U.S. GOVERNMENT PRINTING OFFICE

65–659 CC WASHINGTON : 2000

THE U.S. AND THE CARIBBEAN IN THE NEW

MILLENNIUM: WHAT IS THE AGENDA?

HEARING

BEFORE THE

SUBCOMMITTEE ON

THE WESTERN HEMISPHERE

OF THE

COMMITTEE ON

INTERNATIONAL RELATIONS

HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES

ONE HUNDRED SIXTH CONGRESS

SECOND SESSION

WEDNESDAY, MAY 17, 2000

Serial No. 106–122

Printed for the use of the Committee on International Relations

(

Available via the World Wide Web: http://www.house.gov/international relations

(II)

COMMITTEE ON INTERNATIONAL RELATIONS

BENJAMIN A. GILMAN, New York, Chairman

WILLIAM F. GOODLING, Pennsylvania

JAMES A. LEACH, Iowa

HENRY J. HYDE, Illinois

DOUG BEREUTER, Nebraska

CHRISTOPHER H. SMITH, New Jersey

DAN BURTON, Indiana

ELTON GALLEGLY, California

ILEANA ROS-LEHTINEN, Florida

CASS BALLENGER, North Carolina

DANA ROHRABACHER, California

DONALD A. MANZULLO, Illinois

EDWARD R. ROYCE, California

PETER T. KING, New York

STEVE CHABOT, Ohio

MARSHALL ‘‘MARK’’ SANFORD, South

Carolina

MATT SALMON, Arizona

AMO HOUGHTON, New York

TOM CAMPBELL, California

JOHN M. MCHUGH, New York

KEVIN BRADY, Texas

RICHARD BURR, North Carolina

PAUL E. GILLMOR, Ohio

GEORGE P. RADANOVICH, California

JOHN COOKSEY, Louisiana

THOMAS G. TANCREDO, Colorado

SAM GEJDENSON, Connecticut

TOM LANTOS, California

HOWARD L. BERMAN, California

GARY L. ACKERMAN, New York

ENI F.H. FALEOMAVAEGA, American

Samoa

MATTHEW G. MARTINEZ, California

DONALD M. PAYNE, New Jersey

ROBERT MENENDEZ, New Jersey

SHERROD BROWN, Ohio

CYNTHIA A. MCKINNEY, Georgia

ALCEE L. HASTINGS, Florida

PAT DANNER, Missouri

EARL F. HILLIARD, Alabama

BRAD SHERMAN, California

ROBERT WEXLER, Florida

STEVEN R. ROTHMAN, New Jersey

JIM DAVIS, Florida

EARL POMEROY, North Dakota

WILLIAM D. DELAHUNT, Massachusetts

GREGORY W. MEEKS, New York

BARBARA LEE, California

JOSEPH CROWLEY, New York

JOSEPH M. HOEFFEL, Pennsylvania

RICHARD J. GARON, Chief of Staff

KATHLEEN BERTELSEN MOAZED, Democratic Chief of Staff

SUBCOMMITTEE ON THE WESTERN HEMISPHERE

ELTON GALLEGLY, California, Chairman

DAN BURTON, Indiana

CASS BALLENGER, North Carolina

CHRISTOPHER H. SMITH, New Jersey

ILEANA ROS-LEHTINEN, Florida

MARSHALL ‘‘MARK’’ SANFORD, South

Carolina

KEVIN BRADY, Texas

PAUL E. GILLMOR, Ohio

GARY L. ACKERMAN, New York

MATTHEW G. MARTINEZ, California

ROBERT MENENDEZ, New Jersey

ROBERT WEXLER, Florida

STEVEN R. ROTHMAN, New Jersey

JIM DAVIS, Florida

EARL POMEROY, North Dakota

VINCE MORELLI, Subcommittee Staff Director

DAVID ADAMS, Democratic Professional Staff Member

KELLY MCDONALD, Staff Associate

(III)

C O N T E N T S

Page

WITNESSES

H.E. Richard Leighton Bernal, Ambassador, Embassy of Jamaica ..................... 3

George A. Fauriol, Ph.D., Director and Senior Fellow, Center for Strategic

and International Studies, Americas Program .................................................. 7

Anthony T. Bryan, Ph.D., Director and Senior Research Associate, Dante

B. Fascell North-South Center, Caribbean Studies Program, University of

Miami .................................................................................................................... 11

APPENDIX

The Honorable Elton Gallegly a Representative in Congress from California

and Chairman, Subcommittee on Western Hemisphere ................................... 22

Ambassador. Richard L. Bernal ............................................................................. 24

Dr. George A. Fauriol .............................................................................................. 42

Dr. Anthony T. Bryan .............................................................................................. 51

Dr. Ransford W. Palmer .......................................................................................... 64

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THE U.S. AND THE CARIBBEAN IN THE NEW

MILLENNIUM: WHAT IS THE AGENDA?

Wednesday, May 17, 2000

HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES,

SUBCOMMITTEE ON WESTERN HEMISPHERE,

COMMITTEE ON INTERNATIONAL RELATIONS,

Washington, D.C.

The Subcommittee met, pursuant to notice, at 1:30 p.m. In Room

2200, Rayburn House Office Building, Hon. Elton Gallegly (Chairman of the Subcommittee) presiding.

Mr. GALLEGLY. I will open the hearing.

I have a markup going concurrently in the Judiciary Committee,

and Congressman Ballenger is going to pinch-hit for me.

Today, the Subcommittee continues its oversight hearings on the

Western Hemisphere by reviewing the current political and economic environment in the Caribbean as well as United States policy toward the region.

Three years ago, this Subcommittee held a similar hearing in the

wake of the President’s somewhat historic trip to Barbados to meet

with the leaders of the Caribbean nations. This trip produced the

Bridgetown Declaration, which was hailed as the beginning of a

new era in U.S.-Caribbean relations and was referred to as a ‘‘partnership for prosperity and security’’ in the Caribbean.

At our hearing then, Dr. Fauriol said that because the Caribbean

craved greater understanding and attention from Washington, the

Barbados meeting is probably at least symbolically a step in the

right direction.

In the Spring, 1997, edition of the Journal of Inter-American

Studies and World Affairs, Dr. Bryan wrote, ‘‘The President has

the opportunity to make his second term a memorable one in defining U.S. policy toward the Caribbean,’’ and he asked, ‘‘Will there

be a difference this time around?’’.

Since that Barbados meeting, where such hopes rose, we have

often heard a chorus of complaints from our neighbors in the Caribbean. These have included concerns that what should be U.S. interests in the region, such as strengthening democracy, pursuing economic integration, promoting sustainable development, and alleviating poverty, have given way to a vacuum of issues, as some

have described it, and dangerously out of sync, as others have said.

