United States General Accounting Office

GAO Report to Congressional Committees

April 1996 COMBAT AIR POWER

Funding Priority for

Suppression of Enemy

Air Defenses May Be

Too Low

G O A

years

1921 - 1996

GAO/NSIAD-96-128

GAO United States

General Accounting Office

Washington, D.C. 20548

National Security and

International Affairs Division

B-271451 

April 10, 1996

The Honorable Strom Thurmond

Chairman

The Honorable Sam Nunn

Ranking Minority Member

Committee on Armed Services

United States Senate

The Honorable Floyd D. Spence

Chairman

Committee on National Security

House of Representatives

The Honorable C. W. Bill Young

Chairman

Subcommittee on National Security

Committee on Appropriations

House of Representatives

In March 1996, we issued a classified report on the Department of

Defense’s (DOD) requirements, capabilities, and plans for conducting

airborne suppression of enemy air defenses (SEAD). This is an unclassified

summary of that report. We conducted this review under our basic

legislative responsibilities and are addressing this report to you because

these issues fall principally within your Committees’ purview.

Airborne SEAD has been a critical component of U.S. combat air power for

many years. As part of a broad effort to assess the current and projected

U.S. combat air power capabilities,1

 we sought to determine whether

(1) SEAD is important in the current and anticipated national security

environment and (2) SEAD capabilities will be adequate in terms of the

anticipated threats. Appendix I contains our review’s scope and

methodology.

Results in Brief DOD acknowledges that SEAD has been and will continue to be a critical

component of DOD air operations for many years. However, DOD has

1

In addition to this review, we have reviewed five other key combat air power missions/functions,

including (1) achieving and maintaining air superiority in areas of combat operations, (2) interdicting

enemy forces before they can be used against friendly forces, (3) providing close fire support for

ground forces by attacking hostile forces in close proximity to friendly forces, (4) refueling combat

aircraft in the air to sustain combat operations, and (5) performing aerial surveillance and

reconnaissance to obtain intelligence data for combat operations.

Page 1 GAO/NSIAD-96-128 Combat Air Power
B-271451 

recently made a number of budget decisions that result in reduced SEAD

capability. DOD is abandoning deployed SEAD capabilities that have

significant military value and has dropped plans to improve SEAD

capabilities to meet new threats. Despite the potential adverse impact on

war-fighting capability, DOD has chosen to (1) retire the F-4G without a

comparable replacement, (2) retire the EF-111 and use the less suitable

EA-6B for Air Force missions, and (3) curtail funding for other SEAD

programs. These decisions were made without an assessment of how the

cumulative changes in SEAD capabilities would impact overall war-fighting

capability.

These actions are not consistent with DOD requirements to have systems

capable of defeating a large spectrum of threats. Furthermore, DOD now

recognizes that the decline in SEAD capabilities may create a higher

vulnerability for friendly aircraft as well as frustrate achieving U.S. military

objectives and prolong future conflicts. Nevertheless, DOD has chosen to

support less urgent and more prospective combat air power programs,

such as the Air Force’s F-22 aircraft. We are concerned that DOD’s

decisions, if implemented as currently planned, could reduce U.S.

war-fighting capabilities and may have to be corrected later, possibly at

much greater expense and effort.

Background The SEAD mission is designed to increase U.S. forces’ ability to accomplish

campaign objectives by improving the forces’ survivability. SEAD involves

neutralizing, destroying, or temporarily degrading enemy air defense

systems through either physical attack or electronic warfare. For physical

attack (known as lethal SEAD), aircraft use various weapons, including

missiles that home in on the radars used by the enemy’s surface-to-air

missiles and antiaircraft artillery, to temporarily or permanently disable

the defenses. For electronic warfare (known as nonlethal SEAD),

specialized aircraft electronically jam enemy radars and communication

systems associated with the defenses to reduce their effectiveness.

In practice, SEAD involves the synergistic use of (1) communication

jamming by the Air Force’s EC-130H Compass Call and the Navy and

Marine Corps’ EA-6B; (2) radar jamming by the Navy and Marines’ EA-6B

and the Air Force’s EF-111; and (3) destruction with antiradiation missiles

delivered by the Air Force’s F-4G, certain F-16Cs, and the Navy and Marine

Corps’ EA-6B and F/A-18. Because it is considered impractical to

physically attack all elements of the enemy’s air defense system with

conventional munitions, the goal of SEAD is to protect friendly aircraft by

Page 2 GAO/NSIAD-96-128 Combat Air Power
B-271451 

suppressing enemy surface-to-air missile and antiaircraft artillery sites 

en route to and in the target area.

