Dismantling the Bomb and Managing the

Nuclear Materials

September 1993

OTA-O-572

NTIS order #PB94-107554
Recommended Citation:

U.S. Congress, Office of Technology Assessment, Dismantling the Bomb and

Managing the Nuclear Materials, OTA-O-572 (Washington, DC: U.S. Government

Printing Office, September 1993).

For sale by the U.S. Government Printing Office

Superintendent of Documents, Mail Stop: SSOP, Washington, DC 20402-932X”

ISBN 0-16 -041968- 9

ii
Foreword

T

he Nation has embarked on a bold new mission to enhance world peace through

deep and lasting cuts in nuclear arsenals. It has removed thousands of nuclear

weapons from active, deployed status and has begun eliminating delivery

systems and dismantling the warheads themselves. Our old Cold War

adversary, the former Soviet Union, has taken similar steps. The United States and

Russia have pledged to continue their programs of weapons retirement and warhead

dismantlement, and are discussing methods of defining and achieving long-term goals.

Such efforts are unprecedented and challenging; they require resources and talent

as well as enduring dedication within Government institutions. People are concerned

that the work be conducted so as to avoid the types of adverse environmental and health

impacts that resulted from nuclear weapons production in the past. Experts have been

investigating how to use, control, or dispose of the nuclear materials-plutonium and

highly enriched uranium—recovered from dismantled warheads. For these reasons, the

Senate Committee on Governmental Affairs requested that the Office of Technology

Assessment conduct a study of the key technical, policy, and institutional options to be

considered in the Federal Government’s plans. The Senate Committee on Foreign

Relations endorsed this request. This report presents the results of OTA’s investigations

and analyses.

Although current Federal efforts are adequate for the present, they are insufficient

to meet the long-term challenge ahead. OTA concludes that the success of future

warhead dismantlement and materials management requires a focused, high-level

governmental effort to develop a comprehensive national policy. It also requires an open

decisionmaking process and capable institutions to set and implement long-range goals

and plans. In this report, OTA suggests various initiatives that Congress could consider

to establish a national policy, determine the next steps in warhead dismantlement and

nuclear materials management, approach decisions on the ultimate disposition of nuclear

materials, enhance the institutional capabilities necessary to ensure success, and

encourage sound dismantlement and materials management in Russia.

Substantial assistance was received from many organizations and individuals for

this study. OTA sincerely appreciates the guidance received from its advisory panel,

workshop participants, numerous reviewers, contributors, consultants, and contractors.

We also received help from several Federal agencies, including the Departments of

Energy, Defense, and State, and other Federal, State, and local agencies. Without this

cooperation and expert advice, OTA would not have been able to accomplish this study.

Roger C. Herdman, Director

. . .

Ill
Advisory Panel

John E. Till

Chair-ma

Radiological Assessments Corp.

John F. Ahearne

Sigma Xi, The Scientific Research Society

Charles Barrett

Oil, Chemical, and Atomic Worker’s

International Union

Thomas A. Burke

School of Hygiene and Public Health

The Johns Hopkins University

Beverly E.C. Gattis

STAND of Amarillo., Inc.

Sherri Wasserman Goodman, Esq.l

Goodwin, Procter and Hoar

Kenneth Liechtenstein

Division of Infectious Disease

Rose Medical Center

Robert R. Loux

Nuclear Waste Project Office

State of Nevada

Daniel S. Miller, Esq.

Colorado Office of the Attorney General

John M. Napier

Techniques, Inc.

Robert H. Neill

Environmental Evaluation Group

State of New Mexico

Louis Peoples

Madison Gas & Electric Co.

Ambassador Rozanne L. Ridgway

The Atlantic Council of the United States

Frank N. von Hippel

Woodrow Wilson School of Public and

International Affairs

Princeton University

James D. Wernerl

Natural Resources Defense Council

John M. Whiteley

Professor, Social Ecology and Social Sciences

University of California at Irvine

NOTE: OTA appreciates andis gratefulfor the valuubleassistance andthoughtjidcritiques provided by theadvisorypanel members. Thepanel

does not, however, necessarily approve, disapprove, or endorse this report. OTA assumesfill responsibility for the report and the accuracy

of its contents.

IJ=S D. Werner aud Shern Wasserman Goodmau served on the Piuwl before joining DOE and DOD, respectively.

iv
Clyde Behney

Assistant Director

Health, Life Sciences and the

Environment

John Andelin

Assistant Director,

to Aug. 31, 1993

Robert Niblock

Program Manager

Oceans and Environment

ADMINISTRATIVE STAFF

Kathleen Beil

Office Administrator

Kimberly Holmlund

Administrative Secretary

Sharon Knarvik

Secretary

CONTRIBUTORS

Isaac Amuah

Jan Linsenmeyer

Allison Lowery

Tara O’Toole

PETER A. JOHNSON

Project Director

Emilia L. Govan

Project Director

Mark Brown

Senior Analyst

Joan Ham

Senior Analyst

Project Staff

CONTRACTORS

German Reyes

Analyst

Kathy Cox

Analyst

Paul Carroll

Research Analyst

Jackie Braitman

Kahtilya Consulting, Inc.

Robert Budnitz

Future Resources Associates

Stan Kolar

Kolar Associates

Stephen Lipmann

Environmental Research and

Analysis

Arjun Makhijani

Institute for Energy and

Environmental Research

Robert Morgan

Washington University

Florence Poillon

Editor

Monica Schoch-Spana

Consultant

v
workshop Participants

PLUTONIUM DISPOSITION WORKSHOP

John Ahearne

Sigma Xi

Carl Anderson

National Research Council

Robert Bernero

Nuclear Regulatory Commission

Carl Bloomster

Pacific Northwest Laboratory

Robert Civiak

Office of Management and Budget

Thomas Cochran

Natural Resources Defense Council

Brian Costner

Energy Research Foundation

Alan Croff

Oak Ridge National Laboratory

Harold Feiveson

Princeton University

Thomas Fox

Pacific Northwest Laboratory

Arjun Makhijani

Institute for Energy and

Environmental Research

Marvin Miller

Massachusetts Institute of

Technology

Loring Mills

Edison Electric Institute

William Sutcliffe

Lawrence Livermore National

Laboratory

Ted Taylor

Consultant

Louis Willett

U.S. Department of Energy

Howard Canter

U.S. Department of Energy

Jesse Cleveland

U.S. Geological Survey

Paul Cunningham

Los Alamos National Laboratory

Ted Dobry

U.S. Department of Energy

Joel Gingold

S.M. Stoner Corp.

vi

Charles Haughney

Nuclear Regulatory Commission

Dewey Large

Scientific Ecology Inc.

Paul Maddox

Westinghouse Savannah River

Corp.

Ed Moore

Westinghouse Savannah River

Corp.

Duane Schmoker

Pacific Nuclear Corp.

William Shuler

U.S. Department of Defense

Victor Trelis

U.S. Department of Energy

John Trout

U.S. Corps of Engineers

Louis Willett

U.S. Department of Energy
1

2

3

4

5

Summary 1

The Challenge 2

The Office of Technology Assessment Study 3

Dismantlement of Nuclear Warheads 5

Management of Nuclear Materials 10

Information Access 13

Cooperation With Russia 14

Conclusion 15

Analysis of Warhead Retirement Programs and Plans 17

DOD: Weapons Return and Preparations for Dismantlement 22

Nuclear Weapons Safety Issues 25

Conclusion 30

Chapter 2 References 31

Warhead Dismantlement Programs and Plans 33

Present DOE Activities and Plans 33

Environmental, Health, and Safety Issues in Dismantlement 45

Conclusions 61

Chapter 3 References 62

Future Disposition of Nuclear Materials from

Dismantled Weapons 67

Overall Disposition Concerns 70

Plutonium Storage 77

Plutonium Processing 87

Plutonium Disposition-Conclusion 99

Disposition of Highly Enriched Uranium 100

Chapter 4 References 105

Public Concerns and Information Access 109

Public Concerns 111

Information Access 116

Approaches for Institutional Changes 120

Conclusion 122

Chapter 5 References 123

contents

vii
6

7

Opportunities to Aid Russian Dismantlement 125

Warhead Dismantlement in Russia 126

Management of Russian Plutonium 135

U.S. Agreement for Purchase of Russian Weapons HEU 137

Conclusion 143

Chapter preferences 145

Policy Issues and Initiatives 149

A National Dismantlement Policy 151

Strengthening DOE Management 152

Nuclear Materials Storage 154

Nuclear Materials Disposition 157

A New Materials Management Organization 159

Information Access 161

Cooperation With Russia 163

Conclusion 166

A

B

c

D

E

F

G

Plutonium Pit Storage at Pantex 169

United States and Russia Joint Understanding on

Strategic Offensive Arms 179

United States and Russian Agreement on the SSD

Program 181

United States and Russian Agreement on the

Disposition of Uranium from Nuclear Weapons 185

Labor and the Mission Change Within DOE 189

Acronyms and Glossary 197

Reviewers 201

. . . Vlll
D

uring the Cold War, both the United States and the Soviet

Union built and maintained large stockpiles of nuclear

weapons. Over the past 2 years, the leaders of these

nations have pledged to withdraw tactical weapons and

sharply reduce the size of the strategic weapons arsenal. Both

nations have begun to retire thousands of weapons and to

dismantle the nuclear warheads-the part of the weapon that

contains its massive destructive power. Reducing the nuclear

arsenals of both nations presents a unique opportunity and a

challenge. The opportunity is to eliminate large numbers of

warheads and reduce the threat of nuclear war. The challenge is

to devise feasible and practical means of dismantling them and

managing the constituent nuclear materials without causing new

environmental, safety, or security problems. Still needed are

decisions, policies, and plans to guide both the short- and the

long-term goals of this effort.

Treaty agreements, such as the Intermediate Range Nuclear

Forces (INF) and the Strategic Arms Reduction (START)

treaties, negotiated to date require that weapons be retired from

deployed status and that the means of delivering them be

removed or destroyed. They do not require that warheads be

dismantled or that warhead parts and materials be destroyed.

However, the United States has undertaken to remove certain

weapons from the stockpile, return warheads to the facilities that

assembled them, dismantle the warheads, and store or dispose of

their components, parts, and key nuclear materials. Substantial

disassembly work is ongoing. The specific plans and schedules,

however, are not available to the general public. Nor is the

ultimate scope of this effort.

Summary 1

“Successful dismantlement

and disposition of the weapons

materials may be the single

most important public health,

environmental, and social

challenge we face. ”

Public health expert participating

at OTA panel meeting

“Current dismantlement can

either be done well and set a

foundation for future progress,

or it can be done badly, leaving

so much unaccounted for, so

much room for uncertainty, so

much inequity that it will set

back, if not destroy, future

possibilities. ”

Local citizen’s group reviewer

of OTA report

1
2 I Dismantling the Bomb and Managing the Nuclear Materials

The Office of Technology Assessment (OTA)

has analyzed the present U.S. approach to this

undertaking and concludes that current Federal

efforts are insufficient to the challenge because

they are scattered and lack uniform objectives;

they are not based on a clear mission; the public

distrusts the responsible Federal agencies, and

fears that the environmental and health impacts

may be no better than past performance; and there

has been little informed public debate to establish

national goals. In essence, the Nation has no

coordinated, comprehensive national policy on

nuclear warhead dismantlement, and current overall management of the task is weak.

Neither the United States nor Russia has

developed a technically and politically feasible

plan to dismantle warheads and dispose of the

nuclear materials from them. Policies for nuclear

warhead dismantlement and materials control are

important to both U.S. and international security.

While recent pronouncements and agreements by

national leaders may set goals for reduction of the

weapons stockpile, they do not, by themselves,

eliminate nuclear warheads. Although nuclear

weapons can be rendered less threatening by

destroying the means of delivering them (as

recently negotiated treaties require), destroying

warheads and their constituent nuclear materials

safely and effectively is a very difficult task.

Many of the most dangerous materials will need

careful management for generations.

OTA’s analysis of the dismantlement program

makes clear that eliminating these warheads-or

even destroying a portion of the stockpile of

nuclear weapons that have been amassed-will

be neither simple nor painless. The difficulties of

weapons retirement and warhead dismantlement

should not be underestimated. Plans for long-term

storage or disposition of nuclear materials must

be resolved, and difficult decisions regarding

these matters must be made at the highest levels

of government.

THE CHALLENGE

Tens of thousands of nuclear weapons are still

deployed in the United States, Russia, and other

nations (i.e., ready for use or deliverable). Others,

although not deployed, are part of what is called

—in the United States—the “reserve” stockpile,

meaning they are maintained as “backups” for

deployed weapons. Still other weapons are removed from both the active stockpile and the

inactive reserve, and “retired.’ The warhead

portions of the retired weapons are eventually

returned to a Weapons Complex plant for dismantlement. l

The Strategic Arms Reduction Treaty, START

II, which awaits ratification, provides for some

warheads that are presently deployed to be

separated from delivery vehicles or otherwise

placed in a status in which they are not deliverable

or ready for use. START II does not impose any

requirements to actually dismantle the warheads

that are removed from deployed status. Neither

START agreement calls for dismantling any

warheads that are now in the reserve stockpile or

that may be added to it in the future.

Potential political instability in the former

Soviet Union raises concern that control over

some weapons will diminish and they will fall

into the hands of revolutionary regimes or terrorist groups. The potential proliferation of nuclear

weapons poses a serious threat to international

security. There is also the possibility that a

weapon may detonate accidentally or pose other

types of safety problems. Accidental explosions

are a concern if groups with limited technical

capability and resources have control of these

weapons.

1 Dismantlement means the removal of all nonnuclear components, including the chemical high explosive that surrounds the nuclear

materials. Dismantlement also includes waste management and disposal of other parts and materials. It does not however, include destruction

of the key nuclear materials or even of the major nuclear subassemblies.
Chapter 1: Summary 3

For these and other reasons, the criteria against

which options for dismantlement, storage, and

disposition of components from nuclear warheads

must be assessed differ significantly from those

that applied to warhead production. In the past,

national security was accorded much more prominent attention than environmental risks. Today,

however, there is a need for responsible stewardship of the long-lived nuclear materials that are

bequeathed to future generations, and safeguards

will be required to protect the safety and health of

the public and of the workers who carry out

dismantlement.

New technologies may offer solutions or partial solutions to some of the problems associated

with either safe disposal or utilization of materials

whose radioactive half-lives are measured in

many thousands of years. Yet few proven technologies are readily available. Nonproliferation concerns will affect decisions about technologies

because of the pressure to come up with options

that reduce the risks of nuclear materials being

easily diverted into new warheads.

Dismantlement of nuclear warheads is proceeding at a time when trust of government in

general, and DOE in particular, is--at best--

fragile. The culture of secrecy and insularity

embraced by the Department of Energy (DOE)

and its predecessor agencies has had a corrosive

effect on relations between the Department and

the communities neighboring nuclear weapons

facilities. The United States begins with the

handicap of widespread public mistrust of its own

institutions charged with these responsibilities

because of their previous failures to safeguard the

environment and health. Thus, one of the first

tasks is to rebuild institutional credibility.

To do this, the priorities and characteristics of

the institutions that supported warhead production will have to be carefully rethought. Greater

attention to environmental, safety, and health

impacts is essential. If the United States is to

successfully carry out nuclear warhead dismantlement and materials management and disposition,

and to engage in cooperative efforts with Russia,

new institutional capabilities and management

approaches are essential. These institutions will

be expected to devote much more attention to the

environmental impacts of proposed ways of

handling nuclear materials than was given when

warhead production was the primary concern.

THE OFFICE OF TECHNOLOGY

ASSESSMENT STUDY

This study addresses the challenge of eliminating thousands of nuclear warheads. It traces the

U.S. process within the responsible Federal agencies, with particular attention to factors that may

affect realization of the national goal of safe and

secure stockpile reduction in a reamer that

protects human health and the environment. The

report also reviews related work in Russia,

focusing on the ability of the United States to

influence a safe, secure, and environmentally

sound process there.

If the United States wishes to develop and

implement policies leading to substantial nuclear

arms reduction worldwide, as well as to substantial reduction of the nuclear materials with which

to make new warheads, certain actions are important and probably more urgent than generally

realized. This report discusses the following

major activities involved in the unprecedented

enterprise to achieve nuclear stockpile reduction:

●

●

the process for retiring weapons from active

deployment in the military and returning

their nuclear warheads to the facilities that

manufactured them; and dismantlement of

the warheads, and subsequent handling of

the parts and materials from them; and

the storage, control, and ultimate disposition

of key nuclear materials (plutonium and

highly enriched uranium) from the warheads.
4 Dismantling the Bomb and Managing the Nuclear Materials

●

●

●

●

●

●

●

●

●

●

●

●

Box I-A-Key Findings

Ongoing Federal program and plans within the Departments of Defense and Energy for retirement and

dismantlement of nuclear weapons are currently treated as a short-term modification of existing practice rather

than a change in focus from past missions of production and stockpile maintenance.

Numbers of weapons in the active stockpile, and numbers to be retired and dismantled, are contained in

classified documents not available to the general public, Existing and pending international agreements do not

require that any warheads be dismantled, only that they be removed from delivery systems. The nation’s

massive nuclear stockpile is now partly dismantled, partly in temporary storage, partly in transition, and partly

deployed.

Environmental, safety, and health problems continue in the operation of the DOE Weapons Complex, and

certain aspects of current dismantlement activities---the use of old facilities, additional sources and generation

of waste, and slow adoption of modern health and safety practices ---may affect the success of dismantlement

programs.

A continuing lack of public credibility may have a major impact on progress in dismantlement and on

implementing key operational decisions. Public interest groups have obtained a legitimate voice in influencing

DOE operations through environmental legislation and their political power. Despite new public participation

initiatives, the major DOE sites have yet to ensure adequate communication with the public, to understand public

concerns, or to involve the public in critical decisions.

it is likely that significant portions of the highly enriched uranium and plutonium recovered from dismantled

warheads will need to be stored for decades regardless of the ultimate disposition option chosen for them.

Significant time will be required for making disposition decisions and formulating policies; for planning,

designing, funding, building, and testing even the most available technology; for gaining regulatory and public

acceptance; and for actually processing quantities of materials.

The use of surplus plutonium from weapons as fuel for U.S. commercial reactors is unlikely because of economic

factors, the concerns of U.S. utilities about regulatory constraints and public acceptance, and the need to

evaluate U.S. policies that discourage commercial plutonium use.

if the policies articulated urge expeditious processing or conversion of plutonium to less weapons-usable forms,

it may be best to pursue the most available near-term technologies. OTA finds that a process to immobilize it

directly in some form such as vitrified glass or, with appropriate poisons, to decrease its proliferation risk and

a Government-built and operated dedicated light-water reactor that uses mixed plutonium and uranium fuels

are two such near-term technologies.

it is impossible to fission plutonium completely (and thus “destroy” all of it), but certain new developments may

be able to convert it to different radionuclides at a much more efficient rate than existing technologies. However,

the research required to develop such advanced reactors and converters would be costly, and would require

times on the order of decades.

The U.S. program to assist Russia with nuclear warhead dismantlement has initiated important cooperative work

but has not addressed the broader issues of mutual goals and interests in stockpile and materials reduction or

control, nor has it had a significant effect on Russian dismantlement.

The United States has not verified specific warhead dismantlement activities and accomplishments in Russia,

and has no direct cooperative process for developing accurate information about Russian dismantlement status

and capabilities.

Efforts to integrate U.S. warhead dismantlement plans with programs to assist Russia have not received

substantive attention. There is little linkage between Russian economic, environmental, or social needs and U.S.

programs to assist and encourage Russian dismantlement a related activities.

While the United States views expeditious Russian warhead dismantlement and materials disposition as vital

to its national security, Russia’s agenda is dominated by economic and political issues that could relegate

dismantlement to a low priority.
Chapter 1: Summary 5

The following sections summarize the status of

ongoing dismantlement activities, OTA’s findings, and an analysis of the policy issues involved

and the initiatives proposed. 2 The key OTA

findings listed in box 1-A summarize the major

points discussed in this report. The findings

address U.S. warhead dismantlement and materials management, and U.S. cooperation with

Russia regarding the disposition of weapons in

the former Soviet Union.

Box 1-B lists issues related to the process of

nuclear warhead dismantlement and materials

management. These issues are presented in the

form of questions and relate to the major decisions that the United States will have to make to

facilitate dismantlement both here and in the

former Soviet Union.

Finally, box 1-C presents the key policy

initiatives developed by OTA in this report. These

initiatives are intended to offer possible approaches to improve Government programs and

enhance their chances of success. They could be

adopted either through legislative initiatives or by

the Administration with congressional encouragement. The options can be pursued either

individually or as a group. They are presented in

the order in which they are discussed in chapter 7.

DISMANTLEMENT OF NUCLEAR

WARHEADS

 Status

According to a long-standing administrative

procedure for management and control of nuclear

weapons within Federal agencies and the military

services, dismantlement begins with a presidential decision approving the annual Nuclear Weapons Stockpile Plan. Retired weapons are then

transferred to a military base within the continental United States, where the warhead is usually

separated from the delivery system and returned

to the DOE facility that assembled it. DOE retains

custody until it is dismantled and its components

have been disposed of. In recent years, thousands

of U.S. nuclear weapons have been put on

retirement status: many of these have been

returned to DOE for dismantlement; others are in

storage at military bases, waiting their turn in the

dismantlement process. In FY 1993, the United

States expects to dismantle about 1,400 warheads,

but plans for the total number of weapons to be

retired and disassembled, as well as the future size

of a reduced warhead stockpile, are not available

for public release.

Warheads returned from the Department of

Defense (DOD) to the Department of Energy for

dismantlement are transported to the DOE Pantex

Plant near Amarillo, Texas, where they were

built. Several Department facilities are currently

engaged in warhead dismantlement and related

work, with major activities centered at Pantex,

Y-12 (in Oak Ridge, Tennessee), and Savannah

River (in Aiken, South Carolina). At Pantex,

plutonium pits (the primary explosive parts) are

removed from warheads, placed in containers,

and stored in bunkers. Other parts and wastes are

characterized, stored, and disposed of in a variety

of ways. Nuclear warhead “secondaries” and

highly enriched uranium (HEU) are shipped to the

Y-12 Plant at Oak Ridge for further storage or

disassembly. Tritium gas canisters are shipped to

the Savannah River Plant for storage or processing.

The United States has recently announced that

it will no longer produce weapons-grade plutonium or highly enriched uranium for warheads. In

practice, these activities ceased some years ago,

and production facilities have not been operating.

Thus, the United States plans to store some of the

materials extracted from disassembled warheads

2 The analyses in this report are based on unclassified information. Thus, certain &ta such as weapons types, numbers of weapons,

retirement schedules, warhead designs, materials shapes, and some processes are discussed only in general terms. OTA did have access to

classiiled information in the course of the study and has prepared a classiiled annex to this repo~ which contains more detailed information

regarding the nuclear weapons stockpile, future plans with respect to nuclear weapons, and related data.
6 Dismantling the Bomb and Managing the Nuclear Materials

Box I-B–Issues Related to Weapons Dismantlement and Materials Management

U.S. WEAPONS DISMANTLEMENT AND MATERIALS MANAGEMENT

Policy and Strategy

How many U.S. warheads are to be retired and dismantled?

How much weapons-grade plutonium and highly enriched uranium (HEU) from already dismantled weapons and

from weapons planned for dismantlement will not be required for stockpile purposes, and can thus declared

surplus?

Should information about numbers of weapons to be dismantled and amounts of surplus materials from dismantled

weapons be made public?

Should surplus plutonium pits from U.S. warheads be stored indefinitely or disposed of as waste?

Should surplus HEU from U.S. warheads be stored indefinitely or converted for use in commercial power reactors?

Should U.S. surplus materials be made amenable to monitoring or inspection under a bilateral arrangment with

Russia?

Operations and Management

When will dismantlement of retired weapons or weapons planned to be retired be completed?

What additional measures should be taken to manage the dismantlement mission so as to protect the environment,

as well as public and worker health and safety?

How long should plutonium pits from dismantled warheads be retained in temporary storage at Pantex--and the

HEU from dismantled warheads in storage at Y-12?

What type of processing facility is needed to maintain the plutonium pits?

What type of facilities are needed for long-term storage of plutonium and HEU (pending some future use or

disposal), and where could such facilities be located?

What type of technologies should be used if plutonium is deemed to be a waste, and what facilities are needed

to implement disposal plans?

Should the surplus materials from dismantled warheads be stored separately from materials needed for weapons

stockpile requirements?

To what extent can and should operational information be made available to the public, and how can public

participation best be ensured?

Through what process will a site or sites be chosen for facilities required to carry out ultimate disposition options

including long-term storage, conversion to fuel, or disposal as waste?

Organizational Structure

Should responsibility for management and disposition of surplus materials from warheads be retained in the

Department of Energy’s Defense Programs, or given to a new organization within DOE or another existing

agency, or should a new organization be created for this purpose?

How should the transition be made between the present organizational structure and a potential future one?

How can external oversight and enforcement be strengthened-what agencies should be engaged, and what

mechanisms should be developed?
Chapter 1: Summary 7

RUSSIA’S NUCLEAR WEAPONS DISMANTLEMENT AND MATERIALS MANAGEMENT

How can the United States best encourage and aid Russia in dismantling warheads, and in the management and

disposition of materials from them, and how should those efforts be structured?

Should the United States propose or enter into reciprocal arrangements with Russia involving information

exchange, transparency, and inspections?

Should the United States encourage or promote any role by an international organization wit h respect to Russian

weapons and nuclear materials?

Should the United States enter into joint study projects or provide technical assistance to Russia for processes

leading to ultimate disposition of plutonium?

for possible future military use. The facilities that

were used to recycle old warhead parts such as

plutonium pits have been shut down, largely for

environmental and safety reasons.

Plutonium pits from recently dismantled warheads are being stored at the Pantex Plant, where

warhead disassembly takes place. DOE is running

out of storage space for plutonium pits at Pantex

and wants to change the storage configuration in

existing bunkers to accommodate more pits, but

the specific plan has not been approved yet. HEU

from disassembled warheads is now being stored

at the Y-12 facility, and there are no current plans

to store it elsewhere.

■ Findings

The Nation’s massive nuclear stockpile is now

partly dismantled, partly in temporary storage,

partly in transition, and partly deployed. Whereas

past dismantlement activities were geared to

maintaining the weapons stockpile, present and

future activities are intended to permanently

reduce it. Since fewer new weapons will be made,

most of the materials recovered from dismantled

warheads will no longer be recycled for use in

other weapons. More plutonium and HEU will

have to be stored and managed for long periods of

time, and international factors may have significant impacts on materials management decisions.

Yet, Federal programs and plans within DOD and

DOE for retirement and dismantlement of nuclear

weapons are currently treated as a short-term

modification of existing practice, rather than a

change in focus from the past missions of

production and stockpile maintenance.

Existing and pending international agreements

require only the removal of warheads from

delivery systems. Preparation for long-term institutional custody of warheads and their nuclear

materials lacks direction. DOE does not have

comprehensive and accurate estimates of the total

current or future annual costs of this enterprise,

but available information indicates that DOE

expenditures for dismantlement activities at all

sites could be approaching $1 billion annually.

Thus far, there have been few if any serious

problems with respect to dismantlement, but

some process difficulties and logistical problems

have caused schedule changes. One potential

stumbling block is the storage of plutonium pits

from warheads. Although DOE has stated that it

needs to change the storage configuration in its

World War II-vintage bunkers at Pantex to

accommodate the anticipated number of pits

coming from warheads, it has not yet produced

the documentation required for approval. The

State of Texas, community groups, and other

experts have found DOE’s environmental analysis to be deficient and have objected to the fact

that DOE originally restricted access to the

associated safety review. In addition, some citizen groups in Texas are concerned that although

DOE says the pits will remain in “temporary

storage” for 6 to 10 years, Pantex could turn into

a de facto long-term storage site, and the pits may
8 Dismantling the Bomb and Managing the Nuclear Materials

Box 1-C--Summary of Policy Initiatives

Congress could implement---or the Administration could undertake to implement-the following policy

initiatives:

Initiative 1—A National Dismantlement Policy

Develop and announce a national policy that sets goals for warhead dismantment and materials

management, and specifies the amount of plutonium and highly enriched uranium from dismantd warheads that

will not be needed to support future stockpile requirements.

Initiative 2-Strengthening DOE Management

Implement a DOE management system that gives priorit y to protecting the environment, health, and safet y;

expand and strengthen external oversight of DOE dismantment and materials management activities by

independent outside entities,

Initiative 3---Nuclear Materials Storage

Establish an interagency task force that includes Federal agencies with expertise in regulatory, international,

and public involvement matters to recommend a plan for safe, secure storage of nuclear materials, and to develop

a process acceptable to the interested public for siting new or modified storage facilities.

Initiative 4---Nuclear Materials Disposition

Create a national commission to recommend goals, policies, and programsforuitimate disposition of surplus

plutonium and HEU from warheads, and to provide a basis for developing an ultimate disposition policy for these

materials.

Initiative 5--A New Materials Management Organization

Create a new organization outside DOE to manage surplus materials from warheads, or establish a new

organization for this purpose within DOE or some other existing agency.

lnitiative 6--Information Access

Review and possibly revise the existing legal basis for restricting access to information in light of today’s

post-Cold War national security objectives, and accelerate efforts to increase access to information relevant to

warhead dismantment and materials disposition.

Initiative 7-Cooperation with Russia

Strengthen the relationship between U.S. assistance to Russia for materials disposition and other programs

in which assistance is desired by Russia; develop a means for joint assessment of plutonium disposition

technologies; and negotiate mutual disclosure of information and reciprocal materials monitoring arrangements.

deteriorate before alternative storage arrange- difficulties during dismantlement at Pantex have

ments are available. caused the public to continue to question health

Another stumbling block is DOE’s poor record and safety practices. Lack of public trust and

with respect to environmental and safety matters credibility could adversely affect prospects for

at its Nuclear Weapons Complex in the past, successful conduct of dismantlement and materiwhich has led to concerns among the interested als management activities.

public and affected communities about future While DOE is working on improvements to its

DOE activities at those sites. Recent process environmental, health, and safety programs at the
Chapter 1: Summary 9

Dismantlement means more than putting weapons

under wraps like these “extinct” bombs at the

National Atomic Museum in Albuquerque.

Nuclear Weapons Complex, current dismantlement activities still face problems, such as the use

of old facilities, waste generation, and the slow

adoption of modern worker health and safety

practices. DOE’s lack of public credibility could

also have a negative impact on prospects for

making key operational decisions regarding dismantlement and management of materials from

warheads. Despite DOE’s efforts to develop

better public participation initiatives, the major

dismantlement sites have yet to ensure adequate

communications with the public, address public

concerns, or involve the public in making decisions about dismantlement and materials management that could affect surrounding communities.

In addition, considerable work remains to develop a national consensus around dismantlement

goals and to ensure the protection of human

safety, environmental integrity, and international

security.

 Policy Issues and Initiatives

Although present efforts to dismantle warheads

and manage warhead materials are being treated

by DOD and DOE as business as usual, these

activities should be viewed as constituting a new

mission with different challenges than in the past.

here could adversely affect similar efforts abroad,

with harmful consequences for international security and the global environment.

A NATIONAL DISMANTLEMENT POLICY

To define the new mission, and guide the

agencies in implementing it, the Nation could

establish a policy that sets forth the long-term

goals and rationale for dismantlement. As part of

that policy, decisions about the number of weapons to be retired and dismantled, as well as the

time frame for dismantlement, would be made

public. The Administration will also have to

decide on the amount of plutonium and HEU

currently available from dismantled warheads

that is not needed to support nuclear weapons

stockpile requirements and could be declared

surplus to military needs. To aid this process,

Congress could direct that an unclassified report

containing such information be prepared and

updated annually. This initiative would facilitate

understanding of the rationale and goals of

dismantlement; help ensure the public that future

actions are consistent both with safety and

protection of human health and the environment,

and with U.S. strategic needs; and signal the

international community that the United States is

serious in its intent to dismantle warheads.

STRENGTHENING DOE MANAGEMENT

Although DOE is attempting to establish new

guidelines for protecting the environment, health,

and safety in its dismantlement and nuclear

materials management activities, these matters

require continuing attention. It is critical for DOE

to develop a management system at all levels of

its organization that is strongly committed to

environmental, safety, and health improvements,

and that effectively integrates this commitment

into its operations. To help ensure that this occurs,

external oversight of DOE’s dismantlement and

materials management program and plans should

be strengthened. One way to accomplish this is

for Congress to provide the Defense Nuclear

Failure to effectively carry out the new mission Facilities Safety Board with the necessary re-
10 Dismantling the Bomb and Managing the Nuclear Materials

sources and personnel (and any additional authority required) for this purpose. To assure communities around the sites that activities are being

conducted properly, the Board-as well as DOEcould provide greater opportunity for public

involvement than in the past. In addition, the

Occupational Safety and Health Administration

(OSHA) could be given jurisdiction over DOE

worker health and safety.

In general, Congress could insist that DOE

upgrade and strengthen its management systems

to adopt and maintain high standards of worker

health and safety, public health, and environmental protection.

MANAGEMENT OF NUCLEAR MATERIALS

 Status

The two principal nuclear materials in warheads are plutonium and highly enriched uranium. Together or separately, they can be made

into new warheads; thus there is a need to keep

these materials safe and secured. Because of their

radioactive half-lives, these materials will continue to pose some level of risk to human health

and the environment for many thousands of years.

OTA has thus focused on plutonium and HEU,

although the disposition and disposal of many

other materials from dismantled warheads are of

concern.

A few hundred tons of plutonium and more

than a thousand tons of HEU (exact numbers are

classified) were produced worldwide for warheads. Today, this stockpile exists either in intact

warheads or weapons, in forms ready to be made

into warheads, or as pits and other forms removed

from retired weapons. The United States and

Russia have by far the largest portion of these

materials. Both plutonium and uranium are also

found in various forms and quantities in the

nuclear industry worldwide, along with other

Models of World War II nuclear weapons Fat Man and

Little Boy at the Bradbury Science Museum in Los

Alamos, New Mexico. Conventional explosive

hemispheres that surround the plutonium pit in a

nuclear warhead are shown in the foreground.

industries that use nuclear materials. Some weapons-grade HEU is used in naval and research

reactor fuel. Some plutonium that has been

separated from commercial spent fuel could also

be used in warheads even though it was not made

for such use.

Nuclear materials taken from dismantled U.S.

warheads, including plutonium pits placed in the

bunkers at the Pantex Plant and HEU housed at

the Oak Ridge Y-12 Plant, are considered to be in

temporary or interim storage. Although DOE has

stated its intention to store plutonium pits in

temporary bunkers at Pantex for the next 6 to 10

years, it has not announced any plans to provide

safe storage for the pits beyond that time. DOE

also has not indicated its long-term storage plans

for HEU.

Long-term or permanent solutions to the disposition3 of these materials await policy decisions

by the President and Congress. DOE has not

declared any of this material to be surplus.

However, recent DOE-sponsored studies have

3 In this repo~ the term “disposition” means the spectrum of possibilities about what to do with these materials beyond weaponry-frost

to store them in a safe, secure facility; perhaps to destroy some portions if technically feasible and practical; perhaps to utilize them to produce

civilian energy, if security is adequate and if the technology and economics prove sound; and finally to dispose of them as waste if technology

and mtional policies permit.
Chapter 1: Summary 11

focused on options for plutonium disposition

through the use of various fuels containing

plutonium in existing or advanced nuclear reactors. Within these reactors the plutonium would

be irradiated and some of it converted to other

radionuclides and fission products, possibly with

the generation of electricity. Other studies have

addressed plutonium storage for moderate to

long-range time frames and techniques for turning plutonium into a form suitable for disposal as

waste. Debate over these options is based largely

on whether plutonium is viewed as a valuable

asset whose beneficial uses are to be explored or

a major liability to be disposed of in the safest and

most secure way.

It is extremely difficult to convert significant

amounts of plutonium into a substance that would

be nonradioactive or harmless to health and the

environment. Existing reactor technologies can

be used to consume it as fuel, that is, to irradiate

it and transform portions of it over time. Mixedoxide (plutonium and uranium) fueled reactors

are an example of existing technology that maybe

modified or adapted for plutonium disposition.

Advanced reactor or converter technologies could

be developed to achieve a large degree of

plutonium transformation (and perhaps also to

produce energy). However, available information

indicates that their development would require

significant time and resources, and it is uncertain

how effective they would be. Alternatively plutonium could be disposed of more directly by using

available technologies to embed it in other

materials that make it difficult to recover (such as

vitrified waste).

Some processing of nuclear materials is required to convert them into forms appropriate for

many of the disposition options that have been

proposed, including preparing them for disposal

as waste. Processing of plutonium and uranium

has historically raised environmental and public

health concerns, as well as concerns about occupational health and safety. Regardless of the

technology or disposition approach selected,

radioactive waste will be generated and require

long-term management.

 Findings

Storage of plutonium and HEU from dismantled warheads will be required for one to several

decades, regardless of what choices are made for

ultimate disposition of these materials. DOE will

present some approaches for a long-term storage

facility as part of its Weapons Complex reconfiguration (in conjunction with the preparation of a

Programmatic Environmental Impact Statement

under the National Environmental Policy Act),

and there are expected to be opportunities for

public comment in that process.

Since the Administration has not made an

official determination as to whether any plutonium and HEU from warheads will be declared

surplus (e.g., not needed for future weapons), as

yet there has been no comprehensive Federal

planning process for the ultimate disposition or

management of surplus materials. Discussions in

and out of Government of plutonium disposition

reveal little support for the use of surplus U.S.

plutonium from warheads as fuel for U.S. commercial reactors. Some factors contributing to the

lack of enthusiasm for this option are concerns of

U.S. utilities about regulatory, public acceptance,

and economic issues, as well as the fact that the

United States has in the past discouraged commercial plutonium use because of proliferation

concerns. DOE and certain private firms have

expressed interest in the construction of special

plutonium-fueled reactors at Federal sites to

eliminate portions of weapons plutonium while

also generating electricity.

Decisions about the fate of plutonium from

U.S. weapons could influence similar decisions in

Russia and other nations that may be planning to

use plutonium in reactors. To reduce the world

stockpile of plutonium that is readily available for

weapons, actions need to be taken to discourage

future production and to facilitate controlling the
12 Dismantling the Bomb and Managing the Nuclear Materials

existing materials and making them unusable for

weapons.

With respect to HEU from U.S. warheads, it is

unlikely that this material will ever be considered

waste. Technology is available to convert it for

use as reactor fuel. However, current plans for

introducing uranium extracted from Russian warheads into commercial U.S. power plants will

probably precede any similar program for U.S.

material. Thus, storage of HEU for several

decades is a likely outcome, and safe, secure

means for long-term storage must be planned.

 Policy Issues and Initiatives

Eventually, the United States will have to

decide what it ultimately wants to do with the

stored plutonium and highly enriched uranium

from its dismantled warheads. If none of it is

declared surplus, presumably the plan would call

for storage for an indefinite period or until it is

needed for weapons. If some of the nuclear

material from warheads is declared surplus,

possible disposition options would include storing it indefinitely, converting it for use in existing

or future reactors, or disposing of it as waste (not

likely for uranium).

NUCLEAR MATERIALS STORAGE

Regardless of the ultimate disposition of plutonium and HEU from warheads, safe storage of

these materials for several decades will have to be

planned as soon as possible. There are many

controversial and difficult issues that will take

much time and effort to resolve. These include

finding the most effective way to ensure safe and

secure long-term storage of these materials,

determining g how such facilities should be regulated, and considering whether and how storage

facilities can be made amenable to any bilateral or

international inspections that may be agreed to in

the future. Gaining public acceptance for the

location of any new or modified facilities will be

difficult. Because some of the issues that need to

be addressed are not within the purview or

expertise of DOE, it may not be desirable to

confine the planning process to DOE. A broader

planning process involving government agencies

in addition to DOE could help identify, anticipate,

and resolve key issues.

One way to provide such a process is for

Congress or the President to establish an interagency task force to make recommendations about

the best way to achieve safe and secure storage.

The task force can also examine the feasibility

and consequences of storing surplus plutonium

and highly enriched uranium separately from

materials reserved for stockpile requirements, and

determine what type of arrangement would facilitate potential bilateral or international inspections. Also, because settling upon a suitable and

acceptable location for nuclear materials storage

will be a problem, the task force should consult

with the public and attempt to develop a facility

siting process that is agreeable to the potentially

affected communities.

NUCLEAR MATERIALS DISPOSITION

In the longer term, a process will be needed to

determine the ultimate disposition of surplus

plutonium and HEU from warheads. So far,

discussions of options have been carried on

largely by technical experts and there is no

consensus about most matters.

National policy on these issues is just beginning to be discussed, and the criteria against

which options can be evaluated are only beginning to be considered. To help determine how

nuclear materials are to be dealt with over the long

term, a means should be developed to provide the

President and Congress with a comprehensive

basis for making the policy decisions necessary

before long-term disposition of U.S. nuclear

materials can begin. A preliminary step might be

to obtain a broad range of governmental and

nongovernmental views about what national policies, and the key criteria for evaluating them,

should be. One mechanism for doing this is for the

President or Congress to create a national commission that would evaluate the technical, institu-
Chapter 1: Summary 13

tional,

goals,

and economic issues, and recommend

policies, and programs relevant to the

ultimate disposition of nuclear materials from

warheads.

A NEW MATERIALS MANAGEMENT

ORGANIZATION

Whatever the outcome of decisions about

storage and ultimate disposition of surplus plutonium and HEU, the present organization charged

with this responsibility (DOE’s Office of Defense

Programs (DP)) may not be well suited to carry

out the new nonmilitary mission of managing

materials from warheads. Historically, its activities have been subject to minimal regulation, its

operations have been conducted in secret, and it

has not sought or welcomed public involvement

or been concerned about the international implications of its actions. Its priorities continue to be

maintaining the warhead stockpile.

In contrast, the mission of storing and dealing

with surplus materials is essentially civilian in

nature, and potentially subject to extensive domestic regulation and to scrutiny by the international community. It may be best to have an

organization that is structured from the start to do

this job in a way that gives priority to ensuring

safety and protecting human health and the

environment, operating in an open reamer, involving the public more effectively, responding

to public concerns, and being constantly aware of

the international implications of its activities.

Such an organization could be created within

DOE. Alternatively, Congress could create an

organization outside DOE (perhaps in some

existing agency) to carry out activities related to

the disposition of surplus nuclear materials from

dismantled warheads.

INFORMATION ACCESS

 Status

The institutional framework for making decisions about nuclear warhead dismantlement and

materials disposition is essentially the same as it

was throughout the Cold War. The decisionmaking structure has historically been characterized

by lack of regulation or outside oversight, restricted public access to information, and little if

any public involvement. Current restrictions on

access to information relevant to nuclear warhead

dismantlement and materials disposition are based

on legislative requirements generally intended to

protect national security during the Cold War.

 Findings

The executive branch has undertaken some

reviews of various Federal agency procedures

related to classification and declassification of

information, but those efforts are typically slow

and may not address public concerns about the

lack of information access in warhead dismantlement and materials management matters, particularly with respect to environmental, health, and

safety issues.

Many of the restrictions on information enacted to meet the Cold War situation may no

longer be necessary to preserve national security,

although certain types of information about warhead design and manufacture must still be withheld because of potential terrorist activities and

other security concerns. However, a great deal of

information relevant to warhead dismantlement

and materials management could be made more

accessible, particularly data having to do with the

environment, health, and safety.

 Policy Issues and Initiatives

In light of the increased authority of the States

and of the public in activities at the Nuclear

Weapons Complex, DOE will have to plan and

conduct its dismantlement and materials management activities in a more open manner that will

permit more public involvement. To facilitate

public access to relevant information, legislative

and administrative restrictions on information

access should be evaluated to determine what

changes are needed to suit the new circumstances

of the post-Cold War era and enhance public
14 Dismantling the Bomb and Managing the Nuclear Materials

involvement. Although the Administration is

reviewing some of these matters, more attention

could be devoted to efforts to revise current

standards and procedures for access to information specifically related to warhead dismantlement and materials management. Also, Congress

could review the Atomic Energy Act and other

pertinent laws, or request that the Administration

conduct such a review, and recommend changes

to facilitate public access to appropriate data

relevant to nuclear warhead dismantlement and

materials management.

COOPERATION WITH RUSSIA

 Status

Russia has announced plans to retire and dismantle a substantial portion of its nuclear weapons stockpile over the next decade or more. The

United States has pledged several hundred million dollars for technical assistance in this connection, but only a small portion has been spent.

The Russians have indicated that a lack of

storage for their nuclear materials, especially

plutonium, is impeding their ability to dismantle

warheads. After a series of discussions, the

United States and Russia have agreed that Russia

will design its own storage facility for special

nuclear materials from warheads, with design

assistance from the United States provided

through the U.S. Army Corps of Engineers. The

Russians plan to begin site preparation for this

storage facility within a year, but many political,

technical, and financial obstacles could hinder its

successful completion in the near term.

U.S.-Russian agreements have also been

reached on U.S. provision of, or assistance with,

specific items such as armored blankets, warhead

storage containers, emergency response systems,

and secure rail cars to enhance the safe transport

of weapons. However, these efforts have not had

any significant effect yet on Russian warhead

dismantlement—an objective that requires continuous emphasis at the highest levels of U.S.

Government and by the several agencies designated to conduct the Russian assistance program.

With respect to the HEU from Russian weapons, the United States and Russia entered into an

agreement in February 1993 (subject to terms not

yet finalized) whereby 500 metric tons of the

material would be converted to low-enriched

uranium (LEU) in Russian facilities and then

purchased by the United States. At least 10 metric

tons would have to be converted in each of the

first five years and 30 metric tons in each of the

following years (for a total of 20 years). A final

purchase agreement has yet to be executed,

however.

An implementing agreement would specify

price, certain conditions, and a method of sharing

proceeds among other former Soviet republics.

The contract is intended to provide for participation by both the U.S. private sector and Russian

enterprises; it is also intended to establish ‘transparency measures” for materials control and

accounting.

 Findings

While the United States views expeditious

Russian warhead dismantlement and materials

disposition as vital to its national security, Russia’s agenda is dominated by economic and

political issues that could diminish the priority

given to dismantlement. U.S. efforts to assist

Russia with nuclear warhead dismantlement have

initiated an important cooperative process but

have not yet had a significant effect on the

Russian dismantlement program. And they have

not been carried out in a manner that addresses the

broader issues of mutual goals and interests in

stockpile reduction and materials management.

The U.S. purchase of Russian HEU from

warheads is nearing final agreement and will

contribute to a reduction of the materials available

for new nuclear weapons there. However, it will

be decades before large portions of the total

Russian inventory of this material are converted

and transferred to the United States, and therefore
a significant risk of diversion will remain. The

United States appears to have entered into this

agreement without a fully articulated analysis of

what further steps might be taken to improve the

management and control of warhead materials to

prevent their diversion.

The United States has not verified specific

warhead dismantlement activities and accomplishments in Russia, and has no direct cooperative process for developing accurate information

about Russian dismantlement status and capabilities. Further, the United States has not established

a policy or approach to mutual dismantlement

verification, warhead materials storage, or other

materials management and control activities (including possible future production of warhead

materials).

Efforts to integrate U.S. warhead dismantlement progress and plans with programs to assist

Russia have not received adequate attention.

There is also little linkage between Russian

economic, environmental, or social needs and

U.S. programs to assist or encourage Russian

dismantlement and other related activities.

 Policy Issues and Initiatives

The United States needs a plan for helping

Russia’s dismantlement and materials management process to proceed safely and without

allowing warheads or warhead materials to get

into the wrong hands. An important aspect of the

plan is to increase coordination between the

agencies responsible for U.S. materials management and disposition programs and those responsible for U.S. policy toward Russia. This is

important because the United States must develop

policies that utilize U.S. experience in its programs to assist Russia.

Because many problems and needs in Russia

are unrelated to dismantlement, it is also important at this time to strengthen the link between

U.S. assistance in nuclear materials disposition

programs and other programs in which assistance

is desired by Russia. It would help if there were

cooperative efforts

these matters.

Chapter 1: Summary 15

between the two nations in

To carry cooperative efforts further, an arrangement could be worked out with Russia

whereby the United States would fired a 2-year

joint study of materials disposition scenarios to be

conducted by a U.S.-Russian multidisciplinary

team based in Russia. To help ensure that

dismantlement and materials disposition are proceeding safely and securely, the United States

could also develop and negotiate with Russia an

initiative for mutual disclosure of the amounts of

weapons plutonium and highly enriched uranium

possessed by each country.

An important issue is whether any storage or

processing facilities used in connection with

warhead dismantlement and materials management should be subject to international monitoring, inspections, or even control. In that regard, it

remains to be seen whether the United States can

realistically expect to verify, either directly or

through international agencies, Russia’s compliance with a specified rate of dismantlement-and

its controlled storage of special nuclear material—

without some reciprocal interest by Russia in

verifying U.S. progress along the same lines. A

high-level governmental process is needed to

consider and address means to achieve reciprocal

arrangements to verify the amounts and monitor

the status of these materials in the future.

CONCLUSION

Reducing the nuclear weapons stockpile will

not be simple, painless, or inexpensive. Although

the work of retiring and disassembling weapons

that are outdated or no longer needed in the

stockpile is under way, the next critical steps in

the process are uncertain because no national

policy exists to guide future dismantlement and

materials management activities in the United

States. In addition, the United States has not

developed an effective strategy for encouraging

and assisting Russia in its efforts to safely
16 Dismantling the Bomb and Managing the Nuclear Materials

dismantle its warheads, and to safely and securely

manage the materials from them.

It is important that warhead dismantlement and

materials management be conducted successfully

both here and abroad. Failure to do the job right

in the United States could create risks of accidents, dangers to workers, and harm to the

environment and populations. In Russia, all of

these risks exist, but there are also risks that the

weapons or materials could be diverted and fall

into the wrong hands.

Yet, the existing approach by the United States

to both U.S. and Russian dismantlement is

insufficient. As yet, the Nation has no coordinated, comprehensive policy on this subject and

there has been little informed public debate on the

establishment of national goals.

The prospects for successfully carrying out

dismantlement and materials management activities in the future-and perhaps assisting Russia in

similar efforts--an be improved if leadership is

provided now at the highest levels of government.

Policy guidance will be needed from these levels.

To provide such guidance, the Federal Government will frost have to articulate a national policy

on dismantlement-a policy that sets the objectives and rationale for permanent stockpile reduction.

In sum, the challenge ahead requires planning

and decisions in the near term if it is to be

successful in the long term. The process deserves

consistent and enduring talent, dedication, and

resources, as well as astute management.
R

ecent treaty agreements and announcements by the

United States and Russia to substantially reduce the

nuclear weapons arsenals of both nations (see box 2-A)

present a unique opportunity, as well as a technical and

political challenge, to the Nation. The opportunity is to remove

many thousands of these weapons from current arsenals. The

challenge is to devise feasible and practical methods of rendering

existing weapons benign and to formulate reasonable plans and

make decisions regarding the short- and long-range goals of this

effort (17,20).

Decisions to retire and dismantle large numbers of nuclear

weapons have provided the incentive to define and initiate major

Federal programs. Both the Departments of Energy (DOE) and

Defense (DOD) have established offices and task forces to plan

and implement various steps in dismantlement.l Thousands of

weapons have been taken out of the active stockpile; a few

thousand warheads have been retired and disassembled; and the

remaining warheads from retired weapons will be disassembled

over the next decade. Table 2-1 shows the major types of

weapons in the current U.S. arsenal.

Even though world leaders have made these announcements

about the elimination of nuclear weapons and declared that the

“Cold War is over,’ the recent Strategic Arms Reduction Treaty

(START) and its successor (START II) have not yet been ratified

Analysis of

Warhead

Retirement

Programs

and Plans 2

1 For example, the Executive Management Team for Dismantlement under Defense

Programs; the Plutonium (and highly enriched uranium) Strategy Task Forces under DOE

(Defense Programs and Nuclear Energy Program); Midnight Sun-the Defense Nuclear

Agency (DNA) or the Dismantlement Planning Effort; the Prioritization Working Group

of DNA and DOE; the Nuclear Weapons Safety Committee, established by DOE.

Point

"Although major emphasis

within the nuclear community

has shifted from development

to retirement and disposal of

weapons, I do not view it as a

major change in mission, but

more of a shift in national

emphasis. ”

Pentagon reviewer of OTA report

Counterpoint

“This is no time for

complacency. The arms race

may be over, but it is still too

much business as usual for the

nuclear weapons industry. The

government has yet to indicate

that it can handle conversion to

peacetime work. ”

A citizens’ guide to the future of

the Nuclear Weapons Complex

17
18 Dismantling the Bomb and Managing the Nuclear Materials

Box 2-A–Proposed Reductions in U.S. and Russian Nuclear Arsenals

In just the past 2 years, political leaders in the United States and the former Soviet Union have made

remarkable pledges and set an agenda for denuclearization that, if completed, will eliminate a large part of the

nuclear weaponry built during the Cold War. Some of the key pledges follow (l):

● In the fall of 1991, Presidents Bush and Gorbachev pledged to withdraw almost all tactical nuclear weapons

from forward deployment and destroy most of them.

● As the Soviet Union dissolved toward the end of 1991, leaders of the newly independent states, where

nuclear weapons were based, pledged to join the international communit y as nonnuclear weapons nations

and to remove such weapons from their territories.

● In May 1992, the current nuclear nations pledged to ratify the Strategic Arms Reduction Treaty (START)

that calls for sharply reducing the strategic arsenals of the United States and the former Soviet Union.

● In June 1992, Presidents Bush and Yeltsin agreed to the outline of a START II treaty that would eliminate

all but 3,000 to 3,500 nuclear weapons deployed (deliverable) in each of their remaining strategic arsenals.

● Presidents Bush and Yeltsin signed the START II treaty in Moscow in January 1993.

SOURCE: Office of Technology Assessment 1993.

and no international agreements exist on the

subject of warhead dismantlement. However,

there is substantial agreement among interested

parties within and outside of government that

nuclear weapons retirement and dismantlement in

both the United States and the former Soviet

Union are important steps in promoting national

security and world peace.

This chapter discusses the programs and plans

now in place to retire nuclear weapons and return

the warheads to DOE for dismantlement. The

programs are mainly the responsibility of the

Department of Defense and the Department of

Energy, which is the Nation’s nuclear warhead

design, construction, and testing agency.

The current process of dismantling nuclear

weapons begins with an action by DOD to retire

a weapon from the active stockpile and, when

appropriate, return it to a military base within the

continental United States.2 By making such a

retirement decision, DOD takes an action that

eventually leads to return of the weapon to DOE,

which originally built the warhead and will retain

custody until it has been dismantled and its components have been disposed of in a manner determined by DOE. The individual services (Army,

Navy, Air Force) have physical custody of these

weapons until they are transferred to DOE (5).

There is a long-standing administrative process

for the management, handling, and control of

nuclear weapons within the Federal agencies

having such responsibilities, principally DOE and

DOD. These agencies are now beginning to

modify their procedures for the new, post-Cold

War mission of dismantlement and disposal.

Figure 2-1 illustrates this administrative process.

It begins with preparing a Nuclear Weapons

Stockpile Memorandum—a document that is

revised and updated each year and contains a

5-year projection of the U.S. stockpile. The

three-member Nuclear Weapons Council (the

Assistant Secretary of Defense for Logistics, the

Vice-Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, and

the Assistant Secretary of Energy for Defense

Programs) considers and submits the memo to the

President through the Secretaries of Defense and

2 The term “retirement’ as it relates to nuclear weapons within DOD is an administrative decision to change the weapon’s charge code.

This change in charge code is from the active stockpile to either the retired stockpile or one of the reserve stockpiles. DOD has the responsibility

of removing the warhead from the delivery system and disposing of that delivery system. Activities associated with launcher disposal are not

covered in this study but are, nonetheless, an important part of the total scheme,
Chapter 2–Analysis of Warhead Retirement Programs and Plans 19

Table 2-l—Major Nuclear Weapons Types in the Current U.S. Arsenal

Designation System/common Service Primary uses

name

W48 155-mm AFAP A Surface to surface

B53 Strategic bomb AF Air to surface

W56 MINUTEMAN II ICBM AF Surface to surface

B57 Bomb/depth bomb N, AF Air to

surface/subsurface

B61 Tactical/strategic bombs N, AF Air to surface

W62 MINUTEMAN Ill ICBM AF Surface to surface

W68 POSEIDON C3 SLBM N Underwater to surface

W69 SRAM AF Air to surface

W70 LANCE A Surface to surface

W77 SPARTAN A Surface to air

W76 TRIDENT 1 C4 SLBM N Underwater to surface

W78 MINUTEMAN Ill ICBM AF Surface to surface

W79 8-inch AFAP A Surface to surface

W80-O TOMAHAWK (TLAM N) N Underwater to surface/

surface to surface

W80-I ALCM AF Air to surface

B83 Strategic bomb AF Air to surface

W84 GLCM AF Surface to surface

W87 PEACEKEEPER ICBM AF Surface to surface

W88 I TRIDENT II D5 SLBM I N I Underwater to surface

NOTE:This is an official unclassified list of weapons types, with the older ones at the top and the newer ones at the bottom. It should be noted that

all Army (A) weapons have been retired and the Marine Corps’ nuclear mission has been deleted. Both the Navy (N) and the Air Force (AF) are

reducing the total numbers of weapons in their stockpiles. Total stockpile numbers are classified.

SOURCE: Defense Nuclear Agency, 1993.

Energy and the National Security Council. When

the President approves, it becomes the Nuclear

Weapons Stockpile Plan (NWSP) and is executed

by the Assistant Secretary of Defense (Atomic

Energy).

The Office of the Assistant to the Secretary of

Defense (Atomic Energy) (ATSD(AE)) performs

a coordination function within the Office of the

Secretary of Defense before the memorandum is

submitted to the Secretary of Defense and Secretary of Energy for approval/transmission to the

President. DOE also coordinates internally before

the Secretary of Energy signs it. Once signed by

the President, the document is addressed and

delivered to the Secretary of Defense, Secretary

of Energy, and Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of

Staff. ATSD(AE) gets the copy sent to the

Secretary of Defense and sends it to the services.

It forms the basis of the allocation plan that is sent

to the services and the Defense Nuclear Agency

(DNA) for tracking (6).

As shown in figure 2-1, the NWSP generates

other procedures and actions through DNA, the

various military services, and DOE. The process

eventually results in directives to retire specific

weapons, return the warheads from DOD to DOE,

and begin dismantlement under a schedule that

accommodates the capabilities and constraints of

all the parties involved (5).

Both DOD and DOE have embarked on planning efforts to ensure that the process will proceed

safely and effectively. Plans continue to be
20 Dismantling the Bomb and Managing the Nuclear Materials

Figure 2-l—Planning and Coordination Process for Nuclear Weapons Retirement

Nuclear Ass’t. Secretary Sec. of Defense.

Stockpile Sec. of Energy The

memo Weapons of Defense

Council Na'l Security President (Atomic Energy)

v Allocation

plan

CD

Joint Chiefs

of Staff

Materials

transfer 1

Defense order

Nuclear DNA Field Service

Agency Command b Logistics Service

(DNA) (HQ) Agents Unit

\

4

T

J \

J’.

Priorities &

schedules

a

Weekly

scheduling

meetings

DOE/DNA

Priorities &

schedules !

Production & planning Department

directive of Energy Retirement/disposal Department

● (Albuquerque b

of Energy

Field Office) program control (Pantex Plant)

document

I

d

Weapons

disassembly

Midnight Sun: the name of the DNA working group charged with planning

and monitoring weapons retirement and return

DOE Executive Management Team: DOE’s dismantlement planning group

Priorities Working Group: the joint DOE/DNA group charged with planning and logistics

SOURCE: U.S. Department of Defense, Defense Nuclear Agency.

updated as variables such as base closures have

their effect. Actual weapons retirements are now

under way at various military bases, warheads are

being transported to DOE, and dismantlement

operations at DOE facilities are following suit. It

is not clear, however, when the new planning and

review activities will be incorporated into such

operations, or how carefully the new mission will

be defined so as to result in the needed management and institutional changes. Box 2-B illustrates some of the challenges ahead.

In some ways, the work required to retire and

dismantle weapons is similar to that of producing

weapons and maintaining a stockpile. Over the

past four or five decades, some classes of nuclear

weapons have been retired and others have taken
Chapter 2–Analysis of Warhead Retirement Programs and Plans 21

Box 2-B-The Challenge of Stockpile Reduction

Pledges to rid the world of massive numbers of nuclear weapons have been made with great fanfare and

hopes for lasting peace. The challenge of turning these pledges into deeds and accomplishing the goals, as viewed

in mid-1993, is formidable (l):

● Several tens of thousands of nuclear warheads are located at hundreds of sites worldwide. These

warheads have massive explosive power, and their continued existence --especially in politically unstable

areas of the world--poses serious dangers. The threat is not only from certain governmental or individual

terrorists who may be able to detonate a weapon, but also from either accidental or intentional dispersal

of radioactive materials.

. If not carefully controlled, the stockpiles of highly enriched uranium and plutonium produced over the past

50 years could be diverted to terrorist groups that may have the ability to make crude but dangerous bombs.

. Radioactive materials from weapons can pose substantial long-term threats to human health and the

environment if not safely contained and managed, and no direct methods are currently available for

destroying them.

. Worldwide, more than a million people work in laboratories, facilities, and factories engaged in nuclear

materials or weapons production and maintenance. These workers and their families face an uncertain

future, a changing mission, and a threat to their livelihood and position in society,

. Thousands of nuclear-weapons-related facilities and huge expanses of the environment are contaminated

with radioactive and toxic waste from 50 years of plutonium and tritium production. This poses serious

environmental and public health threats that are just beginning to be addressed. As nations prepare to

dismantle warheads and dispose of materials from them, they will need to focus serious attention and

resources on requirements for human health and safet y, which will involve both a change of attitude and

an assumption of hitherto neglected environmental responsibilities.

SOURCE: Office of Technology Assessment, 1993.

their place. Representative weapons of all types technical operations (4,7,8). Yet in many ways,

have been dismantled for purposes of quality

assurance and reliability testing. In some cases,

conventional weapons systems have replaced

retired systems. Parts and materials have been

recycled whenever advantageous, and significant

efforts have been devoted to careful disassembly

and accounting, as well as the handling of

sensitive parts and materials. Accurate accounting for fissile materials has been basic to weapons

materials security.

Both DOD and DOE claim that because

weapons have always been dismantled as part of

their replacement or maintenance-and because

materials from these weapons have always had to

be recycled or disposed of in some way—there is

nothing very different about the present mission.

Thus dismantlement is considered by many to be

merely a change in emphasis and an adjunct to the

the work represents a significant change of focus

from the past missions of these agencies.

The new mission for these agencies is to

significantly reduce the overall stockpile and

manage materials that are no longer part of

national defense. This mission offers new challenges and requires different technical and management skills. It also brings a need for planning

that rests on an entirely different premise from the

weapons production mission. Planning is necessary now to ensure that more nuclear materials are

safely stored and controlled outside the military

system, that goals for stockpile reduction and

disposition of materials are met in the United

States and elsewhere, and that past mistakes

leading to environmental degradation or threats to

public health are not repeated (15).
22 Dismantling the Bomb and Managing the Nuclear Materials

DOD: WEAPONS RETURN AND

PREPARATIONS FOR DISMANTLEMENT

The Department of Defense is responsible for

the separation of warheads from their delivery

systems, such as missiles, for which it retains

responsibility. DOD is currently implementing

substantial reductions of the U.S. nuclear arsenal.

However, neither the international agreements

concerning the reduction of deployed weapons

nor the START and Intermediate Range Nuclear

Forces (INF) treaties specify that warheads be

dismantled—they merely call for removing warheads from delivery systems (e.g., missiles) and,

in some cases, destroying the delivery systems.

Certain experts, in fact, argue that dismantlement

goals should not fall within the terms of these

agreements (7).3

DOD has stated in the past that if the United

States had to “destroy” existing warheads that

are being “retired” under current treaties and

agreements, it would have to produce new warheads to maintain its reduced inventory. Yet the

U.S. Nuclear Weapons Complex currently has

little, if any, operational capability to produce

new warheads. There is also concern on the part

of some military planners that future weapons

readiness capabilities, and even U.S. military

supremacy, could suffer if too many nuclear

warheads are destroyed before future world

threats have been carefully evaluated (7).

The uncertainty about decisions to retire and

dismantle nuclear weapons—as well as vagueness in the definitions of these and other terms—

means that long-range plans, goals, or capabilities

cannot be accurately determined or evaluated at

this time. The near-term technical questions are,

therefore, whether the retirement and dismantlement operations now under way are being carried

out safely and effectively, and whether the United

States will be able to safely and adequately

prepare for the next step in the process-the

long-term disposition of nuclear materials from

warheads.

Important policy questions are:

whether informed public debate will be

brought to bear on major retirement and

dismantlement decisions;

whether it will be necessary to develop new

policies to direct and coordinate this work;

whether the retirement and dismantlement

process now under way will proceed efficiently and effectively, with adequate attention to health, safety, and environmental

protection; and

whether the effort will sufficiently advance

the stated national security goal of international reduction of nuclear armaments.

 Number of Weapons To Be Retired

or Dismantled

No official government list of U.S. nuclear

weapons to be retired or dismantled is publicly

available. It is generally agreed, however, that the

stockpile will be reduced substantially, but the

precise number of each type of weapon (retained

or dismantled) is reflected in the Nuclear Weapons Stockpile Plan, prepared by the joint DODDOE Nuclear Weapons Council and approved by

the President. That document is classified, and the

plan is continually modified to reflect the most

current U.S. policies and international understandings (18).4

As a beginning, DOE has developed a general

policy for dismantlement. In its policy, DOE has

stated that it will dismantle all retired warheads

turned over to it by the Department of Defense.

s DOD claims it needs tie flexibility to reuse some warheads fkom retired weapons if it so chooses; that the greatest cost in wmpom is

delivery vehicles, not warheads (which are easy to reassemble); and that elimination of warheads is of no use unless constraints are also placed

on fissile material production.

4 The U.S.-Russian agreement, signed in June 1992 and codified by the S’E4RT II treaty signed in January 1993 by Presidents Bush and

Yeltsiq reduces the size of each nation’s nuclear arsenal to 3,000 to 3,500 deployed (deliverable) strategic warheads by 2003. The reductions

called for are the most sweeping in U.S.-Russian bilateral arms control histo~. They represent a major reduction in present arsenals.
Chapter 2—Analysis

Retired nuclear weapons received at the Department

of Energy Pantex Plant.