Specifically, the Caribbean nations complain that U.S. policy reflects a negative image of weak and inefficient governments, tainted by corruption and influences of the drug trade. In fact, the Caribbean nations often complain that U.S. policy, including our attiVerDate 11-MAY-2000 09:56 Aug 01, 2000 Jkt 000000 PO 00000 Frm 00005 Fmt 6633 Sfmt 6633 65659.TXT HINTREL1 PsN: HINTREL1
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tudes toward trade policy, is now totally dominated by a fixation

with the drug agenda.

Our neighbors in the Caribbean are important to us. While the

drug trade is also important, this Committee is concerned about

the perception that the U.S. agenda for the Caribbean may be too

narrowly focused. We are concerned that the leaders in the Caribbean are frustrated with the United States and that anti-American

rhetoric, as witnessed after the WTO decision on bananas, could increase if we hesitate to take a more proactive role in addressing

the numerous problems facing the region in a sensible, coordinated

way.

This hearing, then, poses similar questions asked by Dr. Bryan:

First, since the Barbados meeting, has a true partnership emerged?

Second, have prosperity and security been adequately addressed?

Third, has there been a difference in the U.S. policy toward the

Caribbean in the past several years?

It is the Subcommittee’s hope that these and other questions can

be addressed by our witnesses today.

Before we hear from our witnesses, there are other Members who

may want to make an opening statement, and this is the appropriate time, and I would defer to my good friend, the gentleman

from New Jersey, Mr. Menendez.

Mr. MENENDEZ. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.

Very briefly, I want to take the opportunity to applaud the hearing we are having today and also to say that last week I joined

with many of my colleagues in taking I think a major step forward

in the economic future of the Caribbean and Central America with

the passage of CBI parity legislation that I hope will not only bolster trade with the region and encourage foreign investment and

much-needed jobs but will also be the beginning of an effort to try

to change the conversation and the focus that we have had with

the Caribbean, and I was happy to join in that effort.

We too often ignore the Caribbean as American policy makers.

We face threats still across the globe in terms of both security and

in promoting democracy and human rights, and in that regard we

focus on that to the detriment sometimes of our own region.

It is true that we have serious concerns about money laundering

and narcotics trafficking and those nations that are used for

transiting. But by the same token I would hope that the Bridgetown plan of action, which laid out a plan of action for funding of

education and institution building as well as dealing with those

questions of anti narcotics and money laundering initiatives, would

be heightened by the administration and by Congress itself, which

has not funded those initiatives to the level that they need to be

funded.

It is our problem really, something that I have been talking

about for the last 8 years as a Member of this Committee. It is a

problem that we have with our overall focus both on the region followed up by the resources necessary in our development assistance

in addition to our trade issues with the region. When over 50 percent of the people in the hemisphere live below the poverty level

and we have a very small amount of resources, trade is an important part of promoting the area’s future stability, but trade alone,

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unmatched by some of the economic assistance that we need to promote within the region, will not achieve some of goals.

We look forward to hearing from the witnesses, and I ask that

my full statement be entered into the record.

Mr. GALLEGLY. Without objection.

[The prepared statement of Mr. Menendez appears in the appendix.]

Mr. GALLEGLY. I would ask unanimous consent that a statement

on Caribbean economic relations submitted by Dr. Ransford Palmer

of Howard University be made part of the record. If I hear no objection, that will be the order. Hearing no objection, that is the order.

[The prepared statement of Mr. Palmer appears in the appendix.]

Mr. GALLEGLY. At this time, I will turn the meeting over to our

colleague from North Carolina, Mr. Ballenger, to take testimony

from our first witness.

Mr. BALLENGER. [Presiding.] I would like to say, gentlemen,

along with my friend here from New Jersey, we have been heavily

involved in South and Central America and probably have not done

the proper amount regarding the Caribbean.

Ambassador Bernal.

STATEMENT OF H.E. RICHARD LEIGHTON BERNAL,

AMBASSADOR, EMBASSY OF JAMAICA

Mr. BERNAL. Good afternoon, gentlemen. Thank you, Mr. Chairman, for inviting me to testify before this Committee on this important issue.

These hearings are timely as they take place immediately after

the passage of the Trade and Development Act of 2000 which will

promote U.S.-CBI trade. As we have embarked on a new millennium, it is an opportune time to evaluate the past and plan for the

future. My comments today will focus on the CARICOM countries,

which are the English-speaking countries of the region as well as

Haiti and Suriname.

CARICOM-U.S. relations are good at present reflecting economic

interdependence, political cooperation and a long-standing friendship based on common goals and shared principles. However, U.S.

policy toward the region has been subsumed within a larger Latin

American policy, and it is not easy to discern a policy which is specifically designed for the Caribbean and one which is consistently

receiving attention and application. Attention devoted to policy toward CARICOM varies with U.S. perception of the state of these

small countries. If the view is that the region is not a problem, attention is diverted; and, there is a focus when there is a concern.

A more consistent and stable approach to the region is needed.

Indeed, U.S. policy toward the wider Caribbean is fractured into

several different policies. There are different policies for Central

America, Cuba, the Dominican Republic, and Haiti and for the

English-speaking Caribbean. There is not a holistic U.S. policy toward the Caribbean.

In recent years the institution of regular meetings between the

President and the prime ministers and leaders of the Caribbean as

well as an annual meeting between foreign ministers and the Secretary of State has put the dialogue on U.S.-CARICOM relations on

4

a much more secure footing, and enhances the understanding of

the issues.

In this regard, I commend the Committee for holding these hearings at this time. This is a very important mechanism for garnering the views on U.S.-Caribbean relations and providing this information to Congress.

Mr. Chairman, the international context in which U.S.-Caribbean

relations have been conducted in the past have changed. I would

suggest that it has changed so dramatically that the world that we

knew no longer exists. The world is not changing, it has changed

and U.S.-Caribbean relations must take into account these

changes.

Two of the fundamental changes which affect the relationship

have to do with the rapid and profound transformations which are

involved in the process of globalization which have implications for

both the United States and the region and for the relationship. Second, the traditional post World War political structure rooted very

much in Cold War preoccupations has given way to a new era, and

a new international order has not yet come into place. In this situation the strategic importance of the region seems to have declined

in the perception of U.S. policy makers.

The English-speaking Caribbean is peaceful, has a well established democratic system and is pursuing private sector led, market driven growth strategies. Hence, the region is not a ‘‘crisis

area’’ from the U.S. point of view, leading many in the region is not

among the priorities for U.S. foreign policy. Complacency is unwise

since physical proximity and interdependence means that if the region experiences economic difficulties or political instability, there

will be repercussions in the United States in the form of migrants,

drug trafficking and other undesirable developments.

