Petition for Writ of Mandamus Denied and Opinion filed April 21 , 2016.

In The 

## Fourteenth Court of Appeals

NO. 14

- 16

- 00265

- CV

IN RE DLS, L.L.C. A/ K/A D & L SALVAGE, L .L.C , Relator

ORIGINAL PROCEEDING WRIT OF MANDAMUS 55th District Court Harris County, Texas Trial Court Cause No. 2015

- 68160



### OPINION
On November 13, 2015, r eal p arty

- in

- i nterest Daniel Foret (“Foret”) sued

r elator DLS, L.L.C. ( “ DLS ” ) in Harris County , Texas, under the Jones Act for injuries allegedly incurred in Louisiana inland waters.
On April 4, 2016, DLS filed a petition for writ of m andamus asking this

c ourt to compel the Honorable Jeff Shadwick, presiding judge of the 55th District2

Court of Harris Coun ty , Texas , to : (1) to vacate his “Order Denying Defendant’s
Motion to Transfer Venue
, ” and (2) transfer venue of this case to Montgomery County , Texas

. See Tex. Gov’t Code Ann. § 22.221 ( West 2004); see also Tex. R. App. P. 52. DLS also filed a motion for temporary relief asking this court to stay the proceedings below. For the reasons discussed below, we deny both the petition for writ of
mandamus and the motion for temporary relief

.


### B ACKGROUND
Foret, a resident of Montgomery County, alleges he was i njured while working for DLS on a vessel in Louisiana inland waters. DLS is a Louisiana limited liability company and does not have a principal office in any Texas coastal county. Foret’s petition alleges that venue is proper in Harris County because (1) this suit is brought under the Jones Act ; (2) all or a substantial part of the events and omissions giving rise to the claims asserted occurred on inland waters outside this

state ; and (3) Foret did not reside in Galveston County when the cause of action
accrued

. See Tex. Civ. Prac. & Rem. Code Ann. § 15.0181 (West Supp. 2015). On January 19, 2016, DLS filed a motion to transfer venue from Harris County to Montgomery County where Foret resides. DLS’s motion argues that (1) venue is improper in Harris Count y ; (2) section 15.0181(e)(2) is not the proper
basis for venue in this case ; and (3) venue is proper in Montgomery County under3

section 15.0181(e)(4). On February 5, 2016, Foret filed a response the motion to transfer venue, arguing that DLS had misconstru ed the venue statute. After an oral hearing, on March 7, 2016, the trial court signed an Order denying the motion to transfer venue.



### A NALYSIS



### I. Mandamus Standard
To obtain mandamus relief, a relator generally must show that the trial court clearly abused its discretion and the lack of an adequate remedy by appeal . In re
Prudential Ins. Co ., 148 S.W.3d 124, 135

– 36 (Tex. 2004) (orig. proceeding).
The second requirement is met here because section 15.0181(e) is a mandatory venue statute enforceable by mandam us

. See Tex. Civ. Prac. & Rem. Code §§ 15.0181(e), 15.0642 ; see also In re Transcont. Realty Invest., Inc ., 271 S.W.3d 270, 271 (Tex. 2008). The only issue is whether the trial court properly interpreted and applied the mandatory venue statute. Id

. We revi ew issues of statutory construction de novo

. City of San Antonio v. City of Boerne , 111 S.W.3d 22, 25 (Tex. 2003).



### II. Proper Construction of Section 15.0181(e)
This case presents a novel issue regarding section 15.0181(e)’s construction

. S ection 15.0181(e) ’s applicability is undisputed, as are the facts material to a
venue determination

. The parties agree that (1) a substantial part of the events and omissions giving rise to the claims asserted occurred on inland waters outside4

Texas; (2) DLS does not have a principal office in Texas located in a coastal county ; and (3) Foret resides in Montgomery County. The parties disagree as to the proper construction of section 15.0181(e), which provides: (e) If all or a substantial part of the events or omissions givi ng rise to the claim occurred on inland waters outside this state, ashore in a Gulf Coast state, or during the course of an erosion response project in a Gulf Coast state, the suit shall be brought: (1) in the county where the defendant’s principal office in this st ate is located if the defendant’ s principal office in this state is located in a coastal county; (2) in Harris County unless the plaintiff resided in Galveston County at the time the cause of action accrued; (3) in Galveston County unless the pla intiff resided in Harris County at the time the cause of action accrued; or (4) if the defendant does not have a principal office in this state located in a coastal county, in the county where the plaintiff resided at the time the cause of action accrued. Tex. Civ. Prac. & Rem. Code Ann. § 15.0181 (West Supp. 2015).

