2017, this provision was numbered as 6.1208(1)b.