The Caribbean reality is dominated by vulnerability, and this is

a factor which has to be taken into account in U.S.-Caribbean relations. In addition, there is a major disparity in size and level of development and power between the U.S. and the CARICOM countries.

Nevertheless, there is a basis for partnership based on political

cooperation and economic interdependence. The economic importance of the Caribbean is often not recognized. Let me illustrate.

Co-production of apparel allows U.S. fabrics to be made into apparel in the Caribbean using U.S. machinery and Caribbean labor.

The result is jobs in the U.S. in the textile industry and apparel

jobs in the Caribbean and indeed the finished product for U.S.

firms allows them to stay globally competitive, so the disparities in

size does not mean that there is not an important interdependence.

The vulnerabilities faced by the Caribbean, which are the challenges it faces when trying to adjust to new global economic and

political realities, are the following:

First, economic vulnerability, because, these are very small

economies where the scale of production and the units of production are small. For example, the largest firm in the English-speaking Caribbean is a quarter—their total is a quarter of a day’s production of any of the top 10 firms in the U.S. So there are vast differences.

5

The vulnerability also derives from the fact that these economies

have traditionally been based on exporting one or two commodities

often to a single market. Dominica used to depend for 80 percent

of its foreign exchange on bananas sold in a single market, the

United Kingdom market.

Second, the region, for the most part, consists of small islands

with fragile ecological systems, and the proneness to hurricanes

has been very debilitating to development. Hurricane Hubert in

1988 destroyed about 33 percent of Jamaica’s GDP. The hurricanes

that hit Antigua in 1995 accounted for damage up to 66 percent of

GDP. The region has been hit both by hurricanes and by volcanic

reaction. This is a setback on an ongoing basis for the region.

Third, there is vulnerability on national security issues. These

are small countries. Some of these countries have a population of

less than 100,000. When matched against the enormous resources

of the narcotrafficking cartels, it is very difficult to preserve democracy and resist the corrosive effect of narcotrafficking and the related transnational crimes such as money laundering.

The challenge is how to overcome vulnerability in the new global

context. One way of doing this is to undertake a process of strategic

global repositioning, moving from old industries, improving international competitiveness and moving into new export sectors like

infomatics. This is an ongoing process and one which can be beneficial not only to the Caribbean but to the United States.

For example, some of these industries are intimately linked with

the United States. The tourist industry, which accounts for about

30 percent of the export earnings in the region and one in five jobs,

depends critically on U.S. investment and U.S. cruise shipping and

transport and is one in which several million U.S. visitors go to the

region each year.

I now want to turn to the issues which arise from this vulnerability and the relationship and to suggest some policy directions.

I will do this in two sections, the economics and then the security

aspects.

The economic issues are as follows:

The Caribbean is one of the 10 largest export markets for the

U.S. The U.S. has had a trade surplus with the CBI countries at

least for the last 10 years there in economic interdependence, for

example when Jamaica earns U.S. $1 from exporting garments to

the U.S., it spends some .50 cents buying U.S. goods. In addition,

approximately 350,000 jobs in the U.S. depend on the trade between the CBI region and the CARICOM.

Mr. Chairman, turning to specifications within the economic

gambit, CARICOM has relieved and happy at the passage of H.R.

434 which has been a corrective in that it has provided a level

playing field with Mexico so that the region is no longer at a disadvantage of facing quotas and tariffs in the export of our apparel.

This is an important development, and we congratulate you for

your role in passing this legislation.

Another important area of trade is the FTAA. Here the disparities between countries like Canada, Brazil, Mexico, the United

States and countries like St. Lucia and St. Vincent are enormous.

Therefore in the design of the FTAA, account must be taken of

these differences by allowing these countries some concessions.

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The U.S. policy on bananas, Mr. Chairman, is a most unfortunate policy. It has damaged the friendship with the Caribbean; and

it also will have long-term, deleterious effects on CARICOM and

may eventually have adverse consequences for the U.S. As these

small banana farmers on two or three acres were eliminated from

their only market, it led to a situation of increased vulnerability to

drug trafficking and other illicit activities.

Mr. Chairman, the WTO has launched a new round of negotiations focused on services and agriculture, two areas of critical importance to the Caribbean. The issue of the small size of CARICOM

economies must be addressed by measures incorporated in the

WTO. This will not set a precedent, as this merely extends principles which are already included in the WTO agreement for developing countries. These measures should include variations in the

obligations, extended periods for implementation and technical assistance for capacity building.

Mr. Chairman, trade liberalization has been the engine of growth

in the world economy. Trade liberalization creates opportunities,

but these opportunities only come to fruition with investment. Private investment has led growth in the Caribbean, however, there

is still a need for development assistance. Development assistance

from the U.S. to the region since 1985 has fallen from over $459

million to just over a $136 million. In the case of Jamaica, it has

fallen from $165 million to about $50 million in the last 4 years.

U.S. aid still has an important role to play and the U.S. should try

to restore aid to a more appropriate amount.

Turning to security issues, Mr. Chairman there is an inextricable

link between economic issues and security issues. Economic development is the best antidote to security issues which arise from

narcotrafficking, transnational crime, et cetera.

The CARICOM consists of small societies which are very vulnerable. The United States has played a very important collaborative

role with these countries in handling threats to security. However,

narcotrafficking is a growing menace, and more resources are necessary to cope with this problem. Mr. Chairman, that over the last

14 years no CARICOM, has been cited for not cooperating fully

with the U.S. on narcotics, but it is an enormous strain for the region to sustain its counter narcotics campaign.

In regard to money laundering, an activity associated with

narcotrafficking, the Caribbean has made tremendous progress in

updating regulatory capacity and legislation, and there is a role

here for further cooperation with the U.S.

Migration to this country from the Caribbean has gone on for

over a century and has contributed to the development of this country as well as to the countries of CARICOM. However, there has

been a policy of deportation implemented by the United States in

regard to criminals which is not efficacious. It transports criminals

back into the Caribbean in such large numbers that there has been

an escalation of crime and violence throughout the Caribbean.

Criminal deportees create transnational criminal networks because

they have contacts in the United States. Many of them return illegally to the United States and, therefore, they are not being taken

out of society by incarceration and not being punished by deporting

them. They continue their activities, and this has been a major

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problem. I would like to call for a hearing on this issue so that the

Caribbean can be incorporated into a revision of U.S. policy on deportation.

Environmental preservation of CARICOM is a concern which is

shared by the U.S. and CARICOM.