SEAD Will Continue

to Be Critical to

Overall Air Combat

Capability

Since the heavy U.S. losses to enemy air defenses experienced at the

outset of the Vietnam War, DOD has recognized SEAD as a critical

component of air operations. Now, when a crisis arises, SEAD assets are

among the first called in and the last to leave.

Current war plans require DOD to be able to conduct and win two nearly

simultaneous major regional conflicts. The most recent such conflict,

Operation Desert Storm, required heavy use of the SEAD aircraft fleet.

These aircraft were considered a key to the effectiveness of the air

campaign. For example, strike aircraft were normally not permitted to

conduct operations unless protected by SEAD aircraft. Also, according to

the Air Force, no U.S. aircraft were lost to radar-controlled surface-to-air

missiles during Operation Desert Storm when an F-4G accompanied the

strike aircraft.

Because U.S. and other friendly aircraft will continue to be vulnerable to

enemy air defenses, SEAD’s role as a critical element of DOD’s air combat

capability is expected to continue. Even the advent of stealth aircraft will

not obviate the need for SEAD support because the U.S. aircraft inventory

will continue to be predominately nonstealth until at least 2005 and

probably much longer. Moreover, even stealth aircraft require some SEAD

support. Also, SEAD may be even more critical in future conflicts because

the Defense Intelligence Agency has reported that potential enemy air

defenses are expected to increase in sophistication.

In addition to their war-fighting roles, the limited number of SEAD aircraft

and aircrews have also been used extensively in peacekeeping operations,

such as in enforcing no-fly zones. For example, 13 of the 24 EF-111

operational aircraft were recently deployed to 3 crisis spots. To further

highlight SEAD’s importance, a U.S. F-16 was shot down over Bosnia when

no SEAD aircraft were present.

Airborne SEAD

Capabilities Are Being

Reduced

Despite its own analyses that show SEAD capabilities need to be improved,

DOD’s funding decisions are instead having the effect of reducing those

capabilities. Planned improvements to counter newer threats have been

canceled, and the current force structure is being reduced.

Page 3 GAO/NSIAD-96-128 Combat Air Power
B-271451 

The Air Force’s radar-jamming EF-111 was to have been upgraded to

counter new threats but now will be retired. The Navy will dedicate some

of its EA-6B aircraft to provide SEAD support for Air Force strike missions.

However, the EA-6B is slower and has less range, which may require

different tactics, more sorties, additional fighter protection, and more

tanker support to provide equivalent capability. In addition, the EA-6B

improvement program, which was intended to address newer threats, was

canceled in 1993. Much less extensive upgrades are now under

consideration by the Navy but are not yet funded.

Also, the Air Force will retire its most capable lethal SEAD aircraft—the

F-4G—by the end of fiscal year 1996, although there is no major urgency to

do so. Its replacement, the F-16 equipped with the High Speed

Antiradiation Missile Targeting System, is recognized as much less capable

than the F-4G and was originally intended only as an interim system until

an equivalent capability to the F-4G could be developed and fielded.

However, acquisition of a replacement for the F-4G has been canceled due

to funding limitations.

Airborne SEAD Has

Been Given Low

Funding Priority

As DOD reduces its force structure in response to budgetary constraints,

SEAD programs have been given low priority relative to other missions or

functions. Despite its own analyses that show SEAD capabilities need to be

improved, DOD has instead decided to place higher funding priority on

other combat air power programs, such as the Air Force’s F-22 aircraft.

However, as we have previously reported, there is no urgent need to

deploy the F-22 aircraft because current fighter aircraft can defeat the

foreseeable air-to-air threat well into the next century.2

 Conversely, both

current and known near-term SEAD threats are not being adequately

addressed.

DOD’s decisions on the SEAD force structure have been made based on

budget constraints and with the assumed risk of not being able to

adequately counter enemy threats that were to have been addressed in

various SEAD improvement programs. Further, DOD has not assessed the

cumulative impact on war-fighting capability resulting from the individual

program decisions canceling improvements or replacement systems.