Dismantlement will consist of disassembling

each warhead, removing and storing the uranium

and plutonium components, and disposing of the

remaining parts in accordance with State and

Federal regulations. Most of the weapons retired

by DOD are now being shipped (or will be

shipped) to DOE’s Pantex Plant near Amarillo,

Texas for dismantlement (one weapons type was

recently dismantled at the Y-12 Plant in Oak

Ridge, Tennessee). These shipments are planned

and controlled jointly by DOD and DOE to ensure

safe and effective weapons dismantlement. DOE

has determined that its current safe maximum rate

is approximately 2,000 weapons per year. According to DOE, this rate was selected to ensure

that dismantlement could be carried out in an

orderly, safe, and environmentally sound manner.

DOE has also said that this rate will allow the

United States to complete the dismantlement of

anticipated planned retirements by the end of this

decade (4).

On further investigation, the above rate appears

to be optimistic over the near term. Pantex

managers have indicated that the current targets

are 1,700 per year in FY 1993 and 2000 in FY

1994. The FY 1992 rate was about 1,300 at Pantex

of Warhead Retirement Programs and Plans 123

(see table 2-2 and figure 2-2). At the current FY

1993 Pantex dismantlement rate, the year-end

total would be about 1,430 warheads.

Current U.S. warhead dismantlement plans are

governed by reductions in the nuclear stockpile

planned by the Nuclear Weapons Council. Some

of these plans also take into account the general

goals of the 1988 INF treaty, the 1991 announcement of unilateral withdrawal of tactical weapons

by President Bush, and both the 1991 START

treaty and the START II treaty signed by Presidents Bush and Yeltsin in January 1993 (see table

2-3). Taken together, these initiatives, if ratified

and fully implemented, could lead to the eventual

dismantlement of more than 10,000 U.S. warheads by early in the next century (16). In fact,

START II sets a limit of no more than 3,500

deployed (deliverable) strategic nuclear warheads

each for the United States and Russia by the year

2003. The actual number of warheads to be

returned to DOE for dismantlement is specified in

the annual Nuclear Weapons Stockpile Memorandum. This classified memorandum is submitted to the President for approval each year on

September 30.5 The most recent two submissions

have included an attachment listing the specific

weapons to be retired. The President does not

directly approve or disapprove this list, but could

consider it in review of overall stockpile strategy.

If the above treaties are fully implemented, the

results should be reflected in the annual stockpile

memorandum, which also contains specific numbers of nuclear weapons projected to be in the

active stockpile, the reserve stockpile, and retired.

At present, the return of retired nuclear warheads to DOE is well under way. All retired

weapons that were to be returned to the United

States under former President Bush’s initiative

had been returned to continental U.S. bases by the

end of 1992. Since 1990, DOD has been shipping

retired warheads from military bases to the Pantex

Plant for dismantlement. Almost 4,000 retired

warheads were dismantled at Pantex from 1990

s See classified Annex to this report for a discussion of current weapons stockpile amounts and future plans,
24 Dismantling the Bomb and Managing the Nuclear Materials

Table 2-2—DOE’s Pantex Plant: Nuclear Warheads

Disassembly History, 1990-92

Fiscal Numbers retired

year and disassembled

1980 535

1981 1,416

1982 1,360

1983 960

1984 860

1985 927

1986 574

1987 1,068

1988 510

1989 1,134

1990 1.056

DOD planners evaluating schedules for weapons

returned to DOE.

1991 1,546

1992 1,274

I Total I 13,223 I

NOTE: In addition to these weapons that were disassembled subsequentto retirement, additional warheads were disassembiedforquality

assurance and reliability testing each year-some in this category were

disposed of and others were reassembled and returned to the stockpile.

Thenumberinthis category ranged from Iessthan 100 to about 400 per

year.

SOURCE: U.S. Department of Ene~y.

through mid-1993 (table 2-2). If the current

retirement plans are followed, at least 10,000

warheads should be returned for dismantlement

over the next decade.

The total numbers of warheads in the active and

reserve stockpiles currently, and in the past, are

classified. The number of each type and design of

warhead that has been retired and dismantled is

classified. Annual warhead dismantlement rates

at Pantex are available but not in a form that

would allow one to calculate back to actual

stockpile numbers. Even so, it is clear that the

challenge of effectively and safely managing a

return, dismantlement, and materials disposition

program of the magnitude resulting from the

above stockpile reduction goals is daunting.

This study by the Office of Technology Assessment does not attempt to determine dismantlement quantities and rates beyond the very general

estimates given above. If all of these data remain

classified, an important question is how public

policy will be established for the future storage,

control, and safe management of warheads and of

the materials from their dismantlement. If there is

to be a public discussion, however, useful order-ofmagnitude information about the quantities, rates,

and storage or processing requirements of weapons to be dismantled may need to be made public

and official.

Current DOD Plans and Programs

Because the information is classified, the

Defense Department will not divulge the location,

storage, or transportation routes of nuclear weapons. However, the movement of weapons from

overseas to continental U.S. bases has been

completed. Further retirement of weapons will

continue to take place under the guidance of

stockpile reduction policies. The individual services with custody of the weapons have storage and

maintenance facilities for all weapons whether

the weapons are active, active reserve, inactive

reserve, or retired awaiting DOE pickup prior to

dismantlement. Because this information is classified, the storage capacity relative to the number
Chapter 2–AnaIysis of Warhead Retirement Programs and Plans 25

Oct Nov Dec Jan Feb Mar Apr May June July Aug Sept

SOURCE: U.S. Department of Energy.

of warheads to be retired cannot be revealed.

Currently, the armed services believe they can

store projected warhead retirements, given current base closures and the DOE dismantlement

capability. However, any delays in dismantlement or changes in base closure or base operation

consolidation plans could impact DOD’s capability to store its warheads. The number of active

DOD nuclear capable storage sites is gradually

decreasing, primarily through the services’ effort

to consolidate operations. The Army is heading

toward complete elimination of its nuclear arsenal

and the other services are closing certain of their

storage sites (5).

Figure 2-3 shows the process of weapons retirement in DOD and dismantlement in DOE, and indicates some of the major issues affecting the key

steps. For DOD, the questions of transportation,

safety, and security, as well as pressures to move

weapons because of facility closures, appear to be

driving many of the logistical decisions.

NUCLEAR WEAPONS SAFETY ISSUES

Nuclear weapons have been handled by the

U.S. military services over the past four decades

with great attention to safety of operations. The

DOD process of retiring large numbers of weapons and returning warheads for dismantlement,

however, brings a responsibility to review the

suitability and comprehensiveness of safety practices.

Safety questions have long had high priority

among agencies with nuclear weapons responsibilities. The Nuclear Weapons System Safety

Group maintains a safety report on each weapon.

The Defense Nuclear Agency reviews safety

reports from the Nuclear Weapons Systems

Safety Group and performs safety analyses. Many

types of safety analyses are performed regularly.

DOD is responsible for returning nuclear

weapons located outside the continental United

States. Weapons are returned via air or sea

transport to bases at designated locations within

the continental United States. The intact warhead

delivery system is considered rugged enough to

be its own shipping container in the case of

warheads placed in missile reentry vehicles or in

air-dropped bombs. Other types of warheads are

placed in special containers, when appropriate,

prior to shipment back to the United States from

Europe. Some weapons, although rugged enough

to constitute their own shipping containers, require other containers, for efficient stacking.
26 Dismantling the Bomb and Managing the Nuclear Materials

Table 2-3-START-II Deployed (Deliverable) Warhead Limits

(for each country–the United States and Russia)

Warhead type Limits

Phase ia Phase IIb

Strategic total 3,800-4,250 3,000-3,500

(warheads attributed to deployed ICBMs, deployed

SLBMs, and deployed heavy bombers)

MIRVed ICBMs 1,200 0

SLBMs 2,160 1,700-1,750

Heavy ICBMs 650 0

NOTE: ICBMS = intercontinental ballistic missiles. SLBMS= submarine-launched ballistic missiles. MIRV= multiple

independently targetable reentry vehicle.

a TO be Completed 7 years after the treaty becomes effective.

b TO be completed by the year ZOOS.

SOURCE: U.S. Arms Control and Disarmament Agency.

For the expanded retirement program just

completed, DOD used existing planes and bases,

with limits dictated by safety considerations.

DOD and DOE are also using Safe Secure Trailers

to the maximum extent for transportation within

the continental United States. According to Pentagon officials, as of mid-1993, all of the planned

weapons’ returns from overseas to U.S. home

bases had been accomplished. The movement of

weapons by DOD will now focus on the consolidation of U.S. bases with a future goal of a

minimum number of nuclear weapons storage

sites for each service within the United States

(2,3,8).

In the past, concerns about accidents with nuclear weapons caused DOD to make certain safety

improvements. For example, plutonium scatter

accidents, in which accidental detonation of the

chemical explosives in a warhead disperses plutonium and other nuclear materials into the environment, are of particular concern during nuclear

weapons transportation. Such accidents involving

aircraft on alert have occurred in the past. For

example, a bomber carrying nuclear weapons

crashed near Palomares, Spain, in 1966 during a

refueling exercise, and another crashed during

takeoff in Thule, Greenland, in the late 1960s.

Even though these accidental detonations of high

explosives did not lead to actual nuclear explosions, they did result in widespread dispersal of

the weapons’ plutonium, extensive environmental

contamination, and high cleanup costs (14).

The practice of airborne alert has been discontinued, and the Pentagon reports that no aircraft

crashes have occurred during logistic movements

of nuclear weapons. One response to dispersal

accidents was to develop new types of high

explosives for use in nuclear warheads. The

nature of the chemical high explosives used in a

particular warhead is of critical importance to the

risk of plutonium scatter accidents. All nuclear

warheads produced before 1979 contain an olderdesign, conventional chemical high explosive

(HE) that can detonate under some accidental

conditions, including airplane crashes or fires,

causing plutonium to scatter. The most modern

warhead designs utilize insensitive high explosive (IHE), which is safer since it is designed so

that detonation will not occur under similar

accident scenarios (9,13). Research efforts at

Sandia National Laboratory have developed approaches to minimize plutonium scatter accidents. One past improvement was the development of accident-resistant air shipping containers
Chapter 2—Analysis of Warhead Retirement Programs and Plans 127

Figure 2-3—The Nuclear Stockpile Dismantlement Process (with major Issues In parentheses)

DOD

custody

{

DOE

custody

Transportation

to U.S. bases &—x

(Safety & security)

+=+” “5!!!s

(Facility closure)

\

DOE transportation

to DOE facilities

(scheduling priorities)

Component Warhead Warhead Warhead

staging disassembly staging trucking

Ez2P -

/

(yg; (Nuclear safety ($l;im$ (Limited assets for

ES&H compliance) increased numbers

\

& rates)

?

Waste

disposal

B

(ES&H

compliance)

Off-site

transportation

(Limited assets and

container certification)

\

Staging

m

(:p;Li:

\

Waste

disposal

=

\ E2!l

Reuse (ES&H

compliance)

NOTE: ES&H = environment, safety and health.

SOURCE: U.S. Department of Energy.

that were designed to prevent dispersal of nuclear

materials should an accident occur.

Weapons with conventional HE could be a

problem under certain conditions if these accidentresistant containers are not used or other precautions are not taken (9). Even though the services

have used such containers when necessary, DOD

does not require the use of these special containers even if the weapons contain conventional HE.

A more recent analysis of safety issues conducted in 1990-and known as the “Drell Report” (19)-was an independent study by the

Panel on Nuclear Weapons Safety requested by

the House Committee on Armed Services, joined

by the Senate Commitee on Armed Services. It

considered safety issues as part of developing

future U.S. nuclear forces in the context of recent

profound changes in the strategic, political, and

military dimensions of international security. The

report painted a picture of a weapons program that

had in the past been far more concerned with

production than with safety. Its organizational

recommendations are now being implemented by

the Defense Nuclear Agency and others. They

included establishing or improving the organizations and procedures for evaluating and correcting defects, enhancing training programs, and

evaluating new concerns for operations and
28 Dismantling the Bomb and Managing the Nuclear Materials

functions in the post-Cold War world. It will be

important to support these efforts in the future if

safety is to remain in the forefront.

Based on the recommendations in the Drell

Report, DOD and DOE have recently established

two advisory committees on nuclear weapons

safety. The first is the DOE-DOD System Safety

Red Team Advisory Committee. The Red Team

is responsible for the technical evaluation of

weapons designs and procedures on preventing

inadvertent detonation or plutonium dispersal,

and for reviewing the safety of warhead and

subsystem designs in all credible environments as

well as the documentation related to such subsystems (5). The second committee is the Joint

Advisory Committee on Nuclear Weapons Surety.

This committee has responsibility for advising on

inadvertent detonation and plutonium dispersal,

and for making recommendations on national

policies and procedures to ensure safe handling,

stockpiling, maintenance, and risk reduction technologies for nuclear weapons (see box 2-C).

 Transportation Safety

The responsible services within DOD take

great care to ensure the safety of transport when

weapons or warheads are moved between military

bases or depots, or between staging sites and

destinations within the United States or overseas.

Because larger numbers of weapons are being

retired and weapons are being moved more

frequently, transportation safety has received

even more attention.

Over the last few years, some comprehensive

assessments have been accomplished and new

directives have been proposed to modify and

improve transportation safety. Much work has

been done to analyze what changes could be

effective, but most have not yet been fully

approved and put in place. Also, significant

controversy exists about the merits of certain

proposals, whereas others have generally been

accepted but are being implemented slowly.

A specially equipped DOE transport vehicle used to

ship retired weapons to Pantex as well as to ship

components to other sites.

As of mid-1993, a major study (begun in 1988

and completed at the end of 1992) still awaits

approval of the Nuclear Weapons Council (10).

This joint DOE-DOD Study on the Logistic

Transportation of Nuclear Weapons represents

the first rigorous and formal probabilistic risk

assessment ever done on the subject. It incorporates an extensive database on accidents and their

probabilities; assessments of how individual warheads may respond to accidents; the probability

and consequences of plutonium dispersion; and

an extensive assessment of security problems

associated with various transportation modes. It

includes specific investigation of all modes of

transportation (air, rail, ship, truck) and assessment of the transport containers used. The study

is intended to serve as a tool for service commanders in analyzing the relative safety and

security of various transportation options so as to

choose the one with lowest risk. It is expected to

be approved and released by late 1993 (10)

The other major recent initiative is the development of a new DOD directive for the movement

of nuclear weapons. This directive has not yet

been approved or implemented but would replace

an older one, refer to the new transportation study,

and provide improved guidance to commanders
Chapter 2–Analysis of Warhead Retirement Programs and Plans 29

Box 2-C-Ensuring the Safety of Nuclear Weapons

The United States has always been concerned about the possibility of an accidental or unauthorized

detonation of a nuclear weapon. Warheads have, thus, been designed and built with a variety of safety features

and technical obstacles to prevent these occurrences. However, to provide a credible deterrent force, the weapons

must also be reliable; that is, confidence that warheads will detonate when used must be high. “Nuclear weapons

surety” is the phrase used to describe these often contradictory needs.

As a result of a congressionally commissoned study, a Joint Advisory Committee on Nuclear Weapons

Surety (JAC) was established in September 1992 to consolidate the work of the Departments of Energy and

Defense on the issue of surety. The JAC was established under the auspices of the Federal Advisory Committee

Act.

The focus of the JAC has been on the safety side of the surety equation. It is tasked with advising the

Secretary of Defense, the Secretary of Energy, and the Nuclear Weapons council on matters concerning

“inadvertent detonation or plutonium dispersal.”

. The JAC was officially chartered on September, 1992 and will operate until September 4, 1994. It meets

twice a year and at other times designated by the Chairman.

. The designated Federal official for the JAC is the Assistant Secretary of Defense for Atomic Energy. The

Committee is authorized to have five members, at most. It currently has five, as well as several designated

alternates.

● Subcommittees and panels may be created as necessary to address specific issues. Reports from such

groups are given to the JAC Chairman before being released outside the Committee.

. Meetings are announced in the Federal Register. If meetings are dosed to the public, the Executive

Secretary "will issue an annual report setting forth a summary of its activities. . . as would be informative

to the public.”

The estimated annual operating cost of the JAC is $168,000.

The JAC considers safety issues in all aspects of nuclear weapons. For example, missile design,

propellants, and transportation scenarios are examined, in addition to the warheads themselves. The JAC

has not yet commissioned any substantive analyses (1 1,12).

SOURCE: Joint Advisory Committee on Nuclear Weapons Surety.

in judging and selecting the lowest-risk transport other considerations, such as the need to meet

mode.

Several issues related to these studies involve

the need to improve transportation safety and the

prospects of expediting the process. First, several

experts (mostly at the national laboratories) have

long advocated greater safety and security in

transportation, especially for older weapons that

lack some of the safety features of the newer ones

(9,13,14,19). These experts have been recommending the use of accident-resistant containers

and Safe Secure Transport (SST) vehicles (tractortrailers operated by the DOE Transportation

Safeguards Division). At the same time, some of

the armed services have claimed that the advantages of this approach may be outweighed by

schedules and maintain high security of operations. Some say that accident-resistant containers

can degrade security and are not worth that price.

Much effort has gone into the analysis of

weapons transportation safety, and the resulting

studies and proposed directives have merit. It

appears that they will be adopted and implemented soon, but some constraints remain. If the

process could be moved forward, it should have

significant benefits for reducing the future risk of

accidents that might result in the dispersal of

dangerous nuclear materials. Even though accident-risk probabilities are very low, understanding how to decrease risk further, as shown by

these rigorous assessments, can help decision-
30 Dismantling the Bomb and Managing the

makers make prudent choices and take all possible measures to increase safety.

 Storage Safety

The safety of intact warheads while in storage

is an issue that may merit an updated review

because it is possible that certain storage depots

will be maintained for the long term. Another

factor involves the closing of DOD bases and

other restructuring of forces that may increase

logistical concerns regarding movements of weapons returned to DOE. Here again, the Defense

Nuclear Agency will be challenged to maintain

the best and safest balance between DOD needs

and DOE capabilities. DNA keeps track of weapons in DOD custody and negotiates with DOE

regarding the types and numbers to be transported

to a DOE site for dismantlement in a given period.

A critical factor is, thus, the ability of Pantex—

both its physical capacity and its worker resourcesto meet schedules without sacrificing safety or

overloading any part of the process. There is a

possibility that Pantex schedules will be delayed

if DOE cannot adequately and quickly resolve

problems related to increasing the storage capacity for plutonium pits from warheads6

Because the information is classified, no detailed analysis of DOD storage capabilities,

scheduled closure of facilities, or transportation

capacity for specific weapons return scenarios is

available for public review. Also, safety oversight

systems are mainly internal to DOD. These

should be especially comprehensive and rigorous

in protecting public health and the environment.

DOD and DOE have recently reviewed a range

of nuclear weapons safety issues and listed those

that may require study (in priority order) in a joint

surety plan. In this list, an issue assessment of

long-term storage was given a high priority. Such

an assessment study may be initiated in the near

future, but as of mid-1993, no firm plans have

been made.

Nuclear Materials

 Other Safety Issues

Within the current joint surety plan, some other

safety issues are given high priority. Two of these

are fire resistance enhancement and dismantlement risk. The dismantlement risk issue is relegated to DOE’s attention. Fire resistance enhancement is the subject of a study that has been

initiated by DOD, following a key recommendation of the Drell Report. It will characterize

credible future environments for warhead exposure to fire and will explore improvements in

design, operational procedures, and mitigation

measures that could be employed. The study

began in late 1992 and will be completed in 1995.

Another concern regarding nuclear weapons

safety is whether, in the rush to demilitarize,

dismantle, and eliminate these major weapons,

the system will still command high-quality attention and adequate resources. Although budgets

may be reduced because weapons are no longer

needed, it will still be necessary to provide

resources to ensure that care is exercised in

protecting both individuals and the environment

from these devices and materials.

CONCLUSION

In sum, a substantial nuclear weapons retirement and warhead return process is now under

way by DOD based on presidential directives and

other factors. Retirement decisions are made in

the context of which warheads are no longer

needed in the active and reserve stockpiles. When

such a decision is made, each service with

physical control of a weapon arranges for transportation to a continental U.S. military base, if

appropriate, and then puts either the weapon or

the warhead into temporary storage until it can be

returned to DOE. The DOD process of weapons

retirement, following the national goal of stockpile reduction, has been under way for the past

few years. Issues of logistical planning, safe

transportation and storage, defining overall strat6 See chapter 3 and appendix A.
Chapter 2–Analysis of Warhead Retirement Programs and Plans 31

egy, and making decisions about the Nation’s

nuclear future are being addressed by the responsible Federal agencies but with minimal public

debate or input. Continuing issues that could be

addressed include developing a national consensus, defining a unified mission, and ensuring that

adequate improvements in safety, security, and

protection of health and the environment are

carried out.

CHAPTER 2 REFERENCES

1.

2.

3.

4.

5.

6.

7.

8.

9.

Allison, Graham, Ashton Carter, Steven Miller,

and Philip Zeli.kow, “Cooperative Denuclearization—From Pledges to Deeds,” Harvard University, Center for Science and International

Affairs, January 1993.

Birely, John, Deputy Assistant to the Secretary of

Defense (Atomic Energy), briefing to Office of

Technology Assessment, Apr. 12, 1992.

Boardman, Karen, Program Engineer, Department

of Energy, Albuquerque Operations Office, Weapons programs Division, briefing to Office of

Technology Assessment, May 21, 1992.

Claytor, Richard, Assistant Secretary for Defense

programs, Department of Energy, testimony before the U.S. Senate Committee on Armed Services, Aug. 4, 1992.

Defense Nuclear Agency, “The Nuclear Weapons

Dismantlement Process,’ prepared for the Office

of Technology Assessment, November 1992, and

briefing of OTA staff, Feb. 19, 1993.

Dowis, James W., Special Assistant on Stockpile

Matters to the Assistant to the Secretary of

Defense (Atomic Energy), letter to the Office of

Technology Assessment, June 30, 1993.

Graham, Douglas R., Deputy Assistant Secretary

of Defense, Testimony before the U.S. Senate

Committee on Armed Services on Warhead Dismantlement and the START Treaty, Aug. 4, 1992.

Guidice, Stephen, Assistant Manager for Office of

Operations and Weapons, Department of Energy,

briefing to Office of Technology Assessment on

DOE nuclear weapons dismantlement, May 20,

1992.

Harrison, James, Sandia National Laboratories,

Weapons Project Group, briefing to Office of

10.

11.

12.

13.

14.

15.

16.

17.

18.

19.

20.

Technology Assessment on Sandia’s role in

dismantlement relative to environmental safety,

My 20, 1992.

Hav~ David J., Special Scientific Advisor to the

Assistant to the Secretary of Defense (Atomic

Energy), briefing to Office of Technology Assessment staff, Mar. 5, 1993.

Joint Advisory Committee on Nuclear Weapons

Surety, Authorization, May 6, 1992; and Charter,

Sept. 4, 1992.

Keel, Stanley, Special Assistant for Nuclear Weapons Safety to the Assistant to the Secretary of

Defense (Atomic Energy), personal communication, Mar. 8, 1993.

Kidder, R.E., “Assessment of the Safety of U.S.

Nuclear Weapons and Related Nuclear Test Requirements,” Report No. UCRL-IR-109503, Lawrence Livermore National Laboratory, Dec. 10,

1991.

Miller, George H., Lawrence Liverrnore National

Laboratory, testimony before the U.S. House of

Representatives Committee on Armed Services,

Mar, 31, 1992; see also Miller, George H., Paul S.

Brown, and Carol T. Alonso, “Report to Congress

on Stockpile Reliability, Role of Nuclear Testing,” Lawrence Livermore National Laboratory

Report No. UCRL-53822, October 1987.

National Research Council, The Nuclear Weapons

Complex, Management for Health, Safety, and the

Environment (Washington, DC: National Academy Press, 1989).

Presidential Response to Section 3142 of the FY

1992 National Defense Authorization Act on

Nuclear Weapons Matters, April 1992.

Scheinrnan, Lawrence, and David A.V. Fischer,

“Nuclear Weapons Dismantlement: An Opportunity to Advance the Cause of Non-Proliferation,’

The Atlantic Council Bulletin, February 1992.

U.S. Arms Control and Disarmament Agency,

“Fact Sheet on the START II Treaty,” Washington, DC, Jan. 1, 1993.

U.S. Congress, House Committee on Armed

Services, Panel on Nuclear Weapons Safety,

“Nuclear Weapons Safety Report” (Drell Report), No. 15, December 1990.

von Hippel, Fra~ “Bombs Away,” Discover,

vol. 13, No. 4, April 1992, p. 32.
Warhead

Dismantlement

Programs

w

hen weapons are returned by the Department of

Defense (DOD) to the Department of Energy (DOE),

they are transported to the DOE Pantex Plant for

dismantlement. Dismantlement begins with removal

of all the nonnuclear components, including the chemical high

explosives (HE) that surround the nuclear materials. Dismantlement also includes the management of waste materials, which

comprises such steps as separation, characterization, demilitarization, sanitization, and disposal. Some materials are temporarily

stored. The storage of plutonium and highly enriched uranium is

discussed in chapter 4. The final disposition of nuclear materials

removed from weapons has not yet been determined.

PRESENT DOE ACTIVITIES AND PLANS

 Overview

Several DOE facilities are currently engaged in the warhead

dismantlement process, with major activities centered at Pantex,

Y-12, and Savannah River (see figure 3-l). Plutonium pitsl are

removed from warheads and temporarily stored in bunkers at

Pantex. Other parts and wastes are stored, characterized, and

disposed of in a variety of ways that have been developed and

used by DOE in the past. Secondaries2 are shipped to the Y-12

Plant at Oak Ridge, Tennessee for further disassembly or storage.

Tritium canisters are shipped to the Savannah River Site. Figure

3-2 illustrates the steps involved in dismantlement at Pantex.

and

Plans 3

Point

“From a global security point of

view, I would argue that—the

fact that the Department of

Energy is doing the best it can

with existing dismantlement

procedures until it can finalize

new ones-is the only

responsible approach for them

to take. ”

National Academy of Sciences

staff reviewer of OTA report

Counterpoint

“I continue to worry that the

dismantlement train has left the

station probably headed in the

wrong direction but running on

previous policies in light of the

lack of new policies. ”

Retired DOE manager and

reviewer of OTA report

1 A plutonium pit is the primary explosive nuclear core of the warhead package.

z A key (self-contained) subasaembly of the nuclear warhead package.

33
34 Dismantling the Bomb and Managing the Nuclear Materials

Figure 3-l—DOE Facilities Involved in Nuclear Weapons Dismantlement

Contractor DOE trucking

recovery

(metals, etc.) On-site and

nuclear warheads

from DOD facilities

T

contractor

off-site destruction

~ and disposal ..4-- Y- >

t

Pantex

Warhead disassembly

Oak Ridge Y-12

HEU, secondaries, and

beryllium processing

Lawrence

Livermore

National

Laboratories

Rocky Flats Plant

Los Alamos

National Sandia National

Laboratory Laboratories

Waste Isolation Pinellas Plant Pilot Plant

River

Site

SOURCE: Office of Technology Assessment, 1993.
U-J

Chapter 3: Warhead Dismantlement Programs and Plans 135

1-

\

I
36 I Dismantling the Bomb and Managing the Nuclear Materials

In the past, DOE has dismantled nuclear

warheads as a part of operations to maintain the

active and inactive stockpiles, and to retire

obsolete weapons systems (32). However, during

this earlier activity, most nuclear and nonnuclear

components were returned to the DOE plants in

which they were made. Now, some facilities have

ceased operations and can no longer accept

materials. For example, plutonium pits can no

longer be returned to Rocky Flats, so these pits

must be stored at Pantex. The focus of DOE’s

activities has changed from warhead production

to warhead dismantlement. During FY 1991,

1,546 warheads were dismantled at Pantex. In FY

1992, even though the total number dismantled by

DOE was much larger, the number at Pantex

decreased to 1,274 because one type was of such

design that it could be sent directly to the Y-12

Plant and dismantled there. As of summer 1993,

DOE estimates that about 1,400 warheads will be

dismantled at the Pantex Plant during FY 1993

(83). The pace of dismantlement and the difficulty

of dismantlement work are affected by management, political, and technical challenges.

Management challenges involve integrating

environmental, safety, and health improvements

into dismantlement operations. DOE has asserted

its commitment to protection of the environment,

safety, and health (89). This commitment represents a distinct change from the traditional DOE

culture, and efforts to establish a “new culture”

have been spurred in large part by recognition of

the widespread contamination resulting from past

DOE production practices and revelations about

safety hazards at DOE facilities. Environmental,

safety, and health practices at Pantex and other

plants involved in dismantlement have been

strongly criticized by both internal and external

reviews (1, 17,23,59,67,68,82). Improvements have

been noted in followup reviews, yet much remains to be accomplished (16,84). Another management challenge is to maintain an aggressive

schedule of warhead dismantlement while solving logistics problems in the safest practical way.

DOD now has a backlog of retired weapons and

A Pantex Plant worker removes a nuclear warhead

from a shipping container.

has assigned priority ranking to different types for

return to DOE. DOE management must serve

DOD needs and handle particular weapons systems without sacrificing safety, efficiency, and

effectiveness.

Political challenges include the increased interest of the States and the public in activities at the

Weapons Complex. Recent requirements for DOE

to comply with State environmental regulations

provide greater opportunities for States and public interest groups to oversee DOE operations,

and give these groups additional leverage in

affecting dismantlement activities. For example,

the State of Texas is responsible for hazardous

waste at Pantex under the Resource Conservation

and Recovery Act (RCRA) and for issuing air

quality permits governing emissions associated

with the burning of HE at Pantex. However,

fragmented regulatory responsibilities among different State and Federal agencies, as well as lack

of jurisdiction over some materials, may limit

oversight.

Technical challenges associated with dismantlement stem from the complexity of nuclear warheads. There are many components in a warhead—including nuclear materials, other toxic
Chapter 3: Warhead Dismantlement Programs and Plans 37

Figure 3-3-Materials Generated from Dismantling a Typical Nuclear Warhead

Nuclear Warhead “Physics Package”

Detonators

High explosives

Beryllium

Depleted uranium

Highly enriched uranium

Plutonium

Lithium deuteride

Plastic foam

Neutron generators

Tritium/deuterium

gas canister

ELECTRONIC PACKAGES

(encapsulated/unencapsulated)

■ Lead solder and other metals

~ H Thermal batteries

9 Encapsulating material

■ Electrical components (PCBs)

■ Asbestos

■ Cables

OTHER COMPONENTS

■ Electromechanical devices

■ Functional mechanical devices

9 Electronic components

■ Electric cables

■ Parachutes and explosives

■ Nonfunctional mechanical parts

9 Residuals: O-rings, seals, fasteners, etc.

SOURCES: Adapted from briefing by Johnny Grant, Project LeaderforNuclear Weapons Retirement and Disposal forthe U.S. Department of Energy

(Mar. 17, 1992); and from the National Research Council, The Nuclear Weapons Complex, Management for Health, Safety, and the Envivnment

~Washington,~: National Academy Prees, 1989).

and hazardous materials (chemicals and metals),

and classified materials (switches, electronic

components)—all of which require careful handling and attention to environmental, safety, and

health issues (see figure 3-3 for a list of materials

contained in nuclear warheads). Although weapons have engineered safety features to prevent

inadvertent detonation, some of the explosives in

the older warheads are sensitive to shock and

require controlled conditions. Newer weapons are

more resistant to unintentional detonation of the

explosives. Most, if not all, weapons slated for

dismantlement are older, more sensitive warheads, as are some weapons that are still deployed.

Finally, each weapons type is unique, requiring

different dismantlement tools and procedures,

and possibly different methods of component

disposal. Each change in weapons type requires

extensive planning, operations reviews, safety

reviews, worker training, and special tests. The

time required for these can vary significantly

depending on the type and design of weapon.

DOE has estimated that the time required for only

the main disassembly tasks for several warheads

could vary by a factor of four (83). Information on

whether certain components, such as capacitors,

contain hazardous materials is not always available to DOE. Thus some materials will have to be

tested to identify the chemicals present, prior to

dismantlement and disposal.

Although most recent problems with dismantlement appear to be minor, some have been

of particular concern and have affected DOE’s
38 I Dismantling the Bomb and Managing the Nuclear Materials

schedules. In April 1993, DOE reported that the

outer layer of a plutonium pit had cracked open

during disassembly of a W48-type warhead. The

actual incident occurred in November 1992. The

pit had to be removed from the normal process for

examination and testing. DOE stated that the

incident resulted in minor contamination of the

work area. Since this related to one specific

weapons type, further work on that system was

discontinued until investigations could be completed and new procedures developed. Because of

the time required to shut down one line and start

up another, this type of problem can have a

significant effect on schedules and rates of

dismantlement. Any future problem can be expected to have similar effects (24,78).

 Steps and Facilities in Dismantlement

Nuclear warheads are disassembled into components at the Pantex facility, in Amarillo, Texas.

Parts from the weapons are, in general, returned

to the facility where they were originally produced. An exception is that plutonium pits remain

at Pantex in temporary storage, rather than being

returned to Rocky Flats, which has been closed.

Chemical explosives removed from a warhead’s

pit are burned at Pantex. Individual plutonium

pits are put in steel containers resembling oil

drums, which are then placed in earth-covered

concrete bunkers.

Warheads arrive at Pantex’s Shipping and Receiving Building in specialized vehicles, and

undergo several inspections and safety checks.

They are then unloaded at 1 of 60 storage facilities

(bunkers) contained in the secured area about 1

mile from the assembly/disassembly area (91). As

of March 1992, approximately 42 bunkers were

used for weapons or weapons component staging

(51).

The steps required to assemble nuclear warheads are reversed for dismantlement (79). Thus,

after conducting several inspections and safety

checks on a warhead, disassembly personnel

remove the warhead’s cover followed by all

Aerial view of the Pantex Plant, near Amarillo, Texas.

electrical components and other hardware. Inspection of warheads includes the use of radiography to verify the configuration and condition of

warhead components. Additional tests may be

conducted to determine, among other characteristics, actual mass properties, dynamic balance, and

center of gravity (91).

Removal of the protective case containing high

explosives and nuclear materials (e.g., physics

package) is generally followed by actual separation of the nuclear and HE components. To reduce

the potential for large radionuclide releases in

case of the accidental explosion of conventional

chemical high explosives (used in most of the

U.S. nuclear stockpile), these activities are conducted in assembly/disassembly cells or “Gravel

Gerties” (79). Most of the 13 assembly cells

found at Pantex are used, or could be used, for

disassembly of the physics package (91). Weapons containing insensitive high explosives may

be assembled or disassembled in “bays,” which

do not have the same level of explosive containment as cells.

The disassembly of weapons results in parts

containing HE, special nuclear materials, components containing hazardous and nonhazardous

chemical constituents, and certain other materials

that, because of the classified nature of their

design, must be declassified or “sanitized” prior
Chapter 3: Warhead Dismantlement Programs and Plans 39

to treatment and disposal. Weapons disassembly

also generates solvents, classified metal components, and other regulated hazardous materials

(75). A variety of hazardous wastes may be

generated by this process, and their proper

management (treatment, storage, and disposal)

represents a technical challenge.

Pantex bunkers are used for temporary storage

of special nuclear materials. Most radioactively

contaminated wastes and classified or nonclassified weapons components gathered during disassembly are shipped off-site for treatment and

disposal (91). High explosives are burned at

Pantex (79,91). The majority of recoverable

material generated during the weapons dismantlement process is shipped to commercial vendors

for recycling (91). Commercial waste handling

facilities are used to handle the off-site disposal of

nonnuclear waste from warhead dismantlement

(5,61).

The Y-12 Plant at the Oak Ridge Reservation

in Tennessee is a major weapons component

manufacturing facility. Built in 1943, the plant

initially separated fissile uranium-235 from natural uranium. As the Nation’s weapons programs

changed over the years, so did the capabilities of

Y-12. Lithium separation became a mission of the

plant in the 1950s. Presently, Y-12 has facilities

to fabricate weapons components from uranium,

beryllium, and lithium, and the plant has played

a major role in producing nearly every nuclear

weapon in the Nation’s arsenal.

Secondaries from warheads disassembled at

Pantex are shipped to Y-12, and many of them are

now stored intact. The Y-12 Plant receives highly

enriched uranium from disassembled weapons.

Other components from warheads are also

shipped to the site. Uranium is stored at Y- 12, and

other parts are either stored or treated as waste and

disposed. Some fabrication continues, however,

and Y-12 currently supports the DOE laboratories, nuclear reactor projects, and the Navy’s

Nuclear Submarine program.

DOE’s Savannah River Site in South Carolina

recycles tritium, a radioactive isotope of hydrogen used to boost the explosive yield of nuclear

weapons. In the past, the Savannah River Site also

produced tritium and plutonium. Tritiurn from

dismantled weapons is stored at Savannah River

and purified for reuse. Because of its short

half-life, tritium must be resupplied to weapons.

 Management and Oversight

Structure for Dismantlement

Dismantlement is currently the responsibility

of the DOE Office of Defense Programs (DP).

Actual warhead dismantlement is conducted by

the management and operations (M&O) contractor, Mason & Hanger-Silas Mason Co., Inc.

(M&H), for the Pantex Plant. The DOE Amarillo

Area Office is located at Pantex and reports to the

Albuquerque Operations Office. The Albuquerque Operations Office reports to the DOE Assistant Secretary for Defense Programs. Technical

support is provided by several of the national

laboratories that originally designed the warheads

now scheduled for dismantlement. DP has responsibility for developing and implementing

environmental, safety, and health policies for its

operations. DP receives policy guidance and

oversight from other DOE headquarters offices

such as the Office of Environment, Safety, and

Health (EH) (85).3

To address new challenges in dismantlement

operations, on December 31, 1991, DOE established a special task force, the Executive Management Team for Dismantlement (EMTD), with

broad oversight of nuclear warhead dismantlement operations (62). The Albuquerque Operations Office was designated to establish and chair

EMTD (5). EMTD activities include: 1) establishment of materials identification and disposal

teams; 2) characterization of materials for disposal; 3) development and procurement of specific tools; 4) identification and resolution of

3 EH now includes the formerly independent OffIce of Nuclear Safety.
40 Dismantling the Bomb and Managing the Nuclear Materials

environmental, safety, and health concerns; 5)

definition of treatment and disposal methods for

materials from weapons dismantlement; 6) updating retirement disposal instructions; 7) detailing

specific operating procedures; 8) training operators; 9) evaluating nuclear safety; and 10) conducting a final program review (5).

Despite the preliminary stage of some EMTD

activities, several Weapons Complex facilities

are undertaking warhead dismantlement tasks

using existing operating procedures, in part because DOE considers weapons dismantlement to

be a logical extension of past operations. According to this view, dismantlement has merely

changed the emphasis from assembly to disassembly, but the same techniques, personnel,

facilities, and skills are involved.

Although EMTD is addressing new challenges

in Pantex dismantlement operations, DOE still

relies on many conventional methods. It continues to dispose of components or materials from

dismantled warheads as usual, rather than waiting

until new methods are developed (44). EMTD

recommendations are integrated into ongoing

operations only if the site operations manager

determines a change is needed.

Internal DOE oversight functions were

changed during the tenure of former Secretary of

Energy James D. Watkins, and new policies and

guidance are being developed (85). It has been

difficult in the past to ensure that environmental,

safety, and health guidelines were being followed, and the internal oversight office (EH)

currently has insufficient mechanisms to require

specific compliance or to enforce its requirements. In addition, EH lacks the personnel to

review progress at field offices. Hiring personnel

with expertise in occupational safety and health

has been difficult not only for the oversight office

but for DOE line organizations as well.

The Cost-Plus Award Fee (CPAF) process was

established to help increase emphasis by M&O

contractors on environmental, safety, and health

factors. This process provides a mechanism for

evaluating progress on meeting some defined

objective, but there is little evidence that it

actually increases management’s attention to

health and safety issues (65).

External advisory oversight, with particular

emphasis on nuclear safety issues (e.g., criticality

safety, training of radiation workers) is provided

by the Defense Nuclear Facilities Safety Board

(DNFSB). Regulatory oversight on environmental

matters at Pantex is provided by the Environmental Protection Agency (EPA) and the State of

Texas. Sirnilar management, contractor, and oversight arrangements prevail at other dismantlement sites (e.g., Y-12 in Tennessee, Savamah

River in South Carolina).

The DNFSB is a relatively new external

advisory oversight mechanism. It was created by

Congress in 1989 to provide advice and recommendations to the Secretary of Energy on public

health and safety at DOE defense nuclear facilities (12). In 1991, Congress amended the enabling

act and broadened its jurisdiction to include the

assembly, disassembly, and testing of weapons,

thus expanding DNFSB oversight to Pantex

operations. DNFSB reviews facilities, operations,

practices, and occurrences at DOE facilities. It

examines the safety practices of both DOE and

the M&O contractors. DNFSB also reviews and

evaluates the content and implementation of

health and safety standards, including DOE

orders, rules, and other safety requirements. Table

3-1 lists the orders subject to DNFSB oversight.

DNFSB’s primary tool for gaining the attention

of DOE is to issue recommendations to the

Secretary of Energy that require a response or a

report. Some DNFSB recommendations are specific to DOE facilities (e.g., recommendations

91-2, Closure of Safety Issues Prior to Restart of

the K-Reactor at the Savannah River Site; and

90-7, Safety at Single-Shell Hanford Waste Tanks).

Others apply broadly to all DOE defense nuclear

facilities (e.g., 91-1, Strengthening the Nuclear

Safety Standards program for DOE’s Defense

Nuclear Facilities; 91-6, Radiation Protection for

Workers and the General Public at DOE Defense

Nuclear Facilities). Recommendation 91-6 (11)
Chapter 3: Warhead Dismantlement Programs and Plans 41

Table 3-l—DOE Orders Subject to DNFSB Oversight

Part 1. Weapons-Sensitive DOE Orders

Order

number Subject

5530.1 A Response to Accidents and Significant Incidents Involving Nuclear Weapons

5530.2 Nuclear Emergency Search Team

5530.3 Radiological Assistance

5530.4 Aerial Measuring

5600.1 Management of DOE

5610.1 Weapons Complex Packaging and Transportation of Nuclear Explosives, Nuclear Components, and Special Assemblies

5610.10 Nuclear Explosives and Weapons Safety

5610.11 Nuclear Explosive Safety

5610.13 Joint DOE/DOD Nuclear Weapons System Safety, Security, and Control

Part Il. Safety-Related DOE Orders

Order

number Subject

1300.2A

1360.2A

1540.2

1540.3

1540.4

4330.4A

4700.1

5000.3A

5400.1

5400.2A

5400.3

5400.4

5400.5

5440.1 D

5480.1 B

5480.3

5480.4

5480.5

5480.6

5480.7

5480.8

5480.9

5480.10

5480.11

5480.15

5480.17

5480.18A

5480.19

5480.20

5480.21

5480.22

5480.23

5481.1 B

5482.1 B

5483.1 A

5484.1

5500.1 B

5500.2B

5500.3A

5500.4

5500.7B

5500.10

5700.6C

5820.2A

Department of Energy Technical Standards Program

Unclassified Computer Security Program

Hazardous Materials Packaging for Transport-Administrative Procedures

Base Technology for Radioactive Material Transportation Packaging Systems

Physical Protection of Unclassified, Irradiated Reactor Fuel in Transit

Maintenance Management Program

Project Management System

Occurrence Reporting and Processing of Operations Information

General Environmental Protection Program

Environmental Compliance Issue Coordination

Hazardous and Radioactive Mixed Waste Program

Comprehensive Environmental Response, Compensation, and Liability Act Requirements

Radiation Protection of the Public and the Environment

National Environmental Policy Act Compliance Program

Environmental, Safety and Health Program

Safety Requirements for the Packaging and Transportation of Hazardous Materials, Hazardous Substances, and Hazardous

Wastes

Environmental Protection, Safety and Health Protection Standards

Safety of Nuclear Facilities

Safety of DOE-Owned Reactors

Fire Protection

Contractor Occupational Medical Program

Construction Safety and Health Program

Contractor Industrial Hygiene Program

Radiation Protection for Occupational Workers

DOE Laboratory Accreditation Program for Personnel Dosimetry

Site Safety Representatives

Accreditation of Performance-Based Training for Category A Reactors and Nuclear Facilities

Conduct of Operations Requirements for DOE Facilities

Personnel Selection, Qualification, Training, and Staffing Requirements at DOE and Nonreactor Nuclear Facilities

Unreviewed Safety Questions

Technical Safety Requirements

Nuclear Safety Analysis Reports

Safety Analysis and Review

Environment, Safety, and Health Appraisal Program

Occupational Safety and Health Program for DOE Contractor Employees at Government-Owned Contractor-Operated

Facilities

Environmental Protection, Safety, and Health

Emergency Management System

Emergency Categories, Classes, and Notification and Reporting Requirements

Planning and Preparedness for Operational Emergencies

Public Affairs Policy and Planning Requirements for Emergencies

Emergency Operating Records Protection Program

Emergency Readiness Assurance Program

Quality Assurance

Radioactive Waste Management

6430.1 A General Design Criteria

SOURCE: Defense Nuclear Facilities Safety Board, 1992.
42 Dismantling the Bomb and Managing the Nuclear Materials

led to the development of DOE’s new Radiological Control Manual (RADCON) (80), discussed

later in this chapter.

Another mechanism used by DNFSB to effectuate change at DOE facilities involves the

discussions and technical exchanges that are an

integral part of site visits. The interaction between

DNFSB and DOE/contractor staffs often leads to

improvements that are not reflected in formal

recommendations. This mechanism and the lack

of public access to the Board’s work have been

criticized. Some critics claim that the Board is not

truly independent-that DNFSB lacks adequate

authority because it merely advises the Secretary

of Energy and has never really solicited broad

public input (9,55).

On the other hand, DNFSB identifies a variety

of examples of public participation, including

correspondence with STAND (Serious Texans

Against Nuclear Dumping) and the State of Texas

in response to concerns about staging configurations for special nuclear materials and other safety

issues at Pantex, as well as public access to

DNFSB recommendations, annual reports, notices of public meetings/hearings, and material

available after public meetings in accordance

with Sunshine Act and Freedom of Information

Act rules. These rules were developed in response

to litigation.4 Results of this litigation are that

DNFSB has complied with these regulations but

that meetings involving formal recommendations

to the Secretary of Energy or the President maybe

closed (21). The Supreme Court declined to

review this case in a ruling on May 17, 1993 (90).

Many DNFSB recommendations and site visits

focus on increasing the formality of written

procedures and directions in DOE operations and

in its training of workers. This emphasis may be

a reflection of the background of many DNFSB

staff in commercial and naval nuclear reactors.

The DNFSB advisory role has been taken very

seriously by DOE. All recommendations, to date,

have been accepted. Some commentators within

DOE have expressed concern that this effort to

satisfy DNFSB may divert attention from more

comprehensive needs. They claim that the resources needed to improve overall training activities are sometimes directed into the narrower

areas identified by DNFSB. These individuals

contend that DNFSB plays a very powerful,

almost regulatory, role, yet its recommendations

are not subject to the outside review and scrutiny

faced by regulatory bodies. For example, the

Nuclear Regulatory Commission has formal mechanisms for rulemaking and public comment,

including publishing drafl recommendations in

the Federal Register. DNFSB recommendations

are issued final form for public comment.

Between May 1992 and June 1993, DNFSB

conducted numerous site visits at weapons dismantlement facilities. Most of this effort focused

on Pantex, with additional visits to Y-12 and Los

Alamos National Laboratory, as well as some

review of the DOE Amarillo Area Office and the

Albuquerque Operations Office. The visits resulted in correspondence with DOE concerning

various safety issues, including training, procedures, conduct of operations, compliance with

orders, safety analysis, criticality safety, dosimetry, Operational Readiness Review process,

radiation control practices, and safety of nuclear

explosives. DNFSB has required reports on criticality safety at Pantex (17) and radiation control

practices, and plans to remedy DOE order compliance deficiencies at Y-12 (23). DNFSB has also

made specific recommendations applicable to

dismantlement facilities (Recommendation 93-1,

Standards Utilization in Defense Nuclear Facilities) (19).

4 See Energy Research Foundation v. Defense Nuclear Facilities Safety Board, 734 F. Supp. 27 (D.D.C. 1990); Energy Research

Founalztion v. Defense Nuclear Facilities Safety Board, 917 F.2d 581, 585 (D.C. Cir. 1990); Natural Resources Defense Council/Energy

Research Founahtion v. Defense Nuclear Facilities Safety Board, No. 91-1199 (D.C. Cir., July 24, 1992); Natural Resources Defense

CouncillEnergy Research Foundation v. Defense Nuclear Facilities Safety Board, No. 91-1199 (D.C. Cir., Oct. 9, 1992).
Chapter 3: Warhead Dismantlement Programs and Plans 43

 Dismantlement Procedures

DOE management and the national laboratories jointly produce the standard operating procedures for nuclear weapons dismantlement at

Pantex (32). However, the laboratories have final

approval authority. The national labs have designed all U.S. nuclear weapons. Consequently,

Sandia, Lawrence Livermore, and Los Alamos

constitute a unique source of information about

the nuclear weapons slated for dismantlement

(34).

Some procedures for reviewing and approving

dismantlement activities for particular weapons

programs are in place. The three principal steps

involved are: 1) Operational Readiness Review,

2) Operational Readiness Evaluation, and 3)

Qualification Evaluation for Dismantlement Release. These procedures are internal to DOE and

do not involve public or outside scrutiny. However, DNFSB has taken an active role in reviewing this process at Pantex and other DOE facilities.

The Operational Readiness Reviews (ORRs)

are conducted by a team of contractor engineers

at the dismantlement facility (Pantex or Y-12).

These internal reviews are intended to ensure that

the procedures and equipment necessary to begin

dismantlement operations are in place. After the

ORR, DOE conducts an Operational Readiness

Evaluation (ORE), which is a critique of the ORR

and confirms whether the activity is ready to go.

The Qualification Evaluation for Dismantlement

Release (QED) is an additional review by national

laboratory design engineers to verify the DOE

critique. This step was added as a result of

concerns expressed by DNFSB about the ORRORE process for a particular weapons system at

Pantex. In that example, the ORE found the ORR

to be insufficient. DNFSB conducted an independent review of the ORE, and noted deficiencies in the process used and in safety factors (18).

In particular, DNFSB expressed concern about

continuing deficiencies in the Safety Analysis

process at Pantex, an issue that has been raised

Pantex Plant worker begins warhead disassembly.

repeatedly by both internal and external reviewers

since 1989. DNFSB had also criticized the

ORR-ORE process at Pantex in July 1992 (14).

In practice, many of the informal mechanisms

used in the past to guide M&H dismantlement

operations are still in effect. M&H engineers meet

with their counterparts at the national laboratories

to discuss technical challenges. Laboratory personnel then work on solutions to these problems.

If promising technologies are developed, it is

often up to M&H to determine whether or not to

pursue a new approach, unless it is ordered to

make a change by the DOE Albuquerque Operations Office. Some national laboratory personnel

who have worked closely with M&H are part of

EMTD; others are not.

Recent work on the use of robotics in dismantlement operations has been supported by EMTD.

Some efforts have explored the application of

robotics to reduce human radiation exposure from

dismantlement activities. These methods are being

evaluated by Sandia National Laboratory (see box

3-A). They are examples of some of the dismantlement process design work sponsored by

DOE. There is no clear connection, however,

between such design work and any overall

assessment of dismantlement technology needs

within the Pantex management organization.
44 Dismantling the Bomb and Managing the Nuclear Materials

 Costs of Dismantlement

Because there is no requirement or procedure

for separating dismantlement costs from other

production and surveillance costs within DOE

Defense Programs, very little integrated information is currently available that reflects the total

cost of this new mission. The DOE Albuquerque

Operations Office has, however, responded to

Office of Technology Assessment (OTA) requests for available dismantlement cost data. In

FY 1993, direct costs are estimated to be about

$25 million, and in FY 1994 in excess of $30

million. At least two-thirds of these costs are

attributed to Pantex activities and about oneeighth to Y-12. Estimates represent direct costs

only and do not include many other items that

would need to be considered, such as security,
Chapter 3: Warhead Dismantlement Programs and Plans 45

maintenance, and oversight activities. For example, in FY 1993, operation of the weapons and

materials transportation system by DOE is expected to cost about $79 million, most of which

is used for dismantlement activities. This system

is used to transport all warheads from military

bases to the Pantex Plant and secondaries from

Pantex to Y-12 (42,43,75,76,92).

Such cost figures probably fall far short of the

totals for the comprehensive mission of dismantlement. The total operating budgets for the

two sites most engaged in dismantlement—

Pantex and Y-12—are $240 and $460 million,

respectively, for FY 1993. Managers at each of

these sites have said that at least two-thirds of

their current efforts are devoted to the dismantlement mission or related work. Thus, current

expenditures for dismantlement activities at these

two sites alone would be almost half a billion

dollars. If work at other sites, research and

support activities at the weapons design laboratories, transportation and security, and oversight

and management efforts are included, the FY

1993 DOE budget allocated to warhead dismantlement and materials disposition is in the

range of $500 million to $1 billion (42,43,75,76,92).

Future costs of the dismantlement and management of weapons materials are unknown at this

time. DOE is now preparing a plan for reconfiguration of the Weapons Complex that will likely

incorporate these activities. If new facilities are to

be built, their capital costs must also be considered. Such costs would need to include the

provision of improved health and safety conditions for workers, as well as improved waste

management practices that might accompany

state-of-the-art facilities. Perhaps DOE will include estimates of dismantlement and materials

management costs as part of its reconfiguration

plan. If so, the increase in future costs could be

evaluated in light of the need to replace many old

facilities. However, there is no firm indication

that construction of new facilities will be part of

DOE’s plan, and some contend that new facilities

are not needed (30). In addition, costs to cleanup

the current contamination and dispose of wastes

that accumulated from past practices should be

factored into overall dismantlement costs.

ENVIRONMENTAL, HEALTH, AND SAFETY

ISSUES IN DISMANTLEMENT

Numerous environmental, safety, and health

deficiencies have been identified at Pantex and

other dismantlement facilities during the past few

years, and efforts are under way to address these

problems. As discussed below, some outside

observers are critical of past practices and skeptical of DOE’s ability to significantly improve the

environmental, safety, and health aspects of its

operations. Certain improvements have been

made, however, and changes in DOE’s management approach could bring results.

 Health and Safety issues

Specific steps, processes, materials descriptions, and other aspects of dismantlement work

are classified. Only general outlines of operations

and worker responsibilities can be described

without citing classified information. In this

unclassified study, OTA did not review specific

dismantlement procedures to evaluate worker

hazards. OTA analysis of health and safety issues

is based on unclassified information and data

associated with warhead dismantlement, general

principles of occupational and radiological health

and safety, and unclassified evaluations of health

and safety programs at dismantlement facilities

by internal and external oversight groups. Box

3-B describes some basic, unclassified facts about

dismantlement related to worker health and safety.

Standards and operating procedures governing

the health and safety of workers undertaking

dismantlement operations are developed and

enforced by DOE. DOE is exempted from regulatory oversight by the Occupational Safety and

Health Administration (OSHA). However, DOE

is planning a transition to external regulation by

OSHA over the next 3 to 5 years (72). New

guidance from DOE is being developed in nonnu-
46 Dismantling the Bomb and Managing the Nuclear Materials

Box 3-B—Worker Health and Safety Issues in Current Dismantlement Processes

● Dismantlement occurs in highly secure cells and bays.

● Dismantlement workers handle a variety of materials that can potentially cause health and safety problems,

including radionuclides, explosives, and toxic metals or organics (see figure 3-3, list of weapons components).

. Many warheads slated for disassembly lack modern safety devices, which might increase the risk of accidental

detonation. The disassembly bays (Gravel Gerties) are designed to contain any plutonium released if an

accidental detonation were to occur, but such an accident could have severe consequences for workers inside

the bays.

. Each weapons system requires different procedures and unique tooling.

. In some procedures, workers must rely on personal protective equipment such as respirators, rather than

preferred methods of engineering controls, for protection,

. Different processes are used to remove explosives from pits, some involving solvents, hydrojets, and/or thermal

treatment.

. Workers are trained and certified for dismantlement work.

. Review of operating procedures by safety and health experts is a relatively new measure.

. Health and safety are governed by DOE and implemented by contractors.

● Employees have been unexpectedly exposed to radiation and hazardous chemicals.

. Unexpected radiological contamination has been detected during routine monitoring activities.

. Employees have failed to follow correct procedures.

. Work has stopped because of employee uncertainty about procedures.

SOURCE: Office of Technology Assessment, 1993.

clear health and safety areas, as well as radiation volving dismantlement activities at Pantex over

protection. The new rules are an outgrowth of the past few years.

numerous critical reviews of environmental, safety, Numerous health and safety problems at Panand health practices at DOE facilities by both tex were identified by the Tiger Team sent there

internal and external oversight groups (e.g., Tiger from DOE headquarters in October 1989, includTeams, Advisory Committee on Nuclear Facility ing:

Safety, Defense Nuclear Facilities Safety Board).

Key issues for worker health and safety are ●

whether efforts by DOE to exercise health and ●

safety oversight responsibility are adequate and

whether sufficient resources are being devoted to ●

worker protection. Various reviews of DOE and

contractor performance on health and safety ●

issues are discussed below along with new

initiatives to improve radiation control programs ●

at Pantex and Y-12.

inadequate radiation protection;

inadequate hazard identification and communication;

insufficient resources to accomplish environmental, safety, and health goals;

inadequate policy guidance toward these

goals; and

insufficient management attention to environment, safety, and health (68).

This investigation indicated that compliance

PANTEX PLANT was difficult to evaluate, given the confusing

During dismantlement, workers must handle a array of DOE requirements and the lack of routine

variety of materials, some of which are toxic, operations at the site during the field investigahazardous, and/or radioactive. Box 3-C lists tion. Responses to specific problems identified in

examples of unclassified exposure incidents in- the Tiger Team report are documented in the 1990
Chapter 3: Warhead Dismantlement Programs and Plans 47

Depleted Uranium-238 and Other Metal Residues I

Action Plan preparedly Mason & Hanger and the certain reviewers. In general, Pantex reported to

corrective actions tracking system that includes a OTA that it has responded to health and safety

formal certificate of completion. The effectiveness problems identified by the Tiger Team, through a

of some corrective actions documented in the variety of measures, including:

Pantex tracking system has been questioned by
4 8 Dismantling the Bomb and Managing the Nuclear Materials

increased personnel and budgeting;

new policies to integrate health and safety

into operations (environmental, safety, and

health review system; computer tracking

system);

development of a site-specific RADCON

manual and implementation plan to comply

with new DOE requirements; and

increased opportunities for communication

between labor and management, and improved responsiveness of management to

labor concerns (6).

A Progress Assessment of Pantex actions to

address Tiger Team findings was conducted by

DOE headquarters Office of Environment, Safety,

and Health in March-April 1993. This assessment

focused on four issues: 1) worker safety, 2)

transportation of hazardous materials to and from

Pantex, 3) high explosives, and 4) management of

criticality safety. It concluded that Pantex has

accomplished much in setting up new procedures

at the facility, but the efforts are not well

coordinated and implementation is lagging. One

of the problems noted was a lack of independent

DOE review of explosives safety. Lack of a

program for transporting hazardous materials was

also considered a problem. The lack of a formal

program description for criticality safety was

cited as an issue, although no workplace problems

were identified in complying with procedures

established by the nuclear weapons design laboratories. Regarding worker safety, M&H was considered to have an excellent program, and major

improvements were identified in industrial hygiene; however, many safety problems were

identified in construction projects managed by

the U.S. Army Corps of Engineers (2).

DOE’s own efforts at reviewing progress at

Pantex have been constrained and fragmented in

the past. Responsibility for internal oversight was

divided between the Offices of Environment,

Safety, and Health and Nuclear Safety (NS).

Differing priorities of these two offices led to

difficulties in coordinating facility reviews (25).

Furthermore, beginning in September 1992, EH

was required to give 60 days notice before

inspecting a facility (71). This requirement delayed the Tiger Team Progress Assessment of

Pantex (25).

Under the Clinton administration, Secretary of

Energy Hazel R. O'Leary has made some changes.

Nuclear Safety is again part of the Office of

Environment, Safety, and Health, and the 60-day

notice requirement for assessments has been

rescinded. A number of other initiatives are under

way to increase the independence and effectiveness of EH.5 These initiatives and changes in

headquarters oversight responsibility should be

followed to see if they improve the ability of DOE

to address important matters that cross the boundary between nuclear and nonnuclear issues, such

as high explosives contaminated with radioisotopes, mixed waste, and the overall conduct of

safety analyses and criticality safety.

A review of recent contractor performance

evaluations can provide an understanding of

environmental, safety, and health concerns at the

dismantlement sites. DOE field offices routinely

conduct performance evaluations of their M&O

contractors (73). The Pantex evaluation for AprilSeptember 1992 reveals improvements as well as

continuing deficiencies. The most notable improvements are in radiation safety and management attention to areas that can affect future

operations at Pantex, including public affairs,

environmental restoration, and nonradiological

health and safety of workers. With regard to

radiological protection, measures have been taken

5 The May 5, 1993, Health and Safety Initiative includes developing a departmental safety and health policy; establishing the authority of

the Assistant Secretary for Enviromnen~ Safety, and Health to force cessation of unsafe operations; rescinding the 60-day notice requirement

for environmental, safety, and health assessments; developing a departmental “fatality policy” with strengthened investigation procedures;

establishing employee-management health and safety committees for all Department sites; accelerating issuance of Price-Andemon nuclear

safety rules; and initiating consultation with OSHA with the aim of establishing OSHA regulation of all Department sites (72).
Chapter 3: Warhead Dismantlement Programs and Plans 49

to reduce employee exposures and waste handling

requirements associated with dismantlement operations.

Improvements were made in radiation safety

records, radiation worker training, and Radiological Assistance Team capabilities for emergency response operations. However, the evaluation report criticized other aspects of the emergency response program.

Some problems noted in the report illustrate

how a lack of management attention to environmental restoration program activities affects worker

health and safety. For example, a cleanup operation was delayed because of workers’ not following the approved Health and Safety Plan, inadequate quality assurance for sampling, and improper placement of groundwater monitoring

wells. These problems were attributed to inadequate oversight of a subcontractor. Also, potential

noncompliances with RCRA were noted that

could result in enforcement action from the Texas

Water Commission.

DNFSB devoted considerable resources to

Pantex in 1992, including several site visits and a

full-time on-site representative (14,15). Site visits

in March and August 1992 critiqued the status of

safety analyses and criticality analysis at Pantex,

and found that only a few Pantex facilities were

covered by these programs. DNFSB also found

that DOE’s explosive safety guidelines did not

give sufficient emphasis to nuclear material

releases resulting from operational accidents that

could occur in the disassembly cells. DNFSB

identified concerns with the overall safety attitude during dismantlement operations, given the

apparently wide latitude of disassembly workers

to use their judgment instead of consulting a

supervisor in the case of abnormal situations.

DNFSB noted that disassembly technicians do

not appear to be trained to question an operation

that is not proceeding as expected. DNFSB also

noted a need for criticality experts at Pantex to

participate in the Nuclear Explosive Safety Study

Group (NESSG) that reviews and approves all

weapons assembly/disassembly procedures.

DNFSB staff has found both DOE and M&H to

be responsive (40). One formal recommendation

has been issued as a result of this review. It notes

that there is now a discrepancy in nuclear safety

requirements between facilities that produce and

process fissile materials, and those such as Pantex

that assemble, disassemble, and test nuclear

weapons. DNFSB has recommended that DOE

review its nuclear safety orders and directives,

develop a plan to make nuclear safety assurances

comparable at both types of facilities, and give

priority to a site-wide compliance review at

Pantex (13).

Y-12 PLANT

Numerous health and safety problems at Y-12

were identified by the DOE Tiger Team in its

February 1990 report, including:

●

●

●

●

●

●

slow progress in correcting procedural problems,

slow progress in correcting training problems,

radiation protection deficiencies,

inability to attract and retain competent staff,

numerous OSHA violations and a failure to

follow basic safety guidance, and

insufficient management attention to the

environment, safety, and health (67)

The Tiger Team noted that Y-12 management

paid insufficient attention to safety and health

because it believed that new requirements were

not cost-effective or necessary to protect worker

health and safety, or that DOE did not really

expect strict compliance with health and safety

orders. Managers pointed to minimal DOE oversight, insufficient budgets from headquarters for

health and safety, and the age and condition of

Y-12 facilities, which make process alterations

costly.

In February 1992, DOE returned to Y-12 for a

selective review of environmental, safety, and

health management systems and programs (84).

In general, this assessment concluded that significant progress had been made in improving health
50 Dismantling the Bomb and Managing the Nuclear Materials

and safety programs since the Tiger Team review,

although some programs were still not in compliance with DOE requirements. Two key concerns

were identified during this review: 1) insufficient

formality and rigor in DOE and contractor oversight activities to ensure that environmental,

safety, and health problems were identified and

addressed effectively; and 2) inadequate use of

available management tools by the contractor to

correct environmental, safety, and health problems in this area.

The DOE Progress Assessment Team also

identified some strengths at Y-12, including a

Self-Assessment Program (lessons learned and

alert system, division-level self-assessments, training curriculum), the ORR, and the Quality Assurance plan for the Nuclear Criticality Safety

Department (84). However, the ORR process was

found deficient by the DNFSB, as discussed

below.

Y-12 has responded to Tiger Team criticisms

by reorganizing and creating a new branch

responsible for the environment, safety, and

health. A new mission statement and strategic

plan were as developed by the prime M&O

contractor, Martin Marietta Energy Systems

(MMES), in June 1991. Under the new organization and with the use of the ORR process that the

Tiger Team identified as a strength at Y-12,

environmental, safety, and health reviews are

now integrated into the procedure for obtaining an

internal license to begin a new operation. In the

past, criticality safety was a major part of the

review for new operations, but other health,

safety, and environmental provisions were handled independently and often were not explicitly

included in operating procedures. Training was

the mechanism relied on to ensure workers were

protected, but there were weaknesses in training

too.