Mr. Chairman, the CARICOM countries are not only important

economic partners, and good neighbors, but can also, as small

states in alliance with powerful states like the United States, play

an important international role. Jamaica is now on the U.N. Security Council and is contributing to the struggle for international

peace and security.

Mr. Chairman, the countries of CARICOM and the United

States, are faced by common challenges, but there is long-standing

friendship, economic interdependence and a partnership based on

shared goals. The challenge faced by the Caribbean region,

CARICOM in particular, for economic development while maintaining peace, the environment and democracy is one to which the

United States can support and contribute, through partnership and

cooperation.

I would urge that in the review and formulation of U.S. policy,

the ideas that emanate from this Committee should be an integral

part. It is in the national self-interest of the U.S. to support the

Caribbean in meeting the challenges of the new global environment.

Thank you, Mr. Chairman, for your time. I am willing to accept

questions, and I formally request that my written testimony which

will be made available to you will be placed in the record. Thank

you.

Mr. BALLENGER. Thank you, Mr. Ambassador.

[The prepared statement of Mr. Bernal appears in the appendix.]

Mr. BALLENGER. Let me say that the charts that you used, that

you spoke of, we don’t have copies up here.

Mr. BERNAL. I will be happy to provide those.

Mr. BALLENGER. Thank you.

[The information referred to appears in the appendix.]

Mr. BALLENGER. I would like to report to my compatriot here

from New Jersey that I just got word that there are some procedural votes coming up. So we hope we don’t interrupt you.

Dr. Fauriol, would you like to go ahead?

STATEMENT OF GEORGE A. FAURIOL, PH.D., DIRECTOR AND

SENIOR FELLOW, CENTER FOR STRATEGIC AND INTERNATIONAL STUDIES, AMERICAS PROGRAM

Mr. FAURIOL. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.

Exactly 3 years ago I had the privilege to appear before this

Committee when it held a hearing on U.S.-Caribbean relations, and

at the time I suggested perhaps a bit harshly that there was no

distinct U.S. policy on the Caribbean. There were, instead, a number of functional and country-specific issues stitched together. Let

me update you on this today.

As has been to some degree mentioned by Dr. Bernal, the bulk

of our relationship with the region remains focused on four distinct

and generally compartmentalized issues. Two of the most visible

politically and contentious diplomatically are policies associated

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with Cuban affairs, as well as the fits and starts regarding Haiti

policy.

The third domain could be characterized as trade concerns which

have preoccupied both Washington and the region for more than 15

or 20 years, particularly if you anchor it around the history of the

CBI, and as already been mentioned is this week coming to a new

stage with the favorable outcome of the Africa CBI trade bill.

There is a fourth aspect of policy, narcotics trafficking control,

which has continued its preeminence in the formulation of U.S. regional engagement.

With this as a backdrop, I am stepping backward and imagining

myself as the average American citizen looking at the Caribbean.

The image that the public at large still has of the region is principally as a tourism destination and as a source of the nation’s illicit drug trafficking.

The irony or the rub for policy makers, not only here in Washington but also at the state and local level, is that U.S. involvement

in the region is often underestimated, perhaps under appreciated.

Emergency relief, search and rescue are a highly visible component

of involvement in the region. In the area of commerce, the aggregates of Caribbean and Central American economy amounts to a

two-way trade with the United States of about $40 billion, which

makes the region a significant global player for the United States.

Also countering in many ways the message that I often hear

from Caribbean leadership and intellectuals about the inequalities

due to size, portions of the Caribbean region are in fact engaging

in what could be described as a globalized economic, even political

environment. Information technology, communications-based service industry, new business strategies that build on that can leapfrog the region’s enterprising young leaders into the mainstream of

the 21st century, even if, in fact, they are in the Caribbean.

The problem for the United States is that we still face a region

that remains fragmented geographically and politically, which explains in part the compartmentalized aspects of U.S. policy. Many

Caribbean governments and opinion makers remain fixated by the

need to level the playing field, particularly economically, and outflank the vulnerabilities borne of small size or small states.

A climate of uncertainty also exists regarding an eroding quality

of regional governance, which is probably particularly applicable to

the English-speaking Caribbean which has had a long tradition of

democratic governance.

In Haiti, democratization is stalled. In Cuba, it is strangled by

the Castro regime. The result has been mounting stress on the political systems and the weakening of institutions upon which they

rest.

On average, portions of U.S.-Caribbean relations, therefore, remain involved with mutual frustrations and, to some degree, annoyances. Some of this is linked to pressures regarding drugs and

money laundering.

Likewise, the banana-producing Caribbean states are still angered over Washington’s missionary zeal regarding market access

for bananas into the EU and the ensuing WTO case. There are

frustrations in the Dominican Republic and Jamaica, more recently

in Trinidad and Tobago and elsewhere, which have taken issue

9

with the reverse flow of deported criminals and other undesirables

from the United States, and there are also indications of a flow of

arms and weapons into the Caribbean supplying criminal elements.

Ultimately, however, the practical alternatives in U.S.-Caribbean

relations are probably relatively limited even if there is a feeling

occasionally heard in the region that the United States is selective

and not always a willing ally to the region’s small countries.

Europe obviously remains a potential alternative for the Caribbean with limited options in both economic and diplomatic terms,

most recently expressed by the visit of the French President in the

Eastern Caribbean. But with the Lome-UE preferential trade and

investment regime beginning to fade, the proximity and general access to the $570 billion NAFTA market is the prize for the Caribbean. Beyond that are the hopes, as Ambassador Bernal has mentioned, somewhere down the road.

There continues to be frustration over Washington’s handling of

Cuban policy, but the region has also opened up to other concerns,

unpleasant concerns. This includes well-connected unsavory types,

money laundering, the citizenship-for-sale program in a number of

countries, and the embrace of suspect investors in offshore banking

and gambling. This is happening in part not only because governments in the region are weak, weak actors and weak institutions,

but many perhaps are also willing partners in these kinds of activities.

The Trinidad-based Caribbean Financial Action Task Force recently estimated that there are $60 billion in drug and crime

money that were being laundered every year in the Caribbean region. The region’s narcotics policy file is no more encouraging today

than it was 3 years ago when I testified here before this Committee. The cycle continues, with pressures in Mexico and Central

America leading to stepped-up efforts in the Caribbean. Drug

money continues to penetrate economies through real estate and

other kinds of investment vehicles.

A word about the CBI. I am still of the belief that preferential

trade arrangements are probably an endangered species. The Caribbean strategy, which is probably the correct strategy from its perspective, is to carve out as best as it can windows of opportunity

within the upcoming FTAA process. That may turn out to be a better effect than the potentially delayed millennium global trade

round. The United States can and should be understanding of these

small country concerns and, therefore, the current—or the recent

now successful legislative effort to finalize a modestly expanded

CBI is a step in the right direction coming at the right time.