The trial court’s o rder denying transfer accurately states the parties’ opposing interpretations of section 15.0181 (e) and explains the court’s reasons for adopting Foret’s interpretation:

Plaintiff [Foret] argues that sub

- paragraphs (1) through (4) of CPRC 15.018 1 (e) are independent option s within a mandatory venue statue. Plaintiff’s position is that CPRC 15.018 1 (e) (2) and (4) are both available for him to select, and that he selected CPRC 15.018 1 (e) (2).5

Defendant [D LS] argues that CPRC 15.018 1 (e)(1) through (3 ) apply where defendant has a principal office in this state located in a coastal county, and only CPRC 15.018 1 (e)(4) applies wh e re a defendant has no such office. The organization of the statute favors the Plaintiff’s interpretation. Had the Legislature inten ded Defendant’s interpretation, it would have created 15.018 1 (e)(1)( i) through (iii) as the three option if a defendant had a Texas office, and 15.018 1 (e)(2) to cover what is presently (e)(4) where there is no office. Without such an organization, Plaintiff’s interpretation results. Defendant’s reasoning makes sense, but the Legislature did not write it that way, and the Court will not correct the work of the Legislature.

We a gree with the trial court’s conclusions regarding section 15.0181(e) ’s operation

. We apply the following well

- established principles of statutory construction. “We rely on the plain meaning of the text as expressing legislative intent unless a
different me aning is supplied by legislative definition or is apparent from the context, or the plain meaning leads to absurd results.” Texas Lottery Com’n v. First State Bank of DeQueen , 325 S.W.3d 628, 635 (Tex. 2010). “A court should not
add to or subtract from the language of an unambiguous statute.” Ex Parte Lovings , 480 S.W.3d 106, 111 (Tex. App.

— Houston [14th Dist.] 2015, no pet.); see also Osterberg v. Peca , 12 S.W.3d 31, 38 (Tex. 2000) (courts “should not presume to add” to statute when legislature has demonst rated it “clearly knew” how to add phrase in other parts of statute).6

S ection 15.0181(e)(2) ’s plain language allows a plaintiff to establish venue in Harris County regardless of whether the defendant has a principal office in this
state located in a coasta l county. S ection 15.0181(e)(4) applies only if the defendant does not have a principal office in this state located in a coastal county ; in contrast, subsection (e)(2) ’s reach is not limited based upon where the defendant’s principal office is located

. DL S’s proposed construction improperly require s th e addition of language not found in section 151.0181(e)(2) itself

. In re Atlantic Sounding Co., Inc ., 04

- 15

- 00407

- CV, 2015 WL 8386363, at *3 (Tex. App.

— San Antonio Dec. 9, 2015, orig. proceeding)
, adopted DLS’s proposed interpretation of section 15.0181(e) , stating : “ Under this mandatory provision, venue is only permi tted in the county of plaintiff ’ s residence when the defendant does not have a principal office in Texas located in a coastal county. TEX. CIV. PRAC. & REM. CODE ANN. § 15.0181(e)(4). When the defendant does have a principal office in a coastal county in Texas, venue must be in the county of the defendant’s principal office, Harris County or Galveston County. TEX. CIV. PRAC. &
REM. CODE ANN. § 15.0181(e) (1)

- (3) (West Supp. 2015). ”

The trial court correctly points out that In re Atlantic Sounding Co. does not explain its construction of the statute . We conclude that In re Atlantic Sounding
Co

. ’s interpretation is incorrect because it impermissibly adds language to subsection (e)(2) ’s unambiguous terms. The phrase “ when the defendant does have a principal office in a coastal county in state ” does not appear in subsections ( e ) (1)

- (3). This interpretation also was unnecessary and therefor e dicta because In re
Atlantic Sounding Co. could have reached the same result by holding that venue7

does not lie in the county of the plaintiff’s residence under subsection (e)(4) when, as in that case, the defendant has a principal office in a coastal county in Texas. See In re Atl. Sounding Co., Inc

. , 2015 WL 8386363, at * 2

– 3

.


### C ONCLUSION
The trial court correctly interpreted section 15.0181(e) (2) , which allows a plaintiff to file suit in Harris County regardless of whether the defendant has a principal office in this state located in a coastal county

. We therefore deny DLS’s petition for writ of mandamus and deny DLS’s motion for temporary relief.

/s/ William J. Boyce Justice

Panel c onsists of Justices Boyce, Christopher, and Jamison.