As of January 1993, Y-12 had established

policies for integrating health and safety procedures into its operations. It is in the process of

updating operating procedures, but this is timeconsuming. In the dismantlement program, a

project management team is established for each

new weapons system that comes to Y-12 for

dismantlement. Teams are composed of engineers, industrial hygienists, and health physicists,

who define operating procedures, including

health and safety. Updating procedures for dismantlement is expected to be completed in 1995-96. In

the meantime, procedures are not considered to be

‘‘audit ready, ’ and the health and safety aspects

of operations depend on worker training (36).

In the performance evaluation of the Y-12

Plant (April to September 1992), DOE noted

that-overall-safety and health programs were

satisfactory, effective, and cost-efficient, consistent with DOE orders and applicable Federal,

State, and local regulations providing protection

for workers and the public (81). Individual health

and safety programs were rated as good for

industrial hygiene, nuclear facility safety, industrial safety/OSHA upgrades, nuclear criticality

safety, and fire protection. Satisfactory ratings

were also given for general safety and health,

health physics/radiation protection, occupational

medicine, and transportation safety.

However, implementation by direct line managers of programs, policies, and procedures to

ensure protection of the environment, safety, and

health, as well as quality, was rated as marginal.

A marginal rating indicates a poorer performance

than expected and has the potential to reduce the

CPAF that could be received. Line management’s

commitment to a safe and healthy work environment was questioned because of the number,

severity, and frequency of deficiencies in the

implementation of safety and health programs,

especially in radiation protection and contamination control.

For example, significant deficiencies identified

included: 1) inadequate posting of respirator

areas, which allowed personnel to enter areas

without proper respiratory protection; 2) reentry

of areas evacuated due to loss of ventilation,

without respiratory protection or survey by health

physics and industrial hygiene; and 3) criticality

safety deficiencies associated with assessments
Chapter 3: Warhead Dismantlement Programs and Plans 51

that do not accurately reflect actual storage

conditions, criticality safety procedures that do

not incorporate actual requirements, and lack of

review or approval of procedures (81).

On the other hand, there has been some notable

progress in health and safety at Y-12 on the

specific aspects of dismantlement of one weapons

system (W-33). A new procedure was developed

for dismantling a system that used existing

chemical processes to remove protective coatings

from parts, eliminating the generation of a new

mixed RCRA waste (81).

To date, DNFSB has devoted fewer resources

to Y-12 than to Pantex, and it conducted four site

visits at Y-12 in 1992. Site visits in early 1993

identified continuing problems and lack of improvement in many areas. Staff concerns included

compliance with orders/standards especially for

radiological control, the ORR process, and training.

The problems with ORRs are notable because

this area had been identified as a strength by the

DOE Progress Assessment described above. The

DNFSB criticized the ORR process at Y-12 in a

March 1993 site visit. Inconsistencies with Board

recommendation 92-6 were noted in several

areas, including independence of senior members, scheduling, review criteria, and review team

makeup (22).

There are other apparent discrepancies between

DNFSB and internal DOE reviews. Despite

satisfactory ratings in radiation protection in the

April-September 1992 performance evaluation

discussed above, DNFSB has identified continued deficiencies in radiological control practices

at Y-12 vis-a-vis requirements found in DOE

orders. The DNFSB requested a report from DOE

evaluating the technical adequacy of radiological

control practices compared with DOE and consensus standards, and a second report on plans to

address longstanding problems of compliance

with DOE orders (23).

 Radiation Protection

Radioactive materials in nuclear warheads

require measures to control health risks from

occupational or environmental exposures for

thousands of years. The radioactive half-lives

(i.e., the time required for one-half of the material

to undergo radioactive decay) of uranium-235

(the principal isotope in highly enriched uranium), plutonium-239, and plutonium-240 (the

principal isotopes of plutonium in weapons) are

approximately 700 million, 24 thousand, and 6.5

thousand years, respectively. The actual risk

posed by a radioactive material is a combination

of the material’s half-life, the radiation emitted

during decay, and its quantity. All three of these

isotopes decay by the emission of an alpha

particle accompanied by the emission of very

weak x-rays. Uranium decay is also accompanied

by the emission of some moderately energetic

gamma-rays. There may also be some quantities

of plutonium-241 present that decay to americium241, which has x-ray and garoma-ray emissions

accompanying its decay. The health effects of

different types of ionizing radiation are described

in box 3-D.

Alpha particles are easily stopped by materials

as thin as a piece of paper, and x- or g aroma-rays

are shielded by the structural material surrounding intact warheads. Although there may be some

exposure to penetrating external radiation from

x-or garoma-rays during disassembly, the primary

hazard arises from internal deposition of these

isotopes via inhalation or ingestion, where the

alpha particles are able to expose cells in internal

organs, such as those lining the lung. Once inside

the human body, alpha particles are much more

damaging to surrounding tissue than other forms

of penetrating radiation.

Harmful health effects are not likely to occur

from being near plutonium unless one inhales or

swallows it (88). Absorption through undamaged

skin is limited, but plutonium can enter the body

through wounds. Exposures are not likely from

intact pits, which are usually clad with a protec-
52 Dismantling the Bomb and Managing the Nuclear Materials

tive coating. However, plutonium metal oxidizes

rapidly in moist air or moist argon, forming a

powdery surface coating. The corrosion or oxidation of plutonium does not always occur in a

predictable manner and is affected by many

variables, including the surrounding atmosphere,

moisture content, and alloys or impurities present

in the metallic plutonium (60). Uranium metal

also oxidizes in air to form a coating that is easily

removed as dust during handling of the metal

(60). Plutonium oxide and fine particles of

uranium metal can be a fire hazard because they

are pyrophoric. Both the dust and the fires can

result in inhalation hazards.

If ingested with food or water, most plutonium

is poorly absorbed by the stomach and excreted.

If inhaled, the amount remaining in the lungs

depends on the particle size and form. Forms that

dissolve easily may be absorbed and move to

other parts of the body. Forms that dissolve less

easily are often coughed up and possibly swallowed. Plutonium may remain in the lungs or

move to the bones, liver, or other organs. It

generally stays in the body for decades and

continues to expose the surrounding tissues to

radiation, which may eventually cause cancer.

Cancer risks are naturally related to the level of

exposure, but studies on the effects of low levels

Box 3-D-Health Effects of Ionizing Radiation

Radionuclides, such as the plutonium and uranium used in nuclear weapons, produce ionizing radiation that

has the potential to cause biological damage. The material below represents a synthesis of information obtained

by OTA (27,28,38,56,58,64).

Ionizing radiation is the transfer of energy through space in the form of either electromagnetic waves (e.g.,

x-rays, gamma-rays) or subatomic particles (e.g., alpha particles, neutrons) that are capable of separating

electrons from their atomic or molecular orbits. Biological systems are highly structured and specific at the

molecular level. The consequence of changes due to ionizing radiation is usually damaging to the function of the

cell, tissue, or organ involved.

Cell damage from ionizing radiation maybe reparable and cause no long-term problems, be imperfectly

repaired and cause cel death, or be imperfectly repaired and lead to a modification in the ceil, as discussed below.

There is scientific controversy about the quantitative probability of adverse health effects due to lowdose

exposure.

Reparable ceil damage from ionizing radiation implies the existence of a dose threshold, or safe dosage,

below which cells incur no damage from radiation exposure. This is a controversial issue in terms of low doses

of radiation from gamma- and x-rays. There is solid scientific evidence that repair is far from perfect for high

radiation doses and for doses from alpha particles.

Cell death may or may not adversely affect the functioning of tissues and organs. Most are unaffected by

losses of even large numbers of cells. Radiation damage leading to cell death primarily affects nuclear DNA.

Tissues that normally divide all the time (i.e., gastrointestinal tissue and bone marrow) are the most radiosensitive.

These effects are nonstochastic or deterministic: the severity of the effect increases as the radiation dose

increases.

Health effects on modified cells from ionizing radiation are best studied for cancer and birth defects. These

effects are also sfochastic the likelihood that such an effect will occur increases as the radiation dose increases.

Other effects have not been well studied (e.g., radiation that initiates inflammatory reactions in blood cells).

ionizing radiation is classified into different categories for purposes of determining health effects and

appropriate protection measures. Penetrating or external radiation, including x-rays, gamma-rays, and neutrons,

can travel long distances and penetrate dense materials. To protect tissues from such radiation, shielding is used.

Particu/ate radiation includes electrons, protons, alpha particles, neutrons, negative pi mesons (used for

therapeutic radiation treatment), and heavy charged ions. Much particulate radiation is easily stopped by thin
Chapter 3: Warhead Dismantlement Programs and Plans 53

barriers, such as apiece of paper or skin, and can do biological damage only if deposited within tissue where it

is referred to as an internal emitter. (Neutrons are an exception because they are also a form of penetrating

radiation.)

Internal emitters are radionuclides that are taken into the body via inhalation, ingestion, or skin wounds. Once

absorbed, the radioactive particles, depending on their half-life and decay chain, continue to emit radiation and

potentially kill or alter cells for askmg as they are lodged in the body. Internal emitters maybe metabolized in ways

that result in the radionuclide’s becoming deposited in tissues for long periods.

The biological effects of internal emitters and penetrating radiation depend on the type and amount of

radiation involved. Consequences of internal emitters also depend on the physical and chemical form of the

radionuclide, the route of exposure, and metabolism. Small, soluble particles are generally the worst. Large

particles are often removed from the body by natural processes, depending on the exposure pathway.

It is very difficult to determine the doses, effects, and risks associated with exposure to radiation. The

biological effect of radiation correlates with dose but also depends on several other factors. Identical doses of

different types of radiation, delivered in identical temporal patterns, produce different biological effects, even

though the same amount of energy is delivered.

The type of radiation is especially important because of variations in the spatial distribution of the energy

released. The “track” of a radioactive particle or wave is the set of all transfers of energy produced. Linear energy

transfar (LET) iS the amount of energy transferred and its spatial distribution per unit length of particle track (i.e,

the amount of energy transferred per unit path traveled). Low-LET radiation (x-rays and gamma-rays) deposits

energy throughout the cell in a diffuse pattern. High-LET radiation (alpha particles and neutrons) deposits energy

in a much smaller volume, along fewer narrow, but dense, tracks. Biophysical data suggest that the ability of

radiation tracks to produce damage in closely adjacent atoms and molecules determines the biological effect.

Radiation types that produce dense patterns of ionization do more damage than those that spread the ionization

over larger areas. Thus, alpha particles and neutrons will cause more damage than the same dose of gamma-rays,

x-rays, and most beta radiation. A single track from a low-energy x-ray will produce about 1,000 ionizations along

its length. High-i&T radiation, such as an alpha particle, will produce about 1,000 times more ionization per unit

distance, and large amounts of energy will be delivered to a very small molecular volume of tissue. High-LET

radiation tracks cart produce energy deposition patterns and concentrations that are improbable or impossible for

low-LET tracks. Such patterns could translate into qualitatively different molecuiar biological effects.

SOURCE: Office of Technology Assesetment, 1993.

of plutonium exposure are inconclusive. Animal

studies link plutonium exposure to cancer and

decreased ability to resist disease (88). It is not

clear whether plutonium causes birth defects or

reproductive problems.

The ingestion and inhalation hazards associated with weapons-grade uranium are considered

the primary radiation hazard. Cancer risks due to

enriched uranium are not known; however, there

is some evidence that very long-term, low-level

exposure to insoluble uranium causes increased

risk of lung cancer (88). The chemical toxicity of

uranium is a health concern, especially for soluble

compounds that can cause kidney damage, but

this is not the paramount concern when handling

weapons-grade uranium metal, which is relatively

insoluble (37).

Protecting workers and the public from exposure

●

•

●

requires effective programs to prevent:

criticality,

unnecessary radiation exposures, and

the unplanned release of radioactive material

(60).

This can best be accomplished with welltrained workers functioning in well-designed,

maintained, and monitored facilities with programs and policies that emphasize health and
54 Dismantling the Bomb and Managing the Nuclear Materials

safety. DOE has recently upgraded its programs

for radiation protection with the development of

a new manual for radiation control. The new

manual is a response to criticisms levied against

DOE by numerous oversight bodies, including

the Advisory Committee on Nuclear Facility

Safety and the DNFSB (1,11,80).

Each DOE facility has been required to develop

a compliance assessment and implementation

plan (70). DOE progress in implementing this

recommendation has been criticized repeatedly

by DNFSB, although part of the problem may

simply be associated with changing leadership of

the Department (20). Major criticisms relate to

DOE efforts to make organizational changes to

ensure that excellence in radiation protection is a

continuing priority and that the RADCON manual is not just a one-time effort to upgrade DOE

programs (10). DNFSB is particularly concerned

that appropriately trained people and adequate

resources for radiation protection are available at

all levels of DOE. Apparently, part of DNFSB’s

difficulty in evaluating the adequacy of DOE’s

response to its recommendation on radiation

protection involves problems of access to the

implementation plans of individual facilities.

OTA was able to obtain a draft copy of the

implementation plan for Y-12. According to the

plan, implementation of the DOE RADCON

manual will require significant changes in Y-12

Plant facilities, equipment, and operational procedures (47).

Substantive changes are necessary for radiological assessment of the workplace, control of

contamination, and employee awareness and

understanding of radiological conditions and

events. Y-12 does not anticipate being in substantive compliance until 1997. Although the plan

lays out priorities and cost estimates, some

significant costs are not included. Funding needed

to address the requirements for containment and

ventilation of existing equipment and facilities

does not appear in the plan.

The DNFSB reviewed progress in implementing the RADCON manual at Y- 12 in MarchApril 1993 (23). It noted a lack of technical

justification for actions taken and for decisions

made to defer or take no action. Major problem

areas identified included contamination control

(personnel monitoring, anticontamination clothing, break areas, personnel decontamination);

training (facility-specific and core radiation worker);

and occurrence reporting (skin contamination,

clothing contamination, and compliance with a

revised DOE order). Apparently, the DOE Oak

Ridge Operations Office and its major contractor

do not believe they have the resources to implement many of the mandatory requirements in the

RADCON manual. DNFSB notes that Y-12 lags

behind other DOE facilities in implementing the

manual (23).

 Worker Concerns About Health and Safety

The change in DOE culture to emphasize

health, safety, and environmental concerns rather

than production goals has been under way for

several years. Internal and external oversight

reports note accomplishments and the need for

continuing improvement. Few of these reports,

however, identify the views of workers and their

sense of cultural change. OTA sought worker

opinions on these changes through interviews by

an anthropologist with labor representatives at

DOE facilities (see appendix E).

Workers identified a number of areas as

evidence that DOE and site managers are truly

committed to improving health and operational

safety, including more active DOE presence at

individual facilities, greater contact with the

union, and willingness to shut down a line if

employees have a problem with a standard.

Workers also cited more opportunities to resolve

health and safety complaints, as well as greater

responsiveness from management. Training improvements were noted.

However, several topics were identified as

needing improvement, including unclear leadership and inconsistent enforcement; limited worker

participation in developing improved procedures;
Chapter 3: Warhead Dismantlement Programs and Plans 55

insufficient interaction between DOE and labor;

budget limitations for implementing needed improvements in facilities; overburdened health and

safety staff; continued fear of retribution for

raising problems; deficiencies in health physics

programs, policies, and instrumentation; and

training problems.

A key question for many workers is whether all

changes in health and safety practices are necessary, and whether increased oversight may at

times contribute to the level of stress experienced

by workers and thereby reduce overall job safety.

Many of the changed procedures appear to be

paperwork exercises that do not clarify the job of

the worker. At the Pantex Plant, improvements

are under way to make the standards more user

friendly: for example, engineers visit the work

floor, and workers participate in some procedure

validation teams. Greater worker involvement in

the development of procedures is desirable. Worker

involvement has led to improvements that have

reduced employee radiation exposures during

dismantlement activities, and in one case, problems were encountered during a test of dismantlement procedures because of insufficient consultation with workers who had operational experience

(73,81).

From a worker perspective, the change in

emphasis from production only to concern for

health, safety, and the environment can be aided

significantly by improving opportunities for worker

involvement in all levels of decisionmaking. The

use of specially trained workers as health and

safety representatives is viewed as a key to

making worker concerns known to managers who

have the authority to correct a problem. Worker

empowerment is one of the new safety and health

initiatives announced by the Secretary of Energy

in May 1993. Guidance from EH to program

offices and operations offices on establishing

meaningful employee-management safety committees is planned to be implemented late in 1993.

I Environmental Issues

Widespread environmental contamination with

special nuclear materials during dismantlement

activities is considered by DOE to be highly

unlikely. Potential sources of such widespread

contamination-however unlikely-include an

inadvertent nuclear detonation, a criticality accident, or the scatter of nuclear materials from an

explosion that does not cause a nuclear chain

reaction. This conclusion is based on the record of

handling and dismantling weapons in the past,

analyses of risks conducted in Safety Analysis

Reports (SARs), and criticality studies conducted

by Los Alamos National Laboratory (LANL) and

Lawrence Livermore National Laboratory (LLNL).

Although no major releases of special nuclear

materials have been documented from Pantex

dismantlement activities, because of the potential

impact of major environmental contamination

from dismantlement operations, there is concern

that DOE should be far more aggressive in

reducing the likelihood of such an occurrence.

Reviewers of DOE operations have found fault

with existing SARs, noting that they require

updating (67,68), and have criticized some of the

assumptions made about risk factors (e.g., the

airplane crash scenario in the new SAR draft for

double stacking plutonium pits in Pantex bunkers). DNFSB has formally expressed its reservations with Pantex SARs on two separate occasions and continues to review the SAR program

at Pantex (15,18).

There is also concern by DNFSB about criticality safety at Pantex. The concern is primarily

whether Pantex has sufficient rapid response

capability to take care of any off-normal conditions associated with a warhead that may not be

intact (41). DNFSB concerns stem from a lack of

progress at Pantex on implementing DOE’s own

recommendations to improve criticality safety,

which were identified in Defense Program’s

Technical Safety Appraisal (TSA) of Pantex in

March 1992 (17). DNFSB required a report from

DOE on progress in implementing TSA recom-
56 Dismantling the Bomb and Managing the Nuclear Materials

mendations. The DOE response emphasizes that

the design laboratories have not identified any

credible potential for a criticality incident. However, DOE will implement its orders for SARs and

criticality safety at Pantex, which were previously

considered nonapplicable. Satisfactory implementation of these DOE orders, according to

DNFSB, will result in significant upgrading of

these areas. Pantex is also actively recruiting

additional criticality staff. The ability to independently review design laboratory criticality

analyses is delayed until the completion of a

facility for classified computer operations scheduled for November 1993 (4).

A more recent review of criticality safety at

Pantex was included as part of a Tiger Team

Progress Assessment conducted by DOE’s Office

of Environment, Safety, and Health in MarchApril 1993. This assessment concluded that there

were no workplace problems with criticality

procedures (defined by the nuclear design laboratories); however, neither was there a good program description as called for by industry standards (2).

Experts at LANL conclude that the risks of a

criticality accident at Pantex are extremely low,

given that plutonium is present as a metal in

well-defined shapes and stored in canisters in

well-defined configurations (54). Criticality accidents are much more likely to occur during

processing or management of liquid forms of

plutonium or uranium as opposed to solids.

At Pantex, removing high explosives from

intact weapons is one of the operations posing the

highest risk of an accident that could scatter

nuclear materials. However, these activities occur

in special enclosures designed to contain explosions and releases. Once the nuclear materials

have been separated from the explosives and

detonators, the risks of explosion are significantly

reduced.

The more likely sources of environmental

contamination from dismantlement activities include:

. operational emissions,

● waste management practices,

. contamination from past practices, and

. contamination from old facilities.

The following discussion of environmental

issues at Pantex and Y-12 offers examples from

the sites most involved in dismantlement and is

illustrative of the entire Weapons Complex.

PANTEX PLANT

One of the most likely sources of environmental contamination from projected warhead

dismantlement operations at Pantex is the continued open burning of chemical explosives. This

practice is used to separate some chemical

explosives from other warhead materials that may

be recycled or handled as waste, as well as to

destroy some chemical explosives. Since 1943,

Pantex has operated the Burning Grounds Facility

for the combustion of high explosives or waste

materials contaminated with high explosives, and

for the disposal of scrap metal and other salvable

weapons components (26,48). Liquid materials,

including solvents, have also been burned there

(52).

After burning, the remaining residue or ash

from HE materials that are hazardous, and therefore subject to RCRA regulation, is collected and

shipped off-site to a permitted facility for disposal

(26,53). The scrap metal recovered after the

burning of high-explosive materials and weapons

components is collected for inspection and subsequently transported to another Pantexbuilding for

processing.

Emissions limits have been established for

open burning operations. To reduce future emissions, RCRA permit conditions may become

more restricted (45,63). Not all of the contaminants contained in materials burned at Pantex are

covered by such permits. Radioactive emissions

are subject to DOE orders within the facility

boundary. Additional emissions from an increased rate of burning chemical explosives will

also bean issue if certain warhead dismantlement
Chapter 3: Warhead Dismantlement Programs and Plans 57

activities are accelerated. Since 1988, however,

DOE has taken action to keep the total amounts

below annual permitted emission levels (29).

Another concern about continued open burning

of chemical explosives is the release of toxic,

volatile forms of fluorine. These are produced

from burning chemical explosives that contain a

fluorine-based plastic binder (3). Control measures have been implemented to reduce fluorine

emissions, but the contamination potential may

continue to exist within the Burning Grounds

since fluorine limits apply to the entire facility

rather than to individual burning units.

Pantex has traditionally handled disposal of

some of the waste materials generated from

dismantlement activities itself and shipped other

materials off-site, either to different DOE facilities or for commercial disposal. Figure 3-2 shows

the general disposition of waste materials from

Pantex. Proper handling of wastes from dismantlement to prevent environmental contamination is now a Pantex responsibility that, at least for

some materials, is subject to the scrutiny of State

regulators.

Ongoing nuclear warhead dismantlement at

Pantex generates parts that contain chemical

explosives, special nuclear and hazardous materials, and classified components. From a regulatory

perspective, dismantlement waste can be categorized as hazardous, radioactive, mixed (combined

radioactive and hazardous), and nonhazardous.

Nonhazardous waste includes scrap metal and

trash. Scrap metal parts are collected and transported off-site by ‘outside bidders’ for recycling

(26), and trash is disposed of in landfills (75). Box

3-E describes how Pantex handles waste categories. Nuclear materials including plutonium, highly

enriched uranium, and tritium are not classified as

waste because they are currently considered

assets by DOE (29).

Activities of M&H that involve the packaging

and transportation of hazardous materials and

wastes must comply with applicable DOE guidance. Recent inspections by DOE have raised

concerns about M&H’s inability to segregate

wastes adequately, to provide clear shipping

documentation, and to provide safe storage for

radioactive mixed waste at certain facilities (50).

M&H’s methods of tracking stored explosives

"

. . . do not permit verification that explosive

limits in storage areas are not exceeded,” and

written procedures for operations involving explosives lack review or expiration dates, and may

not be reviewed as often as required. “Documentation seems to be the weakest point of M&H’s

explosive safety program” (49).

Environmental monitoring is being upgraded at

Pantex in response to Tiger Team criticisms. The

State of Texas and M&H are expanding environmental monitoring for both air and groundwater

quality. However, there is still some controversy

associated with new sampling strategies and

quality assurance procedures (83).

One example of increased monitoring involves

investigations to evaluate the potential contamination from past practices at the Burning

Grounds. As part of the RCRA permit issued to

the Pantex Plant in 1991, the Texas Water

Commission requested DOE to investigate about

110 facilities, including the Burning Grounds, at

which hazardous wastes were or are currently

being managed, stored, or disposed. After a recent

visual inspection of sites (e.g., percolation/

evaporation pit, burn pads, and landfills) at the

Burning Grounds (87), DOE plans to submit a

RCRA Facility Investigation report to State

regulators in July 1994 (57,66).

The start of this investigation has been delayed

by the need for DOE to obtain permit modifications for mixed waste storage capacity to handle

any waste from drilling mud (57). Depending on

the extent of environmental impacts identified in

the final report, the Texas Water Commission will

recommend specific measures for DOE to solve

any contamination problems (79). Pantex officials also plan to complete by September 1993 a

report on closing certain operations at the Burning

Grounds in accordance with National Environmental Policy Act requirements (75).
58 Dismantling the Bomb and Managing the Nuclear Materials

Box 3-E—-Waste Disposal at Pantex

Classified Waste

Classified parts must be declassified prior to treatment, recycling, or ultimate disposal to avoid disclosure of

restricted data (8). Such parts are processed to declassify them at Pantex and then transported for recycling or

ultimate disposal. Parts that cannot be declassified are transported to other DOE sites for disposal (e.g., the

Nevada Test Site). The increasing cost of off-site management of such classified components has led to a plan

to build a treatment processing, and declassification facility at Pantex. Before its construction, a classified

hazardous waste staging facility will be used there.

RCRA-Regulated Hazardous Waste

Pantex warhead dismantlement activities generate RCRA-regulated hazardous materials. The largest

RCRA-regulated waste streams include chemical explosives and chemical explosives-containing parts. Chemical

explosives and parts are burned in the open at the Burning Grounds, and the ash is collected and disposed at an

approved off-site RCRA Hazardous Waste Disposal Facility. Other contaminated materials are burned, and RCRA

hazardous residues are accumulated at a permitted storage area. Mixed waste or radioactive waste residues are

not expected from Burning Ground operations.

Radioactive and Mixed Waste

With the exception of waste known to contain hazardous materials regulated under RCRA, all radioactive

waste is transported to the Nevada Test Site for disposal. Low-level radioactive waste generated at Pantex

production and disassembly areas is generally in solid form. It is collected, packaged, labeled, and moved to

storage bunkers to await off-site transportation. Mixed wastes are currently being stored on-site in permitted areas,

pending development of treatrnent options. Little information is available about current storage capacity limitations,

the management of mixed waste, the potential implications of increased weapons dismantlement, and costs

associated with off-site treatment and disposal of mixed waste.

SOURCE: U.S. Department of Energy, 1993.

Most of DOE’s Weapons Complex facilities, dangerous facility used in the current warhead

including those used for warhead dismantlement, dismantlement program. Since 1943 it has been

were built more than 30 years ago. The facilities

in use today have generally been upgraded, but

some still employ processes and technologies that

are inefficient and create large amounts of waste.

Some are also burdened by the safety and

environmental legacy of past operations. Identification of obsolete or inefficient DOE facilities

and technologies will be critical for ensuring

long-term safe management of the materials from

warhead dismantlement. Determiningg which facilities must be upgraded or replaced will be a

challenge. DOE has indicated that “piecemeal

improvements have proven inadequate” (69).

The Burning Grounds at Pantex constitute a

specific example of an obsolete and potentially

operated for incineration of high explosives,

salvable weapons components, and materials

contaminated with high explosives (including

foams, plastics, metals, solvents, and trash) (48,63).

Although the facility is permitted to operate

through 2001, there are serious concerns about

future and continued operation. Several studies

are under way to evaluate current conditions and

identify possible upgrades. However, it seems

that extensive and costly modifications may not

ensure long-term environmentally safe management of high explosives, and compliance problems could result.

The dilapidated condition of the Pantex underground sewer system is also a problem. In
Chapter 3: Warhead Dismantlement Programs and Plans 59

Explosion-resistant warhead disassembly cells at Pantex (Gravel Gerties).

addition to cracked or broken pipes, it suffers

from excessive sediment deposits and blockages.

The Pantex Tiger Team reported that the sewer

system is obsolete and inadequate because it was

originally constructed during World War II to

accommodate the extensive flows associated with

ammunition production, as opposed to the much

smaller flows generated by current activities.

Work is under way to replace some pipes;

however, additional funding is required to support the program (33).

Y-12 PLANT

The Y-12 Plant at Oak Ridge, Tennessee is an

industrial center that processed uranium and other

materials for weapons production. Present activities also include processing and storage of uranium coming from warhead dismantlement. Like

Pantex dismantlement activities, Y-12 processes

generate classified, radioactive, hazardous, and

nonhazardous wastes. Examples include machine

turnings and metal fines; uranium- and berylliumcontaminated trash; waste solutions from metal

plating; liquid waste and sludge generated by

processing operations or waste treatment activities; and waste oils and solvents derived from

machining and cleaning activities (86). These

wastes are handled at Y-12 or transported off-site

for treatment and final disposition.

The list of chemical substances—both radioactive and nonradioactive-used at Y-12 is extensive. This complicates monitoring of possible

environmental releases into the air or water of

contaminants from disposal operations at the

plant. Some releases of toxic materials have been

monitored. The processing and waste treatment

operations at Y-12 discharged 884 pounds of

uranium in 1990 to nearby surface water bodies

and 46 pounds into the atmosphere in compliance

with State permit conditions. Even though a new

treatment facility has replaced depleted uranium

land disposal, contamination from past land

burial practices remains unresolved. Another

source of uranium emission is accidental ignition

of enriched uranium chips or saw fines stored in

nonprocess areas at uranium production buildings. For example, in December 1985 a basket

containing nearly 8 pounds of enriched uranium

chips caught fire, leading to the release of

enriched uranium.

Operations at Y-12 have generated large quantities of low-level radioactive solid waste. In

1990, DOE reported generating 4.3 million

pounds of low-level radioactive waste, or about

22 percent of the total volume of all contaminated

waste (including hazardous waste) produced at

Y-12 that year (86). Uranium is the most common

radioactive waste material, but other radioactive
60 Dismantling the Bomb and Managing the Nuclear Materials

contaminants were reported, including fission

products, thorium, and transuranic elements. Mixed

waste storage is a problem at Y-12 because of the

limited availability of treatment technologies,

storage capacity limitations, and an increasing

inventory of mixed waste from site cleanup

activities.

The generation and management of hazardous

waste at Y-12 are regulated by the Tennessee

Department of Conservation under RCRA authority. Because treatment and storage of this

waste are conducted at several buildings under

State or Federal permit, waste inventories are

recorded in several different databases. As a

result, making a quantitative estimate of plantwide waste is difficult. Similarly, predicting

future generation rates, or estimating current

compliance status at Y- 12, is problematic because

of the lack of consistent databases. Plans to adopt

a comprehensive tracking system are under development.

RCRA compliance has been the most challenging environmental requirement for Y-12.6 According to the Performance Evaluation Report for

April-September 1992, Y-12 received outstanding or good ratings for all other environmental

laws and a satisfactory rating for RCRA. The

internal RCRA inspection program conducted by

the M&O contractor has had difficulties obtaining

adequate data and ensuring that RCRA is applied

consistently (81).

Although operations at Y-12 have recently

been reduced, it still faces several environmental

problems based on past practices, including

human and environmental health impacts of past

radioactive emissions, adequate retrofitting of old

facilities or building of new environmentally safe

facilities, and provision of appropriate treatment

technologies and storage for current waste inventories. There are growing numbers of interim and

long-term cleanup projects under way at Y-12 to

address environmental contamination from past

activities. These remediation activities will have

to be conducted concurrently with warhead dismantlement.

Ongoing environmental problems could impact future warhead dismantlement activities at

Y-12. For example, ambient air levels of radioactive, inorganic, and organic materials are an

ongoing problem. The 1990 Tiger Team assessment noted a lack of emission control and

monitoring devices at several nonprocessing areas

in uranium processing buildings. It also noted a

lack of adequate documentation and control of

radiological conditions at the Y-12 Plant; an

incomplete survey of operational and radiological

areas that are potential sources of worker exposure to radiation; and limited documentation to

verify compliance with air emission regulations.

There are no non-DOE Federal or State standards

specifically for atmospheric emissions of uranium, although total radionuclide levels axe

regulated through the Clean Air Act.7 Future

warhead dismantlement operations could affect

ambient levels of radionuclides at Oak Ridge.

Recent reports have noted a very slight increase

in local airborne concentrations of radionuclides

(86).

In addition, beryllium, processed at Y-12 in

both metallic and oxide powder form, is a

potential health hazard and environmental contaminant. Although ambient air levels of beryllium are below State regulatory standards, the

Y-12 Tiger Team recommended that a new

beryllium monitoring system be installed because

the existing system was outdated (67). In addition

to uranium and beryllium at Y-12, the release of

volatile organic compounds, such as chlorinated

solvents used as degreasers (mostly perchloroethylene), cleaners, and machining coolants, has

G Unti tie mid-198@ DOE titied that the Atomic Energy Act exempted the hazardous potion of mixed WSte from reguhtion ~der

RCRA. A Federal court rejected DOE’s position. See LegaZEnvironmentaZ Assistance Foundation v. Hodel, 586 F. Supp. 1163 (E.D. Term.

1984).

7 U.S.C.A. (1251-1376 (West 1983, Supp. 1990)).
Chapter 3: Warhead Dismantlement Programs and Plans 61

been reported. Substantial emission reductions

have been accomplished at the plant since 1985,

in part due to substituting less hazardous materials in certain Y-12 operations, as well as overall

cutbacks in production (46).

CONCLUSIONS

Nuclear warhead

ongoing at several

dismantlement activities are

sites in the DOE Nuclear

Weapons Complex. The rate of dismantlement at

the Pantex Plant has been reasonably constant

over the past few years and is expected to increase

only moderately in the future. The current rate of

about 1,400 warheads per year has not put undue

strains on the physical facilities, but material

flows and waste streams have changed the focus

of the operating plants. A key issue is whether or

not the new systems now in place and under

development to address environmental, safety,

and health issues are sufficient to manage the

dismantlement program. Clearly, there have been

problems with past practices at dismantlement

facilities. Many of these problems have been

publicized in recent years, and efforts have been

made to improve the situation. Improvements

have been achieved in some areas, yet problems

continue to be documented by both internal and

external oversight activities. Several years will be

required to integrate new policies and procedures

into some operations, and DOE will need to

continually review whether adequate progress is

being made.

Resource requirements to implement environmental, safety, and health programs will be

demanding and will continue for many years.

Capital expenditures are needed to establish

environmental monitoring programs and to improve plant conditions for workers. It will be

important to ensure that these improvements are

well planned and efficiently implemented.

The repeated criticism of lack of line management attention to environmental, safety, and

health issues has been particularly troublesome.

Improvements in programs for health physics,

Many of the more than 6,000 parts contained in a B-61

nuclear bomb are displayed here, along with an intact

weapon and its four major subassemblies,

occupational safety are

unlikely that these proenough resources and

done without the addiindustrial hygiene, and

commendable, but it is

grams will ever have

authority to get the job

tional support of the DOE Office of Defense

Programs, which needs to devote more resources

and attention to environmental, safety, and health

issues. Providing support for greater worker

involvement in the development of new procedures, more opportunities for worker control of

health and safety during operations with the

expansion of the Health and Safety Representative program, and additional opportunities for

workers to communicate with DOE, not just with

M&Os, may help DP become more proactive on

these issues.

Nuclear weapons production history and recent

developments in DOE operations have demonstrated that although some change is evident,

continued scrutiny by outside parties will be

necessary to ensure that progress continues in

improving protection of the environment, safety,

and health during dismantlement activities. Routine review or approval of plans by DNFSB prior

to initiating new weapons dismantlement programs is desirable and may require legislative

action to broaden the statutory scope of the Board.

Additional resources to expand external Federal
62 Dismantling the Bomb and Managing the Nuclear Materials

or State oversight into areas, such as health issues

and environment monitoring, which are currently

not the primary concern of DNFSB, are also

desirable. Oversight by outside parties can add to

the credibility of the review, given that there have

been examples in which DNFSB has been more

critical than DOE internal reviews.

Public credibility has the potential to become

a major issue affecting the progress of dismantlement. Although DOE has acknowledged the

importance of this in its evaluation of the Pantex

program, no significant changes have been made

in methods to communicate with the public, to

understand public concerns, or to involve the

public in decisions. Major attention must be given

to this issue to ensure that public participation

programs are effective. Not only must DOE and

its contractors involve the public in their activities

and decisions, but outside oversight bodies such

as the DNFSB must also provide expanded

opportunities for public participation.

CHAPTER 3 REFERENCES

1.

2.

3.

4.

5.

6.

7.

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Chapter 3: Warhead Dismantlement Programs and Plans 163

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31. Grant, J., Lt. Col., U.S. Department of Energy,

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32. Guidice, S., Office of Operations and Weapons,

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33. Hallein, N., U.S. Department of Energy, personal

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34. Harrison, J., Weapons Project Group, Sandia

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1992.

35. Hernandez, T. Sandia National Laboratories, Advanced Fuzing Department 5166, briefing to

Office of Technology Assessment, “Dismantlement System Studies and Model Developments,’

h?by 20, 1992.

36. Hoag, D., Office of Environment, Health and

Safety, Oak Ridge Y-12 Plant, personal comrnunication, January 1993.

37. Idaho National Engineering Laboratory, “Health

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Facilities,” DE88-013620, June 1988.

38. International Commission on Radiation Protection, 1990 Recommendations of the International

Commission on Radiation Protection, KRP Publication 60 (Oxford, England: Pergamon Press,

1990).

39. Jones, A., Intelligent Systems and Robotics Department, Sandia National Laboratories, briefing

to Office of Technology Assessment, “Sandia

Robotics Capabilities,” May 20, 1992.

40. Krahn, Steve, Defense Nuclem Facilities Safety

Board, personal communication, Feb. 2, 1993.

41. Krahn, Steve, Defense Nuclear Facilities Safety

Board, personal communication, June 6, 1993.

42. Immbardo, K., Albuquerque Field Office, Wmpons programs Division, U.S. Department of Energy, letter to Steve Lipmann, Environmental

Research and Analysis, Oct. 1, 1992.

43. hmgenbaugh, C., AlbuquerqueFieldOffice, WmPons programs Division, U.S. Department of Energy, letter to Steve Liprnann, Environmental

Research and Analysis, Sept. 29, 1992.

44. Imngrnire, Paul, Dismantlement Program Manager, Sandia National Laboratories, Oct. 15,1992.

45. Lowerre, R., Henby, Kelly & Imwerre, letter to

Beverly Gattis, State of Texas Alliance for Resources, Dec. 30, 1991.

46. Lynch, R., Director, Y-12 Facility Management

Division (DP-43), U.S. Department of Energy,

personal communication, May 18, 1993.

47. Martin Marietta Energy Systems, Inc., “Oak

Ridge Y-12 Plant, Compliance Assessment and

Implementation Plan for the DOE Radiological

Control Manual,” Y/DQ-31, Revision O, Sept.

21, 1992.

48. Mason & Hanger-Silas Mason Co., Inc., Environmental Protection Department, Environmental

Monitoring Session, “Pantex Plant Site Environ-
64 I Dismantling the Bomb and Managing the Nuclear Materials

mental Report for Calendar Year 1990,’ MHSMP91-06, July 1991.

49. Mason & Hanger-Silas Mason Co., Inc., “Explosives Safety Appraisal, Mason & Hanger-Silas

Mason Co., Inc., Pantex Plant, January 28-

February 6, 1992,” undated.

50. Mason &Hanger-Silas Mason Co., Inc., “Packaging and Transportation of Hazardous Materials

Safety Appraisal, Mason & Hanger-Silas Mason

Co., Inc., Pantex Plant, Amarillo, Texas, January

28-February 6, 1992,” undated.

51. Mason & Hanger-Sila Mason Co., Inc., “Pantex

Site Maintenance Plan, Vol. IV: Structures, Systems, and Components Description (SSCD) for

Pantex Facilities” (Issue 1: Non-Reaction Nuclear Facilities), MNL-FO-1 103 PROG, Issue No.

1, Mar. 2, 1992.

52. Mason & Hanger-Silas Mason Co., Inc., “Burning Grounds,” fact sheet provided as part of

briefing package distributed to the Public Information Coordinating Group, May 20, 1992.

53. Mathews, W., Mason & Hanger-Silas Mason Co.,

Inc., “Waste Management-Pantex Waste Buster,”

briefing package, circa 1992.

54. McLaughlin, T.P., Group Ikader, Nuclear Criticality Safety, Los Alarnos National Laboratory,

personal communication, Mar. 10, 1993.

55. Mitchell, B., Nuclear Safety Campaign, Seattle,

WA, personal communication, June 1993.

56. Modan, B., “Cancer and Leukemia Risks After

Low-Level Radiation-Controversy, Facts and

Future,” Medical Oncology and Tumor Pharrnacotherapy, vol. 4, No. 3/4, 1987, pp. 151-161.

57. Muck, C., Texas Water Commission, personal

communication, May 18, 1993.

58. National Research Council, Biological E.fiects of

Ionizing Radiation (Washington, DC: National

Academy Press, 1989).

59. National Research Council, TheNucZear Weaporzr

Complex, i14arwgementfor Health, Safety, and the

Environment (Washington, DC: National Academy Press, 1989).

60. Pacific Northwest Laboratory, “Health Physics

Manual of Good Practices for Plutonium Facilities,” DE88-013607, May 1988.

61. Soden, C., Albuquerque Field Office, Environmental Protection Division, U.S. Department of

Energy, briefing to Office of Technology Assessment, “Environmental Protection, Waste Management, Air Quality, NEPA, and Compliance,”

May 21,1992.

62. Tasking Memorandum from Rear Admiral Ellis,

Deputy Assistant Secretary for Military Applications, to the national laboratories and to the

Department of Energy Office of Operations and

Weapons.

63. Texas Water Commission, “Hazardous Waste

Permit 50284,” Pantex Plant, Amarillo, undated.

64. United Nations Scientific Committee on the

Effects of Atomic Radiation, Sources, E&ects and

Risks of Ionizing Radiatior+UNSCEAR 1988

Report (New York: United Nations, 1988).

65. U.S. Congress, Office of Technology Assessment,

Hazards Ahead: Managing Cleanup Worker

Health and Safety at the Nuclear Weapons Complex, OTA-BP-O-85 (Washington, DC: U.S. Government Printing Office, February 1993).

66. U.S. Department of Energy, “Environmental

Restoration Program,” briefing package, GA92-

824/LEl-LE8, undated, p. LE6.

67. U.S. Department of Energy, Tiger Team Amessment of the Oak Ridge Y-12 Plant, Oak Ridge,

Tennessee, DOE/EH-0108 (Washington, DC: U.S.

Department of Energy, February 1990).

68. U.S. Department of Energy, Tiger Team Assessment of the Pantex Plant, Amarillo, Texas, DOW

EH-0130 (Washington, DC: U.S. Department of

Energy, February 1990).

69. U.S. Department of Energy, NucZear Weapons

Complex Reconfiguration Study, DOEJDP-0083

(Washington, DC: U.S. Department of Energy,

January 1991).

70. U.S. Department of Energy, Notice WE N

5480.11, Radiation Protection for Occupational

Workers, June 17, 1992.

71. U.S. Department of Energy, Notice DOE N

2321.1, Coordinating and Scheduling Reviews,

Assessments, and Other Oversight Activities at

Department of Energy Field Offices/Elements,

Sept. 28, 1992.

72. U.S. Department of Energy, Safety and Health

Initiative, DOE News, R-93-085, May 1993.

73. U.S. Department of Energy, Albuquerque Operations Office, Award Fee Performance Evaluation

Report for the period: April 1, 1992-September

30,1992, Contract DE-AC04-91AL65030, Mason
Chapter 3: Warhead Dismantlement Programs and Plans 165

74.

75.

76.

77.

78.

79.

80.

81.

82.

83.

84.

& Hanger-Silas Mason Coo, Inc.,

undated.

Pantex Plant,

U.S. Department of Energy, Albuquerque Operations Office, “FY 1994 Budget Request, Construction Project Data Sheet, Environmental Restoration and Waste Management, Waste ManagementTreatment Operations,” March 1992.

U.S. Department of Energy, Albuquerque Operations Office, “Environmental Restoration and

Waste Management Five Year Plan Activity Data

Sheet FY 94-98,” ALPX-3102, May 28, 1992.

U.S. Department of Energy, Albuquerque Operations Office, “Environmental Restoration and

Waste Management Five Year Plan Activity Data

Sheet FY 94-98,” ALPX-3101, ALPX-3103,

ALPX-3104, and ALPX-3105, May 28, 1992.

U.S. Department of Energy, Albuquerque Operations Office, “OccurrenceReportALO AO-MHSMPANTEX-1992-0028,” July 10, 1992.

U.S. Department of Energy, Albuquerque Operations Oflice, “OccurnmceReport ALO-AO-MHSMPANTEX-1996-O068, Unexpected Cracking of

Weapon Component,” July 26, 1993.

U.S. Department of Energy, Amarillo Area Office,

‘‘PantexPlant EvironmentalRestoration Pro~

Fact Sheet,” undated.

U.S. Department of Energy, Assistant Secretary

for Environment, Safety and Health, “Radiological Control Manual,” DOE N 5480.6, June 1992.

U.S. Department of Energy, Oak Ridge Operations Office, “Performance Evaluation Committee Report for Martin Marietta Energy Systems,

Inc.,” Weapons Business Unit, Contract No.

DE-AC05-840R21400, Evaluation Period: Apr.

1, 1992-Sept. 30, 1992.

U.S. Department of Energy, Office of Defense

Programs, Office of Inspections, “Technical Safety

Appraisal of the Pantex Plant, Amarillo, Texas,’

March 1992.

U.S. Department of Energy, Office of Defense

Programs, information provided to Office of

Technology Assessment during a site visit to

Pantex Plant, Amarillo, TX, February 1993.

U.S. Department of Energy, Office of Environment, Safety, and Health, Progress Assessment of

the Oak Ridge Y-12 Plant, Oak Ridge, Tennessee,

85.

86.

87.

88.

89.

90.

91.

92.

93.

DOE/EH-0265 (Washington, DC: U.S. Department of Energy, February 1992).

U.S. Department of Energy, Office of Environment, Safety, and Health, briefing to Office of

Technology Assessment, Dec. 8, 1992.

U.S. Department of Energy, Office of Environmental, Safety, and Health Compliance, Oak

Ridge Reservation Environmental Reportfor 1990

—Volume I: Narrative, Summary, and Conclusions, EH/ESH-18/VI (Oak Ridge, TN: U.S.

Department of Energy, September 1991).

U.S. Department of Energy, Pantex Plant, Amarillo, TX, “Final Community Relations Plan for

RCRA Investigations,” Appendix D, May 1991.

U.S. Department of Health and Human Services,

Public Health Service, Agency for Toxic Substances and Disease Registry, “Toxicological

Profile for Uranium,” TP-90-21, prepared by

Syracuse Research Corporation under subcontract

to Clement International Corporation, Contract

No. 205-88-0608, December 1990.

Watkins, James, Secretary, U.S. Department of

Energy, “Ten-Point Initiative+Remarks by James

D. Watkins, June 27, 1989,’ reprinted in “Evaluation of the U.S. Department of Energy’s Occupational Safety and Health program for Its GovernmentOwned Contractor-Operated Facilities,” Occupational Safety and Health Administration, December 1990, pp. B-1 to 13.

Weapons Complex Monitor, “The Supreme Court

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West, G.T., Mason & Hanger-Silas Mason Co.,

Inc., Pantex Plant, Amarillo, TX, “United States

Nuclear Warhead Assembly Facilities (1945-

1990),” March 1991.

White, D. G., U.S. Department of Energy, Albuquerque Operations Office, Amarillo Area Office, Administrative Management Branch, memorandum on “Dismantlement of Nuclear Weapons,’ to Frank A. Baca, Division Director,

undated.

Woods, R.O. “The Role of Robotics in Reducing

the Nuclear Weapons Inventory,” written for

Office of Technology Assessment, Aug. 28,1992.
Future

Disposition

of Nuclear

Materials From

Dismantled Weapons 4

A

fter nuclear weapons are taken apart, the nuclear

materials that contained such massive destructive power

remain. Two principal materials-plutonium and highly

enriched uranium (HEU)-are the most problematic.

Together or separately they could be made into new weapons.

Thus there are serious concerns about keeping these materials

both safely contained and securely guarded. This chapter

analyzes the management (disposition) of these materials;

current plans for their storage, further use, processing, or

disposal; studies that are addressing various technical approaches for disposition; and policies that affect these decisions.

The discussion focuses on materials from U.S. warheads,

although the technology for storage and disposition can have

international application. Chapter 6 discusses possible application to Russian weapons materials.

Both plutonium and HEU can be used to make nuclear

warheads, either in combination or alone. Although modern

nuclear warheads commonly use both materials, the ‘Fat Man”

and “Little Boy” U.S. atomic bombs used in 1945 contained

exclusively plutonium or HEU, respectively. Nevertheless, the

ease of making a simple bomb from each material is quite

different. A HEU bomb would be easier to design than one using

plutonium, and would offer a higher confidence of working

Point

“We paid dearly for[weapons

plutonium] in terms of dollars

and the environment—let’s

get something back!”

DOE weapons design laboratory

reviewer of OTA report

Counterpoint

“The DOE presumption of

plutonium as an asset. . . is a

significant policy issue that

needs to be decided by

Congress, not a group of

career civil servants and cold

warriors within DOE. ”

Citizen group reviewer

of OTA report

67
68 Dismantling the Bomb and Managing the Nuclear Materials

without being tested than a similar plutoniumbased bomb (36).1 With the frost U.S. nuclear

bombs, only the plutonium-based design was

tested before use.

This chapter discusses a variety of ideas for

storing, utilizing, processing, and disposing of the

plutonium and HEU recovered from dismantled

warheads. Some consider HEU to pose a much

simpler problem because there is an existing

market for uranium fuel. Conversion of surplus

HEU into conventional low-enriched uranium

(LEU) fuel for use in existing nuclear reactors is

technically straightforward. An existing U.S.

reactor could use fuel from diluted weaponsgrade material just as easily as fuel from conventional sources. On the other hand, it will take

decades to convert large quantities of HEU in this

manner; during that time the HEU will have to be

stored, and will present a continuous risk of

proliferation and diversion. In fact, if proliferation resistance were the only criterion by which to

judge disposition options, one might actually

consider options such as glassification of HEU

with high-level waste-an option that is being

considered seriously only for plutonium.

Plutonium may present a more difficult disposition problem. No civilian power reactors in the

United States currently use plutonium for fuel,

and although its use is technically feasible, the

political and regulatory obstacles may be enormous.

In addition, the United States chose to abandon

the use of plutonium fuel in commercial reactors

nearly two decades ago for political, security, and

economic reasons, and it would be difficult to

resurrect this effort. Therefore, it is likely that a

greater number of possible options will have to be

examined for plutonium than for HEU. In any

event, considerably more literature is available

about the disposition of plutonium than about

HEU. The disparity is reflected in this report: the

section analyzing plutonium options is considerably longer than that devoted to HEU.

Both plutonium and HEU have extremely long

half-lives (24,000 years for plutonium-239 and

orders of magnitude longer for the isotopes of

uranium in HEU). They will, therefore, need to be

contained or isolated for long periods to prevent

environmental contamination or possible human

intrusion and exposure. Both of these materials

pose health risks, as described in chapter 3.

Plutonium is especially toxic in minute quantities

if inhaled or ingested.2

The amount of plutonium and HEU from

retired weapons is growing, as is the need to do

something with it. This chapter is about ‘disposition”3 of this material, specifically the spectrum

of possibilities about what to do with it beyond

weaponry: destroy some portions if technically

feasible and practical; dispose of some as waste if

technology and national policies permit; or utilize

some to produce civilian energy, if security is

adequate and if technology and economics prove

sound.

A few hundred tons of weapons-grade plutonium and more than a thousand tons of HEU

(exact numbers are classified) exist in the world

today—as either intact warheads; forms ready to

be made into warheads, pits, and other components removed from retired weapons; or residues

from the past manufacture of plutonium for

weapons (75-77). The United States and Russia

have by far the majority of these materials. Both

plutonium and uranium are also found in various

forms and quantities in the nuclear industry

1 However, HEU is much harder to make than plutonium. Plutonium-239 can be chemically separated from spent reactor fuel. Chemical

separation could be done by solvent extraction or ion exchange. HEU production requires more work equipmen~ and energy. The desire to

build a nuclear bomb maybe more iroportant than the requirement for a certain amount of fissionable material. Most nations that could build

nuclear bombs havechosennotto, butratherto establish alternative security arrangements. Thus, it maybe more important to focus onanation’s

security concerns than its technological capacity (36).

z plutoniM-23g does not exist in nature but is extracted from spent uranium fuel that has been irradiated in a nuclear r~ctor.

3 “Disposition” means any of a number of steps horn storage to disposal that may be followed after the nuclear material is removed from

warheads.
Chapter 4: Future Disposition of Nuclear Materials from Dismantled Weapons 69

Maintenance employees working in supplied

protective oxygen suits tend to plutonium stored

at the Rocky Flats Plant.

worldwide and in other industries that use nuclear

materials but not in weapons grades. Most notably, large quantities of spent fuel from power

reactors contain significant amounts of plutonium

(in low concentrations). Taken as a whole, the

worldwide tonnage of plutonium in commercial

fuel is many times the amount in weapons grade.4

In countries other than the United States, some

commercial plutonium is extracted routinely from

spent fuel and used in commercial nuclear power

plants or stored in anticipation of its use as fuel in

existing reactors or new advanced reactor designs. In general, such commercial plutonium is

kept as the oxide rather than the metal form used

in weapons. These countries have been pursuing

new generations of advanced plutonium-fueled

reactors. Most of the programs in other countries,

however, have experienced difficulties, and existing operating capacity is low (3).5 In the United

States, no plutonium reprocessing is done. The

importance of these facts for weapons materials

disposition is that the commercial needs and uses

of plutonium worldwide could affect decisions

about the future use of plutonium from dismantled weapons.

Nuclear warhead materials taken from dismantled U.S. weapons include, but are not limited to,

plutonium pits placed in containers and stored in

bunkers at the Pantex Plant, beryllium and

“secondaries’ returned from Pantex and housed

at the Oak Ridge Y-12 Plant, and HEU also

housed at Y-12. These are all considered to be in

temporary or interim storage. Long-term or permanent solutions to the disposition of these

materials await policy decisions by the President

and Congress.

This chapter focuses on plutonium and HEU,

although the disposition of many other materials

from dismantled warheads is also of concern.

Plutonium removed from warheads is generally

given the most attention because it is a principal

building block of nuclear weapons; it poses a

great proliferation risk; and it represents a significant health, safety, and environmental problem.

HEU poses similar problems and risks, but it is

considered a simpler disposition problem because

technology exists to modify and use it in many

commercial nuclear reactors.

Preliminary planning efforts directed toward

disposition decisions for these materials are under

way within the Department of Energy (DOE), the

Department of Defense (DOD), and some other

agencies. Several task forces have been investigating plutonium and uranium inventory projections, and attempting to estimate what portion of

these materials are to be held (stockpiled for

possible future weapons) and what portion may

be surplus (79). Task forces within these agencies

are also investigating certain technical options for

disposing of surplus materials. In addition, DOE

has been preparing plans for reconfiguration of

the Nuclear Weapons Complex and is in the

4 The different isotopic content of plutonium from commercial spent fuel makes this material more difficult to convert for weapons use.

5 Countries with advanced, plutonium-fueled reactor programs include Japan (Fuge~ Joyo, and Monju reactors), France (Phenix), Britain

(PFRreactor),Russia (BN-600), and Kazakhstan (BN-350). With the exception of the Monju, which is scheduled to startup soon+ the continued

operation of existing plutonium-fueled reactors is uncertain.
70 Dismantling the Bomb and Managing the Nuclear Materials

process of developing a programmatic Environmental Impact Statement for this reconfiguration

that is to include consideration of both interim

and long-term storage of plutonium pits from

warheads (12). Assumptions about the future

mission of a reconfigured Weapons Complex,

however, have not yet been publicly presented by

the Federal Government.

Several DOE-sponsored studies have focused

on long-range options for plutonium disposition.

High-tech approaches for “burning” plutonium

in advanced reactors have been given attention in

recent studies,6 as has irradiation of plutonium as

mixed-oxide (MOX) fuel in reactors that are more

closely related to those currently in operation.

Other work covers plutonium pit storage for

moderate to long-range time frames and investigations of techniques for turning plutonium into

a form suitable for disposal as waste. In addition,

many experts continue to debate the question of

whether plutonium is a valuable asset with

beneficial uses or a major liability to be disposed

of in the safest and most secure way (6,16,18,26,30).

It seems clear that in the future, the nuclear

weapons enterprise must pay attention to materials management and the development of longrange disposition options. Consideration of all

approaches to disposition must include a rigorous

examination of potential impacts on human

health and the environment. Disposition scenarios should include comprehensive plans for procedures and equipment required to protect worker

and community health and safety, minimize

waste, manage the waste produced, and prevent

the release of toxic materials. The work is

complex and requires both technical excellence

and management expertise. The tasks will require

many decades, and the consequences will last for

centuries. Capable and enduring institutions are

needed to ensure success. The following sections

address the options for storage and ultimate

disposition of plutonium, and approaches for the

disposition of highly enriched uranium.

OVERALL DISPOSITION CONCERNS

Even though an official decision has not been

made, some portion of the inventory of plutonium

pits that will soon be in temporary storage is

likely to be deemed excess or surplus (not needed

for weapons). Current studies by the Department

of Energy and others on disposition options make

the assumption that about 50 tons of weapons

plutonium could be available in the future for

other uses or for disposal.7

In the same manner, DOE has not officially

declared that any U.S. weapons-grade HEU is

surplus to the needs of military programs. However, current plans indicate that between 25 and

100 tons may become available for other uses in

the future.8

In early 1991 the Department of Energy

established a task force on plutonium strategy9 to

plan for future needs and programs to manage

plutonium under DOE custody. Since then, however, world events have forced a rethinking of

DOE’s plutonium strategy. The task force has had

G The term “burning” refers to irradiation and partial or incomplete fissioning, rather than complete destruction of plutonium. Some

concepts envision extensive recycling of plutonium in systems that could eventually result in near-complete destruction of most of the

plutonium, but these require considerable research and testing and will generate fission products and other radioactive high-level waste.

T DOE has recently issued the unclassified statement: “Up to approximately 50 metric tons of plutonium will (or may) become available

by about 2005 from Defense Programs (DP) inventories for use in reactors and for other civil (unclassified) purposes. Part of that material will

be provided from retired weapons and part from other DP inventories” (56),

S DOE has recently issued the unclassified statement: “. . . under some planning scenarios substantial quantities of HEU (25 to 100 metric

tons) may become available over the next 5 to 10 yea-s and such quantities maybe allocated to civil use” (56).

g This internal DOE group was organized under the Office of Weapons and Materials P1 -g within Defense Programs and reports to the

Deputy Assistant Secretary for Military Applications. The data used and the materials projedions made by the task force are largely classified.

None of the work is subject to outside review or public scrutiny. The product of the task force is still in internal draft form and unavailable

for public distribution.
Chapter 4: Future Disposition of Nuclear Materials from Dismantled Weapons 71

to take into account actual weapons retirements

and plans for future retirements.

The task force has identified and categorized

plutonium in the DOE inventory; it has made

inventory projections based on an expanded

weapons retirement program. Based on internal

interpretations of stockpile plans, the task force

has projected plutonium requirements for both

future weapons programs and other uses and it has

identified some options for future plutonium

management. The plutonium material considered

by the task force includes pits from dismantled

warheads, pits in the process of being reworked

for the stockpile, and materials such as metals,

oxides, and residues that are left over from past

production operations (80).

The task force completed its initial work early

in 1993. Besides the plutonium in weapons still in

DOD custody, the task force identified five

categories of plutonium material, which it defined

in terms of intended use or disposition:

1.

2.

3.

4.

5.

plutonium in active use in the weapons

production program;

a strategic reserve of plutonium for future

weapons programs;

a reserve of plutonium for future, nonweapons programs;

a national asset reserve of excess plutonium

for unspecified use; and

plutonium residues for treatment and disposal.

 Disposition Approaches

Methods for plutonium disposition present a

variety of difficult technical, regulatory, economic, environmental, political, and public policy questions. There is no consensus in the United

States today about what to do with plutonium

from weapons, and there is some question whether

one or more sites can be identified at which the

public will accept long-term plutonium storage.

The ultimate disposition of plutonium from

dismantled nuclear weapons represents a problem

without a ready technical solution. Ideally, options would be judged in light of how well they

may accomplish relevant national goals and

policies arrived at after public debate. Yet, to

date, technical debate among experts about the

merits and limitations of alternatives for managing surplus plutonium is taking place before

important decisions about national goals and

policies have been made by the Federal Government. Therefore, it is difficult to measure proposed options against goals and policies in an

informed public debate. In addition, there is a

wide diversity of opinion about how soon a

decision regarding ultimate plutonium disposition (at least in the United States) needs to be

made.

The Office of Technology Assessment (OTA)

has gathered certain data and analyses about the

plutonium disposition issue, and has held workshops to explore various approaches and their

relative merits. The advantages and disadvantages of many options are being investigated by

groups within or supported by the Department of

Energy and through studies by the National

Academy of Sciences. Conclusions and recommendations from these and other technical study

efforts will probably be reached during the next

year or two. At the same time, it will be important

to make progress on defining national goals and

developing a process to address the national

security, political, environmental, and social impacts of various technologies that could be used.

Decisions in the United States about disposition of plutonium from warheads might also

consider the disposition of plutonium residues

and other special nuclear materials in various

forms that were manufactured for either weapons

or commercial use. Also, if certain technologies

are pursued, it might be useful to consider

whether they could have merit and application in

other countries, particularly Russia and other

members of the former Soviet Union. Another

factor that might be considered is the future of the

nuclear power industry. Civilian plutonium that

has been separated from spent nuclear fuel in

other countries might also be considered when
72 Dismantling the Bomb and Managing the Nuclear Materials

An inspector is reviewing a plutonium button at the

Rocky Flats Plant. This is an example of the current

practice employed for protecting workers during

processing operations.

planning long-term disposition. Even though U.S.

national security goals might be limited to controlling materials from other country’s warheads

in the short term, various commercial nuclear

power activities could have along-term impact on

uses and demands for the same or similar

materials.

The Russian plutonium situation should be

carefully considered. For example, the issue of

whether Russia will extract plutonium through

reprocessing of spent fuel in the future could be

influenced by U.S. decisions to pursue certain

technologies for plutonium disposition.l0 Some

believe that commitments by Russia and the

United States to reduce nuclear arsenals have

created an opportunity to reach agreements to

stop the production of more plutonium worldwide

as part of a general effort to limit the proliferation

of nuclear weapons (3,16).

Recent studies that address the issues surrounding plutonium disposition have generally focused

on one or more of the following:

●

●

●

retrievable plutonium storage, with or without a change in form, for periods up to 100

years or more (possibly as pits, metal ingots,

or oxides);

processing (“burning,” “transmutation,”

“annihilation”) of plutonium to destroy

some portion or dilute and contaminate it,

rendering it more proliferation resistant as

spent fuel (this includes use as a fuel in

existing or new civilian nuclear power reactors, or in special dedicated government

facilities); and

disposal of plutonium as waste, with or

without some suitable change in form, with

possible addition of high-level waste or

specific fission products (e.g., cesium-137).

Each category has variations with unique

implications, and the categories are not mutually

exclusive. Most will be necessary to a greater or

lesser degree at some time in the future. Some

storage is required for all categories, but the time

frame could vary significantly among them.

Minimal processing is probably also necessary if

only to maintain stability for long-term storage.

The extent of processing could also vary greatly.

In the end, some long-term disposal will be

needed either for unconverted materials or for

residuals and waste. Table 4-1 summarizes the

categories covered in this chapter. Figure 4-1

illustrates the various paths that could be followed after dismantlement to dispose of plutonium from warheads.

It is virtually impossible to judge or compare

most plutonium disposition technologies as reported in the literature unless one can be sure they

are being evaluated using the same original

assumptions. Some investigations of plutonium

disposition options begin by assuming that the

material no longer used for weapons is still a

“national asset” and that research should be

directed at extracting the greatest benefit from

10 AIfiou@ tie United stit~ has publicly a~o~c~ that it stopped plutonium production in 1988, some U.S. investigators and Russian

officials state that Russia continues to operate plutonium production facilities (16, 47).
Chapter 4: Future Disposition of Nuclear Materials from Dismantled Weapons 73

Table 4-l-Summary of Selected Plutonium Disposition Approaches

Approaches discussed in

Category OTA report Comments

Storage Existing storage of pits. New long-term Some storage will always be

storage facility. necessary.

Processing Mixed-oxide fuel reactors. Advanced All processing options require

metal reactor. High-temperature gas- development, and their feasibility and

cooled reactors. Accelerator-based applicability depend on the results of

converter. such development.

Waste disposala

Deep geologic disposal in containers Waste options require some technical

after vitrification to form glass logs. development and may be difficult to

Sub-seabed disposal. Disposal in support without convincing economic

space. Underground detonation. arguments.

a W=te disposal Will eventually be necessary even if a processing option is chosen because no processing meth~ an

totally destroy all residuals of plutonium contamination from waste streams.

SOURCE: Office of Technology Assessment, 1993.

this asset. Such benefits could be either to

produce energy or to provide the impetus for a

future large-scale nuclear power economy. Other

investigations make the assumption that plutonium is a liability and that systems should be

sought that would most effectively destroy it or

render it unusable.

Regardless of which long-term approach is

pursued, storage for some period of time will be

required for plutonium from dismantled nuclear

warheads. Retrievable, monitored, and secure

storage is inevitable while warheads are being

disassembled and other long-term options such as

processing or disposal as waste are being investigated. The period could last from one to many

decades. There is sufficient existing technical

knowledge about plutonium storage to have

reasonable confidence in performance (technical,

economic, safety, and environmental).

The conversion of plutonium to mixed-oxide

(plutonium and uranium) fuel for use in lightwater reactors is also considered by most experts

to be technically feasiblell in the near term. The

basic technology to develop a facility for vitrification of plutonium, perhaps mixed with other

radioactive products, to form a waste is also

available.

Other technologies for plutonium disposition

require various amounts of research and development. Some preliminary investigations are under

way, but resources are limited. It will be very

important to follow even these preliminary investigations, however, and understand their conclusions. Such conclusions will always involve

compromise (among factors such as cost, time,

and uncertainty); thus public debate about national benefits and costs will be important to their

acceptability. Any decision about disposition

must inevitably take into account the length of

time that storage would be acceptable from both

technical and security points of view, so that

adequate research, development, and testing of

other technologies (including environmental impact analyses) can be carried out.