But the practical reality within the Caribbean in response to

international trade investment I believe is likely to be a continuing

informal breakup of the region into sets of countries which will engage globalization at different speeds. Recent economic successes in

Trinidad and Tobago and the Trinidad Republic, Barbados, may be

good examples of how the Caribbean, in fact, will be successfully

engaging that globalized environment. Some will do less well and

will therefore have to take advantage of provisions extracted from

multilateral trade negotiations and residual trade arrangements

such as the CBI.

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Let me conclude with a few brief comments about Haiti and

Cuba. Three years ago in my testimony before this Committee I argued that the issue then was to reconcile the Administration’s political imperative to claim success with the very uncertain reality

that existed on the ground at the time regarding any real chance

of democratization and economic renewal. That more or less remains the reality of U.S. policy today.

U.S. policy in Haiti, I would argue at this point, has collapsed

and/or is collapsing, and there is a need for Congress to reimpose

some discipline in this area. Local and parliamentary elections

scheduled for March 19 were postponed until this coming Sunday.

These are elections originally scheduled for November, 1998. Haitian President Rene Preval and the provisional election commission

have in the last 2 months or so been arguing over authority over

the electoral process with the president getting the upper hand,

backed up by a wave of political violence targeted specifically at the

opposition.

In sum, Haiti is a country where elections are not being held on

time, results are not credible, foreign aid is wasted or not spent,

the economy is wide open to the drug trade, the president of the

country rules by decree, political intimidation is widespread. The

new national police is in fact disappearing and not being very effective and may be the source of violence. It has become difficult to

support a policy which is so wasteful in resources and missed political opportunities.

Just as an indicator, the most recent incident involving the expulsion of the head of the International Foundation for Electoral

Systems, IFES. The IFES mission is one of the major actors in the

technical implementations of elections in Haiti with funding from

USAID. The government of Haiti had obtained an internal IFES

document suggesting that President Preval was attempting to postpone the elections.

To me, this is in many ways the end of the line as far as the

credibility of the electoral process in Haiti is concerned, and I

would therefore at this point confirm my impression in two areas

about elections in Haiti:

First, clearly a continuation of the various congressional holds on

the electoral assistance to Haiti until there is a clarification of

these various problems surrounding the process. Second, although

it is awfully close to the date, I would be cautious in supporting

U.S. congressional observer delegations to the process this coming

Sunday. Despite the fact that other governments and other organizations may be sending observers, I hear in the last few days, for

example, that the Quebec parliament has withdrawn plans for its

delegation because of concerns over violence.

Finally, on Cuba, this is still arguably one of the least satisfying

components of U.S. policy not only in the Caribbean but in probably the rest of the hemisphere.

Mr. BALLENGER. Could you speed up? We would like to get Dr.

Bryan’s testimony before the vote.

Mr. FAURIOL. There is not much for me to add from where I was

3 years ago. The danger in the present situation are not the defects

of U.S. Legislation but the deteriorating logic of the Cuban communist state.

11

[The prepared statement of Mr. Fauriol appears in the appendix.]

Mr. BALLENGER. Dr. Bryan, I don’t want to rush you, but——

STATEMENT OF ANTHONY T. BRYAN, PH.D., DIRECTOR AND

SENIOR RESEARCH ASSOCIATE, DANTE B. FASCELL NORTHSOUTH CENTER, CARIBBEAN STUDIES PROGRAM, UNIVERSITY OF MIAMI

Mr. BRYAN. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. Thank you for the invitation to testify before this hearing.

I was given a fairly large agenda, namely to assess the current

political and economic conditions facing the Caribbean, the region’s

priorities and the U.S. role. I will deal with each of them very

briefly. I will limit my comments to the island nations and the continental enclaves of Guyana, Belize, and Suriname.

Economically, this region has followed the neo-liberal reform rule

book. It has implemented policies mandated by the International

Monetary Fund, the World Bank, and regional funding agencies.

Its governments have trimmed fiscal deficits, privatized stateowned commercial enterprises, and liberalized trading regimes.

Even Cuba, which still continues to labor under a deliberate ideological model that doesn’t encourage democracy, has introduced

what I call some version of ‘‘a la carte capitalism’’ which encourages direct foreign investment in certain sectors of the economy.

The present transition in the political economy of the Caribbean

region is full of uncertainties. Many of the small economies are

heavily dependent on one or a few traditional export commodities

for which world prices are not likely to rise.

While inflation rates and fiscal deficits are being contained in

most Caribbean countries and growth rates are respectable, the

economic foundations are shaky. Revenues from privatization sales

and reductions in basic government services are not formulas for

sustainable growth. So global enterprise competitiveness is the real

challenge that most of the countries face.

When we look at the Caribbean, we have to appreciate the diversity in economic growth; and if we look at the review of the 1999

economy, which was done by the Caribbean Development Bank, we

find that GDP growth in the region ranged from 1 percent to over

8.3 percent. The growth was strong in service-oriented economies

which had invested heavily in tourism in recent years. The star

performers were the Dominican Republic, which achieved a growth

rate of 8.3 percent, one of the highest in the world, and Trinidad

and Tobago which grew at 6.9 percent.

The new regionalism in the Caribbean is reflective of this economic diversity. The absence of a large regional market means that

the approach to integration has to be different from any large integration area. In that context, the formation of the CARICOM single

market and economy whose remaining protocols were signed during 1999 and early 2000 is a significant step toward the ideal of

economic integration.

I think there are three characteristics at this juncture which are

clear about the Caribbean economy: First, there is growing acceptance of globalization, corporate integration and the hemispheric

trade momentum. Second, there is a paradigm shift in integration

theory and practice from a vertical perspective (North America and

12

Europe) toward a horizontal relationship between the countries of

the wider Caribbean and Latin America. Third, the challenges confronting the Caribbean with respect to trade with Europe and the

Americas are essentially similar. These have to do with the future

of existing regimes of significant differences, and a strategy is developing which allows simultaneous access to as many global, regional and bilateral trade pacts as possible.

I take a slightly different view to a number of my colleagues with

respect to Caribbean economies. I think in the future the assumption that small Caribbean economies cannot compete in international markets may no longer be valid. Some small economies

can dominate niche markets; tourism, information services, energy

based or petroleum industries, and some of the larger Caribbean

economies are already demonstrating their ability to compete globally in such niche markets. They have high educational standards

and skilled labor resources which compete with many other areas

of the world.

With respect to governance, I think that trends in politics: declining political participation, frustration with the parliamentary system of politics, changes in leadership, conversion to neoliberal economic policies by political parties which have traditionally represented labor, and changing relationships between labor, business

and government, all of these will have an impact on the political

economy of the region in the earlier years of the 21st century.

