Court of Appeals of Indiana | Memorandum Decision 45A03-1408-CR-304| March 18, 2015 Page 1 of 4

MEMORANDUM DECISION 

Pursuant to Ind. Appellate Rule 65(D), this 

Memorandum Decision shall not be regarded as 

precedent or cited before any court except for the 

purpose of establishing the defense of res judicata, 

collateral estoppel, or the law of the case. 

APPELLANT PRO SE

Allenn Peterson 

New Castle, Indiana 

ATTORNEYS FOR APPELLEE

Gregory F. Zoeller 

Attorney General of Indiana 

Karl M. Scharnberg 

Deputy Attorney General 

Indianapolis, Indiana 

IN THE 

COURT OF APPEALS OF INDIANA

Allenn Peterson, 

Appellant-Defendant, 

v. 

State of Indiana, 

Appellee-Plaintiff 

March 18, 2015 

Court of Appeals Case No. 

45A03-1408-CR-304 

Appeal from the Lake Superior 

Court 

The Honorable Salvador Vazquez, 

Judge 

The Honorable Natalie Bokota, 

Judge 

Cause No. 45G01-8103-CR-034 

Friedlander, Judge. 

[1] Allenn Peterson appeals the denial of his pro se motion to correct erroneous 

sentence, claiming that the trial court lacked statutory authority to impose 

consecutive sentences. 
Court of Appeals of Indiana | Memorandum Decision 45A03-1408-CR-304| March 18, 2015 Page 2 of 4

[2] We affirm. 

[3] On March 11, 1981, Peterson murdered Robert Watkins and then raped and 

robbed Watkins’s mother when she arrived home later that evening. Peterson 

was subsequently convicted of murder, class A felony rape, and class B felony 

robbery. He was sentenced to forty-five years for murder, thirty-five years for 

rape, and thirty years for robbery. The sentences for murder and rape were 

ordered to be served consecutively. His convictions were upheld on direct 

appeal and post-conviction relief. See Peterson v. State, 453 N.E.2d 196 (Ind. 

1983); Peterson v. State, 650 N.E.2d 339 (Ind. Ct. App. 1995). 

[4] On August 4, 2014, Peterson filed a motion to correct erroneous sentence. The 

trial court promptly denied the motion, noting that the sentence was not 

erroneous on its face. Peterson now appeals. 

[5] A motion to correct erroneous sentence derives from Ind. Code Ann. § 35-38-1-

15 (West, Westlaw current with all legislation of the 2015 First Regular Session 

of the 119th General Assembly effective through February 23, 2015): 

If the convicted person is erroneously sentenced, the mistake does not 

render the sentence void. The sentence shall be corrected after written 

notice is given to the convicted person. The convicted person and his 

counsel must be present when the corrected sentence is ordered. A 

motion to correct sentence must be in writing and supported by a 

memorandum of law specifically pointing out the defect in the original 

sentence. 

“The purpose of the statute is to provide prompt, direct access to an 

uncomplicated legal process for correcting the occasional erroneous or illegal 

sentence.” Davis v. State, 937 N.E.2d 8, 10 (Ind. Ct. App. 2010), trans. denied. 
Court of Appeals of Indiana | Memorandum Decision 45A03-1408-CR-304| March 18, 2015 Page 3 of 4

[6] “[A] motion to correct sentence may only be used to correct sentencing errors 

that are clear from the face of the judgment imposing the sentence in light of the 

statutory authority.” Robinson v. State, 805 N.E.2d 783, 787 (Ind. 2004). In 

other words, use of this statutory motion should be reserved for the correction 

of “obvious sentencing errors”. Id. at 787 n.3. Claims that require 

consideration of matters outside the face of the sentencing judgment may not be 

addressed via this type of motion. See, e.g., Neff v. State, 888 N.E.2d 1249 (Ind. 

2008); Robinson v. State, 805 N.E.2d 783. 

[7] In his motion, Peterson argued that the trial court lacked statutory authority to 

impose consecutive sentences “because [his] offenses all derived from a single 

episode of criminal conduct”. Appellant’s Appendix at 11. He cited Ind. Code 

Ann. § 35-50-1-2 (West, Westlaw current with all legislation of the 2015 First 

Regular Session of the 119th General Assembly effective through February 23, 

2015) in support of his argument, which imposes an aggregate sentencing cap 

for felony convictions (except convictions for crimes of violence) arising out of 

an episode of criminal conduct. 

[8] Peterson’s motion lacks merit for several reasons. Most notably, because a 

determination of whether the crimes arose out of an episode of criminal 

conduct cannot be made without looking beyond the sentencing judgment1

 to 

the facts underlying each conviction, there is no facially apparent error in 

 

1

 In fact, Peterson has not even included the sentencing judgment in the record. In light of the prior appeals, 

however, we were able to determine the sentence imposed. 
Court of Appeals of Indiana | Memorandum Decision 45A03-1408-CR-304| March 18, 2015 Page 4 of 4

Peterson’s eighty-year sentence. The argument, therefore, may not be raised in 

a motion to correct sentence. 

[9] Furthermore, the statutory provision upon which Peterson relies did not exist 

until 1994. See Slone v. State, 652 N.E.2d 552, 562 (Ind. Ct. App. 1995) (the 

episode of criminal conduct limitation is “part of a legislative amendment to the 

statute which was added in 1994 and which represents a previously nonexistent 

restraint upon a trial court’s discretion when imposing consecutive sentences”), 

trans. denied. Even if it had existed in 1981, the statutory limitation has always 

been inapplicable to murder. 

[10] Judgment affirmed. 

Kirsch, J., and Crone, J., concur.