To evaluate plutonium disposition options and

select the most appropriate, it will be necessary to

establish clear and measurable criteria. The criteria must specify objectives to be achieved and

some means of measuring how well they are

achieved. The criteria should be given relative

11 ~stec~oloU has been demonstrated and used in other co~hies.
74 Dismantling the Bomb and Managing the Nuclear Materials

Figure 4-l—Warhead Dismantlement and Plutonium Disposition Scenarios

Warheads retired

a

Military bases

1

Warheads

returned to

DOE

Warhead

dismantlement

at Pantex I

Plutonium pits

temporary storage

I Today

-------------------------------- ----- K!!!!!! ➤ . 

-

Advanced

reactor, or

------------------ -➤ W ›fl~~nverter

MOX

fuel reactor

MOX i~I

fabrication I Spent fuel I

A I

I

I

I

>

I

1 I

Long term plutonium storage

I

I

I

I

I

I

I

I

I

i

------------------- -> I!!Y9 Waste

>

Vitrification

I Near term I Mid term I Lena term

A dotted line indicates alternative disposition paths.

SOURCE: Office of Technology Assessment, 1993.

weights or listed in priority order. Establishing

such criteria will be difficult, but important. To

reflect a public consensus about national goals,

they must also involve the public in the decisionmaking process.

 Criteria for Judging Disposition

Approaches

Individual researchers have developed their

own notions about what criteria should be considered and which should be most important. A

number of such criteria can be found in studies

(3,4,20,23,48) whose principal results are discussed later in this chapter. OTA’s analysis

indicates that the criteria listed below are among

the most important. This list is not necessarily

complete, but it is a starting point. The items are

not necessarily listed in order of priority. These

criteria are based primarily on the oft-stated

assumption that world peace and security will be

enhanced if nations of the world reduce their

nuclear weapons stockpile; prevent the materials

from being released into the environment; render

such materials as harmless as possible for future

generations; and prevent proliferation of materials that might be reused for new weapons.

1. Security (including verifiability and proliferation resistance). Each approach must be

judged on how well the material is controlled

and protected from theft or other diversion. It
Chapter 4: Future Disposition of Nuclear Materials from Dismantled Weapons 75

is necessary both to protect the material from

possible terrorist actions and to prevent certain

nations from receiving such material through

either overt or covert means (69). If a future

international agreement on storage, use, or

disposal of plutonium is sought, acceptable

means of verifying compliance will have to be

established. Thus, an approach must also be

judged on how well the amounts and forms of

plutonium can be accounted for, measured, and

controlled. An option could also be judged on

how quickly the material could be converted to

a more proliferation-resistant form.

2. Near-term health and safety risks. As discussed

throughout this report, each approach must be

judged on how well the health and safety of

workers and the public are protected throughout the time the material is stored, moved,

handled, and processed. Risks of human exposure to plutonium and other toxic materials are

of primary importance. Risks of accidents, as

well as exposures that may be associated with

routine operations, must be considered. It is

also important to consider in great detail the

many complex steps usually involved in certain plutonium processing options.

3. Environmental and long-term health risks. All

approaches must be measured by the degree to

which environmental protection can be ensured

and future exposures of humans to toxic

materials can be prevented over long time

frames. Because these materials have very long

half-lives, the viability of a geological repository for long-term disposal is a prime consideration if plutonium is to be disposed of as waste.

4. Technical availability and feasibility. Most

available work on disposition has included preliminary evaluations of technical feasibility.

When options are compared, however, it will

be necessary to realistically assess the status of

development of some very complex systems;

the nature of technical uncertainties associated

with each; the possibility of technical failures;

and the time needed to justify, fumd, design,

build, test, license, and operate a full system.

5. Economics and cost. All options will be

expensive, but to compare them it will be

necessary to treat all costs on an equivalent and

consistent basis. The options must be measured

by a comprehensive evaluation of relative costs

including the degree of uncertainty associated

with each cost estimate. Potential benefits such

as the value of electricity produced should be

a factor, as should potential costs from accidents or environmental releases. Cost recovery

should be measured in a consistent and comprehensive way. Researchers have presented

some cost data in various studies to date, but

none are of sufficient quality that comparisons

among options would be fruitful.

6. Political and public acceptance. The consideration and debate of each option must include

adequate involvement of the general public,

experts, and various political interests. To

satisfy this criterion, it will be necessary to

consider public concerns—to understand how

an option can be presented to the public, how

public opinion will be formed, how public

input can be incorporated into decisions, and

how the public will measure benefits and costs.

7. International political impacts. Any choices

made by the United States regarding the

storage and disposition of plutonium and HEU

recovered from dismantled nuclear warheads

will have an impact on the way other nations

approach this issue. Considerations could include the following: Will any option selected

assist in ensuring that Russia will permanently

destroy surplus weapons plutonium? Will it

assist in securing a commitment from Russia to

prevent the further separation of plutonium

from reactor discharge materials? Will it assist

and reinforce the U.S. position to discourage

the separation and recycling of commercial

plutonium worldwide, and to find an ultimate

solution to the disposition of commercial

plutonium. Finally, should any international

reciprocity be considered for plutonium and

HEU disposition options?
76 Dismantling the Bomb and Managing the Nuclear Materials

I Connections Between Civilian and

Military Plutonium

Various analyses place different emphases on

individual criteria. Almost all studies to date,

however, regard proliferation resistance as a

critical factor, and therefore the economic benefits or costs of different plutonium disposition

options may not be overriding factors in the

selection or elimination of any option (5).

The continuing production of new plutonium is

also a factor used by some in evaluating schemes

for disposing of existing weapons plutonium.

Reports indicate that plutonium production and

separation (reprocessing) continue in Russia. The

rationale forrunning these reactors is that they are

required to produce energy for the associated

towns (67). Russian officials claim that reprocessing is continuing because it would be unsafe to

store spent fuel from certain reactors or because

it is part of a continuing effort to develop

advanced plutonium-fueled reactors (16). Commercial plutonium reprocessing is also expanding

(or planned to expand) in other countries (3).

Although the United States has adopted a policy

of not reprocessing any commercial fuel to

recover plutonium, some other countries have

pursued a nuclear policy that calls for reprocessing spent nuclear fuel to separate and recycle

plutonium in reactors.

Worldwide, the civilian nuclear industry has

already separated more than 100 tons of plutonium from spent fuel (67). Some of this has been

“recycled” in various types of reactors, but the

remainder is in storage. Most of the civilian

international industry for plutonium separation is

in Britain and France, but Russia has facilities and

Japan is constructing some. These countries plan

to separate another 200 tons over the next decade

(67). The additional 200 tons to be separated is

covered by contracts with reprocessing plants in

Great Britain and France (3). Plans also call for

this plutonium to be returned to the originating

countries and thus entail a significant expansion

in the handling, transportation, and circulation of

plutonium, which will add to global proliferation,

safety, and environmental risks (3).

Large amounts of separated civilian plutonium

could be a factor in decisions about technologies

that might be developed to convert plutonium

from warheads. Since substantially more plutonium is available in spent fuel from civilian power

reactors than is likely to become available from

warhead dismantlement, some argue that it would

be logical to consider the problem of weapons and

civilian plutonium together, rather than separately (45). Others argue that the storage and

production of separated civilian plutonium

should be controlled in a manner similar to

military material (16).

The control and management of plutonium

from both weapons and civilian power reactors

could be based on the same nonproliferation

concerns (3). Some researchers believe that initially both must be stored under international

safeguards and that there should be a verified ban

on separation of any new commercial plutonium.

Researchers also argue that the principal reason

for current reprocessing and recycling activities

in Western Europe and Japan is institutional inertia rather than economic benefit, and that this increased plutonium activity is unjustifiable on security, economic, or environmental grounds (3).

On the other hand, although recognizing that

the large amount of civilian plutonium represents

a serious proliferation problem, some think that

there are both political and technical reasons for

proceeding expeditiously with a permanent solution to the disposition of surplus military plutonium even if a solution to the civilian plutonium

issue is not currently available. Weapons-grade

plutonium comes in the best form for warhead

construction. It is also in a form that can be

modified more readily for certain disposition

options such as conversion to oxide and glassilication with high-level waste. Finally, timely

actions by the United States to permanently dispose of surplus weapons plutonium may strengthen

its ability to influence Russian disposition actions, and will emphasize the U.S. position
Chapter 4: Future Disposition of Nuclear Materials from Dismantled Weapons 77

regarding the disposition of commercial plutonium and its world leadership role in nonproliferation (24,30).

PLUTONIUM STORAGE

OTA’s analysis indicates that storage of most

of the plutonium from weapons for a few decades

at least is the most likely outcome of the plans and

programs now under way in the United States.

Other options for disposition will require considerable research, development, and testing before

they can be implemented, and they must surmount significant technical and political hurdles

to meet other criteria. In addition, the Federal

agencies involved in making disposition decisions are generally reluctant to dispose of plutonium permanently because of the enormous cost

and effort expended to create this material.

It is important to treat storage with great care

and concern. Safe, secure storage requires attention to design requirements and to all factors that

can affect protection of human health and the

environment. It should be remembered that past

inadequate practices in managing radioactive

waste from weapons production have led to the

vast environmental problems now existing in the

Nuclear Weapons Complex (65). No one wishes

to repeat those mistakes, but avoiding them will

require that difficult decisions be made about

providing adequate storage facilities and the best

protection possible under future storage conditions.

It is important to begin soon to prepare plans

for mid- to long-term storage of plutonium from

dismantled weapons.12 DOE is exploring storage

options through its work on reconfiguration of the

Weapons Complex and its plutonium task forces,

but these efforts are not well coordinated. Among

the factors to be considered initially are the size

of a facility (number of pits or other forms to be

stored); whether other plutonium forms and

residues should be accommodated as well (there

are now substantial quantities of plutonium in

various forms throughout the Weapons Complex); the estimated life of a storage facility; and

any additional capability required, such as the

ability to handle and maintain some pits or classes

of pits that need attention over time.

 Current Efforts

DOE has the responsibility to evaluate all

relevant issues pertinent to plutonium storage.

Plutonium pits from dismantled warheads are

currently considered by DOE to be in interim

storage (6 to 10 years)13 at Pantex. Because the

capacity of the Pantex bunkers is restricted, DOE

has prepared analyses of the safety and feasibility

of expanding that capacity to a maximum of

20,000 pits. An Environmental Assessment (EA)

has been prepared that incorporates the results of

these analyses. In the EA, DOE discusses the

potential of other Nuclear Weapons Complex

sites as interim storage facilities (see table 4-2).

Some of these alternatives maybe considered in

connection with siting a long-term plutonium

storage facility in a reconfigured Nuclear Weapons Complex.

The conclusion from DOE’s initial efforts is

that storage of plutonium pits at Rocky Flats or

Hanford is neither reasonable nor cost-effective

because current plans call for environmental

restoration and no further use of these sites for any

production purpose. Another alternative evaluated is to move the pits to one of the Weapons

Complex sites not planned for closing, such as

Savannah River. However, efforts to expand the

12 ~y ~jornew Feder~ facili~ t. be b@t will rqfie a long time (more than a decade with current DOE pmmd-s)from initi~ P~ns

and concepts to actual completion and frost use (43). Some experts claim that an adequate storage-only facility similar to Pantex could be built

in a much shorter time and at a cost of less than $100 million (58), but none of these estimates has been well developed or documented.

13 WY believe tit DOE ~not & able to provide a site and facility to rep~ce he Pantex b~ers within 6 to 10 years. See appendk

A for a discussion of the current proposal to expand plutonium pit storage capacity at Pantex and the reaction to tbis proposal by the local

community, the State of Texas, and other citizen groups.
,

78 Dismantling the Bomb and Managing the Nuclear Materials

Table 4-2—Alternatives Considered by DOE for Interim Plutonium Pit Storage

Storage Storage capacity

capacity available for

Possible available for other plutonium Issues relevant to

storage site plutonium pits forms this activity

Pantex Plant Standard single- Storage of other The concrete storage

(Texas) layer plutonium forms bunkers were built

Single-layer configuration is has not occurred during World War II to

configuration capable of and is not planned protect conventional

providing interim at the present weapons and

storage for only time. munitions from bomb

6,800. blasts. Although some

pits are already stored

in these igloos, DOE is

evaluating the potential

impacts of extending

this storage.

Multiple pit If approved, the None Environmental and

stacking proposed safety documentation

multiple pit is being prepared and

stacking reviewed.

configuration will

provide interim

storage for up to

20,000

plutonium pits

from

disassembled

weapons.

Hanford Site Facilities at this Existing facilities Requests for funds to

(Washington) site are capable might enable the upgrade facilities for

of providing storage of nearly plutonium storage

storage capacity 20 tons of would appear to be in

for more than plutonium in forms conflict with DOE’s

10,000 other than pits. change in policy from

plutonium pits. defense missions to

those of environmental

restoration and waste

management.

Los Alamos Existing facilities Storage for other Cost of modifying

National have limited plutonium forms is facilities under

Laboratory capacity for available but construction or

(New Mexico) storing largely limited to upgrading existing

plutonium pits. certain forms such facilities is high.

One facility as plutonium

currently under oxide.

construction

could provide

storage for

about 200

plutonium pits;

however, larger

capacities could

be developed.
Chapter 4: Future Disposition of Nuclear Materials from Dismantled Weapons 79

Table 4-2—Alternatives Considered by DOE for Interim Plutonium Pit Storage (Cont.)

Possible

storage site

Rocky Flats

Plant

(Colorado)

Savannah

River Site

(South

Carolina)

Military

bases

Storage

capacity

available for

plutonium pits

The capacity

currently

available for

near- and longterm secure

storage of

plutonium pits is

limited.

Use of existing

facilities could

provide storage

space for up to

1,100 plutonium

pits from nuclear

weapons

disassembled at

Pantex.

Although viewed

by DOE as

facilities with

little potential for

near-term

plutonium pit

storage, the

possibility of

using certain

bases for longterm storage

seems

promising to

DOE. The

estimated

capacity for pit

storage has not

been

determined.

Storage capacity

available for

other plutonium

forms

The space

available for

providing

environmentally

safe and secure

storage is

sufficient merely to

accommodate the

plutonium scrap,

residues, and

waste generated

by the plant’s past

plutonium

processing and

current cleanup

activities.

Storing plutonium

in forms other than

pits is possible

because current

activities involve

the storage of

plutonium oxide

and plutonium-rich

residues

originating at the

site.

The possibility of

using military

bases to store

other forms of

plutonium has not

been suggested or

evaluated to date.

Issues relevant to

this activity

Storage of additional

pits or other plutonium

forms is a remote

possibility because of

the extensive costs

and difficulty

associated with facility

and equipment

upgrades. Addressing

relevant environmental

and safety problems

would also be difficult.

Without modifications

to some facilities,

storage capacity for

plutonium pits may be

further reduced by

future shipment of

plutonium materials

and residues from

other DOE sites.

Many experts believe

that most military

facilities were

designed for weapons

storage only and are

unsuitable for

plutonium pits.

Factors to be

evaluated include

institutional

arrangements and

costs associated with

inspection, security,

and surveillance

requirements.

SOURCE: U.S. Department of Energy.
80 Dismantling the Bomb and Managing the Nuclear Materials

storage of plutonium pits at Pantex will also have

to be continued since, according to DOE, alternatives such as the Savannah River Site would not

independently provide the necessary capacity

soon enough (73).

DOE also considered certain military bases as

potential candidates for interim storage of plutonium pits. No detailed evaluation of converting

facilities from weapons storage to pit storage was

done, and the military services indicate that they

do not have excess capacity at any of the

candidate bases (73). Higher costs and additional

logistical considerations could make storage at

military bases difficult to implement14 (34).

DOE is currently evaluating approaches that

could lead to replacement of the current oversized

Nuclear Weapons Complex by a new one in the

year 2000 and beyond; this future complex is

commonly referred to as Complex 21. The Los

Alamos National Laboratory is preparing plutonium storage design guidance to be used in the

design of a plutonium storage facility for Complex 21. In addition, private contractors are

providing technical support for a conceptual

design. and cost estimate for each alternative

under consideration (72). DOE is using three

major assumptions in regard to a plutonium

storage facility:

1.

2.

3.

It must be a modular design with remote

handling capability to reduce worker radiation exposure;

It must consist of storage vaults and welded

centainment vessels that minimize risk of

intrusion; and

It must provide adequate capacity for safe,

secure, long-term storage for projected amounts

Plutonium pits from dismantled warheads are

temporarily stored at the Pantex Plant in bunkers

like the ones shown here.

of plutonium pits, metals, oxides, and other

stable forms (42).

Other characteristics expected in the final

design are that it must be self-contained, although

it could share other support facilities located at

the site, and it would be constructed at grade level

rather than underground. The central advantage of

adopting a modular approach is that modules can

be added as required, thus eliminating potential

capacity limitations for the plutonium form in

question (12).

DOE is evaluating the storage of plutonium and

highly enriched uranium at separate sites, along

with the possibility of a single facility capable of

storing both. The results of engineering and cost

evaluations are expected to be published in early

FY 1994 (9). The effect that the size of weapons

stockpiles may have on future plutonium storage

needs is also part of this continuing evaluation.

The storage facility design concept under

consideration by DOE includes a Class I vault

1A Seved mse~chers ~ve ~SOpOin@d to the Manzano Mountain facility at Kirkland AirForce Base as a possible alternative fOr PIUtOfiUm

pit storage. Pits were customarily stored at this facility, especially during the 1940s and 1950s when Manzano Mountain was considered the

P-assembly mea for nuclear weapons in the United States. Weapons assembly and plutonium pit storage are no longer conducted here.

Before Maruano Mountain could be considered adequate for storing plutonium pits, however, several important issues (and their cost and time

implications) need to be addressed: 1) the analyses and design modifications required to meet modem environmental and safety standards for

plutonium pits; 2) the capacity available for pits; 3) programs to protect the health of workers; 4) programs to monitor and control radiatiow

and 5) maintenance associated with storage and security operations (50).
Chapter 4: Future Disposition of Nuclear Materials from Dismantled Weapons 81

storage system to meet upgraded security and

safety standards that are not found in current

facilities such as the Pantex bunkers. One example of existing Class I facilities in the Nuclear

Weapons Complex is the storage vaults recently

built at the Savannah River Site.

Modifications to an early proposed design

indicate that the final structural design for a

long-term plutonium storage facility is still evolving. For instance, early designs assumed a 50-year

life to address DOE’s plutonium storage problem.

This was found inadequate by some DOE reviewers, and a new structural design for a 100-year

facility is now being proposed-with plans for

replacing computer hardware and other special

equipment every 25 years (34). Figure 4-2 illustrates the current design features being considered

for this storage concept.

The recent reduction in the nuclear weapons

stockpile, the closing of key processing facilities,

and the downsizing of the Weapons Complex

have also significantly changed DOE’s approach

to long-term plutonium storage. DOE is preparing

a Programmatic Environmental Impact Statement

(PEIS) for the Weapons Complex reconfiguration. One of the objectives of this study is to

evaluate engineering and environmental approaches

to replace the current Weapons Complex with one

that is simpler, more environmentally safe, and

less expensive to operate. The PEIS will also

evaluate strategies for long-term plutonium

storage.

As part of its efforts to reconfigure the Nuclear

Weapons Complex, DOE created a Complex

Reconfiguration Committee in 1991, with senior

representatives from DOE, DOD, and the National Security Council. The committee considered such aspects as future stockpile needs,

long-term production and maintenance requirements, environmental needs, and options for

existing or new facilities (71). DOE had planned

to issue the PEIS in August 1993, but changes in

the weapons stockpile resulting from recently

Figure 4-2-Conceptual Design of a

DOE Plutonium Storage Facility

SOURCE: U.S. Department of Energy.

signed arms reductions agreements have led to

revisions of their schedule (4,9,46). In July 1993

DOE issued a revised notice of intent to prepare

a PEIS that explained the new conditions that

caused this revision and provided a new list of

options to be considered.15 DOE stated that since

February 1991 when DOE originally announced

its intent to prepare a PEIS for reconfiguring the

15 FederaI Register, VOI. 58, No. 140, July 23, 1993, pp. 39528-39535.
82 Dismantling the Bomb and Managing the Nuclear Materials

Weapons Complex, conditions have changed in

such a way that impact the requirements for the

new complex. DOE’s proposed changes in the

PEIS reflect that the future nuclear weapons

complex can be even smaller than originally

envisioned, and also reflect the increased importance associated with stewardship of existing

nuclear materials.

One major change in scope is that DOE

considers it unreasonable to have plutonium

component fabrication at a different site than

storage facilities. Therefore, DOE proposes that

all alternatives under consideration will have

storage, processing, analysis, and fabrication

operations co-located. For the function of nuclear

materials storage, processing, and component

fabrication, DOE now proposes three alternatives—

constructing new facilities, me-g existing

facilities, and no action. If new facilities are

constructed, five alternative sites will be evaluatedIdaho National Engineering Laboratory, Savannah River Site, Oak Ridge Reservation, Pantex,

and the Nevada Test Site.

Public scoping meetings on the revised PEIS

will begin in the fall of 1993, and a plan and

schedule will be announced later. If a decision is

reached to build a long-term plutonium storage

facility, some estimate that constructing such a

facility will require at least 10 years (42). It now

takes DOE more than a decade to obtain funds and

build new budgeted projects, even if the technology is tested and proven (43).

Designing for plutonium storage beyond a few

years is a relatively new concept within the

Weapons Complex. For many years, plutonium

pits recovered from warheads were stored only

briefly at Pantex and then shipped to Rocky Flats

where they were processed for recycling into new

weapons. Scrap plutonium metal and other residues were stored at generating sites with the

intention of recovering the plutonium when

production ceased or when more effective recovery technologies become available. The current

very costly and complex challenge to dispose of

plutonium residues from past operations at the

Rocky Flats Plant (see box 4-A) illustrates how

past practices without attention to environmental

protection have created massive waste management problems with no adequate, feasible, or

practical solution. Future planners and designers

should heed this lesson carefully.

 Design Considerations for a

Plutonium Storage Facility

OTA’s analysis indicates that certain considerations will affect the design parameters for a

plutonium storage facility. Box 4-B lists the types

of technical and related analyses that would be

required as part of any facility design. Additional

considerations will also be important in designing

a plutonium storage facility.

For example, it will be important to identify a

time period within which pits can be stored safely

without further processing. If intact pits are to

‘‘sit on the shelf’ for a defined period of time, the

pit casing and sealed storage drum could obviate

the need for immediate processing. However,

once the design life of the container or casing is

reached, adequate processing capability will have

to be provided (51). There is also a need to assess

the chemical and physical stability of the plutonium materials to be stored (e.g., pits, metals,

oxides, glass, ceramics), and to define the sizes

and concentrations of materials selected for

storage so as to determine the space required for

centainment and criticality control. Although it

may be appropriate to store plutonium as pits for

a defined temporary period, further study is

required to determine any limiting factors for

long-term pit storage.

Another design consideration is the need to

evaluate opportunities for the use of remote

handling technologies (e.g., robotics) in storage

and maintenance areas (51). The selected containment system (e.g., drums, vessels, vaults) should

be designed in a way that facilitates inventorying

stored materials with minimum radiation exposure of workers. There is also a need to protect

workers against plutonium particle exposure.
Chapter 4: Future Disposition of Nuclear Materials from Dismantled Weapons 83

During storage, plutonium metal (as found in pits)

may oxidize and form particles small enough to

be respired by humans. Even though the risk to

workers of plutonium exposure during storage is

low, accidents that could disperse fine particles

are always a concern. In addition, if plutonium is

processed (e.g., converted to oxide) or if pits are

converted to small pieces, there is a risk of

dispersion in forms susceptible to inhalation or

ingestion. Plutonium, which emits alpha radiation, is dangerous when inhaled or ingested (see

chapter 3). Also, over time, weapons-grade plutonium will form americium-241, which emits

penetrating gamma radiation.l6 Since all military

plutonium contains various amounts of americium, it must be handled with appropriate shielding precautions (18).

16 weapons.~de plutm.ium contains mostly plutonium-239 and smaller amounts of plutonium-241, which mturally decays over time to

americium-241 whose half-life is 13.2 years.
84 Dismantling the Bomb and Managing the Nuclear Materials

Box 443-Types of Analyses Required In Designing a

New Long-Term Plutonium Storage Facility

• Safety Analysis Reports that address:

General description of principal design criteria

Nominal capacity considered for the facility,

Type, form, quantities, and origins of the plutonium materials,

Waste products generated during operations, and

Materials handling and storage procedures, including control of decay heat, criticality safety, contamination

control, and criteria for handling damaged containers.

• General operating procedures for packaging, storage, and transportation.

. Design criteria for ventilation, filtration, and off-gas systems.

* Criteria for protection of equipment and selection of instrumentation.

. Radiation protection and control measures.

. Fire and explosion protection systems.

• Requirements for containers, container repair, and maintenance.

● Procedures to be used for monitoring.

* Classification of structures, components, and systems.

• Criticality prevention and criticality factor analyses.

● Maximum radiation dose rates emitted by containment systems.

. Procedures for decontamination of personnel and equipment.

● Accident potential for normal and abnormal operations.

. Design criteria and general operating procedures relevant to security, verificatian inspection, and

monitoring.

. Organizational structure, including functions, responsibilities, and authorities.

SOURCE: office of T~nology Assessmen$ 1993.

There are also broader policy issues to be

considered. These include the need to evaluate

security factors associated with storing plutonium

at a consolidated facility as opposed to two or

more locations. Preliminary analyses appear to

suggest that placing plutonium in a centralized

location may be more cost-effective. Each location will require significant security measures,

including redundant barriers to slow down individuals who attempt to take possession of the

stored materials (41). There are some advantages,

however, to building two facilities, such as

making international or bilateral verification

easier.

It is important to consider whether a U.S.

plutonium storage facility might become subject

to international safeguards for verification sometime in the future. Some experts maintain that in

order to minimize security, accountability, and

proliferation problems, plutonium storage would

best be carried out in collaboration with other

nations that possess nuclear weapons (33). National security considerations also raise the question of whether verification by foreign governments or by any international organization, such

as the International Atomic Energy Agency

(IAEA), could be allowed in the future as the

result of amendments to arms reduction treaties.

Pending the development of an international

plutonium and radioactive waste disposal strategy, some have suggested that the best interim

solution is monitored, secure storage of surplus

plutonium under bilateral safeguards (25,53).

Although weapons plutonium could initially be
.“ . .

Chapter 4: Future Disposition of Nuclear Materials from Dismantled Weapons 85

placed under safeguards through bilateral agreements, some believe that in the long term, an

international control entity such as the IAEA

might better reflect a global interest in keeping

these materials from weapons use (3).

In any event, some experts suggest that the

facility design should enable verification inspections (46) and should accommodate possible

modification of plutonium materials to meet

verification requirements. These considerations

would have an effect on the design, optimum

number, and location of storage facilities.

 Optional Form of Plutonium Storage

The ideal form in which to store plutonium

depends on the goals set for storage. Different

goals-such as greatest accessibility for possible

weapons use in the future, highest proliferation

resistance, or minimal impact on the environment

and workers—may dictate different storage forms.

Stability is also an issue. Some argue that

plutonium metal is less desirable for storage than

the more stable oxide form because fine metal

pieces can ignite spontaneously if exposed to air.

In addition, some claim that storage as plutonium

oxide has proliferation resistance advantages

compared with storage as metal (3), whereas

others say that such advantages are minor (19).17

However, the technology needed to convert

plutonium oxide into its metallic form is easily

accessible (39). Another point is that oxide

powder may pose a greater health risk because it

is more respirable.

If consideration is given to international verification and inspection of a storage facility, it

would be necessary to protect weapons design

information from disclosure. In this case, some

changes to the pits that would modify their shape

or convert them to small pieces may be desirable

prior to storage. This process is commonly known

as ‘‘sanitizing’ the component. Another approach, to minimize the risk of disclosure of

sensitive design information, would be application of verification measures only to sealed

containers holding the sensitive materials, etc.

(55). Passive nondestructive neutron and gammaray spectral assay procedures are sufficient for the

verification of plutonium, and a combination of

active neutron interrogation methods and passive

gamma-ray spectral analysis could be used for

HEU (55).

DOE has stated that the new Special Recovery

Facility at the Savannah River Site is an existing

facility with the potential to process plutonium

pits into plutonium oxide. Originally constructed

to transform high-grade plutonium oxide into

metal buttons for use at Roe@ Flats in making

plutonium pits for nuclear warheads, the new

Special Recovery Facility was never operated.

Savannah River officials consider that reversing

the intended function of the unused plant—

processing pits into oxide rather than vice versa—

may involve only minor design modifications.

One additional function this facility could serve is

to remove americium and other hazardous radioactive decay products from stored plutonium

materials (34). DOE claims that the processing of

plutonium pits into plutonium buttons is currently

possible at the facility. One problem with the

facility, however, is that it was not built to meet

current environmental and safety standards, and if

completely shut down, it would be very difficult

to reopen under modern requirements (34).

On the other hand, storing plutonium pits in

their original form may have some advantages in

terms of ease of verification because each pit

already represents a discrete unit and has a serial

number (28). The cladding of plutonium pits was

designed to have a 20-year lifetime but could

probably last much longer (28).

17 Some res~chers hve suggest~ that pits could be made unusable in warheads by simple means such m clldlhlg Or fi~thm with

boron and epoxy. These approaches might deter a terrorist group but not a nation with weapons manufacturing capability, and are suggested

mainly for nations other than the United States in which good security technology may not be in place.
86 Dismantling the Bomb and Managing the Nuclear Materials

 Plutonium Pit Maintenance

During Storage

If plutonium is to be stored in pit form, it will

be necessary to have the capability to inspect,

modify, repair, or otherwise process any pits or

materials that exhibit problems. Los Alamos

National Laboratory and Lawrence Livermore

National Laboratory already have some capability for pit handling and processing, which is used

in connection with current Pantex operations.

DOE has stated that it would locate a processing

facility at the same site at which anew plutonium

storage facility is built (12). Options based on

storing plutonium in a form other than pits (such

as plutonium oxide) would also require a plutonium processing capability. Either current facilities for processing could be upgraded or new

areas could be developed. It should be noted,

however, that most of the facilities processing

plutonium in the past were built in the 1940s and

early 1950s. They are obsolete and potentially

dangerous, and have been closed because of

safety and environmental concerns. Lessons

learned from these past operations will be valuable to developers of any new facility. In addition,

these facilities often used processes and technologies that were inefficient and costly, and created

large amounts of waste (40).

 The Kirtland Underground

Munitions Complex

There are very few good examples of highsecurity weapons storage facilities built recently

in the United States that might be used as an

example of how a plutonium storage facility

might be constructed. One such facility-the

Kirtland Underground Munitions Storage Complex (KUMSC) at Kirtland Air Force Base in

Albuquerque-was constructed in the late 1980s

according to modern standards of safety and

security at an Air Force munitions complex.

Although not necessarily the ideal facility for

storing weapons-grade plutonium, it illustrates

how modern design standards and principles

Figure 4-3-Major Design Features of Underground

Munition Storage Facility at Kirtland Air Force Base

FIammable

materials LOADING DOCK

storage

Earth barrier Earth barrier

Training

room

Equipment Main

corridor storage

Maintenance Maintenance

bay bay

Munition Munition

storage storage

Entry

control

point

SOURCE: U.S. Department of Defense.

might be applied to a future storage facility.

KUMSC consists of an Underground Munitions

Storage Facility, a Squadron Operations Building, and a Utility Building covering an area of

approximately 7 acres (see figure 4-3). The

Underground Munitions Storage Facility comprises eight areas specially designed to sustain

accidental detonation of certain high explosives

and to contain detonation products. In the event of

an explosion, the particular area affected is

automatically isolated by the closing of blast

doors; after the explosion, pressurized gases are

filtered out of the explosion area and the filtered

air is released to the environment. Each storage

vault at the facility contains multiple storage cells

with approximate dimensions of 25 feet by 100

feet. Individual cells are bounded by doors and

concrete walls able to withstand accidental explosions.

Several design features have been incorporated

into the Underground Munitions Storage Facility
Chapter 4: Future Disposition of Nuclear Materials from Dismantled Weapons 87

to reduce accident and security risks. Examples

include: 1) limiting the use of combustible

materials during construction and operation; 2)

confining the number of blast doors that can

remain open at any given time to one, thus

exposing only two containment areas to the risk

of explosion; 3) providing fire protection systems

and equipment; 4) demarcating boundary lines on

floor areas near walls and doors to limit the

quantities of munitions that can be stored; and 5)

providing only one personnel entrance/exit to the

facility (gravel-filled escape tunnels secured with

heavy steel plates are provided to exit the facility

if the main entrance is blocked) (70). Extensive

security systems protect against unwanted entry

and other threats to the integrity and control of the

facility.

PLUTONIUM PROCESSING

A number of studies over the past few years

have looked at various processing techniques that

might be applied for disposition of significant

quantities of plutonium from retired and dismantled nuclear warheads (see box 4-C). In practice,

it is impossible to convert surplus weapons

plutonium into a substance that is essentially

nonradioactive or harmless to human health and

the environment. It is also difficult to transform

plutonium into a material that cannot be reformed

into weapons material at a later date. No existing

process is available that can completely eliminate

surplus plutonium, and developing new processes

will require substantial research efforts and resources. However, some technologies are available in the near term to create forms that would be

less usable for weapons or to eliminate some

portion of the plutonium.

The language used in discussions of plutonium

processing options can be difficult to interpret.

Some use the term “plutonium burning” to

describe the use of plutonium as reactor fuel so

that plutonium levels in spent fuel are reduced

over time. The same options are sometimes called

‘‘transmutation” or ‘actinide burning” to reflect

the fact that a significant portion of the plutonium

(or various transuranic species) is changed by

nuclear reaction into other, shorter-lived isotopes.

In more recent studies on the use of accelerators

to destroy actinides, the term plutonium ‘annihilation” is used to depict approaches that reduce

the plutonium to negligible amounts after the

process is completed. Many proposals address

plutonium disposition through processing. Although several current ideas have merit, it is too

early in the development of most of them to

compare their specific advantages and disadvantages accurately. In addition, many of the new

approaches to the disposal of plutonium have

been developed with different objectives (e.g.,

whereas one approach may be best at reducing the

risk of environmental and human health impacts,

another may be better for reducing the risk of

proliferation, and yet another for extracting economic value from the plutonium). The tradeoffs

among different approaches cannot be analyzed

reliably until more research has been completed.

The more advanced technological approaches

have significant uncertainties about when they

might be available for full-scale development

(30), how effective they might be, the development effort involved, what other impacts might

result, what nontechnical barriers may arise, and

what benefits they might offer (18). The costs to

implement most of these technologies are not

well known at present (30). Plutonium burning as

U.S. mixed-oxide fue118 in conventional lightwater reactors (LWRs), abandoned in the United

States in the 1970s, is probably the best cost

option (18,59). Costs of some of the fission

options have been estimated by their proponents,

although a detailed comparison of costs and

assumptions has not been made (30).

Therefore, the following discussion of plutonium processing should be interpreted as a very

early indication of how to approach the question

18 MOX is made by mixing the oxides of plutonium and uranhuq and forming the product into conventional reactor fuel assemblies,
88 Dismantling the Bomb and Managing the Nuclear Materials

Box 4-C-Plutonium Processing

Plutonium processing is used in this report to define a myriad of manufacturing steps that maybe employed

to change the form, configuration, content, and chemical or radiological state of the material. The purpose of these

changes could be to make plutonium usable as reactor fuel, to make it more stable for storage, to prepare it for

disposal, or to alter its radiological state so as to eliminate long-lived radionuclides. The steps may include

chemical, thermal, mechanical, and radiological (neutronic) processes. One near-term proposal for processing

Involves making mixed-oxide (plutonium and uranium) fuel and then using it in a nuclear reactor. Although this

technology is available in some other countries, no facilities for carrying out these processes exist in the United

States.

Many steps are required to make mixed-oxide (MOX) reactor fuel from plutonium pits. First, the plutonium

metal must be removed from other associated materials--by chemical or mechanical techniques-then the metal

can be purified, probably by a chemical solution process. Next, pure plutonium would be converted to plutonium

oxide by calcination and finely pulverized to improve its reactivity. The plutonium oxide would t hen be blended wit h

depleted uranium oxide or natural uranium. The uranium oxide would have been derived from enrichment plant

residue by using a chemical step to convert uranium hexafluoride to uranium oxide and then finely pulverizing it.

The mixture of uranium and plutonium oxides would be pelletized, sintered, and loaded into fuel tubes to be used

in a reactor as MOX fuel. Each step in this process must be carefully controlled to prevent releases, protect

workers, and ensure safety. Each step also produces some waste or scrap. Some of the waste maybe recycled,

and some would be treated as transuranic waste because of its reduced plutonium content. Some waste maybe

mixed with hazardous and toxic chemicals or other materials.

The waste generated by MOX fuel fabrication could contain about 1 percent of the plutonium input and 5

percent of the uranium input to the process, but the quantity of waste product would be significantly higher because

it would be mixed with other materials, much of it hazardous waste itself, The experience with plutonium processing

at the DOE Rocky flats Plant is a case in point, in which huge quantities of residue and waste still exist without

a good disposal solution. Whatever waste is produced will require appropriate systems for storage, treatment, and

disposal as well.

It should also be noted that after MOX fuel is made, the remainder of the fuel cycle, mainly within a nuclear

power reactor system, also produces waste that must be properly controlled and handled. Finally, the disposal of

spent fuel after irradiation in the reactor presents another waste disposal problem. As discussed elsewhere, all

spent fuel from standard U.S. nuclear reactors is stored temporality at reactor sites awaiting an acceptable solution

to its ultimate disposal. Spent MOX fuel would be subject to similar constraints.

The above is an example of just one plutonium processing option with its related waste generation and

disposal issues. This report discusses many other processing approaches--making plutonium oxide forms to

enhance storability; mixing plutonium with other wastes and vitrifying the mixture to enhance disposability; or

transforming plutonium radioactively in advanced reactors or accelerators to change a large percentage of it into

other, shorter-lived radionuclides. These processes would also include the generation of wastes and thus must

be properly managed to protect human health and the environment.

SOURCE: Office of Technology Assessment, 1993.

of ultimate disposition of this material. Whatever options, such as vitrification or use as MOX fuel,

path is pursued, it will be necessary to carefully these options generally have not been evaluated

investigate technical feasibility, impacts on and compared on their merits specifically as

health and the environment, ability to meet options for processing surplus military plutonium

ultimate disposition goals, and possible economic in the United States (59). No best approach can be

benefits (18). Although varying amounts of tech- selected today with confidence. After some initial

nical information are already available for some evaluation, however, a few approaches could be
Chapter 4: Future Disposition of Nuclear Materials from Dismantled Weapons 89

researched and their merits identified. If clear

policy goals have been adopted, then the most

technologically developed approaches could be

compared more readily and an optimum one

selected.

 Use of Plutonium as Mixed-Oxide

Fuel in Light-Water Reactors

Various options that call for plutonium to be

used as a fuel in nuclear reactors have been

proposed. These options are based on incremental

changes in currently available, working technology. One option would involve incorporating

plutonium in mixed-oxide fuel to substitute for

some of the conventional low-enriched uranium

fuel used in commercial LWRs. Proponents point

to the electricity generation potential of this

disposal option as uneconomic advantage, whereas

opponents claim that MOX fuel cannot compete

with ordinary LEU fuel economically (16). Another option would use the plutonium incorporated into MOX fuel in dedicated reactors that

could be built on a Federal site, primarily to

convert plutonium into more proliferationresistant spent fuel elements and possibly to

produce some electrical power as well, whose sale

could offset some costs of the project. See box

4-C for a description of the facilities and steps

required for a MOX-fueled reactor approach.

Some experts claim that the use of plutonium

as MOX fuel in nuclear reactors is advantageous

because after irradiation, the fuel would be

poisoned with very toxic fission products that

make plutonium recovery difficult for any group

without reprocessing facilities (5). It is technically straightforward to substitute MOX fuel for

about one-third of the LEU fuel used in conventional light-water reactors such as those in the

United States. However, the use of MOX fuel in

existing LWRS in the United States is viewed by

many as detrimental to verification and proliferation resistance because the practice would distribute plutonium widely in the commercial sector

(3). An alternative would be to have fewer

specially designed reactors that could use 100

percent MOX fuel loadings in order to minimize

physical distribution of the plutonium and thus

enhance both verification (by on-site inspection)

and proliferation resistance. However, utilities

are uncomfortable with the prospect of using

plutonium as fuel for civilian power reactors.

They believe that public opposition may constrain such practices and that the regulatory

process would be long and difficult (3,67).

Although the notion of recovering value from

weapons plutonium by converting it to MOX fuel

is attractive to some, there are drawbacks to this

option. No MOX fuel fabrication facilities currently exist in the United States.l9 There are,

however, MOX facilities in other countries. A

large MOX facility, owned by Belgonucleaire, is

located in Dessel, Belgium. Its startup and status

are currently being debated in that country (15).

The Siemens company built a facility in Germany

that was designed to convert plutonium into

MOX fuel, but operations have been delayed

indefinitely. In Russia, the Ministry of Atomic

Energy (MINATOM) plans to continue to reprocess spent power reactor fuel. MINATOM may

also use separated civilian plutonium as fuel for

its fast neutron or other reactors. Construction of

an industrial-sized facility at Chelyabinsk-65,

intended to manufacture fuel for three BN-800

nuclear reactors to be built at the site, was

suspended. MINATOM would probably like to

find outside financing to complete the MOX

facility to manufacture MOX fuel for other

existing reactors or even for future breeder

reactors (17). However, there is also opposition to

nuclear power expansion plans in Russia based on

economic and environmental concerns.

If the United States built special dedicated

LWRs, plutonium in MOX form might be used

19 ~0 Mox fiel fa~catiOn facfitie~ ~ae ~Om@c~ atJ+~Ord to supply me now-c~celed ChchRiver Breeder Reactor. The facility

was never operated, and it is unlikely that it could be reopened to comply with modern safety and environmental standards.
90 Dismantling the Bomb and Managing the Nuclear Materials

and converted to spent fuel. Plutonium would

remain in the spent fuel but be mixed with highly

radioactive fission products that would make it

significantly less of a diversion risk (3). One

analysis estimated that six l,000-megawatt reactors operating for a decade with full core loadings

would convert about 50 tons of plutonium into

spent fuel (3). If the same amount of plutonium

were used as fuel in conventional reactors with

one-third reactor core loadings, the number of

reactors required would increase threefold. This

could add to diversion risks (3). Dedicated

reactors could be built as specially adapted,

safeguarded, and secured for this purpose and

probably located at a Weapons Complex site (3).

However, a potential drawback, according to

some observers, is that construction and operation

of any plutonium fueled reactors might encourage

the United States to adopt a permanent plutonium

fuel cycle that could increase the risks of plutonium diversion and proliferation (15,16).

A few, very preliminary economic analyses

have been done of the use of weapons plutonium

as MOX fuel in civilian power reactors. Some of

these, while emphasizing the proliferation, verification, security, and monitoring aspects of plutonium disposition, conclude that there are no

economic benefits in the use of weapons plutonium as fuel in commercial reactors, even if the

plutonium itself is “free.” At the current relatively low price of uranium, it would cost more to

convert plutonium into MOX fuel and substitute

it for LEU fuel in conventional LWRs (67). One

estimate is that the fabrication cost of combining

plutonium-which is more hazardous to work

with than uranium-into MOX fuel is ‘‘at least”

twice the cost of LEU20 fabrication (3). However,

others emphasize the inherent value contained in

weapons plutonium and see it as an asset to be

exploited. A related viewpoint is that economic

cost-benefit arguments for any option are unlikely

to be key criteria when measured against the

importance of making plutonium less usable for

weapons (5). Finally, according to another analysis, the cheapest and quickest way to get surplus

plutonium into a more proliferation-resistant or

long-term disposal form would be by some direct

disposal option (17).

Other nuclear experts have noted that even if

the primary goal is to convert surplus weapons

plutonium into a proliferation-resistant waste,

then a method such as burning in a MOX reactor

(which would also generate some electricity) may

be attractive. Studies of possible MOX fuel use

have been performed by two utility industry

groups (the Electric Power Research Institute and

the Edison Electric Institute). These studies

conclude that the once-through option21 has merit

(49,60). These studies also support the construction of a dedicated MOX-fueled reactor facility

on a Federal site. Such an approach would avoid

a major change in U.S. commercial regulatory

policies and would enable the existing security

and other infrastructure to be used.

Over the next 10 to 20 years, MOX-fueled

LWRs may have the technical potential to dispose

of large quantities of plutonium with partial core

loadings of MOX fuel (5). This would require that

facilities be built to convert plutonium to plutonium oxide, mix it with natural or depleted

uranium oxide, and then manufacture MOX fuel.

A future problem in need of attention is that

spent MOX fuel would eventually require disposal. Indeed, all schemes that call for use of

plutonium in reactors produce spent fuel. There

are no operable, long-term disposal facilities for

spent fuel from commercial reactors. The outlook

for geologic repositories for spent fuel is uncertain. Investigations of a possible repository site in

Nevada have encountered serious delays and

public opposition, and are unlikely to be completed soon.

ZO me tem ‘Clew-efiched urani~” or LEU, denotes fuel for conventional power reactom that contains 3 to 5 percent urtiuIw235.

21 ‘6(Jnce-~ou@bm~$ refers t. me use of MOX in nuclem reactors as a means to convert the weapons-grade pluto~um irl MOX to tie

more proliferation-resistant reactor-grade plutonium. No recycling of the weapons plutonium embedded in spent nuclear elements is involved.
Chapter 4: Future Disposition of Nuclear Materials from Dismantled Weapons 91

Developing the facilities and transportation for

using plutonium as a fuel in civilian nuclear

power reactors also poses special problems for

nuclear proliferation and security. The environmental, safety, and health impacts of the processing of plutonium through MOX reactor fuel

require updated investigations.

A final problem facing any proposed use of

MOX fuel in commercial reactors is current U.S.

practice of not recycling commercial plutonium.

Such a policy was established in the 1970s after

a long debate about commercial plutonium reprocessing and use in breeder reactors. A Generic

Environmental Impact Statement on Mixed Oxide

(GESMO) was the focus of this debate. The

GESMO project was terminated in 1979 when the

Carter administration announced the policy not to

pursue plutonium recycling. Although this does

not currently prohibit the use of MOX-fueled

reactors, a new Environmental Impact Statement

would be required, and many believe that the

1970s debate would be rekindled (32,60).

 Other Plutonium Fission Options

Several other fission options have been proposed for plutonium processing. One approach

envisions the use of ‘fast” reactors with a metal

fuel cycle. Under some conditions, fast neutron

reactors may be able to fission plutonium more

quickly than light-water reactors. Several countries, including the United States, are developing

fast neutron reactors—usually as ‘breeder’ reactors that produce, rather than consume, plutonium. None is available today as a proven means

of plutonium disposition.

A recent study prepared for DOE’s Plutonium

Disposition Task Force (48) appears to describe

salient features of most of the known approaches

with current data; this study concluded that use of

excess weapons plutonium in fission reactors

could address multiple goals. Certain options

were compared on the basis of proliferation

resistance, environmental protection, and power

generation to offset operating costs (48). Fourteen

different fission options were considered. The

study estimated that the time required to deploy

them ranged from 5 to 25 years, if the resources

to support such development were available. The

study estimated the remaining development costs

of these options to range from $0.1 to $10.0

billion each and concluded that, when developed,

most options would be able to produce sufficient

power for sale to offset substantial portions of the

operating costs.

It is clear that this study began with the notion

that weapons plutonium is an asset. The options

were selected and compared with the primary

goal of obtaining a return on this asset while

meeting an additional goal of making the material

resistant to diversion for future weapons use.

Recommendations made by this study are that

some of the options appear quite promising and

should be analyzed in greater detail. The advanced light-water reactor option with full MOX

core appeared to be the best for relatively early

deployment, and advanced concepts such as the

accelerator-based converter had the best potential

for achieving the greatest degree of plutonium

transformations into more benign elements and

shorter-lived radionuclides.

A number of concepts featuring advanced

reactor or converter designs have been proposed

with plutonium disposition as a primary objective. They all involve nuclear fission reactions in

a device that focuses on long-lived radioisotopes

such as plutonium and attempts to produce such

reactions more efficiently than current reactor

designs.

The descriptions in boxes 4-D, 4-E, and 4-F

illustrate some of the technologies examined.

Each represents an example of an advanced

technological approach. The first is the advanced

liquid metal reactor—a concept that, according to

Omberg and Walter (48), would take about 10 to

15 years to deploy. This estimate is regarded by

certain experts as highly optimistic. The second is

the modular high-temperature gas reactor, a

concept with a 10- to 20-year development time,

and the third is the accelerator-based converter, a
92 Dismantling the Bomb and Managing the Nuclear Materials

Box 4-D--Plutonium Transformation Concept 1:

Advanced Liquid Metal Reactor/Integral Fast Reactor System

The advanced liquid metal reactor/integral fast reactor (ALMR/IFR) has been proposed as a plutonium

disposition option. It was originality designed as a fast breeder reactor for electricity generation (producing more

plutonium than is consumed).

The ALMR design could be modified to consume plutonium and other transuranic actinides instead of

producing them. This feature was promoted as a means to eliminate such actinides in spent fuel from conventional

U.S. light-water reactors. It would still require plutonium reprocessing, and many burning/reprocessing cycles

would be required to significantly reduce the actinide inventory in spent fuel. This proposal is currently being

evaluated by the National Academy of Sciences Panel on Separations Technology and Transmutation Systems

(STATS panel).

With a new interest in disposal of surplus military plutonium, ALMR designers have suggested the possible

use of their design. However, the concept of plutonium transformation using fast reactors appears to have some

limitations. To consume plutonium in a fast reactor requires significant design changes from the original LMR that

was intended to produce plutonium. It could also be expensive: the required reprocessing could multiply the total

volume of radioactive waste by 10, thereby driving up costs (7).

The concept also envisions reprocessing, to separate fission products in spent fuel, and subsequent recycling

of the remaining plutonium. The licensing process would likely be difficult and contentious both for the ALMR

facilities and their associated reprocessing facilities (45). Reprocessing would be either a standard chemical

separation process or a pyrochemical process if one was sufficiently developed. Aqueous waste from the process

would contain transplutonium actinides including neptunium and residual plutonium, although another process

under development at Argonne National Laboratories can recover better t than 99.99 percent of all actinides, leaving

only fission products in the waste solution (6), Fuel fabrication with recycled plutonium (after the first cycle with

pure weapons-grade plutonium) would have to be done remotely in a hot cell because of gamma-emitting actinides

(52).

If it operates according to present designs this option would eliminate most transuranic actinides, including

plutonium, while generating high-level waste. That waste would require a repository, the future availability of which

is unknown.

Deploying ALMRs solely for burning weapons plutonium would be difficult to implement because only a small

amount of plutonium may be made available from weapons dismantlement Proponents usually tie this concept

to a national decision to turn to a plutonium breeding/recycling energy program. Moreover, as a strategy to

eliminate actinides including plutonium contained in spent fuel, this would be very slow compared to many other

direct disposal strategies such as vitrification. To reach a tenfold reduction in the inventory of actinides

accumulated in U.S. spent nuclear fuel (equivalent to burning 90 percent) was estimated to require more t han 100

years (45).

SOURCE: Office of Technology Assessment, 1993.

concept that would take 20 to 25 years to develop radioisotope (e.g., plutonium-239) is converted to

according to the study. Figure 4-4 illustrates the either shorter-lived radioisotopes or stable isomajor steps involved in these three alternative topes by reaction with neutrons produced in a

reactor approaches. nuclear reactor or neutrons created by bombardIn a general sense, all these concepts attempt to ment of a metal target in an accelerator.

convert one atomic species or radionuclide to The three concepts discussed in boxes 4-D

another. A significant percentage of a long-lived through 4-F are merely illustrative of a larger
Chapter 4: Future Disposition of Nuclear Materials from Dismantled Weapons 93

Box 4-E-Plutonium Transformation Concept 2:

The High-Temperature Gas-Cooled Reactor

The high-temperature gas-cooled reactor (HTGR) concept has been under development for other purposes

for along time. its predecessor was the gas-coded reactor designed by General Atomics and operated at Peach

Bottom, Pennsylvania in the 1970s. More recently, the modular HTGR (MHTGR) concept was proposed as the

basis of a new generation of reactors; it was also a possible choice for the new production reactor to produce tritium

for weapons. Proponents of this concept claim that the reactor could act as a plutonium burner, converting a large

percentage of weapons plutonium-239 to plutonium-241 and plutonium-242.

The MHTGR reactor uses fuel particles coated with ceramic materials that allow the long-term,

high-temperature operation desirable for efficient energy production. The neutrons in the core are moderated by

graphite, and the reactor is cooled with helium gas. Designers claim that reactor safety is based on inherent

characteristics, physical principles, and passive design features, rather than on active engineered systems,

operator actions, evacuation or sheltering, or even reactor vessel structural integrity. Core melting is not supposed

to occur even with a loss of coolant accident because of the refractory nature of the fuel. The reactor is contained

underground for added safety.

MHTGR designers have studied several options for “burning” weapons-grade plutonium. in one concept,

more than 90 percent of plutonium-239 is consumed. The spent fuel discharged after 2 years contains roughly

40 percent plutonium-241. Although plutonium-241 is fissile, its half-life is only 14.7 years, much less than

plutonium-239. in one reference design, 50 metric tons of weapons plutonium could be irradiated in six

450-megawatt (thermal) plutonium-fueled MHTGR modules over 40 years. The spent fuel packages would have

some fissile materials in them but would also be contaminated with nonfissile actinides and long-lived fission

products.

Developers of the MHTGR concept point out several weaknesses. This would be a “first of a kind” reactor

with concomitant high costs, There would have to be a program to develop and verify performance of t he fuel and

to develop fuel manufacturing capabilities. Also, the experiential base for this reactor concept is weak. The concept

has also been proposed by the developers for application in Russia. A further claim by the developers is that it

could be used for both tritium production and plutonium destruction.

SOURCE: Combustion Engineering/General Atomics.

number of possible approaches. One of these beyond the basic reactor or converter itself, such

three, the accelerator-based converter (ABC),

which involves the partitioning and recycling of

long-lived fission products and actinides, is

claimed to be capable of destroying essentially all

the plutonium-a process termed ‘annihilation’

by Omberg and Walter (48). The other two are

said to be somewhat less thorough than the ABC

at completely fissioning plutonium and result in

fission of some part of the original plutonium. All

of these concepts involve considerable uncertainty, and much more work would be required to

determine their feasibility. Each requires the

development of various technologies and systems

as systems for fuel fabrication and preparation

and for waste treatment.

All technologies potentially capable of extensive conversion of plutonium will require substantial investments in development to move

them closer to viability. The development time

and effort required for most of these concepts

have not been thoroughly investigated. Many

claims have been made by proponents of certain

systems, but they have not been compared on an

impartial basis. A National Academy of Sciences

panel is studying the transmutation of actinides in
94 Dismantling the Bomb and Managing the Nuclear Materials

nuclear waste.22 Its results, due in 1994, could high-level, Federal Government evaluation of

have applicability to the disposition of surplus

weapons plutonium.

The Omberg and Walter study (48) reviews the

time and effort for developing various plutonium

fissioning concepts and indicates that if several

approaches are pursued simultaneously, a multibillion-dollar program spanning a few decades

would be required before actual, full-scale systems could be tested and proven. A number of

skeptics in the scientific and engineering community doubt promotional analyses claiming that

certain options can both destroy plutonium and

yield economic returns. Any program to develop

these technologies should be based first on a clear

overall national policy regarding the disposition

of weapons material and second on an impartial,

costs, benefits, and uncertainties.

It was not possible for OTA to conduct an

independent analysis of the merits of various

plutonium fission options. However, based on its

general analyses, OTA concludes that it will

probably be necessary to choose among options

before they have been fully studied and developed. Unless a national policy is articulated in a

timely reamer, large amounts of time and money

could be spent on options that turn out to be

contrary to future U.S. policy.

One key policy choice is whether or not

plutonium should have a place in international

commerce. If the answer is yes, the United States

will have to develop the means to manage

plutonium over the long term for possible useful

economic purposes. If the answer is no, the

22 me panel on separations ‘1’eCtiOIOgy and Transmutation Systems (STATS) was organized in late 1991 and haS investigated advanmd

reactor and converter technologies that could be applied to high-level radioactive waste mamgement problems.
Chapter 4: Future Disposition of Nuclear Materials from Dismantled Weapons 95

Figure 4-4-Selected Advanced Reactor/Converter Options for Plutonium Disposition

T

Bo

Warhead retirement

Warhead disassembly

Plutonium

storage

High temperature Advanced liquid Accelerator based converter,

gas reactor metal reactor molten salt reactor,

particle bed reactor

1 , . 1

\ \

ElNuclear

D

Nuclear

reactor reactor

t! t+

El

Reprocessing ~6?

D

Reprocessing ~@

El El

Accelerator

transmutation

El

TIME FRAME

Long-term Very long term

Mid-term (few decades) (several decades)

e = Plutonium processing and high level radioactive waste

El = High level waste or transuranic waste repository storage

SOURCE: Office of Technology Assessment, 1993.
96 Dismantling the Bomb and Managing the Nuclear Materials

United States must find an acceptable means of

processing plutonium via a reactor or directly

disposing of it. Another key policy decision is

whether plutonium should be put into a less

weapons-usable form as quickly as possible. If

this is an overriding goal, then technologies

available in the near term would be favored over

those requiring long and uncertain development.

Proponents of plutonium as waste and other

experts conclude that the primary goal is to

convert plutonium quickly to a form that is most

difficult to extract and reuse in weapons. If this

goal is accepted, then research could be directed

to determine whether disposal of plutonium as

waste is technically feasible and can be accomplished safely at reasonable cost. If conversion

into waste is a goal, the best solution may be

disposal with as little processing as possible. The

option of plutonium disposal without conversion

might be desirable because the infrastructure for

plutonium utilization is not in place in the United

States and there is significant public concern

about its use (5). Moreover, a key reason for the

U.S. abandoning the development of a plutonium

infrastructure in the 1970s was concern that it

would encourage worldwide plutonium proliferation.

 Criteria for Treating Plutonium as Waste

The efficacy of treating plutonium as a waste

may be gauged by the following criteria:

●

●

●

●

Security. The treatment, storage, and disposal of plutonium must be such that the

difficulty of plutonium reextraction from the

waste is high.

Accident. The risk of catastrophic accidents

must be evaluated.

Health and safety. Processing plutonium as

a waste form involves consideration of, and

protection against, health and safety risks to

workers and the public.

Long-term management. Because of its long

half-life, plutonium must be isolated from

the human environment for extremely long

●

periods, and waste treatment must be compatible with long-term management.

Cost. Some nuclear experts believe that the

security benefits of converting plutonium

into a waste form that is proliferation resistant far exceed any potential economic

benefits from its use. The uncertainties

associated with most proposed approaches

make cost evaluations very difficult. However, nonproliferation benefits and the value

of doing something quickly must also be

weighed.

A number of waste disposal options for plutonium have received some attention, including:

●

●

●

●

disposal in a geologic repository,

sub-seabed disposal,

detonation of warheads underground to fix

plutonium in molten rock, and

disposal in outer space.

DISPOSAL IN A GEOLOGIC REPOSITORY

Plutonium could be disposed of as a waste in a

geologic repository. It could be disposed of

directly after being packaged in special containers

or immobilized in a vitrified form prior to

disposal. Criticality requirements, however, must

be developed and accepted.

Direct plutonium disposal in a repository also

requires consideration of other factors. Plutonium

would have to be packaged in small quantities and

in special containers to prevent accidents. Increased criticality concerns and the potential for

recovery of plutonium from the repository may

open up new questions regarding repository

licensing. A serious argument against such direct

underground disposal is that the plutonium could

be recovered easily in the future and, if not

recovered, could pose a significant risk of contamination unless immobilized in a matrix.

If direct disposal of plutonium were unacceptable, the next approach might be to encapsulate it

in a form that could potentially retard its dispersal

into the environment. Encapsulation technology

could also make it difficult and costly to recover
Chapter 4: Future Disposition of Nuclear Materials from Dismantled Weapons 97

the plutonium for reuse, compared with new

plutonium production.23 One option is to vitrify

plutonium without adding any products except

glass. Experts at DOE’s Savannah River Site have

been investigating methods to produce vitrified

glass containing a small percentage of weapons

plutonium. A second option is to mix plutonium

with high-level waste or poisons prior to vitrification. Most experts agree that if appropriate

“poisons’ or other products are added to plutonium, it can, in theory, be made as proliferation

resistant as spent fuel.

Encapsulation technology has been examined

extensively for the high-level waste resulting

from plutonium production (most of the waste is

now in large tanks at Hanford and Savannah

River). A number of different materials with a

wide range of properties for encapsulation have

been considered (including different forms of

glass, ceramics, and cement-related materials,

along with various metal coatings).

These materials possess varying properties in

relation to the isolation of high-level radioactive

waste. Most of them have not been thoroughly

evaluated, manufacturing technologies are not

fully developed, and knowledge of their applicability to weapons plutonium is limited. In 1982,

DOE chose borosilicate glass as the waste format

the Savannah River Site partly because the

manufacturing technology for glass was far more

advanced than that for other proposed waste

forms.

Because glassification of radioactive waste is

an available technology (at least in countries such

as France and the United Kingdom, although not

quite operational in the United States), encapsulation of plutonium in glass could, in theory,

provide a relatively short route to disposition of

plutonium as a waste. Two plants for the vitrification of high-level waste from reprocessing have

been built in the United States. One is at West

Valley, New York (the West Valley Demonstration Plant); the other, the Defense Waste Processing Facility, is at the Savannah River Site in South

Carolina. Both are DOE facilities. Even though

these facilities are nearing startup, they have

suffered long development or implementation

delays. Glassification is the most near term of any

technology, but the remaining engineering and

testing required should not be underestimated

(66).

Although borosilicate glass has been investigated more extensively, other waste forms may

possess better isolation properties for actinides—

an important factor in light of the 24,000-year

half-life of plutonium-239. The use of these other

waste forms for plutonium has the disadvantage

that much more research and development are

required, and thus the relative costs and benefits

are unknown. However, it may be useful to

explore alternatives to borosilicate glass for

plutonium vitrification, some of which could be

more desirable for reducing long-term releases.

Plutonium pits from warheads would have to

undergo some processing before being vitrified.

Plutonium metal is too chemically reactive,

pyrophoric, and insoluble in glass for vitrification. Suitable forms of plutonium for vitrification

include plutonium dioxide (powder or particulate

form) and plutonium nitrate. It maybe necessary

to mix plutonium oxide or nitrate with other

materials prior to or during vitrification. Calcined

materials that could be mixed with plutonium for

vitrification already exist at the Idaho National

Engineering Laboratory and the Hanford Plant.

In May 1993, the Westinghouse Savannah

River Corp. issued a draft report on vitrification

of plutonium (79). The study provides technical

23 plutotiu production involves irradiation of uranium i%el in a nuclear reactor, followed by chemical separation of plutoni~ from tie

remaining uranium and fission products. Because the fmsion products are very radioactive and toxic, chemical separation requires elaborate

facilities with extensive shielding, such as the canyon facilities at Hanford and the Savannah River Site. Recovering plutonium that has been

encapsulated in glass along with high-level waste would be similar to the chemical separation used to produce new plutoni~and therefore

would require access to elaborate and extensively shielded facilities. This is something a large mtionmight support but a terrorist group might

not be able to.
98 Dismantling the Bomb and Managing the Nuclear Materials

information about several vitrification options—

some using existing facilities with modification

and some requiring new facilities. The report

concludes that the most straightforward option

with only slight modification of existing facilities

would require almost 10 years before beginning

operations. Some rough costs are also given in

this study. The least costly option was seen as

vitrification without addition of a radiation

source, and vitrification in a modified reprocessing canyon with added radioactivity would be a

high-cost option. Total costs for vitrifying 50 tons

of plutonium range from $0.7 to $1.6 billion.

Finally, the report notes that research and development for all options is still needed on criticality

safety, defining physical and chemical properties

of the glasses, and developing and demonstrating

performance of processes and waste form.

More detailed, quantitative, environmental,

safety, and cost analyses are required to fully

assess all options for using either existing or

planned high-level waste vitrification plants or,

possibly, a new plant built exclusively to vitrify

plutonium. Worker health and safety considerations would require particular attention to radiation protection measures, especially if fission

products are combined with plutonium and vitrified. Different options would imply varying

storage times for the plutonium from dismantled

warheads because of different startup times for

facilities. The composition of the glass is also

important for its long-term isolation properties,

which will be crucial in protecting the environment from eventual contamination after the disposal of vitrified plutonium. Also, depending on

the product (plutonium and glass alone, or mixed

with poisons and wastes), the difficulty of future

recovery of plutonium may vary considerably.

Although many countries do not have the technology to retrieve plutonium vitrified with high-level

waste, certain nuclear countries such as the

United States and Russia do. In terms of costs, one

must evaluate the economics of plutonium recovery from glass relative to the production of new

plutonium from reactors and reprocessing plants.

I n summary, the direct disposal of plutonium as

a waste-like the option of disposal as spent fuel

after plutonium irradiation-would depend on the

availability of a radioactive waste repository. No

such repository is now available in the United

States nor is one likely to become available in the

near future. A minimum of a few decades will

probably be required before a geologic repository

for high-level commercial spent fuel can be

opened, but so many technical and political

setbacks have been encountered during the past

decade that it is difficult to make realistic

predictions.

Two approaches are most likely in considering

the prospects for disposal of weapons plutonium

in a repository-one is to plan for indefinite

storage of whatever the short-term form is (from

pits to glass logs); the second is to highlight the

need to develop long-term solutions for this

problem, as well as the problem of disposal of

other defense and civilian radioactive wastes.

SUB-SEABED DISPOSAL

Another option that some have advocated is

sub-seabed disposal of plutonium either directly

or as glass logs with waste (57). Significant

investigations have been done in the past on

sub-seabed disposal of spent fuel from commercial reactors (64). These investigations were

suspended several years ago, but some researchers have suggested that it may be appropriate to

study this option for weapons plutonium disposal.

Here again, more analysis is needed to determine

the costs and benefits, and public and international acceptance may be a formidable obstacle.