Finally, what about the role of the United States? I think both

the Caribbean countries and the U.S. share common ground on a

wide range of issues. Individual Caribbean countries have their

own perception of the kind of relationship that they want to develop, and the political and economic diversity of the Caribbean

does not now provide the U.S. with any possibility of devising a

single comprehensive policy to the region as a whole. However,

there are agendas of opportunity.

I think the passage last week of H.R. 434 is a welcome step in

the direction of such convergence and cooperation. Also important

are the frequent meetings between Caribbean heads of government,

and other foreign ministers and their counterpart in the United

States, which were set in motion by the Bridgetown Accord in April

1997.

I have just returned from the region, and I would suggest that

there are several issues which are critical:

First, hearing of Caribbean concerns about the OECD 1998 report on harmful tax competition as well as the Clinton administration’s budget proposals for a bill which would require the U.S. for

the first time to establish a blacklist of tax havens.

Second, the possibility of a U.S. European Union accord on the

granting of a WTO waiver for Caribbean bananas.

Third, the strengthening of a joint approach to fight drug trafficking, illegal firearms and transnational crime.

Fourth, completion of discussion of a memorandum of understanding on deportation procedures for criminals deported from the

U.S. to the Caribbean that are acceptable to both parties. This

would include more timely notification and sequencing of deportation.

13

Fifth, speedy implementation of the agreed support and cooperation of the USAID Caribbean regional strategy and 5-year program

of assistance with regard to trade, business development and economic diversification and investment.

Sixth, the provision of technical assistance for economic reforms,

particularly in smaller economies.

Seventh, closer cooperation with key Caribbean countries, not

only in major security matters but also in broader gray areas such

as the prevention of environmental degradation and the provision

of food security.

Finally, continued dialogue between the Caribbean nations and

the U.S. to assure peaceful political transitions in Haiti and Cuba.

This mix and management of the broader concerns is where the

U.S. would have to direct its efforts. There is need I think for consolidation of a mutually productive relationship with the Caribbean, and it does not have anything to do with big brother or small

country; it is simply that this is a common neighborhood. A lot of

the problems that we share cannot be resolved without further collaboration and cooperation and continuous discussion.

Thank you.

[The prepared statement of Mr. Bryan appears in the appendix.]

Mr. BALLENGER. We are going to have several votes. The basic

idea is that it may be continuous. I would like to check and see if

my vote is needed. I am going to go vote, and then I will just skip

the rest.

I think we are playing games, and that occurs every once in a

while in potential political problems. We only have a five-vote

spread, and so if I have to come back and go back, I will. But I

will be back to question you gentlemen, if I may. I hope you don’t

mind. It will probably take 10 or 12 minutes to go over there and

get back.

We will recess the Subcommittee for 10 or 12 minutes.

[recess.]

Mr. BALLENGER. Dr. Bryan, since we cut you off, maybe you had

some more words of wisdom that you would like to pass on before

we get into questioning.

Mr. BRYAN. Actually I would defer to questioning. I think it

would be appropriate.

Mr. BALLENGER. Yes, sir.

Mr. BERNAL. I would like to add two points which, I neglected

to mention.

First, is that the sugar quotas for the U.S. is an important issue

because that is still an industry that is important to the

CARICOM, but the quotas are being threatened because Mexico

has asked for its NAFTA quota to be increased. Given that there

is a surplus of sugar in the world and increased domestic production as well, the only way that Mexico’s quota could be increased

would be to take it from the bilateral quota system. Nothing should

be done to reduce the quotas of the CARICOM countries which are

already quite small, but very important.

The second issue is that there is a major agreement between the

EU and the ACP countries, and it is an agreement which gives concessions to those developing countries, and in the past it has been

14

known as the Lome convention. Like CBI, it requires a waiver

under the WTO rules.

The assurances by the administration, that there will be no objection to the waiver for the new EU-ACP agreement, is very important.

Thank you for allowing these additional comments. I would be

happy to take questions.

Mr. BALLENGER. When you mentioned your hurricane, whatever

happens in Central and South America—I apologize to people down

there—my wife and I have been working in that area for 35 years.

We tell people, if you want to get our notice, have a war or blow

up—hurricanes, we pay some attention all of a sudden. But the sad

part is that it does have that effect.

When Hubert hit Jamaica in 1988, I am sure you didn’t know

that the first airplane that landed there came in from Charlotte,

North Carolina; and it had a package disaster field hospital on it,

and my wife and I, we delivered 13 field hospitals all over the

world, and one was to Jamaica.

Sadly for us, we were involved in Haiti. A little lady came to see

me, and she said, I am the mayor of my town, and I am also the

school mistress. She said, I need pencils and paper. I got 800,000

sheets of 81⁄2 by 11 paper and 50,000 pencils lined up with the solution order to take care of it; and the day after we shipped it, they

burned her school down. The sad part, it was to no avail.

One thing I would like to ask, and I don’t know whether it is

even feasible amongst you all, but having been involved in Central

America, say, for 35 years and various and sundry countries there,

I keep trying to tell them over and over again the one thing that

will attract something other than a cut-and-sew industry—and I

come from North Carolina where we used to have the majority of

the cut-and-sew industry in the United States. I voted for NAFTA,

and my name has been mud in North Carolina ever since, because

they blame it all on me. But, in reality, the jobs that we have sent

elsewhere throughout the Caribbean and in Central America have

been replaced by the three largest fiber optic cable plants in the

world and heavily oriented toward German and Japanese industry,

and so we are really much better off.

But the one thing that made it attractive to these other areas

was, in my considered opinion, education; and the greater your

education is in your community or your island or whatever it happens to be, in my considered opinion you are going to be able to

attract better industry.

The example I use most often is, how did Costa Rica get Intel

which has 2,000 or 3,000 people working there? Electronic assembly jobs are better paying than the cut-and-sew operations. I don’t

know whether the effort by the governments in the islands in general have been to upgrade their educational system, but I would

like to have somebody’s reaction to the fact that it appears to me

that if the governments in these areas really are dedicated to try

to upgrade the quality of their people and their lives—growing bananas doesn’t take a developed intelligence, whereas the further

you develop it the more you eat the bananas and try to do something else rather than ship them.

Mr. Bernal, you represent a country.

15

Mr. BERNAL. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.

Let me say, first of all, on record, thank you on behalf of the government of Jamaica for the action that you and your wife took so

expeditiously. One of the things that always strikes me about the

U.S. society, is that it is not just a rich society, it is a generous

society, and that stands to your credit.