Moreover, the preliminary results of DOD’s recent study on electronic

warfare requirements not only reaffirm the continuing need to improve

2

Tactical Aircraft: F-15 Replacement Is Premature as Currently Planned (GAO/NSIAD-94-118, Mar. 25,

1994).

Page 4 GAO/NSIAD-96-128 Combat Air Power
B-271451 

those capabilities but question the funding priorities given to address

air-to-air versus surface-to-air threats.

Recommendations The known contributions of current SEAD assets to mission effectiveness

and survivability and the identified need to improve SEAD capabilities

appear at odds with DOD’s SEAD investment plans. Therefore, we

recommend that the Secretary of Defense postpone the retirement of the

F-4G and EF-111 until the funding priority of the airborne SEAD mission in

relation to other elements of combat air power is reassessed. This

reassessment should include extensive input from the service secretaries

and the war-fighting commanders and be based on the specific threats

expected in the two postulated major regional conflicts as well as likely

peacetime operations.

Agency Comments

and Our Evaluation

In commenting on a draft of this report, DOD did not concur with our

recommendation, stating that such a reassessment of the SEAD mission

area would be redundant to some recent DOD studies. Nevertheless, DOD

added that a mission area assessment of future electronic warfare

capabilities and needs is already underway and that it will take into

account evolving military priorities and increased fiscal restraints. DOD

stated that it is sensitive to the SEAD mission but, with declining budgets, it

must weigh the SEAD war-fighting contribution with other war-fighting

assets. That is precisely our intent in recommending that the funding

priority of SEAD be reassessed relative to other elements of combat air

power. Our concern—which DOD did not address in its comments—is that

previous DOD studies and assessments did not evaluate the relative

cost-effectiveness of SEAD to other elements of combat air power in

meeting current and anticipated war-fighting and peacekeeping needs.

The full text of the DOD comments and our evaluation of them are set forth

in appendix II.

Matters for

Congressional

Consideration

DOD’s planned actions in the next few years will have a negative impact on

SEAD capabilities and may need to be reversed in the future, at much

greater expense and effort. In response to the recommendation in our

draft report, DOD said that a reassessment of the SEAD mission would be

redundant to recently completed and ongoing studies. However, DOD did

not address our call to assess SEAD’s war-fighting and peacetime value

relative to other elements of combat air power. Therefore, we suggest that

Page 5 GAO/NSIAD-96-128 Combat Air Power
B-271451 

the Congress consider requiring that DOD, prior to retiring the F-4G and

EF-111, reassess the relative funding priority of SEAD and other elements of

combat air power based on their war-fighting and peacetime

contributions.

We are also sending copies of this report to the Chairmen and Ranking

Minority Members of the House Committee on Government Operations,

Senate Committee on Governmental Affairs, and House and Senate

Committees on Appropriations; the Secretaries of Defense, the Army, the

Air Force, and the Navy; the Commandant of the Marine Corps; the

Director of the Office of Management and Budget; and other interested

parties.

Major contributors to this report are listed in appendix III. Please contact

me on (202) 512-4841 if you or your staff have any questions concerning

this report.

Louis J. Rodrigues

Director, Defense Acquisition Issues

Page 6 GAO/NSIAD-96-128 Combat Air Power
Page 7 GAO/NSIAD-96-128 Combat Air Power
Contents

Letter 1

Appendix I 

Scope and

Methodology

10

Appendix II 

Comments From the

Department of

Defense

11

Appendix III 

Major Contributors to

This Report

16

Abbreviations

DOD Department of Defense

SEAD suppression of enemy air defenses

Page 8 GAO/NSIAD-96-128 Combat Air Power
Page 9 GAO/NSIAD-96-128 Combat Air Power
Appendix I 

Scope and Methodology

In developing this report, we assessed the Department of Defense’s (DOD)

current and planned suppression of enemy air defenses (SEAD)

requirements, capabilities, and programs and obtained and analyzed

information on SEAD policies, strategies, and doctrine. We also obtained

information on (1) the types and numbers of weapon systems—dedicated

and nondedicated—for use in airborne SEAD, (2) their use and the types of

targets they can engage, (3) their capabilities and limitations, and (4) their

age and physical condition.