UNDERGROUND DETONATION

The option of detonating a nuclear bomb

underground as a means of fusing plutonium into

the surrounding rock was suggested by a group of

Russian scientists. Some believe the verifiability

of this option to be good (5). Costs of this nuclear

explosion classification process might also be

low, but no good analysis is available. Irreversibility is problematic because of the possibility of
Chapter 4: Future Disposition of Nuclear Materials from Dismantled Weapons 99

The Defense Waste Processing Facility (not yet

operational) at the Savannah River Plant. Some have

suggested using this facility for vitrification of

plutonium mixed with high-level radioactive waste

from past operations.

recovering the fused rock and leaching out

plutonium (5). The safety and environmental

impacts of this option have not been evaluated to

any degree, and these concerns have blocked

support for serious analysis.

Political and public acceptance would probably be extremely difficult to obtain in the United

States, if not worldwide, and recent decisions

about stopping nuclear testing in the United

States and elsewhere could be affected by a

serious consideration of this option. Thus some

consider this an “option of last resort” (5).

DISPOSAL IN SPACE

The option of deep space disposal of plutonium

could offer irreversibility, proliferation resistance, and verifiability. Concerns about the safety

of such a project center on the possibility of

accidents during launch, with the potential for

plutonium dispersion over large areas (5). Costs,

although currently difficult to estimate, may be

much higher than for other options such as

geologic disposal, although this could be subject

to reevaluation. Very little analysis has been done

on the space disposal option, and almost no

attention has been given to it in the past 10 years.

Most experts have relegated consideration of

space disposal to the bottom of the list.

PLUTONIUM DISPOSITION–CONCLUSION

The discussion above has presented a variety of

approaches for the disposition of plutonium in the

United States from retired and dismantled nuclear

weapons. The following concluding points summarize OTA’s analyses of the available data, with

reference to the technical and political factors in

the United States. Some aspects may be applicable to other countries such as Russia, but different

conditions can also result in very different conclusions. Plutonium disposition is considered by

many to be one of the most difficult problems

faced by those who will manage materials from

retired nuclear weapons. Not only is it a difficult

problem, but it also must be considered in the

wider geopolitical context of security, human

health and safety, and the environment.

●

●

Storage is a necessary first step, regardless of

which approach is selected for the ultimate

disposition of plutonium. The questions

regarding storage are, How long? In what

form? What kind of facility? Where? Decisions about ultimate disposition are unlikely

to be made soon, but even if they are,

significant portions of the plutonium stockpile will be stored for decades. Thus, it

makes sense to move toward a safe, secure,

state-of-the art storage facility rather than

rely on politically sensitive temporary facilities such as those at Pantex, with risky

periodic lifetime extensions.

The use of weapons surplus plutonium as

fuel for U.S. commercial reactors is unlikely

in the near term because of economic factors

and the concerns of U.S. utilities about

regulatory constraints and public opposition.

Further, U.S. policies that discourage commercial plutonium use because of proliferation concerns would need to be reevaluated.
100

●

●

●

●

 Dismantling the Bomb and Managing the Nuclear Materials

The use of a modified light-water reactor

system for disposition of plutonium as

mixed-oxide fuel at a dedicated government

facility is probably a viable near-term approach if proper attention is given to worker

and public health and safety, environmental

protection, and public involvement.

It maybe possible to immobilize plutonium

directly into some waste form such as

vitrified glass, with or without high-level

waste fission products. This approach could

offer proliferation resistance. A rigorous

analysis of the costs and benefits of this

approach, compared with reactor approaches

(e.g., dedicated reactors with 100 percent

MOX fuel loading) that involve subsequent

handling of the spent fuel, would be very

useful. Here again, health, safety, and environmental protection would need adequate

attention.

Decisions about the fate of plutonium from

U.S. weapons should be made with consideration of Russia and other nations that maybe

planning to use plutonium in reactors. Policy

goals should be stated clearly. If the United

States wishes to reduce the world stockpile

of plutonium that is easily available for

weapons, it should take actions to discourage future production, control existing materials, and make them unusable for weapons.

It is all but impossible to fission plutonium

completely (and thus “destroy” it), but

future technological developments may have

the ability to convert it to different radionuclides more effectively than any existing

system. Research into advanced reactors and

accelerators would be costly and require

long development times (decades), so any

program should focus on specific goals.

Research into space disposal or other unconventional options may merit limited support

if they can be justified on the same basis.

DISPOSITION OF HIGHLY

ENRICHED URANIUM

Substantial quantities of highly enriched uranium will result, by the end of this decade, from

the dismantlement of retired weapons. The U.S.

government has made no decisions regarding

whether or when weapons-grade HEU will be

available outside DOE programs. The technology

required to use HEU in commercial or other

reactors, after blending it down to LEU, is

considered simple by many. The logic is that it

will be easy to shunt weapons-grade uranium into

the world’s already established uranium-based

nuclear power industry. Therefore, the interest in

pursuing research into innovative HEU disposition options is sparse.

Significant attention, however, is focused on

the purchase of surplus HEU from Russia and the

consequent use of that material as fuel by the U.S.

commercial nuclear power industry (see chapter

6). U.S. purchases of HEU would provide hard

Western currencies that Russia desperately needs

to bolster its economy and would guarantee that

some Russian HEU will not be used for making

new nuclear warheads.

However, OTA’s analysis indicates that some

problems must be addressed before a program to

utilize warhead HEU can be implemented. More

extensive investigation is needed of the following: the dilution and conversion of warhead HEU

to the LEU used in commercial power reactors;

the testing and operation of conversion facilities;

interim storage prior to conversion; assurance of

adequate safety, security, and verification in

processing and transport; the impact of weapons

surplus uranium on the already depressed U.S.

and worldwide uranium industry; and the uranium dumping suit brought against the former

Soviet Union by the U.S. Uranium Miners Union

and others. It will also be important to develop

clear national policies about what to do with U.S.

military uranium in light of future security needs.

These considerations will influence any decision

on HEU disposition that may be made in the
Chapter 4: Future Disposition of Nuclear Materials from Dismantled Weapons 101

future and should be part of the present planning

process even if no decision beyond storage is

being considered at present.

DOE is reluctant to quickly convert U.S.

weapons HEU for other purposes. Sometime will

also be required to bring any HEU processing

operation on-line and deal with possible disruptions in the uranium market. It appears likely that

HEU (like plutonium) will have to be stored in a

safe, secure manner for the immediate future.

The United States has stopped production of

HEU and is not planning to make any additional

HEU, at least in the near future. In 1992 the Bush

administration stated that U.S. policy was not to

make any more HEU for nuclear weapons and that

DOE had actually ceased producing HEU specifically for weapons in 1964 (22). This announcement formalized what circumstances had already

dictated. The production of nuclear weapons

plutonium effectively ceased after 1988 because

of safety and environmental problems at DOE

reactors and weapons plants (62). However, DOE

continued to produce HEU until 1992 for the

nuclear Navy, research reactors, and defense

production reactors. In addition, the U.S. decision

to cease all HEU production was the recommendation of a high-level task force formed in 1991

to examine HEU options in light of the large

amounts of HEU expected from dismantled

warheads (62).

It is not certain what fraction (if any) of the

HEU coming from retired U.S. warheads will be

converted to civilian fuel,24 as opposed to being

kept for military purposes such as fuel for naval

reactors (which presumably could be modified to

use the slightly lower enrichments) or to make

new nuclear weapons. The possibility of converting a portion of U.S. military HEU for sale in the

commercial LEU industry is being considered

seriously by some. In its report on the National

Defense Authorization Act of FY 1993 (Public

Law No. 102-484), the House Committee on

Armed Services requested a cost-benefit analysis

of blending surplus HEU with LEU and uranium

scrap for use as commercial reactor fuel (14,21).

Some U.S. utilities would also like to see U.S.

military HEU blended to LEU and made available

on the market as fuel for civilian power reactors

in a manner similar to current plans for Russian

military HEU. The first U.S. military uranium

that may be converted to civilian commercial

reactor fuel would probably be HEU that is in

DOE’s inventory but not in warheads. Generating

LEU fuel by blending down HEU, instead of

mining more uranium ore and enriching it, is

environmentally advantageous because it would

avoid the land contamination associated with

mining as well as the energy expenditure associated with uranium enrichment.

At present, there is no apparent effort in the

United States to make available any HEU recovered from dismantling warheads (35). Nevertheless, the United States may come under some

pressure to show reciprocity by converting its

HEU to other uses, if it can be assured that the

Russians are converting their military uranium to

civilian purposes (as required by the pending

Russian HEU agreement). However, the possible

demand for reciprocity in nuclear warhead dismantlement has not received official attention

(38,54). Most Russian officials have expressed

more interest in the economic value of HEU than

in its security value (38). The major pressure so

far for reciprocity has been from other groups and

other nations—particularly related to renewal

discussions of the Non-Proliferation Treaty coming up in 1995. Some believe that resistance to

reciprocity could become a major stumbling

block for future dismantlement (38).

DOE has stated that enough HEU exists either

in its nonweapons inventory or in warheads

scheduled for retirement to meet all U.S. projected military needs for decades. DOE is currently developing plans to reconfigure the Nuclear Weapons Complex to meet these future

needs (68,71). DOE’s Uranium Task Force is

m AS noted emtim, DOE has stated that some quantities of HEU may be declared surplus SOme-e k tie fume.
102 Dismantling the Bomb and Managing the Nuclear Materials

charged with planning for the future of its

uranium operations. The task force concluded that

none of DOE’s weapons HEU is in excess or

should be considered surplus (26), and recommended that U.S. HEU be stored for now. This

would represent a stockpile for future weapons or

other programs and thus delay as long as possible

the need to produce more HEU for defense

purposes (62). Since this recommendation, additional unilateral U.S. and Russian warhead cutbacks and Russian initiatives to sell HEU may

have increased the possibility that some U.S.

HEU will eventually be declared surplus and

converted, although no such decision has been

made (62).

Clearly, storage of weapons-derived HEU must

be anticipated. Presently DOE is planning to store

all of its HEU indefinitely at the Y-12 Plant (26)

and is not actively considering a decision beyond

such storage. Because of the prospects for U.S.

purchase of converted Russian HEU (see chapter

6), all HEU issues have been discussed in that

context. Not much attention has been given by the

Federal Government to possible commercial uses

of U.S. HEU.

DOE has recently extended the work of the

Uranium Task Force in the form of an internal

management plan. DOE has stated that the goal of

the plan is to manage the Department’s uranium

resources in a manner that extends the availability

of uranium to meet user needs without new

production and with minimal budget outlays,

while meeting new environmental, health, and

safety objectives. This plan is classified, and there

are no plans to produce an unclassified version

(26). The plan projects uranium needs through

2005 and sets requirements for facilities in a

reconfigured Weapons Complex. The uranium

needs considered include national defense; fuel

for tritium production reactors, naval nuclear

propulsion, and space nuclear programs; research

and development programs; and unspecified ‘commercial needs. ’ The plan includes a model that

takes into consideration these various needs and

calculates the “crossover’ date, the time when

DOE’s Y-12 Plant, Oak Ridge, Tennessee, where

highly enriched uranium from warheads is now stored.

the need for building new production facilities

could arise. The Uranium Task Force has also

modeled the forms and amounts of uranium

(accounting for all DOE’s uranium) that will be

present after reconfiguration (26).

 Processing and Storage at Y-12

HEU taken from retired nuclear warheads is

now stored at DOE’s Y-12 facility at Oak Ridge,

Tennessee. Y-12 is a large multipurpose facility

with several different missions in both materials

and weapons production, and a long history of

working with uranium (44). In the past, the HEU

components from warheads were removed and

stored in special compartments at Y-12 (29).

Because Y-12 was built piecemeal, materials

do not flow efficiently from place to place. The

buildings are old, and there is a vast amount of

waste on-site. The facility is also much larger than

present or future levels of production require (40).

Uranium operations at Y-12 involve many industrial processes, including casting, smelting, machining, and recycling, as well as different

uranium forms (buttons, solutions, chips). Some

HEU from weapons disassembled at the Pantex

Plant is also processed at Y-12 (37).

DOE and the Y-12 contractors are currently

reorganizing and redefining its mission-from

weapons production to weapons dismantlement—
Chapter 4: Future Disposition of Nuclear Materials from Dismantled Weapons 103

as DOE downsizes the Nuclear Weapons Complex. To improve the efficiency and costeffectiveness of their operations, for example,

Y-12 management recently reduced the number

of operating uranium casting facilities from 12 to

6. Among the functions delineated in the new

mission are: 1) disassembling nuclear weapons

components; 2) storing and managing warhead

materials such as lithium and highly enriched

uranium; 3) transferring technology to the private

sector (74); 4) evaluating and testing particular

weapons system components; and 5) manufacturing components for other government organizations, such as the Navy’s Seawolf submarine

program (37).

CURRENT STORAGE ACTIVITIES

For security purposes, the area comprising the

Y-12 Plant has been divided into three major

zones: two low-security zones and a highly

secured one. The high-security zone or “exclusion area’ contains HEU processing and manufacturing facilities. This area also includes several

facilities used for storing HEU and some radioactive waste generated by processing activities there

(1,78).

The HEU stored at the exclusion area comes

from a multitude of sources, including government and private institutions and universities. The

largest volumes, however, originate from weapons disassembly operations. Upon arrival, the

HEU-containing parts are inspected and temporarily stored (’‘staged’ until the proper facilities

and equipment become available to remove HEU

from the containers or assemblies and prepare it

for long-term storage.

When a decision is made to store HEU

separated from weapons, the material is prepared

for storage by recasting the metal in a specialized

cylinder, placing it in a sealed container, and

storing it in one of the seven operational concrete

vault facilities in the high-security zone. If the

HEU is part of the national strategic reserve, the

container is stored in a location different from that

used for nonstrategic HEU. HEU is generally

stored in concrete vaults commonly known as

tube vaults. Tube vaults consist of cylinders

embedded in a concrete structure in a configuration that prevents any criticality accident. A

typical tube vault can safely accommodate up to

40 metric tons of HEU, and its design life is

estimated to be nearly 100 years (13).

In addition to HEU, Y-12 handles more than 80

other weapons materials and chemicals contained

in weapons assemblies. Although HEU and

certain other materials such as lithium and

tungsten alloys are recycled and stored at the

plant, most of the remaining inventory (e.g.,

aluminum, rubber, nylon, beryllium) is declassified and demilitarized before being made available to commercial facilities for recycling, treatment, or disposal. Considerable reduction in the

amount of materials shipped for treatment and

disposal has been achieved in the last 5 years (13).

 Efforts to Address Weapons

Dismantlement and Possible Impacts

Current plans call for storing HEU and other

essential weapons materials returned from Pantex

at Y-12’s specialized storage facilities. Although

the rate of “returns” has doubled since 1985, no

HEU storage capacity limitations are anticipated

by DOE for the foreseeable future. Since Y-12

receives only part of the total materials generated

by weapons disassembly at Pantex, and since

most weapons production facilities have considerably reduced their operations, plant officials

claim that increases in weapons dismantlement

activities will not constitute an operational or

storage burden (13). Y-12 officials project current

levels of personnel and expertise to be adequate

for addressing future storage and processing

needs for HEU from dismantled weapons.

To ensure proper management of dismantled

materials, Y-12 officials have developed a computer model that estimates and projects work

force needs, staging space requirements, processing and equipment demands, and long-term

storage availability. Documentation detailing the
104 Dismantling the Bomb and Managing the Nuclear Materials

handling and processing steps to be followed for

each particular material returned from weapons

disassembly has also been developed (13). In

addition, safety analyses have been conducted at

facilities where dismantlement activities take

place, as well as where HEU is stored. Plant

personnel are reviewing current processes and

operations to determine whether additional adjustments must be made to successfully address

any future dismantlement-related activities at

Y-12 (8).

One possible result of expanding the storage of

highly enriched uranium from dismantled weapons at Y-12 is an increase in radiation exposure

during inventory assessment. Exposure levels are

currently reported to be very low, particularly

because of the limited ongoing processing and

handling of HEU at the plant. With an increase in

uranium processing and handling, exposures are

expected to rise but—according to a Y-12 official—

not to levels that will pose any risk to plant

personnel or the general public (8).

No comprehensive analysis is available publicly that evaluates the capability of Y-12 to

continue to accept and store HEU from dismantled weapons, particularly since the total quantity

of U.S. HEU is classified. Plant officials do not

expect Y-12 to run out of storage space for HEU.

However, if such a situation developed, DOE

claims that additional space could be obtained by

using any of the recently closed buildings certified for HEU work. Storage space could also be

made available at other facilities, but additional

capital investments may be required.

Prior to a decision to use any additional

existing Y-12 buildings as storage facilities for

HEU, DOE will have to evaluate them in terms of

safety, security, nuclear criticality, and environmental compliance. Because previous work at

these facilities also involved uranium, the level of

analysis required may not be extensive. Oversight

by State agencies and the Defense Nuclear

Facilities Safety Board may also be necessary

(37). Public involvement should be incorporated

in this process.

To avoid the costs associated with expanding

the number of HEU storage facilities, officials at

Y-12 have examined more efficient methods of

storage. A new—as yet unnamed-storage system was reported to have been developed in

December 1992 (13). Little public information

exists, but according to Y-12 officials, the new

system not only allows the storage of large

amounts of HEU at subcritical conditions but is

expected to triple the usable space in existing

vaults.

Management and handling of HEU can lead to

criticality concerns. The availability of criticality

safety experts at Y-12 is limited. With the

expected increase in uranium storage, efforts are

being carried out to support training programs at

the University of Tennessee for future staff.

Several nonengineering personnel highly knowledgeable about Y-12 facilities have also been

trained to become criticality safety experts. Another preventive measure being undertaken to

minimize the potential for criticality safety accidents involves reducing the number of places in

which HEU is handled (8).

Y-12 is one of the largest handlers of HEU in

the world, and this experience could be a factor in

considering a future de-enrichment and storage

site should Russian weapons materials be purchased by the United States in the form of HEU.25

Although HEU de-enrichment technologies have

been employed at Y-12 for some time, its

processing capacity is limited; consequently,

scaling-up will be needed to handle adequately

the much larger volumes of Russian HEU. The

costs that may be incurred in expanding deenrichment technologies have not been studied.

In terms of storage, Y-12 officials claim to have

sufficient storage space to accommodate Russian

HEU, particularly in metallic form (13). If a

25 As disc~s~ in C~pterG, tie c~ent a~ernent to purchase RussianHEU calls for its conversion to LEU kRussia but does not Plude

the possibility of future HEU shipments.
Chapter 4: Future Disposition of Nuclear Materials from Dismantled Weapons 105

decision is made to store or process Russian HEU

at Y-12, a number of technical challenges (such as

the possibility of accommodating Russian monitoring) will have to be considered. It does not

appear that any serious analysis has been done on

this issue to date (8).

If a new storage facility is developed for

plutonium, as discussed earlier in this chapter, it

would be beneficial to consider HEU storage

needs and criteria at the same time. Separate HEU

and plutonium storage facilities maybe warranted

but only if the added cost and difficulty can be

justified.

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2.

3.

40

5.

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26. Fulner, Robin, Defense Programs, and Roger

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28. Guidice, Steve, Assistant Manager for Office of

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29. Howes, Robert, U.S. General Accounting Office,

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30. Johnston, Tom, Combustion Engineerin#General

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32. Ixwenthal, Paul, Nuclear Control Institute, information provided at a meeting with Office of

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Chapter 4: Future Disposition of Nuclear Materials from Dismantled Weapons 1107

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sW, Mar. 11, 1993.
Public

Concerns

and

Information

Access 5

D

ismantling warheads and managing the special nuclear

materials from them pose great challenges to the United

States and to the Government institutions that will be

charged with a variety of complex tasks. A prerequisite

for effective action is a recognition that conducting this work in

the post-Cold War context is fundamentally different in terms of

mission from warhead production during the arms race. Although

some physical tasks may remain the same, they are now part of

a new mission that involves permanent reduction of the nuclear

weapons arsenal. A crucial component of this mission is the need

to provide responsible stewardship of nuclear materials from

dismantled warheads and to develop solutions for ultimate

disposition of these materials in a safe manner that protects the

environment and human health.

Although the world situation has changed dramatically, the

institutional context in which nuclear weapons policies are

developed remains largely as it was throughout the Cold War.

Policy decisions are still being made within the old legislative,

administrative, and cultural framework, and the United States has

failed to develop a national consensus that could lead to a

focused, new policy and provide the basis for a clear, new

mission. The present institutional framework may not be

appropriate to fulfill competently the responsibilities involved in

the new mission.

Discussion and debate about the role of nuclear weapons in

national security continue to be conducted in two largely separate

and distinct arenas. One is dominated by members of the national

security establishment-particularly those with access to classified information--who develop, evaluate, or implement national

Point

“What would be gained from a

public debate on the issue on

the specifics of how the DOD

determines which capabilities it

will maintain in light of

international trends and treaty

obligations ?“

Pentagon reviewer of OTA report

Counterpoint

“Site by site, citizens will have

to join together to force the DOE

to change by saying that they

will not entrust the next 40 years

to the same regulatory and

bureaucratic structure that

created the last 40 years. ”

Local citizen group reviewer

of OTA report

109
110 Dismantling the Bomb and Managing the Nuclear Materials

policy. The other is populated by outsiders,

supporters, or critics of national policy (including

the media and academia), who have opinions but

very limited access to relevant information.

As described in chapter 2, decisions about the

size and makeup of the nuclear weapons stockpile

are made by a Nuclear Weapons Council composed of officials from the Departments of Energy

(DOE) and Defense (DOD). Each year the Council prepares a stockpile memorandum that, when

approved by the President, determines the amount

and status of warheads for the next 6 years. Like

most other matters concerning nuclear weapons

and nuclear materials, these analyses and deliberations are conducted in secret and the results are

disclosed only to those with appropriate security

clearance. The total number of weapons in the

current U.S. nuclear stockpile is classified, as are

the numbers of warheads in either the active

stockpile or the inactive reserve (10).

On the operational level, most decisions about

U.S. warhead dismantlement plans and logistics

are made jointly by DOD and DOE. Decisions

about specific activities are made by each agency

individually. Primary responsibility for producing nuclear warheads rests with DOE; warhead

production programs are thus carried out apart

from the military agency that is the customer for

nuclear weapons—DOD. After they are assembled, DOD takes custody of warheads from DOE

and retains them until they are retired; custody is

then transferred back to DOE for dismantlement

and the disposition of nuclear materials.

Some public interest groups are concerned that

the decisionmaking process regarding nuclear

weapons policies does not permit adequate and

informed public debate on important national

issues. The most fundamental matters involve the

redefinition of international security in light of

the changed world situation, and the role of

nuclear weapons in preserving U.S. national

security. Specific policy matters that are not being

addressed publicly include: 1) the number of

nondeployed nuclear warheads that the United

States and Russia intend to retain as “backups”

for the deployed warheads allowable under current agreements, 2) the number of warheads

planned for retirement and dismantlement over

the next two decades, 3) the amount of nuclear

material from dismantled warheads, and 4) the

ultimate disposition path for nuclear material that

is deemed unnecessary for defense purposes.

Another concern often stated is that, because

DOE has exclusive jurisdiction over all matters

relating to special nuclear materials,l it is not

subject to outside scrutiny in these matters (3).

This arrangement distinguishes weapons-related

activities from atomic energy activities in the

civilian or commercial sector, which are overseen

by the Nuclear Regulatory Commission and other

appropriate agencies (3). Within DOE, nuclear

weapons responsibilities are housed in the Office

of the Assistant Secretary of Defense Programs

(DP). The office, although part of a civilian

agency, has a predominantly military mission. By

law, responsibility for the production, storage,

and accounting of special nuclear materials is

carried out by a deputy assistant secretary for

military applications from the military ranks (11).

Other offices in DOE support defense program

activities or are customers for the nuclear materials produced under its auspices,2 and some

national laboratories play an important role in all

aspects of nuclear weapons research and development.

1 Special nuclear materials are defined by the Atomic Energy Act as “plutonium, uranium enriched in the isotope 233 or in the isotope235,

and any othermaterial which the Commission. . . determines to be special nuclearmaterial. , . but does not include source material” (42 U.S.C.

2014). The IntemationaI Atomic Energy Agency defines “special fissionable material” as “plutonium-239; uranium-233; uranium enriched

in the isotopes 235 or 233; any material containing one or more of the foregoing; and such other fissiomble material as the Board of Governors

shall from time to time determine” (17).

z For exwple, the office of Nuclem Energy (NE) often acts as a‘ ‘customer’ for materials produced by Defense PIWHWM. NE conducts

research and other activities with the materials.
Chapter 5-Public Concerns and Information Access 111

PUBLIC CONCERNS

Public interest groups, concerned about weapons dismantlement and the disposition of plutonium and highly enriched uranium (HEU) from

dismantled warheads, want to participate in

national decisions on this matter. They recognize

that one of the key issues is whether these

materials are considered a resource to exploit, as

in power reactors, or a waste requiring disposal.

Regarding plutonium, many believe that the costs

and waste streams associated with its possible use

in the U.S. nuclear energy industry would be

prohibitive.

Regardless of the final outcome of this debate,

public interest groups realize that an interim

storage period will be required, and they are

concerned about potential health and environmental threats from storage of these materials,

especially plutonium. They are also concerned

about possible international proliferation problems. Domestically, their concerns include: 1) the

adequacy of plutonium interim storage containers

to reasonably ensure health and human safety, 2)

the insulation of interim storage sites from natural

disasters or other scenarios that may endanger the

surrounding area, and 3) the need for independent

oversight of storage facilities and operations.

Until such questions are answered, the public will

remain unconvinced of the safety of DOE’s

interim storage plans.

A long and deeply ingrained distrust of DOE

exists among public interest groups. This distrust

stems primarily from the sense of frustration the

public has from past experience in dealing with

DOE on environmental issues. The concerns

range from the responsiveness of DOE in meeting

requests from the public for information, to a

perception of disregard for public safety and

environmental integrity in deference to production goals. These groups believe that, to some

extent, DOE also distrusts the public, and that this

is most likely the result of an institutional culture

that has put a premium on security and secrecy.

DOE, they feel, is simply not accustomed to

operating and making policy decisions in an open

and public reamer, which has had a negative

impact on its relationship with some sectors of the

U.S. public. The Office of Technology Assessment (OTA) informally surveyed public interest

groups to determine recent experiences in obtaining information about DOE facility operations. A

summary of results is shown in box 5-A.

Regardless of the sources or extent of the

mutual distrust, it has manifested itself as a strong

concern by the public over whether DOE-the

agency responsible for creating the Nation’s

warheads-is the best institution for dismantling

them as well. Most public interest groups near

DOE sites affected by dismantlement see a need

for greater public involvement in decisions affecting dismantlement operations. They strongly

support the concept of including the public earlier

and more actively in relevant decisionmaking

processes. Despite recent efforts by DOE to

respond to these views, public interest groups feel

that effective and meaningful public involvement

is not being achieved. In fact, the consensus is that

negligible progress has been made toward a true

engagement of the public and that DOE continues

to ignore public concerns.

A recent performance evaluation of the operations and maintenance contractor at Pantex confirms this appraisal, noting a significant lack of

management attention to public affairs. During

the evaluation period, the contractor, Mason &

Hanger-Silas Mason Co., Inc. (M&H), was supposed to demonstrate improvement in a proactive,

public affairs and community relations program,

including accurate and early identification of

issues. M&H did not meet this criterion and

expended little effort in the area, apparently

giving it low priority. The evaluation (35) noted

that the:

Pantex Plant’s role in downsizing the nuclear

weapons stockpile has placed it in the world

spotlight. Media, public and activist group interest continues to grow. This facility is slowly

losing ground in terms of public acceptance and
112 Dismantling the Bomb and Managing the Nuclear Materials

the trend will continue at an ever increasing rate

without a concerted effort to develop and implement a comprehensive public affairs program that

continually seeks to present an accurate picture of

Pantex Plant functions to the public.

Incidents highlighting credibility problems at

Pantex are described in box 5-B.

■ Site-Specific Concerns

Activities at DOE Weapons Complex sites

ment for large segments of the population in

adjacent towns and cities. However, many believe

that local economic benefits have come at the

expense of a negative environmental legacy.

Approximately 45 years of nuclear weapons

production, with its associated materials fabrication and processing plants, reactors, and nonnuclear component needs, have caused widespread

contamination that has led to considerable public

concern about health and the environment.

affect surrounding communities in a variety of Because of these integral links to communities

ways. Historically, they have provided employ- that both support and depend on the Weapons

Box 5-A-Public Participation and Access to Information

Weapons dismantlement activities will affect a variety of people who live in areas hosting DOE weapons

facilities. As a result of the presence of these facilities, and the potential hazads associated with them, many local

citizen groups have formed that seek to learn about, monitor, and participate in their planning and operations.

Although specific concerns may vary depending on the site and its associated activity, in general, these groups

seek to participate in t he decisionmaking process to ensure that adequate precautions are taken to protect public

health, worker safety, and the integrity of the environment.

The efforts of these citizen groups have been impaired, however, by the information classification system,

as well as by an ineffective public communications and inquiry structure and the lack of processes to meaningfully

consider and respond to public concerns in DOE’s decisionmaking, OTA informally surveyed a limited number of

citizen groups about their experiences with information requests to DOE regarding environmental, safety, and

health issues. The following responses characterize common problems.

. A fail 1992 request from a Hanford, Washington group about leach and leak testing, hydrogen generation,

and sampling in a Hanford site grout program was responded to in a timely manner; however, “much

information was withheld under ‘predecisional’ status. This has occurred several times with my Freedom

of Information Act (FOIA) requests. DOE appears to circumvent the law by keeping documents in draft form

for extended, unwarranted periods of time” (18).

. At the Savannah River Site, a group documented many requests for information related to plutonium

operations at the facility, Some inquiries, initiated in 1990, are still pending final responses. The respondent

indicated that “greater headquarters involvement in and control over DOE activities has created a

bottleneck which often significantly delays the release of information” and “DOE relies heavily on FOIA

exemptions, as well as classified and unclassified, controlled nuclear information labels. These

mechanisms make it difficult to identify documents related to public concerns and create substantial delays

in the release of information” (6).

● A group located near the Idaho National Engineering Laboratory (INEL) requested a large amount of

information on radioactive and chemical releases from operations and accidents, as well as worker

radiation exposure records. After submitting a FOIA request, the DOE review concluded that the group be

charged $1,227,900 for fulfillment of the request. According to the group, “this figure has more to do with

the line item budget requirements than with the actual costs involved.” The perception is that “DOE has

used every tactic imaginable to frustrate the release of information on INEL” (4).
Chapter 5-Public Concerns and Information Access 113

● Differences have been reported in the timeliness and openness of DOE, depending on the office involved.

For example, a Hanford group stated that “the staff of the Richland Field Office are more responsive than

those at Headquarter s.” Also, differences among divisions of DOE were reported: “It always takes longer

with DP [defense programs] matters. EH and EM [Environment, Safety, and Health and Environmental

Restoration and Waste Management,respectively] officials are almost always easier to deal with.” The

overall assessment was that “DOE does not assign sufficient resources to classification review” (31).

● Even when responses are timely, the information provided is often not directly related to the request, or

is insufficient. In response to a FOIA request by a national group concerning a DOE work order, DOE sent

"

. . . a nearly blank page, except for one sentence at the bottom which read, in its entirety, ‘6. Analysis of

Public Issues will include an analysis of public perception of health and safety risks, and perception of

potential economic risks (e.g., contamination of local crops). The rest of the work order was never

declassified, even in part.” After pursuing the issue for more than 8 months, “DOE has provided . . . nothing”

(27).

These anecdotes illustrate the feelings and perceptions of citizen groups about information accessibility y at

DOE. Though by no means a comprehensive analysis or sample, they illustrate problems. Obviously, not every

request for information is denied, ignored, or delayed. However, the security environment in which DOE is legally

bound to operate, and the dosed nature of many operations, too often hamper legitimate efforts of the public to

educate t hemselves about operations at DOE facilities. Whether intended or not, the effect is t hat public confidence

is eroded. The new Administration has told citizen groups it will give a high priority to solving these problems.

SOURCE: Office of Technology Assessment, 1993.

Complex, many public organizations have been PANTEX

formed that seek to address the environmental and

health issues associated with these sites. Some

groups are now also addressing the environmental

impacts of new warhead dismantlement and

materials management activities.

Virtually all public interest groups concerned

with nuclear weapons issues, and dismantlement

specifically, share common concerns about DOE’s

competence, the public’s access to relevant information, and effective citizen involvement in

national decisionmaking. Although usually organized in response to concerns about a local site,

these groups also recognize and engage the

national scope and international implications of

Weapons Complex issues. However, in addition

to common concerns about DOE’s operations,

public interest groups have problems specific to

the key dismantlement sites: Pantex, the Y-12

Plant, and the Savannah River Site.

Several public groups are involved with, and

concerned about, activities at Pantex. PANAL,

Panhandle Area Neighbors and Landowners, is a

group of Pantex area residents who organized

when Pantex’s mission changed to one of disassembly and storage. The Peace Farm-an area

adjacent to the facility-serves as a community

for arms control and disarmament advocates.

Serious Texans Against Nuclear Dumping (STAND)

was initially formed in opposition to siting a

nuclear waste repository in Texas (29). Pantex

activities, especially relative to dismantlement,

are now the main concern of STAND. The Texas

Nuclear Waste Task Force is a coalition of groups

with various agendas that was formed to resist the

siting of a high-level nuclear waste repository in

Texas. All these groups have joined to form

STAR, the State of Texas Alliance for Resources,

to address concerns that they share about Pantex

(14).

The group that has made Pantex dismantlement

and storage programs the center of its activities is
114 Dismantling the Bomb and Managing the Nuclear Materials

Local citizens living near the Pantex Plant setup an

information booth during DOE hearings on

Environmental Impact Assessment.

STAND. STAND’s current efforts focus on

stopping the open burning of chemical explosives

and stopping Pantex from becoming the longterm storage site for plutonium pits. STAND and

others believe that open burning of explosives

may represent a public health threat. Of particular

concern is fluoride deposition in soil in the

immediate area, which serves cattle grazing and

other agricultural uses. The future plutonium pit

storage issue is particularly worrisome to STAND

because Pantex is already storing large numbers

of pits. DOE is now planning to increase pit

storage capacity in Pantex bunkers (see appendix

A). Some in the local community are concerned

that this will increase radioactivity within the

storage area and, thus, increase worker safety

risks. STAND, as well as the Texas Attorney

General, is also concerned that no plans are being

made to designate an alternative site for pit

storage, which indicates that a decision to use

Pantex for a more extended time may occur by

default. Other concerns of the public interest

groups around Pantex include the impact of

increased waste streams from heightened disassembly activity, the potential contamination of a

large groundwater aquifer in the region, and

worker safety.

Y-12 AT OAK RIDGE

The primary public

with the Y-12 site is

interest group associated

the Oak Ridge Environmental Peace Alliance (OREPA). The Alliance

acts as a public educator about activities at the

Oak Ridge Reservation as well as an advocate for

changes in many aspects of DOE’s operations

there (22). Regarding dismantlement programs,

the Alliance is concerned mainly with the new

waste streams occurring at Oak Ridge, particularly at the Y-12 Plant. Issues of storage capacity

and safety, proper treatment of components classified as waste, and long-term disposition of

uranium from warheads are top priorities. The

group is urging DOE to prepare an Environmental

Impact Statement (EIS) for dismantlement activities at Y-12, or at least have a section of DOE’s

Programmatic EIS for reconfiguration devoted to

these issues. The waste stream concern is particularly acute since the site is already listed on the

Superfund National Priorities List for cleanup.

OREPA also sees its role as that of a “conscience’ for DOE. As dismantlement progresses,

the group will attempt to verify what information

DOE releases, assess its accuracy, and prod DOE

into maintaining a dialogue with the public. This

latter goal derives from distrust of DOE among

local residents, in light of recent revelations about

mercury contamination at the Oak Ridge site. In

1983, it was reported that more than 2 million

pounds of mercury had been released to the

environment during Oak Ridge operations in the

1960s (22). This incident is one of many that have

generated widespread distrust of DOE by the

public and have led to the conviction of public

interest groups that they must act as oversight

bodies.

Another OREPA concern is DOE’s lack of a

formal plan for the role of Y-12 in its dismantlement program. The group is concerned that Y-12

may become a de facto storage site for hundreds

of tons of highly enriched uranium. OREPA

wants to avoid this and seeks to engage DOE, the

State of Tennessee, and other relevant agencies in
Chapter 5-Public Concerns and Information Access 115

Box 5-B-Credibility Problems at Pantex

In July 1992, a Texas Water Commission official accidentally discovered, when determining whether

classified hazardous waste had been stored in a bunker marked for pit storage, that the plutonium pits were stored

in a different configuration than Pantex has consistently represented to the State (23). Instead of drums in rows

arranged along the sides of the bunker, the pits had also been placed in the middle. The specified 4-foot aisle

access space, emphasized by Pantex officials as a protective measure for workers during monitoring and

inventorying operations, was lacking, and the Pantex official entering the bunker had to walk sideways. The Pantex

official claimed that the represented configuration was typical and the particular bunker was experimental. Three

workers entering the bunker did not put on any protective clothing, even though they seemed to know it was

required. The observed configuration did not appear optimum for worker safety. Moreover, Pantex officials

appeared uncertain about the actual number of pits stored in each bunker (23). The varied explanations given by

Pantex for the aberrant configuration do not inspire confidence and appear to be after-the-fact justifications (13).

in April 1992, radioactivity was detected at the high-explosive burning grounds. DOE apparently conducted

an internal investigation but failed to notify the State. The State found out indirectly, several months later, from a

citizen who had heard it secondhand from a Pantex worker. Since the State was not informed of the incident when

it occurred, it was not given the opportunity to participate in the subsequent investigation. The State-DOE

relationship is not enhanced when an incident occurs and State and local officials find out about it months later

from concerned citizens or the local newspaper (13).

SOURCE: Offioe of Technology Aseeeement, 1993.

dialogue with the public in an open decision- and current study proposals to build reactors or other

policymaking process,

SAVANNAH RIVER SITE

The Energy Research Foundation (ERF), located in Columbia, South Carolina, is the lead

public interest group associated with the Savannah River Site. ERF also addresses nationwide

Weapons Complex issues (6).

Public concerns about dismantlement programs at Savannah River include potential plutonium storage and the storage of tritium canisters.

Although current plans do not call for pit storage

at the site, the option has been discussed (plutonium from past production operations is currently

stored there). Tritium canisters, which are fabricated at Savannah River, are being returned and

stored there as warheads are dismantled. ERF has

concerns about ongoing tritium recycling activities that have, in the past, released tritium directly

into the environment and generated tritiumcontaminated waste. Finally, the group wishes to

participate in decisions that may flow from

facilities at the Savannah River Site for plutonium

disposition.

 National Public Interest Group Concerns

In addition to the site-specific organizations

described above, a range of national interest

groups also are concerned with dismantlement

issues. Two of the groups, the Military Production

Network and the Plutonium Challenge, are coalitions of national environmental organizations and

locally based citizen groups. Another national

group concerned with dismantlement issues is the

Natural Resources Defense Council (NRDC).

The Military Production Network (MPN), with

an office and full-time representative in Washington, DC, describes itself as an alliance of 41

grassroots and national organizations that addresses issues of nuclear weapons production and

waste cleanup. Given the change in mission of

many of DOE’s weapons sites, MPN has also

turned its attention to issues associated with

dismantlement. STAND and OREPA are mem-
116 Dismantling the Bomb and Managing the Nuclear Materials

bers of MPN, and ERF is listed as a “friend” of

MPN (19).

MPN seeks to influence national policy by

working with Congress, the Administration, and

specifically, regulatory agencies and DOE on a

range of issues. MPN has issued a formal position

on dismantlement, which calls for DOE to make

public all plans and information regarding storage

of plutonium and highly enriched uranium from

warhead dismantlement, as well as the use of

plutonium as reactor fuel or decisions on its final

disposition. MPN opposes the disposal of transuranic and mixed transuranic wastes at the Waste

Isolation Pilot Plant, and calls for more public

involvement and environmental sensitivity in the

DOE decisionmaking process.

The Plutonium Challenge, organized in 1986,

began as a coalition of arms control and environmental groups that supported a ban on the

production of weapons-grade plutonium. Recently, it has widened its agenda and addresses

several issues concerning the Weapons Complex

and nuclear arms. The coalition meets each week

to develop legislative strategies aimed at congressional action. The Plutonium Challenge intentionally limits its focus to a few key issues, and

dismantlement is currently not a priority. Although the coalition has not issued or announced

a formal stance on dismantlement, it monitors

events and considers the impacts of weapons

dismantlement on its overall agenda (9).

The Natural Resources Defense Council, founded

in 1970, is a public interest group composed of a

staff of attorneys, scientists, engineers, and public

policy specialists with expertise in environmental, energy and resources, economic, and

proliferation and disarmament issues. NRDC

works on a wide variety of issues in these fields,

and has initiated efforts to address warhead

dismantlement and nuclear materials disposition

as well (5).

NRDC has long focused on nuclear weapons

policy and planning, and is considered an authority on the history and processes related to nuclear

weapons production. Its Nuclear Weapons DataCitizen activists from the United States and Russia

meet at the DOE Savannah River Site.

books are widely recognized as the authoritative

information source for nuclear weapons issues.

Recently, NRDC, in cooperation with the Federation of American Scientists, has hosted a series of

international workshops on dismantlement. These

meetings highlighted a number of issues that were

later pursued in negotiations with former Soviet

officials by U.S. Government agencies.

One of NRDC’s chief interests within dismantlement policy is that a system of verification

and information exchange between the United

States and the former Soviet Union be developed

to address the risks of fissile materials proliferation. The long-term disposition of special nuclear

materials from dismantlement is also a primary

concern of NRDC. Like the local groups, NRDC

places a premium on the openness of, and public

involvement in, the nuclear weapons dismantlement decisionmaking process.

INFORMATION ACCESS

To control the dissemination of information

that could threaten national security, certain

restrictions on access to “atomic energy” information have been established. Certain information and data regarding nuclear weapons activities

must be protected to prevent the proliferation of

nuclear weapons, as well as terrorist threats such
Chapter 5-Public Concerns and Information Access 117

as the theft of special nuclear materials or

weapons, the diversion of these nuclear materials,

or sabotage of nuclear weapons facilities.3 These

restrictions were established in the Atomic Energy Act (AEA) (42 U.S.C. section 2011-2296

(1982 and Supp. IV 1986)) and its amendments,

as well as in the security classification systems

subsequently developed by DOE and DOD. Both

agencies carry out their respective nuclear weapons missions under complicated systems of information classification and security. These systems

are based on a comprehensive set of laws,

Executive orders, and internal rules and orders.

The primary legal foundation for DOE’s information classification and security system is the

Atomic Energy Act of 1954, as amended (3). The

act defines Federal agencies’ obligations with

respect to controlling information related to

atomic energy defense programs. DOE also

works with “National Security Information,”

which is regulated under an Executive order;

however, atomic energy information is controlled

exclusively by the act (12).

Under the AEA, a broad scope of information

related to atomic weapons and processes involving special nuclear materials is categorized as

“Restricted Data”4 and deemed classified from

the moment it is produced (i.e., it is “born

classified" (16). This condition is unique to

nuclear information under the control of DOE.

Such data may be declassified only by a positive

action of DOE. In the case of information that has

been removed from the Restricted Data category

and placed under joint control of DOE and DOD

(“Formerly Restricted Data,” related primarily

to the military utilization of atomic energy), a

decision to declassified must be made jointly by the

two agencies. DOE also issues its own orders

delineating procedures and guidelines for handling information classification and security.s

Restricted Data, once produced, remain classified indefinitely. That is, there is no expiration

date beyond which such information becomes

unclassified. The Atomic Energy Act does, however, mandate that classified information be

continuously reviewed and declassified when

conditions merit (3).

DOE has no office or formal organization that

deals exclusively with declassification,6 but it

does have a process for declassification of Restricted and Formerly Restricted Data (34). The

Office of Classification within the Office of

Security Affairs issues biennial calls for declassification proposals from DOE programs, field and

operations offices, and contractors. (Since 1990,

the Office of Classification has issued two

biennial calls.) The Office of Classification then

reviews the proposals to determine whether the

requesting office has adequately justified the

action. 7 Many criteria are used to judge whether

classified information may be declassified, including:

the extent to which the information would assist

in the production of special nuclear material, . . .

the benefit to be realized by the U.S. program

from the declassification action ... , [and] “the

cost to the U.S. program by the continued

classification of the information (34).

3 For a thorough description of why information requires classitlcation protection, see reference 25.

A “me tem ‘Res~cted Dam’ me~ all data ~ncerning (1) desi~ ~ufacture, or UtibtiOn Of atOmic wwpom; (2) tie production of

special nuclear mater@ or (3) the use of special nuclear material intheproductionof energy, but shall not include data dedassifkd or removed

from the Restricted Data category pursuant to section 2162 of this title” (42 U.S.C. section 2014(y)).

5 DOE Order Series 5600 provides guidelines for DOE personnel working with classified or controlled information.

G The Oflice of Classification within the Ofilce of Security Affairs, which is part of the OffIce of Intelligence and National Security, is the

organizational element with responsibility for classiilcatiom declassification and Unclassified Controlled Nuclear Information.

T The biennial call declass~lcation process is the normal procedure for declassitlcation actions. However, departmental elements may

submit requests for declassification reviews at any time.
118 Dismantling the Bomb and Managing the Nuclear Materials

A schedule for accomplishment of the review

process is also set by the Office of Classification.

The recommended declassification actions are

then distributed to all offices and organizations

involved and, if appropriate, to the Department of

State and the Arms Control and Disarmament

Agency for input on proliferation concerns. Comments from these reviewers, as well as the Office

of Classification, are then forwarded to a Technical Evaluation Panel, which reviews the proposals and recommends either for or against the

requested action. The panel consists of three

nuclear weapons experts, one from each of the

weapons laboratories: Sandia, Lawrence Livermore, and Los Alamos (15). The recommendations of the Technical Evaluation Panel are then

forwarded to the Office of Security Affairs for

approval or disapproval. Approved declassification actions are implemented through internal

DOE bulletins or revisions to classification guidelines (34).

Although the Office of Classification is the

organization with authority over classification,

declassification, and unclassified but controlled

information within DOE, it is not the only

departmental element with influence on classification policy. Most of the classified information

or material within DOE is “owned” by Defense

Programs, which exercises a degree of control

over all declassification decisions (37).

In addition to classified information, DOE has

special procedures for information that is not

classified but is judged to be sensitive. ’ Several

categories of unclassified, yet limited-use, information exist. The most important category with

regard to weapons dismantlement is ‘ ‘Unclassified, Controlled Nuclear Information” (UCNI),

which is related to nuclear activities and was

promulgated in regulations required by the Atomic

Energy Act. The AEA prohibits unauthorized

dissemination of UCNI, and regulations (10 CFR

1017) specify the legal conditions for dealing

with such information.8 Generally, UCNI is not

available to the public unless one requests, and

justifies, ‘special access’ under the provisions of

the law.

The need for the UCNI category has been

questioned by some (1,20,40). Given the sweeping nature of AEA’s information classification

authority, as well as other governmental provisions for information security, UCNI has been

criticized as redundant and unnecessary for the

adequate protection of information on atomic

energy defense programs. A key difference between UCNI and most other classified DOE

information is that data are categorized as UCNI

after a judgment is made by DOE, rather than as

a presumptive condition of the material (as with

Restricted Data).

In one case, a document was categorized UCNI

and, after heightened interest and inquiries from

citizens and public interest groups, released to the

public in a ‘‘sanitized” form.9 Apparently, the

sanitized version differed from the UCNI document very slightly, which indicated that, with

minimal effort, a version could have been made

publicly available at the same time the DOE

version was completed. Had this occurred, DOE

could have made progress in establishing positive

communication and openness with the public, and

improved the level of trust and credibility with the

public. However, the need for continued inquiry

and pressure from citizens and public groups

frustrates the process and damages the image of

DOE.

DOE also handles information classified under

security provisions other than the AEA. The legal

basis for other than Restricted Data and Formerly

Restricted Data categories is Executive Order

12356, issued by President Reagan in 1982 (12).

Executive Order 12356 governs the classification

of “National Security Information. ” National

s DOE Orders 5635.4 and 5650 describe agency procedures for identifying and protecting UCNI.

g The document in this case was a Safety Analysis Report conducted to analyze risks and conditions associated with increased storage of

plutonium pits at the Pantex facility.
Chapter 5-Public Concerns and Information Access 119

Security Information differs significantly from

Restricted Data and Formerly Restricted Data in

that it requires a positive action by an agency or

authorized official to classify something. National Security Information is defined by Executive Order 12356 as falling into 10 categories,

including:

(1) military plans, weapons, or operations; (2) the

vulnerabilities or capabilities of systems, installations, projects, or plans relating to the national

security; . . . or (7) United States Government

programs for safeguarding nuclear materials or

facilities.

Thus, it is clear that Executive Order 12356 can

also apply to DOE Weapons Complex activities

and operations (but not to atomic energy information encompassed by the Atomic Energy Act).

President Clinton has recently directed a comprehensive review of the National Security Information classification system that will culminate

in the preparation of a new Executive order to

replace Executive Order 12356. The Review

Directive states that:

[W]e should re-evaluate our security classification and safeguarding systems. . . to ensure that

they are in line with the reality of the current,

rather than the past, threat potential (24).

The Directive outlines specific questions to be

addressed as part of the review, including: What

steps can be taken to avoid excessive classification? What steps can be taken to declassify

information as quickly as possible? It is important

to distinguish, however, that the Presidential

Review Directive addresses National Security

Information and not Restricted Data (which is

regulated by statute). Thus, the status of information such as nuclear materials stockpile amounts

and numbers of weapons in the stockpile or slated

for retirement and dismantlement will not change

as a result of the review.

Besides the legal foundation that restricts

access to information, the limited infrastructure

and resources devoted to information classification and declassification at DOE hamper effective

and timely response to public information requests. Responses to requests for information are

often slow and insufficient. Information and

documents that are disseminated are too often

released only after great time and effort have been

expended by the requester. Even when the final

action is a denial due to classification of the

information, it is not uncommon for DOE to take

months, or sometimes years, to respond to a

request (6,18,26,27).

Undoubtedly, a large part of this problem is due

to the constraints under which the Office of

Classification operates with respect to financial

and human resources. The Office of Classification has been level-funded since 1980, and

recently experienced a significant reduction of

funding in relation to its total budget. These cuts

have had a particularly adverse impact on its

ability to respond to Freedom of Information Act

(FOIA) (Public Law 89-487) requests.l0 Although mechanisms do exist for the routine

review of classified material, and its subsequent

declassification if deemed necessary, they are

overloaded.11

The statutory and practical restrictions on

information access also affect the accessibility to

the public of the Defense Nuclear Facilities

Safety Board (DNFSB), which has the authority

10 me Fre~om of ~o~tion A@ which allows citizens to request access to government information not generally made available, and

to challenge the withholding of iuformatio~ has an exemption for ‘ ‘properly classiiled’ material. Although FOIA places the burden on the

“owner” agency to justify the denial of access to information or documents, all properly classifkd material is exempt from provisions of the

act. FOIA requests are sometimes responded to by releasing an unclassified version of the restricted material, complete with blacked-out

sections of text or charts.

11 III lgg2, tie Office of Ckssification mview~ approximately 150,000 classified documents categorized as envtimnental, he~tk and

safety information. The number of people engaged in and authorized for review activities is approximately 100 (37). In contrast, more than

5,000 people agency-wide have some type of classiilcation authority (30).
120 Dismantling the Bomb and Managing the Nuclear Materials

to oversee nuclear weapons facility activities and

advise DOE about improving the safety of those

activities. Citizens have found that many documents generated by the Board are categorized by

DOE as UCNI (which are available only after they

have been “sanitized”). Others are difficult to

get, often requiring a FOIA request. The Board

also keeps a restricted database to which the

public does not have access (7). In 1990, a lawsuit

was filed against the Board that ‘‘challenged the

Board’s position that it was not an ‘agency’ for

purposes of the Sunshine Act and the Freedom of

Information Act” (36). A Circuit Court of Appeals ruled that the Board must be considered an

“agency” and must therefore develop rules for

complying with the acts. However, the Board was

allowed to hold closed meetings on recommendations regarding safety and health at DOE defense

nuclear facilities since its enabling statute includes language interpreted by the Court to allow

this (36).

In addition to affecting public access to information such as numbers of nuclear weapons and

materials, security limitations hinder access to

information about the environmental, safety, and

health aspects of activities at DOD facilities that

house nuclear weapons; at DOE’s Nuclear Weapons Complex; and with respect to the transportation of nuclear weapons and materials. Recent

investigations suggest that the process for implementing nuclear weapons policies-which has

historically given priority to national security

considerations, at the cost of neglecting the

protection of human health and safety, and the

preservation of the environment-has not greatly

improved (2,21,28,32,38).

National public interest groups and citizens

near certain Weapons Complex sites are complaining that current rules restrict their access to

environmental, health, and safety data that have

little to do with national security. At the local

level, the failure to disclose such data has

contributed to a lack of trust of Federal agencies

and has promoted an adversarial relationship

between DOE and its contractors on the one hand,

and States, community groups, or other interested

parties on the other. There are concerns that it may

also allow the environment, health, and safety to

continue to be relegated to a low operational

priority in Weapons Complex activities.

Recently, the Office of Classification has

undertaken initiatives to address the issues and

problems described (see box 5-C). A draft Classification Policy Study was completed that made

several recommendations aimed at modifying the

classification environment to adapt to new international security conditions. Also, a departmentwide environmental, safety, and health initiative

included a directive to review such information

and to prepare future environmental, safety, and

health documents with “an eye toward public

release” (33).

In sum, DOE now has discretion to limit access

to a broad range of information relevant to

weapons dismantlement and nuclear materials

management. As a result, the public’s ability to

acquire adequate and timely information regarding environmental, safety, and health issues

related to these activities is greatly impaired.

Information that citizens consider essential to

discussions of safety and health is often inaccessible to interested persons outside DOE because it

is classified or otherwise tightly controlled. Citizens frustrated by lack of access to information

are not likely to trust the agency or support its

plans and programs (39). Yet such trust and

support are critical if warhead dismantlement and

materials disposition programs are to gain needed

public acceptance.

APPROACHES FOR INSTITUTIONAL

CHANGES

If progress is to be made toward warhead

dismantlement and sound materials disposition, it

will be necessary to move from the present

situation of scattered ideas and initiatives to a new

approach of developing broadly acceptable goals

and objectives on which to carry out focused

solutions and attain desired results. A major
Chapter 5-Public Concerns and Information Access 121

Box 5-C-Recent Initiatives Regarding Information Access

President Clinton, as well as the Department of Energy, has recognized the need for modifying the system

under which government information is classified and controlled. Greater public interest and concern about the

Nation’s defense programs (including nuclear operations) domestically, as well as fundamental changes in the

international security environment, have pointed out the need for a reevaluation of the system and goals under

which information is classified. DOE has undertaken initiatives to respond to these needs.

DOE Office of Classification. A Classification Policy Study was completed in fiscal year 1992 and is currently

in draft form. Its recommendations included the following:

. Redefine restricted data to reflect changes in the security environment, as well as respond to the current

state of published information. This recommendation would require amending the Atomic Energy Act.

. Provide authority for the Secretary of Energy to communicate Restricted Data to other countries. Currently,

other nations may release information that is, by U.S. standards, Restricted Data and thus may unwittingly

aid proliferants.

. Eliminate the Formerly Restricted Data Category. information removed from the Restricted Data Category

could be protected adequately as National Security information.

● Allow the authority to reclassify some areas of information. The study found that mandatory declassification

of entire areas of information may be too comprehensive. Technological breakthroughs in areas such as

special nuclear materials production ought to be classified, for example, but current enrichment techniques

should be released.

. Define the scope of Unclassified, Controlled Nuclear information more precisely.

. Conduct a comprehensive review of all nuclear weapons information, with the objective of removing all

information no longer needed to be classified.

DOE Environment, Safety, and Health initiative. AS part of the Secretary of Energy’s Safety and Health

Initiative (May 1993), DOE was directed to “begin review of Departmental classification procedures and

information polices governing public release of documents pertaining to environment, safety and health matters”

(33). The review is being directed jointly bythe Director of the Office of intelligence and National Security and the

Assistant Secretary for Environment, Safety, and Health. Furthermore, the Secretary directed that “all

environment, safety and health documents of the Department of Energy will be prepared with an eye to public

release” (33).

SOURCE: U.S. Department of Energy, 1993.

challenge for the Federal Government as a whole, will need to establish an institutional structure

and the specific agencies engaged in these tasks,

is to undertake and manage this new post-Cold

War mission in a reamer that is competent,

responsible, and credible. To achieve successful

warhead dismantlement and materials management policies and programs in the United States,

the Government will need to establish clear

policies and well-defined objectives appropriate

to present conditions.

The institutions responsible for these tasks

must be made equal to the challenge. The Nation

dedicated to excellence and openness, and to

make protection of the environment, safety, and

health a working priority in both dismantlement

and materials management activities. In addition

to a new openness in making and carrying out

decisions, effective warhead dismantlement and

materials management will require consistent and

enduring talent, dedication, and astute management—

qualities that government agencies often find

difficult to sustain without adequate leadership

and vision. Programs and plans will need to be
122 Dismantling the Bomb and Managing the Nuclear Materials

developed through a process that has broad public

acceptance, as well as the flexibility to adapt to

changing technical and political parameters over

the long period during which nuclear materials

must be managed.

However, OTA’s analyses show that U.S.

dismantlement and materials management efforts

have lacked focus, direction, and coordination.

There has been little informed discussion at high

levels of government in terms of planning for the

ultimate disposition of special nuclear materials

from warheads.

OTA has concluded that the institutions involved in attaining these objectives must meet the

following criteria: a management process and

culture that give priority to protecting the environment and human health, and promoting safety;

internal accountability and external independent

regulation or oversight; a mechanism for making

information accessible rather than restricted; and

a management philosophy of openness, fairness,

and public involvement in decisionmaking.

The traditional limitations on access to information about nuclear matters have prevented

environmental, health, and safety data from being

released and discussed publicly. Lack of relevant

information about these factors has heightened

public concerns, destroyed public trust and confidence, and increased public opposition to proposed agency actions. If the dismantlement and

materials disposition activities are to gain public

acceptance, it will be necessary to modify existing limitations on information access and to make

data relevant to these aspects of nuclear warhead

dismantlement and nuclear materials management easily available to interested citizens.

Further, the ongoing activities and plans with

respect to weapons dismantlement and materials

management are being conducted without meaningful public involvement. Yet experience from

other major nuclear materials management programs-such as the attempt to site repositories for

high-level commercial spent fuel, defense transuranic waste, and low-level waste-has shown that

when the public, the States, and other affected

parties are not effectively included at all stages of

relevant deliberations and decisions, proposals by

Government agencies are inevitably delayed or

derailed. An open, consensus-building process

that allows all relevant views to be heard before

decisions are made on environmental, health, and

safety matters would appear to be essential if key

issues (e.g., whether materials from weapons

should be used for commercial purposes, whereto

site nuclear materials storage and processing

facilities) are to be resolved with satisfactory and

publicly acceptable results.

CONCLUSION

Policies developed entirely behind closed doors

are unlikely to achieve public acceptance, particularly decisions that involve significant amounts

of Government spending. Public support is necessary for these types of policies to succeed, and

public understanding of the issues is a prerequisite for support. Policy development in these

areas will depend on the definition of international security in this post-Cold War era—a

definition that will inevitably involve not only the

role of nuclear weapons but also other concerns

relevant to changing conditions. To meet these

conditions, anew definition should include broader

concepts such as protection of the environment,

human health, and safety in a nonmilitary context.

For effective policy development, information

access will have to be enhanced and participants

in the debate will have to come from more sectors

of government and society than in the past.

Not only will experts and policymakers at the

Departments of Defense, State, and Energy, and

the rest of the national security and disarmament

communities have to be involved, but the discussion must also bring in the views of those who, in

a broader context, have knowledge, authority, and

specific interests in protecting human health and

safety and preserving the environment. Little will

be accomplished unless an informed Nation

agrees to pursue common goals regarding nuclear

warhead dismantlement, and nuclear materials
Chapter 5-Public Concerns and Information Access 123

management and disposition, that preserve the

environment, health, and safety.

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2.

3.

4.

5.

6.

7.

8.

9.

10.

11.

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Adler, Allan R., “Public Access to Nuclear

Energy and Weapons Information,” Controlling

the Atom in the 21st Century (Boulder, CO:

Westview Press, forthcoming).

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the U.S. Department of Energy, Final Report to

the Secretary of Energy, “Final Report on DOE

Nuclear Facilities,” November 1991.

Atomic Energy Act of 1954, 42 U.S.C. Sec.

2011-2296 (1982 and Supp. IV 1986).

Broscious, Chuck Director, Environmental Defense Institute, to Paul Carroll, Office of Technology Assessment, Nov. 13, 1992.

Cochran, Thomas, William M. Arkin, Robert S.

Norris, and Milton Hoenig, Natural Resources

Defense Council, Nuclear Weapons Databook,

Vol. II (Cambridge, MA: BaUinger Publishing

Co., 1987).

Costner, Brian, Director, Energy Research Foundation, personal communication to Paul Carroll,

Office of Technology Assessment, Nov. 11,1992.

Costner, Brian, Director, Energy Research Foundation, personal communication, Mar. 30, 1993.

Costner, Brian, and Francis Hart, Directors, Energy Research Foundation, Columbia, SC, letter

to membership, Jan. 14, 1993.

Culp, David, Director, Plutonium Challenge, Washington, DC, personal communication, May 26,

1993.

Defense Nuclear Agency, “Description of Nuclear Weapons Dismantlement Process,” memorandum prepared for Office of Technology Assessment, November 1992.

Department of Energy Organization Act, Public

Law 95-91, Title III, Sec. 309.

Executive Order 12356 on National Security

Information, Apr. 2, 1982, 4 FederaZ Register

14874 (Apr. 6, 1982).

Gattis, Beverly, President, Serious Texans Against

Nuclear Dumping (ST~), to Ernilia Govan,

Office of Technology Assessment, Sept. 23,1992.

Gattis, Beverly, Director, Serious Texans Against

Nuclear Dumping (ST~), to Jan Linsenmeyer,

Office of Technology Assessment, Mar. 6, 1992.

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23.

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28.

Gray, Miles, Chief, Weapons Branch, Office of

Classification, U.S. Department of Energy, personal communication, June 2, 1993.

Hewlitt, Richard, “The ‘Born Classified’ Concept

in the U.S. Atomic Energy Commission,” study

prepared for the House Government Information

and Individual Rights Subcommittee of the Committee on Government Operations, May 1980.

International Atomic Energy Statute, as amended

up to June 1, 1973, Article XX, p. 6-5.

Martin, Todd, staff researcher, Hanford Education

Action League, personal communication to Paul

Carroll, Office of Technology Assessment, Dec.

4, 1992.

Military Production Network, pamphlet, Washington, DC, March 1992.

Napier, John, comments at Office of Technology

Assessment, Advisory Panel Meeting, May 5,

1993.

National Academy of Sciences, The Nuclear

Weapons Complex--Managementfor Health, Safety,

and the Environment (Washington, DC: National

Academy Press, 1989).

Oak Ridge Education Project, A Citizens Guide to

Oak Ridge (Knoxville, TN: Education Project,

May 1992).

Olinger, Nancy E., Assistant Attorney General,

Environmental Protection Division, State of Texas,

personal communication to Kenneth M. Pusateri,

Defense Nuclear Facilities Safety Board, Sept. 18,

1992.

Presidential Review Directive, National Security

Information, Washington, DC, Apr. 26, 1993.

Quist, Arvin S., Security Classification of Information, Vol. 2: Principles for Class@cation (Oak

Ridge, TN: U.S. Department of Energy, April

1993).

Schwartz, Stephen, Washington, DC representative, Military Production Network, personal communication to Paul Carroll, Office of Technology

Assessment, June 30, 1992.

Schwartz, Stephen, Washington, DC representative, Military Production Network, personal communication to Regina Hunter, Sandia National

Laboratories, June 30, 1992.

Secretarial Panel for the Evaluation of Epidemiologic Research Activities for the U.S. Department
124 Dismantling the Bomb and Managing the Nuclear Materials

29.

30.

31.

32.

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of Energy (SPEERA), “Report to the Secretary,”

March 1990.

Serious Texans Against Nuclearkping (ST~)

of Amarillo, Inc., Information Sheet, 1992.

%n.isgalli, A.A., Chief, Programs Operations

Branch, Office of Security AiYairs, U.S. Department of Energy, personal communication, Apr.

29,1993.

Thomas, Jim, Research Director, Hanford Education Action League, to Paul Carroll, OffIce of

Technology Assessment, Dec. 4, 1992.

U.S. Congress, Office of Technology Assessment,

Hazards Ahead: Managing Cleanup Worker

Health and Safety at the Nuclear Weapons Complex, OTA-BP-O-85 (Washington, DC: U.S. Government Printing Office, Febrwq 1993).

U.S. Department ofEnergy, “Environment, Safety

and Health Initiative,” May 1993.

U.S. Department of Energy, “MemcmanclUxn cm

Department of Energy Declassification Procedures,” May 1, 1990.

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Office, “Award Fee Performance Evaluation

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Report for the period: April 1, 1992-September

30, 1992,” Contract DBAC04-91AL65030, Mason

& Hanger-Silas Mason Co., Inc., Pantex Plant.

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Facilities Safety Board, Annual Report 1992

(Washington, DC: U.S. Department of Energy,

April 1993).

U.S. Department of Energy, Office of Classification, meeting with Office of Technology Assessment, June 23, 1993.

U.S. Department of Energy, Office of Environment, Safety, and Health, Tiger Team Assessments, various sites and dates.

U.S. Department of Energy, Secretary of Energy

Advisory Board, “Report of the Task Force on

Radioactive Waste Management,” 1993.

Werner, James, Senior Environmental Engineer,

Natural Resources Defense Council, personal

communication to Assistant Secretary for Defense

Programs, U.S. Department of Energy, Oct. 1,

1990.
Opportunities

to Aid

Russian

Dismantlement 6

T

he breakup of the Soviet Union and the end of the Cold

War present a unique opportunity for the United States

and the republics of the former Soviet Union to begin

dismantling their nuclear arsenals. Unilateral and bilateral agreements and announcements have formed a basis for both

sides to retire weapons systems, destroy delivery vehicles such

as missiles, and perhaps make progress in dismantling the

nuclear warheads themselves.