Education, sir, is critical. It is a factor which the Caribbean has

always placed emphasis on; and indeed many of the Caribbean persons who come here for employment are not in low-end jobs, they

are in high-tech jobs, in medicine, law, et cetera. The CARICOM

countries are well placed to move, as you correctly stated, out of

some of the lower-paying jobs in, say, apparel and agriculture into

informatics and business services. Indeed, certainly for Barbados

and for Jamaica, information technology is a priority. In the case

of Trinidad, there is a very sophisticated high-tech industry based

on oil and natural gas.

Indeed, the CARICOM has produced all of the skills that are

needed for the 21st century once you think of the Caribbean not

as a physical but a nation without borders in which our Caribbean

citizens here are available to join in nation building in their homelands.

Mr. BRYAN. Yes, Mr. Chairman, I think I just want to refer to

what I said a little earlier when I had to race through this testimony.

Caribbean economies in many instances are competing very, very

well and some of them, as I said, in niche markets, such as information services, energy-based industries, and tourism. They also

show great potential in a number of areas. Part of the reason for

this is the highly educated and skilled labor resources in the region. This is what helps them to compete.

One of the ironies is that education is one thing, but the lack of

resources in some countries is another. What is a bit disturbing is

that, despite democratic traditions, good human rights records,

high educational levels, and relatively high levels of per capita income, some countries are still unable to obtain adequate levels of

international funding to give them a jump start. This has been of

great concern to the Commonwealth Secretariat and the World

Bank which have just issued a report on small states and their

needs and the recommendations which should be accepted by the

international community and the international organizations. So

we have the wherewithal in the region, but this irony still exists.

Mr. BALLENGER. If I may interrupt, that complaint is generally

true in the larger Central American countries. The President of

Nicaragua has told me over and over again, if I can just get a big

bank—we have a little bank that can lend you 5 or $10,000 but

they don’t lend you $10 million and that necessary financing—I basically am a businessman who founded my own company, and you

can’t operate on $5,000 or $10,000 worth of credit. I understand exactly what you are saying.

Mr. FAURIOL. Mr. Chairman, you mentioned the Intel example in

Costa Rica, and you recall that was a multi-year strategy on the

part of the Costa Rican government. It involved a carefully negotiated trade regime that made Costa Rica competitive for an Intel

kind of investment.

16

Looking at the Caribbean outside of the unique case of Haiti, a

country that you are quite familiar with, the Caribbean has, historically had high standards of education. In some ways, that is not

really the challenge. The challenge conceptually is education versus

what has been a problem in the Caribbean, which is an insular vision or mentality. You can have highly educated people, but if they

only look around their immediate neighborhood, it is not going to

be fully articulated. But you probably have a consensus among the

three statements that you have heard here, that in the Caribbean,

the combination of high-value human resources and new technologies, will allow the region to enter the 21st century with a high

degree of competitiveness.

Mr. BALLENGER. Ambassador Bernal, you mentioned the highly

educated who have come to this country. My wife and I, at the request of Mrs. Jemaro, when she said that none of the young people

in Nicaragua were being educated in this country, they were being

taken to East Germany and was it possible for us to do anything.

So we brought these children up from Nicaragua and sent them to

college, but on the prerequisite that they had to go home. Because

if you are educating people to upgrade the economies elsewhere

and they don’t go home, then all you have done is just added some

educated people in this country. We need them, but your islands

probably need them much worse than we do.

Mr. BERNAL. Mr. Chairman, that is a dilemma. But these people

who migrate initially to study or if they are already qualified to

work here are not lost to our system. They make a very significant

contribution not only here in terms of their taxation and employment, but they send back to the Caribbean an enormous amount

of resources which go not only into private investment but also to

support schools and so on.

There is actually a debate now in which many people suggest

that the export of one person may actually be worth more to the

economy than if we kept them at home. We have managed by producing a lot of skills that we have adequate skills in our country.

However, I should enter the fact that Caribbean migrants are

unique in the United States. They all intend to go back and in

many cases there are cycles of movements where they go back and

then they come back and it goes on. So they are not lost to us. Particularly now with the new technology of e-mail and so on, we can

tap those skills in a way that we couldn’t before. So we feel with

this new technology they are not lost to us, and I might say that

some of the most patriotic people in the Caribbean are in the

United States. Patriotic both for this country and for our country.

They are great Ambassadors for us, not lost to us.

Mr. BRYAN. I agree entirely with Ambassador Bernal. I am from

Trinidad and last week we had meetings there on this very issue.

A number of corporate entities in Trinidad are starting to face

manpower problems at certain managerial levels. The economy has

grown to the extent that there is also a labor shortage at some levels.

A lot of the contribution is now being made from the Diaspora

in the United States and elsewhere using e-mail. It is a border less

world.

17

For the first time, I am starting to see the tapping of investment

potential from the North American diaspora. This is a very interesting phenomenon. It is not simply a question of remittances in

the case of Trinidad and Tobago. It is more of a search for investment capital and a movement of investment capital. These are very

interesting trends.

Mr. BALLENGER. If I may add to that, I worked rather heavily,

as hard as I could, on passing CBI, and I had some friends from

El Salvador working on that very thing. The reality—if I were

going to skip Mexico but the rest of Central America—it seems to

me that El Salvador is one of the few places that really has developed rather substantial light industry.

The gentleman that was here working with me on this thing, he

has two box plants, and he prints and makes plastic bags which

is all fairly heavy machine oriented, investment in machinery.

After it passed, he went from having laid off 600 people in his

plant—the day that we announced that we were going to vote on

it and it looked like it was going to pass, his orders took off, and

he immediately was offered the opportunity to sell two of his cutand-sew plants. He was saying he thought he would sell them and

build himself another one.

The basic thing that I saw differently there was the ability to

have investment capital, and I think it really—again, you don’t

have the wars that I was involved with in El Salvador and Nicaragua, but people stayed there. Especially the Christian Arabs did

not leave the country. They stayed there and continued to grow.

Let me ask you, how would you as individuals assess the success

of CARICOM at this point right now?

Mr. BERNAL. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.

The CARICOM is the longest operating integration arrangement

other than the European Union, and it has had success. It has had

success in two ways.

First, by integrating these small economies, it has provided a

larger market in which companies can gain some economies of

scale but also compete in that regional pool before they move into

a global marketplace. The limitations on those achievements stem

from the fact that these are very small economies. Even together

as a regional market, they are still small by global standards. So

there are limitations to this process, but it has been useful.

Second, the regional cooperation aspect has been critically important. By cooperating as a group in mediating the encounter with

the global economy and in international negotiations, there has

been success. Certainly it has been a way in which these countries

can pool their resources and therefore save on costs as well as get

the best that the region has to offer. In those aspects CARICOM

has been useful.