We evaluated service plans to upgrade existing and acquire new airborne

SEAD capabilities. We analyzed information on the current threat

projections for integrated air defense capabilities. We reviewed a variety

of documents and held discussions with DOD officials on the roles and

effectiveness of airborne SEAD assets in Operation Desert Storm and more

recent deployments. Finally, we met with representatives of the

war-fighting commanders to discuss how they assess the adequacy of

existing airborne SEAD capabilities and the services’ plans to upgrade those

capabilities.

We performed our review from August 1994 to November 1995 in

accordance with generally accepted government auditing standards.

Page 10 GAO/NSIAD-96-128 Combat Air Power
Appendix II 

Comments From the Department of Defense

Note: GAO comments

supplementing those in the

report text appear at the

end of this appendix.

See comment 1.

Page 11 GAO/NSIAD-96-128 Combat Air Power
Appendix II 

Comments From the Department of Defense

Now on p. 5.

See comment 2.

Page 12 GAO/NSIAD-96-128 Combat Air Power
Appendix II 

Comments From the Department of Defense

See comment 3.

See comment 4.

See comment 5.

See comment 6.

See comment 7.

Now on p. 5.

See comment 8.

Page 13 GAO/NSIAD-96-128 Combat Air Power
Appendix II 

Comments From the Department of Defense

The following are GAO’s comments on the Department of Defense’s letter

dated January 18, 1996.

GAO Comments 1. The studies DOD mentions, as well as previous electronic warfare and

SEAD studies, are not responsive to our recommendation because they do

not evaluate the relative cost-effectiveness of SEAD to other elements of

combat air power in meeting current and anticipated war-fighting and

peacetime needs.

2. In February 1995, the Deputy Secretary directed the Joint Chiefs of Staff

to study how the EA-6B could be used to provide non-lethal SEAD support

for Air Force missions. The decision to retire the EF-111 had already been

made.

3. The EA-6B is slower and has less range than the EF-111, which may

require different tactics, more sorties, additional fighter protection, and

more tanker support to provide equivalent capability. In addition, given

the additional costs to refurbish, upgrade, and deploy the additional

EA-6Bs for Air Force missions, it is far from certain that the government

will realize any net savings from retiring the EF-111 and canceling its

improvement program.

4. Although the analytical aspects of the Joint Tactical Air Electronic

Warfare Study were completed many months ago, its recommendations

have not yet been endorsed or rejected by DOD. Until DOD takes an official

position on the study, we believe that it is inconsistent to use its results for

the electronic warfare mission area assessment.

5. Fiscal constraints appear to be prominently mentioned in regard to

programs and functions like SEAD and much less so in regard to high

visibility programs like the F-22.

6. We do not disagree with DOD’s comment, but it and the DOD decisions it

refers to seems to give little weight to the fact that the F-16 with HTS is

much less capable than the F-4G and there is no major urgency to retire

the F-4G.

7. Our review of DOD’s studies indicate that they have not weighed

electronic warfare and SEAD’s contributions in war-fighting and peacetime

operations with those of other combat air power capabilities. Our concern

is that the criticality of the SEAD function in both war-fighting and

Page 14 GAO/NSIAD-96-128 Combat Air Power
Appendix II 

Comments From the Department of Defense

peacekeeping operations is not expected to diminish despite DOD’s

decisions to give it lower priority. It may be much more difficult and costly

to regenerate SEAD capabilities than it would be to retain and improve on

current capabilities.

8. We are concerned that the war-fighting commanders’ input may not

have a timely and effective impact on those investment decisions that

directly affect their war-fighting and peacekeeping capabilities. The reason

for our concern is that the commanders were given an opportunity for

input only after the decision was made to retire the EF-111 and use the

EA-6B for Air Force missions.

Page 15 GAO/NSIAD-96-128 Combat Air Power
Appendix III 

Major Contributors to This Report

National Security and

International Affairs

Division, Washington,

D.C.

William Graveline

Carol Kolarik

Tana Davis

Atlanta Field Office Jack Guin

Daniel Owens

Wendy Smythe

Chicago Field Office Terry Parker

Terrell Bishop

Michael Aiken

(707163) Page 16 GAO/NSIAD-96-128 Combat Air Power
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