The challenge of true mutual and significant reduction of the

nuclear stockpile, however, still faces both nations. The United

States has begun its own activities to dismantle nuclear

warheads, as described in chapters 2 and 3. The extent of

corresponding activities in Russia is not clear, but some work is

under way.1 Both nations have made a variety of proposals, and

certain agreements are being discussed, but no specific actions

have been taken to dispose of nuclear materials from retired

warheads. Russia is currently struggling with economic and

political problems that may relegate warhead dismantlement and

materials disposition to a low priority.

Nonetheless, the United States has expressed its intention to

encourage nuclear weapons dismantlement and materials disposal activities in Russia and other former Soviet republics to the

maximum extent feasible and has developed its own programs of

assistance as a means of helping stockpile reduction become a

reality. Congress has provided for a number of recent initiatives

aimed at assisting the former Soviet Union to proceed with

warhead dismantlement in a safe, secure, and timely manner.

1 Although no U.S. oftlcials have veriiled warhead di smantlement rates in Russi%

some U.S. experts believe that recent statements and evidence indicate a cument rate of

1,500 warheads per year (7,1 1).

“Among all the huge renewal

projects facing Russia today,

the main goal is the revival of its

industries, including its atomic

industry. There are about a

million people working for the

Ministry of Atomic Energy. We

are capable of dismantling up to

5,000 warheads per year. But in

order to do this, it is first

imperative to undertake and

ensure the necessary

organization, financing, and

provisions for the disposal of

nuclear waste. ”

1992 speech by Viktor Mikhailov,

Minister of Atomic Energy of the

Russian Federation

125
126 Dismantling the Bomb and Managing the Nuclear Materials

This chapter summarizes the information available from unclassified sources about activities,

programs, and plans in Russia. It also discusses

current U.S. efforts to assist Russian dismantlement and evaluates how well such programs work

to reduce future risks from nuclear weapons and

materials. Recent progress made in these areas,

and prospects for moving forward, are also

evaluated.

WARHEAD DISMANTLEMENT IN RUSSIA

The information available on matters related to

nuclear weapons activities in the former Soviet

Union is very limited, and sometimes conflicting

or ambiguous. Publicly available sources indicate

that since 1949, the former Soviet Union has

produced an estimated 55,000 nuclear warheads

(12). Recent statements by the Russian Atomic

Energy Minister, Victor Mikhailov, indicate that

the Soviet stockpile peaked in 1986 at 45,000 and

declined by about 20 percent by mid-1992 (an

average of 1,500 per year) (37). Over time, some

experts have estimated that Russia has dismantled

up to 25,000 warheads, but it is uncertain how

much of the material has been recycled into new

warheads (12). In various statements over the past

year, Russia has indicated that it will retire and

“destroy” about 20,000 nuclear weapons,2 but

the exact numbers and types of weapons (and

warheads) are subject to speculation.

This chapter focuses on Russia since it is by far

the largest republic of the former Soviet Union,

and the only one with both the announced intent

and the capability to dismantle its own warheads

and dispose of the special nuclear materials from

those warheads.3 Russia also has the largest

portion of the nuclear arsenal within its borders,

compared with weapons now located in other

former Soviet republics. Some limited information is available about the situation in these other

republics.

The Russian agencies in control of weapons

and dismantlement activities are quite similar in

function to those in the United States. The

Ministry of Atomic Energy (comparable to DOE)

has traditionally produced nuclear materials and

weapons components, and assembled and tested

warheads, while the Ministry of Defense (comparable to DOD) is responsible for weapons staging

and stockpile management.

The Russian Ministry of Atomic Energy (MINATOM)—which was created out of the Soviet

Ministry of Atomic Power and Industry in January 1992 by decree of President Boris Yeltsin-is

responsible for the entire nuclear fuel cycle in

Russia, from uranium mining and enrichment to

nuclear electricity production and nuclear weapons design, testing, and manufacturing. MINATOM operates nuclear weapons assembly

facilities, as well as a number of institutes and

laboratories similar in nature to the U.S. system of

national laboratories. There are 29 departments

within MINATOM, and more than 100 institutes,

laboratories, and associations (6,35,40).

The design, testing, and production of fissile

materials and nuclear warheads, as well as

warhead dismantlement and recycling, have been

carried out at about 12 sites. The location of 10 of

these sites is so sensitive that they were not

marked on any Soviet map and are code named

2 According to certain experts, official documents describing the types of warheads to be eliminated partially or completely include (46):

1) all strategic and tactical warheads withdrawn horn Ukraine, Belarus, and Kazakhstiux 2) all nuclear warheads for ground-based tactical

missiles, artillery shells, and land mines; 3) half of the tactical bomb inventory of the Air Force, with the remainder removed from frontline

units and deployed on bases for centralized stockpiling; 4) one-halfof the nuclear warheads for anti-aircraft missiles and one-third of sea-based

tactical warheads; and 5) strategic warheads located in Russia, which are to be reduced according to the Strategic Arms Reduction Treaty

(START II). The quoted number of warheads to be “destroyed” is 27,000-30,000 (6,54).

3 The major Soviet Union facilities for assembly and disassembly of nuclear weapons today are in Russia. Three other newly independent

states also have nuckxu weapons, including Belarus, Kazakhstan and Ukraine. Officials ffom Ukraine have stated that they may want to

dismantle nuclear weapons located in their country themselves, although it is not clear if they have the resources, knowledge, or facilities to

carry this out. There is some question whether Ukraine would violate the Non-proliferation Treaty if it dismantled nuclear weapons.
Chapter 6: Opportunities to Aid Russian Dismantlement 127

after cities 50 to 100 kilometers away. Until

recently, the exact locations of these sites were

kept secret. Since 1989, most of them have been

opened for a limited number of foreign visitors,

but others have remained inaccessible. Recently,

certain sites have been visited by foreign government and nongovernmental groups, and more

information is becoming openly available. Figure

6-1 is a map locating some of the key Russian

nuclear weapons sites that have recently been

discussed in the open literature.

Information is limited concerning the organization, personnel, and management practices of the

Russian Ministry of Defense with regard to

nuclear weapons. The Main Administration of

Nuclear Weapons (the 12th Main Directorate) of

the Ministry is known to be responsible for

nuclear weapons staging, storage, and management, once the weapons are obtained from

MINATOM. The 12th Main Directorate is apparently responsible for transporting nuclear

weapons from MINATOM plants and for staging

the weapons at Defense Ministry sites. The

Ministry of Defense is also responsible for the

transportation of nuclear weapons and warheads

from their deployed sites back to MINATOM

plants for dismantlement. Apparently, nuclear

weapons deployed outside Russia are shipped

from their staging sites to central storage facilities

in Russia under the control of the Ministry of

Defense.4

Russian officials have indicated that they are

dismantling warheads at the rate of 1,500 to 2,500

per year, but U.S. officials have not verified these

dismantlement rates (15). Although definite information about Russian dismantlement progress

would be invaluable, it maybe difficult to obtain

such data without implementing some sort of

monitoring to reliably verify the number of

warheads going into-and the amount of fissionable materials in storage containers coming out

of—a dismantlement site.

Partially constructed offices for a breeder reactor

complex in the Chelyabinsk region near a Russian

plutonium production facility. Construction was

stopped in 1991 after a nonbinding public referendum

that opposed the building of new reactors.

The lack of knowledge about the former Soviet

nuclear arsenal and materials stockpile is recognized as an impediment to international confidence in weapons dismantlement and arms

control agreements. During Senate consideration

of the first Strategic Arms Reduction Treaty

(START) (ratified by the United States on Oct. 1,

1992), a condition to the ratification resolution

was added that called for the President to make a

good faith effort at negotiating agreements that

will allow for the exchange and declaration of

information about nuclear weapons and materials

stockpiles. Specifically, the condition called for:

. . . appropriate arrangement(s), including the use

of reciprocal inspections, data exchanges, and

other cooperative measures, to monitor:

(A) the numbers of nuclear stockpile weapons

on the territory of the parties to this Treaty; and

(B) the location an inventory of facilities on the

territory of the parties to this treaty capable of

producing or processing significant quantities of

fissile materials (52).

4 Transportation of most nuclear weapons is by train. At least some nuclear weapons have been transported by train from the staging sites

to weapons storage depots in Russia (35).
128 Dismantling the Bomb and Managing the Nuclear Materials

Figure 6-l—Nuclear Weapons Complex in the Former Soviet Uniona

(3A

(57

LITHUANIA

f&

R

@J/

Arzamus-16

s I

UKRAIN E

Sverdlovsk-44

Y

z Sverdlovsk-45

Penza-19

~ Zlatoust-36 * ‘ Chelyabinsk-40/ -70

Electrolyzing

ARMENIA

AZERBJN.

# Assembly

dt SNM production/processing

* Laboratory/design

TAJIKISTAN 9 Testing

O Nonnuclear materials

a Locations are approxirnak. Facilities are commonly named for the nearest town of $ignifioantSize.

SOURCE: Defense Intelligence Agency, briefing to the Offioe of Technology Assessment, Apr. 15, 1993. Graham Allison et al. (eds.), Coopemtke

Denudeati~tion: FmmP/@es to Deeds(Cambrkfge, MA: Harvard University, January 1993). R. Stanley Norris, ’’The Soviet Nuclear Archipelago,”

Arms Contro/ 7bd&Iy, vol. 21, No. 1, January/February 1992. Thomas Cochran, Senior Scientist, Natural Resouroes Defense Counoil, comments,

June 1993.

The amendment to the Senate ratification

resolution is nonbinding, and does not affect the

ratification process for the START II treaty.

However, the condition serves to bring warhead

dismantlement under the same type of scrutiny

that traditionally accompanies arms control verification regimes. Achieving such data exchanges

and monitoring arrangements would greatly enhance international confidence in the nuclear

nations’ dismantlement programs.

Russian warheads most likely are dismantled

in the MINATOM plants where they were produced and assembled. Although the Russians

clearly possess the facilities for nuclear warhead

dismantlement, it is not clear that their economy

will be able to maintain the personnel, infrastructure, and financial resources required to operate

these facilities.

There are three principal warhead assembly

plants in Russia that appear to be similar in

function to the U.S. Pantex Plant. They are

Sverdlovsk-45, located at Nizhnyaya-Tura (the

main facility in the Urals); Penza-19, located at

Kuznetsk (115 kilometers east of Penza); and

Zlatovst-36, located at Yuryuzan (a smaller facility 85 kilometers southeast of Zlatovst in the

Urals). Most sources indicate that these facilities

are currently involved in dismantlement activities

(6). In addition, the Russian design laboratory

known as Arzamas-16 has a small-scale warhead

assembly/disassembly capacity and is reported to

be involved in warhead dismantlement (see table
Chapter 6: Opportunities to Aid Russian Dismantlement 129

Table 6-l-Nuclear Weapons Complex in the Former Soviet Union

Facility name Activities Location U.S. equivalent

Penza-19 Component assembly Kuznetsk Pantex/Kansas City

Arzamus-l 6 Design/assembly Sarova LANL/LLNL

Sverdlovsk-45 Assembly Nizhnyaya Tura Pantex

Zlatoust-36 Assembly Yuryuzan Pantex

Chelyabinsk-70 Design Kasli LAN/LLNL

Chelyabinsk-40a Pu/T production Kyshtym Hanford

Tomsk-7 Pu/T production/U enrichment Tomsk Rocky Flats/Hanford/Oak Ridge

Krasnoyarsk-26 Pu/T production Dodonova Hanford

Krasnoyarsk-45 U enrichment Zernogorsk Oak Ridge

Sverdlovsk-44b U enrichment Verkniy Neyvinsk Oak Ridge

Electrolyzing Chem. Combine U enrichment Angarsk Oak Ridge

Semipalatinsk Test sitec Kazakhstan Nevada Test Site

Novaya Zemlya Test site N. Russia Nevada Test Site

Ulbinsky Metallurgy Be/Zr production Kazakhstan -

NOTE: Be- beryllium; IANL = Ims Alamos National Laboratory; LLNL = Lawrence Livermore National Laboratory; Pu - plutonium; T - tritium; U =

uranium; Zr = zirconium.

a May also be called Chelyabinsk-65.

b Alos called Urals Electrochemistry Combine.

c Closed 1991.

SOURCE: Office of Tecnology Assessment, 1993.

6-1 and figure 6-l). In the past, the fissile

materials recovered from dismantled warheads

were probably recycled into new warheads.

As discussed in chapter 2, the relevant arms

reduction treaties mandate only the destruction of

the delivery system (e.g., a missile), if that, and

say nothing about the fate of the nuclear warhead

or the plutonium and other materials contained in

the nuclear explosive package. There is speculation that any missiles that have already been

removed as part of arms control treaties, along

with those missiles returned to Russia from other

former Soviet republics, have been stored intact at

existing Ministry of Defense storage sites inside

Russia, or that they have been only partially

disassembled and the warheads are being stored

at Ministry of Defense facilities (6,35,40). Up to

the present, the United States has not been able to

verify the extent of Russian dismantlement of

warheads or the subsequent storage of fissile

materials.

At the “Third International Workshop on

Verified Storage and Destruction of Nuclear

Warheads,” held in Kiev and Moscow in 1991, a

senior arms control adviser to President Yeltsin

indicated that nuclear warhead dismantlement is

being carried out at two sites at a rate of about

1,500 warheads per year. Although this implies

that Russian dismantlement is actually proceeding at this rate, the United States has not

confirmed the number of warheads dismantled.

Some Russian statements on dismantlement do

not make clear whether warheads dismantled in

the past are being discussed or whether the

materials recovered from these dismantled warheads have been used in new warheads.5

According to both the Ministry of Defense and

MINATOM, available facilities for the storage of

fissile materials recovered from existing warheads are inadequate to store the amounts of

plutonium anticipated from current dismantlement plans (8). There are existing facilities for

s The available literature does not provide the answer as to what amounts, if any, of fissile materials from warheads have been nxycled into

new warheads versus the amounts in storage facilities. According to statements by Ministry of Defense and MINATOM officials, however,

the most likely scenario is that very little of the fissile material has been stored in the past. Most of it is likely to have been recycled into new

warheads.
130 Dismantling the Bomb and Managing the Nuclear Materials

BOX 6-A--Nunn-Lugar Legislation

In 1991 and 1992, Congress authorized $400 million (for a total of $800 million) in the so called Nunn-Lugar

legislation to assist the former Soviet Union in dismantling weapons of mass destruction, including nuclear

warheads. Spending required presidential certification that states of the former Soviet Union were adhering to

relevant arms control agreements. The actual funds have already been approptriated to the Department of Defense

(DOD). Originally, $400 million was set aside in Public Law 102-228, the Conventional Forces in Europe Treaty

legislation now in place authorizing this program includes the following:

. The Soviet Nuclear Threat Reduction Act of 1991 (Title ll of Public Law 102-228, Dec. 12, 1991) authorized

spending $400 million of DOD’S FY 1992 budget to “establish a program to assist Soviet weapons

destruction.” The full name of PL 102-228 is the “Conventional Forces in Europe Treaty Implementation

Act of 1991.” It is a law dealing with North Atlantic Treaty Organization fundding and equipment transfers.

Amendment SP 1439, introduced by Senators Nunn and Lugar, became the “Soviet Nuclear Threat

Reduction Act of 1991 .“

• The Soviet Nuclear Threat Reduction Act of 1992 (Title of Public Law 102-229, Dec. 12, 1991) is a portion

of the Dire Emergency Supplemental Appropriations Act of 1992, which makes technical corrections and

changes in the budget. It “[a]llows for the transfer of funds to assist the former Soviet Union and/or

emerging political structures . . . in dismantling nuclear weapons.”

• The Former Soviet Union Demilitarization Act of 1992 (Title XIV of Public Law 102-484,Oct 23, 1992) sets

various conditions for the money authorized under the two bills described above. For example, “defense

conversion” money cannot exceed $40 million. It is part of the Defense Authorization Act for FY 1993.

. The Freedom Support Act (Public Law 102-511, Title V, Oct. 24, 1992) provides for economic and nuclear

nonproliferation assistance to the states of the former Soviet Union, and authorizes the use of funds made

available under specified acts to carry out demilitarization, and economic conversion regarding nuclear

weapons. This focuses mostly on repealing Cold War restrictions on trade, etc., with Soviet bloc nations.

SOURCE: Office of Technology Assessment 1993,

processing recovered plutonium into new war- sian organizations are diverse. The positions

heads. The three plants at which plutonium has

been produced--Chelyabinsk-65, Tomsk-7, and

Krasnoyarsk-26--are believed to have storage

facilities for plutonium, but it is not known

whether enough space for additional fissile materials from warheads exists at these sites, or

whether there is capacity at any of the sites for the

storage of plutonium pits, tritium, or highly

enriched uranium.6

Views about nuclear warhead dismantlement

and plutonium disposition among various Rustaken by military, academic, and certain government agencies may be divergent. Dismantlement

policy is also a controversial political issue in

Russia. MINATOM Minister Victor Mikhailov

has become the target of more conservative

Russians for his part in promoting Russian

warhead dismantlement. Some members of the

Supreme Soviet have criticized other activities

involving the United States. The possible effect of

internal Russian critics on U.S.-Russian cooperation is unknown at this time.

G Only the Mayak complex at Chelyabinsk processes spent fuel from power and naval reactors. “Reactor-grade” plutonium is stored there

as plutonium dioxide, and between 25 and 30 metric tons maybe stored there currently (such material is less than ideal for weapons use but

still could be used to make a nuclear bomb). The Tomsk and Krasnoyarsk facilities continue to produce plutonium for weapons. Apparently,

those facilities have a related plutonium handling and storage infrastructure (6,12).
Chapter 6: Opportunities to Aid Russian Dismantlement 131

 US. Assistance in Russian

Warhead Dismantlement

Since 1991, Congress has enacted several

measures providing U.S. assistance for Russian

nuclear warhead dismantlement activities (see

box 6-A). The Soviet Nuclear Threat Reduction

Act of 1991 (Nunn-Lugar; Public Law 102-228,

Title II, Dec. 12, 1991) directed the Administration to provide assistance to facilitate nuclear

weapons dismantlement and destruction in the

former Soviet Union, and authorized $400 million for that purpose. As of March 31, 1993, the

Department of Defense had proposed to obligate

about $460 million for various purchases and

activities related to this initiative that have been

agreed to by the United States and Russia or by

the United States and other former Soviet republics. Of the total, only $31 million has actually

been obligated. The agreements were reached via

a series of meetings and exchanges through

March 31, 1993, between the relevant agency

representatives of these countries (principally

Russia) and U.S. agencies.

In the 1992 Dire Emergency Supplemental

Appropriations Act (Public Law 102-229), Congress authorized an additional $400 million to be

applied for this purpose. The latter provides for

the transfer of up to $400 million from DOD

operations and maintenance appropriations or

working capital account balances to facilitate the

transportation, storage, safeguarding, and destruction of nuclear (and other) weapons in the

former Soviet Union (13).

DOD is the executive agent for the program

and is working closely with the National Security

Council, the Department of State, the Arms

Control and Disarmament Agency, DOE, and

other governmental organizations (13). The Safe

and Secure Dismantlement Interagency Steering

Group (SSD) coordinates the various activities.

The impetus for forming the SSD was concern

about the security and control of Soviet nuclear

weapons raised after the August 1991 abortive

coup d’etat in the Soviet Union (8).

In initial bilateral discussions in Moscow

during January 1992, the Russians stated that the

greatest impediment to dismantlement was their

lack of suitable long-term storage facilities and

containers, and inadequate transportation (8).

Secretary of State James Baker responded to

Russian Foreign Minister Andrei Kozyrev in

February 1992 with suggestions covering possible U.S. assistance in transportation and storage,

accident response, an accounting and control

system, and ultimate disposition of the highly

enriched uranium (HEU) and plutonium from

warheads (8). In a November 1992 Moscow

meeting, the United States reaffirmed an earlier

offer to provide aid to expedite the elimination of

strategic arms slated for reduction under START

II (8). Relevant legislative provisions pertaining

to U.S. assistance require the Administration to

certify that the former Soviet republics are

committed to:

making substantial investments toward dismantling and destroying weapons; 7

forgoing military modernization;

forgoing the reuse of fissionable materials in

new weapons;

facilitating U.S. verification of weapons

destruction;

complying with all relevant arms control

agreements; and

observing human rights.8

The Bush-Yeltsin summit in June 1992 included the signing of four SSD agreements, and

discussions in August 1992 led to further U.S.-

Russian agreements (8,16). These included:

. an umbrella agreement for providing NunnLugar assistance, naming DOD and MINATOM as executive agents (see appendix C);

7 It is not clear how the Adrninistration is clef@ “substantial investments” or ascertauun ‘ “ g the extent of these investments.

8 Title II of Public Law 102-228, the Soviet Nuclear Threat Reduction Act of 1991, Dec. 12, 1991.
132 Dismantling the Bomb and Managing the Nuclear Materials

● an armored blanket agreement;9

. an accident response equipment and training

agreement; 10

● a fissile materials container agreement; ll

● a rail car conversion agreement;

. a storage facilities agreement; and

. an agreement on HEU disposition by conversion to low-enriched uranium (LEU).

In March 1993, Ambassador James Goodby

replaced General William Burns as the head of the

U.S. Delegation on Safe and Secure Dismantlement of Former Soviet Nuclear Weapons (22).

Ambassador Goodby has indicated that the Clinton administration intends to put high priority on

agreements under the Nunn-Lugar appropriations

to provide incentives for reducing the stockpile

and eliminating warheads in the former Soviet

Union. The United States is also discussing a

possible multilateral approach with other nations

such as Japan, the United Kingdom, Germany,

Canada, and France. One suggestion is for an

international fund with a U.S. contribution

through Nunn-Lugar and subsequent appropriations. Each country would lend assistance in its

areas of expertise.

Another meeting of the U.S. delegation with its

Russian counterparts in Moscow took place at the

end of March 1993. During that meeting, the texts

of three new agreements (22) were agreed upon

and await Russian signature under the general

umbrella agreement to:

. provide $130 million for equipment to assist

with the dismantlement of missile delivery

vehicles, 12

. provide an additional $75 million for special

equipment for the planned plutonium storage facility,13 and

. provide $10 million for improving materials

control and accountability systems.

Table 6-2 lists the status of funding for all of these

projects as of April 1993.14

Different degrees of progress have been made

with the other three nuclear states-Ukraine,

Belarus, and Kazakhstan-but agreements similar to those with Russia are under discussion for

the transportation of nuclear weapons and the

dismantlement of delivery systems (8). Efforts to

conclude agreements with these states continue--

the greatest progress having been made with

Belarus, which has already signed agreements

(22). Kazakhstan appears to be willing to move

forward, but Ukraine has presented some problems (22). The Ukraine Government is now

divided over whether it should become, or remain, a nuclear power. The government has stated

that it will require $2.8 billion to dismantle its

nuclear weapons, whereas the U.S. offer of

assistance is in the range of $175 million (22).

Little information is available about the breakdown of the $2.8 billion requirement, but U.S.

officials generally consider it to be unrealistically

high (29).

g The armored blankets are for the protection of nuclear warheads during transportation. DOD has delivered 250 armored blankets and is

sending out for bid procurement of additional blankets (13).

10 ~s a~eement is to provide em~gencyre~~e equipment and training to dealwithpotential nuclear weapons tmnspomtionaccidents.

The United States, through work conducted largely at SandiaNational Laboratory, is considered to have the lead in this area. DOD will provide

MINATOMwith a variety of emergency equipment used for dealing with weapons transportation accidents, as well as initial operator training.

11 Underws a=ement, DOD w~ provide IVfIhJA’K)lVfwith Up to 1(.)$OOO containers fOrexChlSive use in ~~porting f~sile ~teri~s from

dismantled weapons. Design and development were begun by DOE, the containers will be built in the United States, and delive~ is anticipated

by December 1995 (8).

12 For tie Ufitti s~te~, tie Defense Nuclem Agency ~ administer pm~ment of tie @pment, ~d for Russia the COmmittee on

Defense Industries will be the executing agency.

13 MINMIOM WM be the execu~g agency for the Russians and the Department of Defense for the United Stites.

14 However, ~negotia~ the s~e of Russ~n mu, tie u~ted s~tes is insis~ titme receive a f~portion of the income frOm the

sale, which may yield $1 billion for Ukraine (22,23).
Chapter 6: Opportunities to Aid Russian Dismantlement 133

Table 6-2-Soviet Nuclear Threat Reduction Projects

Obligations

(proposed) Obligations (actual)

as of March 31, 1993 as of March 31, 1993

Recipient nation Project ($ millions) ($ million)

Russia

Subtotal

Ukraine

Subtotal

Belarus

Subtotal

Kazahkstan

Subtotal

General

TOTAL

Armored blanketsa

Rail car securitya

Emergency responsea

Materials controls

Storage containers

Facility designa

Facility equipment

Export controls

Science centera

Chemical weaponsa

SNDV dismantlementb

Military contacts

Arctic nuclear waste

Emergency response

Communications

Export controls

Materials controls

Science center

Emergency responsea

Communications a

Export controlsa

Emergency response

Communications

Export controls

Materials controls

Support/assessment

5.0

20.0

15.0

10.0

50.0

15.0

75.0

2.3

25.0

25.0

130.0

15.0

10.0

397.3

3.1

3.1

9.9

0

2.0

6.0

0

0

0.2

1.9

0

0

0

26.4

5.0 0

2.4 0

2.3 0

7.5 0

10.0 0

27.2 0

5.0 3.3

2.3 0

2.3 0

9.6 3.3

5.0 0

2.3 0

2.3 0

5.0 0

14.4 0

10.0 1.6

458.7 31.3

a Denotes signed agreement%

b SNDV = Stmtegic nuclear delivery vehicles.

SOURCE: U.S. Department of State, 1993.
134 Dismantling the Bomb and Managing the Nuclear Materials

The people of Muslyumovo from the Chelyabinsk region. Muslyumovo is less than 50 miles downriver from a

plutonium processing plant that dumped high-level radioactive waste into the Techa river from 1948 to 1951.

Almost all of the assistance to Russia for weapons dismantlement is in either of two forms: 1)

supplies or equipment purchased in the United

States, or from U.S. stockpiles, to be shipped to

appropriate Russian agencies; or 2) U.S. technical

or advisory teams to supply technical services or

data to appropriate agencies. Russia has not yet

sought any assistance for actual weapons dismantlement, and it opposes U.S. involvement in such

activities. 15 It appears that Russia is concerned

the United States would gain too much access to

secret facilities or information, and Russia is

confident of its own dismantlement capabilities.

To date, all U.S. assistance has been based on

funds spent in the United States for goods or

services to be delivered later to Russian agencies.

In each case, U.S. negotiators have tried to

determine the need for assistance and assess its

importance before reaching an agreement with

the Russians. Russia has expressed a number of

needs and pressed for the direct commitment of

funds for building facilities. However, the U.S.

policy is to retain essentially complete control

over spending of funds under Nunn-Lugar and to

purchase services or materials in the United

States, consistent with the intent of the NunnLugar legislation to maximize the use of U.S.

technologies and technicians (14). The program is

administered by DOD, and most of the purchases

of services or equipment are managed by the

Defense Nuclear Agency. The Army Corps of

Engineers is, at present, executing only the

IS ~cor~gto tie Weapons conzplti~onitor(ss): “General Sergei Zelenstov, chief nuclear engineer of the Russian MinistrY of Defense,

said all tactical nuclear weapons informer Soviet republics except the Ukram“ e and Byelorussia have beenremoved. A top Russian official said

‘We don’t need any technology or technical aid for dismantling warheads. We don’t need a United States contractor. We can do it oumelves.’

Russia has however asked for aid to develop storage facilities,’
Chapter 6: Opportunities to Aid Russian Dismantlement 135

storage facility design (14). This policy could be

reexamined if U.S. goals for Russian dismantlement are not achieved.

Although Russian President Yeltsin supports

the SSD program and work now under way, the

Supreme Soviet has criticized it on the grounds

that it diminishes Russia’s status as a nuclear

superpower to have the United States dictate

specific aspects of its nuclear enterprise. This, in

turn, has led President Yeltsin to keep a low

profile on the SSD program for the time being and

also to postpone submitting the START II treaty

for ratification (22). In addition to some dissatisfaction with what are viewed as U.S. efforts to

unilaterally dictate the nuclear policy of former

Soviet Union nations, officials from both Russia

and Ukraine have expressed frustration with the

slow pace at which U.S. dismantlement aid is

being made available (42).

Even in Russia, the political climate for acceptance of U.S. assistance is problematic. The

current program is a compromise between the two

countries. Agreements have been reached slowly

and in small steps. Some critics believe that

expenditures have not been well targeted and

have not led to significantly safer or quicker

dismantlement (11). It does not appear that this

program is being used to address the broader

issues of mutual goals and interests in the overall

weapons dismantlement programs of both countries. The timing of U.S. efforts to address these

issues may become more critical if political and

economic instability in Russia continue (9).

MANAGEMENT OF RUSSIAN PLUTONIUM

Little information is available on how the

former Soviet Union managed plutonium from

dismantled nuclear warheads in the past, including how long and where it may have been stored

as intact pits, and where and how it was reprocessed or recycled into new warheads. Some

experts believe that plutonium was fabricated

rapidly into new warheads so that large storage

facilities were not required.l6

There are conflicting reports on whether Russia

currently has sufficient storage capacity to carry

out dismantlement activities.17 Reports from some

meetings in Russia indicate that lack of a dedicated storage facility will not delay dismantlement because temporary storage facilities are

available. The name or location of these facilities

is unclear (12). On the other hand, Russian

officials assert that lack of containers and storage

space for highly enriched uranium and plutonium

is the limiting factor in Russia’s dismantlement

effort18 (8). This contradiction indicates that more

specific information about Russian capabilities

and facilities may be needed if the assistance

program is to be effective.

 US. Assistance to Russia for a

Plutonium Storage Facility

As is the case with U.S. weapons, the nuclear

materials from dismantled warheads of the former

Soviet Union will have to be stored until a decision is reached on final disposition. The United

States is providing assistance in the design of a

storage facility for nuclear materials recovered

from dismantled Russian warheads (via the origiIS ~ the United Stites, plutonium pits are commonly reprocessed to remove impurities @nericiurn-241 in particuk@ prior to being m~e

into new pits. According to one source, both the Soviet Union and the United States recycled plutonium recovered from dismantled warheads

into new warheads, and therefore did not generate large plutonium stocks until the late 1980s (53).

17 The three plants, described above, in the former Soviet Union at which plutonium was produced have stored at least Al~o~ts. At

the end of 1991, 25 metric tons of separated plutonium in oxide form from civilian reactors was stored at the Chelyabinsk-65 plutonium

production facility (12).

18 ARu5s~ news repo~ &t~ AuWst 6, 1992, s~ted ~t “the nuclem work~s th~selves attest tit Kmsnoyarsk-26 [~OtherphItOniUm

production site] is joining the process of dismantling nuclear warheads. The tons of plutonium produced here will most likely also return

here-for storage’ (25). Another former plutonium production facility-Tomsk-7-is the site currently being considered for construction of

the large storage facility for fissile materials from retired warheads.
136 Dismantling the Bomb and Managing the Nuclear Materials

nal Nunn-Lugar Soviet Nuclear Threat Reduction

Act, Public Law 102-228, and subsequent laws) .19

An agreement between the U.S. DOD and Russian MINATOM to assist Russia in the safe,

secure storage of fissile materials from dismantled weapons was announced in August 1992. It

committed DOD to assist a Russian-led effort in

designing a storage facility. Initial Russian design

requirements were received in August, and several joint technical meetings have been held. The

United States has had ongoing discussions with

Russia about construction of a storage facility

there for nuclear materials from dismantled warheads.

DOD is committed to provide, at no cost to

MINATOM, technical assistance in this design

effort, including the development of design requirements and criteria for the storage facility.

Under this agreement, MINATOM retains full

responsibility for facility design, and the total

DOD cost may not exceed $15 million (l). This

amount is considered to be only for design

assistance and is not expected to cover any

fraction of actual construction. The total construction cost and the source of funding have not

been established. Although the United States

would clearly like Russia to cover the major

portion of these expenses, Russia maybe unable

to provide the amounts needed.

The Army Corps of Engineers is responsible

for storage facility design assistance under the

agreement.20 DOE is providing design expertise

from the Albuquerque Operations Office for

project oversight; the Los Alamos National Laboratory (LANL) for control, accounting, and safeguards; and the Sandia National Laboratory for

physical security and materials handling (48,49).

The design is intended as a joint U.S.-Russian

project, and by March 1993, several U.S.-Russian

technical workshops had been held. For example,

in December 1992, the Russian delegation, the

Corps, and LANL staff drafted general safety

criteria (20). The U.S. team is also assisting the

Russians in a preliminary safety analysis, although the United States ultimately considers any

analysis of environmental impact to be Russia’s

responsibility (48,49). The scheduled date for

completion of the design remains December

1993, although there is uncertainty whether the

Russians will be able to complete all their design

tasks by that date (14).

Although the Russian fissile materials storage

facility design is proceeding with U.S. assistance,

the completion date for construction has been

delayed 1 year, to 1997 (22). The Russians plan

to locate the storage facility at Tomsk-7, near the

plutonium production facility. When the new

facility was announced, however, the population

in the adjacent community registered some opposition (8). In light of the accident at Tomsk-7 in

early 1993, when one tank at a weapons material

reprocessing plant exploded and released radioactive material, such opposition may reappear (22).

The city council of Tomsk voted against locating

the plutonium storage facility in that region, and

President Yeltsin has stated that these desires

would be respected (53). Like the United States,

Russia plans to store the plutonium initially as

weapons pits, but these may be removed from

storage later for further use or converted to a more

stable form for longer-term storage. Many Russian officials consider storage to be mainly an

interim measure that is required while final

disposition plans and technologies are being

developed. There is general agreement among

government officials that excess plutonium

should be used eventually in power-producing

reactors, but that these technologies will require

considerable investment to be operational.

19 The Department of Defense plans to obligate up to $90 million to support the storage facility’s desi~ COnstruCtior4 and Oufitting (27);

$15 million of the $90million can be used for facility design (8). Up to $75 million is proposed to provide the specialized equipment neeessary

to make the storage facility operational (13).

ZO The Tr~adantic Division of the Corps in Winchester, Virginia manages the program.
Chapter 6: Opportunities to Aid Russian Dismantlement 137

Russian officials have agreed in principle that

the United States will be able to monitor the

fissile materials storage facility. One condition of

U.S. assistance under the Nunn-Lugar legislation

is that fissionable materials from dismantled

Russian warheads will not be reused in weapons.

The details of certification are not clear. One of

the U.S.-Russian agreements covers the development of a materials and accounting security

system (probably with assistance from LANL) for

use throughout Russian nuclear operations. By

helping to design these systems, the United States

hopes to minimize proliferation concerns (8).

U.S. AGREEMENT FOR PURCHASE OF

RUSSIAN WEAPONS HEU

The United States and Russia signed an agreement on February 18, 1993, to convert 500 tons of

HEU from Russian warheads to LEU and sell it to

the United States (see appendix C). This agreement calls for the safe and prompt disposition of

HEU from dismantled Russian weapons by conversion ‘‘as soon as practical” to LEU 21 for use

in commercial nuclear power reactors. Executive

agents for the agreement are DOE (or the successor U.S. Enrichment Corporation) and the Ministry of the Russian Federation of Atomic Energy.

HEU is a comparatively greater security concern

than plutonium because it is technically much

easier to construct a bomb from HEU. On the

other hand, HEU is easier to “de-weaponize” by

dilution with unenriched uranium to 2 to 5 percent

uranium-235 used in civilian power reactors (34).

Uranium with less than 20 percent enrichment is

not considered to be weapons grade.

The HEU agreement specifies that it will take

place ‘in accordance with existing agreements in

arms control and disarmament’ and to further the

objectives of the Non-Proliferation Treaty (NPT),

and will ‘‘comply with all applicable nonproliferation, physical protection, nuclear material accounting and control, and environmental

requirements. ’ The agreement provides that both

Russia and the United States are to maintain

physical protection of the HEU and LEU, and to

implement the relevant International Atomic

Energy Agency (IAEA) recommendations and

NPT safeguards. Each country would also establish transparency measures, including provisions

for nuclear materials accounting, control, and

access, from the time HEU is made available until

it has been converted to LEU (2).

To carry out the agreement, the United States

has established an interagency task force that

includes the National Security Council (which

has the lead), the State Department, the Arms

Control and Disarmament Agency, the Office of

Management and Budget, DOE (Nuclear Energy

Office), DOD, and the Nuclear Regulatory Commission (18,43). The agreement covers the amounts

of LEU to be purchased, the security necessary,

and the location at which conversion will occur.

It also provides for participation of the private

sector in the U.S.-Russian enterprises.

The State Department is continuing to negotiate the U.S.-Russian HEU purchase agreement. It

considers the basic terms to have been established, but two issues remain to be negotiated:

transparency and how profits will be divided

between the four nuclear states of the former

Soviet Union (47). The allocation of profits from

the sale is a major difficulty that is yet to be

resolved.

 Quantities, Location, and

Transportation of Russian HEU

The HEU agreement specifies that approximately 500 tons of Russian HEU from dismantled

warheads is to be converted to LEU in Russia.22

Most experts believe that this represents a substantial proportion of the HEU to be recovered

from dismantled Russian warheads, although the

21 Def~~ ~ ~fimefiched to less than 20 percent concentration of the isotope urriIdum-235.

22 M ~1 cases, tons as used in this chapter refers to metric tOn.%
138 Dismantling the Bomb and Managing the Nuclear Materials

Box 6-B-US. Facilities for Handling Russian Weapons Uranium

If and when LEU is shipped to the United States from Russia, certain private fuel fabricators such as General

Electric, Westinghouse, Siemens, or ABB (see figure 6-2), could be engaged to convert it to a usable product for

commercial reactors. They do not have licenses to store or handle uranium above 5 percent enrichment but could

process LEU to exact customer specifications if Russian HEU were blended down to less than 5 percent

uranium-235 before shipment.

Another option would be for Russia to blend HEU to Iess than 20 percent enrichment. At this level, two private

companies, Nuclear Fuel Services (NFS) in Erwin, Tennessee and B&W Corporation in Lynchburg, Virginia, as

well as Department of Energy facilities at Y-1 2 and Portsmouth, could handle the more highly enriched material.

If HEU were shipped directly from Russia (as provided for, in principle, in the agreement), the basic technology

for blending HEU into LEU is available here (32). Examples of small-scale U.S. blending facilities include the NFS

facility that has processed and delivered HEU naval reactor fuel under a Nuclear Regulatory Commission license

(4,43). B&W Corp. also has a naval fuel fabrication facility in Lynchburg that is similar, but smaller (18). Allied Signal

has processed uranium concentrates into uranium hexafluoride at its Illinois plant(4). At NFS and B&W, however,

the capacity to convert uranium to uranium hexafluoride would have to be added. Although these technologies

have been used on a small scale, they have not yet been employed on the scale required if the United States were

to import Russian HEU.

SOURCE: clffioe of Technology Assessment, 1993.

precise proportion is subject to speculation. By lovsk-44 will be adequate for converting and

August 1993, an implementing contract is to provide for the conversion of no less than 10 tons of

HEU per year for five years-followed by 30 tons

per year-requiring a total of 20 years for the

conversion of 500 tons. When converted to LEU,

500 hundred tons of HEU would provide enough

fuel to supply all U.S. requirements for about 10

years (19).

Russian officials have stated that they have the

necessary capacity to blend the Russian HEU to

LEU (U.S. facilities are described in box 6-B and

figure 6-2). A technical team from the U.S. uranium companies Allied Signal and Nuclear Fuel

Services (NFS) toured a Russian conversion facility, Sverdlovsk-44, at Verkniy Neyuinsk, near

Yekatrinburg. They reported that new facilities

are being installed at which HEU will be converted and blended with uranium hexafluoride

(UF6

) to produce LEU in the form of UF6. In addition, the Russians are installing loading facilities for UF6 shipping containers (44). The UF6 fluorination facility is expected to have a test run in

October 1993. DOE’s Office of Nuclear Energy

also believes that the Russian facilities at Sverdblending Russian HEU to LEU hexafluoride (45).

Although the Office of Nuclear Energy thinks that

the results of the Allied Signal-NFS review

support this viewpoint, it is conducting its own

investigation and tour. Some modiflcations and

additions to this facility may be required to

achieve the maximurn capacity of 30 tons per year

stated in the agreement. There is also some

question about the quality of Russian HEU

relative to U.S. standards for fuel fabrication (see

box 6-C), and the blending operations may have

to accommodate processes to ensure quality.

Under the purchase agreement, LEU, after

conversion, would be shipped in the form of UF6

in commercial shipping cylinders. DOE expects

to receive these shipments at its existing enrichment facilities (Portsmouth and Paducah) for the

purpose of final blending to meet private customer specifications. Alternatively, blending could

be done by private firms under arrangements with

both DOE and Russian parties. After blending,

the LEU would be shipped to a fuel fabricator for

conversion to an oxide form and the manufacture

of fuel rods (see figure 6-2).
Chapter 6: Opportunities to Aid Russian Dismantlement 139

Figure 6-2—Proposed Facilities for Handling and Processing Uranium from Russian Warheads

A

U.S. Uranium Enrichment

Corporation facilities at

Portsmouth (OH) or

Paducah (KY), or

blend LEU UF6 to

commercial specifications

Private U.S. facilities

blend LEU UF6 to

commercial specifications

U.S. commercial by the U.S. Uranium

fuel fabricators

convert UF. to UO. fuel Enrichment Corporation

for utility customers

SOURCE: Office of Technology Assessment, 1993.

The agreement of February 18,1993, states that

"

. . . an equivalent amount of HEU can substitute

for the corresponding amount of LEU planned for

purchase by the U.S.” If HEU were transported

from Russia, the cost and difficulty would escalate because of required security measures. Regulatory issues would also have to be considered if

HEU blending occurred in the United States. The

Nuclear Regulatory Commission oversees HEU

and LEU processing in the private sector (although not at DOE Weapons Complex facilities).

It issues licenses to store, transport, and process

nuclear materials. Regulations governing private

U.S. processing facilities are being revised in

response to health and safety problems (including

near-criticality conditions) (38,39). Commercial

nuclear facilities are also subject to regulation

under the Environmental Protection Agency (EPA)

and the Occupational Safety and Health Administration (OSHA). Portions of DOE and privatesector facilities that process HEU are subject to

Yekatrinburg

HEU conversion

to UF6 LEU

security measures that could complicate IAEA

inspection procedures. Currently DOE facilities

are not subject to the same EPA and OSHA

requirements that apply to commercial facilities

(see chapter 2).

The Russian-U.S. HEU agreement, if implemented as planned, could have consequences for

world security, economic matters, and world

peace, including the following:

●

•

Dilution to LEU might reduce the threat of

nuclear proliferation since LEU can neither

be used directly to make nuclear weapons

nor be turned back easily into HEU.

Revenues from the sale of HEU might

bolster the economies and social stability of

former Soviet Union states; fund dismantlement activities; and support urgently needed

environmental restoration and health and

safety measures at their weapons facilities

and nuclear reactors.
140 Dismantling the Bomb and Managing the Nuclear Materials

Box 6-C--Problems with Russian HEU Quality

The quality of Russian HEU available under the agreement maybe a problem because of its contamination

with undesirable uranium isotopes (18). The uranium in LEU fuel is predominantly uranium-238, with lesser

amounts (e.g., 3 to 5 percent) of uranium-235. Other uranium isotopes such as uranium-232, uranium-234, and

uranium-236 are considered undesirable: uranium-234, an alpha emitter, is regulated because of the occupational

risk It poses (18, 36). An American Society for Testing and Materials specification limits the maximum content of

uranium-234 in fuel to 1 percent (18}.

Concentrations of these undesirable uranium isotopes relative to uranium-235 can be increased either during

normal uranium enrichment processes or during the reprocessing and recovery of uranium in spent nuclear fuel

(18]. Uranium-234 iS a naturally occurring isotope that becomes enriched along with uranium-235 during the

normal enrichment prows. In addition, uranium-234 fissions more slowly than uranium-235 during irradiation in

a nuclear reactor (i.e., uranium-235 is used up more quickly), Thus, reprocessed uranium recovered from irradiated

spent fuel is even more enriched in uranium-234. The Russians have mixed and recycled their civilian power

reaotor and military uranium, and their HEU may now be contaminated with these isotopes at levels that are

unacceptable by U.S. standards (18).

Minimally contaminated uranium might be cut with depleted or enriched uranium to produce an acceptable

product. However, if Russian HEU cannot be blended to below this level of undesirable isotopes, U.S. fuel

fabricators may be reluctant to accept it (18).

SOURCES: U.S. D@padment of Enargy and Office of TAnology Assessment, 1993.

 Security Enhancement from the

U.S.-Russian HEU Agreement

A major incentive for U.S. purchase of Russian

weapons HEU is to limit the security and proliferation threat represented by this material as long as

it remains in Russia. Some consider that the most

effective method for preventing proliferation is to

limit, as much as possible, access to special

nuclear materials (26). Although the relative

value of HEU and plutonium (to a reasonably

technically advanced nation or group) probably

depends on how readily obtainable each is, rather

than how it would be used in a weapon, HEU may

be more attractive in some ways. HEU, but not

plutonium, can be used in a “gun-type” weapon,

which would be easier to design and would have

a greater chance of working than a bomb based on

‘‘implosion’ (33). This advantage would be

especially appealing to a state with limited

technical capability or to a subnational terrorist

group. On the other hand, the gun design requires

substantially more nuclear material. Therefore,

HEU may be more attractive than plutonium to

—

those interested in certain potential weapons if

enough material could be obtained.

The stated rationale for the HEU agreement is

that it will enhance security and reduce proliferation potential. President Bush announced that the

agreement was intended to ensure that Russian

HEU from dismantled nuclear weapons would be

used exclusively for nonmilitary purposes via

conversion to civilian reactor fuel, and that it

established nonproliferation, physical security,

materials accounting and control, and environmental requirements (56). Intuitively, the HEU

agreement appears beneficial for both U.S. and

world security, but little analysis is available

because of a lack of relevant information.

For example, without knowing the current and

potential Russian HEU inventory, it is difficult to

fully assess the security value of the agreement.

Very little information is available about Russian

uranium inventories, production capabilities, and

practices (51). MINATOM supervises the entire

chain of production and use of nuclear materials

in Russia, including mining of uranium ore,
Chapter 6: Opportunities to Aid Russian Dismantlement 141

enrichment, construction of reactors, and waste

management (4). In the late 1940s the Soviet

Union began enriching uranium for weapons, and

by the 1980s it had gained a reputation as a

dependable supplier of enrichment services in

Europe (51). DOE projects that Russia will have

a significantly larger share of the U.S. market for

enriched uranium, the largest uranium market in

the world, by the mid-to late 1990s and that, by

the end of 1992, Russia will obtain 65 percent of

all new contracts (51)0 In 1991, the Soviet Union

operated four gas centrifuge enrichment plants

(the U.S. uranium enrichment industry is based on

gaseous diffusion enrichment), which according

to a Ministry of Atomic Power and Industry

official in 1990 were all located in Russia (51).

An industry report estimated that Russia’s total

capacity is at least 10 million SWUs (separative

work units) per year, which is more than the total

U.S. annual consumption of uranium fuel for

commercial reactors (51). Russian uranium enrichment capacity is presumably the same today

as it was before the breakup of the Soviet Union.

With Russian interest in exporting its enrichment

services to earn needed hard currency, it may be

motivated to continue enrichment operations.

The timetable of the HEU agreement requires

20 years for 500 tons of Russian HEU to become

de-weaponized by conversion to LEU, but it is not

clear what proportion of the total Russian HEU

stockpile this represents. The 500 metric tons was

a figure volunteered by Russia about how much

material would be made available after dismantlement (45). Although the U.S. State Department

estimated that scheduled nuclear warhead dismantlement in Russia would generate about 500

tons of HEU, it recognized the possibility of other

HEU stockpiles not contained in warheads (34).

Furthermore, HEU may remain in warheads not

scheduled to be dismantled, so it is not known

whether all Russian HEU would be converted to

LEU.

However, DOE considers that converting any

amount of HEU from Russian stockpiles is a

positive step for U.S. security and world peace

(45). Yet, without knowing the Russian plans for

conversion to LEU, it is difficult to assess the

impact of the agreement on the amount of HEU

transported in Russia and the corresponding risk

of diversion or theft. Russian HEU may now be

located atone or more storage facilities. During or

after the 20-year period when, under the agreement, Russian HEU stocks are to be drawn down,

it is not clear to what extent the risk of theft will

be reduced.

Russia retains the capability to produce more

HEU. Although Russia, like the United States,

has not produced any HEU for some years (8), the

agreement does not address the issue of possible

future HEU production in Russia. Instead, the

agreement is based on the premise that the

uranium purchased by the United States would

come from dismantled weapons.

Critics have suggested that the agreement to

purchase 500 tons of HEU may be more of a

symbolic than a practical measure, which will

have little impact on reducing the threat of nuclear

weapons at least in the near term. According to

this perspective, the agreement may be primarily

a way to aid the Russian economy, with only a

marginal contribution toward reducing the threat

of nuclear weapons (21). On the other hand,

bolstering the economy and social structure of the

republics of the former Soviet Union through this

means may have its own security rewards.

Also to be considered are the practical realities

of implementing the provisions regarding compliance with IAEA safeguards and materials protection standards, although actual IAEA enforcement of these standards is not contemplated in the

agreement. Even if the parties agree in the future

to an IAEA role, it may be difficult to implement.

Although the IAEA has the legal authority to take

and store excess fissionable materials (relative to

the amount required for civilian use) including

uranium, it may not have the necessary resources

(34). The IAEA may continue to have funding

problems that will preclude any increased role in

security and verification (10), unless funded by

the United States and other nations.
142 Dismantling the Bomb and Managing the Nuclear Materials

 Economic Benefits from the

U.S.-Russian HEU Agreement

By most criteria, the incentive to achieve

enhanced security outweighs most considerations

of economics or profit. Yet, many within DOE

and U.S. private industry have looked at the

U.S.-Russian HEU agreement primarily as a

potentially profitable business deal, although it is

to be budget neutral for the U.S. Government on

a year-to-year basis.

23 Russia also has positive

financial expectations since the agreement specifies that it is to use some proceeds for the

“conversion of defense enterprises, enhancing

the safety of nuclear power plants, environmental

clean up of polluted areas and the construction

and operation of facilities in Russia” (2).

Processing and diluting HEU to LEU in Russia

could maintain Russian jobs at defense-related

facilities that might otherwise be downsized or

closed. Stabilizing the Russian economy may be

crucial in maintaining sufficient political stability

for the Russian nuclear warhead dismantlement

program to proceed as hoped. The Russian

Ministry of Atomic Energy has more than a

million employees. However, the United States

will have to be convinced that maintaining

employment at Russian defense facilities would

not in effect invigorate the Russian nuclear

weapons complex. The Nunn-Lugar provisions

partially address this point by requiring that

nuclear materials recovered from dismantled

Russian warheads and stored in facilities built

with U.S. assistance must be certified not to be

reused in new weapons.

Victor Mikhailov, the Russian Minister of

Atomic Energy, has stated that Russia would

invest “hundreds of millions of dollars” in

profits from the sale of HEU into cleaning up its

environment and building safer nuclear power

plants and facilities (31). DOE and the U.S. State

Department consider that the Russians are motivated primarily by the opportunity to earn hard,

Western currency from their sales of LEU to DOE

(18,34).

DOE perceives the agreement as an opportunity for Russian uranium enrichment operations

to prosper in the competitive worldwide nuclear

fuel business. Although in 1969 the United States

had a monopoly over the Western World’s

uranium enrichment market, foreign investors

had taken over most of the struggling U.S.

uranium mining industry by 1988, and imports

supplied 51 percent of U.S. power utility requirements (50). In 1992, DOE’s share of the world

enrichment services market was reduced to 40

percent (24,28). Sales of the 500 tons of Russian

HEU after conversion to LEU would be equivalent to about 7 years of DOE’s enrichment

services (43) or, spread over 20 years, to an

average of 35-40 percent of DOE’s enrichment

sales annually (32). The key economic benefit for

DOE may be to reduce operating costs and thus

remain a competitive source of uranium fuel in

the next century (32).

No price was indicated in the February agreement. Current price negotiations will be announced when all terms and conditions have been

agreed to. A key means of valuing Russian HEU

is the health of the uranium market for the

remainder of this decade. Some economic forecasts for the nuclear power industry are not

optimistic. In an analysis of the installed nucleargenerating capacity worldwide, the resulting uranium demand, and the interaction between demand and supply, the conclusion was that installed capacity is likely to increase very slowly

to the year 2000 and that there is little likelihood

of substantial real increases in uranium prices

(41). Past government and industry forecasts of

installed nuclear-generating capacity have been

consistently overoptimistic. Most forecasts were

compiled by agencies that are strongly committed

to nuclear development and did not adequately

23 kaddition to tiego~ that tie agreement be budget neutral, it will not be funded under the Soviet Nuclear ‘1’breat Reduction @Jm-Lug@

Acts of 1991 and 1992.
Chapter 6: Opportunities to Aid Russian Dismantlement 143

recognize the potential for delays or cancellations

arising from engineering, bureaucratic, and political obstacles.

Recent legislation that will convert DOE’s

Uranium Enrichment Corporation into a semiautonomous government corporation (the Energy

Act of 1992, Public Law 102-486) may have some

impact on the Russian HEU agreement. Title IX

of the Energy Act, which established the U.S.

Enrichment Corporation (USEC), also deals explicitly with the purchase of HEU from the former

Soviet Union (section 1408). The law authorizes

USEC to negotiate the purchase of all HEU made

available by any state of the former Soviet Union

under a government-to-government agreement,

provided that the “quality of material can be

made suitable for use in commercial reactors. ”

Whatever plans are adopted, in the early years of

the agreement the USEC is expected to use

HEU-derived LEU to satisfy contracts with utilities. The question of budget neutrality over the

long run is effectively moot once USEC takes

over as executive agent of the agreement since it

will no longer be an agency of the U.S. Government and will have to pay its own way. Nevertheless, the long-term financial risk is that the U.S.

Treasury will eventually have to cover any losses

suffered by USEC or that it will have to guarantee

a loan to pay for the uranium on which USEC

could default.

 Potential Obstacles to the

U.S.-Russian HEU Agreement

The Clinton administration has continued negotiating the implementation contracts (originally to be signed within a few months) specified

in the U.S.-Russian HEU umbrella agreement

(23). Several issues remain to be resolved.

For example, the United States required that

the basis for dividing profits from HEU sales

among the former Soviet republics involved

(Russia, Ukraine, Belarus, and Kazakhstan) be

established at the time of the agreement. Russia

and Ukraine have not been able to agree on this.

Also to be negotiated are specific provisions

for U.S. verification of the weapons source of

HEU, as well as other materials control and

accountability procedures. In addition, the availability of HEU from dismantled Russian weapons

depends on Russia’s capabilities to maintain a

dismantlement schedule that it states is subject to

the availability of a new storage facility.

It is unclear when these difficulties will be

resolved, but both parties are working on them.

Another obstacle may be the concern about

Russian uranium replacing U.S. supplies. Uranium mining and enrichment interests in the

United States have objected to the sale of HEU

and linked this to complaints about Russia’s

alleged uranium dumping (see box 6-D). Unions

representing workers at uranium enrichment facilities are concerned that importing this Russian

uranium will displace U.S. jobs at these plants.

An October 1992 uranium antidumping accord

exempts Russian HEU from quotas (l), but the

antidumping agreement remains contentious.

CONCLUSION

Although the United States has initiated a

number of efforts to aid Russian dismantlement

that are important first steps, concrete benefits

from these efforts may be limited. This limitation

may result in part because no adequate strategic

analysis has yet been carried out of the most

important immediate and long-term objectives of

the United States and Russia with respect to

warhead dismantlement and materials management, nor is there a plan for attempting to

reconcile differing national objectives and requirements.

One issue for consideration is whether the

weapons dismantlement assistance that the United

States is willing to provide coincides with the

priority needs of Russia. Although dismantlement

of weapons is a matter that the United States

views as important for international security

purposes, the economic and political situation in

Russia may make it difficult for resources to be
144 Dismantling the Bomb and Managing the Nuclear Materials

Box 6-D-Uranium Antidumping Suit

How can HEU from nuclear weapons dismantlement be converted and sold on the commercial uranium fuel

market without further upsetting the already depressed U.S. uranium mining and enrichment industry? When the

previous Administration announced the HEU agreement, it claimed that it would have no adverse impact on U.S.

consumers or jobs in t he uranium mining, or processing industries (56). If Russian weapons uranium were blended

with newly mined U.S. uranium, the impact on mining jobs might be minimal. However, the current approach to

let most blending be done in Russia would, undoubtedly, have the effect of replacing U.S. uranium supplies, unless

DOE continues to purchase and stockpile natural uranium.

The uranium miner’s union has objected in the past to the likely impact of the importation of Russian uranium

(not from weapons) to the United States, and it brought suit to blockRussiancommercial sales. In November 1991

the Ad Hoc Committee of Domestic Uranium Producers, a coalition of 13 U.S. mining and milling companies and

the Oil, Chemical and Atomic Workers International Union, whose members are uranium conversion and

enrichment plant workers, fried an antidumping petition with the Commerce Department’s International Trade

Commission and international Trade Administration. The petition requested relief under the Tariff Act of 1930 (19

U.S.C. 1673a) (50). It claimedthat members had been injured by the sale of Soviet uranium at less than fair market

value (50). In 1992, as a result of this suit, the U.S. Commerce Department found that Russia had been selling

commercial-grade (not from weapons) LEU at unfairly low prices (31).

This case has so far addressed only the dumping of commercial-grade Russian LEU and has excluded

Russian weapons uranium from consideration (17). Although the Department of Commerce determined that

Russia was indeed dumping uranium, it specifically excluded HEU from its preliminary ruling, which implies that

Russian weapons uranium may be freely imported into the United States (30,32). The Uranium Miner’s Union may

object to this ruling (32).

Agreements ending the U.S. investigation of alleged dumping of uranium by the states of the former Soviet

Union were signed on October 16, 1992 (3), The agreement with the Russian Federation states that the Russian

Ministry of Atomic Energy will restrict the volume of direct and indirect exports of uranium products from all sources

in the Federation. HEU in existence at the signing of the agreement, or any LEU derived from it, is exempted from

the quotas imposed on uranium shipments from Russia, provided it is purchased by the Department of Energy

or U.S. Enrichment Corporation. Also, the Russian Federation is granted a one-time only opportunity to sell a fixed

quantity of uranium through the end of 1994. The exemption of HEU in the antidumping agreement is explicitly

linked to the agreement on the purchase of HEU.

It is unclear whether any future challenges to this agreement maybe forthcoming from the U.S. uranium

production industry or the unions. The Nation must weigh the security benefits of purchasing Russian HEU against

any job impacts that may occur.

SOURCE: Office of Technology Assessment, 1993.

devoted to that purpose, and current U.S. assistance efforts alone may not ensure that Russia’s

dismantlement process will move forward. If U.S.

efforts do not address some critical needs and

interests of the former Soviet Union along (and

perhaps connected) with dismantlement matters,

little may be accomplished in terms of the latter.

By continuing to address these issues separately

in dealings with Russia, the United States may not

be able to achieve optimal results.

Another important issue is whether any storage

or processing facilities used in connection with

warhead dismantlement and materials management should be subject to international monitoring, inspection, or even control. In that regard, it

remains to be seen whether the United States can

realistically expect to verify, either directly or

through international agencies, that Russia is

proceeding with safe storage of special nuclear

materials, without some reciprocal interest by
Chapter 6: Opportunities to Aid Russian Dismantlement 145

Russia in verifying U.S. progress along the same

lines. At present, there does not appear to be a

high-level governmental process to consider and

address such issues.

The ongoing initiatives and activities to assist

Russia are more likely to obtain good results tithe

United States develops a more focused and

integrated program within the context of broad

policy objectives. Whether or not Russia calls for

reciprocal actions by the United States, many

believe that global nuclear arms reduction will

come about only if the United States sets an

example through its own warhead dismantlement

and materials management policies and programs

(5). Thus, the efficacy of any U.S. attempts to

influence Russia could be enhanced to the extent

that what is expected of Russia has some relationship to the actions of the United States itself. In

formulating this overall program, leaders will

have to understand what changes in U.S. programs could result in corresponding changes in

Russia’s program.

The current governmental process to consider

and address such issues has not yet resolved them.

In addition, U.S. Government efforts with respect

to Russian weapons dismantlement and materials

disposition have not always been well coordinated. Since various offices and agencies are

dealing with different portions of the initiatives,

the essential linkages and connections among the

initiatives are not always analyzed or considered.

This could eventually lead to problems in effectively implementing existing programs or developing additional ones.

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28. Laughon, Kerrnit, Associate Deputy Assistant

Secretary, Uranium Enrichment Program, U.S.

Department of Energy, personal communication,

Aug. 6, 1992.

29. Lepingwell, John, “Beyond ST~T: UkrainianRussian Negotiations,” RFE/RL Research Report, vol. 2, No. 8, Feb. 19, 1993.

30. Lippman, Thomas, W., “U.S. to Buy Russian

Uranium,” Washington Post, Sept. 1,1992, p. Al.

31. Lippman, Thomas, and R. Jeffrey Smith, “Russian Uranium Proposal Divides U.S. Government,” Washington Post, July 23, 1992, p. A24.

32. Magwood, William, Edison Electric Institute,

personal communication, Aug. 19, 1992.

33. Mah, Richard, Program Manager, Weapons Complex Reconfiguration Program, Ims Alamos National Laboratory, comments at Nuclear Nonproliferation Workshop, sponsored by Congressional

Research Service, Mar. 22, 1993.

34. McGoldrick, Fred, U.S. Department of State,

personal communication, Mar. 26, 1993.

35. Natural Resources Defense Council, Report on

Third International Workshop on Verljied Storage and Destruction of Nuclear Warheads,

Moscow and Kiev, Dec. 16-20, 1991 (Washington, DC: undated), 35 pp. plus appendixes.

36. Neff, Thomas L., consultant, personal communication, Feb. 28, 1993.

37. Norris, R. S., and William Arkin, “Estimated

Russian (CIS) Nuclear Stockpile (July 1993),”

Bulletin of the Atomic Scientists, July/August

1993, p. 57.

38. Nuclear Regulatory Commission, NUREG-1324,

Proposed Methodfor Regulating Major Materials
Chapter 6: Opportunities to Aid Russian Dismantlement 1147

39.

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41.

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Nuclear Regulatory Commission, August 1991).

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promoted by Science and Technology by the

Development of Ethics and the A. De Gasperi

Foundation, Rome, Italy, June 15-17, 1992, pp.

5-22.

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1992, pp. 74-77.

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Nuclear Energy, U.S. Department of Energy,

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1992.
I

n this post-Cold War era, retiring and dismantling warheads and managing warhead materials will constitute a

new type of mission for the Federal Government. As

discussed in chapters 2 and 3, the Department of Energy

(DOE) continues to dismantle nuclear warheads retired by the

Department of Defense (DOD) as it has in the past. Yet,

important differences in the purpose of dismantlement—

including the domestic and international context in which it is

being conducted—render this a fundamentally different endeavor from what it was during the Cold War.

One of the major differences is that changed national security

requirements and arms control agreements between the United

States and Russia have diminished the need to maintain as large

a stockpile of nuclear weapons. Thus, the present objective of

weapons retirement and dismantlement both here and in Russia

is to reduce the nuclear weapons stockpile, rather than-as in the

past—merely to update and maintain it.

Further, there is now an international dimension to the

weapons dismantlement and materials management effort. Decisions by the United States on these matters could either enhance

or diminish the opportunity to reduce risks to international

security and the environment. The United States is attempting to

encourage Russia and other former Soviet Republics to dismantle their nuclear weapons and safely manage the materials

coming out of warheads. At some point, the United States may

need to point to its own accomplishments in this area to set an

example for other nations to follow. In other words, success in

this new purpose may be important not only in the domestic arena

but also in the international one.

Policy

Issues

and

Initiatives 7

Point

“Here. . . is another example of

the policy and political process

going totally backwards—

technical debate among

experts, exploring Iimited sets

of alternatives prior to the

formulation of key government

decisions about national goals

and policies. ”

National public interest group

reviewer of OTA report

Counterpoint

“There are always those who

would like to make a grand task

out of a rather straightforward

one—politics is sure to make

anything difficult. ”

DOE contractor official

reviewer of OTA report

149
150 Dismantling the Bomb and Managing the Nuclear Materials

Failure to safely and securely dismantle retired

warheads or to manage warhead materials here

and abroad could have harmful consequences, in

terms of both security and the environment, for

the United States and the international community. To avoid these consequences, policies and

programs are needed for dismantling warheads,

and for managing the plutonium and highly

enriched uranium from them, in a manner that

reduces risks to national security, the environment, and human health.

The United States will have to define its

national security objectives in the post-Cold War

era with respect to nuclear weapons policy, and

decide how best to conduct its own dismantlement programs so as to accomplish both domestic

and international objectives. The United States

will also have to develop the processes for

determining g what materials are surplus for weapons purposes and deciding how nuclear materials

are to be managed over the long term. Finally, the

United States will need to reshape its institutional

structure so it can capably deal with nuclear

materials from warheads.

At this time, the United States may still have an

opportunity to assume a leadership role in ensuring that efforts to control the risks associated with

nuclear weapons are initiated and carried out.

However, if the United States does not act in a

timely manner to define and implement a new

policy of nuclear weapons dismantlement and

materials management suitable to this post-Cold

War era, changing international events may make

it more difficult to have an impact on these

matters in the future.

It is therefore important at this time that the

policy basis for this new mission be declared at

the top levels of Government, and that the mission

be defined and articulated within the agencies

responsible for implementing the policy. This can

be done by the executive branch—initiated by the

President and carried out by DOD and DOE--or

Congress may take the initiative by directing the

Administration to formulate a national dismantlement policy and providing guidance as to its

scope and content.