In recent years, Suriname and Haiti have joined CARICOM,

which is good particularly for Haiti but also good for CARICOM as

well. CARICOM is strengthening links with the Dominican Republic through a free trade arrangement similar to those with Colombia and Venezuela. CARICOM is seeking to expand the size of the

regional market but also to deepen the process of economic integration. For small countries, regionalism is an important strategy both

18

economically and politically in articulating interests of the region

in international affairs.

Mr. BRYAN. I think CARICOM has always been an ambitious organization and it has a long tradition of regional cooperation and

integration. But sometimes the goal falls short of the ambition because of regional disparities in resources and capabilities.

I think it is an organization that we have to be very proud of because it has really been one of the successful examples of functional cooperation and integration in the Western Hemisphere.

Mr. FAURIOL. CARICOM underscores one important factor, which

is the unique institutionalization of the Commonwealth, the

English-speaking Caribbean, for a long period of time, and that has

an effect. Despite perhaps being an institution losing its way in the

1970’s and 1980’s and 1990’s in terms of having an impact on the

region itself, it did create an environment in which a whole subsidiary of set of dialogues, regular contact, a sense of continuing political and economic community, were sustained. These days,

through technology changing international circumstances, as Ambassador Bernal suggested, a rationalization of these institutional

efforts such as CARICOM is helping it become effective internationally. At this point my assessment of CARICOM is that it has

been not historically very effective but still remains an important

player in the institutionalization and progress of the region.

Mr. BALLENGER. Let me ask you, Dr. Fauriol, since you spoke

earlier about Haiti, and we wonder what are we going to do, and

our Committee is involved very heavily, we read that Mr. Aristide

is pretty cut and dried going to be the next President. Could you

venture an opinion as to—I don’t think there are any newspapers

here now. You are safe to say what you want. Could you venture

an opinion as to what you think is going to go on there?

Mr. FAURIOL. The first marker is obviously the elections coming

up this Sunday. I can only speculate. Conventional wisdom is that

some form of an electoral process will take place. There will be voting and ballots and so forth. There is some concern that there could

be some violence, although there is a contrary view that that is not

going to occur. If there is any violence, it is going to occur in the

subsequent phase which is the counting of the ballots and the confusion over the vote count and ultimately growing tensions as to

what is really happening.

My concern here, as I tried to express a little bit in my statement, there is a point after which the international community, including the United States, does have to be able to reconcile what

we mean by democracy and elections.

In Haiti, we may be reaching an awful low standard. The last

elections that Haiti had in 1997, by the best accounts, the consensus that 5 percent of the folks even bothered to vote. I was an

observer, and it was easy because there was not much to observe.

Ultimately, those elections were, in effect, canceled over a period

of about 2 years of political confusion.

The other conventional wisdom, regardless of where one stands

on the issue, is that ultimately this is just a prelude to Presidential

elections at the end of the year and the return of former President

Aristide to the National Palace.

19

My scholarly hat tells me the following, which is that I am less

concerned about the outcome of the election and I am more concerned about the process, and I am troubled by the cumulative effect of a qualitatively deteriorating electoral process since 1995

where a controversial individual will be elected in an environment

which, even among Haitians, will be controversial, and the situation could deteriorate dramatically between now and the end of the

year if violence and the collapsing economy become an issue.

At this point, I am pessimistic, without a practical recommendation except to suggest that this may be the time to hold back and

actually make a determination of where we are, what we have been

doing and what hasn’t worked. Therefore, the question of election

observation to me is a good marker. If you sent observers, you are

likely to be stuck in a situation where you have to pass judgment

over an imperfect situation. If you withhold observation, you are in

a position of being able to determine what might have happened

or what, in fact, did happen.

Mr. BALLENGER. Was Porter Goss with you in that last election?

Congressman Goss?

Mr. FAURIOL. Yes, I had the honor of being a Co-chair of the

International Republican Institute Observer Delegation with Congressman Goss.

Mr. BALLENGER. When he told what he thought of the election,

he caught hell for actually telling the truth. Our responsibility to

the rest of the world seems to be getting terribly large, and in certain areas where you think that you can be effective, I don’t know

where that is, but it is not Kosovo and it is not Haiti. But Haiti

is so close that if this country can tie up its news media for one

little Cuban boy, what could we do for a couple of hundred thousand Haitians when they actually land here?

I told Congressman Menendez that I would keep it going, but I

think you all have a time schedule, and I would like to say that

I thank you profusely for coming forward since I am heavily involved in Central and South America but I haven’t done my little

bit as far as your islands are concerned.

My wife and I—because of the floods that Mitch caused we

shipped enough steel to put the roofs on 2,500 homes in Honduras

and Nicaragua. Venezuela, the floods there, we just shipped eight

containers of used school furniture. If you gentlemen ever feel the

need—things that we in the United States—obviously, in the

United States you can’t build a new school and keep old furniture.

Old furniture in a school is not old furniture anywhere else in the

world except here in the United States. I think I have sent four

container loads to Honduras and eight to Venezuela. You haven’t

been hit by a hurricane lately, and I don’t wish you bad luck, but

the next time you do, let me know if we can help out. My wife and

I, we are not a United Nations or USAID, but we try to be involved.

I would like to thank you all for participating today.

Mr. BERNAL. Mr. Chairman, I would like to thank you for arranging this hearing. I thought it was very timely. I think it serves

to direct attention to an issue which deserves more attention. I

thank you for your leadership on these issues and your continuing

interest.

20

A hearing like this is useful because it promotes the dialogue not

only among those have participated but in the written record it

makes available to a wider audience a source of information which

can be used for those interested in the Caribbean.

I hope that these hearings will become a regular feature of the

Congress. I note in your opening remarks that there had not been

a hearing for about 3 years. I think this was what I hope will be

the start of a regular series of dialogues, because the challenges

that confront the U.S. and the Caribbean can only be overcome by

our economic and political cooperation.

I thank you for the attention of the Committee.

Mr. BALLENGER. Let me also thank you for being as active as you

are. I know quite a few of the other Ambassadors we never hear

from. Just a general appearance of the Ambassadors is effective in

letting us know about problems that we don’t know. Unless you

take the Miami Herald, we don’t know what goes on in Central or

South America or the islands. The Washington Post and the New

York City Times don’t seem to care.

Mr. BERNAL. If I have not sent you enough letters on the CBI,

I pledge to send you more information. Thank you.

Mr. BALLENGER. Again, we thank you all. Thank you for being

here today. The Committee stands adjourned.

[Whereupon, at 3:15 p.m., the Subcommittee was adjourned.]

(21)

A P P E N D I X

MAY 17, 2000

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