Congress and the Administration can take a

number of steps to help meet the technical,

institutional, and political challenges of warhead

dismantlement and materials management here,

and to cooperate with Russia in meeting similar

challenges there. The Office of Technology

Assessment (OTA) has developed a series of

policy initiatives that could improve prospects for

successful nuclear weapons dismantlement and

materials management programs. Although legislative action could appropriately be taken with

respect to all the initiatives, and funds would have

to be authorized and appropriated to carry out

most of them, important steps toward accomplishing many of the initiatives can initially be

taken by the President and the responsible executive agencies. The initiatives address the following matters that would be useful in improving the

present situation:

● establish a national dismantlement policy

that includes the objectives and scope of

such dismantlement and a decision on the

amount of materials from retired and dismantled warheads that will be declared

surplus;

. strengthen DOE management of current and

near-term activities to enhance worker and

public safety as well as environmental protection functions;

. setup a process, and the appropriate institutional structures, for making and carrying

out decisions about the storage and ultimate

disposition of nuclear materials from warheads;

● establish a new organizational structure to

manage long-term materials disposition and

other activities;

. increase access to information regarding

dismantlement and materials management

decisions that are of public concern and

interest; and
Chapter 7: Policy Issues and Initiatives 151

. determine approaches for working cooperatively with Russia to achieve mutually desirable outcomes.

These initiatives and some possible mechanisms

for carrying them out, are discussed below.

A NATIONAL DISMANTLEMENT POLICY

The Nation needs, but does not have, a policy

that sets forth clear, long-term goals for nuclear

weapons retirement and dismantlement, and for

management and disposition of materials from

warheads. In addition to providing a broad

framework for dismantlement and materials management, the Administration needs to decide on

some specific features of future efforts. One such

decision is the number of weapons to be retired

and dismantled, and a time frame for completing

dismantlement that is consistent with both safety

and protection of human health and the environment. Another is the amount of plutonium and

highly enriched uranium (HEU) currently available from dismantled warheads that is not needed

to support nuclear weapons stockpile requirements, as well as the amount of such materials

expected to accumulate incrementally and when

dismantlement is completed. After these decisions are made, Congress and the Administration

can begin to set objectives for long-term management of nuclear materials from warheads.

Openly developing and announcing a dismantlement policy could serve as confirmation to

the international community that the United

States is serious about disassembling most of its

nuclear warheads and is willing to declare some

of the materials from warheads as surplus no

longer needed for strategic purposes. Statement of

these policies will set an example that Russia’s

leaders could use to support similar dismantlement efforts there, as well as enhance prospects

for further U.S.-Russian cooperation in setting

and achieving mutual warhead dismantlement

goals.

 Setting Dismantlement Objectives

A dismantlement policy should specify the

total number of weapons in the active stockpile

that the Administration intends to retire and

dismantle, and a time frame for the completion of

their dismantlement. Announcing specific objectives and schedules will require careful coordination within the varied DOD and DOE organizational structures to make sure that all aspects are

included and that the plan is practical, feasible,

and safe from a technical and management

standpoint. If a public document is issued, it will

have to be carefully declassified, a task that will

require additional time and resources.

The policy should clarify management responsibility and accountability within DOE and the

contractor structure, and should provide uniform

guidance to all field offices. Knowing what the

entire dismantlement effort entails would allow

for better planning and coordinating to incorporate safety and protection of the environment and

human health into all operations. The projected

cost of dismantlement could also be determined.

 Determining and Disclosing

Amounts of Surplus Materials

Once the number of warheads to be dismantled

has been determined, the amounts of plutonium

and HEU that must be managed will be known.

An important part of the new dismantlement and

materials management mission is to begin to

move toward decisions about demilitarization

and ultimate disposition of these nuclear materials from warheads. If policy is directed from the

top levels of government, basic decisions about

surplus materials could be made and announced

in the near future, although the amounts may

change as the international situation evolves.

Given the probability that the United States

does not need to use all the plutonium and HEU

from dismantled weapons to support stockpile

requirements, it would be useful for DOE, DOD,

and other involved agencies to determine as soon

as possible the quantities of weapons plutonium
152 Dismantling the Bomb and Managing the Nuclear Materials

and HEU that now exist-and are expected to

exist after completion of warhead dismantlement—

that will not be required for any future strategic

uses. After a decision is made about what

materials are surplus for such uses, those materials can be put on an irreversible path to demilitarization, and some preliminary actions can be taken

that will lead to ultimate disposition decisions.

To encourage this decisionmaking process,

Congress could direct that an unclassified report

be submitted to Congress, and updated annually,

specifying the amount of plutonium and HEU on

hand from dismantled warheads that will not be

needed to support stockpile requirements. An

unclassified report on the materials allocated to

nonstockpile use would serve to inform the public

of the amount of material that must be dealt with

in both the near and the distant future, and could

facilitate analysis and public discussion of the

safe storage and ultimate disposition of such

materials. In this post-Cold War era, disclosure of

the amounts of surplus materials should be

possible without threatening national security or

aiding potential proliferators. However, it would

require careful study and a sound declassification

process. Some initial information on possible

future surplus nuclear materials has already been

released by DOE and this policy could build on

those first steps.

Designating materials as excess to stockpile

uses would also lay the foundation for working

cooperatively with Russia to encourage a similar

policy of placing surplus materials from weapons

dismantled there on a permanent demilitarization

path.

STRENGTHENING DOE MANAGEMENT

For weapons dismantlement and materials

management policies to be successfully implemented, DOE must carry out its responsibilities in

a reamer that satisfies the public that protection

of the environment, health, and safety is being

achieved. Success in dismantlement and materials management will be judged not only on

whether DOE does its assigned job, but on

whether it does it well from an environmental,

health, and safety perspective. Thus, DOE must

redefine its objectives in terms that will allow it

to attain operational goals, while also meeting

environmental requirements and expectations,

and earning the public’s trust. To do this, DOE

must overcome the management assumption that,

because dismantlement activities have been conducted for many years, nothing new or different

is required in current or future operations. To

ensure that DOE succeeds in doing so, both

internal and external oversight of ongoing DOE

activities will have to be strengthened.

 Conduct of Dismantlement Programs

Although DOE is attempting to establish better

environmental, safety, and health programs in its

various operations, as described in chapter 3, the

Defense Nuclear Facilities Safety Board has

found that numerous problems persist where

weapons dismantlement and materials management programs are being conducted. These findings point to a need for more vigorous efforts to

upgrade environmental, health, and safety programs; to devote sufficient resources to these

purposes; and to institute more effective training

programs in connection with dismantlement and

materials management. These factors strongly

indicate that DOE; its Defense Programs Office,

which has the responsibility for dismantlement;

and its contractors who are involved in dismantlement and materials management programs will

have to ensure that protection of the environment,

safety, and health is a fundamental organizational

objective.

To successfully accomplish this, there must be

strong and visible management commitment to

this objective at all levels—headquarters, DOE

field offices, management and operations contractors, and subcontractors. The responsible

DOE and contractor managers should institute a

comprehensive environmental, health, and safety

program in connection with dismantlement and
Chapter 7: Policy Issues and Initiatives 153

materials management. The key elements of such

a program are the establishment of specific

policies and procedures, and their implementation in day-to-day operations; a credible and open

internal evaluation process; and incentives for

accomplishing the desired results. To succeed, the

program must have adequate resources, including

well-trained personnel, funding, facilities, and

equipment. And, as discussed below, expanded

external oversight is also needed.

DOE and its field offices should be more

involved with planning and evaluating operations

at the sites. A planning and evaluation process is

needed within DOE that has purview over the

entire dismantlement and materials management

mission (including both Pantex and Y-12). DOE

could establish an environment, safety, and health

policy planning group that encompasses the total

dismantlement and materials management program. That group could then issue clear guidance

to managers as to how to implement the results of

the planning process at all levels.

To achieve this new operational mode, workers

must understand clearly how each program activity affects environmental and occupational safety

and health objectives. Individuals with operational responsibility for actual dismantlement and

materials management must take on ‘‘ownership’ of the mission of protecting environment,

health, and safety, and must be empowered to

identify and seek solutions for problems as they

arise.

To protect worker safety and health during

dismantlement and materials storage operations,

managers responsible for operations should assign occupational safety and health matters a high

priority, implement effective worker protection

strategies, enforce standards of the Occupational

Safety and Health Administration (OSHA), and

maintain clear chains of command.

Continuous efforts to institutionalize these

changes are needed. Central to this is the development of operational practices and procedures with

the participation of all relevant personnel, and

continuous training of all personnel involved. It is

also important to link personnel evaluations and

rewards to environmental, health, and safety

accomplishments, to provide strong incentives

(monetary and otherwise) to achieve the desired

results.

A vigorous internal audit and evaluation

process is required to track accomplishments and

identify areas for improvement. To this end, an

organization and process should be established

within DOE’s Office of Defense Programs to

conduct regular audits, and evaluate environmental, health, and safety awareness as well as

results. In addition, DOE’s Office of Environment, Safety, and Health should provide effective

and continuous internal oversight.

 External Oversight

To ensure continuous progress in the environmental, safety, and health aspects of current

programs, it is necessary to have effective independent external evaluation and scrutiny by both

technical experts and the public. Thus, it maybe

desirable for Congress to authorize additional

oversight of ongoing dismantlement and materials management activities by the Defense Nuclear

Facilities Safety Board, which already provides

oversight of nuclear safety and related matters.

Congress may wish to give the Board responsibility to evaluate and approve Safety Analysis

Reports and Operational Readiness Reviews for

each weapons dismantlement program before it

begins, and to monitor each program to ensure

compliance. The Board itself could develop a

process to ensure that environmental, health, and

safety guidelines are being followed during weapons dismantlement and materials management

activities. Areas that are not now emphasized—

including environmental monitoring and environmental health issues--deserve particular attention. The Board would need additional resources

and personnel to expand its activities in these

areas.

Congress may also wish to direct the Board to

provide more opportunity for public involvement
154 Dismantling the Bomb and Managing the Nuclear Materials

in its oversight process. For example, instead of

publishing final recommendations in the Federal

Register, the Board could publish its draft recommendations and issue reports in unclassified

versions, while more actively seeking public

involvement in both processes. These actions

would strengthen oversight and help assure communities that qualified outside parties are fairly

and independently reviewing DOE’s conduct of

dismantlement and temporary storage activities.

With respect to worker health and safety,

Congress could extend OSHA jurisdiction to

DOE facilities. DOE’s credibility would be enhanced if dismantlement and materials management activities were not subject exclusively to its

jurisdiction. Until the necessary resources can be

made available to OSHA, DOE’s Office of

Environment, Safety, and Health could invite it to

conduct periodic reviews with respect to the

warhead dismantlement and materials management program.

State oversight could be facilitated through

better information exchange and increased funding. In addition, mechanisms through which

interested citizens and experts could provide

outside oversight at relevant sites should be

considered. One such mechanism is establishment at a potentially affected site of a site-specific

citizen advisory board, with full-time technical

staff, to provide advice and input to DOE or other

involved agencies on environmental, health, and

safety issues relevant to warhead dismantlement

and the temporary storage of warhead materials.

This type of mechanism is discussed in greater

detail in OTA’s report Complex Cleanup, published in 1991.

NUCLEAR MATERIALS STORAGE

Permanent stockpile reduction means that fewer,

if any, new weapons will be built in the future,

which reduces the opportunity to recycle materials from disassembled warheads for use in other

weapons. As a result, more materials from warheads must be managed for longer periods of time

than in the past. In particular, additional storage

of materials such as plutonium pits and HEU must

be provided. Some amount of both plutonium and

HEU will have to remain in ‘temporary storage,”

most likely for several decades.

At present, plutonium pits and HEU removed

from disassembled U.S. warheads are in the

custody of DOE’s Defense Programs and are

stored at its Pantex and Y-12 plants, respectively.

DOE views storage of pits at Pantex as temporary

(6 to 10 years) but has yet to announce plans or a

timetable for any longer-term arrangements. In

contrast, indications are that DOE intends to

continue storing HEU from dismantled warheads

at Y- 12 in Oak Ridge for the indefinite future. As

explained in chapter 4, regardless of what decisions are eventually made about the disposition of

plutonium and HEU from warheads, storage of

these materials for several decades will be required.

Planning for long-term storage involves resolving many technical, regulatory, institutional, and

perhaps international issues—some of which are

not within the purview and expertise of DOE. Yet,

DOE’s planning for long-term materials storage

is not well coordinated with other agencies, and

decisions being made in connection with the

Weapons Complex reconfiguration could limit

future options. As outlined in chapter 5, concerns

have been expressed about prospective storage

arrangements. Lack of public information on this

subject has made it difficult for interested citizens

to evaluate the adequacy of existing storage, as

well as any plans for future modifications in

current arrangements. Unless potentially controversial issues are identified and resolved early, it

may be very difficult to implement long-term

storage arrangements in a timely manner.

The schedule for Federal Government funding,

design, and construction of a new facility, or even

modifying an existing one, can take more than a

decade. It would therefore be prudent to begin

now to identify and evaluate alternatives that

could provide safe, long-term storage arrangements for materials from warheads. Such alterna-
Chapter 7: Policy Issues and Initiatives 155

tives might include upgraded arrangements or

new facilities at various sites within or outside the

Nuclear Weapons Complex. Once a national

policy has been articulated, the next step is to

determine how much plutonium and HEU will

have to be stored over what period of time, and to

provide capacity for that amount. Next, the form

in which the material is to be stored should be

determined since it is relevant to any future steps

that would be taken. Finally, the infrastructure

and materials processing capability necessary for

a complete, safe, and modern storage facility must

be provided.

Present plans appear to call for DOE to design

a storage facility for plutonium pits that would be

constructed on a Weapons Complex site and be

operated by the Office of Defense Programs.

Present plans also assume that the material to be

stored in the new facility would be military in

nature and thus not subject to licensing by the

Nuclear Regulatory Commission or to regulation

by OSHA. However, if many of the materials are

at some point declared surplus, those assumptions

would not necessarily apply.

Decisions about long-term storage of surplus

plutonium and HEU from dismantled nuclear

warheads involve many considerations that are

not primarily within the purview of DOE. Such

considerations include the scope of external

regulation to which storage facilities and related

activities should be subject, and the extent of

transparency that may be needed to accommodate

present or future U.S. foreign policy objectives. It

would be desirable for these types of issues to be

carefully considered early in the planning process

by Federal agencies with primary responsibility

for these matters. The early input of these and

other agencies on relevant issues could help avoid

problems later in the process.

To obtain this broad input, an interagency

planning process could be constituted by the

President to review the key issues surrounding

storage of materials nom dismantled U.S. warheads. One way to accomplish this is for the

President to establish an interagency task force. If

placed at a sufficiently high level within the

Federal Government, this task force could bring

a national focus to the important task of providing

safe and secure storage of materials from dismantled weapons for as long as necessary. The task

force could make recommendations regarding the

most effective way to ensure safe and secure

long-term storage of the materials from warheads.

In addition, the task force could evaluate related

issues such as the feasibility and consequences of

storing the surplus plutonium and HEU separately

from materials reserved for stockpile requirements, and the means for effectively involving the

public in the siting of any new or modified facilities that may be needed in connection with

long-term storage. To ensure that an interagency

planning process takes place in a timely fashion,

Congress could express its support for this

process and direct the President to transmit

recommendations about long-term storage of

warhead materials to Congress by a specified

date.

The task force could be composed of representatives from DOE (including not only the Office

of Defense Programs, but also the Office of

Environment, Safety, and Health, and the Office

of Intelligence and National Security), DOD

(including the Corps of Engineers), the Environmental Protection Agency (EPA), Nuclear Regulatory Commission (NRC), Department of Labor

(particularly OSHA), State Department, Arms

Control and Disarmament Agency (ACDA), and

the National Security Council. Representatives of

State regulatory agencies could be invited to

participate as appropriate. The task force could be

headed by an official in the Executive Office of

the President and work for a period of approximately one year. Although this is an ambitious

schedule, time is of the essence if the short-term

storage problem is not to become by default a

long-term storage crisis.

The task force should actively solicit expert

and public views, possibly through hearings and

interactive meetings with interested parties outside government, throughout the course of its
156 Dismantling the Bomb and Managing the Nuclear Materials

work. Its draft reports could be submitted for

public comment through the Federal Register.

Extensive input from interested and potentially

affected States should be solicited-possibly

through an advisory panel composed of State

representatives. Although these steps are timeconsuming, they will help in obtaining relevant

input early in the process so that issues raised can

be properly addressed.

By expanding the planning process beyond

DOE and including relevant expertise from other

agencies, issues that DOE may not be factoring

into its process are more likely to be considered.

Environmental agencies such as EPA could

encourage early consideration of issues such as

pollution prevention, waste management, and

environmental and radiation standards. Regulatory agencies such as the NRC should be able to

bring to bear their experience in licensing analogous types of storage facilities. On the other hand,

agencies that are actively involved in dealing with

the international situation (such as the State

Department and ACDA) could provide input

about the likelihood and parameters of any

transparency features that might be necessary.

The States and the public could bring their

perspectives to bear as well.

An important consideration in any future decisions involving storage is whether it would be

feasible and useful to store surplus (nondefense)

materials separately from those reserved for

strategic purposes. A task force could weigh the

advantages and disadvantages of separation from

relevant viewpoints-international as well as

domestic. The task force could also evaluate

options for separate storage, such as whether such

storage facilities should be located on the same or

different sites, and whether strategic and surplus

materials should be in the custody of the same or

different agencies.

One potential consideration that should be

weighed is whether separation of the two types of

materials would facilitate transparency should

bilateral verification or inspection be agreed on

with respect to surplus weapons materials. In the

case of plutonium

consider whether it

classify” the shape

pits, the task force could

would be desirable to “deand size of the pit, or the

amount of plutonium in it, or whether the pits

could be subject to nonintrusive monitoring or

radiation measurements while in their containers.

The task force could also consider whether

physical separation of the civilian materials

would more easily allow the United States to

voluntarily render them subject to International

Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) safeguards-or

perhaps even to place these materials under some

level of IAEA management—should the United

States and Russia ever reach an agreement to do

so. Another consideration is whether separation

of surplus materials from strategic ones would

provide greater certainty to the public and to other

nations that the surplus materials will not be used

again for weapons.

Another factor for a task force to consider is

whether, under current laws and regulations, the

physical separation of U.S. civilian materials

could facilitate subjecting these facilities and

materials to the environmental, health, and safety

requirements and standards applicable to all

nonmilitary nuclear facilities-such as NRC licensing of any facilities in which the materials are

to be stored—and also subjecting operations to

NRC and OSHA regulation and oversight. The

task force could also determine the legislative or

regulatory changes that might be desirable to

ensure that the materials will be stored and

maintained under appropriate conditions so as to

prevent accidents; protect the environment,

health, and safety; and reduce worker exposure to

radiation.

An important economic determination in terms

of physical separation is the additional cost of

security and safeguard measures. If civilian materials are stored at a different site from weapons

materials, there will be duplication of security and

safeguard services. Also consideration will have

to be given to siting of a processing facility for

plutonium pit maintenance, which DOE believes
Chapter 7: Policy Issues and Initiatives 157

must be located at the same

plutonium storage facility.

site as a long-term

The interagency task force would also be in a

good position to recommend a process for further

involving the public in choosing options for

modifying existing facilities or selecting locations for new, long-term storage facilities. As

analogous problems (such as the Waste Isolation

Pilot Plant in New Mexico and the high-level

radioactive waste repository proposed for Nevada) have shown, arriving at a suitable and

publicly acceptable process to select a site for

facilities to contain toxic materials involves many

institutional issues that can be even more difficult

to resolve than technical matters. A carefully

thought-out process is necessary to secure relevant input early and continuously. Any process

for siting new facilities (both storage and associated processing facilities) or modifying existing

ones should be developed and initiated now with

continuous public involvement. The task force

can bring to bear on this controversial matter the

combined experience of the various agencies in

public involvement.

Instead of delaying public discussion of longerterm storage until DOE’s long-delayed reconfiguration process takes its course, or limiting public

involvement to procedures associated with the

National Environmental Policy Act process, it

would be prudent to facilitate early public involvement so as to identify issues that need to be

resolved. The interagency task force could solicit

State and public input, consider the important

factors from different points of view, define the

issues to be resolved, and recommend a broadbased process for involving the public in discussions of the key issues before decisions are made

and funds committed.

NUCLEAR MATERIALS DISPOSITION

Although DOE considers plutonium and HEU

from weapons to be national assets, there is no

national policy on what should be done with

them. Options have hardly begun to be analyzed

from a technical or institutional point of view, and

there are wide differences of opinion about their

merits, time and cost of development, and relative

benefits. Today the discussion of disposition

scenarios is often framed in terms of whether the

materials are deemed “assets” or “waste.”

Rather than attempting to label the materials in

this manner, it may be more useful to begin

developing national policies and objectives for

the disposition of surplus plutonium and HEU

from warheads.

Thus, after a dismantlement policy has been

established, a process should be initiated to bring

together relevant governmental and nongovernmental views to provide the President and Congress with a comprehensive basis for making the

policy decisions necessary before disposition of

U.S. nuclear materials can be undertaken. Given

the numerous political and technical uncertainties

inherent in most of the approaches being discussed, definitive choices among potential options are difficult at this time. Nonetheless, it is

prudent to start a process soon that looks toward

long-term disposition of surplus U.S. nuclear

materials, and considers the practical political and

institutional realities of developing or applying

particular technologies.

Although advocates of certain disposition technologies are optimistic that their favored technologies can be implemented successfully in certain

time frames, many of the options being discussed

at present are complicated and will be difficult to

accomplish because economic and institutional

issues, as well as technical ones, still have to be

resolved. Institutional issues related to siting and

other decisions have not been analyzed.

With respect to plutonium, storage will be

required for several decades. Beyond that, however, it has not yet been determined whether

plutonium should be stored indefinitely or used in

some way (for either strategic purposes, commercial purposes, or both), or whether it should be

disposed of expeditiously in whatever manner is

feasible and acceptable. As indicated in chapter 4,

some of the technologies being discussed in
158 Dismantling the Bomb and Managing the Nuclear Materials

connection with plutonium disposition-such as

advanced reactors and converters of various

types-will take decades to develop, demonstrate, construct, and put into operation in the

United States on a scale needed to accommodate

the expected amounts of plutonium from warheads. Just as important, all of these technologies

will produce waste in several forms-as spent

fuel or other byproducts. At present, the Nation

has no repository for such waste.

The situation with HEU, although somewhat

different, also leads to the conclusion that storage

will be necessary for a very long time. Although

HEU can be blended down to low-enriched

uranium (LEU) and used for commercial fuel,

there is no present plan to do so with U.S.

materials. Further, since the United States plans

to purchase LEU blended down from Russia’s

HEU to fulfill some of its contracts for commercial reactor fuel, it is unlikely that the U.S. supply

of HEU will be needed for this purpose any time

soon. Therefore, storage will be necessary for

these materials for some time to come, although

eventually the United States may have to consider

whether converting HEU for civilian use could

have domestic or international advantages.

At present, as outlined in chapter 4, there are

ongoing studies both within and outside DOE that

address disposition scenarios for nuclear materials from warheads. Most of the discussions to date

have been confined to the scientific community

and have generally been conducted in technical

terms. However, the analysis and selection of

disposition scenarios encompass not only technical, but also public policy, issues. These issues

range from facility siting, through the potential

social, environmental, and economic costs and

benefits of various approaches, to bilateral and

international relationships, and perhaps ultimately

even the future of nuclear energy. A process is

needed for addressing these issues before decisions are made.

To get this process started, Congress or the

President could create a national commission to

recommend appropriate goals, policies, and programs relevant to the ultimate disposition of

nuclear materials from warheads. A commission

working over a period of approximately one year

could gather the broad preliminary input from

both public and private sources that is needed to

inform the policy process. Such a commission

should be composed of governmental and nongovernmental experts, as well as public interest

and community representatives and other interested parties. This type of broad representation is

needed to identify the wide range of issues

involved in planning for ultimate disposition of

nuclear materials from warheads. A commission

would also provide an effective forum for identifying the relationship between potential disposition scenarios and U.S. policies and objectives

here and abroad.

The commission could seek broad input on

formulating both the objectives themselves and

the plans that should be made to meet them. The

objectives with regard to plutonium might well be

different from those with regard to HEU—but in

both cases, defining the objectives can help

determine the most effective actions and the

priority accorded them. The commission can also

help determine the consistency of individual

scenarios with these objectives and with broader

national policies. This process could help avoid

public expenditures on options that are inconsistent with national policies or objectives.

The commission could also outline the steps

that might be needed to meet its recommended

objectives. For example, an objective to convert

plutonium as quickly as possible into a form that

is less available or less usable for weapons would

call for developing or applying technologies that

can accomplish this in a reasonably short time

frame. It may be useful in that case to select

relatively near-term approaches using the most

developed technologies such as vitrification,

other modest processing, or available reactor

systems.

If, however, the objective is to destroy as much

plutonium as possible over the long term, then the

plutonium would have to be retained in secure
Chapter 7: Policy Issues and Initiatives 159

storage (and security costs would have to be

considered) until more advanced technologies are

developed that could bring about more extensive

transformation of the elements or until other

solutions can be implemented. In that case, the

commission could attempt to define the level of

effort needed to develop some of the advanced

reactor or convertor options that would take

longer to put into operation. Processes for handling and disposing of spent fuel or fission

products would also have to be evaluated.

Advanced technologies associated with many

of the disposition options will take decades to

develop and cost a great deal of money. Before

embarking on such programs, it is important to

develop criteria against which options can be

evaluated. Such criteria would include how well

the processes and materials can be controlled and

safeguarded, and how amenable they are to

transparency in the interest of international cooperation. The commission could draw upon and

expand the work of the interagency task force

(discussed above) to develop and recommend

criteria and indicate the priority that should be

given to each.

Disposition of U.S. materials involves both

short-term and long-term dimensions that require

careful planning—particularly to prevent adverse

environmental, health, and safety impacts. The

commission could help identify and evaluate the

relative advantages and disadvantages of individual options in protecting the environment, as well

as human health and safety. It could also help

assess technical availability-that is, how long,

how expensive, and how difficult it would be to

implement a particular option.

Most disposition scenarios would involve substantial processing of nuclear materials. Processing raises local environmental and public health

concerns, as well as significant concerns about

occupational health and safety. As discussed in

chapter 5, one of the major objectives of public

interest groups at DOE sites is to have the public

included more actively, and earlier, in the decisionmaking process in order to better understand

the health and environmental impacts of DOE

activities on the community.

Meaningful involvement by an informed public and the States could help achieve acceptable

outcomes. The commission could provide an

early forum for the expression of community

concerns and for preliminary discussion of the

risks, as well as the advantages, of possible

technical options. The commission could also

recommend a process for facilitating public

access to relevant information, and for early and

effective public involvement in important decisions--

including the location of facilities (for storage,

processing, and disposal) that may be needed in

connection with the ultimate disposition of nuclear materials.

Finally, the commission could examine the

relationship of domestic to international scenarios. For example, any proposal to convert U.S.

HEU to LEU and use it in commercial reactors

would have to be evaluated in light of the LEU

that the United States is planning to purchase

from Russia for commercial reactor purposes.

Taking these and other interrelated factors into

account is necessary if disposition scenarios are to

be evaluated properly.

The commission’s work could provide useful

input to future national policy decisions by

Congress and the President. As discussed below,

decisions will then have to be implemented by an

organization with the capability to carry out the

necessary activities in a manner appropriate to

today’s post-Cold War context.

A NEW MATERIALS MANAGEMENT

ORGANIZATION

In addition to decisions on storage and disposition approaches, there is a need to develop and put

in place an institutional structure capable of

carrying out storage and ultimate disposition

activities over the long term. Dealing with surplus

plutonium and HEU from dismantled warheads

over the long term is a mission that requires

management to meet a new set of technical,
160 Dismantling the Bomb and Managing the Nuclear Materials

institutional, and political challenges. In addition

to possessing adequate technical skills, the organization that undertakes this mission should have

the capability to carry out activities in a manner

different from that traditionally associated with

the defense mission at DOE.

For much of its past history, for example, the

DOE weapons production mission, which is

military in nature, was largely self-regulating. In

contrast, the mission of surplus nuclear materials

storage and disposition is largely civilian in

nature and will not only have to be conducted

from the start in compliance with environmental,

health, and safety laws and regulations, but will

also presumably be subject to appropriate outside

regulation and oversight by Federal agencies such

as the NRC, EPA, and OSHA, and by the States.

Any facilities-including those for storage and

processing-involved in materials disposition

could presumably be licensed by the NRC and

subject to EPA and OSHA regulation even if

located within Federal facilities. Thus, it would

be appropriate to have as the responsible organization one that can capably plan and carry out its

activities in a regulated setting-a mode of

operation that has not been the norm in the DOE

weapons production organization.

Also, in the past, Weapons Complex operations

have been conducted under extremely restrictive

information access procedures. In contrast, the

organization responsible for nuclear materials

management and disposition—while continuing

to protect properly classified information-will

have to develop new approaches to information

availability and access such as those described

below. In a new organization, these approaches

could be shaped on the basis of civilian, rather

than military, objectives. In addition, a new

organization could engage in a more open decisionmaking process to conduct credible environmental and related analyses in connection with

the development and selection of technologies,

the selection of sites, and the management of

ultimate disposition activities.

Further, the new mission of materials storage

and disposition may have to be conducted in a

manner consistent with whatever bilateral or

international considerations become relevant in

the future. A new organization dealing with

ultimate disposition of nuclear materials from

warheads could start with a well-defined mission

that includes not only domestic but also international imperatives, and be structured from the

outset to integrate international considerations

into its programs and actions.

The responsibility for materials disposition

could be assigned to a new organization that is

given both the clear and primary mission of

developing and implementing plans for ultimate

disposition of surplus nuclear materials from

warheads, and the personnel qualified to carry out

that mission. Congress may wish to establish a

new organization for materials management and

disposition as a separate agency outside DOE. Or

a new office could be created within DOU

separate from and independent of the Office of

Defense Programs-with a strictly civilian, nonweapons mission.

Alternatively, such an organization could be

established within another Federal agency. To

avoid past practices that led to widespread

contamination at nuclear weapons sites, the new

organization must take appropriate measures to

conduct activities so as to minimize health and

environmental risks. Because past polices have

led to the inability to locate or operate nuclear

waste repositories, the new organization will have

to gain the acceptance and support of the American public. It is therefore important to develop a

decisionmaking process that is open, fair, and

responsive to public concerns, and the managers

of the organization should be selected in part on

the basis of their ability to operate in a mode that

stresses openness and public involvement.

Although the establishment of a new materials

management and disposition organization will

take some time, the process need not delay

ongoing dismantlement activities. The transition

to a new organization could begin to be planned
Chapter 7: Policy Issues and Initiatives 161

at any time, and its implementation could await

the formulation of a national dismantlement

policy and completion of the interagency planning process for long-term materials storage

discussed above.

An important advantage of giving materials

disposition responsibilities to a new organization

is that it can start with a ‘‘clean slate” and

consciously approach its mission in a manner that

would earn the public’s trust and confidence. A

new organization would have the advantage of

being able to give priority to institutional matters

such as interaction with the public, building

credibility through early and effective public

involvement, and being genuinely responsive to

public concerns. A significant advantage of anew

organization that has a purely civilian mission is

that it can deal with materials disposition issues

pertinent to U.S. relations with Russia and the rest

of the international community on civilian rather

than on military terms.

INFORMATION ACCESS

As discussed in chapter 6, the present institutional context for dismantlement and materials

management differs from that of the past. Although DOE still enjoys some degree of self-regulation over its nuclear activities under the

Atomic Energy Act, many of its activities are now

subject to environmental regulation and safety

oversight. There is also more public scrutiny of

whether DOE conducts these operations safely,

with maximum protection of human health and

the environment. To assure the public that this

is being done, DOE (or a new organization

discussed above) will have to make more information available than has been done during past

activities dealing with nuclear weapons production.

In the interest of national security, legislative

requirements have long prohibited public access

to abroad range of information related to nuclear

weapons. DOE and DOD also have discretion to

further limit information access related to these

and other matters. While restricting access to data

on nuclear weapons design and manufacture that

could aid proliferators and terrorists continues to

be important, the end of the Cold War raises the

question of whether current restrictions on access

to information that maybe relevant to dismantlement and materials management are still necessary.

This question is particularly relevant when it

comes to disclosure of information regarding

environmental, safety, and health issues associated with nuclear weapons dismantlement and

materials management and disposition. Data that

citizens consider essential to discussions of environment, safety, and health are often not accessible to interested persons outside DOE, because

the data may be contained in documents that also

contain classified or otherwise controlled information. A lengthy and meticulous review process

is necessary to remove even small amounts of

classified information from documents in order to

release unclassified information to the public. As

a result, the ability of the public to acquire

adequate and timely information related to these

activities has been impaired.

Another problem facing citizens is the generally slow and often inadequate responsiveness of

DOE to many legitimate requests for information.

Citizens frustrated by lack of information access

are not likely to trust the agency in question or

support its plans and programs. Yet such trust and

support are critical if warhead dismantlement and

materials disposition programs are to gain needed

public acceptance.

Although there are several ongoing efforts

within the executive branch—and particularly

within DOE-to review information classification procedures and increase public access to

information, Congress may wish to consider

whether the existing legal basis for restricting

access to information is appropriate in light of

today’s post-Cold War national security objectives. Congress may also wish to provide additional resources to accelerate the declassification

of documents and the enhancement of public
162 Dismantling the Bomb and Managing the Nuclear Materials

access to information. In particular, Congress

could consider enacting updated standards for

dealing with information relevant to nuclear

warhead dismantlement and materials management or disposition-particularly data relating to

environmental, health, and safety matters—and

require agencies to promulgate rules and adopt

procedures consistent with those standards.

In preparation for possible legislative revisions, Congress could request DOE, DOD, and

other involved agencies to prepare joint recommendations for comprehensive legislative provisions regarding access to information relevant to

nuclear weapons dismantlement and materials

management and disposition, particularly with

respect to environmental, safety, and health

issues. This effort could include a review of

Atomic Energy Act provisions, and implementing rules and regulations dealing with ‘Restricted

Data,” “ Formerly Restricted Data,” and “Unclassified, Controlled Nuclear Information’ (UCNI).

The agencies could be requested to recommend

whether repeal or modification is necessary or

appropriate in light of changed national security

requirements. Recommendations could also be

made for new legislative standards that would

constitute the exclusive basis for restricting

access to data and documents and for disclosing

or disseminating information.

The review could also encompass the standards

and procedures for national security classification

and other categories of restrictions that may apply

to nuclear warhead dismantlement and materials

disposition. Depending on the nature of the

recommendations, they could be implemented by

revising existing laws, enacting a new law that

would supersede conflicting sections of existing

laws, issuing an Executive order, or promulgating

new rules and regulations pursuant to the notice

and comment requirements of the Administrative

Procedures Act.

The rules could, for example, set up procedures

for allowing general declassification requests for

certain types of information to be made by parties

outside DOE. The rules could also establish

procedures that place the burden on those who

wish to retain classification status or other restrictions on information, and provide for resolution

of issues in favor of disclosure. Since this may

entail a more difficult and complicated process

than exists at present, enhanced resources will be

required.

Pending consideration and enactment of needed

fundamental changes, Congress could require

DOE to accelerate efforts to declassify or remove

from the UCNI category appropriate documents

that contain information relevant to issues of

environment, safety, and health. Also, to emphasize the importance of information access, there

could be established within DOE’s Office of

Defense Programs an ‘office of declassification’

that would be responsible for issuing unclassified

versions of classified documents and unrestrictedaccess versions of UCNI information.

There could also beestablished-within DOE’s

present Office of Classification-an “office of

information access. ” The new office could be

given the task of promptly investigating and

addressing any complaints from the public about

the timeliness of information requests regarding

weapons dismantlement and materials disposition issues under the Freedom of Information Act

or other procedures. The office could also anticipate public interest in forthcoming reports about

dismantlement and materials disposition and

related health and safety matters, and make sure

that unclassified versions are issued.

Increasing information access at the agencies

involved in warhead dismantlement and materials

management would give interested parties the

ability to examine the relevant data and to

intelligently evaluate proposed decisions about

warhead dismantlement and materials management and disposition. This in turn could result in

more informed and effective public input to

DOE’s decisionmaking process.
Chapter 7: Policy Issues and Initiatives 163

COOPERATION WITH RUSSIA

The United States cannot single-handedly reduce or eliminate all the security and environmental risks posed by nuclear weapons and

materials since it does not control all weapons and

materials worldwide. At present, most of the

non-U.S. weapons and materials are in Russia.1

As described in chapter 6, the United States has

initiated a program of assistance to Russia with

regard to safe, secure dismantlement, including

the construction of a plutonium and HEU storage

facility. In addition, an agreement is pending

whereby Russia wiIl convert its HEU from

weapons into LEU and sell it to the United States.

No clear policy exists in Russia for ultimate

disposition of plutonium from weapons, but

reports indicate that many officials favor technologies that will use the material in powerproducing reactors.

The United States at present has not been able

to verify what weapons have been or are planned

to be dismantled in Russia, what quantities of

weapons-grade nuclear materials exist or are

being produced, and what is being done with

materials from dismantled warheads. The United

States will presumably maintain appropriate security and accountability systems for its own

nuclear weapons and materials. However, similar

results may not be easy to achieve abroad. Given

these circumstances, the United States will have

to decide whether its present initiatives and

programs to assist Russia are adequately promoting national security objectives, or whether there

is a need to develop different or additional

approaches.

Past U.S. efforts to assist Russia with dismantlement and materials management have

provided important opportunities for cooperation,

but there is not yet a mature process for coordinating and focusing policy at the highest levels of

government. The United States and Russia should

agree on the most important immediate and

long-term objectives of each with respect to

warhead dismantlement, and materials management and disposition. It is important to develop a

plan for attempting to reconcile differing national

objectives and requirements. Without such a plan,

the United States may be implementing programs

to assist Russia that have conflicting goals, lead

to unexpected or undesired consequences, or do

not address the most important issues.

Russia has indicated that it does not want the

United States directly involved in the dismantlement of its warheads and that it wishes to

construct its own materials storage facility (with

U.S. design assistance). On the other hand, Russia

has been willing to enter into an agreement with

the United States on plans to sell uranium from

Russian warheads and has not ruled out the

possibility of cooperative efforts on approaches to

plutonium disposition. There is now an opportunity to pursue such efforts, but it is not clear how

long that opportunity will exist.

 Developing a Strategy for Cooperation

It is in the national interest to seize the present

opportunity and work cooperatively with Russia

to achieve desirable outcomes, particularly with

respect to plutonium disposition. A process is

needed to ascertain the feasibility of U.S .-Russian

cooperation in materials disposition efforts. If

more active U.S. involvement were deemed

prudent, choices would have to be made regarding

the technologies that need to be developed or

applied to meet desired objectives, and the

amount and sources of funding to be devoted to

these purposes would have to be determined.

There may be fiscal benefits to establishing such

policies early, and technology development could

be focused on helping to achieve disposition

options for Russian nuclear weapons materials

consistent with international security objectives.

Since any cooperative programs involving

Russia and the United States will ultimately

1 While this report does not specitlcally address nuclear weapons in Ukraine, which are the subject of diplomatic efforts, U.S. initiatives

similar to those discussed here could be considered with respect to Ukraine.
164 Dismantling the Bomb and Managing the Nuclear Materials

depend on mutual trust between the two nations,

it is important for each nation to have assurance

that the storage and disposition of nuclear materials from dismantled warheads are being managed

in a manner that is safe and secure, and that

protects against proliferation and prevents future

use of the materials in weapons. Some type of

reciprocal information disclosure and verification

could greatly assist in strengthening and maintaining mutual trust and cooperation.

U.S. initiatives to assist Russia in materials

management and disposition efforts so as to

prevent proliferation are more likely to succeed if

they are guided by a high-level, focused, national

policy that calls for the United States to work

cooperatively with Russia to achieve mutually

acceptable disposition of both nations’ surplus

materials. To strengthen prospects for United

States and Russian cooperation with respect to the

disposition of materials from warheads, the President and relevant Executive agencies need to

increase coordination at the highest levels to

develop a strategy and plan for this purpose. The

strategy should be aimed at identifying key issues

and reconciling differing national objectives,

requirements, and priorities. This would serve as

a foundation for developing a mutually acceptable plan for disposition of Russian plutonium and

perhaps for U.S. assistance in that effort.

Key components of an effective strategy

should include strengthening the relationship

between U.S. assistance in materials disposition

programs and other programs in which assistance

is desired by Russia; and developing and negotiating with Russia an initiative for mutual disclosure of information and for reciprocal arrangements to verify the amounts and monitor the

status of these materials over the next decade.

Another element of a strategy could be to

strengthen the link between U.S. and Russian

efforts in nuclear materials management and

disposition.

 Strengthening Cooperative Efforts

One approach to cooperating with Russia on

key issues is for the United States to help Russia

understand the nature of U.S. materials management and disposition efforts. Although U.S.

objectives with respect to its own weapons

plutonium and HEU maybe quite different from

Russia’s, joint deliberations on these subjects and

joint technical studies may help Russia to understand what the United States is doing and to

evaluate its own options. To accomplish this,

coordination is especially necessary between

agencies responsible for U.S. materials management and disposition programs and those responsible for U.S. policy toward Russia, and initial

steps should be taken toward conducting joint

studies and negotiating some reciprocal arrangements for materials monitoring.

To develop an effective relationship between

U.S. and Russian programs, agencies (such as

DOE) that are knowledgeable about U.S. materials management and disposition will have to work

more formally and continuously with agencies

(such as the National Security Council and the

State Department) that shape and conduct U.S.

relationships with Russia and other former Soviet

republics on these matters. Strengthened intergovernmental coordination would help ensure

that programs for U.S. dismantlement and materials disposition-as well as programs to assist and

work with Russia in these matters—are carried

out consistently with U.S. policies and are aimed

at achieving mutually acceptable goals.

A joint U.S.-Russian effort to analyze and

evaluate nuclear materials disposition technologies is one approach that could provide useful

insights into the important immediate and longterm objectives of the United States and Russia

with respect to the disposition of weapons materials. Such a project could be conducted over a

2-year period and be directed jointly by individuals from the United States and Russia, and the

project team could include persons from all the

relevant disciplines and also draw upon expertise
Chapter 7: Policy Issues and Initiatives 165

in Europe and in other nations. The team’s work

could be reviewed by an advisory panel composed of members from the Government, national

laboratories, and industry; the scientific, academic, and environmental communities; and the

public sector in the United States, Russia, and

Europe.

The project team could also consider formulating a proposal for U.S. participation in developing

and applying technologies deemed necessary to

implement feasible disposition options in Russia,

particularly options that could help demilitarize

plutonium as soon as possible. In addition,

technology sharing among the United States,

Russia, and European or other nations with regard

to disposition options can also help achieve

cooperation in the ultimate disposition process,

perhaps avoid options that could lead to proliferation, and help settle on approaches that promote

nonproliferation as well as protection of the

environment and health. It could also provide a

foundation for future cooperative participation by

the U.S. government and the private sector. A

clear U.S. objective to encourage and assist

Russia in converting plutonium, as soon as

possible, into a form not usable for weapons could

reasonably involve U.S. participation in developing technologies for that purpose-regardless of

whether those technologies would be used for the

disposition of U.S. materials.

Another approach may be to link efforts to

work cooperatively on nuclear materials management and disposition with other efforts to assist

Russia in some of its critical needs and interests

not related to nuclear weapons dismantlement.

For example, there are pressing environmental

restoration needs in various parts of Russia. More

active U.S. assistance in this and other areas

deemed important by Russia could be part of the

overall assistance offered with respect to materials management and disposition. Also, since

political instability and economic concerns could

directly affect the success of Russian dismantlement and materials disposition efforts, the United

States may decide that spending more funds in

Russia would actually decrease the risk from

nuclear weapons if it resulted in increased economic and political stability there. A flexible

approach that aims to assist with some of Russia’s

priority needs may be more successful than some

of the present programs, and could lessen criticism in Russia that U.S. programs are diminishing

its international status or that the United States is

attempting to dictate specific aspects of Russia’s

nuclear enterprise.

To strengthen and maintain mutual trust and

cooperation, the United States should develop

means, consistent with recent legislative provisions, that would enable Russia and the United

States to exchange information about nuclear

materials from warheads. This initiative could

apply to the plutonium from dismantled warheads

and also supplement any transparency arrangements made in connection with the agreement for

the sale of Russian LEU to the United States for

use in the commercial power market. Exchanging

information about amounts of nuclear materials in

the custody of each nation would help the United

States better understand the dimensions of Russia’s problems in managing these materials.

Information exchange would enable the United

States to offer any relevant assistance in accounting for the materials or keeping them safe and

secure through whatever disposition processes

Russia undertakes. Presumably, such information

will not be volunteered by Russia without some

offer of reciprocity on the part of the United

States; thus a U.S. initiative in this direction will

be needed.

In addition, Russia may soon begin to look to

disposition options for its plutonium-options

that may involve moving this material from place

to place, processing it, and changing its form.

U.S. concerns about preventing any of the Russian materials from getting into the wrong hands

or causing serious environmental harm could best

be addressed through arrangements that permit

the United States to verify the amount and status

of the plutonium in these various processes and to

monitor the processes as appropriate. Again, it is
166 I Dismantling the Bomb and Managing the Nuclear Materials

unlikely that Russia will agree to such monitoring

without some reciprocity with respect to U.S.

materials.

Thus, if an arrangement can be worked out that

will not compromise the national security of the

United States, bilateral reciprocal agreements

entered into as soon as possible could forestall

potential problems with respect to the nuclear

materials from warheads in the former Soviet

Union. Such arrangements would also enable the

United States and Russia to cooperate in the

common goal of preventing the proliferation of

nuclear weapons. Finally, this approach could be

effective in pursuing U.S. goals of international

security.

CONCLUSION

The policy initiatives discussed in this chapter

were developed from OTA’s analysis of the

problems facing current efforts in dismantlement

and materials management, as well as the opportunities that exist today to move forward and

make significant progress in stockpile reduction

and control of future risks. Box 7-A summarizes

these conclusions and initiatives. OTA’s analysis

indicates that each initiative has individual merit

and could be implemented separately. Alternatively, several or all of the initiatives could be

implemented collectively. Congressional action

in the form of legislation or oversight could begin

the process for each, but most could also be

implemented by the Administration directly.

Success in safe dismantlement and adequate

protection of people and the environment for

generations to come is an important national

goal-the Federal Government has a serious

responsibility to meet that goal.

Box 7-A–Key Policy Conclusions and Initiatives

1. A National Dismantlement Policy

Conclusion

Although the responsible Federal agencies (DOD and DOE) have been carrying out warhead dismantlement

and view this as business as usual, dismantlement and nuclear materials management in today’s post-Cold War

context constitute a new type of mission for which a national policy is needed to guide future actions.

Initiative

Develop and announce a national policy that sets goals for warhead dismantlement and materials

management, and specifies the amount of plutonium and highly enriched uranium (HEU) from dismantled

warheads that will not be needed to support future stockpile requirements.

2. Strengthening DOE Management

Conclusion

Although DOE is attempting to make improvements in its environmental, health, and safety practices, more

attention still needs to be devoted to these matters in connection with warhead dismantlement and materials

management.

Initiative

Implement DOE management system that gives priority to protecting the environment, health, and safety;

expand and strengthen external oversight of DOE dismantlement and materials management activities by

independent outside entities.
Chapter 7: Policy Issues and Initiatives 167

3. Nuclear Materials Storage

Conclusion

Since storage of surplus nuclear materials from warheads will be needed for several decades, and many

issues outside the purview of DOE will have to be addressed before long-term storage can be implemented, an

interagency planning process to identify and resolve these issues should begin as soon as possible.

Initiative

Establish an interagency task force that includes Federal agencies with expertise in regulatory, international,

and public involvement matters to recommend a plan for safe and secure storage of nuclear materials, and to

develop a process acceptable to the interested public for siting new or modified storage facilities.

4. Nuclear Materials Disposition

Conclusion

Consensus is lacking about whether surplus warhead materials should be stored indefinitely, converted into

forms usable for commercial power generation, or disposed of as waste, and about the technical, economic, and

political merits of various disposition options and technologies, and a process for openly discussing and reconciling

diverse governmental and nongovernmental perspectives on these issues is needed.

Initiative

Create a national commission to recommend goals, policies, and programs for ultimate disposition of surplus

plutonium and HEU from warheads, and to provide a basis for developing an ultimate disposition policy for those

materials.

5. A New Materials Management Organization

Conclusion

Since carrying out programs for the ultimate disposition of surplus plutonium and HEU from dismantled

warheads is essentially a civilian mission that will require not only technical skills, but also the ability to meet a new

set of institutional and political challenges, the DOE organization that has been carrying out the weapons

production mission is not well suited to take on the new materials disposition mission.

Initiative

Create a new organization outside DOE to manage surplus materials from warheads, or establish a new

organization for this purpose within DOE or some other existing agency.

6. information Access

Conclusion

Some of the restrictions on access to information relevant to warhead dismantlement and materials

management may no longer be required in this post-Cold War context, and enhancing information access could

increase public trust and confidence with respect to these activities.

Initiative

Review and possibly revise the existing legal basis for restricting access to information in light of today’s

post-cold War national security objectives, and accelerate efforts to increase access to information relevant to

warhead dismantlement and materials disposition.

7. Cooperation with Russia

Conclusion

Although important steps have been taken to assist Russia with weapons dismantlement and materials

management, a focused and coordinated strategy within the Federal Government can improve prospects for

cooperating with Russia to develop a mutually aceptable plan for disposition of its plutonium.

Initiative

Strengthen the relationship between U.S. assistance to Russia for materials disposition and other programs

in which assistance is desired by Russia; develop a means for joint assessment of plutonium disposition

technologies; and negotiate mutual disclosure of information and reciprocal materials monitoring arrangements.
Appendix A:

F

or more than four decades, plutonium pits

from nuclear weapons disassembled at Pantex

were stored in concrete bunkersl prior to

shipment to the Rocky Flats Plant in Denver.

The same concrete bunkers were also used for briefly

storing pits fabricated or recycled at Rocky Flats (30).

After weapons disassembly, plutonium pits are placed

in drums and transported to bunkers for storage in

rows 3 drums wide and 23 drums deep on one side of

the bunker, and 2 drums wide and 23 drums deep on

the opposite side (19). A 4-foot aisle separates the

rows of drums (24). The brief storage of plutonium pits

at Pantex is commonly referred to by Department of

Energy (DOE) officials as “staging.”

Recent reductions in the weapons stockpile and in

weapons component production, downsizing of the

Nuclear Weapons Complex, closing of plutonium

processing facilities at Rocky Flats for environmental

and safety reasons, and the little additional storage

space available at other facilities, all have contributed

to a shortage of pit storage space throughout the

Nuclear Weapons Complex (7). This in turn has placed

additional pressure on DOE to store plutonium pits at

the Pantex Plant.

DOE predicts that once the storage capacity provided by the “most preferable configurations’ in use

Plutonium

Pit Storage

at Pantex

has been reached, all weapons still in the custody of the

Department of Defense and planned for disassembly at

Pantex will have to remain stored at military installations. Weapons delivered to Pantex that were not

disassembled because of pit storage limitations will

remain in the particular bunkers where they are staged.

This storage limit may be reached in late 1993, and

even if packing density is increased, the limit will be

reached in mid-1994 (24).

EFFORTS TO INCREASE

STORAGE CAPACITY

 Consideration of the National

Environmental Policy Act Process

To increase the pit storage capacity at Pantex and

avoid delays in the dismantlement process, DOE plans

to increase the storage capacity of the Pantex bunkers.

As part of the National Environmental Policy Act

(NEPA) process to institute this change, DOE has

prepared a draft Environmental Assessment (EA)

under the act. This EA evaluates any environmental

impact that might result from increasing both the

number of bunkers that can be used for pit storage and

the total number of pits that can be stored per bunker.

To achieve this objective, DOE had planned to issue

10riginally designed to protect conventional ammunitions from bomb blasts during World War II, bunkers are two-room storage facilities

made of concrete, covered with earth-except for the front door—witb a floor capacity of approximately 1,040 square feet. These concrete

bunkers are technically known as Modified Richmond. A double-leaf steel door with two sets of security locks is used in each room to prevent

unauthorized entrance. Portable radiation monitors must be carried by personnel when entering bunkers.

Because the number of concrete bunkers now dedicated to plutonium pit staging is insuftlcient for the increasing number of pits that will

result fromplanned weapons dismantlement operations, the Department of Energy has proposed using some of Plant42’s steel archcxmstruction

storage facilities-also known as SAC magazines-that stage nuclear weapons or sensitive weapons components (26).

169
170 Dismantling the Bomb and Managing the Nuclear Materials

for public comment, by August 1992, a draft Environmental Assessment evaluating plutonium reconfiguration. Because of delays, the draft EA was not issued

until December 1992, and as of this writing, DOE has

received and is evaluating numerous public comments

on that draft.

Earlier in 1992, DOE officials indicated that if the

EA identified any significant environmental impact

associated with the proposed expansion of plutonium

pit storage at Pantex, a more detailed Environmental

Impact Statement would be prepared. According to the

same officials, implementation of multiple stacking

configurations for plutonium pit storage will not begin

until the proper environmental and safety documentation on plutonium storage has been completed (15). If

no potential impacts are identified, DOE will implement its proposed expanded storage configuration for

plutonium pits following the issuance of a Finding of

No Significant Impact (19).

 Preparation of a Safety Analysis Report

To evaluate the safety of bunkers proposed for

expanding plutonium pit storage, DOE prepared a

Safety Analysis Report (SAR) in 1992. As part of the

study, DOE examined the structural safety of bunkers,

the potential causes of accidents, and their consequences to plant workers, the environment, and the

general public. Some of the accident scenarios evaluated in the report include those initiated by earthquake,

human error, aircraft collisions, tornadoes, and fires.

Access to this document for public review has been

restricted by DOE’s information classification rules.2

 Improvements in Storage

DOE is funding several projects to increase its

understanding of the handling, safety, and design

requirements of plutonium pit storage. For example, a

computer model was developed by Sandia National

Laboratory to identify ideal packaging configurations

and optimal space use for storing pits in bunkers (8).

Pantex is also working with the national laboratories

to improve the safety of plutonium pit storage at

bunkers and reduce radiation exposure of personnel

during loading, unloading, handling, and inventorying

operations. One such effort is the project known as

“Stage Right,” in which several Sandia National

Laboratory scientists are studying the potential application of robotics in activities such as handling and

monitoring pits inside the bunkers. First, the project is

to assist the development of a manually operated,

shielded forklift to handle pallets of pit-containing

drums and thus reduce radiation exposure (13). It is

estimated that radiation exposure levels could be

reduced by a factor of five (3,24). Completion of the

first forklift development project is expected in 1993

(14).

The next step in the forklift project would be to

design and manufacture an unmanned forklift to

remotely control the loading and unloading of pit

containers in bunkers. Eventually, an automatically

guided vehicle could be developed, capable of handling and monitoring containers, thereby reducing

radiation exposures even further (3,13).

Sandia National Laboratory is responsible for two

additional projects relevant to plutonium pit storage at

Pantex. One involves the design, fabrication, and

demonstration of the system to be used by the forklift

during multiple stacking of plutonium pits. The other

project concerns the development of a system for

performing plutonium accountability activities, such

as inspections, without having to enter the bunkers. All

of these development programs, however, must await

a decision by Pantex management before being incorporated into actual operations.

CHANGES EXPECTED IN STORAGE

Pantex has disassembled more than 50,000 weapons

in the last four decades (15). Although the manner in

which disassembly activities are conducted has not

changed, storage practices and facilities at Pantex will

have to change. Some of the changes likely to result

from increased plutonium pit storage include the

following:

● Under the planned increase in weapons disassembly rates, the number of bunkers employed for pit

storage could more than double, while the number

of pits stored could reach a total of 20,000 (24).

The bunkers to be added for this purpose (known

2 The SAR was determined to contain Unclassified Controlled Nuclear Information (UCNI). DOE orders restrict the distribution of UCNI

documents mainly to Government officials or certain other official groups who have been designated to have a need to know and wilI also agree

to control the document.
Appendix A: Plutonium Pit Storage at Pantex 171

●

●

●

●

as steel arch construction or SAC magazines)

have been used to store weapons and weapons

components.

In its Environmental Assessment, DOE proposed

to increase storage capacity using a “horizontal

palletized multiple configuration” to store up to

440 pits per bunker (24). Figures A-1 and A-2

show, respectively, the single and multiple stacking configurations associated with plutonium pit

storage at Pantex.

The increased emphasis on weapons disassembly

and pit storage at Pantex may result in operational

changes at the plant; however, little information

exists regarding the type and extent of such

changes. According to a draft internal policy

letter, the plant operating contractor (Mason &

Hanger) expects radiation exposure for a worker

involved in weapons dismantlement operations

"

. . . to be significantly greater than the collective

dose that radiation worker received in 1991

[primarily as a result of] dismantling more

weapons from programs with higher dose rates. ’

According to this document, Mason & Hanger

plans to institute measures to ensure that individual exposures do not reach more than 20 percent

(or 1 rem) of the maximum allowable DOE

radiation dose limit (l).

Total radiation exposures of workers responsible

for conducting periodic inspections and inventories of drummed pits could increase. If interim

storage were to involve all 60 bunkers with a

single-layer vertical configuration, storage of up

to 20,000 pits would result in an annual collective

dose of 100 to 200 person-rem-an increase of

four to eight times the levels measured in

1987-91. However, DOE calculates that the use of

a palletized multiple stacking configuration will

result in a collective dose of 50 to 100 person-rem

per year, or only two to four times the 1987-91

levels.

If no changes occur in current inspection practices, workers could also experience increased

radiation exposure levels if: 1) the protective

equipment (lead apron) worn does not protect a

worker’s back and extremities; 2) radiation exposure is not monitored and reported in terms of real

time but rather on a monthly basis; or 3) workers

experience difficult in identifying specific pitFigure A-l—Pit-Filled Concrete Bunker With

Single-Layer Storage Configuration

0.. Pit containers on castors

000 Pit containers of floor

_ Bunker or magazine walls

SOURCE: U.S. Department of Energy.

containing drums and thus increase work time (3).

Plans are under way to reduce these occupational

radiation exposures through the use of shielded

forklifts, bar codes and bar code readers, and

eventually, unmanned vehicles and robots (24).

. Available information about pit storage configurations used in the past is unclear. The information provided to public officials and communities

about the configurations used for pit storage at

bunkers has led many to believe that the maximum number of pits that could be safely stored

under the single-layer, vertical position configuration was 240 per bunker. DOE, however, has

used other configurations and has stored more
172 Dismantling the Bomb and Managing the Nuclear Materials

Figure A-2—Multiple Stacking Configuration Proposed for Plutonium Storage

at Concrete Bunkers

\

MMmmmmmmmm m

EBmmm Mmmmmm

Plan view Pallet configuration

Side view Front view

SOURCE: U.S. Department of Energy.

pits by putting additional drums in the space comments received to DOE by March 1993, and is

available between the rows of stored drums awaiting a response by DOE to its request for a meeting

(19,25). This has led to public concerns about and consideration of certain modifications to the EA

what other configurations DOE might use to before it is completed. The following are some of the

extend available pit storage capacity at operating major public concerns about expanded pit storage:

bunkers.

. The current lack of interim storage capacity

PUBLIC CONCERNS

In December 1992, DOE submitted a predecisional

draft of the Environmental Assessment for interim

storage of plutonium components at Pantex to the State

of Texas for review and comments. The Texas

Governor’s office, in turn, distributed the EA to a

number of public and private parties with concerns

about this issue. The Governor’s office submitted all

throughout the Nuclear Weapons Complex may

keep plutonium pits at Pantex. Many citizens note

that DOE itself has claimed it will be difficult to

get approval to move plutonium pits from Pantex

to another site because many facilities are old,

deteriorated, or technically obsolete. Most DOE

facilities were built between the 1940s and the

mid-1960s with a strong emphasis on production

activities and little emphasis on maintenance.
Appendix A: Plutonium Pit Storage at Pantex 173

Upgrading to meet environmental, safety, and

health standards is difficult and expensive. Shutdowns and prolonged outages are common at

some sites. Often, DOE’s “piecemeal improvement” approach has proved inadequate (27).

Furthermore, the criteria used for designing

and building many of these facilities cannot meet

today’s standards for seismic design, fire protection, environmental safety, worker protection and

safeguards, and security (27).

Other factors have also reduced the number of

possible storage options. For instance, new approaches to risk and safety analyses have forced

more stringent operating requirements. Therefore, the process of achieving compliance at old

facilities is more difficult (27).

The lack of a clear timetable for siting and

building a long-term plutonium storage facility

has led to public skepticism about the estimated

duration of pit storage at Pantex. Many citizens,

as well as State and local officials, believe that the

lack of storage options for plutonium pits throughout the Nuclear Weapons Complex will result in

Pantex becoming a de facto long-term storage

facility (19,31)0

The major reason for this concern is the

uncertainty associated with the timetable for

interim storage at Pantex. No definitive schedule

has been developed to date regarding implementation of the Programmatic Environmental Impact

Statement (PEIS) for reconfiguration of the Nuclear Weapons Complex. DOE has indicated in its

draft Environmental Assessment that interim

storage at Pantex will range from 6 to 10 years;

however, some DOE officials have suggested that

the storage period may last from 12 to 20 years or

until a permanent storage site becomes available

(23). To date, there is little coordination and

integration between efforts to address interim

storage of plutonium pits (EA) and long-term

plutonium storage (PEIS).

Only limited information has been provided to the

public about the analyses performed by DOE to

support the conclusions reported in the Environmental Assessment. Some have suggested that

DOE release more data to the public. See box A-1

for comments obtained from the recent public

review of DOE’s Environmental Assessment.

OTHER FACTORS

 Criticality Safety

Because plutonium is a fissile material, especially

when present as plutonium-239, considerable attention

must be paid during its handling to the prevention of

criticality accidents. 3 According to a 1992 Technical

Safety Appraisal Team report, the control of criticality

accidents at Pantex is helped by the fact that the

plutonium handled there is present in large metal

components and weapons assemblies. To ensure

effective criticality control, weapons assembly and

dismantlement activities are required to comply with

strict limits based on measurable control parameters.

As part of the efforts to reduce the risk of criticality

accidents, personnel are required to maintain fissionable materials inside containers when not in use. All

storage and shipping containers used are certified as

criticality safe. In addition, personnel must provide

sufficient space (3 feet from center to center) between

the nuclear weapons components and limit the number

of components (not more than three in most cases) that

can be left outside their containers in weapons

assembly/disassembly areas (16,28).

Although most problems identified during the 1989

Tiger Team assessment of Pantex were found to have

been addressed, a 1992 Technical Safety Appraisal

Team review still indicated that the level of formal

authority given to the ALARA (as low as reasonably

achievable) coordinator was minimal regarding concurrence over programs that could either affect radiation levels or ensure that ALARA calculations and

s A criticality accident can occur due to the expansionof fissionable inventories or the removal ofnonfiisionable materials useful to prevent

or termina tea criticality event. Such events can result in potentially lethal doses of neutron and gamma radiation to facility personnel, generate

heat and fission products, and in certain situations, release radioactive materials to the outside environment. Unlike a nuclear reactor facility

in which a criticality accident could release large quantities of fission products, some have estimated that the environmental releases caused

by accidental criticality at DOE plutonium storage facilities would be negligible. Of much greater concer% a recent study concludes, would

be the significant impact of a criticality accident on workers’ health (22).
174 Dismantling the Bomb and Managing the Nuclear Materials

Box A-l–Expressed Public Concerns/Opinions About Plutonium

Components at Pantex

. Limited information was provided about other locations as possible storage options (9,12).

. DOE estimates of the time workers would need to thoroughly inspect and inventory pits in bunkers could

be longer than projected and result in higher radiation exposures of workers (10).

• The analysis of possible environmental impacts disregards current radioactive contamination of nearby soil

(10).1

. Information on tornado analysis appears to exclude the high-frequency, potentially damaging tornadoes

experienced in the Pantex area (20).

• The methodologies used for aircraft accident analyses have not been defined, and the data provided do

not seem to reflect the density of air traffic (commercial and military) in the area or the proximity of Pantex

to the airport (10,18)

. The basis for considering the storage of pits at Pantex for 6 to 10 years was not evaluated (9).

. The use of national security considerations to limit the information available for an open public debate is

troubling.

. The decision to limit the Environmental Assessment to plutonium storage, without regard to other

dismantlement activities at the site (2), is also a concern.

. DOE’s efforts to integrate the Environmental Assessment with its PEIS for the Weapons Complex

reconfiguration are lacking (9).

● The true degree of safety of nearby communities that can be guaranteed by DOE and State governments

is unclear (6).

1 Independmtreviewsofsomeof thelimitedpublicdata available indicatethat inoorrectestimatesof Iargeaircraft

crash rates and iess than comprehensive estimates of air traffic in the region may have been used in the EA (1 1).

KWMX: Offioe of Technology Assessment

procedures were followed. The review also stated that pit form may adversely impact the integrity and

a certified external dosimetry system was lacking (28)

 Plutonium Containers and

Their Availability

The drums in which pits are contained for staging at

bunkers, also known as AL-R8 containers, are made of

carbon or stainless steel with an internal cage for

holding or clamping the pits. To increase pit protection—

and criticality safety-the drum is lined with 3 inches

of cushioning and insulating material (24,28).

AL-R8 drums are characterized by excellent integrity and stability for a period of about 50 years.

Identification and tracking are also efficiently provided. Knowledge of the performance of such containers over Ionger time periods (e.g., 100 years) is limited.

Experts suggest that drum stability for longer periods

be evaluated since the dynamic nature of plutonium in

stability of the storage drums (5).

After having used AL-R8 containers to ship plutonium pits for nearly 30 years, DOE recently issued a

policy abolishing this use and recommending instead

the adoption of drums that more clearly comply with

design criteria promulgated by the Department of

Transportation and the Nuclear Regulatory Commission (17). One such design requirement is that there be

an inner container vacuum system. DOE’s newly

designed pit shipping container satisfies this and all

other criteria, but its cost (about $5,000) is significantly higher than that of AL-R8 drums (about $300)

(16,26). Efforts to design a cheaper container are being

carried out at the Savannah River Site and at Sandia

National Laboratory (14). The limited availability of

shipping containers could become a serious concern if

a large number of pits require off-site transport for

processing.
Appendix A: Plutonium Pit Storage at Pantex 175

 Accident Analysis

The EA accident analysis evaluated the potential of

certain events to initiate accidents that could adversely

affect the bunkers, or even worse, the drums in which

the pits are contained.

DEFINITION OF INCREDIBLE EVENT

In the accident analysis, several events were dismissed as incredible and not considered in DOE’s

analyses of plutonium pit storage facilities at the

Pantex Plant.4 Examples of these include criticality

events, internal/external explosions, internal fires, and

meteor strikes. Other potential events, though evaluated, were also considered highly unlikely, including

structural damage and/or penetration of the bunker by:

1) an explosion-generated missile from a hypothetical

explosion of 50,000 pounds of high explosives stored

at nearby bunkers; 2) a crash by a light, general

aviation aircraft, with a weight of 3,500 pounds and an

impact speed of 80 miles per hour; and 3) a tornado

with speeds exceeding 140 pounds per square foot or

about 340 miles per hour (24).

Events found to be most relevant to the proposed

expanded pit storage at Pantex included:

Explosion hazards. Explosions from other buildings at Pantex were evaluated to determine their

potential to affect the plutonium pits stored inside

bunkers. The results indicated that these pits

would not be affected.

Structural hazards. Analyses in the EA indicate

that earthquakes, tornadoes, and external explosions would have no significant effect on the

bunkers and their contents.

Operational accidents. The operational event of

most concern involved accidental puncture of a

pit-containing drum, followed by crushing of the

plutonium pit by a forklift moving at 5 miles per

hour. Based on its analysis, DOE anticipates that

the plutonium-containing dust escaping from the

damaged container would: 1) have no immediate

or long-term health effect on the worker involved

in the accident; 2) cause only marginal radiation

exposures to workers present in the immediate

vicinity of the bunker where the accident took

place; and 3) release no radiation to the public or

the environment.

Aircraft crash. The EA also contained an aircraft

hazard analysis, which concluded that the probability of bunkers being impacted by an airplane

was less than one in a million (24). According to

some concerned citizens and public officials,

DOE’s decision to evaluate the risk of general

aviation by using probability methodology designed to include all aircraft types may limit the

validity of the results obtained (18) .

Accidents impacting groundwater sources

(Ogallala Aquifer). According to DOE estimates, no operating or accidental activities at

Pantex were found capable of releasing plutonium at levels high enough to impact the underlying Ogallala Aquifer. A similar conclusion was

reached in an independent study conducted by

Los Alamos National Laboratory.

Internal/external fire hazards. On the bases of

the fire hazards analyses performed on Zone 4

(the highly secured storage area where the bunkers are located) as part of the Safety Analysis

Report, DOE concluded that fires would have no

impact on the bunkers or on the plutonium pit

drums stored inside. The absence of combustible

materials inside bunkers was also considered a

major factor in further reducing fire risks (24).

CONCERNS ABOUT DOE’S

ACCIDENT ANALYSIS

Reviewers have made the following comments

about DOE’s accident analysis:

The term ‘incredible’ connotes an event that is too

improbable to be believed. Even though the DOE

analysis states that an incredible event is one of very

low probability, it also eliminates events that are

categorized as such from further consideration. It

would be more helpful and accurate if these events—

especially when they have significant consequences—

were included in a full analysis as “very low probability’ events.

4 DOE terns an event as $~incredible~$ ~h~~ its ~~ence is too ~probable or inconceivable due to the k)CftiOn Cif the faCfity, tie

environmental characteristics of the area surrounding the facility, and the mture of the materials used and operations conducted at the particular

facility. Statistically, an event is called incredible when its probability of occurrence is calculated to be less than one chance in a million,
176 Dismantling the Bomb and Managing the Nuclear Materials

The Federal Aviation Administration’s comment

(21) on aircraft accidents makes the following point:

The Aircraft Hazard Analysis Data on pages 6-5

through 6-8 and Appendix E of the Environmental

Assessment prepared by the United States Department

of Energy has no resemblance to the data provided by

this offie. Therefore, I am unable to comment on any

information contained in the Assessment. For your

information, the total aircraft operations for the Amarillo area in the CY 1992 was 91,800. Any further

restrictions to flight or changes of airspace to the Pantex

Prohibitive area would have an immediate and adverse

impact on the utilization of Amarillo International Airport.

The Pantex Safety Analysis Report, on which the

EA was based, was prepared by a DOE contractor

under the guidance of the Albuquerque Field Office. It

was reviewed by a technical safety review panel, all of

whose members were from either DOE Defense

Programs (DP) or the Albuquerque Field Office and

approved by the Assistant Secretary for DP. The report

was not prepared under the new safety analysis

guidelines. No review by any internal DOE or external

oversight group was done or sought. All accident

analyses were accomplished with this Safety Analysis

Report (4).

APPENDIX A REFERENCES

1.

2.

3.

4.

5.

Alley, C., Mason &Hanger-Silas Mason Co., Inc.,

“Pantex ALARA Policy and Goals for 1992,” a

draft policy document prepared by Clyde Alley

for distribution to Mason & Hanger’s programs,

undated.

Belisle, Mavis, The Peace Farm, personal communication to Roger Mulder, Director of Special

Projects, Office of the Governor, Mar. 12, 1993.

Caskey, Bill, Sandia National Laboratories, New

Mexico, briefing of Office of Technology Assessment staff, May 20, 1992.

Claytor, Richard A., Assistant Secretary for Defense Programs, U.S. Department of Energy,

memorandum on “Interim Storage and Staging

Activities at Pantex Zone 4 West” sent to Ted

Dobry, Defense Programs (DP 6.2), Dec. 21,

1992.

Cunningham, Paul, I-m Alamos National Laboratory, information provided at a briefing of the

National Academy of Sciences Panel on Reactor6.

7.

8.

9.

10.

11.

12.

13.

14.

15.

16.

17.

18.

19.

Related Options for Weapons Plutonium, Jan. 11,

1993.

Dees, Portia, personal communication to Roger

Mulder, Director of Special Projects, Office of the

Governor, State of Texas, Mar. 5, 1993.

“DOE Studying Plutonium Storage at Las Alarnos,

Savannah River,” Weapons Complex Monitor,

vol. 3, No. 28, June 22, 1992, pp. 18-19.

Fernandez, Tony, Sand.ia National Laboratones,

New Mexico, information provided at a briefing

of OTA staff, May 20, 1992.

Gattis, Beverly, Military Production Network,

personal communication to Roger Mulder, Director of Special Projects, Office of the Governor,

State of Texas, Mar. 12, 1993.

Hazlett, Margie K., personal communication to

Roger Mulder, Director of Special Projects, Office

of the Governor, State of Texas, Mar. 15, 1993.

Kimura, Chris, Fission Energy and Systems Safety

Program, Lawrence Livermore National Laboratory, personal communication, Apr. 9, 1993.

Kleuskens, Tonya, Texas Nuclear Waste Task

Force, letter to Roger Mulder, Director of Special

Projects, Office of the Governor, Mar. 15, 1993.

Lxmgenbaugh, Cindy, Weapons Programs Division, U.S. Department of Energy Albuquerque

Operations Office, letter to Mark Brown, Office of

Technology Assessment, Nov. 4, 1992.

Longmire, Paul, Sandia National Laboratories,

briefing before Office of Technology Assessment

Stiff, Nov. 11, 1992.

McBride, J., “DOE Assessing Pantex Dismantlement,” Amarillo Daily News, June 6, 1992.

McLaughlin, T., Group Leader, Nuclear Criticality Safety Program, Ims Alamos National Laboratov, personal communication, Mar. 2, 1993.

McLaughlin, T., Group Leader, Nuclear Criticality Safety Program, ks Alamos National Laboratory, information provided during a briefing of

OTA staff, Mar. 10, 1993.

Miller, Alison A., Air Quality Assessment Program, Texas Air Control Board, State of Texas,

letter to Roger Mulder, Director of Special Projects, Office of the Governor, Mar. 1, 1993.

Olinger, Nancy, Office of Attorney General, State

of Texas, personal communication to Kenneth

Pusateri, Defense Nuclear Facilities Safety Board,

Sept. 18, 1992.
Appendix A: Plutonium Pit Storage at Pantex I 177

20.

21.

22.

23,

24.

25,

Osborne, Judy, personal communication to Roger

Mulder, Director of Special Projects, Office of the

Governor, State of Texas, Mar. 2, 1993.

Schulke, C.R., Air Traffic Manager, Federal

Aviation Administration, U.S. Department of

Transportation, letter to Joseph A. Martillotti,

Bureau of Radiation Control, Pantex Special

Project Coordinator, Jan. 28, 1993.

SCIENTECH, An Assessment of Criticality Safety

at the Department of Energy Rocky Flats Plant,

Golden, Coloradb;July-September 1989, SCI&DOE201-89, Contract No. DE-ACO1- 88EH79081/

Task 20, September 1989.

‘‘Texas Questioning Plutonium Storage Configurations at Pantex,” Weapons Complex Monitor,

Dec. 23, 1992.

U.S. Department of Energy, Albuquerque Operations, Amarillo Area Office, “Environmental

Assessment for Interim Storage of Plutonium

Components at Pantex,” predecisional document,

DOE/EA- 0812, December 1992,

U.S. Department of Energy, memorandum Summary and Action Items, DOE Executive Management Team for Dismantlement Meeting 92-6,

Aug. 5-6, 1992.

26.

27.

28.

29.

30.

31.

U.S. Department of Energy, memorandum Summary and Action Items, DOE Executive Management Team for Dismantlement Meeting 92-5,

June 29, 1992.

U.S. Department of Energy, Nuclear Weapons

Complex Reconfiguration Study, DOE/DP-0083

(Washington, DC: U.S. Department of Energy,

January 1991).

U.S. Department of Energy, Office of Defense

Programs, OfIice of Inspections, “TechnicalSafety

Appraisal of the Pantex Plant, Amarillo, Texas,’

March 1992.

U.S. Department of Energy, Savannah River Field

Office, Environmental Division, “Environmental

Assessment: Storage of plutonium Metal in Building 247-F Vault,’ DOE/EA-0497, February 1992.

West, George T., Mason & Hanger-Silas Mason

Co., Inc., Pantex Plant, Amarillo, Texas, “United

States Nuclear Warhead Assembly Facilities (1945-

1990),” March 1991.

Zamora, Thomas, Friends of the Earth, Washington, DC, personal communication, Nov. 9, 1992.
Appendix B:

United States and Russia

Joint Understanding

on Strategic

Offensive Arms

m he President of the United States of America

1

and the President of the Russian Federation

have agreed to substantial further reductions

in strategic offensive arms. Specifically, the

two sides have agreed upon and will promptly

conclude a Treaty with the following provisions:

1. Within the 7-year period following entry into force

of the START Treaty, they will reduce their strategic

forces to no more than:

a. an overall total number of warheads for each

between 3,800 and 4,350 (as each nation shall

determine) or such lower number as each nation

shall decide.

b. 1,200 MIR Ved ICBM warheads.

c. 650 heavy ICBM warheads.

d. 2,160 SLBM warheads.

2. By the year 2004 (or by the end of the year 2000 if

the United States can contribute to the financing of

the destruction or elimination of strategic offensive

arms in Russia), they will:

a. reduce the overall total to no more than a number

of warheads for each between 3,000 and 3,500 (as

each nation shall determine) or such lower number as each nation shall decide.

b. eliminate all MIRVed ICBMs.

c. reduce SLBM warheads to between no more than

1,700 to 1,750 (as each nation shall determine).

3. For the purpose of calculating the overall totals

described above:

a. The number of warheads counted for heavy

bombers with nuclear roles will be the number of

nuclear weapons they are actually equipped to

carry.

b. Under agreed procedures, heavy bombers not to

exceed 100 that were never equipped for longrange nuclear ALCMs and that are reoriented to

conventional roles will not count against the

overall total established by this agreement.

i. Such heavy bombers will be based separately

from heavy bombers with nuclear roles.

ii. No nuclear weapons will be located at bases

for heavy bombers with conventional roles.

iii. Such aircraft and crews will not train or

exercise for nuclear missions.

iv. Current inspection procedures already agreed

in the START Treaty will help affirm that

these bombers have conventional roles. No

new verification procedures are required.

4. The reductions required by this agreement will be

carried out by eliminating missile launchers and

heavy bombers using START procedures, and, in

accordance with the plans of the two sides, by

reducing the number of warheads on existing

ballistic missiles other than the SS-18. Except as

otherwise agreed, ballistic missile warheads will be

calculated according to START counting rules.

NOTE: This appendix is a reprint of the text of the J~e 1992 Joint Understanding Between the United States and Russia on Reductions

in Strategic Offensive Arms Incorporated in the START II Treaty, signed January 1993.

179
180 Dismantling the Bomb and Managing the Nuclear Materials

5. The two Presidents directed that this agreement be Done at Washington, this 17th day of June 1992, in

promptly recorded in a brief Treaty document which two copies, each in the English and Russian languages,

they will sign and submit for ratification in their both texts being equally authentic.

respective countries. Because this new agreement is

separate from but builds upon the START Treaty,

they continue to urge that the START Treaty be

ratified and implemented as soon as possible.
Appendix C:

T

he United States of America and the Russian

Federation, hereinafter referred to as the

Parties, desiring to facilitate the safe and

secure transportation and storage of nuclear,

chemical, and other weapons in the Russian Federation

in connection with their destruction, intending to build

upon the framework for cooperation set forth in the

Agreement Between the Government of the United

States of America and the Government of the Russian

Federation Regarding Cooperation to Facilitate the

Provision of Assistance of April 4, 1992, have agreed

as follows:

ARTICLE I

The Parties shall cooperate in order to assist the

Russian Federation in achieving the following objectives:

a.

b.

c.

the destruction of nuclear, chemical, and other

weapons;

the safe and secure transportation and storage of

such weapons in connection with their destruction; and

the establishment of additional verifiable measures against the proliferation of such weapons

that pose a risk of proliferation.

ARTICLE II

1. The Parties, through their Executive Agents, shall

enter into implementing agreements as appropriate

United States

and Russian

Agreement on

the SSD Program

to accomplish the objectives set forth in Article I of

this Agreement. The implementing agreements shall

include, inter alia:

a.

c.

d.

2. In

a description of the activities to be undertaken;

provisions concerning the sequence of activities;

provisions concerning access to material, training or services provided at sites of their use, if

possible, for monitoring and inspection and

other provisions as appropriate.

Case of any inconsistency between the Agreement and any implementing agreements, the provisions of this Agreement shall prevail.

ARTICLE Ill

Each Party shall designate an Executive Agent to

implement this Agreement. For the United States of

America, the Executive Agent shall be the Department

of Defense. For the Russian Federation, with respect to

nuclear weapons, the Executive Agent shall be the

Ministry of Atomic Energy.

ARTICLE IV

Except as otherwise provided in this Agreement or

in an implementing agreement, the terms of this

Agreement shall apply to all material, training or

services provided in accordance with this Agreement

or implementing agreements, and to all related activities and personnel.

NOTE: This appendix is a reprint of the text of the “Umbrella” Agreement Between the United States and Russia Concerning Assistance

for Weapons Dismantlement in Russia (The “Safe, Secure, Dismantlement” (SSD) Program), signed June 1992.

181
182 Dismantling the Bomb and Managing the Nuclear Materials

ARTICLE V

1. The Russian Federation shall facilitate the entry and

exit of employees of the Government of the United

States of America and contractor personnel of the

United States of America into and out of the territory

of the Russian Federation for the purpose of carrying

out activities in accordance with this Agreement.

2. Aircraft and vessels, other than regularly scheduled

commercial aircraft and vessels, used by the United

States of America in connection with activities

pursuant to this Agreement in the Russian Federation shall, in accordance with international law, be

free of customs inspections, customs charges, landing fees, navigation charges, port charges, tolls, and

any other charges by the Russian Federation, or any

of its instrumentalities.

3. If an aircraft other than a regularly scheduled

commercial aircraft is used by the United States of

America for transportation to the Russian Federation, its flight plan shall be filed in accordance with

the procedures of the International Civil Aviation

Organization applicable to civil aircraft, including

in the remarks section of the fight plan confirmation

that the appropriate clearance has been obtained.

The Russian Federation shall provide parking,

security protection, servicing, and fuel for aircraft of

the United States of America.

ARTICLE VI

Unless the written consent of the United States of

America has first been obtained, the Russian Federation shall not transfer title to, or possession of, any

material, training or services provided pursuant to this

Agreement to any entity, other than an officer,

employee or agent of a Party to this Agreement and

shall not permit the use of such material, training or

services for purposes other than those for which it has

been furnished.

ARTICLE Vll

1. The Russian Federation shall, in respect of legal

proceedings and claims, other than contractual

claims, hold harmless and bring no legal proceedings against the United States of America and

personnel, contractors, and contractors’ personnel

of the United States of America, for damage to

property owned by the Russian Federation, or death

or injury to any personnel of the Russia Federation,

arising out of activities pursuant to this Agreement.

2. Claims by third parties, arising out of the acts or

omissions of any employees of the United States of

America or contractors or contractors’ personnel of

the United States of America done in the performance of official duty, shall be the responsibility of

the Russian Federation.

3. The provisions of this Article shall not prevent the

Parties from providing compensation in accordance

with their national laws.

4. The Parties may consult, as appropriate, on claims

and proceedings under this Article.

5. Nothing in this Article shall be construed to prevent

legal proceedings or claims against nationals of the

Russian Federation or permanent residents of the

Russian Federation.

ARTICLE Vlll

The activities of the United States of America under

this Agreement are subject to availability of appropriated funds.

ARTICLE IX

Employees of the Government of the United States

of America present in the territory of the Russian

Federation for activities related to this Agreement shall

be accorded privileges and immunities equivalent to

that accorded administrative and technical staff personnel in accordance with the Vienna Convention on

Diplomatic Relations of April 18, 1962.

ARTICLE X

1.

2.

The United States of America, its personnel, contractors, and contractors’ personnel shall not be

liable to pay any tax or similar charge by the Russian

Federation or any of its instrumentalities on activities undertaken in accordance with this Agreement.

The United States of America, its personnel, contractors, and contractors’ personnel may import into,

and export out of, the Russian Federation any

equipment, supplies, material or services required to

implement this Agreement. Such importation and

exportation of articles or services shall not be

subject to any license, other restrictions, customs,

duties, taxes or any other charges or inspections by
Appendix C: United States and Russia Agreement on the SSD Program 183

the Russian Federation or any of its instrumentalities.

ARTICLE Xl

In the event that a Party awards contracts for the

acquisition of articles and services, including construction, to implement this Agreement, such contracts shall

be awarded in accordance with the laws and regulations of that Party. Acquisition of articles and services

in the Russian Federation by or on behalf of the United

States of America in implementing this Agreement

shall not be subject to any taxes, customs, duties or

similar charges by the Russian Federation or its

instrumentalities.

ARTICLE XII

The Russian Federation shall take all reasonable

measures within its power to ensure the security of

material, training or services provided pursuant to this

agreement and shall protect them against seizure or

conversion.

ARTICLE XIII

Upon request, representatives of the Government of

the United States of America shall have the right to

examine the use of any material, training or other

services provided in accordance with this Agreement,

if possible at sites of their location or use, and shall

have the right to inspect any and all related records or

documentation during the period of this Agreement

and for 3 years thereafter. These inspections shall be

carried out in accordance with procedures to be agreed

upon by the Parties.

ARTICLE XIV

This Agreement shall enter into force upon signature

and shall remain in force for 7 years. This Agreement

may be amended or extended by the written agreement

of the Parties and may be terminated by either Party

upon ninety days written notification to the other Party

of its intention to do so. Notwithstanding the termination of this Agreement or the implementing agreements, the obligations of the Russian Federation in

accordance with Articles VI, VII, IX, X, XII of this

Agreement shall continue to apply without respect to

time, unless otherwise agreed in writing by the Parties.

Done at Washington this 17th day of June 1992, in

two copies, each in the English and Russian languages,

both texts being equally authentic.
T

Appendix D:

United States and Russian

Agreement on the

Disposition of Uranium

from Nuclear Weapons

he Government of the United States of

America and the Government of the Russian

Federation, hereinafter referred to as the

Parties, desiring to arrange the safe and

prompt disposition for peaceful purposes of highly

enriched uranium extracted from nuclear weapons

resulting from the reduction of nuclear weapons in

accordance with existing agreements in the area of

arms control and disarmament.

Reaffirming g their commitment to ensure that the

development and use of nuclear energy for peaceful

purposes are carried out under arrangements that will

further the objectives of the Treaty on the Nonproliferation of Nuclear Weapons, affirming their

commitment to ensure that the nuclear material transferred for peaceful purposes pursuant to this Agreement will comply with all applicable non-proliferation,

physical protection, nuclear material accounting and

control, and environmental requirements, have agreed

as follows:

ARTICLE I

 Purpose

The Parties shall cooperate in order to achieve the

following objectives:

1. The conversion as soon as practicable of highly

enriched uranium (HEU) extracted from nuclear

weapons resulting from the reduction of nuclear

weapons pursuant to arms control agreements and

other commitments of the Parties which is currently

estimated at approximately 500 metric tons in the

Russian Federation, having an average assay of 90

percent or greater of the uranium isotope 235 into

low enriched uranium (LEU) for use as fuel in

commercial nuclear reactors. For purposes of this

Agreement, LEU shall mean uranium enriched to

less than 20 percent in the isotope 235; and

2. The technology developed in the Russian Federation for conversion of HEU resulting from the

reduction of nuclear weapons in the Russian Federation may be used for conversion of United States

HEU in the United States of America; and

3. The establishment of appropriate measures to fulfill

the non-proliferation, physical protection, nuclear

material accounting and control, and environmental

requirements of the Parties with respect to HEU and

LEU subject to this Agreement.

ARTICLE II

Purpose

The Parties, through their Executive Agents, shall

within 6 months from entry into force of this

Agreement seek to enter into an initial implementing contract to accomplish the objectives set forth in

Article I of this Agreement. The Parties may

NOTE: This appendix is a reprint of the text of the Agreement Between the United States and Russia Concerning the Purchase of Highly

Enriched Uranium Extracted from Russian Warheads, signed February 1993.

1 8 5
186 Dismantling the Bomb and Managing the Nuclear Materials

conclude additional implementing contracts or agreements pursuant to this Agreement, as required. For any

purchase, the Executive Agents shall negotiate terms

(including price), which shall be subject to approval by

the Parties.

2. It is the intent of the Parties that the initial

implementing contract shall provide for, inter alia:

i.

ii.

. . .

ill.

iv.

v.

vi.

vii.

The purchase by the United States Executive

Agent of LEU converted from HEU at facilities

in the Russian Federation and sale of such LEU

for commercial purposes. The United States

will provide information to the Russia Federation on all commercial disposition of such LEU;

Initial delivery of LEU converted from HEU

extracted from nuclear weapons resulting from

the reduction of nuclear weapons pursuant to

arms control agreements and other commitments of the Parties by October 1993, if

possible;

Conversion of no less than 10 metric tons

having an average assay of 90 percent or greater

of the uranium isotope 235 in each of the first

five years, and, in each year thereafter, conversion of no less than 30 metric tons of HEU

having an average assay of 90 percent or greater

of the uranium isotope 235; however, specific

amounts will be stipulated in the first and

subsequent implementing contracts or agreements;

The participation of the United States private

sector and of Russian enterprises;

The allocation among the United States of

America, private sector firms of the United

States of America, the Russian Federation, and

Russian enterprises of any proceeds or costs

arising out of activities undertaken pursuant to

any implementing contracts;

The use by the Russian side of a portion of the

proceeds from the sale of LEU converted from

HEU for the conversion of defense enterprises,

enhancing the safety of nuclear power plants,

environmental clean-up of polluted areas and

the construction and operation of facilities in the

Russian Federation for the conversion of HEU

to LEU;

By agreement of the Parties an equivalent

amount of HEU can substitute for the corresponding amount of LEU planned for purchase

by the United States Executive Agent.

ARTICLE Ill

 Executive Agents

Each party shall designate an Executive Agent to

implement this Agreement. For the United States side,

the Executive Agent shall be the Department of

Energy. For the Russian side, the Executive Agent

shall be the Ministry of the Russia Federation of

Atomic Energy. After consultation with the other

Party, either Party has the right to change its Executive

Agent upon 30-days written notice to the other Party.

If a governmental corporation is established under

United States law to manage the uranium enrichment

enterprise of the Department of Energy, it is the

intention of the United States Government to designate

that corporation as the Executive Agent for the United

States side.

 Priority of Agreement

In case of any inconsistency between this Agreement and any implementing contracts or agreements,

the provisions of this Agreement shall prevail.

 Additional Measures

1.

2.

3.

4.

The Executive Agent of the Russian Federation

shall ensure that the quality of LEU derived from

HEU subject to this agreement is such that it is

convertible to LEU usable in commercial reactors.

Specifications shall be agreed upon in the process

of negotiating the initial and subsequent implementing contracts.

The conversion of HEU subject to this Agreement

shall commence as soon as possible after the entry

into force of the initial implementing contract.

The Parties shall, to the extent practicable, seek to

arrange for more rapid conversion of HEU to LEU

than that provided for in Article II (2) (iii).

The United States of America shall use LEU

acquired pursuant to this Agreement and its

implementing contracts and agreements, when

subject to United States jurisdiction and control,

for peaceful purposes only.
Appendix D: Agreement on the Disposition of Uranium from Nuclear Weapons 187

5.

6.

7.

8.

9.

10.

LEU acquired by the United States of America

pursuant to this Agreement, and implementing

contracts and agreements related to it, shall be

subject to safeguards in accordance with the

November 18, 1977, Agreement Between the

United States of America and the International

Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) for the Application of Safeguards in connection with the Treaty on

the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons.

The Parties shall maintain physical protection of

HEU and LEU subject to this Agreement. Such

protection shall, at a minimum, provide protection

comparable to the recommendation set forth in

IAEA document INFCIRC/225/REV.2 concerning

the physical protection of nuclear material.

If the Parties enter into an agreement for cooperation concerning the peaceful uses of nuclear

energy, nuclear material acquired by the United

States of America pursuant to this Agreement and

its implementing contracts and agreements, when

subject to United States jurisdiction or control,

shall be subject to the terms and conditions of that

Agreement for cooperation.

The activities of the United States Government

under this Agreement, or any implementing contract or agreement, shall be subject to the availability of United States Government funds.

In the event the United States Government does not

have funds available for implementation of this

Agreement, the Executive Agent of the Russian

Federation reserves the option to obtain funding

for implementation of this Agreement from any

private United States company.

Prior to the conclusion of any implementing

contract, the Parties shall establish transparency

measures to ensure that the objectives of this

Agreement are met, including provisions for nuclear material accounting and control and access,

from the time that HEU is made available for

conversion until it is converted into LEU. Specific

transparency measures shall be established in the

same time frame as the negotiation of the initial

implementing contract, and shall be executed by a

separate agreement.

11. Prior to the conclusion of any implementing

contract, the Parties shall agree on appropriate

governing provisions for entry and exit, liability,

and status of personnel, exemptions for taxes and

other duties, and applicable law.

12. The Executive Agent of the United States of

America shall use the LEU converted from HEU in

such a manner so as to minimize disruptions on the

market and maximize the overall economic benefit

for both Parties. This Agreement shall have no

effect on contracts between Russian enterprises

and United States companies for the delivery of

uranium products which are currently in force and

consistent with United States and Russian law.

13. This Agreement places no limitations on the right

of the ‘Russian ‘Federation to dispose of LEU

derived from HEU extracted from nuclear weapons

resulting from the reduction of nuclear weapons

pursuant to arms control agreements and other

commitments of the Parties beyond the specific

commitments set forth herein.

Entry into Force, Duration and

Amendments

1. This Agreement shall enter into force upon signature

and shall remain in force until the full amount of

HEU provided for in paragraph 1 or Article I is

converted into LEU, delivered, and supplied to

commercial customers.

2. Each Party may propose amendments to this Agreement. Agreed amendments shall enter into force

upon signature and shall remain in force so long as

this Agreement remains in force.

3. Each Party shall have the right to terminate this

Agreement upon 12 months written notification to

the other Party.

Done at Washington this 18th day of February 1993,

in duplicate in the English and Russian languages, both

texts being equally authentic.
T

his appendix presents comments by labor

leaders on worker experiences with health

and safety priorities at selected Department of

Energy (DOE) weapons facilities.l Facilities

included those that have recently been affected by a

shift in mission from weapons production to weapons

dismantlement and the storage and disposition of

bomb parts. The comments are from telephone and

personal interviews by an anthropologist with organized labor leaders at the Oak Ridge Y-12 Plant, the

Pantex Plant, and the Savannah River Site. Comments

are also included from the Oak Ridge K-25 Plant, a

facility whose mission has been formally changed

from weapons production to environmental restoration. Although the interview pool was small and

uneven in terms of craft representation, the individuals

surveyed are key figures in the work force. Interviewees included those holding leadership positions, as

well as workers with responsibility for health and

safety issues.

Questions were asked about workers’ perceptions of

DOE’s efforts to change its culture from a strict

production orientation to one that emphasizes the

protection of health, safety, and the environment.

Topics addressed included DOE oversight; policies

and procedures for protecting the environment, safety,

and health; training; resolution of complaints; health

surveillance; and relationships among labor, contractors, and DOE. This appendix, however, departs from

a cataloging of interview comments and, instead,

Appendix E:

Labor and the

Mission Change

Within DOE

describes labor issues that may impinge on the success

of further transformations within DOE.

HEALTH AND SAFETY IN THE CONTEXT OF

LABOR-MANAGEMENT RELATIONS

 Changing Concepts of Work

Under the direction of former Secretary, James D.

Watkins, DOE instituted an environmental, safety, and

health agenda that has begun to translate into a

different experience of work for the labor force (7).

Worker comments on the revised regulations, procedures, and standards accompanying DOE’s new agenda

are suggestive of a growing disjuncture between old

rhythms of work and new ones. Although the following worker comments indicate that change has begun,

it remains to be seen whether DOE’s commitment of

social and economic resources to this agenda is

adequate.

“REAL WORK” VERSUS HEALTH AND SAFETY

Remarks made by some contractor employees on

the change in “culture” at DOE are reminders of the

notion of work developed under an environment of

production at all costs. Production schedules determined what was valued and experienced as real work

and what essentially kept people in a job.

Production was “born and bred” into the work force

over the years, as one worker describes it, and recent

changes go against this production “mindset” that

1 The interviews were conducte~ and summaries of comments prepared, by Monica Schoh-Spana, a contractor to the Ofilce of Technology

Assessment. The interviews were conducted during the winter of 1992-93.

189
190 Dismantling the Bomb and Managing the Nuclear Materials

developed over time. The new focus on adherence to

standards in production, increased attention to waste

streams, an upgraded security system, and scrutiny of

operations by oversight groups are at odds with

production employees’ prior work histories. How

extraordinary these changes appear varies among

different generations of workers, according to workers

from this facility. The average age of the work force at

one facility is more than 40 years. Younger workers are

learning more from the start about the environment and

the appropriate way of disposing of things. In contrast,

older workers recall a past when they had permission

to “throw things outside” with little regard for the

environment.

The new culture that emphasizes adherence to

standards clashes with the routines and knowledge of

technicians cultivated and valued under the old culture

of production. In the past, explains a worker, the

message was “get the product out, regardless of

standards. Supervisors and managers condoned going

against standards if it meant that the product was

moving. This is no longer the case, proposes another

contact. DOE, managers, and workers are clear on the

importance of adherence to standards on the line. If a

technician has a problem with a standard, he will not

circumvent or ignore it. He will shut down the job and

confer with an engineer or other appropriate personnel

about the problem. The transition on the line, however,

has been a difficult one for some workers. In following

standards strictly, workers cannot use the skills and

shortcuts they developed to get a job done when

supervisors and managers pushed production at all

costs. Explains one worker, people have been working

here for more than 20 years, and now they are asked to

change the way they do their jobs overnight.

The drastic change inexperience, however, has been

difficult not only for floor-level employees but also for

line managers. At one facility, notes one interviewee,

line supervisors have retired because they were not

able to cope with the significant transformations in

operations. Older workers and supervisors at this

facility have often questioned the recent modifications

with statements such as “I’ve been doing this job for

40 years, why do I need to change?”

Workers’ remarks on the personal experience of this

culture change bring into relief DOE’s historical

emphasis on production. How work was defined,

valued, and experienced before DOE’s reorganization

still, in large part, sets the terms for work today. One

contact explains that a shift away from production has

given people an opportunity “to catch up” with

environmental, safety, and health concerns. He jokes

that with less work to do, everyone at the facility can

put more of an emphasis on such matters. Work, his

remark suggests, is really about production, and safety,

health, or environmental concerns are in effect an

overlay to work. These matters are considered a sort of

luxury activity-something standing outside of real

work. When the orientation toward the environment,

safety, and health was first initiated, new regulations

and standards came pouring in. The newness, inconsistency, and frequent changes in standards and procedures have made work difficult, explain two contacts

at a facility. Rules and regulations “slow down the

work process, ’ according to one contact, and therefore

workers think it is a waste of time to try to meet

standards. Another contact also recounts that some

new procedures tend ‘to slow down the work," which

makes some people feel “less productive. ” This

individual has conveyed to his coworkers the importance of doing the job correctly, according to standards. If the procedures lengthen the timeframe of a job,

then they just need to accept it, he suggests. Once a job

has been “proceduralized,” he says, it isn’t the same

job any more.

Experiences with new procedures related to radiation control and security convey more concretely the

clash of the two different work processes. A worker

from one facility relates that it is taking longer to get

in and out of a work area because of the new

requirements in personal monitoring for contamination. The monitoring turns into a hassle if someone

goes in and out of an area several times a day. Workers

become frustrated, he proposes, because they feel that

they are “spending more time exiting an area than

being on the job.” A worker at another facility

recounts the aggravation that has accompanied the

installation of a more rigorous security system. He

argues that the new equipment is poor, and it may take

some people up to five tries before they are cleared to

enter a work area. This can be extremely irritating, and

people may lose their tempers. As one contact proposes, ‘All in all, people want to get their work done.’

The physical layout of work space at some facilities

and the newly mandated radiation control practices

may translate into a real inconvenience and source of
Appendix E: Labor and the Mission Change Within DOE 191

stress for workers, as may a new security system. That

aspect of some of the recent changes cannot be

ignored. It is helpful, nonetheless, to listen to the way

in which workers talk about their experiences with the

new procedures. They provide a commentary about the

new rhythm of work demanded by these procedures.

Furthermore, they reflect a frustration about how such

procedures can get in the way of getting a job done, a

job that was previously measured strictly in terms of

productivity. If the procedures and the standards are

indeed a means to acquire a safer workplace and a

healthier environment overall, then hopefully the work

force will in time develop new routines and habits. A

work culture impelled by considerations of the environment, safety, and health will become second nature,

much in the same way that a production-driven one

did.

WORKER SAFETY VERSUS WORKER HEALTH

As scrutiny of the Nuclear Weapons Complex has

increased and evidence of earlier disregard for the

environment, safety, and health has come to light,

definitions of how safe is safe and who gets to decide

are still evolving. Historically, DOE and its contractors

operated outside the realm of regulatory agencies such

as the Occupational Safety and Health Administration

(OSHA) and the Environmental Protection Agency

(EPA), which set limitations on private industry.

Workers have, however, begun to feel the effects of

new health and safety standards. One of former

Secretary Watkins’s 1989 initiatives, for instance, was

to redirect DOE from adoption of OSHA standards (a

stated policy) to compliance with OSHA standards (an

implemented policy)(7). This new emphasis has had an

unsettling effect on the work force. Individuals from

‘‘outside’ the facility, persons without firsthand

knowledge of facility practices, are questioning the

plant’s safety. Having their work and safety records

investigated by new agents is an uncomfortable

experience for the workers. At the same time, workers

are asking themselves what the new push is about. If

DOE and its contractors are concerned now, why

weren’t they concerned before?

In addressing the new focus on safety,’ workers at

two facilities cite their facility’s safety record, both

figurative and literal, as defense of a long-standing

commitment to safety, not just a recent one. The point

here is not to dispute what may be admirable safety

records, but to note that the records are used to gauge

whether or not a priority on safety exists. In fact, a

review of the Nuclear Weapons Complex by the

National Research Council characterized its occupational safety record as “excellent” relative to the

private sector’s track record in lost workday incidence

(2). On the other hand, OSHA, in its review of DOE’s

occupational safety and health program, identified

instances in which contractors kept injury and illness

rates artificially low (5). Some workers interviewed

also propose that written accounts are not true representations of the incidence of injury and illness at DOE

facilities.

Whether or not incident records are valid appraisals

of health and safety at DOE facilities, the ‘good safety

record” is invoked by the agency and even by some

workers as the sign that safety has been a priority. The

accident or catastrophe-the “life or limb” problem,

as an interviewee describes it—may be the primary

measure of disregard for the health and safety of

workers, but perhaps at the price of obscuring more

long-term threats to their health. Workers draw upon

safety records in defense of their accomplishments and

long-term concern for such matters, because this

information is definitive and available. With regard to

environmental, safety, and health protection within the

Weapons Complex, one means of judging safety and

health-with a short-term orientation-has been fostered at the expense of another, which reflects a

long-term view. Review of DOE-sponsored or contracted epidemiological research concluded that the

agency’s pronouncement that the health of workers has

been fully protected and that “there are no excess risks

of disease and death in the nuclear weapons work

force” could not be substantiated (3).

The ideal new culture will hopefully develop among

workers an awareness of and precautions against both

immediate and distant health threats. An important

caveat here is that workers have not been unconscious

of the threat that their work poses to their overall

health. They have pushed for adequate health monitoring and appropriate analysis of worker epidemiological data. Their efforts have, however, been impeded by

the stance of DOE.

FROM SECRECY TO OVERSIGHT

The workplace at one dismantlement facility has

been transformed through the culture change from an
192 Dismantling the Bomb and Managing the Nuclear Materials

insulated environment to one now subject to the

intense scrutiny of oversight groups. This aspect of

operations since the Watkins mandate has been one of

the most burdensome for some workers. One production technician describes the waves of oversight in

terms of an affront to the competence, dedication, and

safety consciousness of the work force, which has a

lengthy history at the facility. He underscores that

members of the work force know how to do their jobs.

They established this unique plant, and they consider

themselves “the best of the best.” Since the Watkins

mandate, “outsiders” have come in and told the work

force to do what it has always done at the facility—

work safely. Another worker shares this concern with

the increasing oversight of groups such as State

agencies, and the implication that the work force has

somehow disregarded environmental concerns.

Workers’ experience with oversight goes beyond

the feeling that outsiders are judging their work and

questioning workers’ abilities to achieve safe operations. Their frustration also includes the disruptive

influence that oversight activities have on actual line

operations. Work has been transformed from a relatively isolated experience with technicians working in

the bay area on the buddy system into a spectacle with

a total of 10 to 15 people in the bay at one time. This

crowding, plus the distractions that the oversight

people create, can affect their work, proposes a line

technician. He worries about the potentially hazardous

consequences of oversight, a process implemented to

protect environmental, safety, and health concerns.

Oversight is becoming a permanent feature of operations at many DOE facilities, and many different

parties have a stake in defining what is meant by safe.

While workers adjust to a different work environment—

one open to scrutiny-they must also have confidence

that this observation of their activities is indeed a

measure that promotes safety.

 The Environment, Safety, and Health–

A New Culture?

The frustration that has accompanied the new

requirements of the workplace within the Nuclear

Weapons Complex is not, however, simply a matter of

adjusting from one set of work expectations and habits

to another. The consternation of the work force goes

beyond adjustment to the different pace of work that

radiation controls create or to the presence of other

people who have a stake in defining “safe’ operations.

One should not explain away the skepticism or

misgivings toward particular aspects of the culture

change by relying on a psychological frame of

reference (i.e., pointing out the discomfort that naturally attends a change in routine). Nor can one simply

hope that time is the only ingredient missing for the

culture change to take root.

WHEN AND FOR WHOM?

Some workers, for instance, question the sincerity of

the recent emphasis on environmental, safety, and

health matters because the push for production still

exists, particularly at lower levels of authority. While

top managers are committed to the new culture,

lower-level managers (from mid-management down to

line management) have production schedules that they

must meet, explains a line technician. They have to

answer to top managers about production, and some of

the production schedules make it almost impossible to

protect worker health and safety. While the culture

change has made some headway, workers still receive

mixed messages from management: health and safety,

yes, but don’t forget production. These messages also

vary across departments, the line technician notes.

Some foremen shut down if there is a problem,

whereas others push people to produce regardless.

There has been a shift, however, from past emphases,

In the past, every level of the organization was oriented

to production—from top management to midmanagement to the worker. Now, some tradeoffs are

being made between production and worker health and

safety.

The continued push for production at the expense of

health and safety in some quarters may invalidate the

environmental, safety, and health agenda recently put

forth by DOE and undermine the new sense of work

developing on the floor. If workers feel that management is still emphasizing production, and if they

understand this as the bottom line in keeping a job, new

regulations and procedures that inhibit getting a job

done may be experienced as an undue burden. This

situation will continue in the face of irreconcilable

DOE orders—some that stress production and others

that stress health and safety matters. If workers are

inclined to want to get on with their work it may not

be out of a fondness for or familiarity with some notion

of past work. The Advisory Committee on Nuclear
Appendix E: Labor and the Mission Change Within DOE 1193

Facility Safety has suggested that “production” is the

default practice when workers are presented with

conflicting and unclear directions (l).

WHOSE CULTURE CHANGE IS THIS?

While the perpetuation of production priorities at

some managerial levels may inhibit assimilation of the

new focus by the work force, a further hindrance to

worker engagement in the new culture is the manner of

its implementation. The punitive aspects of recent

changes, as well as the limited inclusion of labor in

discussions and decisions regarding this new focus,

demonstrate the same hierarchical relations as in the

Nuclear Weapons Complex that disregarded concerns

for the environment, safety, and health. As one contact

describes it, there are two ways you can make health

and safety a priority. You can come in and dictate a

new program or you can include input from the field.

Employees, he argues, have valuable insight into

making health and safety happen. People in the field

possess skills and knowledge that can make health and

safety into a policy that works on the ground.

The experience of environmental, safety, and health

concerns as another managerial edict derives in part

from the penalties that have accompanied recent

changes in the workplace. A worker proposes that the

“scare tactics” accompanying the new principle of

strict adherence to standards have made the transition

difficult. He recounts the following incident as an

example. Members of an oversight group asked

questions and created disturbances while technicians

were working on a unit. During this high-pressure

scrutiny, the workers missed some minor steps and

were out of compliance with standards. In reaction to

this violation, the plant manager threatened to fire all

four workers, contrary to existing contract language.

A contact at another facility also relates how DOE

“has beaten people over the head’ with safety, which

may affect the success of the new culture. In November

1992, a fatality occurred at a Weapons Complex site.

In response, DOE implemented a blanket policy

increasing the suspension period normally following

an incident, from 1 to 2 days without pay. This measure

was inappropriate, argues this worker, because of the

current reprimand policy under which the contractor

was already working as indicated by the safety record.

From February to November of that same year, the rate

of incidents had steadily decreased. Whereas no one

disputes the value of appropriate penalties and rewards

for inculcating the new value placed on the environment, safety, and health, the punitive nature of work

reorganization may undermine workers’ investment in

the agency’s new priorities.

The issue of penalty also raises questions of

culpability and workers’ concerns that liability for

these matters rests squarely on their shoulders. A

worker evaluating the recent imposition of rules and

standards notes that technicians are taken aback by

their sheer volume. People have to sign off on a

procedure stating that they understand it, he explains.

He worries if the fact that he signed off on procedures

will come back to haunt him, that is, whether that

documentation will serve as proof for his need of a

reprimand should an incident occur. The assimilation

of new practices and priorities should entail a sense of

accountability. However, if the process for developing

accountability entails pushing liability to the lowest

levels of the work force, there is a problem: not only

in labor’s hesitancy to accept new environmental,

safety, and health priorities for fear that it will become

the “fall guy” for problems whose source it cannot

control, but also in the possibility that contractors will

use a system of individualized worker accountability

(through documentation, for instance) as indemnity

against their own accountability in an incident.

Workers constitute one of the purported beneficiaries of the new emphasis on safety and health; yet they

have been given a relatively small role in implementing and evaluating the changes under way. DOE,

which historically has had virtually no presence

on-site, has begun to exert a strong influence on

day-to-day operations of the Weapons Complex facilities with its new agenda. Although the work force has

been told to change the pace and content of jobs, there

is no formal process by which workers can respond to

the changes asked of them. The top-down fashion in

which DOE has instituted these new priorities raises a

question in the mind of some workers of whether the

agency is more interested in demonstrating to its critics

and detractors that it is doing something (i.e., “covering their tails” to quote one worker) than in fostering

true protections for the environment, safety, and

health. If it is committed to a real culture change, then

DOE should develop a system for conferring directly

with labor to learn through its experience. The

Advisory Committee on Nuclear Facility Safety has
194 I Dismantling the Bomb and Managing the Nuclear Materials

already pointed out the importance of developing

channels for effective communication from the floor

level up, in order to strengthen a “safety culture” (l).

Frustrating labor’s incorporation of the new work

practices that comprise the culture change has been a

lack of dialogue with DOE and management regarding

the reconfiguration of work, in particular, and the

redirection of the facilities and the Weapons Complex,

in general. To resolve the tension between the new

emphasis on adherence to standards and the skills of

the work force, one worker suggests a process for

evaluation of standards that involves the technician.

Although some standards are appropriate, he proposes,

others may not be. The process for evaluating new

standards should include technicians, and not involve

merely supervisors and engineers who hand technicians the final word on a standard. Another worker

notes that the union will be participating in a future

procedure validation teaman improvement in incorporating the work force into the culture change. A

contact at a different facility also relates that the

struggle for worker input is constant and cites the

exclusion of labor in the development of DOE’s

hoisting and rigging manual as a recent example.

Although some facilities are still moving in the

direction of improving floor-level contributions to

work reorganization, workers at another facility have

had the opportunity to participate in procedure development, but with limited success. Per a DOE order,

hourly workers were included on development committees for the lock-out/tag-out procedure and the

radiation control procedure. In both cases, hourly

workers made suggestions drawing on their field

experience to improve the success of procedures once

put into place. Their suggestions, however, were

ignored. Explaining the order’s lack of success on the

ground, the worker argues that management basically

has a military orientation and that “a private does not

talk to a general. ” The worker argues that this type of

DOE order is new at the facility, and it will take time

for management to shift from a mode of independent

decisionmaking to one that includes the contributions

of hourly workers.

In appraising the culture change at the site level,

worker contacts identify the new forums for collaboration among labor, contractors, and DOE on issues of

the environment, safety, and health as commendable

developments. The success of these new structures for

incorporating the floor-level perspective suggests the

importance of expanded efforts to engage labor in the

redirection of the Nuclear Weapons Complex. The

tripartite councils, composed of representatives from

management, the union, and DOE, have been an

effective process for fostering communication among

all parties, as well as a mechanism for acting on safety

and health suggestions and concerns. Contacts at one

facility describe the tripartite council as a format for

approaching large-scale problems, rather than minor,

day-to-day worker concerns that can be addressed

through other avenues. That council is particularly

effective because of the high levels of management and

DOE staff that participate. The tripartite council also

provides an opportunity for labor to move beyond

discussions with the contractor and speak directly with

DOE in order to address large-scale problems.

The experience of union-appointed health and safety

representatives in addressing worker concerns is also

suggestive of the benefits of incorporating labor into

authority structures. Atone facility, for instance, union

representatives differ from the professional safety staff

in terms of their commitment to investigating worker

concerns. These representatives tend to have a better

rapport with their coworkers and to be more accessible

in the field. Because of their own craft history, union

representatives have a personal interest in correcting

problems encountered by workers. In addition, workers are more likely to raise concerns with union health

and safety representatives than with professional

safety staff, because they do not identify with the latter

and are aware of both historical and current instances

of retribution. This affinity between union-appointed

representatives and the work force also exists at

another facility.

Through their contributions to standards and procedures development committees, as well as health and

safety complaint resolution, workers are beginning to

have some authority in how the culture change occurs

at the floor level. Lacking in the current environment

of change, however, is effective communication between labor and DOE. At one facility, for instance,

some improvements in terms of floor-level contributions to the development of procedures are beginning

to take place. Nonetheless, labor would like to be

included in higher-level decisionmaking processes in

order to deal with some of the frustrating aspects of

recent changes: continuous oversight by many groups,
Appendix E: Labor and the Mission Change Within DOE 195

constant changes in regulations, and rules that make no

sense to people on the ground. There are conflicting

DOE orders and a variety of new regulations emanating from different oversight groups. Without a uniform

way of doing business, explains a labor leader, it is

hard to communicate to workers what is expected of

them. Workers do not have the opportunity to discuss

their experiences with recent DOE orders and to

contribute suggestions that can improve the transition.

The tripartite councils are a good beginning to

partnership between labor and DOE, but the collaboration should not stop there. Labor leaders at all facilities

included in this investigation argue for more joint

meetings between DOE and worker representatives.

TOO LATE IN COMING FOR SOME

Asking labor leaders to comment on the course of

the “culture change “ initiated by former Secretary

Watkins in 1989 is a request for them to tease out only

one aspect of the dramatic changes currently taking

place at DOE facilities. Their experience of that culture

change is in the context of a very uncertain future for

the Nuclear Weapons Complex as a whole. Impending

layoffs are likely to affect 20 percent of the work force

(4). Dramatic reductions in production requirements

are currently taking place, and the landscape of cleanup

work is not yet clear. If discussions with labor

regarding protections for health and safety shift easily

into conversations regarding job security, it is the

reflection of a common concern—the exclusion of

workers from decisionmaking processes that affect

their well-being, both on the shop floor and in general.

To remark on the health and safety aspects of jobs

that may disappear is an ill-timed effort, in the eyes of

some. In the view of others, however, to understand the

contemporary gains or losses in the areas of health and

safety, one must recognize what the specter of

downsizing can do to a work force. The threat of lost

jobs can create an environment antagonistic to a

redress of environmental, safety, and health problems.

As a worker at one facility explains, during hard

economic times such as these when jobs are difficult

to find, workers are less likely to raise any complaints

about the job. A person fearful of losing his job is not

apt to cause trouble-whether in management-labor

relations or health and safety issues. This posture is not

limited to those with the least power at DOE facilities.

A worker at another facility relates that when the plant

stopped production in 1985 and there were significant

layoffs, everyone-both managers and employeeswent into a “survival mode.” No one questioned

anything.

The engagement of labor in DOE’s new culture is

particularly important in light of the fear of job loss.

Workers must have a sense of investment in the overall

changes that are taking place-the necessary reduction

of some types of jobs and the overall improvement in

the safety and health aspects of those that remain.

Labor has already made clear the shared destinies of

the workers who held positions under the productiondriven regime and those who will hold positions in the

new regime. The environment, safety, and health

should be a priority within the Weapons Complex, but

DOE must also address the adversity that displaced

workers will face. Different legislative proposals have

been aimed at issues of concern for displaced weapons

workers, such as health insurance, medical assistance,

and retraining for cleanup work (6).

 Empowering the Work Force

Some of the experiences of weapons workers with

DOE’s new orientation point out lessons for further

attempts at creating a truly collaborative culture

change. Existing cases of collaboration between management and labor at DOE facilities include the

tripartite council, standards and procedures development committees that incorporate administrative and

field perspectives, and union-appointed health and

safety representatives. These trends should be fostered.

The incorporation of labor, however, should not be

limited to microcollaboration-a focus simply on the

workplace and under the limited care of the contractor.

DOE must meet directly, formally, and regularly with

workers and their representatives. Furthermore, communication with labor should not be delegated to the

lowest levels of authority within the agency.

Other employee empowerment schemes are making

their way into various DOE site operations through the

efforts of different contractors. One cannot, however,

implement an employee involvement program without

first conferring with existing worker representatives.

The imposition, rather than negotiation, of “employee

involvement schemes’ will only perpetuate the disempowered position of labor. Management at one facility,

for instance, implemented worker involvement

schemes to facilitate and address problems associated
196 Dismantling the Bomb and Managing the Nuclear Materials

with mission change. Two of these attempts, “work

teams” (performance management teams) and “skills

enhancement’ (e.g., literacy training), have been

unsuccessful, however, in part because management

neglected to involve existing worker representatives in

the program’s development and implementation.

Another facility with a history of good rapport

between management and the union has developed a

creative solution to the problem of maintenance

backlog. Management approached the union and asked

if it would be interested in putting together a “SWAT

team”—a group of maintenance workers dedicated

solely to addressing safety problems normally held up

in an overburdened system. The union agreed to the

SWAT team, which was, in some respects, a compromise by the union with a long-held tenet of labor—that

one does not cross craft lines.

APPENDIX E REFERENCES

1.

2.

Advisory Committee on Nuclear Facility Safety to

the U.S. Department of Energy, Final Report on

DOE Nuclear Facilities: A Report to the Secretary

of Energy (Washington, DC: U.S. Department of

Energy, November 1991), p. 9.

Committee to Provide Interim Oversight of the

DOE Nuclear Weapons Complex, National Research Council, The Nuclear Weapons Complex:

Management for Health, Safety, and the Environ3.

4.

5.

6.

7.

ment (Washington, DC: National Academy Press,

1989), p. 5.

Geiger, H. Jack, et al., Dead Reckoning: A Critical

Review of the Department of Energy’s Epidemiological Research (Washington, DC: Physicians for

Social Responsibility, 1992), p. 13.

Miller, Richard, Atomic Energy Workers Council

Meeting, Washington, DC, Mar. 19, 1993.

Occupational Safety and Health Administration,

Evaluation of the U.S. Department of Energy’s

Occupational Safety and Health Program for Its

Government-Owned Contractor-Operated Facilities (Washington, DC: Occupational Safety and

Health Administration, December 1990), pp. ii,

4748.

Pellet, Gerald, “Seeking Human Justice,” in Facing Reality: The Future of the U.S. Nuclear

Weapons Complex, Peter Gray (cd.) (Seattle, WA:

Nuclear Safety Campaign, May 1992), pp. 31-32.

Watkins, James, Secretary, U.S. Department of

Energy, “Ten-Point Initiative-Remarks by James

D. Watkins, June 27, 1989,” reprinted in Evaluation of the U.S. Department of Energy’s OccupationalSafety andHealth Program forIts GovernmentOwned Contractor-Operated Facilities (Washington DC: Occupational Safety and Health Administration, December 1990), pp. B-1 to 13.
Appendix F:

ABC

ACDA

AEA

ALARA

ALMR

ATSD(AE)

CPAF

DNA

DNFSB

DOD

DOE

DP

EA

EH

EIS

EM

EMTD

EPA

ERF

FAS

FOIA

fSU

GESMO

HE

HEU

HTGR

IAEA

accelerator-based converter

Arms Control and Disarmament

Agency

Atomic Energy Act

as low as reasonably achievable

advanced liquid metal reactor

Assistant to the Secretary of Defense

for Atomic Energy

Cost-Plus Award Fee

Defense Nuclear Agency

Defense Nuclear Facilities Safety Board

U.S. Department of Defense

U.S. Department of Energy

DOE Office of Defense Programs

Environmental Assessment

DOE Office of Environment, Safety,

and Health

Environmental Impact Statement

DOE Office of Environmental

Restoration and Waste Management

DOE Executive Management Team for

Dismantlement

U.S. Environmental Protection Agency

Energy Research Foundation

Federation of American Scientists

Freedom of Information Act

former Soviet Union

Generic Environmental Impact

Statement on Mixed Oxide

high explosive

highly enriched uranium

high-temperature gas reactor

International Atomic Energy Agency

ICBM

INEL

INF

JAC

KUMSC

LANL

LET

LEU

LLNL

LWR

M&H

M&O

MHTGR

MINATOM

MIRV

MOX

MPN

NE

NEPA

NESSG

NFS

NRC

Acronyms

and

Glossary

intercontinental ballistic missile

integral fast reactor

insensitive high explosive

Idaho National Engineering Laboratory

Intermediate Range Nuclear Forces

Treaty

Joint Advisory Committee on Nuclear

Weapons Surety

Kirtland Underground Munitions

Storage Complex

Los Alamos National Laboratory

linear energy transfer

low-enriched uranium

Lawrence Livermore National

Laboratory

light-water reactor

Mason and Hanger-Silas Mason Co.,

Inc.

management and operations

modular HTGR

Russian Ministry of Atomic Energy

multiple independently targetable

reentry vehicle

Martin Marietta Energy Systems

mixed oxide

Military Production Network

DOE Office of Nuclear Energy

National Environmental Policy Act

Nuclear Explosive Safety Study Group

Nuclear Fuel Services

Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of

Nuclear Weapons

U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission

197
198 Dismantling the Bomb and Managing the Nuclear Materials

NRDC

NS

NWSP

OMB

ORE

OREPA

ORR

OSHA

OTA

PANAL

PEIS

PEL

PPE

QED

RADCON

RCRA

Natural Resources Defense Council

DOE Office of Nuclear Safety

Nuclear Weapons Stockpile Plan

Office of Management and Budget

Operational Readiness Evaluation

Oak Ridge Environmental Peace

Alliance

Operational Readiness Review

Occupational Safety and Health

Administration

Office of Technology Assessment

Panhandle Area Neighbors and

Landowners

Programmatic Environmental Impact

Statement

Permissible Exposure Limit

personal protective equipment

Qualification Evaluation for

Dismantlement Release

Radiological Control Manual (DOE)

Resource Conservation and Recovery

Act

Actinides. Radioactive elements with atomic number

larger than 88.

Alpha particle. Two neutrons and two protons bound

as a single particle emitted from the nucleus of

certain radioactive isotopes in the process of decay

or disintegration.

Beta particle. A charged particle emitted from the

nucleus of certain unstable atomic nuclei (radioactive elements), having the charge and mass of an

electron.

Born classified. Term applied to Restricted Data, a

category of information deemed “classified from

its inception” under the Atomic Energy Act.

Complex 21. Designation for the Nuclear Weapons

Complex when current plans for reorganization are

realized, expected to occur around the turn of the

century.

Criticality Pertaining to a critical mass (the least

amount) of fissionable material that can achieve

self-sustaining nuclear chain reactions.

Curie. A unit of radioactivity equal to that emitted by

1 gram of pure radium.

Demilitarization. The process of eliminating or reducing military weapons, materials, other hardware and

organizational structures.

SA

SAC

SAR

SLBM

SSD

SST

STAND

STAR

START

STATS

SWU

TSA

UCNI

USEC

Rocky Flats Plant

DOE Office of Security Affairs

steel arch construction

Safety Analysis Report

submarine launched ballistic missile

Safe and Secure Dismantlement

Interagency Steering Group

Safe Secure Transport

Serious Texans Against Nuclear

Dumping

State of Texas Alliance for Resources

Strategic Arms Reduction Treaty

National Academy of Sciences Panel

on Separations Technology and

Transmutation Systems

separative work unit

Technical Safety Appraisal

Unclassified Controlled Nuclear

Information

U.S. Enrichment Corporation

Deuterium. An isotope of hydrogen used in the fusion

reaction of a nuclear weapon.

Disassembly. The process of taking apart a nuclear

warhead and removing the subassemblies, components, and individual parts.

Dismantlement. The process of taking apart a nuclear

warhead and removing the subassemplies, components, and individual parts.

Disposition. Determination of the long-term status of

materials.

Formerly Restricted Data. Classified information,

defined in the Atomic Energy Act, that is shared by

DOE and DOD and is related to the military

utilization of nuclear weapons or energy. Decisions

to declassify such data must be agreed upon by both

agencies.

Gamma radiation. Short-wavelength electromagnetic radiation of nuclear origin, similar to. but with

higher energy than. x rays.

Gravel Gertie. Term used for explosion-resistant

assembly/disassembly bays at the Pantex Plant

where nuclear weapons are disassembled.

Half-life. Time required for one-half of the nuclei of a

radioactive mass to decay.
Appendix F: Acronyms and Glossary 199

High-level waste. Highly radioactive waste material

from the reprocessing of spent nuclear fuel (including liquid waste produced directly in reprocessing

and any solid waste derived from the liquid) that

contains a combination of transuranic waste and

fission products in concentrations requiring permanent isolation.

Highly enriched uranium. Uranium enriched in the

isotopic content of uranium-235 to greater than 20

percent.

Ionizing radiation. Radiation that separates electrons

from an atom or molecule.

Low-enriched uranium. Uranium enriched in the

isotopic content of uranium-235, but to less than 20

percent of the total mass.

Low-level waste. Radioactive waste not classified as

high-level waste, transuranic waste, spent nuclear

fuel, or byproduct material.

National Security Information. Classified information that is not specifically governed by the Atomic

Energy Act but by Executive order. The term is used

in relation to DOE nuclear defense programs.

Plutonium. Man-made element produced when uranium is irradiated in a reactor. Plutonium-239 is the

most suitable isotope for constructing nuclear

weapons.

Plutonium pit. The core element of a nuclear weapon’s

“primary” or fission component. Pits are made of

plutonium-239 and surrounded by some type of

casing.

Rad. Radiation absorbed dose, a basic unit of absorbed

dose of ionizing radiation representing an amount

of energy absorbed per unit of absorbing material

such as body tissue.

Radionuclide. Certain natural and man-made atomic

species with unstable nuclei that can undergo

spontaneous breakup or decay and, in the process,

emit alpha, beta, or gamma radiation.

Rem (rad equivalent, man). Unit of dose equivalent.

The dose equivalent in “rem” is numerically equal

to the absorbed dose in “rad” multiplied by

necessary modifying factors.

Restricted Data. Classified information defined by

the Atomic Energy Act. Restricted Data are born

classified, regardless of source.

Secondary. Component of a nuclear weapon that

contains elements needed to initiate the fusion

reaction in a thermonuclear explosion.

Special nuclear materials. As defined in the Atomic

Energy Act, “ ‘special nuclear materials’ means (1)

plutonium, uranium enriched in the isotope 233 or

in the isotope 235, and any other material which the

Commission . . . determines to be special nuclear

material, but does not include source material. . .“.

Tiger Team. Inspection teams that surveyed DOE

Weapons Complex sites pursuant to a June 27,

1989, initiative. Tiger Team inspections gather

information for the Secretary of Energy to assess

environmental, safety, and health problems at the

sites.

Transmutation. A process of converting one element

to another by irradiating or bombarding it with

radioactive particles.

Transparency. Exchange of information, access to

facilities, and cooperative arrangements undertaken

to provide ready observation and verification of

defense or other activities.

Transuranic. Any element whose atomic number is

higher than that of uranium. All transuranic elements are produced artificially and are radioactive.

Tritium. A radioactive gas, an isotope of hydrogen,

that serves as a booster for the fusion reaction in the

secondary component of a nuclear weapon.

Unclassified Controlled Nuclear Information. Information that is not classified but is judged to be

sensitive with respect to DOE defense programs. Its

dissemination is therefore controlled and limited.

UCNI is a response to a requirement of the Atomic

Energy Act.

Vitrification. Process of immobilizing radioactive

material by encapsulating it into a glasslike solid.

Warhead. Explosive part of a nuclear weapons

system. Warheads consist of nuclear materials,

conventional high explosives, and related firing

mechanisms.

Weapons retirement. The process by which nuclear

weapons are determined to be obsolete or unnecessary for national defense. A retired weapon or

weapon system is no longer in an active status or

deliverable, but may still be a fully functioning

nuclear device.
Steven Aftergood

Federation of American Scientists

Washington, DC

William Bibb

Formerly of the Oak Ridge Operations Office

U.S. Department of Energy

Oak Ridge, TN

Oleg Bukharin

Princeton University

Princeton, NJ

Matthew Bunn

National Academy of Sciences/National Research

council

Washington, DC

Thomas Clements

Greenpeace

Washington, DC

Thomas B. Cochran

Natural Resources Defense Council

Washington, DC

Kevin Cook

Office of the Assistant Secretary of the Army

Washington, DC

Brian Costner

Energy Research Foundation

Columbia, SC

Allen G. Croff

Oak Ridge National Laboratory

Oak Ridge, TN

Appendix G:

Reviewers

Paul T. Cunningham

Los Alamos National Laboratory

Los Alamos, NM

Zachary Davis

Congressional Research Service

Washington, DC

Boyd Deaver

Texas Water Commission

Amarillo, TX

Keith H. Dinger

Radiation Health Consultant

Somersworth, NH

Warren H. Donnelly

Congressional Research Service

Washington, DC

James W. Dowis

Office of the Assistant to the Secretary of Defense

(Atomic Energy)

Washington, DC

Joel E. Gingold

S.M. Stoner Corp.

Pleasantville, NY

Thomas J. Goodwin

Defense Programs

U.S. Department of Energy

Washington, DC

John M. Googin

Martin Marietta Energy Systems

Oak Ridge, TN

201
202 Dismantling the Bomb and Managing the Nuclear Materials

Peter Gray

Institute for Science and International Security

Washington, DC

Charles G. Halsted

U.S. Department of Energy

Germantown, MD

Thomas Johnston

Combustion Engineering and General Atomics

Washington, DC

Steven Krahn

Defense Nuclear Facilities Safety Board

Washington, DC

Steve Lipmann

Environmental Research and Analysis

Irvington, NY

Gregory Lyle

Defense Nuclear Agency

Washington, DC

Arjun Makhijani

Institute for Energy and Environmental Research

Takoma Park, MD

Joseph Martillotti

Texas Department of Health

Bureau of Radiation Control

Austin, TX

Jon Medalia

Congressional Research Service

Washington, DC

Marvin Miller

Massachusetts Institute of Technology

Cambridge, MA

Bill Mitchell

Nuclear Safety Campaign

Seattle, WA

Robert Morgan

Washington University

St. Louis, MO

Joseph Pappe

U.S. Air Force

Albuquerque, NM

Arvin S. Quist

Oak Ridge National Laboratory

Oak Ridge, TN

Paul Shutt

Nuclear Fuel Services

Erwin, TN

Lynn Stem bridge

Hanford Education Action League

Spokane, WA

William G. Sutcliffe

Lawrence Livermore National Laboratory

Livermore, CA

John J. Taylor

Electric Power Research Institute

Palo Alto, CA

Pierre Toureille

General Accounting Office

Washington, DC

Troy Wade II

Wade Associates (formerly the Assistant Secretary

of Energy, Defense Programs)

Washington, DC

Loring Mills

Formerly of Edison Electric Institute

Washington, DC

* U S GoVERNMENT PR2NT3NG OFF2CE 1993 - 343-283 - 814/96955